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"The Outlaw Sea: A World of Freedom, Chaos and Crime,"
by William Langewiesche. North Point Press, 2004. 239 pages.
The Ungoverned World by David Friedman
Most of the earth's land is under the control of
governments. Most of the ocean is not. The majority of the area of the globe is,
legally speaking, a stateless territory.
| | David
Friedman is is a professor of economics at Santa Clara University, and the
author of The Machinery of Freedom and Law's Order.
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Thanks to competition among governments, the ocean is stateless in fact as
well as in law. A ship can fly the flag of any nation that will permit it
and there are a lot of nations. If some impose conditions on the use of their
flag, there are always others willing to sell theirs with fewer conditions. The
result is that the ships of the world are effectively without government
regulation of any sort. That effect is reinforced by the nature of the sea itself
big enough and empty enough to make keeping track of what is happening on
it difficult and expensive. It is hard to regulate what you cannot see.
"Panama is considered to be an old fashioned 'flag'
because its consulates handle the paperwork and collect the registration fees,
but 'Liberia' is run by a company in Virginia, 'Cambodia' by another in South
Korea, and the proud and independent 'Bahamas' by a group in the City of
London." The author of "The Outlaw Sea" is more interested in describing
than in judging; it is hard to tell to what degree he approves or disapproves of
the stateless ocean. His first story the book is mostly a series of linked
stories is of a merchant ship that sank as a result of being pushed too
hard, too long, with insufficient repairs. The implication at that point seems to
be that if only ships were subject to properly paternalistic regulation, such
things would not happen, sailors would not drown, and the world would be a better
place. |
| The ships of the world
are effectively without government regulation of any sort.
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But would it be? The crew he describes knew the condition of the ship and the
risks they were taking. They took them because the job, despite its risks, was
more attractive than any alternative. To the economist reader, the outcome of the
unregulated market looks efficient; the owners of the ship were taking risks
that, considering all costs and benefits, were worth taking. At the end of the
book, in a discussion of the Third-World wrecking yards where ships end up,
Langewiesche appears to agree. The work is hard and dangerous, the environment
is polluted, but it is better than the alternatives available to the people who
work there; the European do-gooders who try to close down such operations are
harming the people they claim to be helping. The advantages of an
ungoverned ocean are less clear in two other contexts liability and crime.
Owners of a ship can and often do hide their ownership in a chain of paper
corporations. As long as there is at least one country willing to register a ship
without a clear link to its real owners and there always will be at least
one that situation cannot be prevented. So when an oil tanker goes down,
inflicting very large costs on the owners and users of nearby coasts, there is no
guarantee that anyone can be found responsible and sued for the damages.
Crime too is a problem in an ungoverned world. The book gives a detailed account
of the seizure by pirates of the Alondra Rainbow, a $10 million ship carrying
another $10 million worth of aluminum. Fortunately, the pirates decided to set
the crew adrift instead of killing them, and the crew got spotted before they
died of hunger or thirst. By more good fortune, a month after the hijacking the
Indian navy correctly identified the stolen ship and retook it. What was special
about that case was that the happy ending made it possible to reconstruct the
crime. More successful seizures of ships followed by a name change, a new
coat of paint, and a new registration under a different flag occur with
some frequency. "Of 1,228 pirate attacks reported
worldwide from 1998 through 2002, about a fourth were on ships under way, and of
those about 68 were major, involving gangs of ten pirates or more. . . . Among
them during the five years in question they hijacked perhaps twenty-five large
ships."
| The European do-gooders
who try to close down such operations are harming the people they claim to be
helping. |
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It may occur to those skeptical about the virtues of government authority that
crime occurs in areas controlled by states as well as those that are not
both private crime and state crime, on a considerably larger scale than piracy.
The other problems the author introduces in the context of the ungoverned ocean
appear elsewhere in the book in other contexts leaving it unclear to what
degree the real problems he describes would be solved by more government control
over the oceans. Consider one of the worst naval catastrophes of recent
times, the loss of the ferry Estonia in the Baltic in 1994. The ship was
as far from stateless as a ship can be. It was owned by the Estonian government
in partnership with a publicly traded Swedish company, with extensive support and
regular inspection by Swedish authorities. For some reason the author
suspects poor design by its original German builders, although the question has
been hotly debated it sank, killing more than 800 passengers. Or consider
the sinking of the Exxon Valdez. It was transporting oil from an American
port to an American port and so was required by U.S. law to operate under the
U.S. flag and conform to U.S. regulations. What is interesting about the
book is not the author's judgment, or mine, or even the reader's, as to whether
the stateless nature of the ocean is a bug or a feature. What is interesting is
the observation that a considerable part of the surface of the planet is and
always has been, de jure and de facto, stateless and human
beings continue to live their lives, do business, transport goods, across
it. "There is unembarrassed talk in Washington of
a future under control, in which sailors will undergo meaningful background
checks and will be supplied with unforgeable, biometrically verifiable IDs by
honest, appropriately equipped, and cooperative governments. Panama, for
instance, will vouch for the integrity of, say, an Indonesian deckhand working on
a ship operated by a Cayman Island company on behalf of an anonymous Greek. This
is a vision so disconnected from reality that it might raise questions about the
sanity of the United States."
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