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October 2008
Vol. 22, No. 9
Strategy
The Next President and the Next War
Is a Middle East conflagration on the horizon?
Jon Harrison lives and writes in Vermont.
On June 13, Taliban fighters successfully stormed the main prison in Kandahar, Afghanistan, freeing some 1,200 inmates, at least one-third of them Taliban members. During the month of June, 46 Allied soldiers died in combat in Afghanistan, as against 31 (29 U.S.) in Iraq. It was the second straight month in which combat fatalities in Afghanistan exceeded those in Iraq.1 On the same day as the Taliban’s brazen attack on Kandahar, the outgoing U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Dan McNeill, spoke gloomily about the situation at a Pentagon press conference. The Taliban, he said, is “resurgent in the region . . . it’s going to be difficult to take on this insurgent group . . . in the broader sort of way.”2 “Difficult” is an understatement, because the Taliban are operating from the safety of sanctuaries in northwest Pakistan. McNeill, by the way, had previously stated that it would require 400,000 troops to master the situation in Afghanistan,3 an assessment that has received remarkably little media coverage in the U.S.
On June 5, Israeli forces completed major military exercises over the eastern Mediterranean. More than 100 F-15 and F-16 strike aircraft took part. Long-range refueling and search and rescue operations were practiced by the Israeli forces. The exercises were carried out some 900 miles from Israel, a distance that just happens to equal that between Israeli air bases and Iran’s nuclear facility at Natanz. According to The New York Times:
Several American officials said the Israeli exercise appeared to be an effort to develop the military’s capacity to carry out long-range strikes and to demonstrate the seriousness with which Israel views Iran’s nuclear program.4
Israeli officials were more direct. Sallai Meridor, Israel’s ambassador to the U.S., stated, “Israel prefers this threat [i.e., the Iranian nuclear program] be dealt with peacefully . . . But time is running out.”5 Simultaneously, Gen. Mohammed Ali Jafari, commander of Iran’s Revolutionary Guards, threatened to respond to any attack by launching missiles against Israel and blocking the Strait of Hormuz.6 His threats were followed by Iranian missile tests carried out on July 9 and 10. The missiles fired by the Iranians, while hardly state of the art, supposedly have ranges of up to 1,240 miles. The tremors were felt worldwide. Mohamed ElBaradei, the director of the International Atomic Energy Agency, told Al Arabiya television that an Israeli strike on Iran would “turn the Middle East [in]to a ball of fire.”7
The Iran pot is being further stirred by the Bush administration, which in 2007 launched an expanded program of covert operations inside the country with the objective of regime change.8 Up to now the administration, despite its obvious desire (especially on the part of the vice president) to strike Iran, has had its hands tied by the U.S. commitment in Iraq. With the situation there apparently improving, Bush could decide to settle accounts with the regime that, since the fall of Saddam Hussein, has been his enemy number one.
If not Iran, then perhaps Pakistan. Northwest Pakistan is not only the springboard for the resurgent Afghan insurgency; it also harbors a Pakistani Taliban that threatens Pakistan’s stability9 and a reconstituted al Qaeda that is said to be preparing fresh attacks on the U.S. homeland.10
Time is running out for the Bush presidency. On balance, it seems likely that Bush will hand off to his successor without having started a new war in the Middle East. Certain circumstances (including U.S. electoral politics) could change the odds in favor of war, and these will be discussed below. Whether the next president inherits a new war or not, he will certainly face critical problems in the region.
How will it all play out over the next twelve months? In part, of course, this depends on who wins the November election. A President McCain would almost certainly continue, broadly speaking, the policies of the Bush-Cheney years. That means, first, an ongoing presence in Iraq. We currently have 15 combat brigades there. By next summer, we may be down to ten or twelve. A force of that size would be sustainable over the long term, assuming the United States does not dramatically increase its commitments elsewhere. However, given the worsening situation in Afghanistan, it seems likely that the next president will be forced to escalate the war there — first by introducing more troops, and then, perhaps, by expanding it into northwest Pakistan.
Until recently, McCain had not articulated a detailed policy for Afghanistan. On July 15, however, the day after Sen. Obama called for the deployment of at least two additional combat brigades there next year, McCain came out in favor of sending three. Previously, he had maintained that our NATO allies should supply any additional troops for Afghanistan.11
The problem for McCain is that unless a substantial reduction of U.S. forces in Iraq happens soon, no brigades will be available for deployment to Afghanistan in early 2009. In June, Adm. Michael Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated that he wanted three additional brigades for Afghanistan, but that “troop constraints” prevented such a move. If our troop strength in Iraq is reduced by another five brigades between this fall and next summer, additional forces will be available for Afghanistan. But as of this writing, candidate McCain has not committed himself to any further withdrawals from Iraq.
