

Liberty

May 1989

Vol 2, No 5

Four Dollars

Election Returns:
How the Media
Conspire to
Keep Your Vote
from Counting

Man, Nature, and State:
Free market slogans are not enough
by Karl Hess, Jr

Anti-Imperialism on the Right
by Bobby Taylor

The Fires of Yellowstone
by Jane S. Shaw

Ayn Rand: The Voice of Bitterness
by Justin Raimondo

Existentialism and Liberty
by David Gordon

Plus: *Murray Rothbard* on Public Choice,
Stephen Cox on Teddy at Chappaquiddick,
Phillip Salin on Novels of Achievement,
and a new short story by *Jeffrey Olson*.

"A bean in Liberty is better than a comfit in prison" – George Herbert

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Liberty

R. W. Bradford

publisher & editor

Stephen Cox

Karl Hess

Murray N. Rothbard

David Ramsay Steele

senior editors

Douglas Casey

Mike Holmes

John Hospers

Rex F. May

Ross Overbeek

Sheldon Richman

Jane S. Shaw

Ethan O. Waters

contributing editors

Timothy Virkkala

assistant editor

Kathleen Bradford

copy editor

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Letters

Is There a Maverick in the House?

Chester Alan Arthur ("High Noon for the Libertarian Party," Jan. 1989) mentions only advantages for LPers and disadvantages for libertarian-Republicans when, in fact, the advantages and disadvantages generally apply equally to candidates of any Party. Any elected politician of any Party can be as much of a political maverick as he chooses to be. If he's the only libertarian legislator in a legislative body, he won't be able to defeat or pass many laws and will probably cast a lot of single dissenting votes. But at least he will be able to bring the libertarian viewpoint into the debates on the floor of the House. And that's equally true whether he's a Libertarian or a Republican.

Arthur mentions the sad case of libertarian-Republican Steve Symms who has drifted toward conservatism. This proves nothing: Ron Paul, also a libertarian Republican, evolved in the opposite direction. A drift toward conservatism is not inevitable.

Arthur concludes: "As LP candidates they cannot be elected; as Republicans they cannot be libertarians." The first part is largely correct as 16 years experience shows. But the second part is *not yet proven*. We have one bad example in Steve Symms and one good example in Ron Paul. That leaves the question up in the air. There have not yet been a sufficient number of libertarians running as Republicans (or Democrats, for that matter) for us to know how most would turn out. Why not try that for the next 16 years—or at least for a few years—and see what happens?

Jim Stumm
Buffalo, N.Y.

Marketing the Free Market

"Freedom" that is obtained through the political process is a public good because everyone benefits from the Party's efforts, whether they had anything to do with achieving that result or not.

The lack of professional marketing expertise is really hurting would-be libertarian politicians. For example, the current members of the Party comprise a large mailing list that could be an excellent market for freedom-oriented products,

such as books on how to save money on your taxes or how to protect yourself from pollution without depending on the EPA, etc. etc.

One LP strategy that is not being used is that of buying Congressmen. The LP could set itself up as a lobby, like so many other vested interests do, and grease a few of the right hands . . . In other words, pay for freedom directly like so many organizations do. Why expect these "honorable" Congressmen to give it away free?

The next possibility is to start selling favors right now, without waiting for election. You can start cheap and go from there. It will be entirely ethical to sell special interest groups protection from this or that coercive law. Or you can mention their problems in your speeches for a small "donation."

Incidentally, we don't call ourselves libertarians because that word has been so badly abused. We consider ourselves uncompromising advocates of free markets. It is our fond wish that no political party ever call itself the Free Market Party. We disagree with one recent writer who declared that the LP had put the word "libertarian" on the map. It would be closer to the truth to say that it had put the word "Party" on the map.

Sandy Shaw
Durk Pearson
Los Angeles, Calif.

Getting the Couch Potato Vote

It would seem fairly obvious to anyone who reads R.W. Bradford's "TV Advertising and Minor Party Campaigns" (Jan. 1989) that the next Libertarian Party candidate should stay home. Why go through the tiring, antiquated, and financially wasteful ordeal of a nationwide whistlestop-style campaign (which is largely ignored by national and local TV and everyone else) when so many people can be reached through the purchase of TV time?

Libertarians must stop speaking to themselves and speak to Mr and Mrs Average American where they sit: at home on the couch. I, for one, would be much more inclined to donate to such a worthwhile campaign, and I am sure others would too, especially if we knew that

our money would just go towards the purchase of TV time, the making of ads and nothing else.

One more thing: the "Libertarians" who voted for Bush and Dukakis remind me of the "vegetarians" who just eat fish and chicken.

Bosco Hurn
Palm Beach, Fla.

A Vote for Williams

I strongly second the Libertarian Party nomination (okay, the suggestion) of Walter Williams for President of the United States in 1992 ("Who votes for third party candidates?" March 1989)! Dr. Williams knows this nation's economy, including what the government won't tell us. Like Ron Paul, Williams' emphasis is on individual liberty, and he knows the U.S. government was never meant to be used as a force for social control.

Scott Garfinkel
Brookline, Mass.

Rabbit Bites Duck

I am, as I have confessed, joking *and* serious. Because he is neither, David Ramsay Steele ("The Abolition of Breathing," March 1989) is fated never to understand me. *Liberty* sent a duck to do a rabbit's job. Metaphor, irony, and absurdity play—and I do mean *play*—a part in my expression which is, for Steele, at best a source of confusion, at worst a pretext for defamation.

Steele flubs my discursive definition of work. Work is activity elicited by extrinsic inducements like money or violence. And work, unlike play, is done as a means to some output, not for its intrinsic satisfaction. Whether or not these propositions have the same *sense* (meaning) they have, in Frege's terminology, the same *reference*.


I am at a loss whether Steele's bungle of my remarks on hunter-gatherers is deliberate distortion or ideologically-induced incomprehension. I have never advocated a general return to this way of life, if only because work as we know it, with its division of labor, has disabled most of us from taking up their life of variegated *skilled play*. I quote Adam Smith in support of my view that the division of labor, in increasing the wealth of nations, diminishes the human personality. As Fredy Perlman put it, where once we were much but had little, now most of us have much but are little. But even that does work too much credit.

continued on page 6

“I believe in only one thing and that thing is human liberty...I am against any man and any organization which seeks to limit or deny that freedom.”



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Hunter-gathers inform our understanding, and embarrass Steele, in two ways. First, they are the only known viable stateless societies. Second, they do not, except in occasional emergency circumstances, *work* in any sense I use the word. Steele, with unintended humor, explains why hunter-gathers loaf most of the time: "If you have one animal carcass to keep you going for the next week or two, it's a waste of effort to get another one, and what else is there to do but swap stories?" The poor devils are *too rich to work*. Cruelly denied the opportunity to accumulate capital, what else is there for the benighted savages to do but create, converse, dance, sing, and feast?

No (to clear up a detail) I am not in favor of the abolition of breathing. If Steele is concerned about breathing he should remonstrate not with me but with the owners of the smokestacks which his mentrix Ayn Rand, ostensibly an atheist, says she "worshipped." I worship nothing, but I'd even rather worship God than a *smokestack*.

Bob Black
Albany, N.Y.

Soul Searching About Abortion

In the current, continuing abortion debate, a fetus is always considered a victim. I disagree.

If a spirit entity is separate from a physical body, when does it join the fetus or newborn . . . and how much choice does it have regarding the circumstances—and timing . . . and what effect does this responsibility possibly have on an abortion debate?

One primary source on this theory is Helen Wambach's hypnosis research, *Life Before Life* (1979): "The soul usually enters the body near birth, and has a choice of which fetus to enter. If one fetus is aborted, it is possible to choose another. In some cases, the soul who will occupy the fetus, is in contact with the soul of the mother, and can influence her decision

Letters Policy

We invite readers to comment on articles that have appeared in *Liberty*. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity. All letters are assumed to be intended for publication unless otherwise stated. Succinct, typewritten letters are preferred. Please include your phone number so that we can verify your identity.

regarding abortion."

stormy Mon
Denver, Colo.

Existence Exists, Slavery Enslaves

In "The Absurdity of Alienable Rights" (Jan. 1989), Sheldon Richman argues that it is impossible to sell oneself into slavery. I agree, given Mr. Richman's definition of a slave: "one who belongs—mind and body—to his master."

But his definition is peculiar since it defines all actual slavery out of existence.

Michael R. Edelstein
Kingston, N.Y.

The Absurdity of Philosophy

In two pages Richman demonstrates conclusively that slavery cannot exist. All of us who know that slavery does exist and has existed and is a blight on our own history know also that Richman's article is absurd. We don't have to be philosophers to know that; and if philosophy makes one think that Richman's article is *not* absurd, then philosophy is absurd. Another interpretation of Richman's argument is that a slave is not a person; and that notion has sometimes been used as justification for slavery. But slavery exists whether or not slaves are people. We can own dogs and pigs and cows. These creatures have wills and can decide whether or not to obey their masters; witness the purported behavior of mules.

Miff Perstein
Sedona, Ariz.

Chain Reaction

As a new subscriber to *Liberty*, I just received Murray Rothbard's "The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult." Unlike Frank Bubba (Letters, Jan. 1989), I do not find the monograph offensive. Truth never is.

In 1967 and 1968, I attended a few courses at the NBI, along with a social event. The courses were characterized by little significant discussion except questions directed at clarifications. Such one-way flows seemed strange for a gathering of "intellectuals," even granting some were young and others older—and perhaps wiser. No alternative opinions were ever offered. But it was the social event that really surprised me. Having just come from India, I had expected a gay and friendly affair, seeing that everyone was American. But most participants were aloof, displaying an air of enlightened detachment. Cheerful talk was confined to a few small groups only. I figured they must be an "In" crowd.

Now, belatedly, I learn they were mostly members of the Blumenthal family with some names changed for the sake of symbolism.

Barbara Branden's recent book *The Passion of Ayn Rand* clarifies many of the problems I had with the Objectivists. Seeing what went on, secrecy was certainly of the utmost importance, but the right to privacy cannot excuse everything. To present a facade that is only partly true is inconsistent with the philosophy Objectivists propound—and sell. It is clear the "Inner Circle" knew everything, but maintained a conspiracy of silence.

It also struck me how everyone in that circle was a chain smoker. Surely, these informed people were aware of smoking's hazards. But who would have thought it was a ritual carried too far? From what I can piece together, Ayn Rand died of lung cancer. In that sense, she smoked herself to death. Objectivists despise drug addicts, yet it is undeniable that smoking is a drug addiction, an addiction to the drug nicotine. If one's highest value is one's life, as the Objectivists and I both believe it should be, they have a strange way of showing their conviction.

Yes, we need more people like Murray Rothbard. Perhaps he exaggerates a little, but he isn't far from the truth, and he's honest, which goes far with me.

Gurdip S. Sidhu, M.D.
Herrington Park, N.J.

No More Liberty

Cancel my subscription to *Liberty immediately*. I don't want another issue. Reason? That diatribe against Ronald Reagan by Murray Rothbard ("Ronald Reagan: An Autopsy," March 1989) was the most *disgusting thing* I've ever read.

It's *not* that I'm a Reagan fan but there was no reason whatsoever to refer to Mr. Reagan as "the old coot," "the bastard," "Ronny," among other things.

R.G. Williams
New Haven, Conn.

Kudos for Murray!

Though I have been a critic of Murray Rothbard from time to time, I think his greatest article to date is "Ronald Reagan: An Autopsy." It was pure Rothbardian *excellence*!

Bruce Smith
Douglas, Mich.

Ike Effects

The article "What If Everything We Know About Safety Is Wrong" (John Semmens and Dianne Kresich, March

continued on page 67

Reflections

Calling Calvin Coolidge — My deepest fears have been confirmed. According to *Newsweek*, George Bush is a Jimmy Carter-type workaholic. One Bush aide was quoted as saying, "He's so excited to be president. He just loves it!"

Bush has taken to 14-hour workdays and working weekends, carrying out a rigorous schedule of meetings with officials and high-level briefings. After eight years of waiting in the wings, he is eager to sit in the driver's seat and gun the engines of state full-throttle.

The last president who practiced the political version of the labor theory of value was the unlamented Jimmy Carter. As we all remember, the harder he worked the more he screwed things up. At least Ronald Reagan had the virtue of being lazy. Maybe it was a deep-seated libertarian streak which prompted his afternoon naps and long weekends; maybe he knew that despite the propaganda to the contrary, the president doesn't really "run" the country and that sound governance, a la Calvin Coolidge, is best achieved by doing nothing at all.

It looks as if we're in for another round of busy-body meddling by another leader who has already let the trappings of power and the buzzings of imperial flatterers go to his head.

With the laid back Gipser retired in California and Mr 14-Hour Day making mischief in the White House, the nation had better prepare itself for difficult times.

—MH

The shape of things to come — The new Bush administration is off to a grand start. Treasury Secretary Nicholas Brady, who last year advocated new regulations on the stock market, now wants limits on the junk bonds used to finance the takeover of corporations. He reportedly wants the tax-deduction for interest paid on the bonds to be restricted. Although he says he'd prefer that the double taxation of corporate dividends be ended, he is concerned about the "revenue problems" that would result. So he seems to favor reducing the tax deduction, which in turn will limit leveraged buyouts, sheltering inefficient managers from the threat of takeovers.

Meanwhile, Bush's choice for commerce secretary, Robert Mossbacher, promised that he will retaliate against countries that fail to open their markets to American exports.

And so it goes.

