Liberty

April 1993 Vol. 6, No. 4 $4.00

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by Douglas Casey

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an interview with Roy Childs

Workers Take Control

by Jesse Walker

Vicious Bureaucrats vs Helpless Wolves

by John A. Baden

Isn't Multiculturalism a Good Thing?

by Stephen Cox

Winning the War on Landlords

by Scott Gardner

Also: *Chester A. Arthur* on the marvelous dumbness of Al Gore, *David Ross* on the degradation of boys' literature, *Bill Kauffman* on the crackpot critics of Frank Capra . . . and much, much more.

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Inside Liberty

April 1993
Volume 6, Number 4

Letters

Clinton's Unconsummated Marriage

There's more to America's "new civic religion" than R.W. Bradford pointed out (February 1993). Social psychologist Leon Festinger (*A Theory of Cognitive Dissonance*, 1957) predicted that a person will value a particular choice more *after* making the decision than just before it. This increasing enthusiasm toward the choice occurs even when there is no change at all in the facts concerning the different candidate choices.

This prediction fits very well with the sudden jump in the public's confidence in Clinton's abilities right after the election, as reported in public opinion polls. The slight improvement in some economic parameters doesn't seem great enough to account for the euphoria. In fact, I've been wondering whether this Festinger effect might explain most of the political "honeymoon" effect.

The media appears to be anomalous, however. On CNN at least, many liberal reporters and commentators quickly became very critical of Clinton. A special target of much cynical commentary and derision is the choice of a cabinet "by the numbers" (gender and race driven). They are saying things about this that would have been considered highly politically incorrect not long ago. It seems that, their candidate having won, the media people are awfully eager to jump on Clinton's back for something that seems entirely consistent with what he talked about during the whole campaign. Apparently, the conservative threat is no more, and media paranoia is trained upon threats from the new liberal bosses.

The honeymoon between the new administration and the media may turn out to be one of the shortest on record!

Sandy Shaw
Privacy, Nev.

Do History a Favor

I was intrigued by James Ostrowski's "In Freedom's Way" (February 1993). His call for strategic thinking is appropriate. One of many strategies that will be necessary is a plan for recovery when the collective state finally collapses. Going directly from a strong, interventionist, controlling and paternalistic government, to a state of anarchy would result in certain violence and a probable development of feudalistic society. A libertarian plan for continuation of a smaller, noninterventionist state that will protect the individual rights to property and self-determination could help to prevent that undesirable repeat of history.

John A. Bennett
Sequim, Wash.

Beyond the Horizon Blues

James Ostrowski may be right in saying that only a catastrophe can stop the slow decline of freedom. Not to worry. A catastrophe may be a lot closer than Ostrowski realizes.

As the situation deteriorates in the Middle East, America may be drawn into war again. Now no likely foe could defeat American forces on the battlelfield. But with the help of Russia's far right wing, still smarting from their humiliating collapse and itching for revenge, Arab terrorists could smuggle nuclear weapons into American coastal cities and do terrible damage.

And don't forget the UFO's. Overwhelming evidence shows that we are being visited by extra-terrestrial beings with vastly superior technology. Judging from the extra-terrestrials' penchant for secrecy, their aims are most likely sinister. Many UFO investigators even suspect the extra-terrestrials have underground bases throughout the western United States. The potential therefore exists for a global catastrophe at any time.

Christopher Condon
The Woodlands, Tex.

Half Open Solution

Recently I have been trying to understand the implications of libertarian immigration policy. So I was glad to see your February '93 article," The Half Open Door" by R.K. Lamb. The article, while helpful, does not happen to address the question on which I have focused. Here I will state my present understanding, and hope that someone can correct me if I am mistaken:

We libertarians would not say that private property owners should be required to take immigrants onto their land. So the libertarian goal of open borders runs into trouble, of which Lamb warns, only if we assume that there is public space into which immigrants can pour. This is another instance of the tragedy of the commons.

In a libertarian country all property would be private, and any private property owner could welcome, or turn away, anyone. Open borders would mean no national policy, but every property owner could be expected to have a private policy.

Do you agree?

Richard O. Hammer
Hillsborough, N.C.

Lambasted

R.K. Lamb ignores both the sordid reality of the status quo and the context of libertarian plans for a free society. Existing immigration practice is to divide the world into government-approved people and non-government-approved people. Under it, I cannot sell my house to a willing buyer because, if she is not a government-approved person, she will be forcibly prevented from coming to live in the house she has bought. I can be imprisoned for hiring the willing worker of my choice if that worker is not on the government list of approved people. My available choices in food, music, and friends are a small fraction of what they could be. To justify this, the negatives of open immigration have to be serious indeed. Are they?

Lamb is right when he observes that with open immigration, "The minimum wage would be swept away, welfare swamped, food stamps shredded." Lamb's prospect of "people selling . . . strange, gooey stuff door-to-door" breaks on my choice to live in a neighborhood from which all door-to-door salesmen are excluded by the owner of the street. Similarly, the prospect of "people camped on school playgrounds, in city parks, along the streets" vanishes when all of these places are private, and protected by normal sactions against trespassing on private property.

Adam V. Reed
Morganville, N.J.

Bottom Line

R.K. Lamb's article paints a not unrealistic picture of the effect of an open-door immigration policy on the quality of life in the United States and then says, in essence: if you really knew what it would be like, if you removed your heads from the clouds of theory and looked at the hard facts, you libertarians wouldn't advocate true open immigration.

There do seem to be libertarians who

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STUDENTS

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—Sherry Ingram, Yale University, seminar participant

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believe that a nation devoted to libertarian principles would necessarily be a utopia where everyone would live happily ever after. But there are at least some of us, Mr. Lamb, who are willing to allow other people their liberty even though we wouldn't always like what transformed overnight into a libertarian state (or "non-state"). I would detest the effects of private ownership of rivers, I would dislike not being able to camp where I liked in the Adirondacks, and I would miss zoning in my hometown. Even now, I would rather that half of the current population of the U.S. would move to, say, India, and stop crowding the pieces of open country left between cities on our East Coast. But I wouldn't make them go at gunpoint.

Nor would I keep immigrants out at gunpoint. Would Mr Lamb? If so — what does it mean to believe in liberty?

James McEwan
Lakeville, Conn.

Lynch Mob Rule

L. Neil Schulman ("Hangman, Spare that Murderer," September 1992) sheds light on why libertarianism has not been all that popular with the general public.

Schulman's concept of society is one whose moral basis assumes not that if men were angels no government would be necessary, but rather that men would be angels if no government existed to despoil their noble instincts. You don't need the absence of government to disprove that, all you need to do is turn off the electric power in any city for a few hours and observe what happens.

So how do you argue with a man who sees no moral difference between a lynch mob and a criminal justice system? If you value your sanity, you don't. Arguments are usually indulged in with a reasonable expectation of changing your opponents mind. But if no common grounds exist, no successful conclusions are possible. You might as well argue in English with a person who speaks only French.

Unlike Schulman, I am quite comfortable operating within imperfect human institutions that are, in a democracy, capable of evolving into better ones. His proposal to extract something of equal value from a murderer to compensate for their victim's loss overlooks an important point. Their victim is dead.

John Carter
Earleysville, Va.

Retributio ad absurdum

I am one who takes the view "No capital punishment, ever, no matter what." However, it is not out of any concern for killers as John Hospers implies in his "Just Deserts" piece (February 1992).

I am, first, horrified at the prospect of mistakes. I would expect libertarians, who generally don't even credit the government's ability to pick up the trash on time, to be exceedingly wary of entrusting that institution with human life. However, this fear could be allayed somewhat if proponents of capital punishment will allow one codicil to the authority: should it too late be shown that an error was made and an innocent human being executed, then the lives of the judge, prosecutor, executioner and all jury members who conspired in this murder are likewise forfeit. This does no more than eliminate the doctrine of sovereign immunity and restore a modicum of "retributivism" to the system. I infer, therefore, that Mr Hospers would support such a proviso. Upon such conditions, I suspect that there would be damned few executions and those that did occur would be unlikely to be done in error.

Even so, I would remain opposed to capital punishment because of the brutalizing effect it has on society. Endorsing capital punishment is saying in essence that it is alright to take the life of a helpless human being in cold blood— so long as due process was afforded. Again, I am surprised that opposition to this philosophy does not come naturally to libertarians for whom the only justification for the use of force is self-defense.

Tim O'Brien
Madison Heights, Mich.

Not Marrou's Fault

Chester Alan Arthur's recap of the Andre Marrou campaign for president ("Behind the Electoral Disaster," February 1993) may have most of the facts correct, but his conclusions don't make sense. He also devotes too much energy, for my liking, to personal attacks on Marrou, who has spent many thousands of hours over a period of several years, trying to help spread the libertarian message and build the Libertarian Party. It is too easy to criticize an underfunded, poorly supported inadequately staffed campaign effort after it fails to achieve unrealistic goals. Why bother?

The vote totals of every Libertarian Party presidential candidate to date have been statistically insignificant. Any comparison which attempts to differentiate campaign results based on candidate performance is utterly ludicrous. That's like evaluating the impact of your furnace on global warming.

All that Marrou's vote total tells me is that he never managed to receive sufficient visibility as a candidate to earn credibility in the eyes of voters. If Ed Clark had run in 1992 on Marrou's budget and with Ross Perot absorbing disenchanted voters, Clark would have done no better. I ran for governor in Colorado in 1982 as a Libertarian, and I can tell you, if you campaign without participating in major debates; without serious media attention; without funds to buy major amounts of television advertising; and, without significant name recognition, no matter how well you campaign, you will be ignored on election day. Your votes will come from hardcore principled libertarians (those who vote, at least), from friends and relatives and from those voters who want to protest against the major choices. No matter how soundly you defeat your opponents in candidate forums, no matter how persuasive you are on radio talk shows and in media interviews, the overwhelming majority of voters won't know you exist and your vote total will be insignificant.

Paul Grant
Englewood, Colo.

Arthur responds: If the quality of the candidate makes no difference, as Grant argues, then why should LP members put any time or effort in trying to select a good candidate? If election returns for LP presidential candidates are "statististically insignificant," then must we attribute the 95% decline in the LP presidential vote in Alaska in the past 12 years to random noise?

Two Party Partisan

I am heartened by Chester Alan Arthur's comment that he suspects "that many will abandon the Libertarian Party for other parties, and that some will begin

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Letters Policy

We invite readers to comment on articles that have appeared in *Liberty*. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity. All letters are assumed to be intended for publication unless otherwise stated. Succinct, typewritten letters are preferred. Please include your phone number so that we can verify your identity.

Reflections

A tale of two Texans — In 1989, when a Republican President nominated Texas Republican Sen. John Tower to be Secretary of Defense, the Senate committee considering the matter grilled him without mercy, relentlessly snooping into his private life, ferreting out information about his use of alcohol and his sex life. After forcing him to take an oath of abstinence from hard liquor, they rejected him anyway.

In 1993, when a Democrat President nominated Texas Democrat Sen. Lloyd Bentsen to be Secretary of the Treasury, the Senate Committee considering his nomination did not ask him a single question. Instead, it endorsed him unanimously, honoring him with a standing ovation. The elderly zillionaire tool of special interests took office without any pledge to abstain from giving subsidies to his buddies and otherwise loot the public treasury.

This, I suppose, is what the Democrats meant last fall when they argued that Clinton should be elected to end "gridlock" in Washington. —CAA

Rap on the head — The Board of Health in Seattle has just adopted a rule making it a crime to ride a bicycle without a helmet. There are lots of things one could say about this. My choice is "What the #@#!%!@!"

I guess it is just a natural extension of mandatory motorcycle helmet laws and automobile seat belt laws. As those earlier laws were passed, many people fought the clear encroachment on individual liberties with the argument: "If they can mandate this, what's next?" Now, we know what's next but still have to wonder what will be the next next. There will be one. Don't you worry.

Perhaps, after some ground-breaking research into the head injuries incurred by children while tobogganing, mandatory sledding helmets will seem prudent. This wouldn't be all bad though. Just think of the great breakthroughs in thermal, protective headwear this would encourage. Eventually, with the degeneration of our cities, when the benefits of full-time head protection, full-time flak jackets, and permanent condoms are realized, they could meld it all into full-on electronic body armor. Time to go long on Bell Helmet stock.

Meanwhile, couldn't the Seattle police skip the citation and just sell people helmets? The scheduled fine, $30, is roughly equal to the price of a low end helmet, and this way, they could ensure compliance. The officer would pull you over, take your money, padlock the helmet on your head, then test your new melon-protector with a few strokes of his nightstick. —BDK

High on Italy — Italy has just decriminalized the personal use of illicit drugs, from marijuana to cocaine and heroin. Illogically, the *selling* of such substances will still be a crime — but let that pass, for now. The reform is still a welcome triumph of common sense.

It will be interesting to see whether the Italian experience will conform to the dire predictions of the more strident opponents of decriminalization. According to William Bennett's thinking, the populace of the venerable Boot will in short order consist mostly of vacant-eyed junkies and the victims of their depredations.

Well, time will tell. Meanwhile, I will make two predictions. First, in Italy nothing at all will happen. Those who have been using naughty substances will continue to do so; the vast majority who don't, still won't. Second, there will be a total silence concerning the matter from the Bill Bennetts of the world. —WPM

Progressive definition — *Wall Street Journal* pundit Albert Hunt admires Clinton's "sensible shifts from campaign pronouncements" (that is, broken promises). —JSS

Diversity ain't what it used to be — Bill Clinton worked admirably hard to achieve diversity of race, ethnicity, and gender in his cabinet. (Whether he achieved *sexual* diversity we have not been informed.) For example, after an arduous search, he managed to find a female academic economist who is against free trade to be chairwoman of the Council of Economic Advisers. But in his quest to make his cabinet "look like America," Clinton fell short in two ways, at least: he neglected to appoint someone who believes government should do less not more, and, as the *New Republic* pointed out, he gave lawyers a grossly disproportionate presence.

But perhaps I've confused diversity with difference. —SR

Revisionist revisionism — Charles Beard's wise characterization of Wilsonian internationalism — "perpetual war for perpetual peace" — will have to be retired, I suppose; the new Bushian internationalism as represented by the spirit of Somalia is "perpetual war for perpetual charity." —BD

First punk — The presence of an adolescent girl in the White House is sure to provide amusement during the next four years. What will the glare of growing up in public do to this young woman, not terribly attractive by conventional standards, daughter of the symbolic king of the entire "system," overprivileged and probably feeling plenty guilty about it, and likely to go through the normal identity crises of adolescence?

Given the cocoon in which Chelsea undoubtedly lives, the last thing anyone would expect is that she might turn to

punk rock. But don't be surprised if she does. Youth subculture has come to the Mall in the last year or so. On January 3, the girl-punk movement known as "Riot Grrrl" got front page attention in the Washington *Post*'s "Outlook" section. I hope Chelsea read it.

Riot Grrrls are angry young women, with rhetorical tendencies toward female separatism and supremacy. They are usually children of the suburban upper-middle to upper-class connected by a xeroxed, self-produced fanzine network, politically "progressive" and opposed inexorably to patriarchy, meat-eating, and everything else that makes up this society they see as unconscionably repressive and brutal towards women and the planet. They are out to be abrasive and shocking, they don't care what you think, but they damn well want you to notice them and pay attention to what they have to say. And if you're anything like me in your tastes in music, expression and attitude (and young women), you will. I see many of them around Washington D.C., where I and now Chelsea live. There are so many in the area that I was able to attend a Riot Grrrl convention this summer, where Riot Grrrl bands and zinesters came from all over to play, commiserate, and plot the death of patriarchy. (I was actually only allowed to attend half of the convention; no boys were allowed the first day.)

What I learned from the *Post* article that I hadn't already learned from personal experience is that Sidwell Friends is one of the local schools where many Riot Grrrls are born. And Chelsea, I suspect, is in the perfect psychic position to embrace a way of teenage girl life that tells her everything her dad stands for is shit; especially for the young girl whose dad could be thought to stand for *everything* wrong with our culture; after all, he's "running the show," right?

I hope this all comes true, and Chelsea will shove through a claque of scandalized reporters one day soon with her hair a fried-out Kool-Aid red, nose-ringed, and snarl "bite my left one." (battle cry and album title for Bikini Kill, the Queen of Riot Grrrl bands.) —BD

Do as I legislate, not as I do — The Premier of Quebec, Robert Bourassa, is a strong advocate of Canada's nationalized health care system. He has also been suffering from a rather serious form of skin cancer. Recently his condition required surgery. It really isn't necessary to go on, is it? *Of course* he came to the United States for the operation. This sort of thing is so routine it's not even news anymore. When is the last time you heard of some prominent American traveling to our Neighbor to the North for medical treatment? More to the point, how many wealthy Canucks stay in their own country for such services? —WPM



"I don't blame Captain Kangaroo for retiring — All those years without a promotion!"

Atlas drugged — This from the Associated Press: "A Tennessee drifter who said he set churches afire to help stave off homosexual urges and the compulsion to steal cars was found not guilty by reason of insanity" in January by a federal judge in Florida. Patrick Lee Frank was accused of setting 17 church fires in 1991. He has been diagnosed as a paranoid schizophrenic, and after his verdict he was locked in a federal mental hospital.

What is noteworthy about the case is not its rarity. Unfortunately, it is not nearly rare enough. One of the insanities of the legal system is that people like Frank can escape moral judgment by conjuring up a sufficiently bizarre explanation for their criminal actions. No, what is noteworthy about the case is what Frank's public defender had to say. Tom Miller commented that his client would spend many years in the hospital, adding, revealingly, "unless there is a miracle drug that is not (yet) available that would make people more comfortable to say he is cured." No psychiatrist would have been so unsophisticated as to have put it that way. Psychiatry's myth is that it cures the "mentally ill." But like the little boy in the "Emperor's New Clothes," this naive lawyer (I guess that's not a contradiction in terms) blurted out something much closer to the truth: that the real object of psychiatric treatment is not the so-called mentally ill, but *us*. When a drug comes along that makes us feel Frank is cured, he will be let out of the hospital that has locks on the doors. Why not cut out the middleman and just give the drugs directly to us? —SR

Grasping Gore — Comedians — generally the most prescient observers of the American political scene — have identified Vice President Albert Gore's salient characteristic as his resemblance to a mechanical puppet. As I reviewed the vice presidential debate, I could appreciate this conclusion. As Dan Quayle passionately defended the boneheaded conservatism he inherited from his family, punctuating his theses with broad gestures taught him by a high school debate coach, and Admiral Stockdale did his wonderful imitation of everyone's favorite senilescent uncle, Al Gore droned on and on and on, as if his head were full of gears.

But for once, the comics got it wrong. Al Gore's mechanistic monotone is a false front for a characteristic far more essential to his inner nature. Consider two of his responses.

Dotty old Admiral Stockdale posed this puzzler for Al:

> I read where Sen. Gore's mentor had disagreed with some of the scientific data that is in his book. How do you respond to criticisms of that sort?

Al responded:

> Thank you, Admiral, for saying that. You're talking about Roger Revelle. His family wrote a lengthy letter saying how terribly he had been misquoted and had his remarks taken completely out of context just before he died. He believed up until the day he died . . . (audience laughs) No, it's true. He died last year, and just before he died he co-authored an arti-

cle which had statements taken completely out of context.

In fact, the vast majority of the world's scientists — and they have worked on this extensively — believe that we must have an effort to face up to the problems we face with the environment and if we just stick our heads in the sand and pretend that it's not real we're not doing ourselves a favor. Even worse than that, we're telling our children and all future generations that we weren't willing to face up to this obligation. I believe that we have a mandate to try to solve this problem, particularly when we can do it while we create jobs in the process.

After clarifying the criticism that Stockdale suggested, Gore proceeded to ignore the criticism entirely. Normally when a politician uses this tactic, he switches the subject and delivers a few carefully chosen and rehearsed words. Not Al. He simply babbled incoherently, losing control of both his grammar and any semblance of rationality.

Does Gore actually believe that some critics have suggested that we shouldn't face the problems we face? Does he actually believe that scientists have done extensive research on whether we ought to face the problems that we face? What sort of work could convince "leading scientists" of this? And have these scientists also done "extensive work" on the issue of whether "we should stick our heads in the sand and pretend it's not real"? To what does the word "it" refer? What obligation is Gore talking about? What problem do we have a mandate to try to solve? And who are these scientists who have researched the question of whether "pretending" problems are not real is "doing ourselves a favor"? What competence does the "majority of the world's scientists" — botanists, geologists, seismologists, mathematicians, theoretical physicists, etc. — have to decide on the public-policy question that Gore seems to be discussing? And how were these people polled?

Here is Gore's response to the question that followed, this one about health care:

There are almost 40 million Americans who work full time today and yet have no health insurance. We are proposing to change that, not with a government-run plan, not with new taxes, but with a new approach, called "managed competition." We are going to provide a standard health insurance package provided by private insurance companies, and eliminate the duplication and red tape and overlap and we are going to have cost controls to eliminate the unnecessary procedures that are costing so much money today.

"We are going to provide a system provided by private companies"? I'm glad we've got that straight. Is the problem of skyrocketing health care costs and the unavailability of medical care to some people really caused by "duplication and red tape and overlap"? What's the difference between "duplication" and "overlap"? And what overlap is he talking about? And what is an "unnecessary procedure"? Please tell me — I feel a little sick.

What is remarkable about these responses is not their evasiveness. What is remarkable is their sheer stupidity. Mostly, they don't make sense, but when a meaning is discernible, it is self-contradictory or idiotic.

Sure, Gore responded to questions mechanically, usually reciting a well-rehearsed spiel. But when he ventured from his script, he babbled like an idiot, juxtaposing phrases he had heard into a sort of goopy mass of clichés, contradictions, banalities and sheer nonsense.

For four years, we have been entertained by a slightly stupid frat boy who somehow got elected Vice President. The next four years look less interesting. Compared to Al Gore, Dan Quayle is a virtuoso of the English language and a genius of speculative philosophy. Normally, stupidity in high public office is good for some guffaws. Gore somehow makes it *just plain dull.* —CAA

Envision world uniformity — William Safire, the self-described "libertarian hawk" who is the only readable eminence on the Op-Ed page of the New York *Times*, cheers Slick Willie's endorsement of "the Wilson-FDR-Truman-Kennedy-Johnson view of the American burden." With the Kemp-Bennett-Cheney chickenhawk globalists in charge of the GOP, our Two-In-One party system can careen from intervention to intervention — in Somalia, Iraq, Bosnia, Panama, and wherever else there are ratholes to be filled and colored people to be killed. Yet, Safire warns, a few refractory lugs refuse to get with the program: they are "isolationists of the resentful right, Perot protectionists, diplomatic accommodationists, and old New Left peaceniks now lying quietly in the weeds."



Safire uses mildly pejorative terms to caricature the opposition, but we get the picture: anyone who dissents from the Perpetual War Consensus is a racist working-class thug, a Main Street Rotarian in love with Norman Rockwell and high tariffs, a femmy Alger Hiss type who takes tea at the Communist vicarage, or an indolent pothead who thinks Jim Morrison is still alive.

I don't know about "diplomatic accommodationists" — I thought the stereotypical striped-pants State Department functionary disappeared with Quemoy, Matsu, and the hula hoop — but the other three blocs are on the side of the angels, defending human scale living, self-determination, and an American identity that

"The Leaning Tower of Gore," by Gunnar Bergstrom

is something greater than the Bush-Clinton vision of docile allegiant consumerists of the New World Order. Their European cousins — French farmers, Scottish nationalists, German hippies, and those beautiful stubborn Danes — are heroically keeping the European Community from swallowing whole peoples and cultures and traditions.

So as we rally round the flag, boys and girls, in defense of America and our little pieces thereof, let's join arms with all those pissed-off Polacks, gray-collar Perotistas, and Grateful Deadheads who so alarm our Rulers and their hired scriveners. It's an American thing; the New York *Times* wouldn't understand. —BK

No taxation with representation! — This past election the voters of Colorado approved the most revolutionary tax initiative in America's history: they stripped elected officials of the right to tax. They passed a constitutional amendment that requires electoral approval of any tax measure at any level of state or local government. That's 1,935 units, from water districts to school districts on up. What's more, any ballot that proposes a tax increase must specify the amount needed to get the job done. If the tax then generates more than expected, the surplus must be refunded to the taxpayers. But if the revenue falls short of the goal, the taxers have to go back to the voters.

Now that's spending control!

Opponents of the amendment outspent supporters by more than two to one, and managed to convince 46% of Colorado's voters that they ought not seize the right to impose taxes out of the hands of bureaucrats and politicians.

I don't know what sort of arguments opponents of this very democratic measure mustered. Did they argue that citizens ought have no say in how much they are plundered? That people are too dumb to know what's good for them? What could have motivated the opposition? Simple contempt for popular will? Anti-democratic rancor?

Probably the opposition wasn't driven by deep conviction at all. Opposition came from the ranks of complacent supporters of the status quo, from lobbyists who figure it's easier to convince a handful of legislators to raise people's taxes than to convince a majority of the people, and from supporters of the paternalistic-tending creep of government in general.

"I couldn't fix dinner — The Consumer Protection Agency recalled everything."

The same election in Colorado offered voters a chance to consider a "mere" 1% sales tax increase for the improvement of the state's educational system, a black hole into which people can't get enough of throwing dollars. 55% said no. —SJR

Tweedle-dee-dumb & Tweedle-doo-doo — Bill Clinton didn't waste any time before he started breaking his campaign promises; a month before his inauguration, he's already backtracked on half a dozen. From welcoming Haitian refugees to altering relations with China to pushing through middle-class tax relief, there's scarcely a pledge he hasn't at least decided to "reconsider." Some say if the election were to be held again, Slick Willie would lose, but I'm not so sure. Once the voting was out of the way, our Lame-Duck-Chief set about sending troops into Somalia, setting things up for Operation Desert-Vú, pardoning Iran - Contra scum — actions that, however popular they might presently be in the polls, were clearly too controversial for Mr Bush to perform in the midst of election season.

I don't know which is worse; listening to the candidates lie about what they're going to do once elected, or feeling the pinch when they do what was really on their minds. —JW

The cost of quackery — Scientistic hubris marches on. The latest dispatch from the fantasylands of economic "science" is from Andrew F. Brimmer of Brimmer & Co., an economic consulting firm in Washington, who tells us that he has calculated the cost, in Gross Domestic Product, of racial discrimination in the workplace. For 1991, it turns out, racism cost us all $215 billion.

You see, this number represents the added amounts blacks should be making if they were hired for jobs that fully represented their educational achievement; this is the extra amount they *would be paid.* So presumably if this $215 billion "loss" were to be made up, it would require employers to come up with an extra $215 billion. (Apparently, every cent of our money we don't give to someone else is a dead loss to the "Gross Domestic Product.")

And even Brimmer grants, according to the January 7 Washington *Post*, that "overt discrimination may not be there, but the echoes are there." So it is these "echoes" that are making millions of individual hiring and payment decisions in the minds of millions of employers. And of course, the inevitable policy recommendation that results from this breakthrough in economic "science": more affirmative action. After all, it'll make us $215 billion richer.

The most important advances in human knowledge in the next century will be wiping out all the fake "knowledge" of this sort with which the 20th century disciplines of economics, sociology and psychology have weighted down our thinking and discourse. —BD

Live and let Di — The British royal family serves the country only as a source of scandal and disgrace these days, a sad clown troupe in a particularly ugly corner of the national bread and circuses. I suggest a cost-effective means

of ending their blight of doddering blue bloods, one that is in perfect keeping with the role they have played of late in the commonwealth's public consciousness and taste: Throw them all to the lions in public gladiatorial competition.

It would be scarcely less civilized and dignified than ogling at photos of their toe-sucking and reading about their suicide attempts and speculating about those parts of their sex lives still shrouded enough to demand speculation. Plus, I calculate it would add, umm, $59 billion to their GDP. —BD

New consumer trend — The biggest unanswered question about the new administration is, what consumer product will soar in popularity now that we have elected a new president? Reagan's election goosed the sales of jelly-beans, and Bush's victory caused a run on deep-fried pork rinds. Alas, I am unable to make a prediction. Though Clinton's paunch suggests he isn't missing many meals, there is little evidence that his appetites run toward food of one particular sort; his lusts seem directed more toward power and sex. When I saw Tipper Gore and Hillary Clinton at the inauguration, the thought struck me: maybe there'll be a run on peroxide. —RWB

Prepackaging opinion — We're all tired of the endless proliferations of "news analyses," "perspectives on the news," "backgrounds on the news," and the other utter nonsense that newspapers insist on featuring at the expense of news stories. Everyone realizes that these features are merely ways for a newspaper's staff to vent its ideology while maintaining that the newspaper itself is fully objective and impartial.

But I'm growing increasingly annoyed at the liberty that writers of "hard" news are now taking to indoctrinate their readers without, apparently, even knowing that they are doing so. I don't especially object to the opinions that these writers express. What I object to is being treated like a child.

One example will do: a front-page story in the Los Angeles *Times*: "Yugoslavia's Panic Ousted by Radicals." I smell something already: "radicals" isn't exactly the most objective term I can think of. I remember that Barry Goldwater was considered a "radical" when he ran for president in 1964. And we all know that the bad guys in the Russian legislature — the people whom Marx would recognize as left-wing radicals — are routinely called "conservatives" and "right-wingers" by the U.S. media. But I press on to the "news" story itself:

> Encouraged by their recent electoral triumph, ultranationalist Serbian radicals voted Tuesday to oust Milan Panic from the office of federal prime minister. The no-confidence motion against the moderate Panic easily passed both houses of the federal Parliament, spurred on by the wave of extremism that has washed over the remains of Yugoslavia since a Dec. 20 election defeated proponents of peace and reform.

Well, fine. All of this may be true; in fact, I'd be willing to bet on it. To the extent that I care what happens in Serbia, I like Panic much better than his opponents, who seem to fit my own definition of "extremists." But I don't like to get my news after it has passed through somebody else's ideological alimentary canal. I'll make up my own mind about who is a proponent of "peace and reform," thank you. I believe that I have some chance of deciding on my own about who is a "moderate" and who is an "ultra," if the kindly newswriters will just give me the facts about the names, actions, and explicit positions of the parties involved.

I know that label-mongering is supposed to make the news easier to read, but what's the point? If you're interested enough in Serbia to want to read news reports about Serbia, I suppose you're also interested enough to want to affix your own labels to Serbian activities. If something in a news report strikes you as "extremism," you can remark to yourself, "This is extremism!" The *Times* isn't making your life much easier by usurping this task.

I don't like to get my news after it has passed through somebody else's ideological alimentary canal. I'll make up my own mind about who is a proponent of "peace and reform," thank you.

What you'd like to see in a newspaper is the who, what, where, and when — the news, in short — and you don't want to be forced to hunt for it through paragraph after paragraph of opinions.

Opinions, as we know, are what *Liberty* is for. —SC

Rethinking Clinton — I got a call the other day from a radio commentator who pointed out that I had goofed when I suggested that Bill Clinton's superbly skillful deviousness would enable him to be a particularly good president, especially in matters of foreign affairs. He had been seduced by my thesis, and had advocated it in his broadcasts. But Clinton had proved me wrong in early January, when he had shown a singular ineptness in foreign affairs, as demonstrated by his conciliatory comments on Saddam Hussein.

He had a good point. I suppose I ought to say that I had written only that Clinton's peerless mendacity qualified him to be a foreign policy whiz. Deviousness is necessary for successful management of foreign policy, but not sufficient. But that would be splitting hairs. The fact is, I was wrong. I failed to consider the fact that the ability to lie is not enough. It must be accompanied by intellectual focus and analytic ability. On these scales, if Clinton's comments on Iraq are an indication, Clinton and his advisors are even less competent than Bush and his crew.

A colleague of mine at *Liberty* has suggested that I was wrong also when I suggested that Clinton is motivated by power lust. Observing Clinton's retinue of Hollywood suck-ups, he suggested that Clinton's fundamental motivation may be a lust for glamor and fame.

Here I shall stand by my guns. There are better ways to get glamor and fame than politics. Who is more famous, Madonna or George Bush? Elvis or Ike? Who is more glamorous, Dan Quayle or Cher?

Even the Presidency — the most famous and glamorous position in the world of politics — does not confer upon its

conqueror the glamor enjoyed by even a minor popular music artist or movie actor. And surely this fact is well-known to Elvis-fan Clinton.

Meanwhile, he seems intent on setting some kind of record for changing his position on issues. The middle-class tax cut he promised during his campaign has somehow evolved into a middle-class tax hike (the details are being worked out), his promise to open U.S. borders to refugees from Haiti has been abandoned entirely, etc. As we go to press, his on-again, off-again support for ending military discrimination against homosexuals is on-again, suggesting that the votes and campaign contributions of gays are more important than the votes and campaign contributions of Haitians.

It must annoy Bush to see how easily Clinton gets away with breaking his campaign promises, in the light of public reaction to Bush's reneging on his famous "No-new-taxes-read-my-lips" promise in 1988. The explanation for this seeming apparent inconsistency in public opinion is simple: most Americans actually believed Bush's promise; virtually no one believes Clinton's promises. —CAA

Practicing what they preach — During the past week, more than a dozen people have asked me some variation of the question, "What's your take on Zoe Baird?" Ms Baird, you will recall, was the new president's choice to be Attorney General. But it turned out that Ms Baird and her husband had sinned: they had hired two illegal immigrants as personal servants and paid them in cash, without withholding social security.

When the politicians and commentators in Washington learned this, they said, "Oh, well. No big deal." But when the people of the nation heard, they were incensed, burying their senators in an avalanche of indignant letters demanding that Baird be turned down. In response to the public outrage, Baird withdrew her name from consideration.

As I write these words, Baird is still a hot topic of conversation, but by the time most of you read them, she will be an almost forgotten, trivial footnote in American politics. Before long, my "take" on the situation, today eagerly sought by friends and colleagues, will be as interesting to us as a detailed account of the Yankees-Brewers baseball game of June 11, 1983.

And anyway, I don't really have a "take" on Zoe Baird.

On the one hand, Ms Baird is accused of exchanging her money for the labor of two people, in a way that all believed to be beneficial, and that harmed no one. I cannot see why the fact that a person was not born in the U.S. and has not secured permission to work here from the Immigration and Naturalization Service ought to disqualify him or her from gainful employment.