Regarding Iran, McCain has made it clear that he will not tolerate that nation becoming a nuclear power. Every indication is that Iran cannot be prevented from building a nuclear weapon by peaceful means. The logical consequence of this would seem to be war.
Given an ongoing, major U.S. presence in Iraq, and an expanding commitment to Afghanistan, it becomes difficult to see how an effective war against Iran could be waged, short of introducing conscription (something McCain has not proposed).
Obama has called for new directions in U.S. policy. In a July 14 New York Times op-ed piece, he reiterated his call for the withdrawal of all U.S. combat brigades on a 16-month timetable.12 As already mentioned, he also proposed simultaneously to increase our presence in Afghanistan.
Obama’s essay, it should be said, was a through-and-through political document, revealing a merely superficial understanding of the strategic and tactical issues. Why, for example, a 16-month timeframe, beyond the fact that it’s probably the longest one that MoveOn.org will accept? Why only two additional brigades for Afghanistan, as opposed to the three the nation’s top officer advocated?
Obama long ago called for strikes, if needed, against al Qaeda in the tribal areas of Pakistan. In addition, he has advocated opening a dialogue with Iran, although he has also said that he will not countenance that country’s going nuclear. That he would actually use force against Iran to prevent this, however, seems unlikely.
The overall picture, whoever becomes president, remains endlessly complex and fascinating, though darkened by countless and ongoing human tragedies, not to mention shadows of doom. For the sake of clarity, I will examine in turn the situation on the ground in the four areas of crisis — Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.
Iraq: Should We Stay or Should We Go?
At the moment, the picture in Iraq looks brighter than at any time since Bush declared major fighting over in May 2003. The past year has witnessed a remarkable series of ups and downs in both the military and the political situation.
Violence declined markedly in the last four months of 2007, for reasons I elucidated in an earlier essay.13 As 2008 opened, violence flared up once more. In April, Iraqi civilian deaths again exceeded 1,000. Since then, however, violence has fallen to levels unseen since early 2004. What happened?
At the end of March, Iraqi Prime Minister Nouri al Maliki ordered and personally oversaw an Iraqi government offensive against militia and criminal elements in Basra, Iraq’s second city and the key to the country’s oil-rich south. The main target was the Mahdi Army of radical cleric Muqtada al Sadr, al Maliki’s erstwhile ally. Poorly organized and carried out, the offensive quickly stalled. Over 1,000 government troops deserted, and al Maliki’s representatives had to travel to Iran to negotiate a ceasefire with al Sadr.
But the seemingly hapless al Maliki wasn’t done in by this highly unsatisfactory outcome. With a determination and nimbleness that startled virtually every observer (this writer included), he returned at once to the attack. Wisely coordinating his plans with the Americans this time, he sent his forces back into Basra, supported now by American and British airpower, intelligence, and logistical support, as well as U.S. and British special operations units. The Sadrists and criminal elements backed down before this show of force, and government troops took control of Basra by April 19.
When the initial Basra operation commenced, the Sadrists began making trouble in Baghdad, lobbing rockets and mortar rounds into the Green Zone and engaging in street battles with government forces. At the same time, they offered to negotiate with the government. Al Maliki instead chose to take on the Sadrists. Sadr City, the vast (population 2 million) section of the capital under Sadrist control, was first partitioned by an enormous blast wall set up by U.S. forces. Adopting salami-slicing tactics, Iraqi troops (again backed by U.S. ground and air power) attempted to take over Sadr City block by block. They encountered considerable resistance, and would not have succeeded to the extent they did without major help from the Americans. In any case, it never came to a final showdown. A ceasefire was signed on May 11, and nine days later Iraqi government troops completed the occupation of Sadr City.
This was followed in June by a sweep through Amara, another Sadrist stronghold, where little resistance was encountered.14 Simultaneously, U.S. and Iraqi forces were engaged in winkling out al Qaeda fighters in the northern city of Mosul, Iraq’s third largest.