—SLR

Mencken, Nock and Public Choice — H. L. Mencken once wrote that the art of George Bernard Shaw consisted of stating the obvious in terms of the scandalous. Mencken's observation came to mind when I read Murray Rothbard's suggestion ("Public Choice: A Misshapen Tool," page 20) that the key insight of the Public Choice school had been noted by Albert Jay Nock years earlier, only "Nock's analysis was far more trenchant, radical, and libertarian, and was written in far more lucid and scintillating English prose." It occurred to me that perhaps the real insight of the Public Choice

economists was to state the scandalous in terms of the obvious—or at any rate, to translate it into the academic vernacular, spice it up with a few mathematical formulae to impress the intelligentsia, and eliminate from it any moral denunciations, so popular with libertarians.

I do not intend to trivialize the accomplishments of the Public Choice school, whose thinking I admire. They have taken the observations that lay in Nock and Oppenheimer and in the more-or-less determinist historical methodology of Beard and developed them into a more comprehensive way of understanding social change, and then expanded their theory in truly provocative and unexpected directions. Of course, Buchanan, Tullock & Co have a major advantage over Nock, Oppenheimer & Co: they live under a much more comprehensive state and concomitantly have far more more self-aggrandizing bureaucrats to observe than did their forebears.

Even so, I wonder how Mencken would have reacted to Public Choice theory. I suspect he may have observed that it has little to say that wasn't obvious to Mencken's own father on the day in 1884 when he made a \$50 gift to his local alderman to keep the city from hassling him about the sign in front of his cigar factory.

—RWB

Society as addict — It is high time that someone raise his voice in protest: the American public is increasingly being treated as one vast outpatient clinic. It's as if heroic libertarian psychiatrist Thomas Szasz had never written. Szasz has partially won his great battle against compulsory commitment for "mental illness"; but his lifetime of writing apparently has made no dent in the larger campaign to stop the odious medicalization of all life's problems.

All around us we are assaulted by medical news and proffered medical treatment. It is perfectly natural to have one cable TV channel—Lifetime Cable—devoted solely to medical news and discussion; surely, this topic is just as legitimate for specialized information as is finance or the weather. But the problem is that virtually *all* news has been medicalized. Two minutes on the latest problem in Paraguay are invariably followed by far more time on the latest heart, lung, or whatever medical report. Despite the alleged glories of modern medicine, new dread diseases are being discovered nearly every day, and pressure groups devoted to these new ailments never cease to clamor for our attention. ("Send funds immediately to combat the heart-break of XYZ, which strikes one American every five and a half days!")

Far worse is that all of life has been turned into a medical problem. It used to be that babyhood, adolescence and old age were singled out for the administration of medical therapy; then, a few years ago, in her best-selling work, *Passages*, Gail Sheehy brought a Great Leap Forward to this scientific discipline by discovering an allegedly grave crisis for every two or three years of one's life. In addition to the so-called "midlife cri-

sis," which had been in vogue for a decade or so, Sheehy supplied an unending series of grim crises; no sooner did one miraculously get past the "late-twenties crisis" than one was plunged headlong into the dread "early-thirties crisis," and so on, until presumably one was happy to drop dead, at long last, from sheer exhaustion.

The worst aspect of this medicalizing of society has been the universalization of the concept of "addiction." Once a plausible description of the strictly physiological consequences of drugs, the concept got expanded to "psychological addiction," and since then the fat has been in the fire. It has now come to the point where "addiction" is a smear term for anything you or I like and would hate like hell to give up. So there are alcohol, tobacco, work, sex, and love "addicts" as well as addicts to a zillion other activities. All this means that if you are attached or

radical and Dump the Helpers?

—MNR

Blushing Hoosiers — Quick: name a great political leader from Indiana. You have to be quicker than that. Give up? Okay, I know of one—Gene Debs, from Terre Haute. And that was quite a while ago. Indiana ought to be able to do better than that. It looks small on the map, but there's at least five million people here, and a statesman or two ought to turn up in a crowd like that every now and then.

But Debs is it. After him, I guess the most prominent is Wendell Wilkie, and I think his fame comes more from alliteration than from statesmanship. The last time Indiana got anywhere near the Presidency was back when Thomas Marshall was Veep. He apparently had every reason to take over, since Wilson was flat on his back and incapable of functioning as President, but being your typical take-charge Indiana politician, Marshall let Mrs. Wilson run the country while he spent his time making up cutesy quotes about five-cent cigars.

Right now, of course, Indiana is best-known politically for being sort of a big playpen for embryonic Vice-Presidents (no wonder he's against abortion) and even greener governors.

No, Indiana had better try to forget its role in politics if it's to have any self-esteem at all. Indiana, I guess, is a lot like Russia, and should try to emphasize its cultural contributions—you know, Theodore Dreiser, James Whitcomb Riley, Kurt Vonnegut, Lew Wallace, Philip Farmer.

Yes, we Hoosiers sure envy you people from the other forty-nine, who have such statesmen as Barry Goldwater and . . . and . . . hmm. Maybe we shouldn't feel so embarrassed after all.

—RFM

The deer and the antelope can play, but free markets are out of the question — One

of the big controversies in Montana right now is whether landowners should be allowed to charge fees for hunting on private land. Most people concede that landowners have a right to control access—but a lot of hunters are outraged at the idea that landowners will actually keep them out unless they pay. They contend that fee hunting is going to make most Montanans "second-class citizens," as landowners cater to wealthy hunters from Texas, New York, and California. Says a Montana legislator: "We are turning hunting more and more into a rich man's sport."

Fee hunting is evolving because the state owns and manages wildlife and state ownership has led to problems. In the view of some, there are too many hunters and too little game (especially antlered elk and other kinds of trophy animals) on public land. Even though Montana is still sparsely populated (5.6 people per square mile) the pressure on game can be severe because the vast amounts of public land are essentially a common pool.

Hunters have an incentive to kill as many animals as possible and no individual has a strong incentive to protect them the way an owner would. On the ranchers' side, a spur to fee hunting is that ranchers' crops and forage are feeding elk and deer rather than their livestock. (That can cost thousands of dollars a year.)

A market in hunting, like markets everywhere, can correct some of the problems created by state ownership. While landowners can't sell or lease the right to hunt, they can lease the right to access. Their prices range from \$10 a day to hunt deer or upland birds to \$15,000 for a fully guided hunt for trophy bull

The once-plausible concept of addiction got expanded to "psychological addiction," and since then the fat has been in the fire. "Addiction" has become a smear term for anything you or I like and would hate like hell to give up. Now there are alcohol, tobacco, work, sex, and love "addicts."

devoted to any particular person or activity, then this attachment is "addictive" and you become duty-bound to give it up. Not only that: the latest wrinkle holds that if you have any sort of close relation with anyone whom these scolds and busybodies claim to be "addicted," then you too automatically become a "co-dependent" and at least equally addictive as the culprit/outpatient you are in a relationship with. Recently I came across paperbacks with screeching headlines: *How to Cure the Disease of Codependency* and even, *Society is an Addict*.

Is everything then hopeless? Oh no, things may be grim, but for the hawkers of the medical paradigm, there is a way out, albeit a painful and expensive one. Aid is available from the massed legions of those who like to call themselves "helping" or "caring" professionals. For every ten of us outpatient addicts there are one or more "helpers" or "caregivers" ready to fleece us of our dollars and our self-respect. Methinks the only "addiction" we are really suffering from, and from which we are in desperate need of help, is our accelerating dependency upon the medical model and its assiduous promoters, the helping professionals.

You see, getting rid of one's "addiction" on one's own can never work, according to our self-appointed Helpers. Recently I had a conversation with two shrinks who are experts in alcoholism. One said that her ex-husband "is" an alcoholic, even though he had successfully carried through his own decision to quit drinking at the age of 50. "Oh, he's a 'dry' alcoholic—they're the worst." "But," I asked, "how can he be a terrible alcoholic if he's quit drinking?" "That's because he refuses to follow the Eleven Steps (of Alcoholics Anonymous)." I'm not sure the number was Eleven, but you get the picture. The whole world is an addict, and the only way out is to surrender our souls to our Helpers. Since, according to all these people, the addiction problem is getting steadily worse, this seems to indicate that we should try something new and different: so why not get really

elk. Between these two are a wide range of options for hunting and other recreation.

Fee hunting shows signs of making both buyers and sellers better off. Of course, libertarians concerned about the rights of the animals themselves might feel that they are excluded from this improvement. But if it is better for more animals to live and to live longer on the average, fee hunting makes them, too, better off. Landowners have an incentive to increase the quantity and longevity of game to attract more hunters or higher fees or both. Deseret Ranch, a large ranch in Utah that has had fee hunting for several years, increased its elk herd so substantially that it has transplanted over 600 elk to public lands throughout the state.

If sportsmen didn't benefit, fee hunting wouldn't occur. Terry Anderson, one of my colleagues at the Political Economy Research Center (PERC) and an avid sportsman, tells about sitting on the plane next to a Montana consulting engineer who was vociferously criticizing fee hunting. When Terry described his fee hunting arrangement and the black bear he killed with a bow and arrow (biggest in the state that year), plus the five elk killed by other members, and the lack of hunting pressure on wildlife, the outspoken advocate of public hunting changed his tune. Well before the airplane landed, the fellow gave Terry his business card and said, "When you have an opening, let me know." —JSS

What's in a name? — Facts are stubborn things, as somebody said awhile back, but the problem with facts is that they're usually described with words, which are worse than stubborn.

What words shall we use to represent the two sides of the abortion controversy? Up until I was straightened out by a friend, I always used "anti-abortion" and "pro-abortion." They seemed symmetrical to me. But my friend pointed out that "pro-abortion" misrepresented a lot of people who were actually against abortion, but who were still more against abortion laws. She said I should use "pro-choice." I've been thinking about that one.

Offhand, it sounds good. It's certainly more accurate than "pro-abortion." But what about the people who indeed are pro-abortion? They invariably rank themselves with the anti-abortion people, and including people who advocate abortion for reasons of eugenics, racism, overpopulation-phobia, or other social-engineering purposes under the term "pro-choice" seems a little namby-pamby. I don't think we've got a good word for this yet.

Indeed, the abortion question bristles with insidious words. A favorite of mine is "parasite." The pro-choicers (I'll use it for the time being), or many of them, are fond of maintaining that a fetus is a parasite in a woman's body. Folks, that is a crummy way to use the English language. If we're going to loosen up the term "parasite" that much, we could also say that the cerebral cortex is a parasite in a woman's body, right? It doesn't really contribute anything and is always getting the rest of the body into trouble. "Parasite," in anything other than its strict scientific usage, is Marxist drivel-jargon, and they can keep it.

Not to let the anti-abortionists or anti-choicers or whatever off the hook here, though, let's remember how so many of them like to refer to "baby-killing." Now, this is a poser. No, fetuses aren't babies, any more than they're parasites. True, as time goes on, they get closer and closer to being babies, but, being as

scientific as we can, it's dirty pool and bad language-usage to say "baby-killing" unless it's meant literally.

But, as before, I'm not all that crazy about the popular alternative term from the other side of the dispute—"termination of pregnancy." That makes it all sound cozily non-violent, like deciding to part your hair on the other side for a change.

No, the abortion problem—maybe more of a problem for libertarians than for anybody else, given our desire to be honest and consistent—is tough enough as it is without misusing words to make it tougher. —RFM

Heavy message — On your cable music station, watch for black heavy-metal group Living Colour and the video for its song "Cult of Personality" (from the album *Vivid*). The video shows Gandhi, Stalin, FDR, JFK, and others, with the obvious intention of reproving political hero-worship. The song says, "You don't need to follow me, / Only you can set you free." —SC

Taking the oath — Where do people get the idea that libertarianism is a narrow ethical doctrine that requires an absolute promise never under any circumstances to initiate the use of force, even in the most trivial way? Why do they find it necessary to define libertarianism in such a priggish fashion?

Am I the only person troubled that such an important spokesman for libertarianism as David Bergland would exclude from the movement such an illustrious libertarian intellectual as Ludwig von Mises, simply because Mises did not agree with the Libertarian Party's narrow definition of libertarian?

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So far as Bergland is concerned, anyone who declines to swear an oath that he does "not believe in or advocate the initiation of force as a means of achieving political or social goals" should be excluded from the Libertarian Party. He says that there are only "four or five" people who otherwise qualify as libertarians but who would not sign the oath; their "numbers are (1) minuscule, and (2) who cares?" (*Liberty*, January 1989)

Apparently a majority of Libertarian Party members agree; they have beat back several efforts to repeal or revise the oath. This peculiar criterion of libertarianism is not exclusive to the Libertarian Party. For example, anarcho-capitalist science-fiction writer (and LP critic) L. Neil Smith offers the following definition in an advertisement for a libertarian organization:

"A LIBERTARIAN is a person who believes that no one has the right, under any circumstances, to initiate force against another human being, or to advocate or delegate its initiation. Those who act consistently with this principle are Libertarians, whether they realize it or not. Those who fail to act consistently with it are not Libertarians, regardless of what they may claim."

Well, I have news for David Bergland, L. Neil Smith, and others like them. At least five of the editors of this periodical, including me, cannot in candor sign the LP's "loyalty oath" despite the fact that we consider ourselves libertarians.

The poll of *Liberty's* readers ("The Liberty Poll," *Liberty*, July 1988) posed the following question:

"Suppose that a parent of a newborn baby places it in front of a picture window and sells tickets to anyone wishing to observe the child starve to death. He makes it clear that the child is free to leave at any time, but that anyone crossing his lawn will be viewed as trespassing. Would you cross the lawn to help the child?"