On the other hand, Baird didn't help her cause when she lied. Her story that she believed what she had done to be legal is simply not credible. The laws she violated were enacted by Congress only after noisy and well-reported debate and controversy. Any well-informed citizen, not to mention any well-informed *lawyer*, was aware of them. If, by some chance, Baird was truthful in saying she was not aware that her actions were illegal, then she is both ill-informed as a citizen and a boob as a lawyer, hardly the sort of person to take home a half million a year as chief counsel for Aetna Life and Casualty. Perhaps the political elite figured that her ability to concoct such a story and stick with it under pressure is an admirable trait, one qualifying her for high public office.

Personally, if I could have believed her preposterous tale, I would have immediately wired my Senators urging their support for her confirmation. As nearly as I can tell, most of the laws the attorney general is busy enforcing are destructive of the health, prosperity and liberty of most Americans. So having an ill-informed boob as attorney general might actually do the country some good.

But Baird is not an ill-informed boob. She is part of the same power structure that foisted on the American public the ridiculous law that she casually violated, along with a million other equally stupid laws and regulations. In this context — but only in this context — what she did is monstrous. "You common people have to obey these laws that I and my friends foist on you," she said. "But I shouldn't have to, and if I get caught, I'll just pay a little fine and accept the high honor of being a member of the President's cabinet." When you think that farmers are being hit with much larger fines for the crime of plowing a field that has been ruled a "wetland" because it has a puddle on it during the snow-melt in the spring, her action is genuinely outrageous.

Most of the laws the attorney general enforces are destructive of the health, prosperity and liberty of most Americans. So having an ill-informed boob as attorney general might actually do the country some good.

Hence my ambivalence. If an ordinary American did what Baird did, she would have my complete sympathy. But given Baird's desired role in enacting and enforcing this and all the other idiotic laws and regulations that plague Americans, my sympathy wanes pretty fast. I think marijuana prohibition is stupid and wrong, but I might favor prosecuting Bill Bennett if he were caught smoking dope. —RWB

Kicking the habit — No matter how I try, I can't seem to get off the unemployment-insurance rolls. It's not that I'm hooked on the money . . . I just can't get the State of Illinois to let me quit the program.

From the start, I was uncomfortable about accepting unemployment insurance. I didn't like the idea of accepting money the state takes from innocent business owners. But, unemployed, I gave in to weakness and signed up for "unemployment compensation." For months I filled out the forms that required a listing of five employer contacts per week ("proof" that I was searching for work), and accepted their checks.

Periodically, one class of "benefits" would run out, but

they'd automatically put me in another class. The government kept passing new legislation providing "extended" and "emergency" benefit programs. The checks kept coming in. It was too easy.

Soon I decided I would start my own business and make my own money. I stopped looking for work with other employers. My moral reservations against (or my guilt about) accepting these "benefits" resurfaced, and I decided to get off unemployment.

I finally sent in my last benefit-request form. But there was no place on the form to indicate that I wanted to stop receiving benefits. So, instead of listing employer contacts, I wrote, "I am no longer searching for work. I no longer wish to receive unemployment compensation. Please remove me from your mailing list."

Two weeks later they sent me a form stating that I "failed" to qualify, that I should correct this error, that I am still eligible for benefits, and that I'd have the opportunity to defend my claim. Another form stated my "rights as a claimant," assuring me that my "benefits will not be suspended or terminated until a fact-finding interview has been conducted," and that I had rights to attorneys, witnesses, appeals, and so on. They even provided, for the first time, a toll-free phone number to call for more information! And they asked me to go to the office to make my case.

Hmmm. I guess I didn't make it clear to them. I wrote back explaining plainly that I failed at nothing: I am *not* claiming benefits. I reiterated my request that they remove me from their mailing list.

That, of course, prompted them to send me another letter (with unusual speed, I might add), addressing me still as a "claimant." "You have a choice," it said, to receive "regular" benefits or "emergency" benefits. That's it. I was to check the appropriate box at the bottom and sign it. Not receiving benefits was not an option.

I like to make my own options, where possible, so I added my own little box at the bottom, and wrote: "I choose none of the above — please remove me from your mailing list," and mailed it back. I haven't heard back yet, but I'm sure I will.

The State of Illinois is determined to keep giving me money I haven't earned.

Most people I met waiting in lines at the unemployment office griped about the department's sluggish pace, the paperwork, the rules, and the bureaucracy, seeing them only as obstacles to getting their entitlements. They think the state is tight-fisted and doesn't really want you to get those "benefits."

Trust me. They want citizens to keep getting that money — especially, it seems, when they're not claiming it! Just try getting off unemployment insurance someday. And good luck. — *guest reflection by* Eric Banfield

Chapter 11 — I recently went through a devastating bankruptcy. The assets of my business were insufficient to pay my debts. As my financial position crumbled, I could see no way to turn the situation around. The only person who could help me out was a tycoon who would buy my properties for only a pittance, merely delaying the inevitable (and probably relishing the prospect).

The bankruptcy occurred in a game of Monopoly but, even so, the experience was wrenching. I felt like Bob Cratchit under the heel of Scrooge.

My chief hope was the government: If my opponent could be forced to pay enough taxes I might have had a chance. But in Monopoly the income tax is only 10% or $200 and, in fact, nothing rescued me, not even my opponent's heavy assessment for hotel repairs.

While Monopoly can be fun, poor luck and a few miscalculations can make it a bummer. As I sat there perspiring nervously, I began to wonder: Is this the free market system that I routinely defend?

Monopoly looks enough like capitalism to make a libertarian queasy. Charles Darrow, the unemployed heating equipment salesman who invented it in the midst of the Depression, does not seem to have been fond of private enterprise. (Indeed, he probably hated it after Parker Brothers turned down his invention.)

After our game was over (my son went bankrupt, too), Monopoly robber baron and economist Richard Stroup explained how the game misrepresents free markets.

To begin with, the rules require that you have a monopoly (that is, you must own all the properties of a single color) before you can add houses. Under capitalism, of course, monopoly is unnecessary for investments and, in fact, rarely exists without strong protection from government.

In Monopoly, once buildings go up, the rents do, too. You previously paid $24 when you landed on Marvin Gardens; when it has two houses, you pay $360. However, no value was created for anyone. The payer of rent must pay more while receiving nothing in return. Under capitalism, houses and hotels, with their higher prices, aren't built unless the investors think that there are customers who want them; that is, only if they add real value. If the builder misjudges consumer demand, the rent may not go up at all.

In Monopoly, all the other participants benefit from your business failures; under capitalism, the market includes many participants who have no desire to see you fail.

In Monopoly, only rich people can make lucrative investments such as hotels; under capitalism, even small investors can buy stock in potentially lucrative investments.

In Monopoly, luck plays a large role. Under capitalism, luck occurs, too, but more important is ingenuity in creating



"I don't have to hunt and gather — I work for the government."

value for others.

To summarize: Monopoly rewards exploitation of others; it's the only way to win. Under capitalism, you succeed by providing value.

Whew! I feel better.

Charles Darrow did, too, as the years went by. He had the game produced locally. After the New York toy retailer F.A.O. Schwarz began to distribute it, Parker Brothers reconsidered. The company and Darrow worked out a royalties arrangement that made Darrow a millionaire. At age 46, he retired and became a gentleman farmer in Bucks County, Pennsylvania. His creation of pleasure for millions of game players financed his extensive world travel and his hobby of collecting exotic orchids. —JSS

Optimizing wolves — Alaska has recently proposed killing wolves as a way to boost caribou, moose, and deer populations for tourists and hunters. But many people find gunning wolves from airplanes offensive and are outraged.

The logic underlying the killing seems clear, but the issues are complex. Wolves do kill caribou, elk and moose — especially their young. Reducing wolf populations should increase the numbers of these ungulates, but by how much?

Wolves were deliberately eliminated from the Yellowstone ecosystem decades ago. Like most well-intentioned interventions in ecological and economic systems, the results have been different and more severe than anticipated.

According to Dr Fred Wagner, Director of the Ecology Center at Utah State University, wildlife managers see three options:

First, with no controls, predators and prey will reach a long-run equilibrium with low numbers of both.

A second option — elimination of predators — allows herds to rise dramatically in the short term, but in the long run small populations result from degraded habitat.

The third way is to decrease predator numbers moderately, providing a sustainable rise in ungulate populations. Alaska seems to be trying to follow this third, moderate control option, thereby enhancing big-game hunting.

But the link between predator and prey is questioned by some scientists. They contend that herbivore numbers are primarily determined by habitat, that predators play only a marginal role in determining numbers of caribou, moose and elk. Only renewed habitat, such as that created by fire, can significantly increase populations. And regardless, they say, accurate determination of "optimal" wolf populations is hard to achieve.

What precedents do we have for wolf-control programs?

Yellowstone Park is a prime (if discouraging) example. Wolves were deliberately eliminated from the Yellowstone ecosystem decades ago. Like most well-intentioned interventions in ecological and economic systems, the results have been different and more severe than anticipated.

Elk populations in the Park have erupted, causing massive over-grazing and the prospect of mass starvation during severe Rocky Mountain winters. Whole plant and animal species have been decimated, drastically changing the park's ecology. What will be the results in the delicate Arctic tundra?

Wolf controls have been tried in Alaska but without great success; it is bears, not wolves, that were found to be taking the largest share of ungulates. And, as Dr Kenneth Raedeke, a wildlife specialist at the University of Washington observes, "having a brown bear control program, even in Alaska, is not (politically) acceptable."

This gets to the heart of the matter: the nature of political decision-making. The decision to control wolf populations was made on the basis of political power, not science, economic efficiency or environmental sensitivity. Wolves, apparently, are thought to be politically acceptable targets while bears are not.

In Alaska, Gov. Walter Hickel and special-interest groups such as the Alaska Outdoor Council, a coalition of outfitters, hunters and bush pilots, have used the levers of political control over natural resources to their advantage, regardless of ecological effects. They want to make it easier for hunters to kill moose and caribou by increasing their populations, even though, as the director of the Alaska Division of Wildlife Conservation admits, "there are no real shortages of big-game animals in Alaska."

This is the predictable result of bureaucratic management in a political environment. As public-choice economics teaches, more than ecological concerns are being sacrificed to special interests.

The consequences, while clear for the wolves, may be equally bleak for Alaska's reputation and for its important tourist economy. The state has already received "hundreds of letters" protesting the plan. Not long ago, the National Parks and Conservation Association cancelled its 75th anniversary board meeting scheduled for Anchorage. A decline in tourism may match the decrease in wolf population.

By responding to a small, vocal constituency, Alaska's government may have damaged a far broader, but less well organized and focused group. This decision once again illustrates the pitfalls of political-bureaucratic natural resource management, where special interests can run the decision-making apparatus to their benefit while ignoring the costs imposed on many.

The Alaskan wolf example demonstrates that sound environmentalism must recognize the dangers of political management. In a

Who's Who in Reflections

CAA	Chester Alan Arthur
JAB	John A. Baden
RWB	R.W. Bradford
SC	Stephen Cox
BD	Brian Doherty
BK	Bill Kauffman
BDK	Brian Krohnke
WPM	William P. Moulton
SR	Sheldon Richman
SJR	Susan Rutter
JSS	Jane S. Shaw
JW	Jesse Walker

Why isn't everybody a libertarian?

Why aren't people breaking down doors to join the Libertarian Movement?

When you explain libertarian ideas, why aren't people dropping to their knees and protesting, "All my life, with open arms, I've waited for you and your message. How do I join? When's the next meeting? Is there a limit to how much money I can give?"

Is Something Wrong With Your Libertarian Ideas?

You be the judge.

Re-examine the political and economic ideas of Rand and Von Mises, Friedman and Rothbard, Hazlitt and Hayek, Bastiat and Heinlein, Jefferson and Paine.

Browse through the catalogues of Laissez Faire Books, Freedom's Forum and Liberty Tree.

Scan the policy reports of the Cato Institute, Heartland Institute and Reason Foundation.

Leaf through *Reason, LP News, Freedom Network News,* and *The Pragmatist.*

Or this issue of *Liberty.*

Need more proof? Compare your libertarian ideas to the statist ideas you read in the newspapers and magazines. To those you see on television. Liberal and conservative, socialist and fascist, totalitarian and populist.

Not even close, is it? Liberty wins hands down.

"You Libertarians have a 24 carat gold idea—freedom—and you can't even give it away. Ever ask yourself why?"
Congressman Sam Steiger, 1976

In 1976, I was the Arizona Libertarian Party's candidate for the congressional seat held by Morris Udall.

I lectured people who weren't interested. I debated when I should have discussed. I talked when I should have listened. I talked down to everyone.

If there was an offensive, shocking way of presenting a libertarian position—I used it.

Every so often, people would try to agree, but I didn't notice. I couldn't take 'Yes' for an answer.

My campaign taught me how to lose friends and alienate people.

Finally, it sunk in. My problem wasn't other people. It was the man in the mirror. Me.

Do You Lose Friends And Alienate People?

Some libertarians have a more–rational–than–thou attitude. Or smarter–than–thou. Or more–principled–than–thou. Or more–ethical–than–thou.

Are your 'discussions' really lectures? Do you try to convince by beating the other person into submission? Do you behave like a tormentor, not a mentor?

And when you fail to persuade, do you blame the listener? The other person isn't rational enough, or intelligent enough, or good enough? It's always their fault?

That is the road to permanent failure.

Failure is feedback. It's telling you to do something different.

The people you don't convince are showing you what does not work. Are you paying attention?

The marketplace of ideas works just like the free market. Consumer response is a teacher. Are you learning?

The Art Of Political Persuasion.

I felt stupid and embarrassed by my campaign in 1976. But I was determined to salvage something from my experience. I wanted to learn the art of political persuasion.

I began to read. It's now over 1,000 books on psychology, epistemology, semantics, salesmanship, cybernetics, self-help, hypnosis, communication and creativity.

I interviewed specialists in communications and persuasion. I asked questions and took notes.

I applied the scientific method to everything I learned. I tested every approach, technique and format. I observed and listened.

I began to write up my results. *How To Get Converts Left & Right* and *The Late, Great Libertarian Macho Flash* were published by *Reason.*

I followed these with more articles: *The Militant Mentality, The Myth Of Mushrooms In The Night, Leveraging Liberty With Language* and *Intellectual Judo.*

The libertarian audience wanted more, so I launched a seminar. *The Art Of Political Persuasion Marathon Weekend Workshop* has been offered all over the United States and Canada.

Then, I tested my teachings in the field. I was the organizer and fund-raiser for the 1988 *Marrou VP Campaign, Project 51–'92* ballot effort and the 1992 *Marrou For President Campaign.* Between Fall 1987 and Fall 1991 I raised more than $500,000 for these projects. $519,344 to be exact (source: FEC).

Now, after 12 years of study, testing and results, I have produced a three hour audio tape learning program: *The Essence of Political Persuasion.*

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- ➢ Open the door with rapport.
- ➢ From confrontation to conversation.
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Marshall Fritz, founder of Advocates For Self-Government

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greener political economy, environmental management should be guided by science and constrained by economic realities. We can learn from Alaska. —JAB

The sublime and the sub-beautiful — During December, television and newspapers kept talking about the beautiful weather being enjoyed by virtually every part of the country. Lovely thick snow. Postcard vistas. White Christmas. Very romantic.

I never saw any of this. I traveled a few days, but I didn't get a chance to travel to any place "interesting." The weather was cold; it rained a bit; the sky was uniformly grey; the sun seemed to set about 3 o'clock in the afternoon; and the horizon was generally occupied by decaying industrial towns.

In other words, I traveled in a landscape with real charm. True, it wasn't the kind of charm that gets on a postcard, but it was charm nonetheless.

In most "beautiful" vistas, there's really just one thing to see. A bunch of white snow. Sunlight on a beach. The Golden Gate Bridge. In a conventionally "ugly" or "boring" environment, one is not distracted by such banalities. One is free to contemplate the pure geometry of a village street bisected by a gently curving pair of abandoned rails. One has leisure to notice the varieties of grey, green, and brown that shade into one another on an empty field or the side of an old house, colors too delicate ever to be named. And one can finally see the trees for what they are — not those plump, self-satisfied, conformist bags of leaves that decorate the streets in summer but the thin, grey, mysteriously mobile sculptures, each with its own shape, that bare themselves to a slow winter sky.

Any child will be impressed by snowflakes glistening on the big Christmas tree at Rockefeller Center, but it takes an adult to appreciate the steady silver drip of rain from a garage roof that badly needs repair. When I was a little boy, I was depressed by the pitifully plastic Christmas displays that showed up on the front stoops of my home town. They were images of poverty and (so I thought) despair. Now that I've grown up, I think I'm beginning to recognize symbols of courage and a kind of triumph in the oddly shaped electrical objects that people save from one year to the next to adorn their houses.

We Americans enjoy the kind of beauty from which all indications of age or struggle, especially human struggle, have been removed. If we are fond of an old building, we nevertheless insist that it be spiffily "restored." We can't stand the thought of a clearcut slope in the midst of a forest. We have a hard time understanding that it's our mood that creates the "natural" scene, as much as the other way around, and that our mood has something to say about us.

There's a story from World War II that I like very much. After the Japanese conquest of the Philippines, the conquerors decided to execute Philippine General Manuel Roxas. He was put in a car and driven out to be killed. Along the way, Roxas noticed delicate white flowers beside the road. "Aren't they beautiful?" he said. Colonel Nobuhiko Jimbo, in charge of the execution, was so struck by Roxas's remark that he persuaded his superiors to save him. After the war, Roxas became the first president of the Philippine Republic, and colonel Jimbo received a knighthood — fit rewards for their ability to recognize beauty in unexpected places. —SC

Royalty vs reality— Late in 1992, the Irish Republican Army tried and failed to assassinate Prince Charles and Lady Di. It figures — the first good idea the IRA's had in years, and they screw it up.

I didn't want to write about the royal breakup. Of everything wrong with the American media, their constant reportage of the doings of the British royal family sticks out like an infected blister. Why the hell should I care which wealthy welfare bum is diddling the Queen's cousin or King's schoolchum or Earl of Guernsy's anthrax-ridden cow? Why can't I go to a supermarket checkout aisle without being visually assaulted by the latest picture of Di's face or Fergie's breasts or Charles' ears? Every word written about the Windsor family, including these, would be better spent on a great novel. Or a mediocre poem. Or a grocery list.

Half my ancestors fought a revolution so they wouldn't have to put up with these guys; the others hopped on a boat pointed west for the exact same reason. So this is a matter of family honor for me. I will not, not ever, not ever ever, give a damn about the royal family, and as soon as I'm done writing this rant, I will go back to caring only about those issues connected somehow to the real world. Ready . . . set . . . *go.*

—JW

Public Choice, 101 — Democracy: In theory, the tyranny of the majority; in practice, the tyranny of minorities.

—SR



Where to Live

The Geography of Taxes

A Survey of the United States

by R. W. Bradford

Where taxes are high, where taxes are low, where taxes are least likely to bring you woe.

You've just heard your state's governor explain that, thanks to the inability of the private sector to provide adequate health care, your state will be instituting its own health care program, and your income taxes will be going up. Just last month, he explained that your state was no longer competitive in education, but the problem could be solved by giving teachers a raise, which will mean raising your state's sales tax by a penny. And from now on you will have to pay sales tax on shoe shines, haircuts and other personal services.

You wonder, *isn't there some place I can live where taxes are lower?*

If you find yourself in this predicament, I have good news. Unless you are a resident of Wyoming — and only one of every 548 Americans has that particular pleasure — you can lower your taxes simply by moving to another state. Wyoming is one of seven states with no income tax, and its other personal taxes are all quite low. The result is that Wyoming has the lowest personal taxes of any state. The savings can be considerable. For most people, Wyoming's taxes will be less than half the taxes they pay their own state and local government:

Income level	Wyoming taxes	U.S. average taxes
$ 25,000	$1,144	$ 2,193
50,000	1,907	4,594
75,000	3,277	8,277
100,000	4,135	10,157

Of course, there are reasons you might not want to pull up stakes and head to the Equality State. For one thing, you might find it hard to make a living there. Wyoming had the lowest population of any state in 1980, and its population declined during the next decade, as its major industry — energy — weakened.

Even if you are independently wealthy or can relocate your current work to a remote location, you might not want to go to Wyoming. The state is mostly desert, has harsh winters, and is almost entirely rural. If you prefer the pleasures of urban life . . . well, Wyoming's biggest city is smaller than Midwest City, Oklahoma, or Euclid, Ohio.

Happily, Wyoming isn't the only state with relatively low personal taxes. A family of four making $25,000 will pay only about $500 more per year to live in Florida, where the weather is warmer and the cities bigger. The $50,000 family pays about $600 more; the $100,000 family $1,100 more. Don't want to live among the retired Midwesterners, New Yorkers and hillbillies? Then consider Nevada. Or Alaska, if you don't mind a little cold weather. Or maybe Texas, or Tennessee, or South Dakota, or Washington.

I get these figures from "Tax Rates and Tax Burdens in the District of Columbia: A Nationwide Comparison," published quasi-annually by the Department of Finance and Revenue of the District of Columbia,* from which much of the information in this article is derived. Apparently, the idea is to prove that taxes aren't as bad in Washington, D.C. as most people think.

The study summarizes the taxes paid by a family of four with incomes

continued on page 20

* I say "quasi-annually" because, although the Department of Finance and Revenue claims to publish it annually, the 1992 report has not yet appeared. I have called the Department monthly since June of last year (when the 1992 report was scheduled to be published) and have each time been informed that the 1992 report is "still at the printers; we will have it next month." The sixth time I was told this, I asked the official offering me this explanation to identify himself, so I could quote him in this article. In classic bureaucratic manner, he refused to tell me his name, suggesting instead that I write my congressperson. Consequently, the data in this article comes from the 1991 report, and is valid for 1990 taxes. And because the level of local taxes varies from one jurisdiction to another, the survey cites taxes in the largest city in each state.

State and Local Personal Tax Burden
Family of Four with $25,000 Income, 1990



Tax Level
- less than 5%
- 5% – 6.9%
- 7% – 8.9%
- 9% – 10.9%
- 11% – 12.9%
- 13% – 14.9%
- more than 15%

State	income	property	sales	auto	total	percent	rank
Alabama	658	303	863	155	1,978	7.9%	21
Alaska	0	1,339	0	116	1,455	5.8%	4
Arizona	425	912	749	237	2,323	9.3%	35
Arkansas	527	551	490	160	1,727	6.9%	11
California	111	748	599	215	1,673	6.7%	9
Colorado	568	935	781	202	2,486	9.9%	39
Connecticut	0	1,837	747	382	2,966	11.9%	47
Delaware	820	641	0	112	1,573	6.3%	6
D. C.	1,132	641	451	149	2,372	9.5%	36
Florida	0	483	597	148	1,229	4.9%	3
Georgia	700	1,018	825	164	2,707	10.8%	43
Hawaii	935	597	401	180	2,112	8.4%	26
Idaho	491	754	587	140	1,972	7.9%	20
Illinois	588	720	666	186	2,160	8.6%	29
Indiana	830	502	497	374	2,203	8.8%	32
Iowa	686	1,295	390	184	2,556	10.2%	40
Kansas	438	599	500	303	1,839	7.4%	15
Kentucky	1,311	528	408	163	2,411	9.6%	37
Louisiana	315	189	896	198	1,598	6.4%	7
Maine	308	1,130	337	343	2,118	8.5%	27
Maryland	1,039	1,181	473	134	2,826	11.3%	45
Mass.	1,131	193	428	245	1,996	8.0%	22
Michigan	1,075	1,419	363	123	2,980	11.9%	48
Minnesota	681	6	327	205	1,218	4.9%	2
Mississippi	367	632	644	236	1,880	7.5%	16
Missouri	772	514	568	208	2,063	8.3%	24
Montana	540	988	0	240	1,767	7.1%	13
Nebraska	457	1,161	985	335	2,938	11.8%	46
Nevada	0	699	564	252	1,516	6.1%	5
N. H.	20	1,490	0	170	1,680	6.7%	10
N. J.	373	1,853	488	85	2,800	11.2%	44
N. M.	382	747	734	135	1,998	8.0%	23
N. Y.	864	641	1,055	87	2,647	10.6%	42
N. Carolina	720	681	494	233	2,129	8.5%	28
N. Dakota	239	1,144	405	167	1,954	7.8%	19
Ohio	870	871	601	141	2,484	9.9%	38
Oklahoma	635	465	599	183	1,883	7.5%	17
Oregon	972	2,365	0	119	3,457	13.8%	51
Penna.	1,745	995	358	93	3,192	12.8%	49
Rhode Isl.	392	1,702	316	232	2,641	10.6%	41
S. Carolina	505	866	658	282	2,312	9.2%	34
S. Dakota	0	1,361	606	139	2,106	8.4%	25
Tennessee	0	968	661	158	1,787	7.1%	14
Texas	0	1,048	457	145	1,650	6.6%	8
Utah	694	638	791	181	2,304	9.2%	33
Vermont	478	1,192	398	128	2,196	8.8%	31
Virginia	498	863	455	352	2,167	8.7%	30
Washington	0	1,004	663	272	1,939	7.8%	18
W. Virginia	580	406	531	231	1,749	7.0%	12
Wisconsin	529	2,281	481	145	3,436	13.7%	50
Wyoming	0	494	482	168	1,144	4.6%	1
U.S. average	558	871	582	182	2,193	9.2%	–

State and Local Personal Tax Burden,
Family of Four with $50,000 Income, 1990



Tax Level
- less than 5%
- 5% – 6.9%
- 7% – 8.9%
- 9% – 10.9%
- 11% – 12.9%
- 13% – 14.9%
- more than 15%

State	income	property	sales	auto	total	percent	rank
Alabama	1,348	642	1,223	246	3,459	6.9%	9
Alaska	0	2,551	0	137	2,678	5.4%	4
Arizona	1,301	1,737	1,129	373	4,540	9.1%	28
Arkansas	1,743	1,049	735	253	3,781	7.6%	15
California	1,220	1,490	911	368	3,989	8.0%	18
Colorado	1,626	1,781	1,169	299	4,874	9.7%	33
Connecticut	0	3,498	1,126	680	5,304	10.6%	43
Delaware	2,375	1,221	0	153	3,749	7.5%	13
D.C.	2,707	1,458	733	228	5,126	10.3%	38
Florida	0	1,414	902	202	2,518	5.0%	2
Georgia	1,783	2,174	1,189	299	5,445	10.9%	44
Hawaii	2,589	1,223	598	254	4,665	9.3%	30
Idaho	2,297	1,416	883	183	4,780	9.6%	32
Illinois	1,281	1,694	1,018	248	4,241	8.5%	23
Indiana	1,817	977	743	374	3,912	7.8%	16
Iowa	1,894	2,477	588	295	5,254	10.5%	42
Kansas	1,270	1,140	746	472	3,628	7.3%	10
Kentucky	3,087	1,007	674	267	5,035	10.1%	37
Louisiana	1,055	1,355	1,363	328	4,102	8.2%	22
Maine	1,773	2,153	555	454	4,934	9.9%	34
Maryland	2,612	2,249	706	181	5,748	11.5%	46
Mass.	2,655	642	681	321	4,300	8.6%	24
Michigan	2,703	2,702	540	167	6,112	12.2%	48
Minnesota	2,318	1,292	535	306	4,451	8.9%	27
Mississippi	1,297	1,421	941	409	4,068	8.1%	20
Missouri	2,177	979	892	360	4,408	8.8%	25
Montana	1,675	1,881	0	408	3,964	7.9%	17
Nebraska	1,366	2,211	900	556	5,033	10.1%	36
Nevada	0	1,332	875	405	2,611	5.2%	3
N. H.	50	2,838	0	226	3,114	6.2%	7
N. J.	937	3,718	816	137	5,609	11.2%	45
N. M.	1,428	1,422	1,054	177	4,081	8.2%	21
N. Y.	3,464	1,222	1,528	109	6,323	12.6%	49
N. Carolina	2,224	1,298	715	366	4,603	9.2%	29
N. Dakota	737	2,178	633	211	3,759	7.5%	14
Ohio	2,376	1,659	967	193	5,195	10.4%	39
Oklahoma	1,914	971	908	270	4,063	8.1%	19
Oregon	2,636	4,506	0	168	7,310	14.6%	50
Penna.	3,480	1,896	571	124	6,071	12.1%	47
Rhode Isl.	1,080	3,241	498	412	5,232	10.5%	41
S. Carolina	2,093	1,649	953	513	5,208	6.9%	40
S. Dakota	0	2,593	880	185	3,658	6.9%	12
Tennessee	0	1,843	983	213	3,039	6.9%	6
Texas	0	2,041	747	184	2,973	6.9%	5
Utah	2,263	1,215	1,166	295	4,940	6.9%	35
Vermont	1,377	2,270	634	167	4,448	6.9%	26
Virginia	1,769	1,643	686	607	4,704	6.9%	31
Washington	0	1,912	1,051	457	3,420	6.9%	8
W. Virginia	1,695	773	794	391	3,653	6.9%	11
Wisconsin	2,179	4,345	688	198	7,411	6.9%	51
Wyoming	0	940	715	252	1,907	6.9%	1
U.S. Average	1,665	1,775	879	275	4,594	9.2%	–

State and Local Personal Tax Burden
Family of Four with $75,000 Income, 1990



Tax Level
- less than 5%
- 5% – 6.9%
- 7% – 8.9%
- 9% – 10.9%
- 11% – 12.9%
- 13% – 14.9%
- more than 15%

State	income	property	sales	auto	total	percent	rank
Alabama	2,173	999	1,834	539	5,545	7.4%	9
Alaska	0	3,826	0	237	4,063	5.4%	4
Arizona	2,043	2,606	1,693	1,002	7,344	9.8%	28
Arkansas	3,186	1,574	1,103	536	6,399	8.5%	15
California	3,076	2,271	1,367	866	7,580	10.1%	18
Colorado	2,644	2,671	1,753	823	7,892	10.5%	33
Connecticut	370	5,247	1,685	1,679	8,982	12.0%	43
Delaware	4,149	1,831	0	233	6,214	8.3%	13
D.C.	4,680	2,319	1,099	307	8,405	11.2%	38
Florida	0	2,394	1,345	298	4,038	5.4%	2
Georgia	2,975	3,391	1,784	759	8,909	11.9%	44
Hawaii	4,518	1,883	897	383	7,681	10.2%	30
Idaho	4,039	2,612	1,325	290	8,267	11.0%	32
Illinois	1,971	2,719	1,528	386	6,604	8.8%	23
Indiana	2,805	1,478	1,104	1,104	6,491	8.7%	16
Iowa	3,070	3,720	882	589	8,261	11.0%	42
Kansas	2,360	1,710	1,118	1,453	6,641	8.9%	10
Kentucky	4,825	1,510	1,011	576	7,922	10.6%	37
Louisiana	1,655	2,582	2,045	704	6,986	9.3%	22
Maine	3,553	3,229	833	1,326	8,941	11.9%	34
Maryland	4,140	3,374	1,058	277	8,849	11.8%	46
Mass.	4,204	1,116	1,021	1,094	7,435	9.9%	24
Michigan	4,455	4,053	810	252	9,570	12.8%	48
Minnesota	4,003	2,646	802	728	8,179	10.9%	27
Mississippi	2,319	2,252	1,412	955	6,937	9.2%	20
Missouri	3,347	1,469	1,338	832	6,985	9.3%	25
Montana	2,925	2,822	0	914	6,661	8.9%	17
Nebraska	2,617	3,316	1,351	1,247	8,530	11.4%	36
Nevada	0	1,997	1,312	850	4,160	5.5%	3
N. H.	100	4,256	0	646	5,003	6.7%	7
N. J.	1,651	5,682	1,223	177	8,733	11.6%	45
N. M.	2,859	2,133	1,580	267	6,839	9.1%	21
N. Y.	6,315	1,832	2,292	168	10,608	14.1%	49
N. Carolina	3,748	1,947	1,072	764	7,531	10.0%	29
N. Dakota	1,585	3,267	950	303	6,106	8.1%	14
Ohio	4,048	2,489	1,451	294	8,282	11.0%	39
Oklahoma	3,378	1,503	1,362	632	6,875	9.2%	19
Oregon	4,476	6,759	0	250	11,484	15.3%	50
Penna.	5,047	2,844	856	193	8,940	11.9%	47
Rhode Isl.	2,293	4,862	748	982	8,885	11.8%	41
S. Carolina	3,546	2,474	1,429	1,279	8,728	11.6%	40
S. Dakota	0	3,889	1,320	277	5,487	7.3%	12
Tennessee	0	2,765	1,474	328	4,567	6.1%	6
Texas	0	3,087	1,212	299	4,507	6.0%	5
Utah	3,632	1,823	1,750	611	7,816	10.4%	35
Vermont	2,966	3,405	951	265	7,587	10.1%	26
Virginia	2,945	2,464	1,028	1,483	7,921	10.6%	31
Washington	0	2,868	1,577	1,028	5,473	7.3%	8
W. Virginia	3,230	1,160	1,190	919	6,499	8.7%	11
Wisconsin	3,622	6,518	1,032	301	11,474	15.3%	51
Wyoming	0	1,410	1,072	794	3,277	4.4%	1
U.S. average	2,905	2,728	1,325	593	7,545	10.1%	–

State and Local Personal Tax Burden,
Family of Four with $100,000 Income, 1990



Tax Level
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- 7% – 8.9%
- 9% – 10.9%
- 11% – 12.9%
- 13% – 14.9%
- more than 15%

State	income	property	sales	auto	total	percent	rank
Alabama	2,875	1,284	2,446	621	7,226	7.2%	10
Alaska	0	4,846	0	244	5,090	5.1%	2
Arizona	2,939	3,301	2,257	1,158	9,656	9.7%	24
Arkansas	4,691	1,993	1,470	617	8,772	8.8%	15
California	5,133	2,895	1,823	1,014	10,865	10.9%	33
Colorado	3,688	3,384	2,338	934	10,343	10.3%	27
Connecticut	700	6,647	2,256	1,982	11,585	11.6%	40
Delaware	6,043	2,320	0	248	8,610	8.6%	13
D.C.	6,743	3,007	1,465	324	11,539	11.5%	39
Florida	0	3,178	1,800	314	5,292	5.3%	4
Georgia	4,198	4,365	2,378	901	11,842	11.8%	44
Hawaii	6,485	2,411	1,196	409	10,501	10.5%	31
Idaho	5,825	3,570	1,767	307	11,468	11.5%	38
Illinois	2,673	3,539	2,037	408	8,657	8.7%	14
Indiana	3,792	1,878	1,476	1,232	8,378	8.4%	12
Iowa	4,377	4,715	1,176	678	10,946	10.9%	34
Kansas	3,497	2,166	1,491	1,686	8,840	8.8%	16
Kentucky	6,621	1,913	1,349	666	10,548	10.5%	32
Louisiana	2,265	3,563	2,727	723	9,277	9.3%	19
Maine	5,401	4,090	1,111	1,482	12,083	12.1%	47
Maryland	5,747	4,273	1,411	294	11,726	11.7%	43
Mass.	5,753	1,495	1,361	1,233	9,842	9.8%	25
Michigan	6,978	5,134	1,080	266	13,458	13.5%	48
Minnesota	5,721	3,729	1,070	832	11,352	11.4%	35
Mississippi	3,363	2,916	1,882	1,119	9,280	9.3%	20
Missouri	4,555	1,860	1,783	990	9,188	9.2%	18
Montana	4,673	3,575	0	1,072	9,320	9.3%	21
Nebraska	4,006	4,200	1,801	1,449	11,455	11.5%	37
Nevada	0	2,530	1,749	976	5,255	5.3%	3
N. H.	150	5,391	0	731	6,272	6.3%	7
N. J.	2,821	7,253	1,631	186	11,892	11.9%	45
N. M.	4,517	2,702	2,107	281	9,608	9.6%	23
N. Y.	8,920	2,321	3,056	183	14,480	14.5%	49
N. Carolina	5,297	2,466	1,429	874	10,066	10.1%	26
N. Dakota	2,442	4,139	1,266	339	8,186	8.2%	11
Ohio	6,013	3,153	1,935	312	11,413	11.4%	36
Oklahoma	4,853	1,930	1,817	729	9,328	9.3%	22
Oregon	6,361	8,561	0	267	15,189	15.2%	51
Penna.	6,713	3,603	1,142	204	11,661	11.7%	42
Rhode Isl.	3,580	6,158	997	1,158	11,894	11.9%	46
S. Carolina	5,066	3,134	1,905	1,515	11,620	11.6%	41
S. Dakota	0	4,927	1,760	294	6,980	7.0%	9
Tennessee	30	3,502	1,965	347	5,845	5.8%	6
Texas	0	3,924	1,495	312	5,731	5.7%	5
Utah	5,020	2,309	2,333	703	10,365	10.4%	28
Vermont	4,578	4,313	1,269	279	10,438	10.4%	29
Virginia	4,202	3,122	1,371	1,743	10,438	10.4%	30
Washington		3,632	2,103	1,196	6,932	6.9%	8
W. Virginia	4,855	1,469	1,587	1,073	8,984	9.0%	17
Wisconsin	5,203	8,256	1,376	320	15,156	15.2%	50
Wyoming	0	1,786	1,429	919	4,135	4.1%	1
U.S. average	4,234	3,490	1,759	674	10,157	10.2%	–

of $25,000, $50,000, $75,000 and $100,000 per year. It includes four taxes paid directly by individuals: property tax, sales tax, automobile tax, and income tax.

