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Gilligan Unbound: Pop Culture in the Age of Globalization,
by Paul A. Cantor. Rowman & Littlefield, 2001, 297
pages.
Globalization, Little
Buddy! by Stephen Cox
Did any book ever have a better title? And the motive
behind the book is almost as good to do some justice, for a change, to the
study of American popular culture.
| | Stephen
Cox is a professor of literature at the University of California San Diego
and the author of "The Titanic Story." |
|
For too long, popcult has been the restricted grazing land of the politically
correct. The largest herd on the range bears the "cultural studies" brand. These
are people almost always academic people who hold to quaint Marxist
notions and spend their time hunting for ways in which culture embodies and
ramifies the allegedly oppressive structure of capitalist institutions. And their
categories of "oppression" are as fixed as their methodology. What counts for
them is racial oppression, class oppression, and gender oppression. The
oppression of boredom never occurs to them. As for "globalization," the
key term in our author's subtitle, the cultural studies folk know all about that,
of course. At least they know how evil it is, since it is a product of the
capitalist system. The logic is straightforward, though the intellectual result,
from a historical point of view, is a bit peculiar. Since the time of Marx
himself, the left has expended enormous energy excoriating nationalism and
particularism of every kind, demanding world peace and improved communications
among peoples, and just generally raising cain about the desperate need to
globalize the globe. The left now finds most of its fondest dreams fully
realized. Barriers to trade have fallen on every hand; enmities among nations are
at an all-time low; the peoples of the world are united as never before by
instantaneous means of communication that exceed the ability of any government
(or predatory capitalist corporation) to control them. But because this
globalization happened largely as a result of capitalist processes of
profit-seeking, the reaction of the left has not been to rejoice but to wring its
hands and mourn. Also, on occasion, to scream and shout and hurl rocks and
bottles. |
| All over this favored
land, there are college courses about the "McDonaldization" of the world, but I
can't imagine that any of these classes are anywhere near as enjoyable and
stimulating as an order of burgers 'n' fries. |
|
So globalization, which was always heralded as a solution to every problem, is
now regarded as a problem in itself, or even as a kind of cultural disease. Once
globalization is defined as a disease, of course, any cultural tissue that bears
it will be subjected to the type of treatment appropriate to disease: It will be
dissected, not enjoyed. All over this favored land, there are college courses
being taught about the "McDonaldization" of the world, but I can't imagine that
any of these classes are anywhere near as enjoyable and stimulating as an order
of burgers 'n' fries. The same might be said about all the academic prosecutors
who refuse to let Elvis, Snow White, and "I Love Lucy" (which are, no doubt about
it, global phenomena) escape from accusations of racism, sexism, and hegemonism
by pleading guilty to the lesser charge of simple-minded entertainment.
The New Puritans The humorlessness of the cult studies elite the
"New Puritanism," in our author's phrase (p. 214) has done much to
discredit all analysis of popular culture, not to mention all use of the term
"globalization." What Cantor proposes to do, however, is to demonstrate that both
the term and the pursuit can have value, that they can actually help us to
identify interesting features of the kind of world we live in. Cantor, a
distinguished professor of literature at the University of Virginia, knows that
popular culture is basically entertainment, and should be analyzed as such. He
also knows that some types of entertainment will bear more analysis than others,
because they are more carefully organized, more mentally challenging, more
capable of projecting complex intentions. Yes, popular culture is often a
collaborative enterprise, but there are individual intentions involved,
nevertheless; it wasn't just the Spirit of the Age that named an episode of
"Gilligan's Island" "Our Vines Have Tender Apes." Ranking the four
television shows with which he is principally concerned, Cantor says that "The
X-Files" "has genuine artistic merit," Gilligan "is television at its most
average . . . simply mass entertainment," and "Star Trek" and "The Simpsons"
"fall somewhere in between these two extremes" (xxxviii). This, it seems to me,
is a significant undervaluation of "The Simpsons," America's finest work of
satire, but never mind. Cantor recognizes that there is something else to
consider besides economic and political isms; there are also the marks of
artistic intention that lead one to attend to certain cultural objects in ways
that one does not attend to others. In attending to "The Simpsons," indeed,
Cantor shows that he does perceive the subtlety and complexity of its
satire. Throughout his book, he allows his method of analysis to respond
to the nature of its objects, rather than insisting, as the practitioners of
cultural studies routinely do, on applying the same reductive method to every
work. He also maintains the sense of humor that constitutes, one would think, a
minimum qualification for the analysis of anything at all in the world of human
beings, but particularly for the analysis of popular culture. With great comic
propriety, he dedicates "Gilligan Unbound" to Sony SLV-420, his VCR, "Without
which this book could not have been written." His "Notes on Method" begin in this
way: "As a professor, I am expected to give an account of my methods. My
general readers, who are mainly interested in what I have to say and not in how I
am going about saying it, may feel free to skip this section. My academic readers
will probably conclude that I am epistemologically naive no matter what I say.