Crossing the lawn to help the child, thereby trespassing on the parent's property, clearly is "an initiation of force as a means of achieving a social end." Nevertheless, fully 89% of respondents said that they would help the child. Are all these people to be excluded from the Libertarian Party?

What about the 98% of the respondents to the poll who claimed they would rather trespass than face certain death? Or the people who agree with virtually every policy proscription of the Libertarian Party, but who are unwilling to agree to its categorical version of the non-aggression principle?

These numbers are not "minuscule." I care about the fact that a lot of people (me included) are barred from the Libertarian Party, or encouraged (officially or unofficially) to sign the oath anyway, despite our disagreement.

When I showed this Reflection to a friend, he said that some readers might get the idea that I favor aggression as a social principle, and encouraged me to write a paragraph or two to dispel this notion. So here goes.

I am convinced that the non-aggression principle is fundamental to the whole idea of society. But I object to its being cast as a categorical imperative. No, stronger words are necessary: I resent its being used as magic potion to provide libertarian solutions to all social problems.

—EOW

The crime and punishment of Ted Bundy

— One of the more peculiar conservative arguments for capital punishment runs as follows: we should insist on capital punishment because only in this way can we uphold the "awesome dignity of the law." Like so many conservative arguments, it approaches the essential point, but then veers off in the wrong direction. What is so important about the death penalty for the crime of murder is that it upholds the *dignity of the victim*. The law reasserts this dignity by reflecting the heinousness of the criminal's act in the punishment itself. In doing so, the law

gains dignity, but that is not what is important. What matters is that the dignity and the rights of the victim are defended.

Predictably, the recent execution of serial killer Ted Bundy inspired opponents of capital punishment otherwise. A few dared flout common sentiment by appearing before the media, speaking of humanity, mercy, justice (!) and so forth. But with Ted Bundy as the "victim," their pleadings were spectacularly unconvincing.

I was pleased that not one libertarian, so far as I am aware, used the occasion to promote the standard *anti-government* argument against capital punishment: that the state cannot be trusted with matters of life and death.

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
This argument for outright prohibition of the death penalty—rather than a critical and watchful examination of institutions and practices—has never impressed me. In any event, in this case it proved to be irrelevant: As the date of the execution approached and with the evanescence of legal recourse, Bundy began a long string of confessions, many of them supported by collateral evidence (namely, the bodies of his victims). There was no question of his guilt. And considering the appalling nature of his crimes, questions of his *deserving* to die seem perverse.

I feel a sense of satisfaction at the execution of Ted Bundy. But this does not mean that I regard the Bundy legal affair as wholly gratifying. Two dissonant points come readily to mind.

One: The fact that it took a decade to "pull the switch" shows that there is something gravely wrong with our legal system. Ted Bundy manipulated the system and prolonged his life with a series of legal maneuvers, retrials, stays of execution, etc. This should not be tolerated. It is neither just nor expedient. It only demonstrates the awesome stupidity and *indignity* of the present legal system.

Two: Ted Bundy, master manipulator, did not die without getting in his last affront to the idea and practice of justice. Shortly before his death he granted interviews with James Dobson, an evangelical Christian defender of traditional family values. Bundy claimed that pornography "made" him commit those crimes, that his viewing of pornographic materials added fuel to his perverse, homicidal fires. Dobson, of course, ate this right up—ignoring, however, that Bundy cited as pornographic inspiration for his crimes such smut as high school cheerleading catalogs.

Thus Bundy, clever as ever, turned our worry away from his own perverse (and unpredictable) imagination to the even more dangerous (and predictable) imaginings of James Dobson and his fellow illiberal crusaders. And so Ted Bundy added to his crimes of rape and homicide the more illustrious and socially



"I'd like to get a job, sir, but I hate the idea of my money going to support welfare bums."

acceptable crime of liberticide.

—TWW

Euphemism watch — As George Orwell pointed out, we live in an age of political euphemism. Words are power; to re-label is to control. Or so it seems.

The latest and most pernicious effort by pundits and commentators is use of the term "homeless" to describe bums, transients, crazies, criminals and plain unfortunate people. While it's true that many of these people are "homeless" in the sense that they must live on the streets, a surprisingly large number actually have homes they could live in. But most prefer to live on the streets or mooch off others.

To call these the "homeless" is misleading. They are also "computerless," "microwaveless" and "Rolls Royceless." The movement to relabel them "homeless" was intended to remove the judgmental aspects of their characterization. After all, some of the "homeless" are truly needy through no fault of their own: battered wives and families, mentally deficient people turned out of hospitals and asylums, the temporarily unemployed, and so on. While precise statistics are not available, probably about a quarter of the "homeless" fall into this category. And, sure enough, there are plenty of shelters and relief programs for this deserving 25% or so.

But the homeless special-interest lobby (Mitch Snyder and the welfare industry) needed a better image if it was to create a monstrous new "problem" to solve with tax money. After all, the Salvation Army and other churches and charities have been helping the deserving unfortunate for years, long before Hollywood and the media became interested.

Now, thanks to the new euphemism, the "homeless" problem fills the airwaves and the pages of the socially concerned news media. We non-homeless are expected to feel dutifully guilty over our privileged status and are constantly reminded of our chintziness.

By all means, let us suffer these poor devils urinating on the sidewalks, occupying our vacant real estate, rummaging through our trash and menacing us for our money. After all, *they* are the morally deserving "homeless" and we are the selfish and undeserving, ah, er, . . . just what are we? The "homed"? The "housed"? Maybe the "clean and privileged selfish"? Well, whatever, get the Word Patrol out and coin some suitably pejorative term for us.

On a different euphemism front, some progress may, perhaps, be noted. The handicapped (i.e., the deaf, dumb, blind, crippled, etc.) have long labored under the semi-pejorative term "handicapped" or the equally offensive "disabled." While these terms carry a correct meaning in some instances (the one-legged man is surely handicapped in a cross-country marathon), they tend to lump the physically unfortunate into a category that is conceptually unfair. Many "handicapped" are fully functional in nearly every important and meaningful way.

There have been numerous attempts to re-label them, most of which have failed. The "differently abled" is one that comes to mind, and surely a more misleading and barbarous locution could hardly be imagined.

But recently the term "inconvenienced" was used by one who applies it to himself. This seems a less value-laden term. While still literally accurate, it carries less of a stigma than "handicapped." It implies that disability is a matter more of degree than of absolute inability.

Well, we'll have to see. The problem is that sometimes new

euphemisms become as pejorative as the terms they were intended to replace.

Meanwhile, the debate over Negro, black, afro-American, African-American, et. al., has re-emerged, just when we thought the "Black is Beautiful" debate had settled the issue.

—MH

Good news on the "Greenhouse" — The 80s has been the decade of the New Puritanism, a systemic assault on bourgeois comfort and enjoyment; that is, on what is truly our "quality of life." In the name of what used to be called "hygiene," we have been subjected to an organized and crippling barrage. We have been commanded to give up sex, tobacco, and liquor, to say nothing of the more exotic drugs; we have been deprived of any food that might possibly taste yummy; we have been ordered into the vile torture of continual exercise; and we have been divested of our fondest activities in the dread name of "aholic": "alcoholic," "workaholic," even "loveaholic." In the immortal words of Sheridan Whiteside in the *Man Who Came to Dinner*: "Are we to be spared *nothing*?"

Last year the misery of a hot summer was made even worse by those pests and harpies, the environmentalists. "It's the greenhouse effect," they warned, trying to strip us of our last shred of comfort by taking away our aerosol cans, our automobiles, even our air conditioners—all so that the earth's temperature won't rise by two degrees in fifty years. Well, now Science has spoken, in the January issue of *Geophysical Research Letters*. In the latest study, a team of scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration tried their damndest to find a greenhouse effect in the U.S. weather records since 1895, but they were grudgingly forced to admit defeat. Try as they might, they could find no record of the dread warming effect. To the contrary, they discovered that, in the 45 years from 1895 to 1940, there was a "marginally significant" rise in temperatures; but this warming was followed by another 47 years of a "marginally significant" drop in temperatures! Result? Zilch.

Science has spoken. In the latest study, a team of scientists from the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration tried their damndest to find a greenhouse effect in the U.S. weather records since 1895, but they were grudgingly forced to admit defeat.

Yes, yes, we know that any decade now, the Greenhouse Trend may start down its inexorable path. But, in the meantime, greenhouse hysterics, beat it out the door. Don't come back for another ten years or so. And, on your way out, leave that summer thermostat set at 68 degrees.

—MNR

If this be imperialism, make the most of it — Traditional American imperialism got its real start under McKinley, and is best symbolized by the person of Teddy Roosevelt. Teddy, seemingly forever disappointed that he wasn't born a Hohenstaufen, tried to make up for it by doing his best to turn the United States into a clone of the European imperialist powers. It was, I believe, contrary to the American charac-

ter, but the "Progressives" pulled it off anyhow, grabbing bites of the Pacific and Latin America, and finally, under the leadership of the raving-messianic Woodrow Wilson, forced our collective nose into the affairs of Europe itself.

This had predictable results. We came up with the Pledge of Allegiance at about this time, written, as has been revealed, by another crazy socialist. We made a decision then to stop leading the world by example and start leading it by force. Example worked better. Newly-independent nations prior to our change in policy tended to come up with constitutions amazingly like our own. They even aped our nomenclature, having Presidents and Senators and Congressmen instead of Prime Ministers and Parliaments. Sometimes their new flags looked like ours. Well, all that changed with the switch to European-style imperialism. After WW I, right up to now, the United States seems, in terms of foreign policy, to be utterly indistinguishable from Kaiser Wilhelm or Soviet Russia or Bloody Damned England—at least to the unsophisticated Third World.

So let's abandon imperialism for neo-imperialism. Here's how it will work:

The U.S. will have a two-tiered foreign policy. The first function will be defense-related. Our borders will be defended. The foreign policy connection is that the borders will be defended based on perceived foreign threats, and it will be a legitimate function of the government to make military treaties with foreign powers, i.e., stop pointing those things at us and we'll stop pointing these things at you. No surprises there.

The other legitimate foreign policy responsibility of the U.S. government will replace foreign aid, NATO, trade agreements, economic summits, invitations to Arafat, loan guarantees, North American Common Markets, cheerleading for democracy by fledgling Vice-Presidents, moral equivalents of war, and the whole ball of wax. The President and the Secretary of State will, with the advice and consent of the Senate, consider applications from foreign political units for admission to statehood. Nothing more, nothing less.

How simple it will be. If Israel, or El Salvador, or the Transvaal wants U.S. aid or political support, or whatever, no problem. Apply for statehood.

Statehood, however, would have its down side. You'd have to put up with the Bill of Rights, for one thing. You'd have to give up socialism, dictatorship, established churches (Christian, Jewish, Moslem, Atheist, or whatever), race laws, language laws, and all those other little perks that most ruling classes enjoy so much.

I know it wasn't perfect, but this is the way we used to get new states sometimes—Texas springs to mind.

Of course, we won't want Haiti to become the 51st state and have the whole place go on welfare, will we? So we'll have to get rid of welfare—Federal welfare, at the very least. And we'll have to get rid of most all the other political garbage we've accumulated since our changeover from Tom Paine to Teddy Roosevelt. If we get rid of all the economic laws, we need have no fear of new territories like Swaziland or Hong Kong or Ulster being an economic drain on the present fifty. If we get rid of all the affirmative-action drivel, we won't have to worry about ethnic or racial strife.

In short, if we go back to being the kind of country we were originally intended to be, imperialism will be obsolete anyway, and neo-imperialism would be a logical development. If Napoleon Duarte or Yitzhak Shamir or Yasir Arafat or

Bernadette Devlin or Joseph Savimbi want the aid and approval of the United States, they can sign the Declaration of Independence and the Bill of Rights and become one of the United States.

If they can live with freedom, we can live with them.

—RFM

The end of the secular century — The storm over Salman Rushdie provides a vivid and dramatic illustration of one of the great truths of our era: that the Age of Atheism is ended. During the 1960s trendy theologians proclaimed that God is dead; but now we find that God is still (or again?) very much alive, and that it is Atheism for which burial rites must be conducted.

We have to realize that the secularist age, even though seemingly inevitable and eternal at the time, was only a brief glitch in the history of mankind. Secularism was born in the Age of the Enlightenment, in the eighteenth century; it was given great impetus by Darwin in the late nineteenth century, and it came into its own and dominated Western culture from the 1920s through the 1960s. In the United States, mainstream Protestantism had slowly but surely been transformed from a militant pietism of the mid-nineteenth century into a secular, barely religious, form of left-liberalism. Mainstream Protestant preachers would deliver sermons about the virtues of the Marshall Plan or aid to the homeless interlarded with a few small sentimental references to "God" or "Jesus." During the early 1960s a friend of mine rented a room for a while in the home of the Protestant chaplain at the University of Chicago. After lengthy discussions about theology and religion, my friend told the chaplain: "It seems that you and I have identical views on religion. The only difference is that I call myself an 'atheist' whereas you call yourself a Protestant minister."

As for pre-Vatican II Catholics, they were scarcely integrated into American cultural and intellectual life. They were considered a strange breed, a throwback to the Dark Ages, who really *believed* that stuff.