This is fascinating reading. One discovers that whatever the level of income, the citizen of Oregon pays between 3 and 4 times the taxes as the citizen of Wyoming. If you live in a low tax state like Wyoming, Washington, Texas, Nevada or Florida, there's not much hope of finding lower taxes. If you live in Oregon, Wisconsin, New York, Michigan, Pennsylvania or another high tax state . . . well, I just hope the antics of your local politicians are amusing enough to justify the hideous taxes you pay. (The charts and maps on pages 18–19 summarize tax rates for all fifty states.)

Where are taxes lowest?

It is plain that Wyoming has the lowest combined state and local income, sales, property and automobile taxes, and by a rather substantial margin. But the question of where *taxes* are lowest is a bit more complex. One thing is certain: Wyoming is not the lowest tax state.

Each of the fifty states has its own unique tax ecology. Wyoming, Alaska, Washington, Nevada and Florida all have low personal taxes. This is not to say, however, that they have low taxes. In general, they prefer either indirect taxes or "export" taxes, i.e. taxes that generally do not fall directly on individuals. Other taxes — whether on business activity, hobbies, liquor, tobacco, natural resources, tourism, or anything else — are ignored in figuring personal taxes, on the theory that many residents do not pay them.

There is relatively little correlation between the level of personal taxes and the overall level of taxes. Wyoming and Alaska have the lowest and third lowest personal taxes, respectively. But in terms of total taxes as a percentage of gross personal income, both rank near the bottom: Wyoming 46th and Alaska 50th.

There is a great variety of indirect taxes. For most individuals, the most important indirect taxes are what are generally called "sin" taxes, that is, taxes on products or activities that are widely believed to be sinful. Sin taxes are easy to sell to voters, on grounds that they will discourage normal people from odious behavior, and will then be paid mostly by odious people.

The most notable examples are tobacco and alcohol taxes. These vary considerably from state to state. Wyoming taxes a six-pack of beer 1¢. Hawaii, in contrast, taxes the same six-pack 50¢. Wine-producing California taxes table wine 0.4¢ per bottle. Florida taxes the same bottle 60¢. A bottle of whiskey is taxed 30¢ in Maryland but $1.30 in Florida. A pack of cigarettes is taxed 2¢ in tobacco-producing North Carolina but 41¢ in Texas.

In recent years, as the prudish left has gained more influence over American public life, the automobile — that wonderful instrument of mobility and individualism — has been transformed into an instrument of evil. As a corollary of this metamorphosis, gasoline taxes have been mutated from a quasi-use tax earmarked for highway construction to a sin tax for general revenue. Like other sin taxes, gas taxes vary considerably from state to state, ranging from 8¢ per gallon in New York to 26.5¢ per gallon in Nebraska.

But the sin tax that varies most from state to state is the tax on gambling. Nevada gains a tremendous amount of its revenue from taxes on gambling, while other states outlaw all forms of it, thus eschewing this particu-

State and local taxes, per capita, 1990



State	taxes	rank	State	taxes	rank	State	taxes	rank
Alabama	1,968	5	Kentucky	2,077	9	Nevada	2,675	34
Alaska	9,555	51	Louisiana	2,339	18	Ohio	2,331	17
Arizona	2,599	32	Maine	2,578	30	Oklahoma	2,176	12
Arkansas	1,688	1	Maryland	2,901	40	Oregon	2,697	35
California	3,019	42	Mass.	2,973	41	Pennsylvania	2,342	19
Colorado	2,656	33	Michigan	2,750	39	Rhode Isl.	2,571	29
Connecticut	3,154	43	Minnesota	3,218	45	S. Dakota	1,985	6
D.C.	4,530	50	Mississippi	1,886	2	S. Carolina	2,116	10
Delaware	3,233	46	Missouri	2,004	7	Tennessee	1,952	4
Florida	2,532	26	Montana	2,371	20	Texas	2,286	15
Georgia	2,371	21	N. Carolina	2,148	11	Utah	2,212	13
Hawaii	3,233	47	N. Dakota	2,504	24	Vermont	2,581	31
Idaho	2,017	8	N. H.	2,238	14	Virginia	2,531	25
Illinois	2,432	22	N. J.	3,192	44	W. Virginia	1,937	3
Indiana	2,324	16	N. M.	2,730	36	Washington	2,732	37
Iowa	2,543	27	N. Y.	3,917	48	Wisconsin	2,741	38
Kansas	2,461	23	Nebraska	2,547	28	Wyoming	3,942	46
						U.S. average	2,663	–

lar source of loot. State lotteries have been defined as "a tax on people who don't understand probability theory," but strictly speaking the revenue from them is a different sort of tax, profit from state monopolies. (Another example of this form of indirect taxation is profit from some state's liquor monopolies.)

In addition, states impose a wide variety of taxes on business activities, including some very substantial taxes. The state of Washington, for example, has a "Business and Occupations" tax, which falls on the gross receipts of every business or farm in the state, differing from sales tax in that it exempts nothing. Michigan has a "single business tax," a bewilderingly complicated tax on the sum of the gross profits of a business, plus all wages and dividends paid by the business, and certain other expenditures.

The late Sen. Russell Long of Louisiana liked to explain the process of writing tax law with the maxim, "Don't tax you, don't tax me. Tax the fella behind the tree." By this, I suppose, he meant, let's not tax politicians or special interests. Everyone prefers taxes that have to be paid by someone else, witness the popularity of Clinton's promise to raise taxes on businesses in other countries and on that tiny portion of the population that earns more than $200,000 per year.

State tax officials and law-makers are so enamored of this notion of taxing people who live outside their state that they have given the process of enacting such measures a nice-sounding name, "exporting" taxes. Hawaii taxes all temporary lodging (except college dormitory rooms) at a rate of 9.14%, on the theory that mainland tourists will have to pay it all. Since Hawaii has greatly restricted the supply of accommodations, thereby eliminating modestly priced accommodations driving the average daily room rate well into three figures, this has proven a tremendous revenue source. Other states and many cities have done the same; in New York City today the tax on hotel rooms is a whopping 21.5%.

The other way that states "export" taxes is to enact special taxes on industries that make products sold primarily to other states. A high "severance" tax on coal and natural gas, for example, enables Wyoming to maintain a very high overall level of taxation (8.45% of gross personal income, fourth highest among the 50 states) while maintaining the lowest level of personal taxes. Needless to say, this works best on industries that cannot move to other states, most notably on mining.

Of course, taxes on tourists and on extraction of natural resources do not really "export" taxes. By taking 9% of the gross revenue on the rental of accommodations, Hawaii isn't really costing tourists more: it is reducing the prices (and therefore the value) of rental property. By charging coal miners an exorbitant fee to extract coal from their property in Wyoming, the state isn't forcing residents of other states to pay more for coal; it is simply reducing the profitability of coal mining and the value of property that has coal. The ultimate effect of these taxes is not to export taxes; it is to *confiscate* the property of a relatively small number of people.

A Revealing Comparison

Washington and Oregon offer an illuminating contrast in state tax policy. A quick inspection of the data reported on pp 18–19 reveals that on average a Washingtonian pays far less than an

State and local taxes, as percentage of gross personal income, 1990



State	taxes	rank	State	taxes	rank	State	taxes	rank
Alabama	6.5%	23	Kentucky	7.9%	41	Nevada	6.3%	18
Alaska	12.4%	50	Louisiana	7.0%	29	Ohio	6.1%	15
Arizona	7.2%	33	Maine	8.0%	43	Oklahoma	7.3%	34
Arkansas	7.0%	28	Maryland	6.3%	19	Oregon	5.8%	11
California	7.1%	31	Mass.	6.9%	27	Pennsylvania	6.1%	16
Colorado	5.0%	3	Michigan	6.9%	26	Rhode Isl.	6.5%	22
Connecticut	6.0%	14	Minnesota	8.3%	44	S. Dakota	4.8%	2
D.C.	15.8%	51	Mississippi	7.5%	38	S. Carolina	7.8%	40
Delaware	9.1%	47	Missouri	5.6%	7	Tennessee	5.6%	8
Florida	5.6%	6	Montana	6.4%	21	Texas	5.2%	4
Georgia	6.1%	17	N. Carolina	7.4%	36	Utah	6.4%	20
Hawaii	10.8%	49	N. Dakota	7.4%	37	Vermont	6.8%	25
Idaho	7.3%	35	N. H.	2.7%	1	Virginia	5.7%	10
Illinois	5.4%	5	N. J.	5.7%	9	W. Virginia	8.4%	45
Indiana	6.7%	24	N. M.	9.4%	48	Washington	7.8%	39
Iowa	7.2%	32	N. Y.	7.0%	30	Wisconsin	8.0%	42
Kansas	6.0%	13	Nebraska	5.8%	12	Wyoming	8.5%	46
						U.S. average	6.6%	–

Oregonian in each of the four income levels in the study:

Income level	Oregon taxes	Washington taxes
$ 25,000	$ 3,457	$1,939
50,000	7,310	3,420
75,000	11,484	5,473
100,000	15,189	6,932

In three of the four income levels, Oregon's personal taxes were the highest in the country; in the fourth they were second highest. In contrast, Washington's personal tax level ranked 8th from the bottom at three income levels and 19th from the bottom in the fourth.

It seems plain enough that Oregon's personal taxes are much higher than Washington's.

But what about other taxes? The tax systems of the two states are very different. Oregon depends primarily on high income and property taxes, keeping most other taxes quite low. Washington has no income tax and moderate property taxes, it depends on keeping practically all other taxes high. The chart below compares various tax rates:

Tax	Oregon	Wash.
Beer, per barrel	$ 2.60	$ 4.78
Wine, per gallon	.77	1.68
Cigarettes, per pack	.28	.34
Gasoline, per gallon	.16	.22
Vehicle registration	20.00	27.75
Real estate transfer, per $1,000	12.80	0.00
Vehicle sales/excise	0.0%	6.5%

So while an average Oregonian pays far more in direct taxes, an average Washingtonian pays more in indirect taxes. In the end, who pays more? More broadly, which of the fifty states has the lowest overall level of taxes?

There are at least four different ways to answer this question.

1) If we limit the taxes under consideration to income, sales, automobile, and property taxes, as pointed out above, Wyoming has the lowest taxes. But this fails to consider many taxes. Indeed, in some states, less than half of taxes collected comes from these traditional sources.

2) How about considering the total taxes collected by the state? In this case, South Dakota is the leader, with "only" about $1.4 billion collected in 1990. But this is partly the result of South Dakota's low population, which plainly has nothing to do with the overall level of taxes. We have to compare the total tax collections to something else.

3) On a per capita basis, Arkansas has the nation's lowest taxes, $1,688 in 1990. This approach makes better sense than ignoring indirect taxes (and awarding the low tax crown to Wyoming), or ignoring the population and prosperity of a state (and awarding the crown to South Dakota.) But this method has its own problem, a fact that becomes clear when you look at the other states with low per capita taxes. The top five are rounded out with Mississippi, West Virginia, Tennessee, and Alabama, a list with a very strong correlation to low average income. Plainly, one important reason these states' per capita tax collections are so low is that their people don't have as much money to loot.

4) How about figuring taxes as a portion of total personal income of the residents of each state? This takes into account the relative prosperity of each state's residents, as well as (indirectly) its population, thereby eliminating the inherent advantage of small states (like South Dakota) and poor states (like Arkansas).

A Clear Winner

By this standard, there is a very clear winner: New Hampshire. Indeed, New Hampshire's "take" of gross state personal income in 1990 was only 2.73%. That's more than 40% less than its runner up, South Dakota, where 4.79% of personal income ends up in the hands of the state.

But even this standard has its flaws. Why should taxes be higher just because people are more prosperous? It doesn't cost appreciably more to build a highway in Georgia than in Arkansas. Why should Georgians pay more for their highways than Arkansans?

And there is the more fundamental problem of the inherent fallaciousness of the concept of "gross personal income," which measures only monetary income.

Even so, I think New Hampshire deserves the title of "lowest tax state." It ranks low in personal taxes and low in most of its tax rates (no sales tax; income tax only on business income, dividends, and interest), and it has modest property taxes. More importantly, while there are problems with measuring the level of taxes by comparing gross taxes to gross personal income, it is less unsatisfactory than its alternatives. And the huge 83% difference between New Hampshire's tax level and the level of runner-up South Dakota ought to signify something.

None of this has much to do with the question that started out this exploration of the problem of measuring state tax levels. Where should you go to save on taxes? The answer to this question varies with personal circumstances. For a retired person on a very limited income, Oregon might make sense, despite its extremely high income tax. For a person with a high income, any of the states without income tax (Washington, Alaska, Nevada, Texas, Wyoming, South Dakota, Tennessee, Florida, New Hampshire) makes a sensible choice.

Of course, the character and level of state taxes is only one variable in deciding where to live. If you hate cold weather, you won't move to Alaska no matter how low its taxes are. But tax environment is a relevant factor in deciding where to live. A footloose retiree with fairly substantial income and no need for employment will do well to look at the low income tax states. The state he chooses will depend on a variety of his own personal values, but it is plain that some families with an annual income of $100,000 may very well prefer Florida's annual tax bite of $5,292 to Wyoming's $4,135. In any case, he would have to find substantial charm in Oregon to choose to live there at a tax cost of $15,189 per year. ❑

About the data

All figures are for 1990; taxes in virtually all states have increased since. Estimated taxes on pages 18–19 reflect taxes in the largest city in each state; taxes in other locations are generally somewhat lower. The listing of state and local taxes per capita and as a percentage of gross personal income reflect all state and local taxes collected in each state. "U.S. average" taxes are normalized by each state's population.

Class Is in Session — Will They Learn?

by Douglas Casey

The New Class is getting ready to "force the spring" in Washington. If spring is coerced, can fall be far behind?

I was a classmate of Bill Clinton's at Georgetown from 1964 to 1968, and, although I don't recall meeting him, we have lots of mutual friends. They tell me that he was a "grind," whose main outside interest was getting elected to various student-body positions. He wasn't a party animal, and apparently could never be found worshipping at the altar of the porcelain god of a Saturday night. In subsequent years, as the aphrodisiac of power went to his head, he became something of a player. Gennifer Flowers is apparently just one of a long line of upwardly mobile bimbos who helped him make up for time lost in school.

But all that is his personal business, apropos of nothing, and I can't see why anybody should care about it. Much more important, and more difficult to understand, are his political convictions. My suspicion is that he doesn't really have any beliefs, as such, except for a very strong opinion that *he knows best*. That's one of the most dangerous beliefs anyone can have, because it means he's likely to be completely opportunistic. It also means he's not likely to be very market oriented, because the market has the nasty habit of supplying goods and services that individual people actually want, which are likely to differ from those that he "knows" are best. Whatever he does is likely to be cloaked as either "realism," which is the abnegation of philosophy, or "pragmatism," which is a nonphilosophy of getting what "needs to be done" (i.e., whatever seems like a good idea at the time) done by whatever means are necessary. Not good.

"Inside Bill Clinton's Head," by James Gill

But what does Bill feel needs to be done? Since Slick Willie apparently has no core philosophy, it's best to look at the character of the people who he sees as his peers, and from whom he seeks advice and ideas. Bill and all his colleagues are the most powerful members of something that has been called "The New Class."

Apparatchiks of Another Color

The New Class is not so much a political class as a socio-economic grouping that gravitates toward political power. It was first described by Milovan Djilas, the renegade Montenegran communist, to describe the bureaucracy that accumulated power, wealth and privileges in Soviet eastern Europe. The concept was adapted by Irving Kristol, B. Bruce Biggs, Herman Kahn, and others to describe a similar class that has gained influence in western democracies.

Robert Reich, Clinton's chief economic advisor during his campaign (and now Secretary of Labor) is an archetypal example of it; Reich calls them "symbolists." They're concerned with what Marx termed the "means of production," but they don't deal with these "mate-

rial productive forces" directly; in other words, you won't find them farming, mining, manufacturing, inventing, or working with their hands. They're not interested in experimenting with nature, tinkering with technology, or generally manipulating physical reality, so much as experimenting with human nature, tinkering with politics, and manipulating society.

These people make their way in the world through dealing with symbols, words, and concepts. They are writers, editors, producers, media people, mid-to-upper-level bureaucrats, workers in "public interest groups" and charitable organizations, academics, entertainers, lobbyists, lawyers, planners, artists, analysts, consultants, and the like. Workers such as these have been around since the dawn of civilization, but it's only in the late 20th century that they've existed in such numbers that they actually form a significant class. With the advent of some fairly recent technologies (the jet plane, television, and nationally distributed newspapers), they've become a coherent voice. Dan Quayle, though not particularly bright or shrewd in most of his public comments, was quite correct when he called them the "cultural elite."

Those in the New Class are well educated and earn enough to give them the leisure to think about what they consider the "important" things in life. Though they make much of "caring" for those who aren't so economically privileged, they usually have very little direct contact with the working classes. In fact, they tend to see the kind of hands-on production that the proletariat engages in as being somewhat degrading. For instance, all the brouhaha about America becoming a nation of "hamburger flippers" during the '80s was largely a result of their lack of respect for manual labor. The fact that entry level jobs are educational, and build the skills and attitudes necessary for higher positions, is lost on them.

They are generally opposed to anything that smacks of commercialism, popular culture, or middlebrow values. Even if they don't always have substantial net worth, they always affect upper middle class values. They feel that economic plenty and material comfort are their birthright, but they usually have little insight on how those conditions came to be. They believe that the government creates wealth, and commercial interests unfairly exploit it.

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Like any elite, they enjoy their position on top, and want to maintain it. Because economic progress tends to bring up those on the bottom into the middle and upper middle classes, diluting the power and influence of those who have already arrived, they tend, like every elite, to be against free markets. Although they defend political democracy — mainly because they feel, correctly, that they can manipulate the attitudes of many voters — the New Class wants to stifle positive economic change and maintain current class distinctions. Lack of upward mobility is alien to what has been traditional American culture, and it's no accident that New Class values are much closer to traditional European values.

The New Class holds technology and capitalism responsible for a litany of supposed ills — "too many" cars, parking lots, strip shopping centers, and suburbs; "too few" snail darters and spotted owls, despite the fact that technology and capitalism are the primary forces that have elevated the high standard of living enjoyed by most Americans today.* The problem, in the view of the New Class, usually boils down to too many people (more precisely, too many people who aren't members of the New Class) living too well, and thereby having too much of an effect on the planet. Those in the New Class think they know best, and are anxious to impose their solutions on everyone else.

When it comes to solutions for the ills of society, they're quite righteous, taking on the tone and uncompromising attitudes of moral crusaders. Since they socialize and work mainly with one another and they control the news, entertainment, educational, and literary media, they think practically everybody agrees with their view of things. And there is some merit to this belief. Because they're in a position to set the parameters of a debate (e.g., a question might become not "Should there be government welfare?" but "How much welfare, for whom, and who should decide?"), they pretty well control at least the general direction of thinking.

New Class Themes

There are at least eight themes that unify and define the thinking of the



"What's so bad about organized crime — *you* guys are organized, aren't you?"

* This is not to say that a reasonable person can't see that economic growth can create serious problems. What the New Class fails to appreciate is that problems like environmental degradation can be dealt with from within the framework of free markets and technology.

New Class. In most cases, they've taken something that either is, or has the potential of becoming, a real problem, and blown it alarmingly out of proportion. A fire burning in your furnace is a good thing; a fire burning down your house is not. This is a distinction they often miss. I'm indebted to Herman Kahn for identifying a number of these themes:

1) **Technology** — The New Class is deeply suspicious of technology. People naturally tend to fear anything powerful that they don't really understand. Very few of the New Class have any real scientific training, and almost none have any exposure to engineering; thus very few have any practical understanding of what technology is all about. So they want to take control away from scientists and engineers, believing that such techno-wonks don't have the wisdom to employ their products. (That wisdom, of course, resides in the New Class.)

It seems to them that technology leads to mostly bad results. In the case of pollution from automobiles, for instance, they would feel much more satisfied (at least psychologically and spiritually) if people would cut down on their driving by 50%, than they would if a new device was invented cutting down pollution by 50%. Since they believe that the mass of men are at least untrustworthy (if not downright evil), they don't want them to have too much power over the environment. This sentiment drives the technophobia associated with the "back to the earth" movements. Which brings us to their second major theme.

2) **The Environment** — Despite their general hostility to science, they often cite science when convenient. They take seriously even the most remote possibilities of disaster, and arouse calls for instant (and usually poorly thought out and counterproductive) action. They seldom make even the most cursory attempt to calculate costs for supposed benefits. When asked whether they're concerned about burning down the barn in order to kill the rat, the maximum extent of economic analysis by a member of the New Class is likely to be: "That just depends on the relative value one places on the preservation of the barn, as opposed to the destruction of the rat."

In any event, science takes a distant second place to a form of socially acceptable hysteria when it comes to environmental issues. Environmentalism is rapidly gaining status as a new religion. Environmentalism has much in common with traditional religion: it posits a god ("The Environment"), demands sacrifice to that god, and requires that many of its beliefs be accepted on faith. But it differs in certain fundamental ways. For one thing, its worldview is secular. Ironically, despite its secularism and the mantle of science in which it cloaks itself, environmentalism is fundamentally hostile to the notion — common to Christianity, Judaism and Islam — that people ought to have direct dominion over nature and this world. Whether environmentalism will widely displace these older religions remains to be seen, but it has already displaced them in the lives of the New Class.

3) **Health and Safety** — The New Class figures that no human being is capable of making a rational or informed judgment about what risks he might take. If "society" is going to pay the costs of an individual's sickness or injury, it follows that society's guardians (i.e., the New Class) should insure that the individual behaves in an appropriate manner. It's not very important whether those who have to obey the rules (and pay for them) really like them or not.

Since the New Class members are better educated and more sophisticated than the population at large, they tend to believe they know what's best for them. The end product, of course, is a busybody mentality. But social workers, politicians, and pundits, among others, are really just professional busybodies. They exist to set standards for others, and then make sure those others conform to their standards.

4) **Social justice** — Multimillion dollar jury awards to burglars injured in the commission of a crime, and sympathy for looters as "protesters" are just two symptoms of a general attitude that no one is really responsible for either his own actions, or what happens to him. The New Class translates social justice to mean not just equality before the law or of opportunity, but equality of income and standing. They're perfectly willing to visit the sins of the fathers upon the sons, which is what "affirmative action" is all about.

As a result, people are treated not so much as individuals, but as members of racial, religious, or other groups. This social stratification serves to entrench exactly the problems the New Class ostensibly is trying to solve, and sets up an atmosphere for real class warfare as a bonus.

5) **Economic development** — A great deal of emphasis was placed on "jobs" during the 1992 elections, although it wasn't made clear exactly what that meant. A process of elimination is helpful; we know jobs in fast-food restaurants aren't acceptable, and factory and other "grunt" work is clearly behind the power curve. It's tough to create productive work for people when you don't let the market tell you what it wants. So the New Class tells the market what it wants, or at least what it ought to want.

To date, the New Class has been a bit vague about how it will create jobs. To their credit, most in the New Class seem at least dimly aware that simply adding people to the government's payroll won't solve the problem, since the added costs (i.e. higher taxes) would destroy jobs in the private sector. So they talk vaguely about stimulating new technologies and job training, by the judicious imposition of government "investment" (i.e. spending) and regulation.

One effect of the overt regulations, peer pressure, and social opprobrium arising from New Class values is that people tend to work less hard, take more leisure, and take fewer risks. If the Wright brothers had to develop an airplane in today's environment, Kitty Hawk would still be an obscure village in North Carolina.

Un-common policy sense.

What Has Government Done to Our Health Care? by Terree P. Wasley. The crisis in health care is the result of a long history of government meddling in the medical marketplace. In a variety of ways the state has limited the supply of and overstimulated demand for medical services. Wasley's prescription for reversing the ills of the system is to give consumers the power to control their own health care spending. 1992/160 pp./$19.95 cloth/$10.95 paper

A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War by Ted Galen Carpenter. The passing of the Cold War is the most important development of the late 20th century. Yet Washington clings tenaciously to a host of obsolete, expensive military alliances, including NATO, that have the potential to embroil the United States in conflicts unrelated to its vital interests. Carpenter proposes withdrawal from those entangling alliances and a policy of nonintervention. 1992/212 pp./$22.95 cloth/$12.95 paper

Liberating Schools: Education in the Inner City edited by David Boaz. America's most innovative education analysts take a good look at American schools—especially those in the inner city—and offer proposals for major structural reform. The book, which includes the editor's thorough critique of the public school system, presents a compelling case for choice in education. 1991/220 pp./$25.95 cloth/$13.95 paper

Quagmire: America in the Middle East by Leon T. Hadar. The author challenges the Washington foreign policy consensus, which demands that the United States remain the dominant power in the Middle East. After examining American policy through the Persian Gulf War and arguing that the United States cannot impose order in the region, Hadar concludes that it is time for America to disengage from the Middle East and adopt a policy of benign neglect. 1992/240 pp./$23.95 cloth/$13.95 paper

Patient Power: Solving America's Health Care Crisis by John C. Goodman and Gerald L. Musgrave. The price of health care and insurance is skyrocketing because few people spend their own money on medical services. The authors' innovative solution is to restore power and responsibility to consumers by allowing them to buy their own tax-free medical insurance and to set up tax-free medical savings accounts. The result would be a consumer-directed system of competition and innovation. 1992/550 pp./$29.95 cloth/$19.95 paper

Sound and Fury: The Science and Politics of Global Warming by Patrick J. Michaels. The author, an environmental scientist, writes that despite the current hype and science-by-press-release, the greenhouse effect poses no serious threat to the world we know. The most disturbing finding of his study, however, is the willingness of some to distort science to expand the government's control over our lives. 1992/208 pp./$21.95 cloth/$11.95 paper

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6) **Free markets** — Since the manifest bankruptcy of socialist systems around the world, members of the New Class have lost their enthusiasm for absolute state control. But they haven't embraced free markets. Instead, they emphasize government/private "partnership," of "national industrial policy," "targeted spending," and numerous other euphemisms for planning, directing, or controlling the economy.

7) **Entrepreneurialism** — The New Class holds entrepreneurs and businessmen in low esteem for a number of related reasons. Entrepreneurs employ people, which leads to a suspicion they also exploit them; they advertise, which means they "force" people to buy things they don't really "need"; they make money, which means they are expanding the gap between rich and poor. New Class attitudes toward business are quite similar to the attitude of European aristocrats toward work in general, i.e., it's best left to the lower classes, and those who haven't found a way to rise above it.

The fact that businessmen are typically "doers" leads the New Class (who see themselves as "thinkers") to look down on them. Businessmen are viewed suspiciously, unless they can justify their social value in some way other than just making a profit. Someone who makes a million dollars inventing a new widget, or a cancer cure, is treated as if he were the sole beneficiary; the manifest benefits to society are simply ignored.

8) **Traditional values** — Boy Scout virtues are out, and radical chic is in. Nineteenth-century values (courage, perseverance, responsibility, achievement, and the like) are out. John Wayne is unhip and antisocial; Woody Allen and Alan Alda are proper male role models. Some lip service will be paid to traditional values to avoid outraging the Silent Majority of voters. But the New Class holds both the Silent Majority and its values very much in contempt.

The Origin and Future of the New Class

It's not that individual members of the New Class necessarily think all these things make good intellectual sense, either. But they generally defend these views the way many ex-Catholics will still argue for the Church's dogma — or the way Scots will defend the eating of haggis, even though they realize the stuff is abominable. Being a member of a peer group is an emotional thing, giving rise to atavistic responses. It's like patriotism; almost everybody feels it, even though it makes little rational sense.

Members of the New Class make their way in the world through dealing with symbols, words, and concepts. Dan Quayle, though not particularly bright or shrewd in most of his public comments, was quite correct when he called them the "cultural elite."

Joseph Schumpeter anticipated the origin of the New Class early in this century, recognizing it as part of a phenomenon that tends to cause capitalistic societies to self-destruct. His basic argument is that capitalism breeds anti-capitalistic mentalities, not because it doesn't produce wealth, but because it succeeds so very well.

Children of prosperous parents tend to accept wealth as a given. Their parents were surrounded by poverty (or at least relative poverty), found a problem with it, and developed a solution to the problem (through innovation, hard work, high savings, etc.). But children of parents who faced this struggle seldom have the drive it takes to create their own fortunes.

But they do find a problem with abundance, especially if there are a lot of people (whether they're across town, or in Somalia) who must do without. This is most true if they've been inculcated with guilt about wealth, which isn't very hard to do, since the children have obviously done nothing to create it or deserve it. As a result, they develop their own solutions to the new perceived problem. Physically that can mean alcohol, drugs, and general dissipation; psychologically and intellectually it usually means adopting New Class values.

So most children of affluent parents hit upon the wrong solutions to the problems they perceive with the wealth around them. Certainly, the influences they get from their teachers, the media, and other sources of New Class influence are anti-wealth and anti-capitalistic. The fact that they are innately hypocritical is swept under the carpet.

It's hard to say where this will lead. There's no question that as time goes on, basic industries (agriculture, mining, and manufacturing) are going to become trivial in terms of the number of people engaged in them, even though their products will be more important than ever. Progress will continue in stops and starts. As New Class people grow in numbers and influence (as they will over the next four years), their ideas will slow down progress, and cause a reaction.

But, as Marx would have said, the "historical imperative" is definitely on their side. The world is going to get wealthier, and the New Class will grow and gain even more influence. My guess is that many of the New Class's current ideas, starting with those that are extreme, silly, or just plain wrong, will eventually fall by the wayside. Over time, their economic ideas will become diluted and irrelevant. The fact that the New Class is well educated, and has time to think, means that more and more will eventually be intellectually convinced that a free market is a good thing. It's probably a lot like the evolution of the working class, in that regard. They used to want to smash machines, and string up the owners. Now they want more machines, because they've come to understand they allow high wages, and they'd like to become the owners.

Certainly, the last 50 years of the twentieth century haven't been like any other five decades in human history. The population will have gone from 2.5 billion to over 6 billion; the world's aggregate GNP from $2 trillion to $20 trillion. The world's population will go from mostly pre-literate to fairly well educated, rural to urban, and pre-industrial to industrial. And the rate of change is still accelerating, although the New Class will do its best to slow it down.

But don't worry. It's just a stage they're going through. ❑

Lament

The Lost War of the Rents

by Scott Gardner

It is fifty years since rent control was imposed in New York City. Who is celebrating?

Suddenly, you discover that someone else also owns the home whose deed you so dearly cherish. A mystery? Have you entered the Twilight Zone?

Welcome to the world of rent control.

In a bizarre transformation of the law, rent control advocates have created a concept of dual property ownership that challenges the limits of rationality: merely by virtue of occupancy, tenants are automatically vested with property rights to the apartments in which they live.



Lost in New York

Consider the case of Albert Wahon, a Long Island publisher. He bought a two-bedroom apartment in Great Neck, N.Y., which he planned to rent for a year, until he and his family were ready to move in. The $1,200 monthly rent did not cover his expenses, but he felt that renting was better than leaving the apartment vacant for so long. What Albert Wahon did not know was that a fluke in the law brought his co-op under the rules of rent regulation.

