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Stratagem Engage Iran:
A Way Out of Iraq
by Jon Harrison The U.S. should anticipate events rather than await them.
American policy in the Middle East is at an impasse. The Iraq Study Group, also known as the Baker-Hamilton commission, has labored — and brought forth a mouse. Its amorphous recommendations, amounting to more of the same with a bit of self-projected light at the end of the tunnel, seem designed to dodge the issues rather than resolve them. Since there is so much blame for Iraq to go around, and no one — not a single politician or soldier — is willing to take any of it, this is perhaps understandable. Victory has a thousand fathers . . . | | Jon Harrison lives and writes in Vermont. |
| Few Americans realize how dangerous the U.S. global strategic position is today. The troops and equipment of the Army and Marine Corps are being ground down by repeated deployments to Afghanistan and Iraq. The situation on the ground in both these countries is deteriorating. The frontier provinces of Pakistan, which feed the revitalized Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, may be on the brink of an explosion.1 In East Asia, we are just one mad impulse of Kim Jong Il away from disaster on the Korean peninsula.2
In Iraq the supply routes for our forces, not to mention the avenues of exit when we finally do leave, are within range of Iranian guns. Admittedly, it would be suicidal for Iran to fire those guns. But less direct means exist for the Iranians to wreak havoc on American forces in Iraq.
Stretching from just south of Baghdad to the Persian Gulf is the Shiite portion of Iraq. This area is swarming with militias capable of unleashing guerrilla warfare against our troops and supply columns moving between Iraq and Kuwait. The militias are very much under the influence of Shiite Iran.3 Imagine our forces attempting to withdraw in the face of opposition from thousands of urban guerrillas in Najaf, Amara, Naseriya, Basra — each a potential Mogadishu. That our troops could eventually cut their way through is certain. That casualties would be very heavy is equally certain.
It seems a long time ago that the Bush administration and the media were seriously contemplating a campaign against Iran. Yet it was only late last summer that the drumbeat for war against Iran reached its crescendo, at least in the media. At the same time the Bush administration, no doubt taking into account how bad the situation in Iraq had become, was actually moving away from a confrontation with Iran. The administration had already issued a visa for former Iranian president Seyyed Muhammad Khatami to travel to the United States. Then in early October, comments by former Secretary of State James Baker, head of the commission seeking to pull Bush's chestnuts out of the fire in Iraq, left the impression that a war against Iran was no longer in the cards. This impression became a certainty once the November election results were tallied.
| | The simple fact is that the United States is
not going to leave the Middle East.
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| The Baker-Hamilton commission's major positive recommendation is that the U.S. should talk to Iran — which is indeed the key to getting the United States out of Iraq relatively quickly and cleanly. Additionally, it can be the route for maintaining a predominant U.S. influence in the Middle East, in the face of competition from Russia, China, and the European Union.4
So long as the U.S. economy is dependent on fossil fuels, the Middle East and its oil and gas fields will remain important to us. No amount of drilling in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge or anywhere else will make America independent of foreign oil. The petroleum resources available outside the Middle East are not sufficient to allow us to ignore the world's greatest repository of oil. Becoming more dependent on non-Middle Eastern suppliers such as Venezuela, Mexico, and Nigeria, with their hostile or unstable governments, would not be a sound policy. Finally, it should be recognized that in the absence of a major U.S. role in the Middle East, Russia and China will seek to fill the vacuum. A Russian or Chinese stranglehold on the Western world's primary source of energy is not a situation we could live with.
I know that many readers of Liberty would prefer that the U.S. simply withdraw from the Middle East. I sympathize with their views, and I truly wish I could be an advocate for those views here. But the simple fact is that the United States is not going to leave the Middle East. Bearing that in mind, I am trying to point the way toward the best possible policy for the United States to follow — not my ideal policy, and perhaps not yours, but the most effective and least costly one that might actually be implemented.
If we accept the idea that a predominant U.S. influence in the Middle East is necessary, the question then becomes: why is engagement with Iran important? American policy in the Middle East rests on three pillars: Israel, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia (there is a fourth — the Hashemite kingdom of Jordan — that provides support for the U.S. presence in the Middle East, but it is of relatively little importance). All three are long-term liabilities for the United States.
The special relationship with Israel unquestionably complicates our relations with the Islamic world, threatening the uninterrupted flow of Middle Eastern oil to American industry and consumers. This U.S.-Israeli special relationship will, however, continue. The one forward step the United States could take would be to put considerably more pressure on Israel to reach a settlement with the Palestinians. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the Israeli problem in greater detail.