Bill Buckley likes to tell a story of his meeting, as a young man, with Ayn Rand, with Rand telling him: "Come, come, Bill,

What the cultural liberals left out of this Disneyfied view of life is real cultural differences and conflicts, and especially the serious commitments of militant religion. Cultural diversity is a noble ideal but, to paraphrase Mao, it is no tea party; it is often a serious and rugged business, and secularists had better start wising up to this fact.

surely you are much too intelligent to believe in God." Ayn Rand, however, was not alone in this attitude compounded of arrogance and naïveté. She was, characteristically, simply more blunt about it. The dominant secularist attitude in American culture was precisely that: the only people who could believe in God or Christianity were credulous and halfwitted peasants. And American life of the 1920s through 1960s seemed to confirm this notion. For, after their defeat at the Scopes trial, conservative fundamentalist Protestants retreated into the hills and rural

fastnesses of America, and into the life of marginal social and economic classes. It was then easy for sophisticates to dismiss hard-shell Christianity as merely a cult of hillbilly snake-charmers.

And not only Christianity. The secularist twentieth century also dealt a grave setback to Islam. Moslem regimes were gener-

No Moslem government has sent any hit men to get Rushdie; enforcement of the Moslem death penalty has been "privatized." At the same time, the defense of Rushdie by the British government has been nationalized: the British taxpayer is now being forced to shell out an enormous sum for protection for Rushdie.

ally secularist and heedless of Islam; the gravest blow came when the Kemal Ataturk regime, after World War I, brutally forced a Western-style "modernization" on Turkey by virtually suppressing Islam and outlawing such Moslem practices as the *chador* (the veiled dress for women).

In every civilization, religion had always been the dominant force in people's values, goals, and very lives. In the twentieth century, it was possible for secularist intellectuals to ignore this overriding fact, and to claim that modern science had put an end to these "superstitions" of the past. But now, since the 1970s, secularism is rapidly going down the tubes, in the United States and throughout the world. Religion is back, and with a vengeance—literally and figuratively. Fundamentalism has made a remarkable comeback in the United States, and Islam, both Sunni and Shi'ite, is back with a roar. No longer is it possible to ignore the importance of religion in human life and culture.

Even though more fuss about the Rushdie affair has been made in the United States, England, of course, has really been the center of the storm. England, arguably the least religious country in the Western World, is the adopted home of the ex-Moslem Salman Rushdie and was the original publisher of his book. A fascinating article from London in the *L.A. Times*, (Dan Fisher, "Multicultural Concept Takes Beating in Britain," March 1, p. 10), reports a rising tide of anti-foreign and generally xenophobic attitudes in England in the wake of the Rushdie controversy. Apparently, in 1966, Labor Party Home Secretary Roy Jenkins (now a leader of the Social Democrats) set forth a new policy toward Britain's racial and ethnic minorities: acceptance of cultural diversity, instead of trying to mold all minority groups into one homogeneous British product. But now, in the wake of increased Moslem immigration and the Rushdie controversy, Right and Left alike are rapidly rejecting cultural diversity and talking again about a stern approach toward imposing one "British culture and its values."

The trouble is that cultural liberalism was adopted in Britain, and to a large extent in the U.S., by secularists whose benign and naive view of cultural differences is of happy ethnics wearing their quaint folk costumes and going through their charming little folk dances on national holidays. What they left out of this Disneyfied view of life is *real* cultural differences and conflicts, and especially the serious commitments of militant religion. In short, clashing attitudes toward liquor, the role of women, relig-

ious blasphemy, and all the rest. Cultural diversity is a noble ideal but, to paraphrase Mao, it is no tea party; it is an often serious and rugged business, and secularists had better start wising up to this basic fact.

There are some interesting and ironic twists to the Rushdie affair that have gone unnoticed. One is the fact that the Ayatollahs and other angry Moslem leaders have issued their pronouncements, *not* as government officials, but as leaders of private religious communities. No Moslem government, Iran or elsewhere, has sent any hit men to get Rushdie; in a sense, enforcement of the Moslem death penalty has been "privatized," although methinks this is not the sort of privatization that Bob Poole and others have in mind. At the same time, the defense of Rushdie by the British government has been nationalized: for the British taxpayer is now being forced to shell out an enormous sum for possible lifetime protection for Rushdie and his wife. But why shouldn't they pay for their own privately arranged protection? Even minarchists surely do not expect to commit government police forces to extraordinary and expensive measures to protect any one person indefinitely. Now that Rushdie's inscrutable novel—previously the victim of bad reviews—has been made into a runaway best seller by Moslem threats, he is certainly in a position to privatize his own defense.

The long-term strategic lesson for secularist libertarians of the resurrection of religion in the modern world should be crystal clear. The prospects for the eventual victory of liberty, in the U.S. and in the rest of the world, are excellent; the prospects for the triumph of atheism are nil. Secularist libertarians should stop trying to convert the religious to the dubious glories of atheism, and should start trying to convert them to the cause of liberty.

—MNR

Case closed — I know I've been on Ronald Reagan's case from the beginning, but I can't resist one last comment. It seems entirely appropriate that one of Reagan's last acts as president was protectionist. He removed from a duty-free program hundreds of millions of dollars worth of imports from Thailand because that country is apparently not vigilant enough in protecting the "intellectual property rights" of Americans. Regardless of what one thinks of copyrights and patents (I think they're interventionist unless they are contractual), there can be no justification for punishing innocent American consumers.


At least we can say that Reagan left the way he came in.

—SLR




"Five tribes are for, five are against, and two are undecided."


The float is sinking



Abstinence makes the heart grow fonder




Ditch vs. economic reality



BURONS

A speculation on the source of headlines
by Bob Ortin

War beats drugs



Essay

Man, Nature, and State

by Karl Hess, Jr.

Environmental worries are real; slogans are not enough. Karl Hess takes an ecological approach to environmental problems . . .

Years ago I was employed as an agricultural advisor to the government of Tunisia. The main problem facing Tunisian agriculture was over-grazing. Too many sheep and too little control vested in the users of the land had resulted in environmental disaster. I ordered barbed wire so that some control could be gained over the use of the land. When the barbed wire arrived, it was grabbed by the military to beef up the perimeters of Palestinian refugee camps. The land remained over-grazed and continued to erode.

This little episode illustrates the problem that is faced in trying to protect the environment under the stewardship of government. The top priority of government is to protect itself, not the environment. Government, a political creature subject to warring constituencies, almost invariably pursues short-term objectives. Alas, protection of the environment is a long-term objective—an objective that lies beyond the comprehension of legislators or the expertise of technocrats.

Ever since this experience, I have been very skeptical of calls for governmental "solutions" to ecological problems. Unfortunately, this skepticism is rarely heeded. The libertarian ecologist is apt to feel like a voice crying in the wilderness—even, sometimes, among libertarians.

For instance: In "Liberty and Ecology" (*Liberty*, Sept. 1988) John Hospers has taken aim at liberty's Achilles' heel and challenged the environmental relevance of free people and free markets.

He has concluded, and I agree with his conclusion, that the environmental threats of population growth, ozone depletion, the greenhouse effect, air and water-borne pollution, and ecosystem simplification are the most serious problems facing mankind. Liberty would indeed be a shallow victory in a world bereft of diversity and poisoned by man's lethal leftovers.

But I reject Hospers' conclusion that long-term environmental interests can safely be left to the province of the state. I reject it not only because I believe that governments are themselves environmentally unsafe, but also because government environmental programs are ecologically unsound.

John Muir, founder of the Sierra Club, wrote that "one soldier in the woods, armed with authority and a gun, would be more effective in forest preservation than millions of forbidding notices." Soldiers have been in America's public woods for over a century, and the results have not been promising. Armed with the self-righteousness of Gifford Pinchot and the scientific determinism of America's most notable plant ecologist, Fredrick Clements, federal agencies have re-

duced our major national parks to biological deserts and subjected our public forests to repeated ecological insults.

Environmental incompetence, of course, is not limited to state institutions. In fact, many of the ecological threats facing the world today are the result of behaviors seemingly disconnected from state institutions. Hospers is correct: regardless of the source of environmental damage, the ecological end results are the same.

How can the theory and practice of liberty answer Hospers's legitimate concerns? Jane Shaw, I believe, provided part of the answer in her able defense of private property rights ("Private Property: Hope for the Environment," *Liberty*, November 1988). But property rights are not sufficient to resolve all the problems.

It is questionable, for example, whether America's public forestlands would be benefited significantly by simply exchanging the current federal landlord for a single private owner. The decisions of the private owner, like those of federal land management agencies, would affect millions of acres of land. One wrong decision could be devastating. Fire-control practices of the

Forest Service during three quarters of a century have adversely affected wildlife habitat and made normally resilient forest ecosystems susceptible to biologically disastrous fires. Would a single private owner have acted much differently?

Hospers correctly notes that "simplification leads to great vulnerability." A simplified ecosystem, he writes, is "much more easily upset when something happens to one of its parts, than is a diversified community." Public forestlands, when controlled by a federal agency or by one private owner, are simplified ecosystems. Public forestlands, when decentralized into the hands of many owners, approach the ideal of a diversified community.

But diversity of ownership is not the only issue. Another is information. When information is scarce or difficult to obtain, the ecological efficacy of diverse property rights is compromised. If, for want of alternative information, private property owners shared the fire-control ideology once propagated by the Forest Service, privatization of public forestlands would not provide an ecologically distinguishable alternative to federal ownership.

Today, the exponential increase of accurate information, in conjunction with free markets, can provide an environment in which diversity in private property ownership will ecologically outperform the centralized monocultures of the state. Free markets make information accessible. The probability of good information entering into some land management decisions is greater when ownership is diversified than it is when ownership is consolidated under a single, monolithic structure.

Let's consider some basic ecological concepts.

Biological diversity is crucial to the integrity of ecosystems, living spaces that include soil, plants, animals, and atmosphere. Man is part of the global eco-

system and his existence is predicated on its sustainability. A sustainable ecosystem is one in which the various components are capable of indefinite maintenance given some level of solar energy input. Solar energy is the currency upon which ecosystems operate.

Like individuals, ecosystems periodically face problems with the flow and availability of their unique currency. When, for example, disease devastates an ecosystem's major plant species, energy (packaged as eatable plants) is lost that would otherwise be available to grazing animals. A shortage of energy currency then reverberates throughout the ecosystem, ultimately affecting all organisms on the food chain.

Fortunately, ecosystems are like prudent people—they have insurance against disruptions. Species diversity is one of their insurance policies. If a multitude of plant species is available to grazing animals, the loss of a single species need not be catastrophic. A diversity of predators and competitors is just as important. The explosion of the deer population on the Kaibab Plateau in northern Arizona following the removal of wolves and cattle by federal agencies is a textbook example of the instability of simplified ecosystems. The legacy of simplification in this case was starving deer and denuded hillsides.

The many species that contribute to diversity provide multiple paths for the energy used in sustaining ecosystems. But the importance of biological diversity becomes even more apparent when you regard the energy flowing through the veins of an ecosystem as *information*. Energy, incorporated into organic matter, provides the informational base upon which plant and animal behavior is based.

Plant succession, for example, is ruled by the informational content of energy incorporated into matter. Fire-devastated forests in the West regenerate first with aspen and lodgepole pine. The

presence of those species provide the conditions under which shade-tolerant species such as fir and spruce germinate and thrive. The transformation of energy into pine and aspen provides the biological cue that awakens spruce and fir to life. Similarly, the availability of food (packaged energy) provides the information that regulates animal fertility and population.


Energy is information; ecosystems depend upon information to survive; diversity has the potential of enhancing or expanding usable information. Ecology, of course, is more complex than a brief review of these basic principles. Yet, the foundation of an ecology of liberty rests on these simple and empirically verifiable propositions.

Ecological Creatures

American ecologists have traditionally conceived of diversity in the narrow sense of the number of species and subspecies within a particular ecosystem. Hospers has relied upon this traditional interpretation to structure his environmental warning. He has correctly observed that species diversity is decreasing at an alarming rate worldwide. But his warning that depletion of species may destabilize world ecosystems is debatable—not because the diversity argument is invalid but because the argument is construed too narrowly.

The primary cause of species extinction is not the wanton slaughter of animals but more subtle changes wrought by man. As more and more of the earth's surface is transformed by agriculture, less and less solar energy currency is available for the plentitude of species once common to earth. Species incapable of adapting to the changes generated by man are the first to disappear. When their niches (fancy term for homes and workplaces) in nature dissolve, they perish.

The quality of human life may, however, be enhanced by preserving species diversity in selected areas such as wilderness, parks, and zoos. It all depends on man's skill in generating and proliferating quality information and his efficiency in applying that information to his environment. The ultimate ecological niche for man in a stable world ecosystem may well rest on his ability to communicate information—that is, upon his ability to propagate through culture, community, science,



"I said I wanted to do basic research, but not *this* basic!"

and art a diversity upon which man and nature can thrive and coexist in harmony.

What obstacles limit human ability to foster diversity? Hospers suggests that self-interest is one. He argues, for example, that "[a land] owner's long-term interest [which is identical to ecosystem interest] may not coincide with his short-term interest."

Of course, the conflict of interests to which Hospers alludes is not only normal but natural. All species are motivated by self-interest. Left to their own devices, without the normal checks and balances provided by nature (e.g., predation, disease, limited food, etc.), most species would expand catastrophically. Narrowly conceived self-interest is the rule, not the exception, in nature.

Man is the only creature capable of voluntarily rechanneling self-interest in directions beneficial to his global ecosystem. Nevertheless, man is ravaging his home. Hospers is right about this. But Hospers is mistaken when he fears the environmental destructiveness of people more than the destructiveness of the states that rule people. The major state powers, he hopes, will reach agreement "not to pollute, not to kill endangered species, and in other ways to refrain from harming the environment" and to "enforce [environmental] conformity within [their] own borders."