Although the rent control law specifically exempted individually owned New York City apartments from control, the lawmakers just plain forgot to exempt any other community in the state, such as Westchester, and Nassau County. As a result of this oversight, Albert Wahon's tenant applied for and received a rent rollback to $822 a month. Because the tenant also happened to be over sixty-two years old, he qualified for a senior citizen's right to remain in that apartment indefinitely.

So now Albert Wahon owns an apartment that costs him $400 a month to carry, but one he cannot hope to live in until his tenant voluntarily moves out or dies — perhaps not even then. There is now a whole new body of case law guaranteeing succession rights to the heirs or roommates of a tenant living in a rent-controlled apartment.

Although this case made the headlines because of its obvious unfairness, it is essentially no different from what

"Tenant Rebellion," by Gunnar Bergstrom

still happens today to every owner of rent-controlled property wherever such laws are in effect. Two people get to own the same piece of property at the same time; the landlord pays the bills, the tenant enjoys the benefits.

Although the tenant is also the "owner" of the apartment, it nevertheless remains the nominal owner's obligation (under penalty of fine or imprisonment) to maintain the plumbing, provide plentiful heat and hot water, pay the water bills and real estate taxes, provide insurance coverage, exterminate the bugs, and paint the whole apartment every two years.

Two people get to own the same piece of property at the same time; the landlord pays the bills, the tenant enjoys the benefits.

It is interesting to note that many tenants can qualify for these wonderful and carefree property rights *and still* not bother paying rent. Many tenants of rent-controlled apartments are savvy in navigating their way through the bureaucratic maze, able to stir up a rat's nest of housing statutes, building department codes, and assorted complaint procedures for the express purpose of withholding rent payments. These delaying tactics, combined with the normal three to five year backlog for such applications and administrative proceedings serve to allow tenants to defer paying rent for many years . . . sometimes for life.

An Unsentimental Education

I learned all about tenants' property rights and the ingenious tricks to avoid rent they spawn the hard way, from my own tenants. For eight of the ten years I owned a small rent-controlled building in Manhattan, one tenant used the techniques described above to live *rent-free*. When I finally sold the building in disgust, I had to choose between accepting settlement of the back rent for ten cents on the dollar, or face a lengthy court trial and risk getting nothing at all from a landlord-hating judge. Isn't free enterprise grand?

So assiduously do the humanitarian housing moguls champion these hallowed "tenants' property rights" that they are routinely granted to any and all residential rent-controlled tenants regardless of their citizenship, their questionable primary residence status, their non-taxpaying proclivities, their known criminal records, or even their violation of existing rent regulations.

Another pair of tenants rented an apartment in my building for use as an art gallery. The apartment was legally zoned for commercial use (which was not rent controlled) and all rent checks were paid through the business. Yet when my tenants claimed they were illegally using the gallery as their living quarters, the court immediately converted the apartment to rent-controlled status along with the inevitable rent rollback and overcharge penalties.

One of the favorite arguments by rent control's apologists is that no one forces landlords to own property, so therefore whatever unfair treatment they receive is their own idiotic fault. There is a certain warped logic to this argument — rather like Saddam Hussein's claim that his devastation of Kuwait was the fault of the Allied Coalition's driving him out. But the sad fact is that, in most cases, no one ever warns new owners about the kind of treatment they are certain to receive at the hands of the rent control establishment.

No one warned me. I had to learn the hard way.

Foundation for Catastrophe

In a democracy whose magnificent system of free enterprise is the envy of the entire ex-Bolshevik world, rent control is an anomaly whose irrational consequences are rarely foreseen. In fact, such socialistic incongruities as tenants' property rights are so alien to most Americans that few fully comprehend the blatant anti-property philosophy inherent in having two people own the same building at the same time.

Those people who correctly perceive rent control as a legal scam, but who benefit financially from its favors, will seldom oppose this law on moral or ethical grounds. The vast majority of taxpayers, who are incapable of seeing through rent control's humanitarian pretense, will bear its costs without complaint, never suspecting that the system is robbing them blind and destroying their cities in the process.

Owners gullible enough to think that the Sovietization of American property rights is a constitutional impossibility will stand in shocked disbelief as their properties are effectively confiscated.

And those owners gullible enough to think that the Sovietization of American property rights is a constitutional impossibility, will stand in shocked disbelief as their properties are effectively confiscated by "liberal" politicians pandering for the tenant vote.

By debasing the whole concept of private ownership, rent control lays the groundwork for the eventual destruction of all private property. As the Russian people have learned to their dismay, when everybody owns everything, nobody owns anything. ❑



"Sorry, but if I sustain your objection, *everybody* will want me to sustain their objections."

The *Liberty* Interview

Ayn Rand, Objectivism and All That

Roy A. Childs, Jr, interviewed by Jeff Walker

Roy Childs burst upon the libertarian movement in 1968, when he wrote "An Open Letter to Ayn Rand," in which he argued that Rand's concept of absolute, inviolable rights implied anarchism, not the limited government theory that Rand advocated as a part of her philosophy, Objectivism.

At the time, the libertarian movement consisted of isolated individuals and groups, mostly ex-Objectivists who made the same argument as had Childs. But Childs' elaboration of the argument, coming at a time when the organized Objectivist movement was falling apart in the wake of Rand's repudiation of her lieutenant and designated "intellectual heir" Nathaniel Branden, stimulated its transformation into the modern libertarian movement.

Childs quickly rose in the ranks of that movement. By the middle-1970s, he was a close associate of Murray Rothbard, who had become the intellectual leader of the new movement, involved in Rothbard's intrigues and enterprises. He participated in the explosive growth of the libertarian movement in the late 1970s, culminating in his editorship of Libertarian Review *from 1977 to 1981.*

After Libertarian Review *folded, Childs' literary output declined, pretty much limited to writing the catalog of Laissez Faire Books. He often expressed disgust for that work, but it paid the bills and kept him in a position of influence in the libertarian movement.*



Childs loved gossip and was always a brilliant conversationalist, maintaining a very wide circle of acquaintances. His death in May 1992 left the libertarian movement a less lively, less colorful place.

A few months before his death, Childs shared his knowledge of the Objectivist and libertarian movements with Canadian journalist Jeff Walker, who was preparing a CBC "Ideas" radio documentary on Ayn Rand. Although the focus of the documentary was Ayn Rand's legacy, their conversation ranged into some of the most controversial corners of American culture — including, of course, the libertarian, classical liberal revival of the past quarter century.

Walker had already interviewed numerous others for his Rand documentary before he visited Roy Childs in his Manhattan apartment. Roy offered him a Coke, Walker turned on his tape recorder, and the conversation began.

Childs: Last night I was over at the Blumenthals'. An interesting discussion went on about whether Ayn Rand was evil, with the Blumenthals and Kay Nolte Smith saying yes and Barbara Branden being very defensive of Rand. I never heard anything about Ayn and about Nathan like the stories I heard there . . . *

Walker: I've never heard any bad stuff about Ayn Rand that didn't make it into the Barbara Branden book, *The Passion of Ayn Rand*.

Childs: I read an early draft of that book; Barbara cut out over 200 pages, I think. There were some great Greenspan anecdotes. Apparently Ayn took him apart at an elegant elite restaurant, got mad at him, blew her top, called him a coward. There was one anecdote after another. In the original treatment of Frank he came off looking much worse, much more of a drunk. The original manuscript was 780 pages.

I heard of your trouble with Nathaniel. He can be a pain.

Walker: It's almost like he carries his own little cold spot around with him. It's hard to believe he's a psychologist.

Childs: He likes to control things and he doesn't like interviews to begin with because people can control him and pull him out of context.

Walker: At one point he accused me of trying to manipulate him. I was almost complimented — this, coming from one of the ultimate manipulators. What other stories did you hear during this six-hour discussion of whether Ayn Rand was evil?

Childs: You know the stories Barbara tells in her book? Well, one of the funny things about the book is this: She'll tell a story as an archetype of what happened and give the impression that it happened once and that this is one of the worst things that happened. When in fact, according to the Blumenthals and Kay, this happened on a daily basis. Remember the one about the young ballerina who had some irrational this or that, and they tore her apart? Branden strutting back and forth in the apartment, Ayn applauding, and

* Joan and Allan Blumenthal, Kay Nolte Smith and Barbara Branden were members of Rand's "inner circle " of close friends and acolytes. Allan Blumenthal is a psychiatrist, Joan Blumenthal a painter, and Kay Nolte Smith a novelist; Barbara Branden is author of *The Passion of Ayn Rand*, a memoir-biography of Rand.

"Roy Childs," by Gunnar Bergstrom

the ballerina was reduced to tears and gave up her career. They said this happened constantly, day in and day out. The problem with Barbara's book is that she implies that this is a really rotten thing but it happened once in a blue moon.

I've also heard stories of Rand's great generosity, too, helping people through college and giving people money.

Walker: Barbara mentioned that to me too. Were they followers?

Childs: They were people she was friendly with and knew and thought highly of.

Walker: Were they card-carrying Objectivists?

Childs: Some of her closest friends you wouldn't call card-carrying Objectivists because they weren't intellectual at all. She was remarkably unpretentious in certain ways, as long as she wasn't being "the great Ayn Rand" in public. I didn't know her, though I met her a few times. I'd like to make that clear. But I know everyone who knew her.

Walker: Do you think her over-all influence on people's personal lives was negative?

Childs: Although she could be kind, she vilified things like kindness and getting along with people as explicit values. The starkness with which she would present her views led people to go around acting in very bizarre ways and to abandon very normal personality traits like politeness and manners that we take for granted in civilized society. She thought she had the obligation to storm out of things if something was said she didn't like. I think Peter Breggin said that there are a lot of perfectly normal people who try to think of themselves as heroes, and that can be very self-destructive if you reach beyond in effect reality in your own life.

Rand gave a lot of people the self-confidence to strike out on their own and to go after independent values. But she also encourages pretentiousness, unrealism about goals and posturing about being a victim, of being a minority in society.

I was never an Objectivist. My background was that at the age of thirteen in 1962, I read Henry Hazlitt's *Economics In One Lesson*. I went from there to FEE and Leonard Read's works, and Mises and Hayek and Friedman.* I didn't read Rand until my last year of high school because I was a nonfiction reader. I read the *Objectivist Newsletter* before I read the novels, so I was taken with her but I wasn't entranced because I was already an individualist, a free marketeer. So she didn't knock me on my ass.

Walker: So you already had your own intellectual reasons for believing in some of her ultimate values.

Childs: I already had a column in my student newspaper, and I had travelled so widely giving talks. I taught at Rampart College, the Freedom School. I was a prominent young pup of a libertarian. I hung around with a lot of people — Edith Efron, the Brandens and others right up to the split — while I was still a teenager.† So I met everyone — all the rank and file libertarians and Objectivists throughout the country.

And an enormous number of them had, because of Objectivism and Rand, grandiose ambitions that bore no relationship to what they were ever going to do with their lives. Most of them 25 years later haven't done anything. A perfectly normal girl who could have done some good writing or taught English or something wanted to be another Victor Hugo. She changed her name to Regina Hugo under Rand's influence, and had nine pretentious novels planned out. After failing utterly at this, not having the technique or the training for it, she just dropped out of sight and became sort of a farmer in the middle of the midwest.

It's not that people's lives were ruined. I can tell you a lot of people were given the power and the self-confidence to rethink their lives and do very interesting things. Rand gave a lot of people the self-confidence to strike out on their own and to go after independent values. But she also encourages pretentiousness, unrealism about goals and posturing about being a victim, of being a minority in society. And something I think she had in common with existentialism — particularly in *The Fountainhead* and *We The Living* — was the sense of alienation. I think that the one thing she communicates in page after page of her writing is alienation from the general culture and the general world; these are her enemies. And you have to withdraw in some sense, if not physically to Galt's gulch, then psychologically.

Walker: Allan Blumenthal has suggested that the entirety of Objectivism was a projection of Ayn Rand's semi-pathological psychology, which is pretty remarkable coming from someone who was part of the inner circle for so long.

Childs: That's not really fair. There's an awful lot more to her ideas than that. There's a lot to her philosophy, particularly on the foundational issues. I know the history of philosophy, and she made some really important innovations. In the context in which she was writing this stuff, some of the breakthroughs she made were enormous. Before Rand, the defense of freedom and capitalism was pretty chintzy. Everything was theological — God gives you rights — and everything was on this very lowbrow level. And then you have a handful of people — most notably Mises, Hayek, and her, and later Friedman — who start giving some backbone to this whole classical liberal/libertarian/Objectivist point of view. And the defense of capitalism was kicked upstairs by those three figures. I think she had a lot to do with that.

Her whole philosophy couldn't possibly be a projection of

* Henry Hazlitt (1894–) is a journalist and economist, author of many influential libertarian books besides his most famous one, *Economics in One Lesson* (Harper & Bros., 1946). FEE is the Foundation for Economic Education founded in 1946 by Leonard E. Read (1898–1983), a former prominent Chamber of Commerce official. Ludwig von Mises (1880–1972) was a prominent and radical classical liberal social philosopher and leader of the Austrian school of economics. F.A. Hayek (1899–1992) was an economist and social thinker who played a pivotal role in the revival of classical liberal thinking. Milton Friedman (1912–) is a prominent classical liberal social thinker. Hayek and Friedman have won Nobel Prizes for economics.

† Edith Efron is a journalist and author. Her most recent book is *The Apocalyptics* (Simon and Schuster, 1984). In 1967, she was the first member of Rand's "inner circle" to be expelled.

her personality. But, some aspects — the issue of sense of life, her artistic values — probably are. Her own psychology may be responsible for the twists and the turns and some of the subtleties. Rational self-interest doesn't have to mean you act like a son of a bitch. The concretes that are picked up from her, I think, are these strange personality quirks. Her view of sex, for example, might be just purely a projection, although, in basic terms, sex should involve values.

Walker: Her theory of sex is interesting. She has a good point when she says that men and women should get together on the basis of shared values and admiration, but there are a lot of other things that go into it.

Childs: The influence that had on an awful lot of young kids — since I knew the rank and file Objectivists when they were teenagers — was trying to force themselves into relationships based on their shared values. Endless talking, that's what relationships were to them. Endless talking.

Walker: I asked the Blumenthals about parties they might have had with the inner circle, and they said that New Year's Eve they would sit around discussing metaphysics.

Childs: Rand was a serious woman. She was a most remarkable woman. Look at the structure of her life: where she came from; how she got out; what she did. Very few people find what they want to do at an early age and do it.

Walker: In *The Ideas of Ayn Rand*, Ronald Merrill says she believed that deciding early the course of one's entire life is good for everybody to do, and that this is very bad advice for many young people.

Childs: If they didn't already know what they want to do at the age of 19, they think that they're psychologically fucked-up or they have bad premises and they went into therapy.

An awful lot of the Objectivists I knew were people in transition to libertarianism. And a lot of them scuttled the morality and got into rock music and all sorts of drugs. You know, the first time they used marijuana, got high and listened to Led Zeppelin or The Moody Blues.

Walker: You mean they got unfocused? God, Ayn Rand would have gone crazy if she'd known that any of her followers were into marijuana and Led Zeppelin.

Childs: This is something I fought with the Blumenthals about. I know that she took Dexadrine every day for forty years.

Walker: But low dosages, according to Barbara Branden.

Childs: Her secretary told me that she'd take a couple of five milligrams, and if nothing happened in an hour, she'd take another two, or three, or four. She was taking this on top of pots of coffee. I took Dex as a diet pill, so I know this stuff, for two years. I know the effects of the thing. Dexadrine does produce things like paranoia, suspicion of other people and nervousness, and a lot of things that became traits of her character.

Walker: She was taking this for forty years?

Childs: She started taking it as a diet pill back in the '30s.

Walker: So you think that might have had more to do with how her personality developed than Barbara Branden says?

Childs: Do you remember that picture of her with her Napoleon hat and her cigarette holder at the House Committee on Un-American Activities hearings? Doesn't she look like a speed freak in that picture? She looks like a cobra ready to strike, extremely high and high-powered and intense and tense. I think there's a lot more than meets the eye there.

All of which is a digression on the issue of drugs. Rand and her group liked certain drugs. They liked nicotine and they liked caffeine and they liked uppers. I imagine she would have gone for coke. I'm not sure if she ever did, but she was hanging around Hollywood in the '20s and '30s, and it was very big then in the movie and music industry.

Walker: How did they deal with alcohol at these parties? Were people allowed to drink? Get drunk?

Childs: Not drunk, but she didn't censor it. She herself didn't drink much. She didn't like it. The whole inner circle denies this story, but Murray Rothbard swears by it: She once decided to prove the strength of mind over body, and started downing vodka and drank more than a fifth, claiming that she was in complete control of her reactions and her body, right up to the moment when she passed out. I think that may be an exaggeration. But Murray swears it's true. And there are other quirky stories like this about her.

She was an incredibly eccentric, interesting personality. She had a bad temper. But, she couldn't just say she had a bad temper, it always had to be tied to the explicit beliefs in the philosophy, derived premises and everything. You know, she would just pound people away, pound people with her intellect. She had a very upsetting youth, and I don't think she dealt with it very well.

Walker: Certainly the revolution, expropriation, and the impoverishment of her family would be traumatic for anybody. Yet she apparently dismissed the effect of all that



"Ayn Rand in the City," by Gunnar Bergstrom

on her philosophy, saying, basically, everything was formed before that.

Childs: Jeff Riggenbach did a piece once, I think in *Reason*, where he pointed out that this might very well explain this incredible fanatical commitment that she had to self-control and to controlling her environment. Her environment was so unstable, so chaotic and so threatening that she really became such a fanatic on self-reliance and other things because you couldn't trust anyone around you.

Walker: When I mentioned to the Blumenthals that Barbara Branden had said that you couldn't call Objectivism a cult because most people who went into it didn't go on to some other cult when they left, they said *absolutely not true*. There are all kinds of people that went directly into EST or converted back to Catholicism . . .

Childs: A lot of people when they break out of one cult are cult-shy after that. I don't know if I'd call Objectivism a cult in the literal sense, but certainly the New York group was to a large extent. But there are a lot of Objectivists around the country who didn't get exposed to her personality except through her books. They were not really Rand worshippers. For a lot of people, reading her books constituted an incredible intellectual awakening. And for the first time in their lives, they became really intellectually curious, because she hits you with so many different ideas and different contrary perspectives, and her characters are so contrary, so cranky, at the same time unusual, colorful and offbeat. She opens a lot of people up to questioning and thinking about things, and they go on to read and think about everything. And it has a very illuminating positive influence on their lives, I think.

She once decided to prove the strength of mind over body, and started downing vodka and drank more than a fifth, claiming that she was in complete control of her reactions and her body, right up to the moment when she passed out.

Others became so alienated from the world that they only felt at home inside her novels and the world she created. These are the people who couldn't do anything except talk about John Galt and *Atlas Shrugged* and Dagny and Howard Roark and these people as though they were real figures. They read and reread and reread these books over and over again and that was their life.

Walker: Were these people weak in the departments of reason and individualism when they came to Rand?

Childs: Objectivists have bullied a lot of people through the use of the word reason. A lot of them are emotionally high-strung. In intellectual discourse, they insult rather than reason. They're not scholars. They're not well-read. They may be very bright but they're not well-educated. They chant "Reason, reason, reason," but if you examine their mental processes, simply step back for a minute, you realize they're not reasonable even by their own standards and definitions. They have one powerful opinion after another on all sorts of things that they've never tried to defend. Since they don't associate with people who they disagree with, their arguments are untested in the normal give and take of intellectual discourse. That's one of the reasons that Objectivism was atrophying as a philosophy until David Kelley broke loose from the official Objectivist movement.*

I want to say something about the inner circle. Its cultish character wasn't entirely her doing or her fault. She had friends in Hollywood. She had friends in New York. The Hazlitts and Mises and all these other people. She knew some very good people, very sharp people, people who were her peers. After she met Branden, he started dragging in the whole family business, all these Canadian Jews from Winnipeg and from Toronto. And a whole host of the inner circle were nothing but relatives. It's like a family tree there.

It's interesting they were all kids. Branden was 21. Peikoff was 16, and everyone else is in between except Barbara who was a year older. Not only were they very impressionable; they were proud as hell to be associated with Ayn Rand. In effect the cult wasn't created by her but by *them*, by the fact that they were 25–35 years younger than she was and were so impressed, so awestruck and so proud of being a part of her life that they acted, in effect, like shepherd dogs keeping the others away. By barking at her feet all the time, they made it impossible for her to continue normal relationships with her own peers and people of her own age. Nobody wanted to deal with these hangers-on. Bennett Cerf said (I think in his *At Random*) that she was perfectly fine by herself, but not when her acolytes were around.

Walker: Was that primarily Nathaniel Branden's doing, his serving as kind of her hit man, her son of a bitch?

Childs: I like everybody that was in the inner circle. They've all got interesting, wild stories to tell about each other, and they're probably all true. They were probably all sons of bitches and Nathaniel was the first son of a bitch. But Barbara in her book does not come across as being a hatchet woman at all. And in fact, she was. The Blumenthals were hatchet people. It's not that they did anything on the scale that Branden did, but they weren't supposed to. It was a hierarchy; if they were called upon, they did. When they were called upon to sign a statement against Nathaniel, they did that. They stayed there voluntarily. This is not a concentration camp, yet some of them stayed there for 25 years or more.

Walker: I'd think for someone like Allan Blumenthal, who you describe as such a sweet guy, this must all have been going against his nature.

Childs: It must have been painful as hell. You can see it more with Joan because she's such a tough cookie. I adore her and I love Allan too. But you can't see this in him; it doesn't look like part of his personality. He's a musician. He likes Mozart and Bach . . . all these no-no things.

* David Kelley is a philosopher and author of *The Evidence of the Senses* (Louisiana State University Press, 1986). He broke with the remnant of the "official" Objectivist movement in 1989. Before her death, Rand named Leonard Peikoff her new "intellectual heir," an endowment that Peikoff believed had empowered him to set an official Objectivist policy on a variety of issues. Kelley bristled under Peikoff's restrictions, and broke with Peikoff over the issue of whether a loyal Objectivist would read Barbara Branden's book on Rand, which Peikoff had denounced sight-unseen. Kelley has since established the Institute for Objectivist Studies.

Of course this stuff is not new to Objectivism. I mean, history is filled with charismatic, older accomplished productive people who attract a brilliant circle of young followers who act as enforcement agents.

Walker: Nathaniel Branden mentions that leaders in the behaviorist movement had a big split and falling out.

Childs: I'm a piano music fanatic, and I'm a great fan of the romantic music revival that started in the '60s. Even within this revival there are cults and factions. And they act in the most bizarre ways because of differences over interpretations of music and who's the greater composer, different approaches to the piano and things that to outsiders look absolutely trivial. When you're inside, you think they're important like the world's at stake. And that's what happened with Objectivism and other parts of libertarianism. Let's face it. They thought the survival of civilization was at stake. You could see that the stakes were very high and for them, people who disagreed with them were either betrayers or enemies.

Walker: Was Rand a genius?

Childs: I think she was . . . that she was an *ignorant* genius. And those are not uncommon either. She figured a lot of things out for herself and didn't do a lot of reading in philosophy. She didn't read the major people she criticized. She didn't read Kant.

Walker: Does it seem paradoxical that this movement was devoted to reason and individualism, but in fact suppressed reason and individualism?

Childs: Nietzsche used to say, "Don't judge a philosophy by the first generation of its adherents." I think that's the case here. Branden said to me all along that we wouldn't get any decent perspective on Rand until well after her death. I agree with that, because of this sect around her.

There's more to the philosophy than her personal impact. Look what it takes to create a system of thought in the 20th century. You have to screen out so many distractions. The paradox in one sense is this: here's an advocate of self-interest who tried to save mankind, who tried to save the world, just like a lot of people who have opposing views. Her whole life was dedicated to this task. She didn't get much personal pleasure out of life. She didn't seek it out. She wasn't selfish in that sense. To pursue this kind of life, as opposed to just having a family and doing this on the side, to pursue this as the core of your being for decades requires enormous discipline and screening out a lot of choices. She didn't travel much, but when she did she enjoyed it. She didn't go to the opera much, but when she did she enjoyed it. In the 1960s she went to see *La Bohème* and she said how marvelous, I haven't seen it since Russia. She hadn't taken the time to go across town to the Metropolitan Opera to see *La Bohème*, and she lived in New York most of her life.

Walker: What was preventing her from doing that? Certainly by the late '60s early '70s she wasn't so heavily involved with Objectivism.

Childs: I think that she was clinically depressed near the end of her life. She was still repeating what was obviously at that point a bromide and not true — that the culture was alien and that she couldn't find any values in it. I always found that a crock. This is a very rich culture and I think to not find any values in the popular music, the popular culture, the movies, and the arts is absurd. I think that you'd really have to have blinders on to think this is a bankrupt culture in that sense. Though in terms of intellectual things, it might be the case. But even then she was midwifing along with all these other figures I mentioned a revival in the interest in capitalism and other things that by the time she was an elderly lady she could see in one country after another she had influenced. But she wasn't willing to relax and take credit for it. She put her whole life on the line for her work, the way that any great genius has to. Her whole being was dedicated to what she did as long as she could. Then she gave up and died. In many ways it was a narrow life. So I don't really judge things by her misbehavior with her followers and their misbehavior toward other people. It's too personal.

An awful lot of the Objectivists I knew were people in transition to libertarianism. And a lot of them scuttled the morality and got into rock music and all sorts of drugs. You know, the first time they used marijuana, got high and listened to Led Zeppelin or The Moody Blues.

In *Intellectuals*, Paul Johnson trashes left-wing intellectuals by looking into their private lives. In my review of that book I said, all right, let's do the same thing for some right-wing intellectuals. An awful lot of brilliant people throughout history have had discreditable private lives. I don't care what their point of view was. Their lives didn't match up to their ideals. This may say that to create major works of art or intellectual accomplishment distorts the personality, period. And she is no more, no less a victim of that than anyone else ever has been.

Walker: Is she more a popularizer than a profound original thinker? When I asked Antony Flew* what Ayn Rand's major contributions to philosophy were, he said "absolutely zilch." He said it was preposterous that she'd made any sort of contribution whatsoever, even though he was glad to admit that she had been a very effective propagandist for capitalism at a time when capitalism needed a propagandist.

Childs: Well, he's trained in a different school of philosophy. Norman Barry's book *On Classical Liberalism and Libertarianism* has a chapter on Ayn, and Barry simply doesn't understand her. He wonders, is she a rationalist or an empiricist, is she this or that? He tries to squeeze her into existing categories and dichotomies. A very phenomenal part of her philosophy was that she didn't believe in the dichotomies — mind/body, the whole business — and she wanted to smash them. She never wrote a technical treatise to do that. Her philosophy is painted in bold strokes. I've read all these other characters; they don't understand what she said. They just get it wrong. They don't understand that she isn't a rationalist or an empiricist because her view of reason is different than theirs. It doesn't come out of the tradition of analytic philosophy; it doesn't speak their language.

* A British libertarian philosopher, best known for his work in philosophical theology.

They think of her as a popularizer because she is such a better writer than they are. She has a throbbing prose style, vivid and colorful that just knocks them all down in terms of popular appeal. I have a question for all who say this. Who is she popularizing? Nobody else advocates rational self-interest based on man's nature. Her view of reason is different from the traditional philosophical one. It's educated; it's not a stupid view of reason; that reason integrates facts of reality as opposed to the distinction between the *a priori* and the empirical that's standard in philosophy. Her view of capitalism as the only moral system in history and how she derives it from certain basic needs of human nature and of the way we use our mind is original. She's close to Spencer in her view of rights as being derived from the requirements of human life in society. She doesn't believe that rights come from God. And she's not a legal positivist who believes that rights come from the government. There's no figure out there who's some meta-person. She's not a Nietzschean in that sense, she's not a Herbert Spencerite, she's not an Aristotelian.

Rand had a bad temper. But, she couldn't just say she had a bad temper, it always had to be tied to the explicit beliefs in the philosophy, derived premises and everything. You know, she would just pound people away, pound people with her intellect.

Walker: Is her originality in the content of her philosophy or in the package?

Childs: In the package but also in fine tuning the things within the package. Aristotle has a lot of stuff — even in his theory of knowledge — which is junk because, you know, you're talking about thousands of years ago; he just slipped up. I think she's corrected major problems in the Aristotelian tradition. It's not that she created a whole new system. She acknowledges that. But I think she has been a problem solver. The reason Aristotelianism and other philosophies that are similar to Rand's have lost out all the time in intellectual debate is that they reach certain dead ends that they couldn't find their way out of. Rand tries to solve these problems, by starting with her views of concepts and axioms. I think that she painted in broad strokes some very formidable answers to these problems. I think that people like David Kelley are now doing the detailed work that will really mean something in another 20 or 30 years.

The packaging is original. But also a lot of stuff in the package. But you could say that of almost any creative work of art. It's not as if Michelangelo was the only one to do statues of human beings that have anything to them. The genius was in the perfection of it and in the choices that he made.

Walker: How long do you think it will take before mainstream philosophers begin to give her recognition for her philosophic work?

Childs: A lot of philosophers who are going to be making the case for her thinking are just now reaching the point of having any influence at all. It takes 30 years for an academic philosopher to start to have influence. So, the kids who read her as teenagers and are now professors of philosophy are going to be taking over. There are hundreds and hundreds of philosophy professors who cut their teeth on Rand. I know a kid now of 22 who's getting his Ph.D. and he started with Rand as a teenager. I think the originality of her epistemology will become widely recognized. Prior to Rand, we had pretty well given up concepts like axioms in philosophy. I think she has shown what they are, how they function, and why we need them. Paradoxically, she has asked some almost Kantian questions, like how is human knowledge possible. But she's gone a different route and I think she's gotten some really powerful answers. It's just that she's so far outside the language of contemporary philosophy. In effect, she never engaged in debate. She said, in effect, "Screw it." She wanted to just dismiss the whole thing and start over.

There's very interesting parallels between her and Hayek. Both think that the problem is in the view of reason that's developed and why people become irrational. For Hayek the problem was a misuse of reason and taking the scientific method and applying it to people. Rand argues that the problem in the direction of western thought came in the medieval period with the dispute over the problem of universal, between the nominalists and the realists. What set up all these dichotomies — rationalism versus empiricism, soul versus body, all that sort of stuff that is now taken for granted in philosophy — she wants to reject all these dichotomies. She argues that the problem is at the *starting point* of these dichotomies.

She's not really a natural rights person and she's not a utilitarian either. But she's integrated parts of each. Her rights are based on utilitarian concerns, but it's not a utilitarian view of rights. Once again she throws out both approaches and has a different way of doing things. I think Peikoff's book will help. I think people will stand on that book and on Kelley's stuff and do some good work.

Objectivists thought the survival of civilization was at stake. You could see that the stakes were very high and people who disagreed with them were either betrayers or enemies.

Walker: How about libertarians? Are more of them getting away from her Objectivist roots?

Childs: Some are and some aren't. I'm a book marketer right now. At Laissez-Faire Books she's still the biggest seller. Laissez-Faire Books has customers in 50–60 countries, and when you look at the best sellers you're talking about Hazlitt's *Economics in One Lesson*, all of Ayn Rand's work and then Thomas Sowell, and then after Sowell there's a whole group of people who sell very well. And Rand is bought by people in East Germany and Poland and all over the place. She has a big following. There's been a big revival since her death. Libertarians have sometimes both just walked away from her and some have come back. There's a lot more dia-

logue now between libertarians and Objectivists than there ever was before. One aspect of the Kelley/Peikoff split is Kelley's willingness to talk to libertarians and vice versa.

Walker: Did you read that article in *Liberty* from a few years back by David Ramsay Steele, "Alice in Wonderland"?*

Childs: Great writer isn't he? But he's ridiculous in certain ways. I mean he's defending a view of sex that your actual sexual choices are determined by genes. He's a Popperian. I think that's bizarre, ridiculous. I think Popper is a great genius — he's another one with a cult — but I think his views and philosophy are wrong in many ways, starting with his view of causality. Steele is a *very* big follower of Popper who thinks induction is impossible. It's a view that's been prevalent in philosophy since Hume.

Rand says this is ridiculous. So on a very basic level she rejects Popper and Steele is just put off by that. Steele comes from a very different political tradition. He was a well-known Marxist in Britain before he came to the U.S. He converted to Austrian economics by reading the Mises/Hayek debate on the socialist calculation problem. He was a top young intellectual over there with one of the left-wing political parties and converted in his early twenties.

Walker: Sounds like David Horowitz.†

Childs: Steele's much more of an intellectual than David Horowitz. Steele is brilliant.

Walker: Should I give him a call about Rand?

Childs: Sure, he'll just give you scathing comment after scathing comment.

Walker: Steele referred to *Atlas Shrugged* as a crashing failure, and here he is editing Ronald Merrill, who told me he read *Atlas Shrugged* 26 times or that's when he lost count. It's amazing to me. I can't imagine reading it again unless I had a gun to my head.

Childs: It would be a different matter if you were reading it in 1957 or even 1965. For a lot of people the first time they read that book none of the ideas around now about capitalism were current. The Left had every major cultural organ in the '40s and '50s. It was the dominant intellectual force; there was no intellectual right-wing force of any visibility. And for her to take all this on with one punch, in effect, is I think just remarkable. And if you conceive of reading it in that situation, you will see it differently. In that context, *Atlas Shrugged* was so ballsy, so courageous a work to be written from the late '40s to the mid '50s in the heyday of the Left. The Left was *it*, intellectually. *National Review* had a circulation of only 10–20 thousand, and they weren't much to brag about in terms of intellectual power. You'll also have to remember two things about Ayn Rand that are not pointed out: that she was writing as a very powerful woman in the '30s and '40s and '50s and '60s when, whatever the lip service to feminism, women were not treated very seriously as intellectuals. The other thing, of course, is the reason she never took on in the right wing, I think, the Buckley right wing, was that she was Jewish. I know from my early days in the right wing as a baby punk that the right wing was solidly anti-Semitic right until the end of the 1960s. Behind closed doors it was thoroughly anti-Semitic.

Walker: Didn't they take to Mises? Mises is Jewish.

Childs: Mises' books were pushed, but Mises himself was not that prominent. He was not a personality in that sense. It's not that the right wing adopted him and got him on the lecture circuit in his fifties and sixties. They didn't. They pushed his books but he himself was isolated. He had a job at a business school at NYU, but he was not even salaried. A handful of businessmen paid his salary all those years from 1946 on.