Too much can be made of these successes. The Shiite government’s victories over Shiite fighters in Basra and Sadr City were largely negotiated.15 They could not have been achieved without U.S. support. As for al Qaeda, whether it is driven from Mosul or not, it continues to find havens from which to mount attacks.16
Critical to the Iraqi government’s position is the continuation of the Sunni Awakening. Adequate forces were available for the Basra and Sadr City operations because units could be borrowed from Sunni Anbar province and elsewhere. The Sunnis are, for the moment, content to receive U.S. dollars and arms in return for remaining quiet. But Sunni-Shiite reconciliation remains a distant and perhaps unreachable goal.17 The ongoing Helsinki talks between various Iraqi political leaders may hold out a slender thread of hope.18
The Iraqi government also depends on the goodwill of Iran. A three-cornered power struggle among Iraq’s Shiites, involving al Maliki’s Dawa Party, the Islamic Supreme Council (ISC), and the Sadrists took a sharp turn with the scheduling of provincial elections for this fall (recently rescheduled to December). Al Maliki and the ISC joined forces to prevent an electoral victory by the Sadrists. While Dawa and the ISC both dispose of militias (the latter’s is the Badr Brigade), their combined strength does not equal that of the Sadrists (the Mahdi Army). Hence al Maliki’s decision to use the Iraqi Army to clear Basra — a move supported not just by the United States and Britain, but by Iran as well.
Iran gave its full political and moral support to al Maliki’s move against the Sadrists in Basra — and this despite the fact that Muqtada al Sadr sits in Qom, protected from al Maliki and the Americans by the Iranians! On the other hand, it condemned the Sadr City operation and supported the May 11 ceasefire. It would seem that Iran wants to keep the Sadrists in play as a safeguard against the possibility of al Maliki’s government becoming too independent and assertive. Its closest ties to Iraq’s Shiite community are with members of the ISC, some of whom spent decades in exile in Iran.19 The primary Iranian policy goal in Iraq is probably the continuation of a Shiite-dominated but weak central government.20
Fragile though it may be, al Maliki’s newfound prestige has wrought a change in Iraq’s political atmosphere. The Iraqi prime minister, formerly perceived as a milquetoast, has “made his bones” and won the respect of friend and enemy alike. He won a potentially important political victory on July 19, when Tawafiq, the largest Sunni political bloc, which had been boycotting the government for the previous eleven months, returned to the fold.21 Al Maliki now apparently feels strong enough to stand up to the Americans.22
Nor are the changes confined to politicians. The Iraqi Army has gained experience and with it a modicum of cohesion.23 Indications are that sections of the population may be rallying to the government and the armed forces.24 As with al Qaeda in its heyday, the Shiite extremists overplayed their hand in imposing on the populace their version of Islamic law. People in both Sadr City and Basra were clearly relieved to be liberated from the heavy hand of the militias.25 In short, an Iraqi center may be forming, and perhaps it may hold.26
Still, signs of real reconciliation between sects and ethnicities are hard to find.27 Reconstruction, despite huge oil revenues, has hardly begun. Corruption remains endemic. The wounds of the past five, indeed the past 50 years, are still raw. It is by no means clear whether we are witnessing the birth pangs of an Iraqi democracy or the preliminaries to another Lebanon.
The imperial aspects of America’s Iraq policy are complicated by the Iraqi government’s growing confidence.28 After a conversation with al Maliki on July 17, President Bush accepted “a general time horizon” for a U.S. withdrawal,29 though the administration has so far refused to be pinned down to definite numbers and definite dates.
With this concession (nebulous though it was) the Bush administration suddenly assumed the centrist position in the Iraq debate, with Obama on its left calling for a definite timetable for withdrawal, and McCain on its right opposing any timeline.30
McCain has been advocating a long-term U.S. presence in the country, which would entail spending tens of billions of dollars annually for years, along with some level of U.S. military involvement (100,000 troops? 50,000?) and casualties. Of course, whether U.S. voters will support such a policy remains to be seen.
Obama would enter office with a plan that would virtually end our involvement by mid-2010. His plan does call for a “residual” force to be left behind after the combat brigades are withdrawn. This would be assigned various duties, amounting in substance to protecting the president’s political backside should trouble start brewing again on the ground in Iraq.31
On July 19, at the outset of Obama’s grand tour of the Middle East and Western Europe, al Maliki came out and said that U.S. troops should leave Iraq “as soon as possible,” and that Obama’s 16-month timetable was “the right timeframe for withdrawal.”32 The Iraqi prime minister was clearly feeling his oats after his victories in Basra and Sadr City. The danger for both al Maliki and Obama is that the extremists will lie low until the United States withdraws, and then begin the civil war anew.
While a recrudescence of violence over the next year could lead al Maliki to embrace the McCain position,33 Obama’s plan may actually represent the most the United States can do. As everyone admits, U.S. ground forces are badly stretched and in need of a period of rest and recuperation. They are not, unfortunately, likely to get it. For it appears that forces withdrawn from Iraq will be needed in Afghanistan, to prevent a Taliban-al Qaeda victory there.
Afghanistan: Looming Defeat?