The state is envisioned as an impartial mediator poised between destructive individuals (or groups) and the environments they have ravaged. It is seen as unbiased toward man and nature and somehow removed from the environmental problems that plague earthly ecosystems. It is not perceived as an ecological being having ecological functions as well as ecological consequences. The likelihood of the state accomplishing something other than ecological good is not considered—or if it is, it is accepted as a necessary cost of curbing the greater evils of private action.

States do more than intervene on behalf of the environment, and even when they just intervene in this way, beneficial results are not necessarily the rule.

States expend most of their energy on activities having no apparent bearing on environmental quality—such as combatting human diversity for the sake of consolidating power. Keep in mind that the state is not only threatened by diversity, it is the antithesis of diversity. Yet, states, like people, are ecological creatures whose actions predictably have ecological consequences beyond the intended scope of their actions.

Two examples will clarify my point.

The explosion of the deer population on the Kaibab Plateau in northern Arizona following the removal of wolves and cattle by federal agencies is a textbook example of the instability of simplified ecosystems. The legacy of simplification in this case was starving deer and denuded hillsides.

North African nations have subsidized bread production to ensure an adequate and affordable diet for their citizens. Those subsidies, however, have increased the desertification of their already arid countryside. Inexpensive bread (well below the cost of the grain used in its production) is used by rural peasants to feed sheep whose numbers exceed the carrying capacity of overgrazed rangelands. Farmers are able to graze their lands clear of plant life and still maintain their herds. Nature's checks and balances—which normally would make farmers accountable for overgrazing—have been bypassed by the state. In the short run, the interests of farmers and governments are served. In the long run, both the people and the land suffer.

Anglers in Montana, resentful of the control that private property owners had over some of the state's best fishing spots, successfully advocated legislation allowing citizens to enter private lands as long as they travelled below the historic high-water levels of the streams they wanted to fish. But today, anglers are becoming aware of the unintended ecological consequences of state beneficence: prized locations are being overfished.

A Rule of Unintended Consequences

The severity of unintended ecological consequences increases in proportion to the

transfer of power from individuals and communities to the centralized state. Theoretical support for this rule rests on the diversity argument. State usurpation of local power reduces effective diversity. Citizens and communities become facades of diversity in their respective ecosystems. The ecological potential they represent—the promise of their creativity, culture, and visions—remains unrealized without the means of implementation: power.

Power translates potential human diversity into maximum ecological benefit when property rights are fully vested in the unit of diversity (individual or corporate); when accurate information is abundant; and when markets allowing access to information and the implementation of information are not obstructed or limited. Even under ideal circumstances, human action will be less than perfect. Environmental damage will continue to be generated by uncaring or misinformed people. One might argue that state intervention to deal with these ecologically aberrant people is justified. But intervention would diminish diversity, returning us full circle to the heart of the problem!

Despite the fallibility of free people, environmental well-being will be better served by the many decisions of diverse actors than by the single decisions of centralized states.

When limited in time and space, the ecological consequences of environmental mistakes (intended or unintended) will have fewer repercussions. As a general rule, small population units are unable to wreak as much environmental havoc as larger population units. Further, the likelihood that good ideas and good actions will emerge in response to environmental needs appears more certain when the number of independent actors increases. Is it best to subject the fate of an enormous landscape to one decision maker or to multiple decision makers, each controlling only a fraction of the landscape? In the latter case, many decision makers will go wrong, yet at least a few will arrive at environmental excellence. In the former case, there is no such certainty. Decentralized environments would obviously be much

more effective in isolating local economic and environmental disturbances and limiting the magnitude of their ecological impacts.

The Political Ecology of Expanding Population

The principal environmental threat to the global ecosystem is, according to Hospers, exponential growth of human population. I share this sentiment. How can my theoretical model be applied to the problem? It is no secret that for millennia, human population in what we term the Third World was relatively stable. Today, population growth in that region threatens to inundate the world with hungry bodies.

Western nations underwent similar population expansions with the arrival of the industrial age. Yet their populations have levelled off and remain within the probable carrying capacities of their environments. Third-world nations do not appear to be emulating the Western experience. The explanation, I believe, lies in the fact that in Western nations population growth was an ecological response to natural changes (those emanating from within the structure of society). In contrast, population growth in the Third World is an ecological response to unnatural changes (those brought about by forceful intrusions). The unintended consequences of outside cultural, political, and economic influences has been uncontrolled population growth.

Hospers correctly attributes part of the cause of population expansion in the Third World to the introduction of Western medicine. Although charitable in intent, it has allowed human fertility to outpace the fertility of the earth. Western intervention in the Third World, however, has achieved more than the introduction of modern medical care. It has undermined traditional cultures unprepared for change and has led to the usurpation of traditional communal rights and powers by nation states conceived in the image of the West. The centralized states of the Third World have eroded the ability of decentralized peasant societies to manage their own affairs. In the language of

ecology, diversity has been diminished. Local cultures and communities no longer play a decisive role in reproductive activities. And the states that have undermined the workings of communities have also stood as obstacles to the realization of material conditions that might have induced rural populations to regulate their growth voluntarily.

The communities of the Third World exhibit few of the conditions necessary for functional human diversity. Property rights are often denied or limited. Markets are nonexistent or tightly controlled. And information, when available, is usually filtered through the tentacles of the state. Contributing to the confusion is Western relief aid that artificially supports unsustainable populations. The carrying capacities of many Third-World countries have been great-

The prevailing strategy of the state for pollution control relieves polluters of the responsibility of confronting and resolving the pollution they generate. All they need do is meet the minimum standards set by federal regulatory agencies. No incentive exists for environmental excellence. No thought is given to the ecological potential of diversity.

ly exceeded thanks to the unintended ecological consequences of state intervention.

I do not claim to have a remedy for this extremely complex and serious problem. I suspect, however, that devolution of state power back to families, kinship networks, local tribes, and communities would be an important step in bringing populations into balance with the carrying capacity of the land. It would be much harder to escape accountability for contributing to excess population if individuals were answerable to their neighbors (rather than to states). While the cost of one additional child might be insignificant to a nation, it could be ecologically devastating to a small community. It is not difficult to imagine which unit of social organization would be most likely to respond to the marginal newborn.

Western subsidization of the Third World should also be halted. Our short-term interest may be laudable—to feed, clothe, and shelter unfortunate people. But the long-term effects of our benefi-

cence, unless combined with significant property and market reforms within Third-World countries, will have serious global repercussions.

The one positive action that can be taken is to eliminate barriers to trade and population movement. If the Western experience is a valid model, material well-being should influence population growth. We should do all we can to encourage institutional reforms that will change the distribution and quantity of wealth and information in the Third World.

The purpose of policy reform, ecologically speaking, should be the multiplication of sustainable, self-regulating social units—not the consolidation of subsidized or regulated ones. Market forces will ecologically link independent social units, not politically combine them in the manner of the centralized state. Hospers's call for environmental collusion among major nation states is a response to symptoms (population expansion), not causes (state intervention).

There is no better laboratory than the United States in which to assess the potential

of human diversity. All the conditions for releasing the ecological power of human creativity are present here to some degree, and so are most of the major environmental problems.

Consider two of these problems, soil depletion and air pollution. Let us experiment with each to test the efficiencies and deficiencies of decentralized (free market) strategies compared with centralized strategies for coping with urgent environmental problems.

How Best to Deplete the Soil

If our goal were to encourage soil erosion and depletion of soil fertility, how might we best proceed? We would undoubtedly begin by injecting distortions into the free market. If our objective were to create a desolate landscape, we would want a centralized economic policy that would encourage, above all else, over-production of farm produce. We would subsidize farmers to produce beyond the needs of our society. We would provide enough subsidies to ensure that they could afford the most

economically wasteful and environmentally damaging agricultural practices. We would also provide sufficient subsidies to ensure that they would cultivate the most marginal and fragile lands.

As soil erosion increased and soil productivity fell, and as marginal farmers approached bankruptcy, we would add further subsidies. We would gear up our land-grant colleges, our national extension services, and our federal soil conservation agencies to provide just enough assistance to keep farmers working toward our goal. We would also look to national charity drives and subsidized federal loans to make sure that the net income of farmers remained above that of the non-farming population, so that few would voluntarily desist from their environmentally ruinous occupations.

Finally we would reap the rewards of our market intervention. Soil erosion would be at historic heights and soil productivity would be at historic lows. To make sure that our policies would have a lasting effect, we would also lavish subsidies on the worst of farmers. We would reward their bad stewardship and keep them in business by paying them to take their lands out of production. The scenario, of course, is not imaginary. It is the official farm policy of the United States.

Centralized agricultural policies, the ecological cues that emanate from the state, do have their place. They would make excellent strategic weapons. Why use nuclear warheads to destroy an enemy nation when all that is needed is a shot of famine, thanks to the beneficence of the opposing state? But assuming we wished to survive, how might we release the creativity of thousands of American farmers and enlist it in a viable alternative to policy monoculture?

Marketization is the answer. With the elimination of farm subsidies, marginal farmers would look for new professions, and those remaining would look for new management strategies to survive in a deregulated market. Lands unsuitable for cultivation would be retired from production by decentralized market forces at rates exceeding the current conservation reserve program—and at no cost to the taxpayer.

To speed the experiment, we might also phase out the Soil Conservation Ser-

vice and the Cooperative Extension Service. The result would be complete marketization of agricultural information. Put to the rigorous test of the marketplace, superior technologies and innovative resource management strategies would surface—no longer held in check by old technologies and strategies whose only competitive edge was the free price offered to subsidized farmers.

How Best to Unpollute the Air

Most of us are uncomfortably aware of the effects of air pollution. As I write, smoke drifting north from wood-heated homes in Juarez and auto emissions trapped by cold air moving south from Albuquerque magically coalesce before my computer screen. Eyes already reddened by the hypnotic allure of a flashing cursor become inflamed by unwelcome particles. And I am one of the fortunate who live in one of the more sparsely populated areas of the United States!

The prevailing strategy of the state for pollution control has been the imposition of best available technologies. Polluters are relieved of the responsibility of confronting and resolving the pollution they generate. All they need do is meet the minimum standards set by federal regulatory agencies. No incentive exists for environmental excellence. No thought is given to the ecological potential of diversity.

No one is responsible for the atmosphere in which polluters dump their wastes. The ownership of neither that ethereal dump nor the wastes that contaminate it is easily determined. Consequently, all atmospheric polluters are treated in the same way by federal regulators—all subject to the banality of *best available technologies*. Equality of treatment, however, begets mediocrity of results.

But what if we replaced state regulation with the natural regulation of the marketplace? What if we created a new category of property rights? Let us imagine that polluting industries (including companies manufacturing polluting products) could buy transferable pollution rights—for convenience, let's call them permits—on the free market. The number of permits for each pollutant (which could include carbon dioxide—the major culprit of the greenhouse

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Critique

Public Choice: A Misshapen Tool

by Murray N. Rothbard

Some of the Public Choice school's most celebrated "insights" have been staples of libertarian thought for nearly a century. And some central Public Choice contentions are problematic, to say the least.

I appreciate the virtues of public choice analysis, as outlined by Jane Shaw ("Public Choice: A Useful Tool," *Liberty*, January 1989). In fact, some of my best friends are public choicers. But perhaps I may be pardoned for not throwing my hat into the air. Shaw identifies as the central contribution of public choice analysis the doctrine that people are at least as motivated by self-interest in the political realm as in other walks of life, and she hails Buchanan & Tullock's *Calculus of Consent* (1962) as contributing this insight. But when I entered the libertarian movement in the late 1940s, this doctrine was *already* a guiding staple of libertarian thought. It was particularly striking in the work of the great Albert Jay Nock, especially in his magnificent *Our Enemy the State* (William Morrow, 1935) and in his *Memoirs of a Superfluous Man* (Harpers, 1943). A brief quote from Nock will demonstrate, not only that he preceded Buchanan & Tullock, but also that Nock's analysis was far more trenchant, radical, and libertarian, and was written in far more lucid and scintillating English prose:

There are two methods, or means, and only two, whereby man's needs and desires can be satisfied. One is the production and exchange of wealth; this is the *economic means*. The other is the uncompensated production of wealth produced by others; this is the *political means*. The primitive exercise of the political means was, as we have seen, by conquest, confiscation, expropria-

tion, and the introduction of a slave-economy. The conqueror parcelled out the conquered territory among beneficiaries, who thenceforth satisfied their needs and desires by exploiting the labour of the enslaved inhabitants. The feudal State, and the merchant-State . . . merely took over and developed successively the heritage of character, intention and apparatus of exploitation which the primitive State transmitted to them . . .

The State, then, whether primitive, feudal or merchant, is the *organization of the political means*. Now, since man tends always to satisfy his needs and desires with the least possible exertion, he will employ the political means wherever he can—exclusively, if possible; otherwise, in association with the economic means. (Nock, *Our Enemy the State*, pp. 59–60.)

The idea that political action is often the product of economic self-interest, furthermore, extended far beyond libertarians to the historical method often derided as "economic determinism," practiced by Charles A. Beard in the early years of the twentieth century,

and by his host of "neo-Beardian" followers ever since. The difference is that, with a few notable exceptions (such as George W. Hilton), Chicago School or public choice economists turned loose on historical explanation tend to be perfunctory and simplistic, lacking appreciation for the complexities and nuances of actual historical events.