Now that nobody is reading, I feel ready to proceed." (xxix)
| Nobody ever was that
smart, not even John F. Kennedy or Mr. Spock, but Americans somehow survived.
They did so by means of individual, self-interested choices, not because of their
genius for democratic social organization or their skill at operating a command
economy. |
|
Common sense and a sense of humor go a long way with Cantor's subject. But
this author has another rare quality. He is one of the few academic humanists in
America who actually understands economics. Libertarian readers will be
especially interested to know that he participated (as a high-school student!) in
the seminars of the great free-market economic theorist Ludwig von Mises. Cantor
is a leader of a small but energetic avant-garde that is bringing literary people
the news that the study of economics did not cease with Marx and Veblen.
Cantor understands that globalization is the logical extension of the economic
principle of division of labor, without which cultural progress culture
and civilization themselves could not exist. He also understands that the
global expansion of markets and communications represents an enormous economic
benefit, an enormous expansion of wealth, for the billions who participate in it
not just the wealth that can be counted in dollars, but the unquantifiable
wealth of knowledge, freedom, and self-expression. Economics of "The
X-Files" And Cantor sees the debits as well as the credits. No economic
development is all for the best. Economics is not a branch of morality; it does
not teach us that a good economic system will produce nothing but good results.
The Misesian brand of economics, which emphasizes individual choice, contingency,
and risk, allows Cantor to see the many sides of the cultural phenomena he
examines. He fully appreciates the fact that "The X-Files'" obsession with
international (and interplanetary) conspiracies represents a ridiculous
development of globalist anxieties; yet he also appreciates the fact that there
are no unmixed economic blessings, that one person's practical benefit may be
another person's psychic hardship. The cultural costs of globalization are as
worthy of analysis as its cultural benefits, even though the benefits, to
Cantor's mind, as to my own, greatly outweigh the costs. As an analyst,
however, Cantor is principally concerned with America's movement from the
preglobalist to the globalist phase of popular culture. He examines four
television series in depth, a pair from each of those historical phases. The
earlier pair "Gilligan's Island" (19641967) and "Star Trek"
(19661969) express a pre-globalized "ideology of the American
nation-state" (xv). In "Star Trek," it's liberal America versus the totalitarian
Klingons, and liberal America always has the stuff to win. Indeed, as Cantor
points out, the Prime Directive (don't interfere with the beings you visit)
always has a way of yielding to the intrepid voyagers' desire to remake every
culture in their own liberal-democratic image. "These people aren't living," the
ineffable Dr. McCoy announces in one episode, "they're existing. . . . They
should have the opportunity to choose we owe it to them to interfere"
(43). And the interference is uniformly successful. It is as if America actually
had the power, which leftists always assert it has, to remake the globe in its
own image. Gilligan's jungle isle may seem radically different from the
command deck of the Enterprise, but a similar ideology prevails. As Cantor
shows in hilarious detail, the island is a goofy idealization of the American
political landscape, a place where people are always learning the right lessons
about how to behave in liberal-democratic society. Gilligan himself is the
perfect representative of democratic man: "Unlike the other characters in the
show, he has nothing to distinguish him and that constitutes his form of
preeminence in the context of a democratic regime" (5). Other characters
the Skipper, the Professor, the Millionaire have qualities that ought to
give them authority, and would automatically give them authority in any
but a modern-liberal society; yet they always lose out to the incompetent but
lovable Gilligan. And the loss is harmless: As a group, the castaways survive and
flourish. Cantor argues that the salient image is that of a group of liberal
American democrats who can land on any spot in the globe (just as Capt. Kirk and
his friends can land on any spot in the galaxy), take it over, and make it
work.