In the Arab world the U.S. has placed its bets on Saudi Arabia and Egypt, with good returns up to now. But both these states represent wasting assets. Egypt and Saudi Arabia are in effect the personal fiefdoms of the Mubarak and Saud families, respectively. As such, their existence is based on bribery and repression, rather than popular support. In time, it is likely that these ruling families will come to grief at the hands of their own people, replaying the end of the Shah of Iran.
As a concomitant to our support for these dictatorships, the U.S. has become deeply unpopular among the Egyptian and Saudi masses. Recall where almost all of the 9/11 hijackers, not to mention thousands of other al Qaeda recruits, came from. And it is estimated that two-thirds of the suicide bombers in Iraq were Saudis. Our Egyptian and Saudi friends constitute a small minority floating uneasily on a sea of anti-Americanism. If a political tsunami were to sweep them away, the American position in the Arab world would be lost as well.
| In Iraq the supply routes for our forces, not
to mention the avenues of exit when we finally
do leave, are within range of Iranian guns.
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| The United States should anticipate events rather than await them. That means engaging Iran. Iran, much more than any Arab state, is a true nation. While the Arabs will almost certainly sink back into obscurity once their oil fields run dry, the Iranians are a people to be reckoned with. There is substance to Iran that one does not find in any Arab state, not even Egypt.5 Iran has an ethnic and cultural continuity that Egypt lacks; it has also absorbed Western ideas and techniques far more readily, and to better advantage, than any of the Arab states.6 With a long and storied history, a population of nearly 70 million able and energetic souls, and the world's second-largest proven oil and gas reserves, Iran represents the biggest prize in the Middle East, and is recognized as such by American rivals Russia and China.
As an emerging regional power, and the country to which Shiite Islam looks for leadership, Iran is clearly the rising nation in the Middle East, and one with which the United States must engage. Many advantages would accrue to the U.S. from a rapprochement with Iran, beginning with a resolution to the Iraq problem.
Given a U.S.-Iranian understanding, that problem simply disappears. The U.S. could acknowledge the fact that Iraq has devolved into three separate entities, the most important one of which is Shiite-dominated and looks to Iran for guidance. We could then withdraw our forces, leaving the Shiite-dominated Iraqi state, with Iranian assistance, to crush the Sunni insurgents (Baathists and al Qaeda) in Baghdad and al-Anbar province. If the Iraqis and Iranians are successful in this, it would eliminate the possibility of an al Qaeda terrorist state emerging on Iraqi soil. Even if the Iraqis and Iranians failed to suppress the insurgency completely (a result not necessarily unfavorable to our long-term interests7), the terrorists would be far too busy fighting for survival to mount operations against us.
Immediately after the November elections the Saudi king, Abdullah, summoned Vice President Cheney to Riyadh. It is said that Cheney was told the Saudis would intervene in Iraq to support the Sunnis, were the U.S. to side with the Shiites or withdraw. Given both the internal situation in Saudi Arabia and the fighting ability of the Saudi armed forces, this must be seen as a bluff. The Saudis have no chance of standing up to Iran. They could send money into Iraq, and volunteers willing to blow themselves up, but these could not bring about a fundamental shift in the Sunnis' fortunes. The Saudis could threaten to cut us off from their oil, but if the U.S. had forged a relationship with both Iraq and Iran, that threat would be hollow.
We should not withdraw from Kurdish territory in Iraq. The Kurds have established an autonomous republic within Iraq, and are champing at the bit to declare complete independence. They are friendly to the United States and would welcome a U.S. presence in their country.
An American presence in Kurdistan8 could only add weight to our influence in the region. The U.S. would be well-placed to restrain Kurdish irredentism and the regional disruption it could cause. (Turkey, Syria, and Iran all have Kurdish minority populations.) Kurdistan could also serve as a point d'appui for U.S. forces if al Qaeda got out of hand in al-Anbar. Turkish anti-Americanism, already on the increase, would admittedly receive further impetus from any U.S. backing for the Kurds. But Turkish parliamentarians voted in 2003 to prevent the use of their territory for operations against Saddam Hussein's Iraq. Standing by the Kurds is the least we can do to repay our erstwhile Turkish friends for their perfidy.
Engaging Iran has been advocated by thinkers as diverse as Thomas P.M. Barnett and Jim Lobe.9 Barnett has made the point that the United States, having disposed of Iran's two most troublesome neighbors (that is, the Taliban in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq), has chips to call in.10 But these chips are useless if the U.S. refuses to play the game. It should be remembered that no less a strategic thinker than Richard Nixon selected Iran (albeit under the Shah) as the stand-in for British power in the Gulf, once Britain had decided to abandon its position east of Suez.