Furthermore—and this is one of my major criticisms of the public-choicers—they, unlike the Beardians, really do carry their economic determinism to the extreme of denying *any* motivation in human history except monetary gain. Hence, they are at a loss to explain much of what is or has been happening in the world. Take, for example, the absurd concept of "rational ignorance" of Downs and Tullock. Shaw states that this concept shows that the individual citizen has "little incentive even to vote." She understates the argument. On "rational ignorance" grounds, the individual has *no incentive* to vote, since an individual has no discernible influence on the outcome of an election. But then the question insistently intrudes: why then *do* people vote at all? Why

did 50 percent of eligible voters vote in the 1988 presidential election? The public choicers would lamely have to say that these voters are all being "irrational," but this scarcely supplies an explanation. The real answer is that voters are motivated by *ideology*, which, rightly or wrongly, leads them to pull the lever for the candidate of their choice. But if the public choicers should ever concede this point, their entire house of cards would come a-tumblin' down, because then they would have to concede that ideas and ideology, and not simply monetary self-interest, can guide people's actions. Or, to put it another way, people can hold certain values or ideas so strongly that they become part of their "self-interest," but not a self-interest that can be

quantified into monetary cost-benefit calculations. And therein lies the rub for the public choicers, and therein lies the superiority of Austrian-school economics, which not only acknowledges *but is grounded upon* the fact that individuals are always guided by their subjective values and goals, among which monetary gain is only one element.

In my view of human affairs, ignorance, whether willful or not can never be glorified as "rational." People *should* be interested in the world around them, especially since they are part of that world and are bound to be affected by it. The search for, and acquisition of, knowledge is noble and glorious, and willful ignorance about vitally important matters marks one as less than fully human. But how can the public choicers, in their crabbed Benthamite calculus, be expected to understand such concepts? Even on their *own* terms, their extreme economic determinism leaves them unable to comprehend behavior which, for some reason, they are trying to understand. I have already mentioned the 50 percent who, despite the demonstrations of the public choicers, persist in trooping to the polls. But there is still more to be said about voting. Why, for example, were voter turnout rates persistently far higher during the nineteenth century—ranging to 90 percent for presidential contests? The public choicers have no answer. The proper

explanation is that, during the nineteenth century, the political parties were far more consistently ideological: the Republicans and Democrats stood for sharply contrasting ideologies and political programs, which were rooted in turn in sharply contrasting religious values. These value and ideological clashes fostered deep party loyalty in Democrats and Republicans; party membership became an integral part of their lives. Starting in 1896, however, the political party system changed drastically, with the two parties quickly becoming

The extreme economic determinism of the public choicers leaves them wide open—and properly so—to ridicule based on exposing their own inner, performative contradictions.

virtually indistinguishable ideologically. Elections were reduced to mere clashes of personality and patronage, thereby providing voters with an echo instead of a choice, and lowering their enthusiasm and their turnout rate.

Moreover, the extreme economic determinism of the public choicers leaves them wide open—and properly so—to ridicule based on exposing their own inner, performative contradictions. For if everyone is always and ever governed only by "economic" (i.e. monetary) gain, then what of the public choicers themselves? Why can't we say that public choice theory itself is a mask for the economic interests of the public choice profession? Indeed, this was the tack taken by the perceptive and witty liberal journalist Michael Kinsley, on the occasion of Jim Buchanan's Nobel Prize. Kinsley wrote that, if everyone is always and ever motivated by monetary gain, why can't we engage in a public choice analysis of the public choicer, of the universities that hire them, and of the Swedish Nobel Committee that awarded Buchanan the prize? To dismiss such ripostes as simply "nasty," as did public choicer Jennifer Roback of George Mason University, is to miss the point. For the only real defense of the public choicers: that they were and are motivated by the love of truth, contradicts the public choice doctrine itself, which denies any motivation for human action but monetary gain. And if the public

choicers themselves can be motivated by principles or values, why can't anyone else?

The other big problem of the public choicers is their fatally flawed attitude toward government: that is, their failure to grasp the central libertarian insight enunciated by Nock: the crucial distinction between a voluntary exchange, where both parties gain; and a coerced exchange, where one party gains at the expense of the other. Instead of regarding the State as the organization of the political means—as the systematization of theft and coercion on a grand scale—the public choicers regard the State as *merely* one large firm, very much the same as a private organization. State officials try to earn revenue, gain a surplus

over expenses, etc. Generally, the public choicers hold the State to be a particularly inefficient firm, but in principle their treatment of government is a benign one. The public choicers even fuzz over the difference between voluntary and coerced exchange by a semantic trick: euphemistically referring to taxation as a "complex," rather than a coerced, exchange.

A final complaint: why do public choicers persist in calling privilege-seeking at the hands of the State, "rent-seeking?" Why befuddle the already confused public by mixing in the pursuit of anti-social special privilege with the legitimate collection of rent by landlords? Actually, the flaw here is deeper than mere semantic error. The attack on rent stems from David Ricardo's bitter opposition to land rent, which stemmed from his failure to understand that landlords perform the highly important function of allocating scarce lands to their most productive uses. The neo-classical economists then generalized the attack on rent by identifying "rent" as all "surplus" income earned by anyone on the market—the surplus meaning income that could be taxed away by the government and still not reduce the effort or supply of the producer. In taking over this assault on rent, the public choicers appear to be mixing and conflating income from State privilege, with a perfectly legitimate return earned on the free market. □

Investigation

A Conspiracy of Silence

Uncovering the Media's Election-Night "Coverage" Policy

by Margaret M. Fries

"Whatever is only almost true is quite false, and thus among the most dangerous of errors because, being so near truth, it is the more likely to lead astray."

— Henry Ward Beecher

Ben Bradlee is credited with having said that "news is the first rough draft of history." If this is true, the page on "Dissenting Voters in the American Electorate" has been left blank this year. As a result of new vote gathering procedures, designed and implemented by the major networks and wire services, well over a million votes cast for minor party candidates in national races went unreported and the percentage of the popular vote represented by those dissenting ballots was falsely attributed to the Democratic and Republican candidates for those offices.

In the presidential race, there were close to a million votes cast for candidates other than the Bush and Dukakis tickets, but those votes went unreported by the national print and broadcast media. The percentage of the popular vote for president represented by those ballots was intentionally redistributed to the tallies of the Republican and Democratic tickets. Nationally, the Bush and Dukakis teams shared a "bonus" of about 1% of the popular vote. State by state, the percentage of the popular vote earned by those two tickets was falsely increased by as much as 4%. The additional percentage points given to those candidates, in fact, represented votes cast for minor party presidential candidates.

Half the redistributed minor party vote was for the Libertarian Party candidates, Ron Paul and Andre Marrou. Many LP candidates in senate and house races made even larger "donations" to their opponents' vote percent-

ages. In most cases where a Libertarian was the only challenger to a Republican or Democrat, the major party candidate was given a "clean sweep" by the media. They were reported as having run "unopposed."

The impact of this decision continues to be felt, and the implications for the future are significant enough to warrant a full discussion of the mechanics of reporting the vote.

The News Election Service

At the bottom of all this misreporting is a monopoly called the News Election Service (NES). NES is a news gathering cooperative, jointly owned and operated by three major networks (ABC, CBS, NBC) and two wire services (AP and UPI). To understand NES's "lock" on election reporting, a bit of history is in order.

Prior to the 1964 election, the major television networks and wire services competed fiercely with one another. Each strove to provide the earliest and most accurate reports of election returns. Computers were just starting to be accepted by news organizations for polling and election projections. Many of the advanced polling techniques we take for granted today were being de-

veloped at that time. Network presidents knew the margin of error and dreaded a tightly contested race. They understood that, in a close contest, the first network to call the winner ran a significant risk of naming the wrong candidate. During the 1964 California presidential primary, the inevitable occurred.

From poll closing time, and well into the next morning, Goldwater and Rockefeller were each announced as winners—each, of course, by a different network. On primary night, and well into the next morning's news, New York City channel 2 viewers were treated to a real spectacle, courtesy of the flagship CBS affiliate, WCBS. That station alternated between the two authoritative, but contradictory reports. Even as the CBS network feed continued to name Goldwater as the winner, the local portions of the broadcast (taking their information off the AP wire) persisted in reporting that Rockefeller was the Republican nominee.

Within days, network and wire service representatives met to work out the agreement that created the Network (and later News) Election Service. In his book "In the Storm of the Eye," former CBS president, Bill Leonard describes

that meeting as marking the "end of the absurd competition among the major networks to collect votes." The arrangement not to compete was approved by Robert Kennedy's Justice Department.¹

Starting in 1964, and in even numbered years since, NES has gathered and reported on the "unofficial"² election results of presidential, congressional and gubernatorial races, as well as selected primaries and state party caucuses. The information is transmitted from NES, to its owner/operators and to NES subscribers, such as Cable News Network (CNN), *The World Almanac and Book of Facts*,³ and a number of political science researchers throughout the country.⁴

The networks and wire services, in turn, relay the information to their affiliates and subscribers, which include most of the newspapers, weekly news magazines, independent television and radio stations. The News Election Service is therefore the primary, if not exclusive, source of national information of election returns from election day until well into the new year. In certain localities, such as New York City (see sidebar, p. 24) this situation has made some information virtually unobtainable in the days and weeks following an election.

According to Robert Flaherty, NES Executive Director, the collection process for this year's election involved nearly 100,000 NES reporters positioned at various polling places and county boards of elections throughout the country on election day. Each reporter was equipped with several printed forms, each of which was used to record a portion of the vote tally as it was made public by local election officials. The reporters telephoned these raw numbers to NES, where their computer system tabulated the information and calculated the percentage of the popular vote earned by each candidate. These "finished" results were then fed to the parent organizations and NES subscribers. Within minutes, the formatted information was available for transmission to the public by the broadcast and print media.

Until the 1984 election, NES at least gathered information on every presidential candidate appearing on the ballot in each state. Whether or not each total was actually broadcast during the course of election night coverage or appeared in the next morning's paper, was an editorial judgment made by news directors and publishers in the exercise of their journalistic discretion. Having gathered *all* the results⁵ the NES's percentage of the popular vote was correct

I asked NES Executive Director Robert Flaherty if he felt any personal responsibility, moral or ethical, regarding NES's recent reporting procedures. Not surprisingly, Flaherty adopted the "Nuremburg defense." He was, after all, just "doing his job."

for each candidate in a given race. Whether a news organization chose some or all of the candidates for its report, the story could include the correct percentage.

This option no longer exists. The NES report of total votes *cast* is actually only the total of the votes they have *collected*. Because they do not report the votes cast for minor parties, the total vote number is wrong. A diligent reporter or news director who wished to report at least the number, or percentage, of votes cast for "other candidates" is now unable to do so.

Prior to the 1984 election, NES ceased gathering votes for most third party presidential candidates. The Libertarian Party votes continued to be part of the calculation. According to Flaherty, based on a "poor" showing in the 1984 election, the NES board of managers added the LP to the ranks of the "insignificant" parties. When plans were made for the 1988 election, the board decided to exclude Libertarian Party candidates in their vote gathering.

During the week prior to the 1988 election, I spoke with Bob Flaherty about NES's plans. I asked him, hypothetically, how NES would report the vote percentages in a state where the Republican candidate got 55%, the Democrat got 35% and a third party candidate got 10%. His response was that the two major party candidates would be reported to have split the vote 60-40.

He admitted that by failing to collect vote totals on third parties (or to at least report the total vote cast), the percentages attributed to the reported candidates might be somewhat exaggerated. He was "not sure" whether the NES report informed the user that the vote totals did *not* indicate the total votes cast, but merely reflected the total of the votes which NES had chosen to collect.

I asked him if he felt any personal responsibility, moral or ethical, regarding NES's recent reporting procedures. Not surprisingly, Flaherty adopted the "Nuremburg defense." He was, after all, just "doing his job"—just implementing the policy dictated by the NES board of managers. When asked about the composition of that board, Flaherty declined to reveal the names of anyone who sat on that board. The NES board of managers is mentioned in the defendant's pleadings, filed in the suit brought by

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the Populist Party (discussed further, below).

Those documents state only that each of the parent organizations "are represented." The choice of words will raise a flag for those familiar with the construction of contracts or statutes. These were carefully drawn pleadings, drafted by experienced media attorneys. Were the board made up exclusively (or even primarily) of representatives from the parent networks and wire services, then it would have been described just that way. The chosen construction indicates that, *among* the board members, one will find representatives of the parent organization.

A description which is neither inclusive nor exhaustive tends to invite speculation. Who else might be sitting on the board of the News Election Service? Executives from subscriber news organizations? Inspectors from the Justice Department? Representatives of the FEC? Officers of some Boards of Elections? Perhaps, a *bi-partisan* contingent to represent the "two party system?" Those who might know aren't saying.

The NES Policy in Action

According to Flaherty, the purpose of the News Election Service is "to provide an accurate set of unofficial election results" to all its subscribers as quickly as possible.⁶ News organizations, reporters and political scientists accessing NES information are thus lead to believe that they are getting a reasonably accurate report of the votes cast for various offices in the recent national election. Flaherty and representatives of the three networks have claimed that excluding information on minor party candidates has no significant impact on the accuracy of their reports.⁷

I suggest that the facts noted above, refute this assertion. Nevertheless, there are some who will argue (indeed, some LP NatCom Reps already *have* argued to me) that misreporting by 1% (or .5%, or 3%) is not significantly inaccurate. The following, I hope, illustrates how the NES's selective vote collecting practices do result in inaccuracies which can hardly be characterized as "insignificant."

In the state of Alabama, for example, there were 7 congressional races. In each district, a Libertarian was one of the candidates for office.⁸ In Districts 2, 3 & 4,

the LP candidate presented the sole challenge to a Republican or Democratic incumbent.