| Gilligan's jungle isle
may seem radically different from the command deck of the Enterprise, but a
similar ideology prevails. |
|
The Death of James T. Kirk This flattering self-image of American
democracy was, of course, subjected to withering attack in the 1960s and 1970s.
Cantor's other two examples of popular culture "The Simpsons"
(1989 ) and "The X-Files" (1994 ) show what remains after
the assault. Here is an America that no longer reaches out confidently, with the
solution to every problem on the planet. Here is an America that is goofy,
instead, with fears about "alien" influences ("The X-Files"). Here also, to go to
the other extreme ("The Simpsons"), is the America that makes the Kwik-E-Mart
(the local franchise of a multinational corporation, operated in Springfield,
USA, by the amazing Apu Nahasapeemapetilon) the focus of its social existence.
The two programs represent opposing visions of the same globalizing process.
According to the "X-Files'" vision of America, people are now faced with tragic
choices of loyalty between the traditional community of family, friends, and
nation, and the larger, more potent, and much more dangerous world that impinges
on them from the outside, psychically as well as economically. According to "The
Simpsons"' vision of America, however, it is definitely "possible to have your
global cake and eat it locally, too" (205). Homer Simpson sees a lot of the
world, but it never affects his appetite, or his ability to satisfy it.
This comic vision, Cantor senses, is much closer to the truth of our world. The
Simpson family, that platonic form of fecklessness, always manages to survive
into the next episode, despite the fact that its members never really take
anything very seriously, whether it's the United States government or the forces
massing across our borders and it all seems a lot more realistic than "The
X-Files'"' images of a world that is out to get us, and probably will, because
nobody, even Mulder and Scully, is smart enough to figure it all out and do all
the right things about it. Well, nobody ever was that smart, not even John F.
Kennedy or Mr. Spock, but Americans somehow survived. They did so by means of
individual, self-interested choices, not because of their genius for democratic
social organization or their skill at operating a command economy.
Cantor's book was published just before the events of Sept. 11 and of course was
not informed by them. But I doubt that anything happened on that date that is
outside the scope of his analysis. The story he tells is the story of the
decreasing cultural potency of the nation-state, when measured against the new
economic and technological forces that now disseminate not only information but
also power, of a kind, throughout the planet. We no longer live in a world where,
as Cantor aptly recalls, all the computers that Capt. Kirk was likely to
encounter were brontosauruses operated by some central government, agencies of
conformity and delusion that could nevertheless be dispatched by a single thrust
of Kirk's liberal-democratic mentality, or phaser. (The fact that Kirk's own
by-no-means-democratically-operated spaceship was itself controlled by such a
computer is an irony that apparently escaped the creators of "Star Trek," which
is redolent throughout, as Cantor shows, of the Kennedy era's innocence of its
own ironies.) We live in a world in which either a terrorist or a heaven-born
scientist can use a laptop to transform reality, and the nation-state will have a
hard time stopping him. That may seem tragic, in an "X-Files" way,
especially in the light of Sept. 11. If it does seem tragic to you, however, you
might think a little more about what the terrorists (and the antiglobalists) are
trying to do. They are trying to use the technology of a globalized world in
order to destroy globalization. They want to go back back to a regime of
nationalism, particularism, and statism, back to a world in which only one kind
of voice had the power to make itself heard. Merely to state this intention is to
show how ridiculous it is. We do not know exactly how such intentions will fail,
but they will fail. We know that, compared with Osama bin Laden, even the
Simpsons are political geniuses.
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