The kids who read her as teenagers and are now professors of philosophy are going to be taking over. There are hundreds and hundreds of philosophy professors who cut their teeth on Rand. I think the originality of her epistemology will become widely recognized.

Walker: So if he'd been a WASP do you think he'd of had a distinguished professorship at Harvard or anything?

Childs: Maybe not Harvard because Harvard was left wing at that point; but back to Ayn. She took no guff from anybody. She stood up to men in a way that they weren't used to coming from a woman, period. She had an abrasive, aggressive and courageous style. She just didn't have any of the mannerisms of a weak WASP woman worried about meek little and inconsequential things. If she had been a woman Jewish leftist, she would have been lauded. But of course as Irving Howe points out in *The World of Our Fathers* — and this has been a subject of constant discussion in the Jewish press, *Commentary* magazine published by the American Jewish Committee — in the '20s, '30s and '40s to grow up Jewish in America was to virtually guarantee that you would be a socialist as a young person. People who were not socialist and were Jewish were viewed as non-Jewish Jews, as *Commentary* once called Robert Nozick.§

Walker: I read somewhere, it might have been Paul Johnson, that the Communist Party back in the '30s and '40s was about half Jewish in membership. Would she be aware of that and not want to emphasize her Jewishness because she wouldn't want people to associate . . .

Childs: She didn't push her Jewishness (although she certainly acknowledged it) because it was something that was not chosen. It's the same thing as with her *very* strange view of families: that you didn't owe any special loyalty to your family because it was not a chosen value. Only the values you chose were important. So your ethnic background or the religion under which you were brought up weren't important.

Walker: Were a lot of her early followers Jewish? I ask because so much of her inner circle was, and people are naturally drawn to intellectuals of their own ethnic group.

* March 1988, pp 35–43. Steele is editor of the General Books Division of Open Court Publishing and author of *From Marx to Mises* (Open Court, 1992.)

† Horowitz was a prominent radical leftist in the 1960s. He has since become a libertarian-oriented conservative.

§ Robert Nozick is a Harvard philosopher and author of the National Book Award winning exploration of libertarian social theory, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (Basic Books, 1974) and other writings.

Childs: In New York, more than half maybe, an enormously high percentage. Another interesting thing about the Objectivist movement in those early days is the high percentage of blacks. In the '60s and '50s, you never saw black people hanging around the *National Review* but there were around Rand and Objectivism. And these people taking the NBI courses* in New York City, I've met a lot of them . . . dozens and dozens and dozens. They were the blacks who were breaking out of the mold and trying to become professionals and make something out of their lives. And a lot of them latched onto Rand.

Walker: I'd think that was something Barbara Branden would have brought up more.

Childs: I told her to, but she didn't. She left a lot of stuff out of that book. It's not a book about Rand's influence or the wider thing around Rand. It's a book that takes a very close look at Rand's life, by someone who was standing next to her. She only gets historical in the opening parts, when she wasn't there. Then it becomes partly a memoir, and then it becomes a memoir of someone who's not right there, but as someone who's still in the inner circle. She comments very little except in that spurting last chapter where she mentions all the people influenced by Rand. There were *lots* of black people. It was a very interesting thing because there weren't any libertarian blacks to speak of and there weren't many conservative black intellectuals. Walter Williams was influenced by her quite a bit. He, I think, just read everything she wrote and was a big admirer of hers.

Rand was writing as a very powerful woman in the '30s and '40s and '50s and '60s when, whatever the lip service to feminism, women were not treated very seriously as intellectuals.

Walker: Of course, the new Supreme Court Justice read *Atlas Shrugged.*

Childs: She influenced so many people. I've heard so many people mention her over the years: Clint Eastwood, Burt Reynolds, Jill St. John, Raquel Welch, Phyllis Diller, just a very odd assortment of people have mentioned her. Oh what's his name, Hunter Thompson was a great admirer of *The Fountainhead;* he said it was one of the formative experiences of his life.

Walker: Do you think it's better for people to learn about Rand on their own from the novels? Or to get involved with an organized Objectivist movement?

Childs: [On their own,] unless you're going to be a professional intellectual and you want the comradeship of other people doing this sort of thing. Too many retired dentists have sat through too many courses. If you know what I mean.

It's like anything. You have to have an organized core for anything to get done beyond what the founder does and that's always going to have cult-like aspects. It all washes out over all so that the cult-like aspect disappears. It's probably necessary to have that core of cultists in the beginning to kick the thing into motion so that it survives beyond the lifespan of the author. If you really think about it, most people's influence ends with their death. And for those who continue on, unless they have followers who are pushing and propagandizing for it — who are usually fanatics — their point of view dies. I think Objectivism will live because of people like Peikoff. They're also doing her harm because they're such prigs.

Walker: Well my understanding of Peikoff's view is that everything that Ayn Rand ever said is true. That's absurd. I mean, it borders on insanity. To promote that kind of view, and he's the official Objectivist spokesman . . .

Childs: Do you want a Coke or Pepsi?

Walker: No, I'm alright, do you want something? So Peikoff and his people are bound to turn a lot of people off as they come into contact with their organization through reading her books and sending in the little card to the Ayn Rand Institute.

Childs: It's absurd. You know what killed his book *The Ominous Parallels* was her introduction. Not only was it a bad book in certain ways but in the introduction she had the gall to say, *It's so great to see a major cultural achievement which is not mine.* I mean how can you read that and take this seriously? This self-congratulatory attitude they had about everything I found repulsive.

Walker: She was quoting Robert Stadler, the bad scientist, which I thought was rather odd.

It would seem to me that this David Kelley branch of Objectivism is what's going to carry forth Objectivism in a sane way over the next 10–20 years. If they had to rely on the Peikoff camp, it would just turn into a joke.

Childs: Peikoff is still good at putting on the record the last snatches of what she did and said. He's a curator in effect, and in effect his book on Objectivism is basically, as he says, not from her books, but from private arguments and discussions, and it's good to have that on the record. It's sort of like St. Paul or somebody.

Walker: I can't wait to read it actually. Is there lots of stuff you can't get in other books?

Childs: There's lots of stuff that you can't get in any other book. He's constantly making connections between things in the philosophy, which she never did. And he makes his connections constantly, because, as he says, in any conflict between the forest and the trees, his is the perspective of the forest. It is systematic. It begins with why philosophy is important and goes right into basics, right into axioms and builds from there and goes on and on. The first five or six chapters I think are brilliant. They're pathbreaking in terms of what's available to us in print, and I think it'll give you a solid perspective on why I think there's more there than meets the eye.

Walker: Do you think Ayn Rand would have approved of this book?

Childs: Yeah. She would find a lot wrong with it but she bitched about everything; after all, she was much smarter than him.

* NBI was the Nathaniel Branden Institute, which sponsored lecture courses and other educational efforts. NBI provided the organization for the Objectivist movement, and was run by Nathaniel and Barbara Branden, with Ayn Rand's blessing. It was disbanded in 1968.

Walker: I just picked up an anthology of *The Objectivist,* not the newsletter but the magazine, and I noticed there were announcements that some publishing company would soon be publishing Peikoff's *The Ominous Parallels.* This was 1969! It got published in 1980. What happened?

Childs: What happened is she made him write and rewrite it and rewrite it. He would stall, and get depressed. Barbara Branden told me that Rand urged him to hurry up and finish it to help defeat Lyndon Johnson in 1964. She was horrible.

Walker: Would you even consider that an Ayn Rand book? She had so much control . . .

Childs: No, because the research was his. She didn't know any of that stuff. She didn't read any of the things that he read. She learned the history of philosophy by talking to Peikoff and Barbara Branden, who were both graduate students in philosophy.

Walker: I asked Peikoff if at any point he became more of a teacher to her, and he said absolutely not. He just laughed at the suggestion. But I wondered if Peikoff was directing her reading in philosophy.

Childs: Oh, yeah, and Barbara did too to a certain extent. She had no real view of free will for instance, and Barbara's masters thesis was on free will. Ayn learned a lot from her. I mean, she wasn't an ignorant peasant or anything . . .

Walker: This is the famous master's thesis that Murray Rothbard was supposed to have plagiarized from.

Childs: You have done your research, haven't you.

Walker: Oh, yeah, I've read just about everything. Well, actually there are a few obscure books that I'm trying to get to that I'll read when I dig them up.

Childs: What's that?

Walker: Diet Coke or a Regular?

Childs: Regular. Do I look like I'm a Diet Coke person?

Walker: What about the rest of the crowd, Binswanger and Schwartz . . . Are they just minor intellectual characters and hangers-on?*

Childs: Yeah, I think so. Schwartz is nothing; he's an imitator. Binswanger is a Ph.D in philosophy, presumably has some training, but he's certainly not going to have any influence in life. Nothing there of any consequence that I've seen yet. George Reisman is very good. He's a smart cookie.†

Walker: Well he's the one that did the great imitation of Nathaniel Branden.

Childs: I've heard that tape. It's hysterical.

Walker: Did Branden have a different or more pronounced accent then?

Childs: He talked quicker and was more arrogant, and the rhythm to his speaking was very pronounced, very declamatory, oratorical with a very pronounced rhythm to it; he would proclaim things, he wouldn't state things, he would proclaim them.

Walker: Did that make him an effective public speaker?

Childs: To an extent, but it was sort of weird. I understand that with people who knew him — they'd have a conversation with him and it was like trying to have a conversation with someone in a public arena; he was boastful and other things. I hear he was a prick, though, so, I don't know.

Walker: I asked Albert Ellis. His overall opinion of him was that the guy's a psychopath. But that's Albert Ellis.§

Childs: Albert Ellis is not exactly the most non-neurotic person in the world. I think he's a cuckoo bird sometimes. The guy is just another innovator who has his own school of thought. He wouldn't call his following a cult, but boy, the way he rides herd on them if they deviate from his point of view! Anytime you have a mentor and a protegé and the protegé wanders off the reservation the mentor is hurt and betrayed and the bigger the scale of ideas or accomplishments or whatever it is, the more the feeling intensifies.

In the '60s Friedman was not Friedman yet, Buckley was being silly, Mises was not a public figure, Hayek wasn't — there just wasn't anyone.

Walker: Do you think it would have made a big difference to Objectivism had Ayn Rand been a little more amenable to having debates or at least discussions with people that disagreed with her?

Childs: Yeah.

Walker: That's John Hospers' view: she was a tragic figure because she didn't have the temperament to put this philosophy out there in the way it deserved to be put out there.**

Childs: I talked to Barbara about that. I said I wanted to do a book on Ayn. She's calling hers *The Passion of Ayn Rand.* Mine would be *The Tragedy of Ayn Rand.* I'm freelancing these days, not as easy to earn a living when you don't have a salary. I'm 42. I have a lot of health problems as you can imagine at this weight, so I have to watch my income. And I don't really have the money to invest in doing a book right now but I sure would like to do it; I have a lot of things to say about this. I mean it's going to have a happy ending in a certain sense; a version of that philosophy is going to live a long time, I think. Perhaps modified and made a little more sophisticated here and there, less dependent on her novels. But her novels continue to sell at the rate of 90–100,000 copies a year.

Walker: What's your opinion of *Atlas Shrugged* and *The Fountainhead* as novels, as literature?

Childs: I think *The Fountainhead* holds up more, but it doesn't try to do as much. It's a more personal book. And I think it's a fine novel and it's very exciting in certain ways and the writing is quite beautiful in areas. *Atlas Shrugged* is more di-

* Harry Binswanger and Peter Schwartz are loyalists to the official Objectivist philosophy. Schwartz is editor of *The Intellectual Activist;* Binswanger edited *The Ayn Rand Lexicon* (New American Library, 1986).

† Reisman is an economist, and author of *The Government Against the Economy* (Caroline House, 1979).

§ Noted psychologist, author of *Is Objectivism a Religion?* (Lyle Stuart, Inc., 1968) and many other books.

** John Hospers is a prominent philosopher who was briefly associated with Rand during the early 1960s. Although never an acolyte, he was the first academic philosopher to take Rand seriously. He had a particular affinity for Rand's political thinking, which resulted in his writing *Libertarianism* (Nash, 1971). He is a Senior Editor of *Liberty.*

dactic; it's more heavy-handed, but it's not unique in that sense. I mean, I like Victor Hugo, I like Dostoevsky, I like a lot of the novels she likes and a lot of other things, and if you read the 19th century novels that are large-scale novels, Victor Hugo will sometimes have a *200-page* digression on history; talk about heavy-handed! And this is not uncommon among 19th century novels among which *Atlas Shrugged* essentially is one. So essentially you have to think of that as a Russian novel.

I remember the party scenes with the left-wing intellectuals where she's constantly having them spill things on themselves, and dribbling and slobbering. She's an odd novelist in that she moralizes about her own characters as she's in the process of presenting them. She doesn't just present an evil character and let you draw your own conclusions, she editorializes, so every last thing is there and there's nothing left to the imagination. In the meantime, the characterizations are not that deep. People don't change much. She never had a theory of psychological change. And so her heroes and villains appear full-blown in their teens. There are occasional figures like Cherryl [Taggart] who struggle. Reardon sort of struggles with understanding, but his life is one way. It's just that he doesn't have the mental tools to understand his own values, in effect.

So there are problems; there are problems in any big book. She tried to do too many things in it. At that point she showed no indication of ever writing non-fiction philosophy. In effect this was her statement. So it's got a lot of speeches that maybe wouldn't have been there if maybe all along she had said I'm gonna write this novel and then go on to non-fiction.

Walker: Do you think if she hadn't met Nathaniel Branden she might have just completed *Atlas Shrugged* then gone on to write another novel and never have written all these non-fiction essays?

Childs: Who can tell? I don't know that she had in mind all along a systematic philosophy. He certainly systematized it first under her guidance. He wrote the Objectivism courses from scratch, with her looking over his shoulder. It wasn't exactly her doing in that sense. He was the organizer of the organized philosophy and her organized movement. He was the entrepreneur.

Walker: By the way, regarding *The Fountainhead,* I think Barbara Branden erred. She described it as a humorless book, and I found it to be just crackling with wit. I don't understand her perspective.

Childs: I think you have come to the book with a certain cultural knowledge, and know things that Barbara didn't know at the time she read it. She read it too young. I don't think she sees the book, all the things that are there yet. The left-wing intellectuals are much more interesting in that book than they are in *Atlas Shrugged.*

Walker: I've heard it said that if the writer doesn't have some sneaking sympathy for the villains then the villains become much less credible. Certainly by the stage of *Atlas Shrugged* she loathed and detested all her villains so much . . .

Childs: I think there's a lot of humor in *Atlas,* but it's all heavy-handed satirizing. Like the bum's speech on the train. Humor didn't come naturally to her. She didn't have a great sense of humor.

Walker: But you wouldn't guess that from reading *The Fountainhead.* I would have expected a different kind of book.

Childs: Yeah, she took herself a little more seriously.

Walker: Is that because of the crowd around her?

Childs: I think, I think. They kept saying you're saving the world, you're saving the world, you're saving the world, and she was not one to say *all right already, leave me alone.* She ate it up. I don't mean to leave you with a negative impression, I think she was a great, a wonderful writer and did a lot of good to a lot of people and the people who were harmed in many ways were just too young to have read her, they were too unformed, and she's not responsible for that; she's not responsible for the fact that so many 16 year olds pick up her books, and find their lives turned on their heads.

Walker: The problem is that once Objectivism became formulated as an explicit systematic philosophy, people began reading *Atlas* in a totally different way when Branden and others said there were explicit role models of her philosophy in the novels.

Childs: That's a very keen insight. I think that's absolutely right. In the new edition of *Atlas,* Peikoff's intro ties together the novel and the philosophy. It ties them together and I want to see them forced apart. Those novels exist independently of the philosophy. They're not just appendages or illustrations. These are independent works of art and they should be read on their own terms and not as expressions of her technical philosophical thing, much of which came later.

Walker: I don't really see *Atlas* as the best intro to Objectivism.

Childs: Me either, me either. It's becoming more and more dated, I think in a way that *The Fountainhead* isn't. And again, it's because the culture is changing. There are a lot of things that weren't there when she was writing that are now there. Why was she so heavy-handed? She was shouting at the top of her lungs in *Atlas* and maybe that's why some things changed, I mean, that the Me generation of the '60s and the heated denunciation of American foreign and domestic policies in some of her talks. There just was no voice then. Friedman was not Friedman yet, Buckley was being silly, Mises was not a public figure, Hayek wasn't — there just wasn't anyone.

In the '60s her talks at the Ford Hall Forum and various universities were broadcast live on National Public Radio in the United States, and I remember people getting together in apartments, just zillions of people, to hear these things, and I went to hear a couple of them — thousands of people crammed into auditoriums and listening to it on loudspeakers outside. Lines for the Ford Hall Forum talks that were like for Horowitz. They'd been in line for two days to get tickets.

Walker: How does that fit in with the idea that the '60s were the left wing decade?

Childs: It wasn't. It wasn't. There were two radicalisms, not one. In the one were people like myself who were busy reading Rand and Mises, Hayek and Friedman all these others who were individualists and pro-reason and pro-capitalism and anti-war, pro-legalizing drugs — influenced by Szasz — all these other things. I have a book sketched out that I may never write called *The Unknown Visionaries,* and the first part of it is the rise and fall of socialism over the last century. And the fact is this individualist philosophy was pieced together starting in the '20s and '30s with people like Albert Jay Nock, Rose Wilder Lane, Isabel Paterson, and Mises and later on Hayek and Rand and Rothbard and all these others. But this

had no public organ. They had no *New York Times* magazine or *New York Review of Books* or anything else and by-and-large everyone was aware of the left-wing radicalism but not the libertarian-individualist radicalism. So the '60s was by no means totally a left-wing decade. I mean I was a part of the anti-war movement. I marched on Washington. There were a lot of libertarians there with me. Karl Hess was there, a lot of Rothbard's followers, there were hundreds and hundreds of us. We just didn't get any of the press. We didn't commit any crimes so we didn't have any trials; we didn't have any Chicago Sevens. We didn't have any Abbie Hoffmans or Tom Haydens. Also another thing is the libertarian-individualist radicalism of the '60s tended to be 5–10 years younger than the others. See, I graduated from high school in '66 and started college when I was 17; the other kids who were leading these things on campuses were graduate students in their 20s — 24, 25, sometimes 30. So you see the difference between me and David Horowitz even though I also edited a magazine called *Libertarian Review* with about 25,000 readers. It's not comparable to *Ramparts* 'cause we never got up to 100,000; we didn't have the national following, but, also my generation was five to ten years younger. He's got to be close to 50.

Walker: I think the left-wing radicals would say that the libertarians were not that radical. Certainly back in the 1950s . . .

Childs: Well there weren't very many in the '50s.

Walker: But America didn't listen to its left-wing intellectuals in the late '50s did it?

Childs: No, it didn't; it didn't listen to Rand either. She was a minority, too. She wasn't embraced by the Eisenhower administration; she hated them. The conservatives hated her right off the bat.

Walker: But considering her anti-socialist tirade and her espousal of capitalism you'd think that wasn't needed so much when *Atlas Shrugged* came out as it was needed in the mid-'60s when the culture really seemed to have taken a turn to the left.

Childs: Well, the '50s had no direction politically. The seeds of both the Left and libertarian movements were in the '50s. There was just a calm period after World War II and Korea. Not much happened. Eisenhower was not a movement toward capitalism. Eisenhower was a Left Republican in many ways, in the context of leading the conservative Republicans led by Taft, and the people who were pro-Eisenhower were not regarded as conservatives at all. The Eisenhower Republicans were moderate, Wall St., left-wing Rockefeller Republicans. Remember in the late '50s and '60s the struggle among the Rockefeller Republicans and the Goldwater Republicans for control of their party. Eisenhower was not perceived as a pro-capitalist figure. In fact he pissed off the right wing because he didn't do anything to dismantle the New Deal. He didn't do anything one way or the other. He didn't get us involved in any wars and he didn't dismantle the military. He didn't expand the welfare state by introducing new programs and he didn't contract it. The budget stays flat for almost the whole period of the '50s. There's almost no inflation.

Nothing happens in the '50s. Everything was bubbling as the baby boom started to grow up a little bit and start looking at things. So in these coffee shops you had everybody from Murray Rothbard and Ayn Rand and Mises and his followers on the one hand — and the young Milton Friedman, studying like crazy and beginning to write — and on the other you had the Kerouacs and other cultural figures like Ginsburg, C. Wright Mills, the budding young Michael Harrington, who I knew pretty well.

And then came our involvement under Kennedy more than Eisenhower in Laos and Cambodia and Vietnam and Thailand, which was protested by the extreme right and the extreme left. The Birch Society slogan "Get Us Out" originally did not apply to the U.N. It applied to involvement in the Far East. The Birch Society was made up of conservatives opposed to American participation in the Korean war.* You have to understand here that historically the right wing in America were the opponents of intervention in Korea. The left wing ate it up. I.F. Stone and certain people were critical of it, but the left wing at that point had to show that they weren't communists and said that they were willing in effect to shut up in the face of the Korean war. There were no big left-wing protests at all. It was all right-wing people. The left-wingers who attacked it were people like Harry Barnes, who was virtually exiled over his opposition to American involvement in World War II. Charles C. Tansill, Charles Beard, the great progressive historian, was read out of the Left because of his opposition to these involvements. So the right wing was the anti-war movement in the '50s.†

In the late 1950s and early '60s, National Review *was still defending segregation in the South on the grounds of states' rights. Rand never would have done that. She loathed racism. That's why she hated conservatives.*

Walker: By the way, just a little tangent, while we're talking about war, you don't hear Ayn Rand talking much about World War II.

Childs: She opposed American intervention.

Walker: Altogether?

Childs: Yeah.

Walker: Would she have rather that America hadn't got into the war, and that Britain might have fallen to the Nazis?

Childs: She was fairly sophisticated in those days and she knew a lot of the conservative opponents of American entry and they had a very solid case that this was a crock; this was

* The John Birch Society is a quasi-secretive organization of anti-communist activists, founded by Robert Welch in 1958. Its distinguishing characteristic was a belief that communism was a gigantic criminal conspiracy that controlled practically everything in the world. Welch's belief that Dwight Eisenhower was a "conscious, dedicated agent of the Communist Conspiracy" first gained the Birch Society notoriety. Contrary to Childs' recollection, the JBS slogan "Get US Out!" was aimed at the United Nations for almost a decade before Welch decided that it applied to the Vietnam War as well. (Welch's opposition to the war resulted from his conviction that the Communists who control the U.S. government had gotten us into the war and were running it for their own profit, just as they ran pretty much every thing else.)

† Harry Elmer Barnes, Charles C. Tansill and Charles Beard were historians who argued against U.S. involvement in European wars.

a bunch of lies. That Hitler had no intentions against Britain, I think can be argued very well. I mean Britain declared war on him and not vice versa. Hitler wanted to go East.

Walker: Yeah, he thought that Britain could be his ally.

Childs: Yeah. He didn't want to knock off the French either. Why did he let the British escape at Dunkirk? He wanted to appease them, to a certain extent. He wanted to take central and eastern Europe. He wanted the Ukraine for Lebensraum and thought it would take the German nation a thousand years to digest it. That was his goal. The stuff about conquering the world and other things is bullshit, but it's true of every war. We heard the same kind of lies in the Cold War and Vietnam. I'm a great opponent of America as the world policeman. I hate the Bush program. I hated Reagan's. I hated Kennedy's, Johnson's and everything else. I was an anti-cold war Goldwater Republican at the age of twelve.

Walker: Luckily you're a social lovable person, otherwise you wouldn't have had any friends. If you espoused your beliefs in a Randian sense, Jesus.

Childs: I didn't have very many friends, but it was still fun. I remember arguing with the heads of the anti-war movement at SUNY at Buffalo in '66 and I was a 17 year-old punk, I was pretty skinny then, they were Trotskyists and I would bait them. I said the way to stop the war was to abolish the income tax so they couldn't fund it and dismantle all these programs and everything else. And they hated me.

Walker: Is it your view that World War II was the natural outcome of the result of the situation in 1917, that Hitler's ideology in part was to fight the Bolsheviks?

Childs: As a matter of practical fact, when we did intervene, they were basically slaughtering each other, almost stalemated around Stalingrad and other places. The war was not going well for Hitler when we intervened. I would have stayed out on those grounds, too. It's all come out now, the Churchill stuff of him trying to maneuver Roosevelt into the war, and Roosevelt didn't need a lot of maneuvering in certain ways. There's a strong case to be made against American entry into both World War I and World War II. I think both interventions have done enormous harm.

Walker: Wasn't Churchill keen on continuing the war at the end of World War II against the Soviets? Or have I got that wrong, it's something I read a long time ago.

Childs: Well, originally he wanted to be allies with them and make them sort of junior partners in running the world. But Britain ended up a basket case at the end of the war, and he wanted America's help in putting Russia down because he was afraid it would end up dominating Europe. Churchill was to me not a good guy. He helped create the thing he warned about. Why on earth, even with the evidence available to them back then, would you back Stalin over Hitler? I think they're both so rotten and evil that going to war over Hitler's invasion of Poland and end up handing Poland over to Stalin is about as hypocritical on a grand historical scale as anything I can imagine.

Walker: Is it possible that because the Soviets were such a closed system, because they kept such a tight lid on information, we in the West didn't realize until much later what a slaughter house it was?

Childs: There was a lot of literature available in the '30s. Just go to an old library that still has stacks and go through it. And you'll see these books and all this other stuff that was published. There was a huge library of stuff on what had happened in the Ukraine as far as starving those millions of people. This was not unknown to people who were concerned about that kind of thing. And there were debates on the Left between the Stalinists and the Trotskyites over Stalin's crimes and they knew what the crimes were. The show trials were in 1936, not 1946. Intellectuals and people who wanted to pay attention knew what they were. They knew about the Gulag and things like that; this was not that controlled.

Walker: Do you think as Paul Johnson does that Hitler's concentration camps were patterned after those in the Soviet Union?

Childs: No, as a matter of fact there is more evidence that — I'm an amateur historian on the Hitler front — he took as a model the American reservations for Indians. And his model was, after the war, to set aside these areas for undesirables so they couldn't intermarry and intermix with Aryans. He liked the idea of defeating them and confining them to reservations. In many ways the model of the American Indian reservations was taken from the British experience with the Irish. Many prominent Brits wanted to defeat the Irish militarily and have all of Ireland be a part of Great Britain and confine these wild Irish who were always rebelling to very small policed areas. The American military was looking around for ways to deal with the Indians.

Walker: Getting back to Rand: so you think that one of her main contributions was that she was an intransigent opponent of socialism, communism and the expanding welfare state at a time when those notions were quite popular?

Childs: But she goes a step further. It wasn't merely her opposition to collectivism. Capitalism as a moral ideal: I don't think that had ever been done. Classical liberals didn't do it. Even early libertarians didn't do it. It was not just her opposition to collectivism, it was the positive. That was a very big thing.

Walker: Do you think that her moral justification of capitalism was more influential than say, Buckley's?

Childs: Buckley in my view did not have a moral sense of capitalism. I read all the back issues of *National Review* and I don't remember seeing that anywhere. He, from the standpoint of Catholicism, defended tradition. In the late 1950s and early '60s, *National Review* was still defending segregation in the South on the grounds of states' rights. She never would have done that. She loathed racism. She loathed all that kind of stuff. That's why she hated them. She hated conservatives. It wasn't just that they hated her.

Buckley was a traditional Catholic. He upheld private property, capitalism and other things . . . but his big thing was poking fun at liberals. He was a great figure in using his scathing wit to puncture liberal hypocrisy, and that was of big value because he had intellectual self-confidence, some degree of swashbucklingness to him and he was a charismatic figure on campuses. There was no positive thing in him about capitalism the way there was in Rand.

Walker: I barely had a look at Hayek and Mises. Did they make strictly consequentialist arguments, or moral arguments, too?

Childs: Mostly Hayek is a moralist here. He's very concerned with freedom. His big book is *The Constitution of Liberty*. *The Road to Serfdom* is a warning about the effects of a planned economy on individual freedom, so it's not an

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The Other Austrian

by Mark Skousen

Swashbuckling corporate raiders take heed, here's another Austrian economist offering advice.

Peter F. Drucker once walked into the boardroom of a major company in crisis and bluntly demanded, "Gentlemen, what is your business?" Most of the executives thought it was a sophomoric question, but Drucker kept pushing. He repeated the question over and over again. "What is your business?" It took them an hour to figure out what Drucker was getting at: *they had lost their vision.* Once they returned to fundamentals, they found their way back to profitability — all because Drucker asked a "dumb" question.

Drucker is eclectic, independent and unpredictable. Although he is known as Mr Management, he is a lone wolf, operates without a secretary, and has no supporting organization. He is an outsider. In the words of one admirer, he is an "iconoclast — the smasher of idols, seeker of proof, demander of evidence, gadfly, thorn in the side, tough and hard-nosed commentator on problems faced by our society."[1]

Nearly everyone in the business world is familiar with Drucker, either through his books or his columns in *The Wall Street Journal*. He is a household name among MBAs, corporate executives and business students. Drucker is the world's most sought-after business consultant. His *vitae* is multifarious: lawyer, journalist, political theorist, economist, novelist, futurist, and philosopher extraordinaire. Now in his eighties, with 25 books under his belt, he is still active in writing and consulting, though he does not travel much anymore.

Business students and executives have often told me that Drucker's ideas have a certain "Austrian" streak to them. They say that his emphasis on entrepreneurship, innovation and investment capital as well as his denunciations of big government, excessive taxation and Keynesian economics, has much in harmony with the ideas of Böhm-Bawerk, Mises, Hayek and the Austrian school of economics.

So: is Peter Drucker a closet Austrian?

Viennese Roots

In the very literal sense, Drucker is an Austrian. He was born in 1909 in Vienna, during the heyday of the Austrian school. But he was too young to attend Ludwig von Mises' famous seminar. When he graduated from gymnasium in 1927, he went to the University of Frankfurt, where he got his LL. D. in the early 1930s. But his roots remained Viennese. He refused a job offer from the Nazi's Ministry of Information. Instead, he wrote a 32-page monograph on the 19th century German philosopher, Friedrich Julius Stahl. There is as much to learn about Drucker as there is about Stahl in this paper. Stahl was paradoxical: a Jew by birth, a Protestant by conversion, and a conservative opposed to absolute monarchy. Not surprisingly, Drucker's paper was banned by the Nazis. Like Mises, Hayek, and other enemies of the Nazi state, Drucker immigrated to the West before the war broke out. He traveled to England in 1933 and the United States in 1937.

The Manager's Manager

Of course, the question of whether Drucker is an Austrian is not a question about his birthplace. It is a question about his economic theory. If one limited the question to his management approach, the answer is clearly in the affirmative: Drucker's style of management is Austrian through and through. Time, expectations, new information, and potential change in production processes — all Austrian focal points — are constantly emphasized in his writings and consulta-

tions. The manager must be an entrepreneur, not just an administrator. Innovation is essential. In 1985, he wrote an entire book on the subject, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship*.

He criticizes management for engaging in short-term planning, what he labels "industrial Keynesianism." Long-term planning is more risky, says Drucker, but is essential for survival, especially for large corporations. Owners and managers must be future oriented, he stresses. "Tomorrow's vision is today's work assignment."[2] The Japanese have been so successful, Drucker asserts, because they're so long-term oriented.

In Search of a New Social Order

It was his life in America that turned his interest to business management. During the late 1930s, Drucker began searching for a new social and industrial order. He became disenchanted with "unbridled" capitalism as the Great Depression wore on and on. But socialism, fascism, and communism seemed even worse alternatives to society's ills.

He finally found his answer in the only "free, nonrevolutionary way" — the large corporation. He was enthusiastic about his discovery: big business could provide a superior alternative to socialism and big government. According to Drucker, the large corporations should be the conduit through which economic stability and social justice would be established. Only big business could afford to assume social responsibilities such as job security, training and educational opportunities, and other social benefits. Such an alternative was absolutely critical in an age when free enterprise was on the defensive around the world.

After the war, Drucker got a consulting contract with General Motors, which gave him an opportunity to develop his thesis more fully. His exhaustive study of GM culminated in the 1946 publication of *Concept of the Corporation*. Drucker came to the unshakable conviction that the large corporation should be the "representative social institution" of the postwar period and that major American companies such as GM should take the lead in building the free industrial society.

Top officials at General Motors resented the book and scoffed at the idea that a large corporation should assume social responsibilities. But Drucker's reputation as a management expert grew despite GM's cold shoulder. By 1950, he was professor of management at New York University, and in 1973 he was appointed Clarke Professor of Social Science at Claremont Graduate School in California.

Drucker maintains that a company is more than an economic entity. "Even more important than economics are the psychological, human, and power relationships which are determined on the job rather than outside it. These are the relationships between worker, work group, task, immediate boss, and management."[3] A company's administrators have a moral purpose and social responsibility beyond making short-term profits. Drucker envisions the large corporation as the social institution, far superior to government in providing a retirement income, health care, education, child care, and other fringe benefits. He argues that corporate welfarism should replace government welfarism. Drucker acknowledges that such social activity could undermine economic performance, but he rejects Milton Friedman's admonition that business' only legitimate responsibility is to increase its profits. A lethargic government has created a "vacuum of responsibility and performance" which big business must fill.

A Moral Dimension

Drucker's attitudes toward business management and government may not be economic in origin, but religious. "The only basis of freedom is the Christian concept of man's nature: imperfect, weak, a sinner, and dust destined for dust; yet man is God's image and responsible for his actions."[4] He calls for a return to spiritual values, "not to offset the material but to make it fully productive."[5]

But how far he is willing to carry this insight is open to question. Drucker has been criticized as an apologist for big business. And it is true that he has been reluctant to discuss big business as a special interest lobbying power. Drucker usually envisions business and government in an adversarial role rather than a cooperative one. In his massive volume, *Management*, his chapter on "Business and Government" fails to mention how big business often uses its power to gain special tax breaks, subsidies, monopoly power and restrictions on foreign competition.

Paul Weaver, a former Ford executive, describes the extent of corporate statism as follows: "From the beginning it [big business] has worked aggressively and imaginatively in this spirit, and over the years it has won a dazzling array of benefits — tariffs, subsidies, official monopolies, tax breaks, immunity from certain tort actions, government-supported research and development, free manpower training programs, countercyclical economic management, defense spending wage controls, and so on through the long list of the welfare state's indulgences and beneficences."[6]

Unfortunately, the master is oddly silent on this critical issue.