The NES report denies all this. According to the News Election Service, there *were no* Libertarian Party candidates in any of the seven House races in the state of Alabama. In the three way races, the LP candidate is merely missing from the report. In districts 2, 3 & 4, where the Republican or Democratic candidate's only opposition came from a Libertarian, the major party candidate is reported to have been "unopposed." So much for the approximately 40,000 voters (representing between 6% and 10% of the vote in each of those districts) who cast their ballots for Jerome Shockley, John Sebastian or Joel Brook King.

The NES listing chronicles each and every House and Senate race in the country. There were 17 Libertarian Party candidates for the U.S. Senate. No LP senatorial candidates appear in the NES report. Of the approximately one hundred ten Libertarian candidates for House of Representatives, only six are listed by the NES report. (A careful look, reveals two other LP candidates, but they are identified as members of other parties.) In the remaining one hundred-plus House races, there is no indication that Libertarian candidates took part at all. Where the LP candidates were part of two-way races, the Democratic or Republican candidate is listed as having been "unopposed."

Using the NES report, one would get the impression that "third" party presidential candidates have virtually disappeared from the electoral scene in recent times. One finds that, in 1980, there were at least four presidential candidates running in each state; many states had more. In 1984, by contrast, the listing indicates there was only one alternative to the Republican and Democratic presidential candidates, David Bergland. By the 1988 race, it appears that these alternative parties have entirely dropped out of the national election business.

Reactions to the NES Reporting Practices

In October, the 1988 NES policy was made public in a Denver *Post* article by LP member, Jon Baraga. In its wake, Tonie Nathan and an *ad hoc* network of activists went to work on the media and

sponsors involved. The News Election Service, along with its parent and subscriber organizations, received numerous calls and letters denouncing the new policy. On the local level, regional reporters and news gathering organizations were alerted to the policy. The results were mixed.

It is worth noting that many sponsors of election night television coverage represented various segments of the communication industry. From sponsors in the business of accurate communication (through computers, copiers, FAXes, telephone lines, etc.) one might have expected an immediate and sympathetic response. For the most part, this was not so.

The major sponsors, AT&T and Xerox, while privately expressing their "regret" to Tonie Nathan, refused to take any action, either publicly or directly to the networks. Only Kinko's copy service, a minor sponsor, protested immediately and publicly. In letters to the presidents of the networks, Kinko's

In Search of the

The New York State LP did not have an extensive slate of candidates in the recent election. Aside from local candidates, Ron Paul, Andre Marrou, and Bill McMillen (in a bid for the U.S. Senate) were the only Libertarian candidates on the ballot state-wide. One might have expected that getting the initial results on just three candidates would not have presented too large a problem.

From the time the polls closed on election night, and continuing into the next morning, some of us who worked on Bill's campaign tried to get an idea of how the vote was shaping up in New York State. I must admit that, in my naïveté, I had assumed such a state-wide information network was already in place. Upon discovering no plan to collect returns was in place, I began my search by calling the state Board of Elections in Albany. They were pleased to give state-wide results on the two major party candidates for each office. When asked for information on other candidates, they claimed that the returns were "not complete." When pressed about how they could have returns on some candidates and not others, the officer admitted that the Board

Chairperson, Paul Orfalea, condemned the NES plan as "an act of deliberate misrepresentation" adding "we at Kinko's do not want to be a party to it." He stated that he failed to see how reporting all the numbers could work any hardship on the collecting organization and concluded by reminding the networks that "the election reporting process should be free from any hint of bias or inaccuracy, and should be presented to television audiences as factually and completely as possible."

Some local government entities refused to get involved, while others rose to publicly condemn the policy. A caller to the New York State Commissioner of Elections was informed that what the media did about reporting the vote had nothing to do with that office (but see the sidebar "In Search of the New York

Vote"). The Denver County Board of Elections, in an October 20th Public Resolution, called the policy "a serious and grievous abridgement of individual and human rights [that] must not be tolerated in a free society." Although the resolution urged "every election official and every citizen in America to join us in condemning each of these organiza-

When one has unfavorable information about the major networks and wire services, to whom does one issue a news release? Would the AP be eager to put a story out on the wire concerning its own duplicity?

tions for their part in this deception," the response was not overwhelming. This was not surprising, considering how difficult it is to publicize the issue. After all, when one has unfavorable information about the major networks and wire services, to whom does one issue a news re-

lease? Would the AP be eager to put a story out on the wire concerning its own duplicity?

The reactions of local press and broadcast journalists were diverse, ranging from yawns to outrage. Very few major newspapers contacted carried any information on the NES policy. The *Wall Street Journal* printed a November 2nd

Op-Ed piece by Richard Winger (of Ballot Access News). Marshall Fritz President of Advocates for Self-Government managed to get "hard" news coverage of the situation in the *Fresno Bee*. A scat-

tered few local newspapers provided some low-profile pieces.

The most outspoken editorial appeared in the *Orange County Register* (part of the libertarian-oriented Freedom Newspapers group) and labeled the selective coverage of election returns "a

New York Vote

actually had no returns from any New York county.

"Then where" I persisted, "did you get the figures which you just gave me?" After some hesitation came the reply, "The News Election Service, and that's all they gave us and if you got a problem with that, I suggest you give them a call." Indeed. Here is the New York State Board of Elections, relying on the services of a television network cooperative to provide early election returns, and (unless the caller were extremely persistent) disseminating that information as if the Board itself were the source.

During the day following the election, several of us were able to contact the majority of upstate New York county boards of elections and, in every case, were cheerfully given their latest count on every candidate on the ballot. The downstate counties, however, proved to be a very different story.

When Robert Goodman, New York City LP Candidate for State Assembly, first told me that there was no way to get vote totals from any of the New York City Boards of Elections, I was incredulous. When I called the Election Boards in Manhattan, Brooklyn,

Queens, Bronx and Staten Island, however, they all gave me the same story: "We don't have a single voting machine or tally here; the police department has them all locked up. Try calling them or the News Election Service."

As a third party candidate, Bob's vote totals had not been collected by NES. During the days following the election, Bob attempted to find out what his own vote total had been. The Bronx Board of Elections referred him to "New York's Finest," from whom he learned that all the election results were available at One Police Plaza (the NYPD's headquarters).

Arriving at that location, he was denied access to the information and told that the totals had already "been released to the public"—that the NYPD had given the tallies to the News Election Service, and maybe he should call them. (He did, just to be sure, and NES had only collected the information of the other two candidates in that race.) Bob then demonstrated to the NYPD information officer that he was a bona fide, on-the-ballot candidate, and asked if he could be given only the vote totals for his own assembly district race. He explained that regardless of what had been made available, NES had not recorded his votes. The information officer responded by saying that the

only way he could release any information was to a person holding either a Police Department Press Pass, or a court order.

Having published a few articles in his time, Bob inquired about how one might get such a pass. He was told that the issuing officer was on vacation but, in any case, acquiring a NYPD Press Pass takes several weeks under the best of circumstances.

Not having the funds to retain an attorney to apply for a court order, Bob contacted several state officials, most of whom expressed shock and dismay that he was unable to find out how he did in the election. They indicated that it seemed contrary to state election law to withhold that information from any member of the public, and suggested that he file a Freedom of Information Law inquiry. Under New York Law, however, the agency has 30 days to respond to such a request. Further, the initial response generally takes the form of "we're working on your request," which gives them another couple of months to respond with the actual information requested.

It became clear that the totals would be certified (and finally available) a bit sooner than the information could be obtained with a FOIL request, so Bob decided to wait.

truly Orwellian move." The editorial, reprinted in several dailies, asked "Do you have any idea how many votes Libertarian Party presidential candidate Ron Paul or New Alliance Party candidate Lenora Fulani got nationwide? Neither do we . . ." The editorial concluded by wondering if "our media [are] so complacent and lazy, so happy to get taxpayer funded advertising from the major parties, that they consider it their duty to suppress any news of divergence from the ruling hegemony?" These are strong words, but the question is worth pondering.

The Populist Party Suit

As one of the libertarian activists taking part in pre-election efforts to alert local news reporting organizations and attempt to dissuade the national media from their proposed election reporting plans, I lived for nearly two weeks with a telephone receiver stuck to the side of my head. One of the many people who contacted me during this period was Silvia Benitez of the New Jersey Populist Party.

Silvia had gotten my name from a member of the New York City LP. When she called me, during the last week in October, she was in the process of single-handedly putting together a suit against NES and the networks regarding the proposed plan for election night coverage, and was trying to gather information for that effort. She explained that the petition was to be filed in the Federal District Court of New Jersey, on behalf of the New Jersey Populist Party and the Ron Paul for President Campaign Committee.

The Ron Paul People eventually withdrew, but the petition was filed on schedule.⁹ The complaint recited the well documented facts surrounding the NES's election coverage plans, along with several somewhat vague and unsupported allegations regarding a network conspiracy to change official vote totals (which was to be accomplished by means of computers and telephone lines). The relief requested included both monetary damages and injunctive

relief in the form of a restraining order. Specifically, the petition asked for a court order compelling NES and its parent organizations to report *all* the election results and to report them accurately. Implied in such an order would be a requirement to abstain from disseminating any results if the defendants could not report in compliance with the court's order.

While both specific and punitive damages are available to a plaintiff after he or she has been libeled, the courts have traditionally refused to order defendants to either say, or refrain from saying, a particular thing before the fact. Even when the plan is to publish purloined government documents, as it was

tion officials not only contribute to the gathering process, but also rely on the incomplete information as their own, pending the official canvass, when that monopoly was created with the permission of the federal government—then, yes, it is monstrous. The News Election Service, however, is just a handy way of describing a collection of individuals, and it is on this basis that change is most likely to be brought about.

It is not necessary to be a minor party member or sympathizer to be offended by lies being presented as truth. If you would like to see things done differently, act on it.

The NES is no more than a collection of individual people. It is quite possible that many of those involved can be persuaded to "do what is right *because* it is right." Inform the people who are responsible for this practice that you are aware of it and do not approve. Write or call all your local newspeople. Write to the networks, as well as your state AP and

UPI offices. Silence is consent.

If you have little faith in moral persuasion, there are other routes. Individual suits are out of the question, and the party with the best case has no interest in pursuing legal relief for the lies about its candidates. There is, however, the anti-trust problem. Although I was unable to get unequivocal confirmation, I got the distinct impression from my research that the Justice Department's approval of NES was reluctant, and only won by promises of integrity and pledges to serve the "public interest" . . . So, why not take a minute and write to your congressperson, or the Anti-Trust Division of the Justice Department, and ask some questions—whatever questions *you* may have about the NES monopoly. Be sure to send copies to the CEOs of the major networks and wire services. I'm sure they'd be interested. □

Notes

1. Attempts to discover the details of, or possible conditions attached to, this approval have, thus far, been unavailing.
2. All election results are unofficial until the official canvass, often several weeks subsequent to a national election. In most states,

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Is the NES a "monster"? When accuracy means so little to a reporting organization, when state election officials not only contribute to the gathering process, but also rely on the incomplete information as their own, pending the official canvass, when that monopoly was created with the permission of the federal government—then, yes, it is monstrous.

in the celebrated "Pentagon Papers" case, the courts have been unwilling to grant such relief.¹⁰ Rooted in the First Amendment, the reluctance to order a prior restraint has been, perhaps, the most consistently upheld interpretation of any portion of the Bill of Rights.

The request for an injunction was, not surprisingly, ultimately denied. The suit for damages remains, however, and the plaintiffs have dropped allegations of tampering with the official vote. Pursuing what could amount to a major suit in Federal Court, even on a "shoe-string," requires experienced legal counsel and some money for expenses. Absent support from other minor parties, the suit seems unlikely to get very far. My latest information is that the New York State Right to Life Party is planning to join as co-plaintiffs and the New Alliance Party has it under consideration. The Libertarian Party has rejected the idea of any legal action.¹¹

The "Locked NES" Monster

Is the NES a "monster"? I think so. When accuracy means so little to a reporting organization, when state elec-

Rebuttal

Ghost Dancing With "Inalienable" Rights

by Andrew B. Lewis

We have—or should have—certain rights. But are they "inalienable"? Does it matter?

In his essay "The Absurdity of Alienable Rights" (*Liberty*, January 1989) Sheldon Richman invokes Thomas Jefferson, wraps himself in the Declaration of Independence as though it were a ghost-dancer's medicine shirt, and armed with the coup stick of linguistic confusion sallies forth to do battle with the opponents of natural rights theory in general and with Ethan O. Waters in particular. The only casualty is his argument. That is fortunate, for his shrill and apodictic harangue endangers what it attempts to defend.

Sheldon Richman asserts that rights must be inalienable to be meaningful, that inalienable rights are essential to the concept of self-ownership, and that self-ownership is central to libertarianism. I disagree on every point.

No one can deny that rights can be violated, usurped, or destroyed. If any of these lamentable events occur, then what does it matter that these rights were "inalienable"? Thomas Jefferson considered it self-evident that life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness were inalienable. Nietzsche considered the dichotomy between Master and Slave self-evident. Louis XIV of France considered divine right of kings self-evident. Perhaps Nietzsche and Louis Capet do not deserve mention in the same breath as Jefferson, but their beliefs were as well grounded in fact as his.

Richman attempts to demonstrate the logical necessity of inalienable rights by showing the concept of alienable rights to be absurd.

His primary target is the concept of the voluntary slave contract. He asserts

that such contracts have, *a priori*, no validity. But voluntary slave contracts, or indentures as they were commonly known, have nevertheless existed. When Benjamin Franklin ran away from his master, he was in violation of a law that depended on another frame of reference than ours or Thomas Jefferson's.