At present, we are losing the war in Afghanistan. The situation there was deteriorating even before NATO took on its “peacekeeping” role in 2006. As already noted, U.S. combat deaths in Afghanistan now exceed those suffered in Iraq. According to U.S. military sources, militant attacks in the first half of 2008 were well up over the same period a year earlier.34 In April, the Taliban just missed assassinating Afghanistan’s president, Hamid Karzai. On July 6 a massive suicide car bombing outside the Indian embassy in Kabul, the Afghan capital, killed 54 people and injured over 100.
U.S. forces are caught in a deadly day-to-day struggle with the Taliban and other militant groups,35 all of which use the civilian population as a shield. Heavy civilian casualties and serious psychological problems for many of our troops result from this type of war.36 Afghanistan is and remains a failed state. President Karzai — our man in Kabul — is little more than the mayor of that city (nor has he shown any qualities beyond those of a small city executive). The drug trade has grown exponentially since the Taliban’s ouster. A solution, if there is one, will likely be military in nature, and not entail nation building. There appears to be little basis for the latter in this society dominated by obscurantism.
But where to find the 400,000 troops that Gen. McNeill says are needed to master the insurgency? In July, Defense Secretary Gates and the Joint Chiefs of Staff decided to reinforce Afghanistan. However, although the last of the surge brigades had just departed Iraq, none was available for immediate deployment to Afghanistan. Oddments, small units, were all that was available for quick (i.e., within weeks) deployment. The fact was that at that moment, the strategic reserve (ground forces) was empty.
Given an ongoing U.S. presence in Iraq, there is no way to reach the 400,000 figure without reintroducing conscription. The presidential candidates, of course, are mum on this. There’s no quicker way to lose an election than to tell the citizenry that their kids will be compelled to fight and die in a rat hole like Afghanistan.
As already mentioned, candidate Obama has said that if elected he will deploy “at least” two additional combat brigades to Afghanistan. Admiral Mullen called for three. Neither constitutes enough boots on the ground, if McNeill’s figure of 400,000 troops is to be taken seriously.
Some libertarians want to end the Afghanistan intervention. Writing for the weblog Liberty and Power (July 14), David Beito (a fellow contributing editor at Liberty) took Obama to task for advocating a reinforcement of the U.S. presence there:
Not recognizing the contradiction [with his policy for Iraq], Obama proposes the exact opposite solution for Afghanistan. Instead of letting the Afghans take “responsibility for the security of their country,” he wants to make them even more dependent on American welfare.
Ivan Eland, writing for The Independent Institute’s email newsletter “The Lighthouse” (July 28), took a somewhat similar line:
The al Qaeda that threatens the United States is in Pakistan, not Afghanistan or Iraq. Thus, the U.S. should withdraw all of its forces from Iraq and Afghanistan and concentrate on dealing with al Qaeda in Pakistan.
One is puzzled by this reasoning. There is no way to “deal with” al Qaeda in Pakistan except from our position in Afghanistan. A U.S. withdrawal from Afghanistan would be followed by a Taliban takeover of the country. A militant-controlled Afghanistan, in addition to posing an increased threat of a new 9/11, would serve as the base for the growing Islamist campaign in Pakistan. And a militant, Islamist Pakistan possessing nuclear weapons would constitute a real danger to the United States (unlike Iran, which practices realpolitik despite what Bush, Cheney, and McCain would like you to believe).
That it should be so is regrettable; but libertarian wishful thinking cannot undo 60 years of mistaken U.S. policy toward the Islamic world. The fact is that al Qaeda and the Taliban, supported by elements of the Pakistani military and security services, are aiming to establish Islamist regimes in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.37 If we allow this to happen, we condemn ourselves to a decades-long conflict with militant Islam, a conflict that could transform our society beyond recognition, with personal liberty lost in the quest for security.
Pakistan: A Nest of Vipers
Pakistan is undoubtedly the critical area. Here militant Islam and the terrorist threat must be taken on and, if possible, defeated. The first thing to recognize is that Pakistan is, practically speaking, an enemy of the United States.38 Undoubtedly, there are Pakistanis who are relatively pro-Western. Unquestionably, the Pakistanis have helped us hunt down some members of al Qaeda.39 However, the average Pakistani, outside of the major urban areas, by no means wishes us well or shares our values.40 As for the Pakistani establishment, who was it that supplied North Korea and Libya with nuclear expertise?41 It is beyond dispute that members of the armed forces, and particularly the security services, infected with Wahabism, share the goals of al Qaeda and the Taliban. Recall that when Undersecretary of State Richard Armitage was sent to Pakistan after 9/11, his first words to the Pakistani leadership were “prepare to be bombed back to the stone age” (i.e., unless you cooperate). What friend would require such language after the slaughter of 3,000 American civilians?