Drucker Qua Economist

Drucker is much more than a management consultant and writer. He is also a commentator on politics, economics and culture. Here Drucker is less easy to categorize.

His economic views are often in line with Mises and today's Austrians; other times they are not. He often rejects notions that Austrians consider essential. Ludwig von Mises and he were colleagues at New York University in the 1950s, but they did not see much of each other. "Mises considered me a renegade from the true economic faith," Drucker says, and "with good reason."[7]

Drucker became disenchanted with pure laissez faire capitalism during the Great Depression. Today he supports a Hamiltonian approach to government — small, but powerful. He believes in a strong president and a central government that plays a serious role in education, economic development, and welfare. Furthermore, he rejects the gold standard and favors a central bank.

At the same time, however, Drucker advocates many positions that free-market economists would applaud.

Inflation is a "social poison." Government has gotten bigger, not stronger, and can now only do two things effectively — wage war and inflate the currency. The state has become a "swollen monstrosity." He continues, "Indeed, government is sick — and just at a time when we need a strong, healthy, and vigorous government."[8]

Drucker advocates privatization of government services as a way to reduce a bloated bureaucracy. Indeed, Drucker claims he invented the term, calling it reprivatization in his 1969 book, *The Age of Discontinuity*.[9] Social Security should be gradually replaced by private pension plans. The corporate income tax, says Drucker, is the "most asinine of taxes" and should be abolished (but replaced with a value added tax). Defense spending is a "serious drain" on the civilian economy, and should be cut sharply. The cost of "free" government services are "inevitably high."[10] Echoing Hayek, Drucker claims that no public institution can operate in a businesslike manner because "it is not a business."

Drucker is largely optimistic about the future. He talks excitedly about an expanding global economy and the collapse of Communism. Multinational corporations, both large and small, are far more important than foreign aid or domestic spending programs by the state, and will lead the way into a new nirvana. The more firms become "transnational," the healthier the world economy will be.

According to Drucker, the large corporations should be the conduit through which economic stability and social justice would be established.

Drucker is encouraged by events in developing countries, especially efforts to privatize and denationalize and open up domestic economies to foreign capital. The worst move a developing country can make is to adopt Marxism. "Communism is evil. Its driving forces are the deadly sins of envy and hatred. Its aim is the subjection of all goals and all values to power; its essence is bestiality; the denial that man is anything but animal, the denial of all ethics, of human worth, of human responsibility."[11] Drucker debunks Soviet-style central planning, which only produced "disdevelopment." He rightly concludes that Soviet economic growth rates are largely figments of the bureaucratic imagination.

Search for the "Next Economics"

Drucker expresses a withering contempt for the economics profession, which he says is still largely Keynesian in nature. Economists are too concerned with the equilibrium theory of a closed economy rather than the growth, innovation and productivity of a global economy. Drucker claims that contemporary economics is where medical school or astronomy was in the 17th century. "There are no slower learners than economists. There is no greater obstacle to learning than to be the prisoner of totally invalid but dogmatic theories."[12]

He blames Keynesianism for an unhealthy anti-saving mythology, causing "undersaving on a massive scale" among the western nations, especially the United States. Moreover, "Keynes is in large measure responsible for the extreme short-term focus of modern politics, of modern economics, and of modern business . . . Short-run, clever, brilliant economics — and short-run, clever, brilliant politics — have become bankrupt."[13]

The management guru is also discouraged by today's popular schools of economics, including the monetarists and the New Classical school. They too ignore entrepreneurship, uncertainty and disequilibrium. Drucker calls for the "next economics" to be "microeconomic and centered on supply," not aggregate demand, and should emphasize productivity and capital formation.[14]

Contemporary Austrian economics seems very much like Drucker's vision of the "next economics." Somewhat surprisingly, Drucker's writings do not mention the work of today's Austrians, like Murray Rothbard, Israel Kirzner and Roger Garrison. When I asked him his opinion of contemporary Austrians, he told me that he was not familiar with their writings. He had not heard of Kirzner's major work, *Competition and Entrepreneurship*, even though Kirzner and Drucker both taught at NYU in the sixties.[15]

Drucker's favorite economist is Joseph Schumpeter, the Austrian-born Harvard economist. In a 1956 article, "Modern Prophets: Schumpeter or Keynes?," he clearly sides with Schumpeter, predicting that of these "two greatest economists of this century . . . it is Schumpeter who will shape the thinking . . . on economic theory and economic policy for the rest of this century, if not for the next thirty or fifty years."[16] Drucker likes Schumpeter's emphasis on dynamic disequilibrium and innovation by entrepreneurs who engage in "creative destruction." In his 1985 book, *Innovation and Entrepreneurship*, he emphasizes the impact of technological change, innovation, the unexpected and new knowledge on business and the world economy.

Drucker advocates privatization of government services as a way to reduce a bloated bureaucracy. Indeed, Drucker claims he invented the term, calling it "reprivatization" in 1969.

But, of course, Schumpeter was an *enfante terrible* and renegade from the Austrian school as it developed under Mises and Hayek. In this sense, Drucker fits more into the Schumpeterian mode, although he does not share Schumpeter's pessimism about the future of capitalism.

In the final analysis, Peter Drucker is his own man.

Drucker's mind is like a rough diamond, providing flashes of insight at every turn. He is able to analyze complex subjects so that his readers and clients catch Drucker's vision, seeing the essential simplicity behind the apparent chaos.

Sooner or later, every student of business discovers Peter Drucker. Now it is time for economists and social sci-

entists to discover him too. ❑

Notes

1 Tony H. Bonaparte, *Peter Drucker: Contributions to Business Enterprise* (New York: NYU Press, 1970), p. 23.
2 Peter F. Drucker, *Preparing Tomorrow's Business Leaders Today* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1969), p. 290.
3 Drucker, *The Unseen Revolution* (New York: Harper & Row, 1976), pp. 134–35, 168.
4 Quoted in John J. Tarrant, *Drucker: The Man Who Invented the Corporate Society* (Boston: Cahners Books, 1976), p. 30.
5 Drucker, *The Landmarks of Tomorrow*, p. 264.
6 Paul H. Weaver, *The Suicidal Corporation: How Big Business Fails America* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1988), p. 18.
7 See Drucker's autobiography, *Adventures of a Bystander* (New York: Harper & Row, 1979), p. 50. In an interview in 1991, Drucker told me that on the few occasions they met, Mises was always depressed. "He was one of the most miserable men I ever met."
8 Peter F. Drucker, *The Age of Discontinuity* (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), p. 212.
9 ibid., p. 234.
10 Drucker, *The New Realities* (New York: Harper & Row, 1989), p. 215.
11 Drucker, *The Landmarks of Tomorrow* (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), p. 249.
12 Drucker, *The Frontiers of Management* (New York: Harper & Row, 1986), p. 13.
13 Drucker, *The Unseen Revolution*, pp. 114–15.
14 Drucker, *Toward the Next Economics and Other Essays* (New York: Harper & Row, 1981), pp. 1–21.
15 Israel M. Kirzner, *Competition and Entrepreneurship* (University of Chicago Press, 1973).
16 *The Frontiers of Management*, p. 104.

Roy Childs Interview, *continued from page 42*

economic thing saying it's going to be inefficient. One of the most interesting chapters in *The Road to Serfdom* is called "Why the Worst Get On Top": under totalitarianism, the spread of political lying is necessitated by certain kinds of government actions. And so he was interested in the cultural effects of statism and interventionism. There's a large moral and social concern on both their parts. It's just not as explicit as Rand, 'cause they're more traditional, trained intellectuals.

Walker: Rand was well read in Hayek's stuff, wasn't she?

Childs: She hated Hayek, intellectually. Because, to her, he put reason down. He said reason is limited. Secondly, he compromised throughout *The Road to Serfdom* and explicitly said he was not in favor of laissez-faire. She regarded him as a moral coward. She told Barbara once that she regarded *The Road to Serfdom* as the most dangerous book ever written. NBI never carried one Hayek book. You'll not find any sentence of hers in print on Hayek. Mises yes, Hazlitt, Bastiat, a lot of other second-rate economists that she pushed for in favor of the free market — G. Warren Nutter, Carl Snyder — but she never promoted a Hayek book or said a kind word about him.

Walker: Were Objectivists a bunch of homophobes back in the early days?

Childs: I think Branden was. I'm gay, so I know all about this issue. I went to Branden as a client in 1971. He wasn't homophobic but he was of the view then that it was definitely the result of some sort of neurotic turn in the personality and it could be corrected. We became very good friends, he didn't have any phobia about it or anything.

Walker: How did they feel about children?

Childs: It was never frowned upon or denounced. But, they did see having children as interfering with their careers, for the most part. And those who did have kids — the Hessens and Kalbermans and a bunch of others — but they were not generally the intellectuals of the outfit.* Rand held that it was perfectly fine to become a housewife and mother and raise kids; and you had to take it seriously because she saw it as a profession like any other — you had to study it. But as a matter of practical fact . . . they thought that kids would in effect get in the way.

Walker: Making them about as progeny-oriented as the Catholic priesthood?

Childs: Yeah.

Walker: Why was it that capitalism experienced a resurgence in its moral legitimacy in the 1980s?

Childs: Let's get rid of this view of the '60s as a left wing decade for a minute and let's think of it as a "me decade" where there was a shaking off of cultural right-wing puritanism and experimentation with various lifestyles. And along with that a questioning of all these conventional ideas of what your life ought to be about, a questioning of careers. Those of us who grew up in the '60s had much more freedom than our parents did to pick and choose things, and we used it. And we were rebellious and there were a lot of us and we sort of choked every institution we went through — the whole baby boom. And those of us who were in college and stuff during the '60s, in the '70s went to work and started to write and other things. I'm not saying this in a personal sense, but the values of the '60s that were prevalent in the '70s and '80s. They were grown up more, simply more adult versions, more real-world, more realistic about earning a living and about capitalism. Just as kids didn't like constraints on the use of marijuana in the '60s, they didn't like constraints in conducting business in the '80s. And they were grown up business people. The attitude didn't change much, just the objects.

It wasn't a question of capitalism's efficiency. I don't think anyone ever doubted that. Well, there were people who held that socialism would be more efficient, but by the '70s and '80s that was just dead. Nobody believed it anymore.

No, I think it was the issue of personal freedom under capitalism *versus* under socialism. We had decades of promises from socialists and social democrats about how it was all going to turn out if they had power. And they had the power in Western Europe and all these other countries. Things were not looking all that great, weren't that nice. The welfare state stopped people from starving but turned their lives into miserable hells.

I think what happened was that it was just the long-term results of Rand and all these other people. They started it. They were the fountainhead. ❑

* Here Roy's memory fails him. Robert Hessen is a Senior Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution and author of *In Defense of the Corporation* and *Steel Titan: The Life of Charles M. Schwab*; his wife Bea was an attorney. Elayne and Harry Kalberman are Nathaniel Branden's sister and brother-in-law and peripheral members of Rand's "inner circle." Elayne Kalberman is a nurse; Harry Kalberman a stockbroker.

Reviews

***The Disuniting of America: Reflections on a Multicultural Society,* by Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. W.W. Norton, 1992, 160 pp., $15.95.**

Isn't Multiculturalism a Good Thing?

Stephen Cox

Oh, God, here's another book about multiculturalism. This time it's by a modern liberal. He's worried about what multiculturalism will do to America's national unity. He sounds like a conservative. He's also worried about what multiculturalism will do to America's traditional belief in the primacy of the individual. He sounds like a libertarian. Then again, he's worried about what multiculturalism will do to other items on the modern-liberal agenda, like increased aid to public schools. He sounds like a modern liberal who is trying to escape responsibility. Doesn't he realize that modern liberals started all this fuss, with their notion that the state should subsidize culture and educate the public in social morality? He just doesn't like the predictable outcome — the demand by every interest group in the country that the public should be educated in the way that *we* deem right.

But wait a minute. Maybe I'm being unfair, not only to Schlesinger but also to his multiculturalist targets. Let's try to straighten this out. What does "multiculturalism" mean, anyhow?

Try a basic definition: "Multiculturalism: a cluster of ideas and practices derived from the assumption that Americans of different social groups, especially ethnic groups, have different values and different means of expressing those values, and that their differences ought to be respected."

This sounds safe enough — and indeed, some people regard multiculturalism as little more than an ideal of civilized conduct, with an emphasis on the esteem that is due to the contributions that people of all "cultures" have made to America. In this sense, multiculturalism is practically synonymous with sensitivity and an opposition to arbitrary discrimination; it has a lot to do with a libertarian enjoyment of individual differences. One end of the multiculturalist spectrum is mild and uncontroversial.

In the bulging midsection of the spectrum, however, multiculturalism is practically synonymous with allegiance to a variety of modern-liberal causes: "progressive" feminism, hiring quotas, sweeping curricular reform to achieve abstract goals of "inclusiveness," increased support of already-vast social service projects geared toward the needs of "women and minorities" (as those needs, those "minorities," and even those "women" are defined by politicians), linguistic reform ("s/he," "God the parent, God the child"), speech codes in colleges, historical revisionism (Columbus didn't discover America, or if he did, it was a bad idea), and so on.

As we approach the radical end of the ideological spectrum, multiculturalism becomes monoculturalism. Here the reasoning is that because American institutions have been dominated by the ideas and practices of white, male, heterosexual Christians, they must now be dominated by whatever is regarded as their opposite. History texts must now be Afrocentric rather than Eurocentric, the "masculinist" vocabulary must yield to the feminist, and families in which men bring home the bacon and women serve it up to their 2.2 children must be regarded as abnormal, while families consisting of two working lesbians are regarded as the norm.

There are two simple reasons why so many books are now being published about multiculturalism: (A) There are so many forms of multiculturalism, all pretending to be the true form, that there's plenty to fight about. (B) The moral justifications that apply to mild forms of multiculturalism are commonly used to legitimize the extreme forms, which means that arguments can branch off in hundreds of strange directions. Somehow, for example, the idea that everyone needs to be sensitive to cultural differences has resulted in fundamentalist parents being forced to send their children to schools where they learn that Christianity is genocidal (wasn't Columbus a Chris-

Somehow the idea that everyone needs to be sensitive to cultural differences has resulted in fundamentalist parents being forced to send their children to schools where they learn that Christianity is genocidal and that gay sex is like any other kind of sex, so long as you wear a condom.

tian?) and that gay sex is like any other kind of sex, so long as you wear a condom. A certain sensitivity seems to be lacking here and someone feels called upon to write a book showing where multiculturalism did or did not run off the track.

Some people seek a society that is multicultural, not in recognizing the multicultural nature of each American, but in regarding everyone as a member of a group and ensuring that everyone's group "culture" will be fostered and protected by benevolent state institutions.

But wait! Before arguing about "multiculturalism," shouldn't we try to see if we know what "culture" means? I realize, of course, that we're not concerned with Beethoven, Brahms, and Bach; that's not what "culture" means in this context. We're concerned instead with the ways in which people behave in their daily lives, with their mainly implicit, often "inherited" values, with their characteristic, often unpremeditated expressions of who they are and what they share with people whom they regard as similar to themselves. Fine. But what's "culture"?

To answer, or perhaps to evade answering, this question, let me tell you something about my friend Paul. Paul's paternal grandparents were poor people who came from Russia. No, that's not quite right: they were Russians who came from what is now Lithuania. Paul's maternal grandparents were poor people who came from Norway and Sweden. His mother and some of the rest of his family remain active in Swedish-American organizations. In his youth, Paul spent his summers in a Swedish-American community in Northern California. Paul's mother keeps in touch with relations in Norway; four years ago, she and Paul traveled there to visit aunts and cousins. Communication was somewhat strained, because Paul does not speak Norwegian. Neither does he speak Swedish or Russian. He speaks German, because he learned German in college, perhaps because German might come in handy in science. Paul is a biophysicist who works in a university. As a result, he knows about 100,000 times more about molecules than he does about Swedish, Norwegian, or Russian history. But this is no problem, because none of his Swedish-American, Norwegian-American, or Russian-American friends expects him to know any more than he does. They don't know any more, either. Most of Paul's friends, in fact, are Jewish, Brazilian, Japanese, Chinese, Irish, and other hyphenated Americans. Some of these people he knows because of a common interest in country-Western music; Paul plays the guitar and sings. Among Paul's numerous siblings, most of them women, are lawyers, a film editor, and another physicist. The family seems to spend a lot of time arguing about politics; some of them have strong social ties to people on the left, others to people on the right.

Now, does this little story shock you? Or is it merely a story typical of America — not at all predictable in its details (what American story is?), but highly typical in its general pattern? Well, it's typical, of course. You would have been shocked only if I had told you that Paul had become a professional advocate of Russian-Lithuanian-American causes or that he had decided to devote his life to litigation for the interests of Swedes.

But of what "culture" is Paul's story typical? Is Paul simply an "American" through and through, in the way (I suppose) that Finns in Finland are thoroughly Finns? Or does Paul have an ethnic culture — or three of them? Or has he given all that up for the culture of the university, where he spends most of his time and energy? Looking at Paul's artistic expressions, we find them typical of the "Anglo-Saxon" culture of the American heartland; but this is a place that Paul has never visited, except once, I think, when his plane touched down for a half-hour in Michigan. Perhaps we can label Paul by his political culture, which puts him at odds with some of his family, some of his colleagues in the university, and some of his country-music buddies — though not, of course, with all of them. Or perhaps we should carry the analysis further, probing the customs and values that Paul has picked up from his gender or his generation (Paul is 30). Perhaps we should keep analyzing Paul until his "culture" looks like an anthropologist's tray of pot shards, or like the storage room at Xanadu.

But perhaps we shouldn't. Don't we already know everything we really need to know? We're not going to be able to come up with a satisfactory definition of what "culture" means to Paul or to other individual Americans, or to Americans in general; and if we could, these people would probably change their culture, just to spite us. Paul's case merely illustrates the fact that "culture" for an American is typically a matter of cultural influences so many and various as to allow every individual to orient himself (or herself) in many different ways, depending on occasion, personal taste, the state of the economy, and the state of the weather. Ralph Ellison said this much better than I can, in an essay called "The Little Man at Chehaw Station." It's in his book called *Going to the Territory*.

The pride that modern people may feel in the history of the groups they belong to is an intellectual pride, not one based on simple and automatic inheritance.

So what's the problem?

The problem is that this typically American idea of cultural diversity and cultural freedom has, and has had, some powerful competition. There is competition today from people with special interests in special aspects of American culture(s), people who want there to be just one kind of political expression, one set of values ("family values," "multicultural values," "progressive values," whatever), one way of classifying people. They want you to be

either "white" or a "person of color," either characteristically "male" or characteristically "female," either a "feminist" or a "right-wing fundamentalist." They want people's choices about what they like in the mix of American "cultures" to be subjected to all the rigors of an intensely moralistic criticism.

I'm not thinking just about, or even mainly about, the criticism leveled at white male heterosexuals who are constantly caught revealing their "insensitivity" to other people's cultures, or to what is imagined to be other people's cultures. I'm thinking most about the pressure that many African-American school kids feel to "act black," about the pressure that many professional women feel to behave like radical feminists, about the pressure that many gays feel to "come out" in ways that radical multiculturalism regards as the most defining of gay culture, because they are the most extreme.

The damage done by such standards of conformism is often economic. No matter what an antidiscrimination law says, you are much less likely to get a job if you act out your cultural differences in decisive ways; no one really likes a conformist, especially a conformist who is advertising his difference from one's *own* kind of conformism. The most important damage of conformism, however, is the diminishment of one's own breadth and flexibility as a person, of one's own ability to be "multicultural," in one possible sense of that term.

But I said that the American idea of cultural freedom "has, *and has had* some powerful competition. America does not have a history of full cultural freedom. Every American is a member of at least one group that has suffered arbitrary discrimination, and some people have suffered much worse than others. To suffer discrimination means to be treated not as a culturally free individual but as a member of a group from whose culture one cannot escape, especially as that culture is seen by bigoted outsiders. Blacks as a group bore the mark of slavery. Jews as a group were regarded as inappropriate candidates for a university education. Italians as a group were regarded as unmarriageable into polite society. Gays as a group were outlawed.

Precedents set by the group-think of the past lend support to the group-think of the present. They help to convince individuals that the reason why no one seems to listen to them or no one wants to hire them must be that they are identifiable members of groups that other, more powerful groups dislike. The impression may be true or false; it is typically incapable of definite proof, one way or the other, so it doesn't easily go away. And some people respond to this impression by seeking a society that is "multicultural" in an anti-individualist way — multicultural not in recognizing the multicultural nature of each American, but multicultural in regarding everyone as a member of a group and being determined to ensure that everyone's group "culture" will be fostered and protected by benevolent state institutions.

How much of the discriminatory group-think of the past is still alive? It is impossible to say. A black colleague of mine remarked to me that he was convinced that "white racism was growing all the time." I told him that as far as I could see, that wasn't true; that I had grown up in a midwestern community in which mixed-race couples were shunned and sometimes beaten, and that no one in that community would dream of acting in that way now. There had been some progress, anyway. I talked along in that vein, but I could see that I wasn't being very convincing. My colleague, of course, can't see "white" "culture" from the inside. And in most cases, he can't really know if one of his acquaintances has been passed over for a job because he's not the best qualified, or because he's black.

But what does seem clear is that many of the "multicultural" efforts of the present are strongly counterproductive, at least insofar as they are intended to enable people in groups that have suffered from discrimination to advance themselves economically. To spend week after week of a public-school education on the question of homosexual "lifestyles," or on the superiority of African civilization in the third millennium, B.C., to the European non-civilizations of the time, or on the issue of whether Columbus wrecked America by discovering it, or on the importance of referring to young females as "women" rather than "girls" — all of this does a shocking disservice to students who need to learn basic intellectual skills that will enable them to do with their lives what they will, whatever they will. Yet this is the kind of thing that is happening, wherever the culture of the most "progressive" multicultural educationists has asserted itself.

Further: to preach advanced multicultural ideology, as do many of the media, many politicians, and virtually all of the liberal clergy, as if it were the only ethic appropriate to twentieth-century Americans is to leave twentieth-century Americans sadly in need of thoughts to guide them in most of life's real business. To make an intelligent young woman pause to ask herself if

"P.C. Bookseller Ad," by Gunnar Bergstrom

her choices are suitable to her "as a Chicana" or "as an Asian-American" is to encourage her not to find out what she wants to do and ought to do. And if she is led by her education to believe that everyone else is looking at her as a representative of some group phenomenon, then she may regard any criticism she receives from others as directed solely at her group — and any rewards she achieves as given merely to her as a member of that group. Both alternatives are demoralizing.

As a remedy for the evils originally caused by group thinking, multiculturalism (as it is most "progressively" preached and practiced) seems doomed to fail. As an intellectual project, it also seems doomed, because it falsely represents the nature of people's identifications with the "cultures" that become important to them.

Go to the graves of your great-grandparents. Do you know where they are? As an American, probably you do not know. Maybe they're in some foreign country, or maybe you've never cared to discover where they are, despite the fact that, according to the multiculturalists, you ought to care about this very much. But go to those graves, stand there in the cemetery, and ask yourself what you feel.

Perhaps you feel the romance of history, the sense of that great adventure (and "great" does not mean "pleasant") that somehow created you out of events wholly foreign to *you*: the journeys of men and women who were exiled because of religious opinions that you neither understand nor care about, the journeys of men and women who struggled with economic necessities that you will never confront, the journeys of men and women who were sold into slavery and transported to a new and hostile world that for you is the source of all enjoyment. Surely you will sense how little you know these people. They are bone of your bone, blood of your blood; but you find it hard to remember their names. Maybe you inherited a Bible from them, or a favorite ring. But almost everything that is *you* in the cultural sense, your values, your concept of yourself, your means of expressing yourself, has come to you, not from these almost anonymous ancestors, but from the American cultures that surround you — and these cultures originated, in large part, as the cultures of "other people."

Your own individual culture is not a matter of biology. It is a matter of ideas, ideas that can be chosen, understood, and applied by individual minds. If we feel pride in our ancestors' cultural accomplishments, it is because we have created our own imaginative identification with them.

The argument applies even more emphatically to the cultural influences that come from broad, nonfamilial groups. Women are born women, and

To spend week after week of a public-school education on the issue of whether Columbus wrecked America by discovering it, or on the importance of referring to young females as "women" rather than "girls" does a shocking disservice to students who need to learn basic intellectual skills that will enable them to live their lives.

gay people may be born gay, but the relationship of contemporary women and gays to "women's culture" and "gay culture" in, say, the nineteenth century is something that has to be exhumed by historians. The pride that modern people may feel in the history of these groups is an intellectual pride, not one based on simple and automatic inheritance. That word "culture" does, indeed, have its problems.

Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., has a sense of this, and it is somewhat surprising that he should. Schlesinger is one of the leading modern liberals of our time. He was one of the two or three major intellectual influences on and spokesmen for the Kennedy political machine. He is therefore responsible, as much as anyone, for the steadily leftward drift of American intellectual life. So it is surprising, and heartening, to find his new book criticizing the "ideologues" of multiculturalism for

> call[ing] on the republic to think in terms not of individual but of group identity and to move the polity from individual rights to group rights. (130)

The "underlying philosophy" of the ideologues, he says,

> is that America is not a nation of individuals at all but a nation of groups, that ethnicity is the defining experience for most Americans, that ethnic ties are permanent and indelible, and that division into ethnic communities establishes the basic structure of American society and the basic meaning of American history. (16)

As an historian, Schlesinger is in a good position to see through the all-obliterating intellectual smog that obscures variations among individuals in groups. He knows that "Western culture," that hegemonic power so much resented by multiculturalists, is not one culture at all: "Churchill and Hitler, St. Francis and Machiavelli, Pericles and Dracula — monocultural?" (88) He understands that it is mere nonsense to regard the distinguished cultural achievements of past cultures as the products of ethnic groups *per se*, as if the Greeks invented democracy because they were Greeks or the Jews perfected monotheism because they were Jews. He knows that the ancient Egyptians, who were members of several "racial" groups and no backward bunch when it came to culture, would have found the modern identification of race and culture quite "meaningless" (77). He emphasizes the fact that self-esteem usually

Schlesinger's justification of American society is its encouragement of individualism, even if individualism weakens the hold of ethnic cultures.

"springs from achievement, from personal rather than from racial pride" (92). He emphasizes, also, the inspiration that comes to individuals across the banal boundaries of "cultures":

> Is Lincoln to be a hero only for those of English ancestry? Douglass only for blacks? Great artists, thinkers, leaders are the possession not just of their own racial clan but of all humanity. (92)

As an observer of the contemporary scene, Schlesinger sees that the tendency to identify individuals with large and antagonistic "cultural" groups often "exaggerates differences, intensifies resentments and antagonisms, drives ever deeper the awful wedges between races and nationalities" (102). He also sees that insistence on group identification is something much more popular with the "self-appointed spokesmen" for minorities than with the people for whom they speak (42), people who are usually eager to gain for themselves all the good things of general American society, rather than to value themselves on their cultural distinctness.

Striking confirmation of Schlesinger's views came recently from the Latino National Political Survey, "the most extensive effort to measure Hispanic attitudes to date." The survey concluded, according to the New York *Times* (December 15, 1992), that "economic self-interest and a driving commitment to be part of American society shape attitudes among Hispanic groups more than a sense of ethnic identity." 93% of Mexican-Americans thought that citizens and residents of the U.S. should learn English. 75% of Mexican-Americans, compared to 74% of non-Hispanic whites, think that "there are too many immigrants." An "overwhelming majority" of Hispanic-Americans indicated that the goal of bilingual education "should be to teach English or both languages rather than to preserve the Spanish language and culture," as some political leaders of Latino communities prefer. Angelo Falcon, one of the study's co-researchers, observed of its findings: "The implication is that there is a growing gulf between the Latino leadership and the community."

Schlesinger's justification of American society is its encouragement of individualism, even if individualism weakens the hold of ethnic cultures. In fact, Schlesinger draws the kind of sharp line between "individualist" and "collectivist" cultural tendencies that modern liberals used to scold libertarians for drawing (127). But although most of Schlesinger's book should go over well with the libertarian audience, and almost all of it is written with Schlesinger's accustomed clarity and intensity, some of its details will not hold up to scrutiny.

Eager to show how far America has come, even without the guidance of multiculturalists, Schlesinger sometimes paints too dark a picture of history, especially when he is talking about the writing of history. He ignores his own emphasis on the complexity of individuals' relationships to groups when he alleges that "American history was long written in the interests of white Anglo-Saxon Protestant males" (53). We are to picture a stuffy drawing room inhabited only by scribbling old Anglican gents who are motivated only by the interests they share with other old Anglican gents. In schoolbooks, Schlesinger says, "the only good Indians were dead Indians" (53). Go to a used bookstore, please, and find the schoolbook that says this.

Like a true modern liberal, Schlesinger has trouble focusing on the role of the state in creating the problems that distress him. Few people, certainly not Schlesinger, would really care what their neighbors thought about "culture" if the neighbors couldn't use the government to implement their views.

Even when Schlesinger decides to make a tactical compliment to multiculturalism, his compliment can have an unconsidered sound, as when he says that American education has begun "at last to acknowledge the existence and significance of the great swirling world beyond Europe" (15). Again, go down to the used bookstore and find (as you easily will) a world history text from *circa* 1940, and tell me that its treatment of the non-European world is scantier than the brief and pitifully superficial views one finds in current texts. The current expectation is that the schools should

educate students in racial pride, family values, multicultural awareness, safe sex, feminist lifestyles, just-say-no, and holidays from everywhere. This has naturally lessened the time that schools can devote to such merely academic subjects as world history.

Schlesinger criticizes educators for spending their time teaching racial pride rather than preparing students to succeed in general American society (74, 90) — yet he demands "greater investment in education" (101). Greater investment, Prof. Schlesinger? How much greater, or just greater all the time? And do you have any reason to suppose that the educators you criticize will spend that greater investment more wisely than they have spent the greater investments already in their hands?

Like a true modern liberal, Schlesinger has trouble focusing on the role of the state in creating the problems that distress him. Few people, certainly not Schlesinger, would really care what their neighbors thought about "culture" if the neighbors couldn't use the government to implement their views. Thirty years ago, state governments took black parents' money and used it to force their children into segregated schools. Now state governments take white parents' money and use it to force their children to study "multicultural" subjects that often reflect badly on *their* group. Neither of these experiments is good or useful, and neither would have happened if the state had kept its hands as far away from the educational process as possible.

If a voucher system allowed parents to choose the schools in which they wished their children to be educated, some misguided parents would choose schools in which kids are taught that their individuality is inevitably determined by their ethnicity, gender, or religion. But there is every reason to believe that very few parents would do so, and every reason to believe that the vast majority would insist that their children be given an education that would prepare them to live successfully in our diverse society and to achieve what they, as individuals, want to achieve. If there were real choice in education, there would be no occasion for communities to be convulsed by moronic debates about whether the public schools should signify their approval of condoms or of abstinence, Christmas or Hanukkah or Kwanzaa, English-only or bilingualism. By their very existence, the schools would signify the importance of the great principle that unifies and justifies the American social order, the principle of free cultural choice, which is the principle of individual liberty.

Schlesinger almost sees that this is the principle on which America works, but his vision is fogged by other principles. He cannot quite bring himself to say that the more the government lets people alone, the better they usually get along together. He says that "unless a common purpose binds them together, tribal hostilities will drive them apart" (10), although, as he indicates elsewhere in his book, nothing is more likely to drive people apart than attempts to indoctrinate them about common purposes. When Schlesinger gets around to defining what America's common purposes should be, he suggests that they have to do with the exercise of "political rights and civic responsibilities," through which we express our "ideals of democracy and human rights," "ideals of the essential dignity and equality of all human beings, of inalienable rights to freedom, justice, and opportunity" (26, 118, 27). Well, fine; these are admirable concepts, so admirable that everyone has developed his own interpretation of them. I'm not sure that we will soon agree to be happily "united" in a "common purpose" to abide by any of those interpretations.

Better to say: Let's get the state to start leaving people alone. If we can just agree on that, our "cultures" can be safely allowed to wander off and multiply as they see fit.

Better to say: Let's get the state to start leaving people alone. If we can just agree on that, our "cultures" can be safely allowed to wander off and multiply as they see fit. It shouldn't be a destructive process. They're already pretty good at it. ❑

***When Workers Decide: Workplace Democracy Takes Root in North America,* edited by Len Krimerman and Frank Lindenfeld. New Society Publishers, 1992. 308 pp., $39.95 hb, $16.95 sc.**

Workers Take Control

Jesse Walker

The summer before I went to college, I got a job working for a Burger King in Galveston, Texas. I liked most of the people I worked with, even the guy who kept trying to prove to me that black men were biologically superior to other races and sexes, but other than that it was a lousy job. Low pay, boring work, odd hours, hot grease constantly splattering into my face — you get the idea.

But what I hated most about the job were the periodic visits from Houston managers. One in particular got on everyone's nerves by wandering around the kitchen telling one and all to "hustle." "Hey, kid," he'd tell me as I loaded burger patties into the broiler, "let's see some hustle over there," like he was some junior high football coach. The fact that I had to work at the speed set by the machine and not vice versa didn't matter to him, because he had absolutely no idea of how the broiling process worked. I could have explained it to him, but then again, he could have had me fired. I was dispensable. This was grunt work; anyone could master it (except, apparently, bossy white-collar workers from Houston).

He would sometimes try to "help" me, shoving more burger patties into the broiler by putting them on top of other patties. Since this prevented the parts of the patties that touched each other from getting cooked, it was about as much help as throwing good meat directly into the dumpster. I guess this was supposed to be an example of his idea of "hustle."

That restaurant worked best when the only managers around were those who had been promoted from the floor itself. We got the work done, didn't waste our time going by the book without good reason, and found ways to keep incompetent workers out of the loop. At those times, Burger King was hardly a paradigm of worker control, but it was a lot more efficient and a little bit less shitty to work for.

Most people don't work at Burger King, but many work for places with similar problems. Self-management is an attempt at a solution to such problems. It isn't a complicated idea. When employees own and manage their own businesses, workers have a greater stake in their enterprises' success and the enterprises have better reason to treat their owner-employees and the communities they live in with respect and care. Plus, by providing greater direction over our own lives and livelihoods, worker control allows more room for individual creativity and self-development — and, thus, for the development of society as a whole. That's the theory anyway.