Can Iran be engaged? This certainly would have been easier between 1997 and 2005, when the moderate cleric Muhammad Khatami held the Iranian presidency. Democrats and Republicans alike have much to answer for in failing to take advantage of the possibilities on offer during Khatami's time in office.11
In May 2003, in the wake of the entry of U.S. troops into Baghdad, Iran offered to settle its outstanding differences with the U.S. on very favorable terms. The Bush administration, apparently triumphant in Iraq, did not deign to reply to this overture. Now Iranian officials feel confident enough to trumpet their preconditions for any U.S.-Iranian talks, including a definite timetable for the withdrawal of American forces from Iraq. We will simply have to ignore both the preconditions and the insolence behind their enunciation as we try to engage the Iranians. The strategic advantages to be gained from engagement are too important for us to stand too much on our dignity. Diplomatic finesse will be required to bring the Iranians to both their senses and the table. Whether the national security team of Bush, Cheney, Rice, Hadley, and Gates (second-stringers all) is capable of accomplishing this is by no means certain. Nor do we yet know if they will even try.
| Iran can be an American stalking-horse in
the essential task the U.S. must set for itself
over the next generation — the diminution, or
perhaps dissolution, of the Chinese empire.
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| One of our Iranian interlocutors would be President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, a man who manages to give the impression of being a pipsqueak and a villain at the same time. Ahmadinejad's doubts about the Holocaust and his call to relocate Israel to Europe do not bode well for any fruitful engagement. Indeed, watching this man greet David Duke at a recent gathering of Holocaust-deniers in Tehran was enough to turn one's stomach. But there is more to present-day Iran than Ahmadinejad and his ilk. For example, in local elections held in December, reformers and moderate conservatives outpolled supporters of Ahmadinejad.
Although anyone reading or listening to the American media would never know it, the Iranian revolution and the Islamic Republic it spawned have actually run out of steam.12 The germ of a European-style democracy (admittedly with a religious component) is there, if the Western nations will but help it to flower. This opportunity exists now. It is in both the short and long term interest of the U.S. to seize it.
As a first step, the United States should approach Iran concerning mutual apologies and reconciliation over the events of 1953 (when the U.S. overthrew the democratically elected Iranian government of Muhammad Mossadeq)13 and 1979 (when the Iranians seized the U.S. Embassy and hostages). Once a blank slate has been established, cultural exchanges, economic ties, and political and security talks should follow. In short order it would be seen that U.S. and Iranian interests, rather than being in opposition, in fact dovetail.
What does Iran stand to gain from a rapprochement with the U.S.? First, it no longer faces the danger of a U.S. attack. Second, it wins recognition of its regional status and influence from the world's greatest power. Third, it obtains economic and technical assistance (particularly in the energy field) that no country other than America, not even Russia or China, can provide.
What does the U.S. stand to gain? As already discussed, rapprochement with Iran would provide a way out of the Iraq mess. It would also relieve pressure on Israel's northern frontier (Hezbollah in Lebanon). And it would give the U.S. leverage on the nuclear issue. The problem of Iran's nuclear program will be solved, if ever, only by U.S.-Iranian engagement. It will not be solved while the two countries remain in opposition.14
Going even beyond this, a relationship with Iran opens up the prospect of far-reaching advantages for the United States. Iran can serve as a fulcrum for U.S. world power, presenting us with opportunities hitherto undreamed of. A U.S.-Iranian condominium over the "Black Crescent,"15 especially in light of growing instability in Saudi Arabia, would guarantee U.S. energy supplies far into the future. Iran also presents a perfect pivot-point for the extension and consolidation of U.S. influence in the former Soviet republics of Central Asia, with their important mineral and natural gas resources. Last but by no means least, Iran, operating under the flag of pan-Islamism, can be an American stalking-horse in the essential task the U.S. must set for itself over the next generation — the diminution, or perhaps dissolution, of the Chinese empire.16
The possible fruits of a U.S.-Iranian rapprochement, as outlined above, go far beyond the puerile initiatives of the Bush administration in the Middle East — its pettifogging ideas about democratizing the Arab world, and its foolish little war in Iraq. Admittedly, even a friendly Iran would not necessarily be amenable to some U.S. policy objectives, and would be capable of playing a double game against us. Be that as it may, engagement should be tried. The U.S. will always retain the ultima ratio of war, should engagement fail. It would be irresponsible to choose war without giving engagement a chance.
There are people who abhor the thought of talking to Iran, period. There are others, like George W. Bush, who would do so only if the Iranians agree to onerous preconditions set by the United States. Beyond the fact that the U.S. is currently in no position to set terms, I would remind these people of Lord Palmerston's dictum: "England has no friends, only interests." The same holds true for 21st-century America.