Kashmir means more to the Pakistanis than their relationship with the United States. They will never sacrifice the jihadists who are fighting against both the United States in Afghanistan and India in Kashmir. At some point, the United States would do well to forego the false friendship of Pakistan, while drawing India into an ever-closer relationship.42
The Pakistanis, in playing the great game, may be riding a tiger that will consume them. The tribal areas of the country’s northwest are under the control of the Pakistani Taliban and al Qaeda. The recently elected Pakistani government, adopting a policy first tried without success in 2006, has negotiated a series of peace deals with the militants.43 Meanwhile, Peshawar, a city of 3 million people, is virtually besieged by militant forces.44 On June 28, the government began an “offensive” in the North-West Frontier Province, which resulted in a few score deaths on each side. Several Taliban were arrested, including one or two mid-level commanders. The Taliban retaliated by seizing several dozen hostages, including police officers and government employees, and threatening to kill them unless their comrades were released.45 The whole affair calls to mind the Keystone Cops, albeit with some bloodshed. The ground truth appears to be that the Pakistani government cannot cope with the militants. Indeed, as previously mentioned, the state apparatus itself is honeycombed with radical Islamists who support the goals of the Taliban.
Thanks in large part to intelligence and training provided to the Taliban by members of the Pakistani security forces, attacks across the border into Afghanistan have grown more deadly.46 The Pakistani government has refused permission for U.S. forces to cross the border and clean up the tribal areas.47 Even if the United States could persuade Pakistan to give the green light, a cross-border campaign would not necessarily solve the problem, given limited U.S. resources, the difficult terrain, and the ability of the insurgents to blend into the populace.
Al Qaeda camps in the northwest reportedly now contain upwards of 2,000 fighters.48 Some terrorism experts are warning that another major terrorist attack on U.S. soil is inevitable.49 Meanwhile, high-level U.S. intelligence officers and military men regularly make the journey to Pakistan to consult with the government of our “ally.” They inevitably return with promises that prove to be empty.
Apart from Obama’s call to hit al Qaeda in Pakistan, no one has put forward a serious proposal to deal with the threat stemming from the tribal areas.50 McCain’s July 15 speech contained nothing but bromides. The call to send two or three additional combat brigades to Afghanistan may help stabilize the situation there, but it’s unlikely to bring victory. It seems then that we will be bogged down in the area for a very long time, while waiting to see whether disaster, in the form of another 9/11, strikes us at home.
Speaking of disaster, another may be brewing in the case of Iran, to which I now turn.
Iran: Casus Belli?
It’s anybody’s guess what current U.S. policy toward Iran truly is. The administration’s goals are clear, but how it plans to reach them remains in question. Its principal aim is to put a stop to the Iranian nuclear program. A second goal has been to curb Iranian interference in Iraq — but with the current quiet on the Iraq scene, that effort has faded somewhat into the background.
Trying to look behind the scenes, one discerns competing interests jostling for influence. The vice president and the neocons are set on regime change, by force if necessary; Defense Secretary Gates and Secretary of State Rice are advocating diplomacy and, if that fails, a ratcheting up of sanctions; the military seeks to avoid a resort to arms, given our overstretched Army and Marine Corps. The president, it appears, tacks first one way, then another. The result has been most unsatisfactory for U.S. interests.51
A sensible approach to Iran and the nuclear issue was laid out by former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski and retired Gen. William Odom (a former director of the NSA) in a May 27 Washington Post op-ed.52 Unfortunately, the administration has not followed their advice. The U.S. approach to the June-July round of the international talks on Iran’s nuclear program, in which it at first held back from sending a representative, then dispatched the undersecretary of state for political affairs simply to hear Iran give its response, baffled observers.53 On the other hand, the United States has announced plans to open an interest section in Tehran, a small but long overdue step.
At the moment, the administration seems to be counting on the threat of new sanctions to persuade the Iranians to yield on the nuclear issue. Simultaneously, it is pursuing wide-ranging covert operations inside Iran, including support for Baluchi and other Sunni separatists — a very dicey proposition indeed, given that these are hardcore Islamists.54
If neither talking nor attempts to destabilize the regime produce results, will this administration resort to a military attack? Almost certainly not. For two years, I have been saying and writing that there will be no U.S. attack on Iran, for the simple reason that we don’t have the forces available. Airpower alone is not enough, and we certainly don’t have the ground troops to spare. The military, with its hands full in Iraq and Afghanistan, wants no part of another war. With the generals and admirals opposed, I don’t believe Cheney and his friends will be able to pull off a “Persian Gulf incident” in this administration’s waning days, though I have no doubt they’d like to.55 Defense Secretary Gates is known to oppose military action against Iran. So long as he remains in office, there will be no U.S. attack.