In the past, self-management has been considered impractical. Most of its supporters advocated such clumsy self-government procedures as putting all significant decisions up to a vote; many were also hostile to the concept of private property, preferring an unwieldy system of communal usufruct. Not surprisingly, most of their experiments failed.

But worker control has never been limited to that sort of organization. For example, even as many of the anarchist collectives that emerged during the Spanish Civil War "abolished money," held all things in common, and subsequently suffered economically, others issued their own currency, preserved individual ownership of property, and prospered — while maintaining a regime of ownership and management of the means of production by the workers. For all their "socialist" rhetoric, the most successful Spanish anarcho-syndicalists had simply discovered a more efficient, more equitable way of organizing property ownership.

Their analogues today have found several such routes to equity and efficiency: cooperatives, ESOPs, flexible manufacturing networks, and more. The range of options is explored in a new anthology edited by Len Krimerman and Frank Lindenfeld, *When Workers Decide: Workplace Democracy Takes Root in North America.* And, while a share of the contributors sound like old-line socialists and collectivists, most do not. Even those writers who see a role for government in supporting worker ownership understand that initiative must come from below for employee control to work.

ESOPs and Federations

When the steel industry was battered by a wave of plant closings, statist liberals in Washington, D.C. responded with — what else — a plant-closing bill. But when the Weirton Steel Company prepared to close its doors in 1984, its West Virginian workforce reponded in a different way: they purchased the plant. Since then, many other steelworkers have adopted the same tactic. Some did not succeed in saving their jobs. Others — many — did.

Weirton workers used an ESOP (Employee Stock Option Plan) to buy out their company, receiving a majority of its stock in exchange for wage concessions. With this came not only a stake in the firm's profits, but greater control over the production process as well. Thus, to give but one example, a Weirton mechanics' employee participation group, on the initiative of one of its members, researched and designed an air-evacuation system to capture the lime dust produced when

lime was unloaded.

Despite this, Weirton employees still lack full democratic control, and other stock plans provide still less opportunities for self-management. In Avis's much-vaunted ESOP, for example, "the company's 24 million shares are to be 'gradually' released to the 'owners' over seventeen years . . . today, Avis's 12,300 workers own on average only twenty shares each, total value $200" (p. 162). Often, employees who successfully bid for company ownership are then denied substantial company control. Much of this has to do with the typical ESOP structure, in which a trust fund actually owns and votes the stock. Usually, the trustees are chosen by the financiers who lent the money, leading to an overabundance of bankers, managers, and lawyers on the board of trustees. Only about a third of ESOPs (the so-called "democratic ESOPs") allow voting rights to trickle down to the workers.

For all their "socialist" rhetoric, the most successful Spanish anarcho-syndicalists had simply discovered a more efficient, more equitable way of organizing property ownership.

Perhaps, some day, workers who feel cheated by non-democratic stock ownership plans will ally themselves with the shareholders' rights movement and retake their companies. In the meantime, other worker-owners and potential worker-owners are turning to another facet of the self-management movement for assistance: federation and mutual aid.

Solitary worker-owned businesses often suffer from managerial inexperience, lack of marketing know-how, and diseconomies of scale. Federations of employee-owned firms allow information and experience to be shared, funds to be pooled, and member firms to produce on a larger scale by cooperating with one another. There are as many kinds of cooperative federations as there are reasons to federate. The Northeast Ohio Employee Ownerhip Center facilitates employee buyouts of failing plants, helping bidders avoid such pitfalls as "ownership" via trust fund. North Carolina's Self-Help Credit Union provides financing for worker-owned businesses, home ownership in low-income communities, and aid to the sick and poor. Rural Entrepreneurship Through Action Learning is a network of "business-incubation centers" in Georgia and the Carolinas. Other such organizations abound.

In all this, what is most interesting is just who the employee-owners are. Most are not left-wing ideologues; indeed, the traditional left tends to be uncomfortable with these projects. Instead, these are pragmatic, middle-of-the-road people who are simply tired of losing their jobs because of managerial incompetence. Why not have a go at it themselves?

The Left and Worker Ownership

The libertarian left has been eclipsed by Marxism and social democracy for a century. With the exception of the United Steel Workers, today's labor movement is overwhelmingly hostile to employee ownership, for much the same reason that most corporate managers don't care much for the idea: it is a threat to their power.

The editors of *When Workers Decide* are themselves of the left, and give over some of the book to self-management's critics. Some of these pieces aren't bad; Pete Leki's "I'd Be All for ESOPs If. . ." (162–163) includes a good discussion of real versus phony ownership, though his proposals for change ("government subsidized capitalization of workplaces") are pretty abominable.

But Lance Compa's essay, "The Dangers of Worker Control" (157–161), is a true embarrassment. Fearful that worker-owners will become "small-scale capitalists" (horrors!), Compa will support employee ownership only if it is part of a larger drive for "democracy in the whole of society" — i.e., "for affirmative action, . . . for more unemployment benefits, for a higher minimum wage, and for food stamps." The bottom line: "From the standpoint of the labor movement, adopting the objective of greater worker control is bad policy because it emphasizes enterprise consciousness rather than class consciousness." That is to say, it encourages individual and mutual creativity and responsibility instead of docile acquiescence to union orders. "Distracted by problems of production and competition," Compa asks, "would workers in a worker-owned and worker-run enterprise be likely to organize around" left-liberal causes? Paradoxically, Compa accuses the employee-ownership movement of "business unionism" — craven acceptance of the status quo, rejection of the concerns of the rank and file. "In exchange for supporting free enterprise at home (sic) and the cold war abroad, cooperating with the Central Intelligence Agency by participating in agency-funded foreign labor 'institutes,' and supporting huge military budgets and the U.S. imperialist policy in the Third World," he writes, "the labor movement was accepted as part of the country's power establishment. . . . [U]nion involvement in experiments with workplace democracy and worker control is of a piece with business unionism." Labor activists should reject this project, Compa says, and instead embrace what he calls "rank-and-file unionism."

Most employee-owners are not left-wing ideologues. They are pragmatic, middle-of-the-road people who are simply tired of losing their jobs because of managerial incompetence.

But if anything deserves the title of "business unionism," it is Compa's stale confrontationalism, where union and managerial bureaucracies play out their state-subsidized roles and the production process remains fundamentally unchanged. And what could be more rank-and-file-oriented than management for and by the rank and file? What could, by making union bureaucrats superfluous, be more subversive

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





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of the labor movement's participation in "the country's power establishment"?

In fact, some of those arguing for self-management in *When Workers Decide* are rank-and-file activists, and they leave no question as to their position in the labor movement: they are heretics. They have had successes — buyout funds have been established in several unions — but remain a minority voice; for the most part, "the reaction of union officials above the local level has ranged from hands off to antagonism" (117). Only recently, with economic hardship pushing many unions to the brink of extinction, has a new breed of unionist begun to think in terms of worker control. Similarly, new economic conditions have prompted many managers to also consider worker ownership and greater employee participation in decision-making. "Empowerment" has become a management buzzword, though few large corporations have implemented it on a large scale.

Government subsidy has shielded managers from the force of their mistakes. Market discipline, conversely, is what is driving so many corporations to accept employee participation in ownership and management.

The Greater Economic Vision

Some of the contributors to *When Workers Decide* have a traditional left-liberal vision of the greater economy: more worker control in the context of "industrial policy" and limited nationalization. Some have no real economic ideology, and speak of governmental and private funding for worker buyouts and start-up costs as though the two sources of money are fundamentally the same. And some have a libertarian attitude, pushing employee ownership experiments as "socially responsible forms of privatization" (48), citing studies by the Reason Foundation, a libertarian think tank.

It is this last group that stands the best chance of promoting true worker ownership and self-management. For while the state may have more resources at its disposal for financing worker control, government money always comes with government strings. The most dangerous of these — because it is so tempting — is protection. Activists who point to mismanagement as a source of America's economic decline often fail to realize that it is government subsidy that has shielded managers from the force of their mistakes. Market discipline, conversely, is what is driving so many corporations to accept employee participation in ownership and management.

Worker-owned businesses that receive little or no subsidy look to the free market for creative solutions to problems once considered the government's domain. We have already seen how, while most of the left pressured for government action to stop plant closings, Weirton employees took over their plant themselves and made it a solvent — and democratic — business. Similarly, when the worker-owners of Colt Enterprises faced offshore competition, they responded with neither calls for protection nor wage cuts and layoffs, but with their own line of high-quality specialized women's sportswear. In fact, "rather than battling the workers who obtained their lost Levi's and Liz Claiborne contracts, Colt . . . resolved to work with them in solidarity," by putting $1 of the manufacturing price of each of their products toward education for workers in the Dominican Republic (36). No protectionism here!

Still, many people don't seem interested in working "in solidarity" with others beyond their immediate friends and family, and quite a few don't appear intrigued by the thought of having a say in how their workplaces are run, either. Consider Burger King again: will making mass-produced fish sandwiches ever be a meaningful sort of self-expression? (Don't try to dodge the question by suggesting that there will be no crummy fast food in the anarchist utopia of tomorrow; there's a market for it now, even with tastier, healthier food available for the same price in a much more convivial atmosphere down the street.) Will entry-level workers at traditional "first job" spots like Burger King want to be employee-owners at all? Do they have the skills that management requires?

I doubt that the Home of the Whopper is built for conversion to self-management. Mere employee ownership, management intact, could work as well there as anyplace else, of course; at the very least, the financial incentive of a share of the profits might make for improved service. But division of labor exists for a reason. When I worked at Burger King, I knew how to make sandwiches; I didn't know much of anything about sales and marketing. Total separation of labor and management may usually be a mistake, but so is putting all decisions up for everyone to debate. Besides, I didn't want a say in how the restaurant was run; I was there for the summer and no longer. I had a need for money, and Burger King was just a means to that end.

But I still can't forget how much smoother things ran when upper management was away. Or how even summer-only employees like me had incentive (namely, an easier time getting the job done) to figure out better ways of doing things. Or how most of us, bad at marketing though we may have been, knew more about keeping the kitchen going than that fellow from Houston did.

Though I have a hard time imagining Burger King reorganized as an anarcho-syndicalist collective, I'd bet serious money that a dose of employee participation and ownership might help it out a bit. It's certainly helped a lot of other firms: according to separate studies conducted by the National Center for Employee Ownership and the New York Stock Exchange, firms with at least 10 percent worker ownership grow faster and have higher profits than those without. That implies that, even though many employees might not want to put in their two cents, just allowing those who do want to would be a boon. And more radical business structures, in which interested employees don't just "participate" but actually call the shots, are doing well too. That's what *When Workers Decide* is all about.

And don't be surprised if the number of employees interested in having a say is more than you expect. Nigel Balchin once put it this way: "Industrial psychologists must stop messing about with tricky and ingenious bonus schemes and find out why a man, after a hard day's work, went home and enjoyed digging in his garden." If the mass of people are so disinterested in creative, self-directed labor, why do they do so much of it when they don't have to? And might not at least some of them find a way to bring that initiative to the workplace, if only they had reason to believe that there was a place for it there?

A Step Toward Liberty

Worker ownership will never completely displace other forms of organization. It will, however, continue to grow, and in more and more different forms. Co-ops and democratic ESOPs are only the tip of the iceberg; flexible manufacturing networks, or FMNs (a form of "high-tech, small-scale artisan production" where "shops — many, although not all, worker-owned — form temporary and shifting alliances and cooperate in their use of computer-aided design, production, and marketing methods" [236]) already predominate in Italy's Emilia-Romagna region and are beginning to take root elsewhere, from Europe to Ohio.

A libertarian society, free of the state's regulation and control, will admit any form of voluntary organization, member-run or not. But libertarians should find a lot to support in the self-management movement because of the broader political and cultural current it suggests. People who own and manage their own workplaces have to understand the value of self-reliance and mutual aid; in a tight spot, that's all they can rely on. What use do worker-owners have for regulations meant to protect them from uncaring employers, for central plans that interfere with their own intentions, for a welfare state that duplicates their own mutual insurance pacts?

A society infused with both self-reliance and solidarity is a society with no need for a paternalistic state. A society filled with drones is a society predisposed to totalitarianism. ❑

Coming of age in America has not been made easier by literary "progress."

Le Morte d'Alger

David Justin Ross

There once was a time of heroes, when men and boys overcame great hurdles to accomplish great deeds, whether extending the American empire on land or sea, pioneering a new technology, or recovering a widow's stolen fortune. In those days, boys looked up to heroes and wanted to be like them, wanted regardless of being poor or orphaned or crippled to take risks and succeed. It was a time when the production of wealth was admirable, when the discovery of new medicines was a goal worthy of a life's dedication, and when honesty and honor were virtues worth teaching and learning. When our nation was a century newer, there was a class of literature that reflected the high ideals and honorable goals of adults and set out to teach them to new generations of young men.

Boys' adventure literature has lived through four periods, each with a distinct kind of writing setting the tone. What I call Prehistory, lasting approximately up to the end of the Civil War, saw the gradual evolution of a kind of writing that was meant to be read by boys and young men and that also was *about* them. The second period, defined by the working life of Horatio Alger, its most prolific author, lasted until the dawn of the twentieth century. With the closing of the frontier and the subsidence of the Age of Magnates, series fiction took over, producing the Golden Age of juvenile literature.

The Golden Age lasted for half a century before declining standards of education and social morality overtook it and produced the mess that is present-day juvenile fiction.

Definitions

Though there were plenty of books for boys that were about historical or fictional adults (the writings of G.A. Henty are good examples), by far the most influential and widely-selling books were about characters only a little older than their readers. What I call boys' adventure literature was written *for* boys or young men and was also *about* boys and young men. (Though there were parallel developments in fiction for girls, I will concentrate on boys' fiction, with which I am more familiar.)

Most boys' adventure literature was set in the common world of the day, small-town America. In this it followed the model of fairy tales. Fairy stories start off "Once upon a time" in a world of petty kings and paupers, woodcutters and impenetrable forests. When the classic fairy tales were composed, this was the normal world. Our perspective is distorted because the normal world of that time is now gone.

Boys' adventure literature works the same way. It begins with normal boys at home somewhere in small-town America. As with our experience of fairy tales, our perspective is similarly distorted with respect to this fiction genre, since small-town America is not the daily experience of most Americans. Thus the setting itself, meant by the authors to be a firm grounding in everyday life, seems itself a kind of fantasy world.

The era in which this literature first developed had some strange contrasts. Most boys lived in an extremely restricted world, a world in which the daily routine revolved around family, farm work, church, and perhaps school. On the other hand, boys of that era were often required to take on the responsibilities of manhood very early. Many leaders of wagon trains were in their teens. At that age many boys were

fathering families and girls were bearing children. Society therefore presented the contrasts of a very constrained life for most juveniles with a small minority having tremendous responsibilities and living lives of significant peril and adventure. While the frontier was still open, the lives of that minority, romanticized and exaggerated, formed the escapist literature of the stay-at-homes.

A critical element of Golden Age adventure fiction is the accomplishment of an important goal. This goal might be global (such as winning the Spanish-American War or settling Oregon) or personal (creating a great industry or learning to use a new kind of machine), but it is always something important, external to the person, that meets an internal goal. Since this is adventure literature, there are all kinds of hardships and difficulties besetting the protagonists; since this was heroic literature, the protagonists overcome them and reach their goals. Always, the difficulties of birth or education or opposition by enemy characters were obstacles to be overcome while accomplishing the main goal. The difficulties themselves are only important because they are in the way.

In this literature, the overall goodness of the world and its inhabitants is accepted as a given. The world can be changed by people who want to change it and most people are good and helpful. There are, of course, opponents and evil people to be overcome, but they are decidedly in the minority. They do not represent the normal state of the world; their evil is a perversion and is known to be.

A second critical element of adventure literature is that it taught. In the preface to the 1852 book *The Boy Hunters,* Captain Mayne Reid explains why he is writing:

> For the boy readers of England and America this book has been written and to them it is dedicated. That it may interest them so as to rival in their affection the top, the ball, and the kite. That it may impress them so as to create a taste for that most refining study, the study of nature. That it may benefit them by begetting a fondness for books, the antidote to ignorance, idleness, and vice has been the design, as it is the sincere wish of their friend the author. [1]

From Reid on, authors intended to entertain boys, to teach them how to do interesting things, and to teach them how to live right.

Always, the difficulties of birth or education or opposition by enemy characters were obstacles to be overcome while accomplishing the main goal. The difficulties themselves are only important because they are in the way.

The hero of these books often follows a regular pattern. First, he learns *how* to do something. This may be how to ride a horse or drive an automobile or assemble an airplane, but it requires the acquisition of some particular skill. Next, he learns the *importance* of that knowledge. The hero may suddenly be called upon to scout for Indians or deliver an important message. Finally, he learns the importance of the *right use* of that knowledge for his own and for other people's benefit — to make some bad situation better — and in the process he undergoes a *change* for the better. This change is generally both in an external situation — he rescues and marries the heroine or his successful company makes him a magnate of industry — and internal — he becomes a better person.

This branch of American literature is important for a number of reasons. Most of our fathers and grandfathers grew up reading it, and it helped set their world-view and the world-view of most men who grew up before the middle of this century. It reflected the optimistic and moral perspective of most Americans of its day, and its degeneration since 1950 reflects and contributes to social changes for the worse.

The Prehistory of Boys' Adventure Literature

The ultimate origins of boys' adventure stories are lost in antiquity, as are those of the adult adventure fiction from which it sprang. As far back as there is writing of any kind, there is adventure literature: the epic of Gilgamesh is the world's oldest book. More widely known in the European tradition is Homer, which once upon a time every English and American boy learned in school. Many of the English read him in the original.

Literature whose primary purpose was to tell an interesting story while teaching right living can be traced from Aesop's *Fables* and the biblical book of *Esther,* through medieval morality plays and classical fairy tales to Bunyan's *Pilgrim's Progress.* In *Pilgrim's Progress* all the elements were present except the specific address to boys. It is didactic: its purpose is to teach the way of salvation. It is adventurous: there were a lot of perils and obstacles to be overcome on the way to the Heavenly City. It was also a widely-read book, often the only book a family owned besides the Bible. The centuries since it was written have not lessened its virtues at all, and if it is less widely read today, that is our century's loss.

Around the middle of the 19th century literature specifically addressed to boys evolved. One reason was that the population in the United States was becoming literate and literate juveniles were a ready market. Both the increase in education and the availability of

"Let you keep enough for bus fare? — You want to get me in trouble with the union?"

time to read were the result of the increasing wealth of America. A larger and larger part of the population no longer had to spend all its time working just to survive. Plus, paper became cheap to produce with the discovery of how to make paper from wood pulp, and the printing process became automated. Cheap paper and increasing literacy led to a great increase in the number and diversity of publications in the late 19th century.

During Prehistory, there was relatively little literature directed at girls. One reason for this was a lower literacy rate among girls. Another reason was that, no matter how much the girls actually participated in the adventures of the time — particularly in settling the west — they were expected to stay home, bear children, mend clothes and play it safe.

The Early Days: 1867–1899

Mayne Reid's books and other such stories were indicative that something was beginning, but boys' adventure fiction did not really take root as an independent genre until 1867. In that year, Horatio Alger's first book, *Ragged Dick, or, Street Life in New York* was serialized. The following year it was published in book form.

About the same time as the first Alger stories, other series began which showed boys working in various professions. One example is *The Boy With the National Survey*, which told of a boy with the Coast and Geodetic Survey doing actual surveying. The protagonist in these books was a boy working at a real job. Often, the setting was quite important. *With Dewey at Manila* was released to coincide with the Spanish-American War, and showed that war up close and from the perspective of a boy.

The Golden Age lasted for half a century before declining standards of education and social morality overtook it and produced the mess that is present-day juvenile fiction.

Also during the final third of the nineteenth century, books aimed at girls first appeared. In many cases, the writers might as well not have bothered. If the boys' books were sometimes too sweet, the girl's books were cloying. *Elsie Dinsmore*, the most popular girls' series of the 1870s, '80s and '90s, should have carried a saccharine warning label. As Leslie McFarlane says in his autobiography, *Ghost of the Hardy Boys*:

> There was a long shelf of Elsie Books, all perpetrated by a lady named Farquharson who got her start, like Horatio Alger, writing for Sunday School publications. She used the alias of Martha Finley. . . . [and] in the Himalayas of junk turned out by writers of juvenile fiction, the Elsie Books stand like Everest as the worst ever written by anybody, and . . . Elsie Dinsmore is without peer the Most Nauseating Heroine of all time. [2]

Another major contributor to the literature of the period was the Dime Novel. It was printed on pulp and filled with dreadfully written stories and wild tales that purported to be histories of people like Jesse James. The adventures were generally set sufficiently far from the readers that none really could judge the accuracy. Thus books published in the East were about "The West," and vice versa. Dime novels were roundly railed against by parents and ministers, which is to say, they became extremely popular.

One step up (in quality of content) from the Dime Novel were the pulp magazines. In quantity, the pulps outdistanced everything else published at the time, and some of the pulp writers themselves were prolific indeed. Quoting McFarlane again:

> For sheer volume it is unlikely that anyone ever equalled Frank Richards who wrote a 30,000-word story, the entire contents of "Magnet," an English magazine for boys, every week for thirty years. . . . [The magazine was about] an imaginary public school for boys, called . . . Greyfriars. Just to nail down Mr. Richard's claim to the all-time heavyweight title, it should be noted that . . . [t]he only rival to "Magnet" was a weekly paper for boys called "Gem," about . . . another boys' school named St. Jim's, penned with unflagging zest and regularity by one Martin Clifford. Admirers of "Magnet" and Greyfriars often debated hotly with fans of "Gem" and St. Jim's over the respective merits of authors Richards and Clifford. These disputes ended with the incredible revelation that Frank Richards was also Martin Clifford.[3]

Richards wrote all of both magazines for years, nearly 2500 novella-sized works during his lifetime. You can imagine the quality. He almost certainly holds the record for volume, but in sales he is swamped by that peculiarly American institution, Horatio Alger.

Most of our fathers and grandfathers grew up reading this type of American literature. It reflected the optimistic and moral perspective of most Americans of its day, and its degeneration since 1950 reflects and contributes to social changes for the worse.

Horatio Alger

There are two uncontested truths about Horatio Alger: First, he is the best-selling writer in American history. He wrote 125 books, a total surpassed by a number of authors, but those books have together sold more than 400 million copies. Second, and equally important, with the possible exception of the author of the Elsie books, Horatio Alger is the worst writer in American history. To give him proper credit, he never professed to be anything but a hack writer. His greatest claim to fame is as the inventor of the formula novel. As many subsequent writers have done, Horatio Alger made his living writing and rewriting the same story.

Alger was the son of a Unitarian minister. He too became a minister, only to be fired by his congregation within two years for spending too much time writing. After *Ragged Dick* became a smash success, he moved into a home for street kids in New York and

there spent the rest of his life writing for the edification of the homeless boys. These books, however dreadful they are, nonetheless were intended to be didactic and to show boys that if you are in a bad situation, that isn't where your life has to end. You can work hard, save your money, and better yourself. Alger wasn't just the preacher of platitudes. He showed in detail how to raise yourself up. If his protagonist earned three dollars a week, Alger would show how he spent $2.75 — detailing the cost of every meal he ate — and saved the remainder for the future. Here is Walter Conrad, hero of *Strong and Steady*, about to set out to seek his fortune in Ohio:

> He selected a comfortable seat by a window, and waited for the train to start. He realized that he had engaged in quite a large enterprise for a boy of fifteen who had hitherto had all his wants supplied by others. He was about to go a thousand miles from home, to earn his own living — in other words, to paddle his own canoe. But he did not feel in the least dismayed. He was ambitious and enterprising, and he felt confident that he could earn his living as well as other boys of his age.[4]

This is the stuff that two generations of American youths grew up devouring in huge quantities. In many ways he was the writer of his age, the age of the industrial magnates. Horatio Alger's professional career demarks the first period of boys' adventure literature, which started in 1867 and ended with his death in 1899. With the new century, the Golden Age began.

The Golden Age, 1900–1950

The Golden Age is the age of series fiction, a continuing sequence of books with the same protagonists. There were series books in the early days, of course — the Elsie Dinsmore books and the four books of the Tom Sawyer series (*Tom Sawyer, Huckleberry Finn, Tom Sawyer Abroad*, and *Tom Sawyer: Aeronaut*) for examples — but in the first half of the twentieth century nearly all boys' (and girls') fiction books were part of a series. The Alger books, though very similar to each other, were not series books. Their protagonists grew from boyhood to manhood during the novel and then disappeared forever.

Series fiction in its modern form began in 1899 with the publication of the first great series, "The Rover Boys," whose author's name was Arthur M.

These books, however dreadful they are, nonetheless were intended to be didactic and to show boys that if you are in a bad situation, that isn't where your life has to end. You can work hard, save your money, and better yourself.

Winfield. The next year, L. Frank Baum published *The Wonderful Wizard of Oz*, the beginning of both youth fantasy fiction and a series that eventually ran to 14 books written by him and more written after his death.

Many series had names that told what they were about: The Radio Boys, The Motor Boys, The Motion Picture Chums, The Motor Boat Boys, the Airplane Boys. The heroes had names like Dave "Dauntless" and Ken "Fearless." Most of these names sound strange and stilted to us today, but others seem less odd: Tom "Swift" and the "Hardy" Boys are part of the same convention, but either because the series are well known or because the names are real names, they seem less peculiar.

Boy Scout Fiction

There was an entire subgenre dedicated to Boy Scout Fiction. The Boy Scouts were founded by Baden-Powell in 1910 and came to the United States in 1911. The Boy Scouts turned out huge quantities of writings. Probably the best known of the Boy Scout authors was Percy Keese Fitzhugh who wrote the Peewee Harris, the Westy Martin, the Roy Blakely, and the Tom Slade books. The Scout fiction adhered closely to the didactic tradition. They were, of course, aimed at the boy who was considering scouting or already involved in it. A typical book is *Tom Slade at Temple Camp.* Its cover shows a uniformed boy blowing a bugle while, in

the background, two scouts signal with semaphore flags.

These books taught the Scout virtues, and wholeheartedly endorsed the Boy Scouts as a movement. The ones by Fitzhugh, at least, are well written, with characters that have real worries and hopes. *Tom Slade at Temple Camp* talks about the three medals for lifesaving that the Boy Scouts had: the bronze for saving another's life, the silver for saving it at substantial risk to your own life, and the gold, for saving it at grave risk of your own life. In this quotation, two scouts are discussing the medals:

> "I suppose the gold cross is the highest award they'll ever have, hey?"
>
> "Guess so."
>
> "There's nothing better than gold, is there?"
>
> "It isn't because there's nothing better than gold," said Garry. . . . "It's because there's nothing better than heroism — bravery — risking your life."[5]

Because the Scout books were very popular, they engendered *fake* Boy Scout stories. These often had the same picture on the cover, and names with "Scout" prominently in the title, but here the word meant someone running around in a distant land killing natives, and had nothing to do with Boy Scouting at all. Needless to say, the Boy Scouts hated the fake books. Several of the real books mentioned the fake ones by name (though slightly disguised) in order to rail against them.

The Technology Books

This brings me to my favorite series fiction, the scientific ones. There were a considerable number of series dedicated to explaining and showing the use of some new technology. The series were usually named for the technology. There were two different series called "The Radio Boys," one called "The Radio Girls," an "Airship Boys," an "Aeroplane Boys," and an "Airplane Boys" series. In addition were "The Motor Boys," "The Motor Boat Boys," "The Submarine Boys"; in short, a series for nearly every interesting technological invention of the day.

Here is a segment from *Trailing a Voice*, published in 1922. An adult protagonist has just returned from a trip to Washington:

> "But the pleasantest recollection I have of the trip," he went on, "was the speech I heard the president make just before I came away. It was simply magnificent."
>
> "It sure was," replied Bob enthusiastically.
>
> "Every word of it was worth remembering. He certainly knows how to put things."
>
> "I suppose you read it in the newspaper the next day," said Mr Preston, glancing at him.
>
> "Better than that," responded Bob, with a smile. "We all heard it over the radio while he was making it."
>
> "Indeed" replied the principal. "Then you boys heard it even before I did."
>
> "What do you mean?" asked Joe, in some bewilderment. "I understood that you were in the crowd that listened to him." . . . "You see it's like this," the schoolmaster went on to explain. "Sound travels through the air to a distance of a little over a hundred feet in the tenth part of a second. But in that same tenth of a second that it took the President's voice to reach me in the open air radio could have carried it eighteen thousand six hundred miles."[6]

This little discourse on the relative speeds of light and sound is just thrown into the story to teach a little more about radio. This book, in the course of a fictional adventure, meant to teach kids as much about radio as they could absorb — how to use it, how it worked. Such attention to the fine details of the technology characterized the technology sub-genre.

Edward Stratemeyer

A genre of series fiction that became popular during the Early Days and remains so today is the detective story. These started as fiction for adults, but rapidly found a home in juvenile literature. Indeed, the two most popular juvenile series of all time were detective stories.

One of the most popular pulps was Street and Smith's "Nick Carter Detective" stories. It is instructive that twenty-two of these early detective stories were written in the early 1890s by a man whose name stands above all others in the history of juvenile literature: Edward Stratemeyer. Who? Books

created by Stratemeyer singlehandedly accounted for 80% of all published juvenile literature sold between 1898 and World War II (he himself died in 1930). Five of the series created by him are still in print and still being added to, and today collectively sell more than three million copies a year. But you don't know him by the name of Edward Stratemeyer. (Unless, of course, you read my article "The Mystery of the Missing Detectives," *Liberty*, November 1992.)

A year or two ago, there was a billboard on display along Highway 101 in Silicon Valley showing a portrait of L. Ron Hubbard (who at that point had been dead for four or five years) and the caption, "Twenty Five National Best Sellers and More to Come." The Scientologists did not invent the idea of books written by dead authors. The inventor of this valuable concept was Edward Stratemeyer. He was the literary executor of Horatio Alger's estate. No one ever found any papers naming him to that role, but it was one he carried out with great enthusiasm over a number of years. He also did the same for Oliver Optic (William Adams), another prolific writer of the late 19th century.

What Stratemeyer was doing, of course, was writing new stories himself. This gave him an idea. If dead authors could continue to write books, then non-existent authors could also write books. Thus was born the Stratemeyer Syndicate. Stratemeyer hired authors, gave them outlines, and paid them to write books under a house name. Some of these house names and the series they "authored" should be familiar. The list goes on for pages, but here are a few of the major ones churned out by the Stratemeyer Syndicate:

Series	Author
The Rover Boys	Arthur M. Winfield
The Bobbsey Twins	Laura Lee Hope
The Motor Boys	Clarence Young
The Motor Girls	Margaret Penrose
Tom Swift	Victor Appleton
Baseball Joe	Lester Chadwick
Motion Picture Chums	Victor Appleton
The Moving Picture Boys	Victor Appleton
The Moving Picture Girls	Laura Lee Hope
The Movie Boys	Victor Appleton
The Outdoor Girls	Laura Lee Hope
Ruth Fielding	Alice B. Emerson
Fairview Boys	Frederick Gordon
Corner House Girls	Grace Brooks Hill
Bunny Brown and his Sister Sue	Laura Lee Hope
Dave Fearless	Roy Rockwood
Betty Gordon	Alice B. Emerson
The Blythe Girls	Laura Lee Hope
Don Sturdy	Victor Appleton
Barton Books for Girls	May Hollis Barton
Bomba the Jungle Boy	Roy Rockwood
Nat Ridley Rapid Fire Detective Stories	Nat Ridley, Jr.
X-Bar-X Boys	James Cody Ferris
The Hardy Boys	Franklin W. Dixon
Ted Scott	Franklin W. Dixon
Roy Stover	Philip A. Bartlett
Nancy Drew	Carolyn Keene
The Dana Girls	Carolyn Keene
The Happy Hollisters	Jerry West
Tom Swift Junior	Victor Appleton II

Two books that chronicle how the Syndicate worked are *Ghost of the Hardy Boys*, by Leslie McFarlane, and *The Secret of the Stratemeyer Syndicate* by Carol Billman. McFarlane wrote the first batch of Hardy Boys books (to Stratemeyer's outline), under the name of Franklin W. Dixon, from 1927 to 1944. In 1927 he answered an ad put out by Stratemeyer looking for a fiction writer to "fill out" a book written to outline form. Stratemeyer sent him an outline for each of the first three books in the series. These were *The Tower Treasure, The House on the Cliff,* and *The Secret of the Old Mill.* The idea was for the series to spring full-blown onto the publishing scene.

It is in these books that a minor pseudo-Alger character named Frank Hardy gets reincarnated. No longer a book agent in an Alger book (written by Stratemeyer), he is, along with his brother Joe, the amateur detective son of Fenton Hardy, a famous professional detective. Through more than a hundred and fifty books in two series, Frank and Joe have aged only a couple of years from the first book where they were sixteen and fifteen, respectively. The Hardy Boys is second only to Nancy Drew as the biggest selling juvenile fiction series of all time.

McFarlane had no idea what he was starting when he answered Stratemeyer's ad. All he knew was that he would be paid $125 for each book, which was a fairly good sum in 1927, particularly since each book only took him a couple of weeks to write. McFarlane's Hardy Boys books aren't bad. They are not great literature, or intended to be. By today's standards the language is occasionally involuted and verbose, but McFarlane took a fair amount of care with them. He knew his audience and added humor and good cheer to Stratemeyer's rough outline. This is the arrival of the Hardy Boys' Aunt Gertrude:

> "Sweet spirits of nitre, Aunt Gertrude herself!"
>
> "No!"
>
> "Yes!"
>
> "Let me see!" Frank rushed to the window in time to see Aunt Gertrude, attired in voluminous garments of a fashion dating back at least a decade, laboriously emerging from the taxicab. She was a large woman with a strident voice and the Hardy boys could hear her vigorously disputing the amount of the fare. This was a matter of principle with Aunt Gertrude, who always argued with taxi drivers as a matter of course, it being her firm conviction that they were unanimously in a conspiracy to overcharge her and defraud her at all times. With Lavinia (her cat) under one arm, and a huge umbrella under the other, Aunt Gertrude withered the taxi driver with a fiery denunciation and, when he helplessly pointed to the meter and declared that figures did not lie, she dropped both the cat and the umbrella, rummaged about in the manifold recesses of her clothing for a very small purse, produced the exact amount of the fare in silver, counted it out and handed it to the man with the air of one giving alms.
>
> "And just for your impudence, I shan't give you a tip!" she announced. "Carry my bags up to the house!"
>
> The driver gazed sadly at the silver in his hand, pocketed it, and clambered back into the car. "Carry them up yourself," he advised, slamming the door. The taxi roared away down the street.
>
> Frank chuckled. "That's one on Aunt Gertrude."
>
> But Aunt Gertrude had no intention of carrying the bags up to the house. Suddenly she glared up at the window from which the two boys had been watching the scene. "You two boys up there," she shouted. "I see you. Don't think I can't see you. Come down here and carry up the bags. Hustle now." They

hustled.[7]

This writing was typical. Not great literature, but fun, and it certainly paints a vivid portrait of Aunt Gertrude.