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| 1 | See "In Pakistan, Recent Attacks Shred Hopes for Regional Peace Model," Washington Post, Nov. 11, 2006. |
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| 2 | The North Koreans are reported to have 10,000 artillery pieces aimed at Seoul. Should war break out in Korea, we have insufficient ground forces available to defeat the North Koreans, and would have to employ massive airpower, possibly even tactical nuclear weapons. Unbeknownst to most Americans, we may be closer today to pulling the nuclear trigger than at any time since the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962. Those who doubt this must have great confidence in the rationality of the North Korean dictator.
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| 3 | Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army, the most capable indigenous fighting force in Iraq, relies on Iran for weapons and, to some extent, guidance, as does the Badr Brigade, which was created and trained by Iranian Revolutionary Guards. For Iran's standing among the Iraqi Shiites, see Vali Nasr, "The Shia Revival" (Norton, 2006), pp. 185–210, and especially 199–200. |
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| 4 | See for example Flynt Leverett, "The Race for Iran," New York Times (June 20, 2006).
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| 5 | No fewer than four important books about Iran have been published in just the last few months. See Ray Takeyh, "Hidden Iran" (Henry Holt, 2006), Jason Elliot, "Mirrors of the Unseen" (St. Martin's, 2006), Vali Nasr and Ali Gheissari, "Democracy in Iran" (Oxford University Press, 2006), and Ali M. Ansari, "Confronting Iran" (Basic Books, 2006). On Egypt see Mary Anne Weaver, "A Portrait of Egypt" (Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).
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| 6 | On this see Nasr, "The Shia Revival," pp. 211–26.
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| 7 | It is imperative that we avoid a united Islamic front (Shiite-Sunni) forming against the West. This was Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's vision in the 1980s (see Nasr, "The Shia Revival," pp. 137–138). The realization of such an alliance would spell the collapse of U.S. influence in the Middle East, with dire implications both regionally and globally. The question of Israel's survival would at that point undoubtedly take center stage. |
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| 8 | This would be a force of brigade strength, with enough equipment pre-positioned so that two divisions could be rapidly deployed there once the troops were flown in. The idea of stationing a small U.S. force in Kurdistan was first put forward by Peter W. Galbraith. See his "Our Corner of Iraq," New York Times (July 25, 2006). The risk in leaving U.S. troops in a landlocked country in a volatile region is by no means negligible. They could, however, be evacuated by air in an emergency. |
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| 9 | Barnett, a former student of Samuel Huntington's at Harvard and the author of "The Pentagon's New Map" (Penguin, 2004), is familiar to many from his appearances on C-SPAN. Though an advocate of a level of U.S. interventionism around the world that is unsustainable both fiscally and in terms of public support, he clearly understands the motivations and power relationships of the actors in the Middle East. Lobe, the astute Washington bureau chief for Inter Press Service, is an authority on the neoconservatives, and has lectured on them to audiences as far away as China. Although a Zionist, he is opposed to Israeli expansionism beyond the pre-1967 borders, and has offered trenchant critiques of Israeli and American policies in the region. |
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| 10 | Former Iranian president Khatami, during his recent visit to the U.S., made a point of mentioning shared U.S.-Iranian interests in Iraq and Afghanistan. See "U.S., Iran share interests in Iraq, Khatami says," USA Today (Sept. 4, 2006). In fighting the Sunni insurgents in Iraq, we are doing Iran's work for her. That American soldiers are dying on behalf of a state that President Bush has labeled a pariah is ironic, to say the least. |
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| 11 | Khatami, in a Sept. 3, 2006 interview with the Financial Times, indicated a willingness to support a two-state solution in Palestine. |
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| 12 | See for example Nasr, "The Shia Revival," p. 212 et seq. |
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| 13 | For an accessible account of this CIA-directed coup ("Operation Ajax") see Stephen Kinzer, "All the Shah's Men" (John Wiley & Sons, 2003). During the Clinton administration Secretary of State Madeleine Albright expressed regret for the CIA's action. |
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| 14 | For an interesting discussion see Noah Feldman, "Islam, Terror and the Second Nuclear Age," New York Times Magazine (Oct. 29, 2006).
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| 15 | This coinage refers to the oil-rich swath of land that wraps around the Persian Gulf from the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia through southern Iraq to the Iranian side of the Strait of Hormuz. From the point of view of energy supplies it represents the most valuable real estate on the planet. The population throughout (including the Saudi Eastern Province) is majority Shiite. |
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| 16 | This is a subject for another essay, but suffice it to say that the fixed policy of the English-speaking nations since Elizabethan times, namely, that no single power should be allowed to wax too great, remains as valid today as it was 400 years ago. |
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