What of the Israelis? It depends in part on the course of the U.S. election. If McCain, a fervid supporter of Israel, is trailing badly in the polls as election day nears, they may choose to strike. If they do, it will be a very serious blunder, no matter how successful, tactically speaking, the operation may be. The shock waves will reverberate for years, possibly decades, with effects not just in Israel but around the world, including inside the United States. Gates is said to have told the Democratic Caucus, in an off the record talk, that if Iran is attacked “our grandchildren will be fighting jihadists.”56
There is no foreseeable scenario under which a President Obama would order strikes to take out the Iranian nuclear facilities. Whatever the Illinois senator’s shortcomings, he is smart enough to realize that deterrence can work against Iran (a point well made by Brzezinski and Odom). What Obama could do to prevent an Israeli attack on Iran remains to be seen. What McCain might do to assist one is too easily imagined.
The Choice
Which of the two presidential candidates is more likely to prevent a Middle East conflagration? Obama is short on experience but a quick learner. While his foreign policy apparatus contains all too many Clinton administration retreads, the fact that he chose Jack Reed and Chuck Hagel to accompany him to the Middle East inspires confidence. He would enter office with the goodwill of much of the Islamic world and Western Europe. This could be particularly helpful in that the war in Afghanistan will certainly expand under Bush’s successor — both the tempo of the fighting and, quite possibly, its geographic extent.
The tribal areas of Pakistan, not Iraq or Iran, should be the number one national security priority for the next president. To his credit, Obama recognized this some time ago.
McCain, the old warrior, is a man of honor, though obviously not an ideal candidate from the libertarian point of view (neither, of course, is Obama). We would all be far better off today if he had been the Republican nominee in 2000. Possibly, however, his time is past. For all his vaunted national security expertise, he has been wrong about Iraq, Afghanistan, and Iran. Nor is his knowledge of the Middle East as profound as his supporters like to assert.57 He is an old man with a bad temper — not, perhaps, the right figure to take on the responsibilities the next president will face.
Obama has a good chance of winning the election — first because voters are scared about the economy, and second because (as with John Kennedy before him) the mainstream media overwhelmingly want him for president. These factors will probably outweigh the electoral drag of his race. The danger is that, like Kennedy, he will come into office all too sure of himself. One hopes that the counsel of men like Hagel and Reed would prevent a replay of Kennedy’s first year in office.
Whatever can go wrong often does. Who would be better at the helm — a young and flexible man or an old man who has known battle? In a few short weeks, America’s voters will give us their answer.
Notes
1. Figures for July once again revealed higher losses in Afghanistan than in Iraq. In a single Taliban attack on July 13, nine U.S. soldiers died. [return]
2. “A Sober Assessment of Afghanistan,” Washington Post, June 15, 2008. [return]
3. McNeill interview with Susanne Koebl, Spiegel Online, Sept. 24, 2007. In June 2008 there were approximately 65,000 U.S. and allied troops in Afghanistan. According to official sources, trained Afghan army and police forces totaled about 75,000, leaving a shortfall of some 260,000 troops. [return]
4. “U.S. Says Exercise by Israel Seemed Directed at Iran,” New York Times (June 20, 2008). [return]
5. “Bush May End Term With Iran Issue Unsettled,” New York Times (June 21, 2008). [return]
6. The Strait of Hormuz is the “chokepoint” at the entrance of the Persian Gulf. The U.S. could undoubtedly keep the strait open, though the possibility of U.S. ship losses (and therefore war with Iran) would be a constant danger. According to a Reuters dispatch of July 2, 2008, the commander of the U.S. Fifth Fleet, Vice-Adm. Kevin Cosgriff, told a conference on Gulf naval security held at Abu Dhabi that “Iran will not attempt to close the Strait of Hormuz and we will not allow them to close [it].” [return]
7. Associated Press report, June 21, 2008. [return]
8. See the important article by Seymour Hersh, “Preparing the Battlefield,” in the July 7 issue of The New Yorker. Hersh, like Bob Woodward a celebrity überjournalist, resembles the latter in maintaining a rather convoluted relationship with officialdom. Like Woodward again, he has sometimes been wrong about the big stories he has reported over the past 30 years. This particular piece, however, has the ring of truth. [return]
9. See for example “Taliban Imperils Pakistani City, a Major Hub,” New York Times (June 28, 2008). [return]