The chief rival to the Stratemeyer books, both in sales and intent, were the Boy Scout books. The Stratemeyer books raised nearly as much ire at Boy Scouts of America as did the fake scouting books. The Boy Scout books had the clear goal of teaching boys how to live right and how to acquire certain skills, while Stratemeyer's books were mostly just for fun, and of course to make him money. The kids in the Stratemeyer books were rarely under any adult supervision to speak of, while in the Boy Scout books, the adult supervision was far more obvious, both with the direct presence of Scout leaders, and with the imposed discipline of Scouting.

Fitzhugh, writing before the Hardy Boys but after the Rover Boys and other early Stratemeyer series, wrote explicitly in opposition to the books of the Stratemeyer Syndicate, considering Stratemeyer's books to be unwholesome. The two sets of books exist in similar worlds, but there are differences. The Hardy boys may go to church, but the Boy Scout books are more explicitly Christian, and their protagonists are more explicitly taught self-discipline and morals. At the same time, the Boy Scout books are more realistic. Their heroes don't go chasing international spies in their home towns like the Hardy boys. They live lives that were available to every boy. They quite often get into harrowing situations but always in relatively ordinary circumstances like swimming on a lake or getting trapped in a forest fire. The protagonists have problems to overcome and personality traits to fight against. People get better or they get worse. Overall, the Boy Scout books are better written and of higher quality than the Stratemeyer books. Needless to say, the Stratemeyer books sold better.

By the time all was said and done, there were 125 series put out by the Stratemeyer syndicate. To show the productivity of Stratemeyer's book factory, this should be compared to the 125 total books written by the extremely prolific Horatio Alger. Stratemeyer

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used 68 pen names, 47 of which belonged to the Syndicate. In all, the Stratemeyer series encompassed 1,300 book titles, with more than 200 million books sold. Nancy Drew and the Hardy Boys were most popular. A total of 80 million Nancy Drew books and 75 million Hardy Boys books have been sold.

Through more than a hundred and fifty books in two series, Frank and Joe Hardy have aged only a couple of years from the first book where they were sixteen and fifteen, respectively. The Hardy Boys is second only to Nancy Drew as the biggest selling juvenile fiction series of all time.

Despite such popular newcomers to the juveniles market as Sweet Valley High, Nancy Drew continues to be the best-selling fiction series, with sales of about a million copies annually, and the Hardy boys second, with sales totalling just under a million.

The Themes of Boys' Adventure Literature

The implicit or explicit world view of nearly all pre-1950 boys' literature is clear: *The world is outside of you, not inside.* The world is important. The world is malleable. Learning how to do things is important. It may be how to track and catch an animal (or a man), or how to build a radio set, or how to carry a message in battle, but what you learn is important and what you do with the knowledge matters. Actions have consequences. If you do something, it has a consequence in the external world, for good or ill, and you are responsible for those consequences. In the course of a normal life moral choices must be made, and those choices are important and have consequences as well. Your actions and choices also affect you. In these books, whether Boy Scouts or Stratemeyer or any of the others, the protagonists change, usually for the better, as a result of their deeds. In long series such as the Hardy Boys, the main characters cannot go on changing indefinitely, but even in them, secondary characters evolve as a result of what they do and what happens to them.

The books are optimistic. The world is a decent place, with perhaps a few bad apples, but most people are helpful and good, and in the end, good triumphs over evil and adversity. Except in the expressly detective fiction like the Hardy Boys, most evil and adversity are there to hinder the heroes in achieving their goals. The heroes are not expressly trying to overcome adversity. They are trying to accomplish goals and the adversity and evil characters must be dealt with because they get in the way.

Technology is good. It is the result of people who set out to create better ways of doing things and succeeded. Technological devices make the world easier and better. If a blind man cannot read, radio opens a wider world for him. If a doctor has trouble reaching patients quickly enough in his horse and buggy, the automobile will get him there faster.

Modern Juvenile Fiction

Golden Age books survived the Depression, though their numbers shrank, and many made it through World War II. But by 1950 the decline had begun. That is the watershed year dividing the Golden Age from the modern era.

There are, of course, still shelves of books turned out each year for the juvenile market. It is still primarily aimed at boys or girls separately. Romance fiction, which has nearly destroyed constructive reading in adult female middle America, has made the same inroads in the younger set with such series as "Sweet Valley High," which chronicles life in and around a school of that name.

Representative of modern writing, and the darling of educators everywhere, is the "My life is miserable and nobody likes me" school of writing, personified by Judy Blume. These modern books are much better written than the Golden Age books, at least in terms of grammar and syntax. It is their content that is poisonous. I listened to Judy Blume on "Sonya Live," a talk show. Blume was very intelligent and witty, and yet I found myself having a very negative response to her. It finally dawned on me that in all her discussion, nowhere did she say that people have responsibilities, that people's actions have consequences. Instead, her entire output is dedicated to victimology. Consider the introduction to Judy Blume's book *Blubber*:

> Yearling Books . . . are designed especially to entertain and enlighten young people. Charles F. Reasoner, Professor Emeritus of Children's Literature and Reading, New York University, is consultant to this series.[8]

The old series didn't need professional child psychologists, and that may account for why they taught rather than "enlightened." Perhaps it is the influence of Dr Reasoner that makes Judy Blume's characters professional victims. This quotation is near the end of *Blubber*. The main character is writing a letter to a friend of hers:

> . . . Things are not the greatest in school either. I am having this special problem.
>
> It doesn't have to do with reading or math or anything like that. It's much worse. A lot of people don't like me anymore. And for no good reason. I'm trying hard to pretend it doesn't matter, but the truth is, it does. Sometimes I feel like crying but I hold it in. I wouldn't want to spoil your vacation, so I won't say anything else.[9]

In the old days if anyone cared about being liked by the general population, it would have been a problem to overcome at the beginning of a book, resolved at the end. What Judy Blume and others of the pop psychology school are doing today is teaching children how to "cope." The heroes of Golden Age fiction don't cope. They go out and *change the world*. Today, characters cope. That is what has gone wrong. Without any sense of how well they have characterized what is wrong with Judy Blume's writing, the blurbs on the cover are instructive:

> "An inside look at how obnoxious some well-to-do suburban fifth-grade children can be to each other and to adults." — *Booklist*
>
> "This book focuses on the dormant indiscriminate cruelty of the mob and the absolute evil of any leader

who uses her powers to direct that cruelty against a victim. . . . [*Blubber*] will be read by many children who love her books."

— New York *Times Book Review* [10]

These comments sound like Ayn Rand parodies of modern book reviews. Unfortunately, they are real. In the old books, knowledge and technology were good things. Right use of knowledge (morals) was a good thing. The world was important. And the books were entertaining. All of that is gone, except for the "entertaining" part, and if you suffer through stuff like *Blubber*, you may fear that's gone as well.

The change started in the Great Revision. From 1950 through 1977 more than 100 of the Stratemeyer books, primarily from the best-selling series, were revised: The Bobbsey Twins (which started in 1904 and are still being added to), The Hardy Boys (1927), and Nancy Drew (1928). The purpose of the revision was to update the setting, to update the language (get rid of roadster and flivver and insert convertible), to eliminate ethnicity, and to dumb them down. These changes are passed off with a little blurb at the beginning of each revised book: "In this new story, based on the original of the same title, Mr Dixon has incorporated

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the most up-to-date methods used by police and private detectives." No indication of what has actually taken place, of how the books have been altered. The results are predictable. The characters in the new Hardy Boys books have no introspection, no evidence of reasoning going on for the actions they take, and the pace has been accelerated until there is nothing but action. If characters were cardboard in the original books, they are paper now. Gone are any changes or growth of characters. For instance, the colorful introduction of Aunt Gertrude quoted earlier is gone now, replaced by *nothing*, no introduction; Gertrude is *just there.* All character has been edited out of existence. [11]

That happened in the most famous series, but it reflected the changes in the rest of the world. What happened? How did the Judy Blumes win?

The Depression probably started it. The books kept selling during that time and were not changed, but the Depression and World War II made people long for more security. The frontier ideal, dead officially at the end of the 19th century with the closing of the frontier, lingered on through the twenties. But the thirties and the forties killed it. Adults, at any rate, didn't want adventures. They wanted a stable and secure world.

Television would seem a likely target, and it certainly has contributed to the fall-off in literacy, but boys' adventure fiction was already being pablumized before TV became universal. Television just followed the same course, a decade later.

On top of the anti-controversy fifties came the socially-conscious sixties. No longer was it okay to pursue an individual goal unshared by others. Social goals became more important than personal goals. Racial equality in the school became more important than actually teaching anything. Universal education, which late in the 19th century created the vast market for these books, helped degrade them in the end as "universal" gave way to "identical," and education was aimed at the lowest common denominator.

Where is this leading us? A recent issue of *Time* got it right. The change has made us "a nation of crybabies," [12] a nation of people who never pin responsibility for what happens to them where it belongs: on themselves. We have created a nation of degraded people who are teaching the next generation an even lower and more degraded sense of value. We say that nothing you do is your fault, and wonder why joggers are beaten and raped in Central Park. We believe "if it feels good, do it," and wonder why 40,000 people a year die of AIDS.

Not all is yet lost. People have begun to notice that something is badly wrong. The August 5, 1991 edition of

The implicit or explicit world view of nearly all pre-1950 boys' literature is clear: The world is outside of you, not inside. The world is important. The world is malleable. Learning how to do things is important. What you do with knowledge matters. Actions have consequences.

People, for example, has an article called "Hardy Once Again," about Phil Zuckerman and his Applewood Books. Zuckerman bought the rights from Simon and Schuster (who had previously bought the Stratemeyer Syndicate) and Applewood Books has reissued the first three Hardy Boys and the first three Nancy Drews complete with the original cover art.[13]

Curiously, the idea of proactivity — that the world is moldable to human will, and worth molding — survives nearly intact in two related areas of juvenile literature: Fantasy, and Science Fiction. On the fantasy side, Madeleine L'Engle, C.S. Lewis, and Susan Cooper all wrote or still write good stories solidly in the old tradition. On the science fiction side are L'Engle again, Robert Heinlein, and a number of less known writers, including Barbara Bartholomew, author of the Time Keeper trilogy. In all of these works there are problems galore for people to overcome, many of them deep within the person himself, but they are incidental to the real goals to be accomplished. This sense of values, probably more than the technology, helps explain why the Radio Boys sound to us so much like science fiction. The old sense of wonder and of progress remains.

Today, responsible storytelling has retreated to a corner, but it has begun to turn and fight. Someday, it may regain the field. ❑

1 Mayne Reid, *The Boy Hunters.* (Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1852), p. 1.
2 Leslie McFarlane, *Ghost of the Hardy Boys.* (New York: Methuen/Two Continents Publications, 1976), pp. 160–161.
3 ibid. pp. 156–157.
4 Horatio Alger, Jr., *Strong and Steady.* (New York: Hurst & Company, date unknown), p. 168.
5 Percy K. Fitzhugh, *Tom Slade at Temple Camp* (Racine, Wisconsin: Whitman Publishing Co., 1917), pp. 174–175.
6 Allen Chapman, *The Radio Boys Trailing a Voice.* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1922), pp. 12–13.
7 Franklin W. Dixon, *The Missing Chums.* (New York: Grosset & Dunlap, 1928), pp. 54–56.
8 Judy Blume, *Blubber.* (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1974), p. 1.
9 ibid., p. 139.
10 ibid., back cover.
11 For a colorful account of how the author of the original passage discovered its excision, see McFarlane, op. cit., pp. 93–95.
12 Jessie Birnbaum, "Crybabies: Eternal Victims." *Time,* August 12, 1991 (cover story).
13 For a more complete discussion of the Hardy Boys series, see my "The Mystery of the Missing Detectives," *Liberty,* November 1992, pp. 69–75.

Booknotes

Heretics All — Heretics, even dead ones, who refuse to genuflect before the empire's secular saints are in big trouble. The latest guest of honor at an auto-da-fé is the director Frank Capra, who made two extraordinary films (*It's a Wonderful Life* and *Mr Deeds Goes To Town*) and several lesser but still fine pictures.

Capra was never a political hack or partisan, but he operated from this noble and heartfelt belief, spelled out in his charmingly bitter autobiography, *The Name Above the Title:* "When I see a crowd, I see a collection of free individuals: each a unique person; each a king or a queen; each a story that would fill a book; each an island of human dignity."

Capra made no secret of his politics: he was an individualist progressive along the lines of Burton K. Wheeler (the rumored model for Jefferson Smith in *Mr Smith Goes To Washington,* a film Wheeler hated). Capra detested the New Deal, as did so many of our finest artists and writers and poets, among them Robert Frost, Robinson Jeffers, Maxwell Anderson, e.e. cummings, and Edgar Lee Masters.

Frank Capra was faithful to his wife, kind to his co-workers, and he left us a rich body of work. But his latest biographer, Joseph McBride, has uncovered a secret so shocking that it has sickened and outraged book reviewers, however inured they are to the usual human depravities. McBride's discovery, revealed in ***Frank Capra: The Catastrophe of Success*** (Simon and Schuster, 1992, 512pp., $24.00), is this: Frank Capra hated Franklin D. Roosevelt!

He voted against Saint Franklin four times. He and Adolphe Menjou "used to get together and excoriate FDR," whom Capra thought was a "dictator." Unlike FDR, who "managed to transcend the selfishness of his privilege," the Sicilian immigrant Capra cherished America for the opportunity it provided; he was guilty of the "reactionary idealization of small-town America." And if that weren't enough, "with his general lack of intellectual sophistication . . . Capra never progressed beyond a superficial understanding of Marxism. His deep-seated emotional bias against collectivism and in favor of rugged individualism" kept him from a proper appreciation of the New Deal. Etcetera.

H.L Mencken's reputation survived the recent fracas over his Roosevelt-hatred, and so will Frank Capra's. But until our forbears get the biographers they deserve — independent men and women who understand that there used to be real debate in this country, and that most artists are iconoclasts averse to sucking up to the powerful — the posthumous slander of great Americans will continue. —Bill Kauffman

Spontaneous Life — Even as academe seems to grow more stilted and bureaucratic, fresh paths of study emerge in the cracks between the discipline walls. One of the most fascinating of these cross-fertilizations is *artificial life,* a vibrant but mostly invisible field located somewhere between computer science and biology. ***Artificial Life*** (Pantheon, 1992, 320pp., $24.00) by journalist Steven Levy, is the first comprehensive popular guide to what a-life is, where it's going, who's behind it, and what it all means.

Briefly, a-life is the artificial simulation of evolution within an entirely electronic environment. Simple rules are laid down by the programmer; from these, complex ecosystems develop and grow. Life, in this view, consists not of matter itself but of the processes that animate that matter and those processes could as well be applied to pure information in the virtual realm of computer memory as to actual stuff we can touch. Thus, for example, comes the genetic algorithm: rather than program a computer to solve a given problem, a programmer allows a program to *evolve,* in a procedure modelled after actual genetic breeding. It works, too; programs emerge that regularly outperform those specifically created to solve the task at hand.

One of the most fascinating chapters deals with the application of a-life principles to robotics. Previously, the robotic ideal was the creation of an artificial intelligence that controlled all the robot's mechanical functions, reacting in a different way to each possible stimulus. The practical result of this was a very powerful — and powerfully *slow* — robot brain that controlled the robot's every move by observing everything around it, reacting after 15 minutes or more of deliberation, then spending another quarter-hour looking around. Then new pioneers started to devise something different: small, fast mechanical creatures, each of which knows only a few tasks but all of which together learn to interact with their en-

vironment. The result is something more akin to a termite colony than a traditional artificial intelligence, but it's an improvement, or a step back. It can adjust, and learn, rather than remain helpless in the face of strange environments. It can afford to lose constituent parts, where older robot systems react cataclysmically even to moderate damage. It is, in short, a self-regulating system, with all the open-endedness and resilience that that suggests.

Or, if you would prefer, it is a spontaneous order emerging from a few general rules, rather than a planned order based on many centralized commands. There is something remarkably Hayekian about this entire enterprise; reading *Artificial Life*, stimulates a tremendous appreciation for the nature of unplanned order. One also feels the excitement of discovery and invention: the people Levy describe are pioneers doing their darndest to create something new in the inert environment that is the modern American research university.

I've barely scratched the surface of what a-life entails and haven't even begun to recount the story of how the field came to be. But why listen to me when Levy is ready to tell all? He is a skilled writer, capable of breathing life (so to speak) into both the characters that populate his book and the concepts he is explaining. The result is a thrill to read. —Jesse Walker

Fear and Loathing in Quebec

— Some Canadians seem to think the United States government is circling like a vulture waiting for the provinces of Canada to dissolve their union. This fear is groundless. Most Americans, if they think of Canada at all, are indifferent to the issue. A few Americans (some of them on staff at this magazine) oppose any such move because they see John Q. Canadian as a lily-livered milquetoast whose ancestors couldn't stick to it when the U.S. violently seceded from Britain 217 years ago. As for the U.S. government, a confidential source at the Dept. of Defense tells me that the agency (or several agencies) has investigated the possibility and decided that the only province of interest is British Columbia. (Perhaps it could be called "American Columbia," to distinguish it from the District of Columbia, which is hardly American any longer.)

With these thoughts of separatism and bad blood, I turned to ***Oh Canada! Oh Quebec!*** (Alfred A. Knopf, 1992, 271 pp., $23.00) by Mordecai Richler. It is a wonderful book. Richler, one of Canada's most famous writers, considers his native Quebec and its movement for separation with wit and a sense of humor. He shares with us conversations he overheard in Woody's Pub, his favorite watering hole in Montreal, and the Owl's Nest, his favorite pub in Magog near his vacation home. In this way we get a handle on what Canadians *really* think about the absurdities of modern-day Canada, particularly the language laws in Quebec.

The history of the language laws, which require that all advertising, public signs, and company names be exclusively in French, forms the structure of the book and provides a framework for his discussion of French-English relations. Richler sees the absurdities of the situation while making clear the sorrow and suffering that afflict all Quebecers, whatever their language. His love for Montreal is manifest and sincere. He celebrates its cultural diversity, but fears that this will change as the desire to ensure its Frenchness triumphs.

Part of his hostility to French separatism lies in its inclination to discriminate against Jews (like himself). Though I am sympathetic with him on his point, it doesn't seem to me to change the fact that French speakers have suffered for years from English speakers' paternalism and high-handedness. It is simply another wrong. —Kathleen Bradford

It's OK to Hate Everybody —

Make no mistake about it: Florence King is not nice. She is a woman who R.S.V.P.'d to a dinner invitation asking her to come only if she could refrain from smoking with: "Go fuck yourself."

In these times of cultural "healing" and social intolerance, a book attacking the feminization of America might get banned, burned, or at least suffer the disgrace of sluggish sales. It's dangerous to say: "Our feminized niceness has mired us in a soft, sickly, helpless tolerance of everything. America is the girl who can't say no, the town pump who

lets anybody have a go at her." This charge and others like it, though, found their way into print, and I say it's about time. In ***With Charity Towards None: A Fond Look At Misanthropy,*** (St. Martin's Press, 1992, 194 pp., $17.95), Florence King offers a catalogue of misanthropic literary figures, hateful American cultural figures, and all out blasts on today's America, what she dubs "The Republic of Nice."

The characters she sketches include Irving Berlin, Ty Cobb, Richard Nixon, Ambrose Bierce, Ayn Rand and others. She praises Berlin's monomania, Cobb's violence, Nixon's crotchety disdain for youth, truth and the American way, Bierce's devilishness, and Ayn Rand's ability to alienate and destroy those close to her. She attributes Rand's contributions to the welfare of mankind as compensation for her rejection of her own Judaism.

But by the time I got to the epilogue, "A Misanthrope's Garden of Verses," I had had enough. It's not that I was finally bullyragged into wanting to stick up for mankind, or that she stepped on my sore toe, or that I felt sorry for someone so consumed with hate. I was simply bored with her tone. Yes, the excesses of what passes today for liberalism and most elements of our pop-culture deserve ridicule, even hyperbolic ridicule. But King wears on the ears like fingernails on a chalkboard. Vitriolic contempt is best in smaller doses.

—Brian Krohnke

Anti-Statist SF — I would be remiss not to note a new edition of F. Paul Wilson's Prometheus Award-winning science fiction novels *Healer, Wheels Within Wheels,* and *An Enemy of the State.* These three books are combined in a hefty paperback volume under the boring title ***The LaNague Chronicles*** (Baen Books, 1992, xi + 649 pp., $5.99). Though all SF, they are not the usual in series fiction, that is, retreads of the same plot. *Healer* is space opera, *Wheels* is a thoughtful little mystery dealing with racism and political manipulation, and *Enemy* is an imaginative account of a peaceful libertarian revolution.

Wilson is not a great writer *qua* writer. His failings, however, may not derive from a lack of talent, but from a regrettable admiration for Robert Heinlein and a hopeless desire to write good horror (he is the author of a "bestseller," *The Keep,* a mediocre novel that was made into a very bad movie). If you set your sights low . . .

But the novels in this collection are enjoyable. I count them as guilty pleasures, having read each of them several times. They are certainly better than Wilson's attempts to send chills up his readers' spines, and they have a sure place on that relatively small bookshelf of explicitly libertarian science fiction. And as an added bonus, Wilson provides a short preface that offers his political "testimony"; for those who collect such things, this is an interesting one, if a bit familiar. —Timothy Virkkala

Ideas In Action — Erika Holzer's second novel, ***Eye for an Eye*** (Tor-St. Martin's Press, 1993, 251pp., $18.95), is very Aristotelian. It has a beginning, a middle, and an end. Everything in it propels the reader forward as relentlessly as a coiled spring. It proceeds inexorably toward a crashing climax. Each development is a surprise to the reader as it occurs, yet appears in retrospect as either causally or dramatically inevitable. Character and setting are there, but they are always subordinate to the plot, as Aristotle said they should be. Also very much in evidence is a fourth element, which Aristotle considered optional — *theme,* or underlying idea illustrated by the action — making *Eye for an Eye* a very Randian novel.

"That was the 'Wimp's Liberation Front' — they say they're holding Don Knotts hostage!"

It begins with the brutal and senseless murder of a young bride in Westchester county, by hoodlums from New York City. The rest of the novel is devoted to various unconventional ways (in the criminal underground) of apprehending the culprits and administering to them "just deserts." Along the way we have compelling descriptions of assorted police stations, salons of the wealthy, criminal hideouts, and most of all the pockmarked streets of the South Bronx. The theme is the responsibility of individuals for their actions (not society, not environmental influences) and the moral necessity of punishment, not for the sake of deterrence but as a matter of justice.

This brief description gives only an inadequate idea of the wild action sequences and the intense encounters of enforcers with callous criminals in the squalid and decaying streets of New York. The New York setting comes to exciting life in this novel as East Berlin did in her earlier novel, *Double Crossing.*

The action is non-stop, rat-tat-tat. If I have any criticism, it is that I would wish a more leisurely presentation of character. I want to feel that I know intimately the main personae in a drama; but so fast and incessant is the action that I sometimes have to page back to be sure that I have the characters straight. If Mrs Holzer had taken some extra pages to develop her characters, it would have enriched the novel and made us empathize more fully with them. As it is, some of the most fascinating characters strike one as a bit truncated and incomplete: we are left wanting to know more about them, and even want to stop the action for a moment to absorb the significance of the character-interactions.

But if non-stop action is what you like, you can't go wrong with this one. Even if, like me, you want more detailed character-portraits, you will find this is a riveting novel, both searing and sobering. It is rare to encounter a work of fiction that is breathlessly exciting from start to finish, and at the same time dramatizes a theme of significance and urgency. —John Hospers

Letters, *continued from page 6*

to be active in both the LP and another party." We in the Republican Liberty Caucus already see strong evidence of this. Our membership is going through the roof! Also, many LP stalwarts have recently jumped on board. I'll let the cat out of the bag: New Jersey LP Chair Mike Pierone, West Virginia LP Chair Brian Horton, and former Connecticut LP Chair Wayne Bartling have just joined officially. Also, former LP National Chair Dave Walter has agreed to serve on our Advisory Board. We believe that there is absolutely nothing wrong with being members and being active in both the LP and GOP!!

Eric Rittberg
Talahassee, Fla.

Broad Consent

Wendy McElroy ("The Unholy Alliance," February 1993) asks "After the [feminist] anti-pornography crusade, who will take a woman's consent seriously?" Two pages later she complains "20th century laws refuse to recognize rape within mariage . . ." I speak as a bachelor, but surely marriage constitutes consent to sex with one's spouse. So wouldn't the recognition of "rape within marriage" contradict McElroy's contention that women can give consent?

Andrew Lohr
Lookout Mtn, Ga.

Libertarianism and Feminism,

In reviewing my book *Reclaiming the Mainstream,* Jane Shaw ("Is Feminism Obsolete?" February 1993) poses an interesting question: should a libertarian be a feminist?

This seems to me exactly parallel to the question: should a libertarian be an environmentalist? Both social movements attract a lot of media and political attention to real social problems, that have both statist and libertarian components. I think it behooves libertarians to encourage the libertarian elements of these movements, or at least to be happy when they succeed.

The feminist movement consists of personal networks and political organizations; both call attention to real problems. On the personal side, feminist action ranges from workshops on assertiveness against sexual harassment to job information to cooperative daycare arrangements, as well as action to persuade employers to consider child care and flextime in their employee benefits packages. On the political side, feminists work against policemen who won't interfere in incidents of "domestic discord" even when confronted with bruised women and who ask women who report rape if they enjoyed it, and judges who will tell a woman to go home to the husband who beat her and "act like a grownup." Prostitutes are still criminalized; surrogate mothers are in legal jeopardy; judges are still ordering mandatory birth control for women under their jurisdiction and "in the interest of the fetus" mandating caesarian sections for women who don't want them. The right to abortion is being regulated to death. True, all of this attacks the rights of individuals. But libertarians are not initiating action in many of these areas, and feminists are. Libertarians are certainly not forming personal networks to help women's problems.

I did not write this book primarily for libertarians, I wrote to summarize the individualist history of feminism, which is too little known, and to call on this individualist heritage in mounting feminist arguments for libertarian positions on current issues like pornography, comparable worth, and social feminism. So I didn't address Jane Shaw's question, because my goal was to convince "individualists" to become more consistently libertarian. As Shaw's review states in many ways, libertarians should already be there.

Joan Kennedy Taylor
New York, N.Y.

Notes on Contributors

Chester Alan Arthur is *Liberty*'s political correspondent.

John Baden is president of the Foundation for Research on Economics and the Environment in Seattle, Washington.

Eric C. Banfield is a freelance writer living in the great Midwest.

"Baloo" is *Rex F. May* in disguise, the perpetrator of numerous cartoons appearing in *The Wall Street Journal* and elsewhere.

Gunnar Bergstrom, the cartoonist, does not have an interesting enough life to have a bio right now.

Kathleen Bradford is copy editor of *Liberty.*

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Douglas Casey is the author of the best-selling investment book of all time, *Investing in Crisis.*

Stephen Cox is Professor of Literature at the University of California, San Diego. His most recent book is *Love and Logic: The Evolution of Blake's Thought.*

Brian Doherty is a journalist in Washington, D.C.

Scott Gardner is a landlords' rights advocate living in the Big, Rotten Apple, and author of *Live Rent-Free for Life!*

James Gill, the cartoonist, is an American living in Europe.

John Hospers is the author of numerous philosophical writings, including *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* and *Understanding the Arts.*

Bill Kauffman is a writer-in-exile in Elba, N.Y. He is the author of a novel, *Every Man a King.*

Brian Krohnke is *Liberty*'s outgoing editorial assistant.

William P. Moulton used to be an Aristotelian, but is now merely peripatetic.

Sheldon Richman is Senior Editor of the Cato Institute.

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Susan J. Rutter is an editorial assistant at *Liberty.*

Jane S. Shaw is a Senior Associate of the Political Economy Research Center in Bozeman, Montana.

Mark Skousen is an investment advisor, economist, and author of *The Structure of Production* and *Economics on Trial.*

Timothy Virkkala is assistant editor of *Liberty.*

Jeff Walker is a Canadian journalist.

Jesse Walker works above board in Ann Arbor, Michigan.

Terra Incognita

New Delhi, India

Progressive solution to traffic problems in the world's largest democracy, as reported by the Associated Press:

> "We suffer from the holy cow syndrome," says New Delhi's chief of traffic police. Because the cow is sacred to Hindus, most people won't do anything to get them out of the roads. So, the city employs 120 animal catchers to chase them, rope them, and haul them out of town, and out of traffic.

Palo Alto, Calif.

Marian Wright Edelman, President of the Children's Defense Fund, sets the priorities for the nation's youth, as reported by the San Jose *Mercury News*:

> At the commencement address at Stanford University, Marian Edelman beseeched graduates to commit themselves to community service and to "redefine success in America in the 1990s." In between bursts of applause she asserted that "service is the rent each of us pays for living — the very purpose of life, and not something you do in your spare time or after you have reached your personal goals."

Charleston, S.C.

Musical interpretation in the Palmetto State, as reported by the Associated Press:

> In response to a study of his college's race relations, President Claudius Watts of The Citadel military college ordered the school's band to play "Dixie" at football games in a manner that "will not be taunting."

Manila, Philippines

Advance in Moral Science, as reported by the Associated Press:

> Members of a cult here tied up traffic for hours yesterday by deflating the tires of cars, trucks, and buses stopped in traffic. The cult's leader said this was "God's way of stopping bad deeds."

Berlin

Interesting observation by the Hon. Joseph P. Kennedy II, Congressperson from Massachusetts, as reported in the Seattle *Times*:

> In a speech at John F. Kennedy High School in Berlin, Rep. Joseph P. Kennedy II told students, "For some reason, everybody looks down on foreigners and doesn't consider them to be citizens. They aren't foreigners, they're your people. I'm a foreigner."

Providence, R.I.

Interesting idea of tribal traditions, as reported in the Providence *Journal Bulletin*:

> George H. Hopkins, Chief Sachem of the Narragansett Indian Tribe, argues that money generated by its gambling arena on the reservation should be used to "do the things governments do for their people — provide health care, housing, social services, child welfare, adult education, employment assistance."

U.S.A.

Cruel and unusual punishment returns to the schools, as reported by *Educational Reporter*:

> Teacher Bruce Janu sentences misbehaving pupils to the Frank Sinatra Detention Club, where they are forced to listen to Sinatra tapes. He has threatened repeat offenders with Tony Bennett and Mel Torme.

Oakland, Calif.

New form of disability, as reported by the San Jose *Mercury News*:

> Judge Ruth M. Friedman has ruled that the Department of Motor Vehicles may not dock the pay of an employee for time missed at work, because the employee is a mother of five, afflicted with "inadequate child care and inadequate public transportation" which are "more properly characterized as social problems rather than personal problems."
>
> The case involves Leshbia Morones, a mother of five whose husband also works, and who was docked for 10.1 hours pay for being late 51 times during a 6 month period. Ms Morones argued, "It's just very, very stressful to have to take care of five kids before going to work. It seems unfair for this agency not to take into consideration human things."'If there is unexpected traffic, or she has car trouble, she will be late," Judge Friedman ruled.

Milwaukee

Efficient use of Human Resources in America's Dairyland, as reported by the Milwaukee *Journal*:

> On November 17, the Milwaukee County Department of Human Resources sent a memo to every county employee, announcing examinations "for the positions listed below." Below this heading: "No openings."

Brawley, Calif.

Advance in medical care in southern California, as reported by Lynn Elber of the *Associated Press*:

> The People's Health Clinic has announced a policy that employees with hickeys will be sent home without pay.

Washington, D.C.

Further evidence that government is a wise shepherd of its assets, as reported by the *National Taxpayers Union*:

> 84-year-old Carl Albert, whose 6-year term as Speaker of the House ended 14 years ago, is still paid $200,000 per year to help "wrap up his Congressional business."

Menomonee Falls, Wisc.

How civil seizure laws fight organized crime, as reported by the Associated Press:

> The Drug Enforcement Agency is considering a civil seizure of the Salvation Army's Santa suits, kettles and bells, after police arrested one of its bell ringers selling a small amount of marijuana.

Olympia, Wash.

The lengths a public servant will go to avoid adding new government regulation, as reported in the Seattle *Times*:

> In response to a query about new health care legislation, Washington Governor Booth Gardner responded, "We've literally searched the globe, but we haven't found anything that works except government regulation."

Ithaca, N.Y.

Perseverance pays in the Empire State, from the Associated Press:

> In less than five hours, a 19 year-old Ithaca woman robbed the same convenience store three times.

(Readers are invited to forward newsclippings or other items for publication in *Terra Incognita.*)

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continued from back cover

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- "P.C. or B.S.?" by Meredith McGhan
- "Acid Rain and the Corrosion of Science," by Edward C. Krug
- "Who Really Wrote *Little House on the Prairie?*" by William Holtz

Plus writing by Ross Overbeek, Karl Hess, Sheldon Richman, Jane Shaw, Lawrence White, Randal O'Toole and others; and an interview with Pat Buchanan. (72 pages)

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- "Hong Kong: Where Everyone Has a Job," by Mark Tier
- "Divorce, Czechoslovak Style," by Vojtech Cepl and Ron Lipp

Plus writing by Eric Banfield, Karl Hess, David Horowitz, Daniel Klein and others; and fiction by J. Orlin Grabbe. (72 pages)

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