10. See for example the New York Times articles “Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan” (June 30, 2008) and “Intelligence Chief Says Al Qaeda Improves Ability to Strike in U.S.” (Feb. 6, 2008). [return]
11. Could it be that McCain’s presidential prospects were so tied to the Iraq surge that he was willing, in large part, to ignore Afghanistan? The July 15 speech (the text of which is widely available online) revealed a surprising lack of knowledge about the situation on the ground there. [return]
12. Barack Obama, “My Plan for Iraq,” New York Times (July 14, 2008). [return]
13. See Jon Harrison, “A Successful Surge?” in the March 2008 Liberty. [return]
14. It is this observer’s opinion that the Sadrists probably blundered by not waging all-out war against the government and the Americans in 2008. Without doubt, a Tet-style offensive would have failed militarily, but the resulting chaos and bloodshed would have spelled political doom for the Bush strategy of deliberate drawdown and a long-term U.S. presence. [return]
15. An estimated 700 Sadrists were killed in the fighting. On the other hand, The New York Times on June 21 quoted an unnamed “American defense official” as saying, “We may have wasted an opportunity in Basra to kill those that needed to be killed.” This would not be the first such opportunity wasted, going back to the initial confrontation between U.S. forces and al-Sadr in 2004. [return]
16. A suicide bombing killed 63 people in Baghdad on June 17; another in Baquba on July 15 killed 35 army recruits and wounded twice as many more. Al Qaeda in Iraq has been degraded but by no means eliminated. [return]
17. See for example “Big Gains for Iraq Security, but Questions Linger,” New York Times (June 21, 2008). For indications of reconciliation on the ground, see The New York Times articles “Iran Halts Talks With U.S. on Iraq” (May 6, 2008) and “Iraq City Has Brittle Calm and War Scars” (July 7, 2008). [return]
18. The meetings were organized by a Tufts University trustee, which speaks volumes about the lack of imagination and diplomatic finesse in the U.S. State Department. See “Iraqi Parties, After Meetings in Finland, Agree on Principles to Guide Further Talks,” New York Times (July 6, 2008). [return]
19. For background on Iraqi Shiite Politics and the role of Iran, see Vali Nasr, “The Shia Revival,” (Norton, 2006), especially 187–204 and 223–25. [return]
20. Whether Iran supports a unitary Iraqi state (as do the Sadrists) or an autonomous Shiite south (as does the ISC) remains unclear. Perhaps the Iranians are divided or uncertain on this question. A Shiite-dominated south (and most of Iraq’s oil is located in the south), would be easier to manage, it would seem. Another question is whether Iran really wants the United States out of Iraq. U.S. support for the Shiite-led government furthers rather than hinders the main thrust of Iranian policy, while the tying-down of U.S. forces in Iraq makes a U.S. attack on Iran less likely. At the same time, Iran, employing its client Hezbollah, is training Shiite fighters (including Sadrists) to kill Americans in Iraq. The multiple layers of Iranian policy are beyond the comprehension of most American voters and politicians. [return]
21. “Sunnis End Boycott and Rejoin Iraqi Government,” New York Times (July 20, 2008). At the same time, members of the Shiite United Iraqi Alliance replaced four Sadrist ministers who had been boycotting the government since May 2007. [return]
22. See The New York Times articles “Talks With U.S. on Security Pact Are at an Impasse, the Iraqi Prime Minister Says” (June 14, 2008) and “A More Confident Iraq Becomes a Tougher Negotiating Partner for the U.S.” (July 10, 2008). [return]
23. In some parts of the country, even the Iraqi police have been dying like men. See “Iraq City Has Brittle Calm and War Scars,” op. cit. [return]
24. “Shiite Militia in Baghdad Sees Its Power Ebb,” New York Times (July 27, 2008). [return]
25. For Basra see “Drive in Basra by Iraqi Army Makes Gains,” New York Times (May 12, 2008). [return]
26. However, see the biting comments by Iraqis in the July 16 New York Times article, “Suicide Bombers Kill 35 Iraqi Recruits.” [return]
27. On July 28, after suicide bombers killed dozens in Kirkuk, mob violence broke out, pitting Kurds against Turkmen – this despite the fact that the bombings bore all the hallmarks of Arab al Qaeda. [return]
28. Perhaps the most striking evidence for Iraq as imperial project was the recent awarding of no-bid contracts to Western oil companies to service Iraqi oilfields. This marked a return of the companies to Iraq after a 36-year hiatus. More importantly, it effectively cut Russia and China out of the Iraqi market. On the security side, the United States, in negotiations for a security pact, has sought the right to establish no fewer than 50 long-term bases on Iraqi soil. [return]
29. “Bush, in Shift, Accepts Idea of Iraq Timeline,” New York Times (July 19, 2008). [return]
30. In late July, however, McCain seemed to be edging toward endorsement of a timeline for withdrawal. See “Bush and McCain Seem to Diverge in Foreign Policy,” New York Times (July 26, 2008). [return]
31. For the views of Iraqis on Obama and his plan for their country, see “In Iraq, Mixed Feelings About Obama and His Troop Proposal,” New York Times (July 17, 2008). The article is an interesting snapshot of Iraqi attitudes toward the U.S. presence. [return]
32. Maliki interview with Spiegel Online (July 19, 2008). The Bush administration was on the phone with Maliki’s office almost immediately. However, claims that al-Maliki’s remarks were mistranslated proved incorrect. Al-Maliki’s spokesman, Ali al-Dabbagh, told reporters on July 21 “We are hoping that in 2010 that all combat troops will withdraw from Iraq.” [return]
33. To some extent, his support for Obama’s position is tied to Iraqi electoral politics. Once the provincial elections are over, he could if necessary cozy up to the Americans again. [return]
34. “Afghan Death Toll Up as Iraq’s Falls,” New York Times (July 2, 2008). [return]
35. The conflict also resembles a World War III by proxy, with Pakistan, Iran, and Russia involved, as well as NATO and the various nonstate actors. On this see Ullrich Fichter, “Why NATO Troops Can’t Deliver Peace in Afghanistan,” Spiegel Online (May 29, 2008). [return]
36. See the sobering article by Elizabeth Rubin, “Battle Company Is Out There” in the February 24 New York Times Magazine. A great piece of reporting. [return]
37. See for example the Associated Press article by Jason Straziuso, “U.S. think tank: Pakistan helped Taliban insurgents” published in The Washington Post on June 9. The RAND Corp. study, “Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan,” on which the article was based, can be downloaded from RAND’s website. See also The New York Times articles “Pakistanis Aided Attack in Kabul” (Aug. 1, 2008) and “CIA Outlines Pakistan Links With Militants” (July 30, 2008). [return]
38. Ibid. The Pakistani prime minister, Yousaf Raza Gilani, visited Washington on July 28–30. Interviewed on the PBS program “The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer” on the 29th, he denied any links between Pakistan and militants. “We would not allow that” he said. Whether Gilani is a liar or a fool remains to be seen. [return]
39. But not the big two. [return]
40. In contrast to Iran, where the great mass of the people are pro-Western, despite the insults they have suffered at Western hands. [return]
41. The idea that this was some sort of rogue operation is patently absurd. [return]
42. Unfortunately, the main supply route for U.S. forces in Afghanistan runs from the port of Karachi through Pakistan and the Khyber Pass. [return]
43. See “Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” op. cit. [return]
44. Taliban Imperil Pakistani City, a Major Hub,” op. cit. [return]
45. See “Taliban Threaten to Kill Officials Held Hostage,” New York Times (July 19, 2008). [return]
46. “U.S. think tank: Pakistan helped Taliban insurgents,” op. cit. [return]
47. The Pakistanis have allowed predator strikes against some high-value targets, principally al Qaeda Arabs, but nothing more. In 2003, the Pakistani government pressured the Bush administration to halt joint U.S.-Pakistani special forces operations on Pakistani territory. [return]
48. “Amid Policy Disputes, Qaeda Grows in Pakistan,” op. cit. [return]
49. Ibid. [return]
50. Obama has been derided by some for “wanting to attack a U.S. ally.” It is unclear whether those (like Sean Hannity) who employ this phrase simply lack understanding of the situation or are indulging in a political cheap shot. [return]
51. Space constraints prevent any extensive exploration of the policy background here. The reader is directed to the Iran studies published by Ted Galen Carpenter of the Cato Institute, which can be found on Cato’s website. [return]
52. Zbigniew Brzezinski and William Odom, “A Sensible Path on Iran,” Washington Post (May 27, 2008). Odom died three days later at his vacation home in Vermont, a great loss to supporters of sensible U.S. policies in the Middle East. [return]
53. “Nuclear Talks With Iran End in a Deadlock,” New York Times (July 20, 2008). [return]
54. “Preparing the Battlefield,” op. cit. [return]
55. Cheney was undoubtedly the driving force behind the resignation in March of Adm. William Fallon, the head of Central Command, who opposed military action against Iran. But the Pentagon brass, with Bush and Cheney only months away from leaving office, was not intimidated. Fallon, by the way, reportedly referred to Gen. David Petraeus as “an ass-kissing little chickenshit.” [return]
56. Audio remarks of Seymour Hersh on newyorker.com. [return]
57. See “McCain, Iraq War and the Threat of ‘Al Qaeda,’” New York Times (April 19, 2008) and Matthew Yglesias, “McCain’s Mixed-up Timeline,” theatlantic.com (July 22, 2008). [return]
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