Richman argues that contract slavery is absurd because the slave would have to surrender his will to a master and would then be incapable of hearing or comprehending—much less obeying—the master's commands. Therefore, contract slavery, and all slavery for that matter, is impossible because a true slave would be an inert lump of meat and bone. He insists that "In the strictest sense, all actions are voluntary."

That is a very dangerous statement because it is so easily misinterpreted.

Imagine the naive observer who concludes that one group performed certain apparently unpleasant tasks such as toting bales of cotton in the hot sun voluntarily, while another group voluntarily sat in the shade and drank bourbon to beat the heat. The observer would then decide that one group consisted of natural servants and the other of natural masters.

If this naive observer were a black child of the antebellum South, then the discrepancy between his frame of reference and his true feelings would drive him insane with hatred and frustration. His only solace would be hope in a better world after death.

If this naive observer is a white child of the antebellum South, he would learn to punish "aberrant" behavior in rebellious chattel, and the discrepancy between his world view and his true feelings would drive him insane with repressed guilt. He would find solace in projecting the evil in his way of life onto the black, in romanticizing violence, and in perverting his spiritual heritage in an attempt to find some superpersonal justification for his actions, his social structure, and his way of life. Thousands died to straighten out such misunderstandings.

Where did Mr. Richman go wrong?

He insists that a slave must exercise his will to hear and comprehend a command. But a slave exercises nothing at all to hear and comprehend a command if he is conscious, he can hear, and he can understand the language in which the command was given. If one can will to perform it, one can will not to perform that action. I challenge anyone, by

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Appraisal

What Went Wrong With the Paul Campaign

by G. Duncan Williams

Ron Paul's interview in the January *Liberty* is candid and revealing. Particularly interesting is his insistence on being "positive": "I just ignore people who want to be negative"; and the fact that he "feels good about the whole thing" as "the one who was on the road for eighteen months." Ignoring the negative is practicing what August Comte called "cerebral hygiene," which might also be called, "planting one's head firmly in the sand." Paul's outlook is also eerily reminiscent of what has euphemistically been called the "detached management style" of Ronald Reagan.

The leaders of the Ron Paul movement promised the Libertarian Party at Seattle four things about their campaign: (1) that we would get an articulate, intelligent, credible candidate; (2) that the candidate would be a hard-core libertarian, with no compromising or waffling, and with an Old Right tone and accent; (3) that they would raise a helluva lot of money; and (4) that they would run a competent, *professional* campaign—the 8 minute TV spot exhibited at the convention being a sample of such an effort.

The Paul campaign came through extremely well on points (1) through (3); but, let's face it, they flopped badly on point (4). The Paul campaign was very far from professional or competent, and that was tragic, because we failed in our opportunity to make a significant impact on American politics. If they had run a truly professional campaign, we could easily have broken through to one million votes, and possibly even to two million—and that would have greatly increased party membership, and media and public recognition, and would have spread our hard-core libertarian message far and wide.

Furthermore, we can never be *really* positive about any campaign or about the LP *until* we have first weighed the various criticisms and engaged in unsparing cri-

tiques of our own efforts. How else can we ever learn from our mistakes if we don't first acknowledge that we have made any? Or are we all supposed to be infallible or, as the fundamentalists say of the Bible, "inerrant?"

The major error of the Paul campaign was not to buy any television advertising. This fatal defect has been pointed out by Chester Arthur and others. It is absurd to say, as Ron Paul did, that no TV can be purchased from a campaign kitty of \$3 million. We live in a television age; campaigns do not exist unless the candidates are seen on TV; and to be seen on free TV, we must first spread the message on paid-TV. It was the TV ads of the 1980 Clark campaign that generated the high vote totals, as well as the national excitement over the Clark campaign among the general public and among LPers themselves (regardless of what one may think of the *content* of those TV ads.)

But the lack of TV ads is only a symptom—though the most important one—of the enormous mismanagement of the Paul campaign. Other symptoms included: the failure to have any brochures, buttons, bumper-stickers, and the various paraphernalia that link a campaign to the public and to party members; the failure to hire a professional and competent press secretary; the failure to hire a professional PR man until very late in the campaign, and then sniping at his successes; and the placing of absolute power over the campaign into the hands of someone who, at very best, was a control-oriented autocrat totally inexperienced in national campaigns, and, at worst, someone engaged in long-time financial imbroglios that served at the very least as a severe distraction from the campaign.

In contrast, the great shining spot of the Paul campaign was the Ballot Access effort, spearheaded by Burt Blumert, which garnered over \$600,000 and got us

on the ballot in forty-six states.

At the root of the incredible mismanagement of the Paul campaign, and in particular of its failure to purchase ads on TV, was the conscious decision by Ron Paul to allocate virtually all available funds into his personal travel and speaking schedule. If ten Libertarians in Boise, Idaho, for example, wanted to hear him, he was there, with an entourage of one or two; it was Houston to San Francisco, San Francisco to Houston, Houston to Boise, Boise to Houston, etc., etc., for the entire campaign. As we all know, travel costs—even when traveling coach and not first-class *a la* Russell Means—mount up. When Ron Paul told *Liberty* that the \$3 million intake went for "travel expenses, overhead, and mail," he was undoubtedly correct. But *what* travel expenses! And *why*?

It's fine to travel and rally the troops in the *early* stages of a campaign, after the nomination. But it does not pay to keep on doing so, especially when this manner of campaigning prevents the buying of TV ads. Much of the fund-raising pitch was based on the idea of buying TV ads. And it is not as though all talk of TV advertising vanished from the discussions of Ron Paul's advisors: I have it on good authority that precisely the opposite is true. So the crucial question is: why did Ron Paul fail to follow their advice?

This brings me back to Ron Paul's revealing "I feel good about the whole thing" as the person on the road for eighteen months, and Ed Clark's remark that Ron "worked very, very hard; he worked harder than any other candidate has ever worked." Precisely. Clearly, unless we believe in the labor theory of value, Ron worked *too darn* hard, and did so, despite all suggestions or criticisms, because he enjoyed it, because he greatly enjoys traveling and speaking about liberty. Well, that's splendid of course, but here is a case of too much of a good thing, a self-indulgence that perhaps cost us over half-a-million votes and a place in history. Or, to put it another way, Ron worked much too hard at what he loved doing (traveling and speaking) and not nearly enough at the less exhilarating task of thinking about the organizing and the management and the strategy of his own campaign.

So who in 92? It is two years too early to answer that question. But, during these years, we must not commit too early, we must keep ourselves open to candidates rising from within our ranks as well as to spectacular converts from the outside, and, above all, we must be prepared to insist that our next candidate adhere to all the four points mentioned above. □

Proposal

The Oath of Purity

by Johnny Fargo

To be a member of the Libertarian Party you must sign an oath. Most Libertarian Party members consider it a perfect way of keeping their party "pure." Unfortunately for the oath's supporters, some of the less-than-perfectly pure are also perfectly reasonable . . .

For three weeks now, this thing has been sitting on my desk—unsigned. My name and address are preprinted on the form, my check is made out and in the envelope—waiting. I reach for the pen, but my hand refuses to pick it up. Once again, I read the statement I am required to sign: "I hereby certify that I do not believe in or advocate the initiation of force . . ." It's just a simple matter of renewing my annual membership in the Libertarian Party.

Of course I don't advocate using force. I'm no thug. I'm not the type to use brute force to take candy away from kids or to beat up little old men. It's just not in me, and yet. . .

My mind goes back a number of years. A libertarian convention. A non-libertarian speaker—one of those Republicans who advocates a free market but also worries a lot about an adequate national defense. He stood before the audience, a little nervous, out of his element. He hesitated as he spoke. Then his curiosity apparently got the better of him. Seemingly, he had to know just how solid this pack of opposition was before he launched into the main thrust of his speech.

What if, he said, what if we got rid of every bit of government—we sell the roads, abolish the welfare system, privatize education, and so forth—everything except a 5 percent tax to finance our national defense. Thus we would be 95 percent free! And without that 5 percent tax for national defense, let's assume the military forces of Canada, Mexico, or Cuba might invade and take us over. What if that were the case? What if the only choice the forces of reality present-

ed us was the choice between being 95 per cent free or being 90 per cent enslaved? Which would you choose?

Would you stick rigidly by your principle of not initiating force—not even to collect the 5 percent tax used solely for national defense—and thus end up with almost no freedom at all? Or, at that point, would you compromise your sacred principle for the sake of remaining 95 per cent free? If reality only offered those two options—which is certainly conceivable—how many here would vote to keep the 5 per cent tax? How many? Raise your hands.

My gut feeling was: of course, I'd vote for keeping the tax. Then I gave the idea a moment of serious thought and concluded that my gut feeling was absolutely right—if those were the only alternatives available. But I was not about to raise my hand. I was sitting in the front row, and I pictured rotten tomatoes, old shoes, and big stones hitting me in the back of the head.

But then the speaker smiled and relaxed. The last thing I expected, he said, was to be among friends. I turned around—over half of the people had their hands up. I raised my hand, stretched it high. It felt good, it felt right. But then how could I be a Libertarian? I betrayed the party of principle. I felt like

a goody-good kid in Catholic Sunday School, and I had just found out that the priest knew all along that I secretly masturbated.

Now as I sit here trying to sign this statement so I can get this damn thing out before the mailman comes, another thought comes to mind: I think of my neighbor, Joe, across the street. I like Joe.

I picture him in front of his old pickup truck parked in the street on a Saturday afternoon, fiddling with the radiator hose. And I'm pulling some of the weeds out of my front yard. Then I see this big cement truck rolling down the hill. The driver had forgotten to set the brake before he got out. The thing is rolling straight toward Joe. But Joe is a little slow, and after a couple of six-packs—hell, there ain't no way. By the time I could get Joe's attention and attempt to explain what the hell's happening, it would be too late.

Instead, I dash across the street at top speed. I drive my right shoulder into Joe, pick him up, and we both go crashing down on his front lawn. My football coach would be proud of me. But I initiated brute force against my neighbor, I bruised him, I busted two of his ribs. Will they excommunicate me from the party of principle? How can I possibly sign this statement and get this thing out

for the mailman?

If I were more creative, I imagine I could recite a long list of exceptions to the holy principle that a rational, moral, and upright person might make under certain conditions. It's a damned good principle, a good rule of thumb. But not a sacred cow.

I picture Ed Clark standing on the back of that flatbed truck, giving a speech during his 1980 campaign for the presidency. He would reduce taxes by a full third—that's pretty radical. But what of the other two-thirds? Would he utilize the brute force of government, or the threat thereof, to collect it? He would legalize the "soft" drugs. But what about the hard drugs? Would he employ the hired gunmen of government to prevent people from peacefully using these substances?

Ed Clark. He was our hero, our spokesman. More than anyone else, he represented the party of principle to the general public. Then why the hell did he have to hide our holy principle? Why did he have to subvert it, compromise it, or skirt it while campaigning in public? Why couldn't he put it right up front?

I try to imagine myself standing on a

soap box in front of my own relatives, co-workers, and neighbors and saying: "We must abolish all taxes! Right now! Public schools, roads, police, social security, national defense—all gone. Right now!" But I couldn't do that, not in front of my mother. My heart is with Ed Clark no matter what the party purists said about his compromising the party of principle. "The party of principle? You're more like a party of hypocrites—when the going

less brute force in our efforts to resolve the world's problems?

"I mean, clubs and guns are nasty things. And I realize that some people get real excited about utilizing them against others, and I know Adolf Hitler could have used more people like that. But just as a matter of principle, don't you think we could be just a little less bloodthirsty, just a little less savage about how we go about solving the world's problems—just a little less brute force."

If we reduced taxes by a third, that would be a solid reduction in the use of brute force or the threat thereof. And legalizing the "soft" drugs—that would be another size-

able step in the right direction. In fact, any reduction in government would normally imply a reduction in brute force—for the essence and business of government itself is the domination and manipulation of people with the use of organized brute force or the threat thereof.

And my neighbor, Joe, with his bruised body and busted ribs . . . what was the alternative? Which way entailed the least amount of brute force initiated against Joe? Reality sometimes doesn't offer nice clean choices. And that choice between being 95 per cent free and 90 per cent enslaved—which alternative would entail the least amount of brute force amongst people. After all, we are advocating less brute force within the world, not more.

Imagine all that bickering between the party purists and the not-so-holy. With this new principle, such divisions and bickering might vanish. We could all advocate, without reservations, a society with a little less brute force in human relationships. And how many millions who are ideologically just outside the party of principle could now stand solidly behind our banner?

We could be in the forefront on a lot of issues. We would be against wife-battering, child-beating, rape, armed robbery, and gang violence—as well as being against the legal acts of brute force initiated by the agents and employees of government. I envision us as the leading edge of the humanistic movement—advocating a kinder, more peaceful, more benevolent world, one with a little less brute force.

Ed Clark. He was our hero, our spokesman. More than anyone else, he represented the party of principle to the general public. Then why the hell did he have to hide our holy principle? Why did he have to subvert it, compromise it, or skirt it?


gets rough, the first thing you compromise is your holy principle. Why can't you just face it and be more realistic?"

But the party of principle—it has such a nice ring to it. It differentiates us from all those other guys and puts us a little closer to the angels. But principle must be *public*; I want to put my principle up front, I want to wear it on my sleeve.

Thus, I have a modest proposal: let's change the principle. Instead of totally denouncing the initiation of all brute force—right now! for all time, for any reason whatever, and in all cases—what if we changed our basic principle to: "I hereby certify that I believe in and advocate initiating a little less brute force in human relationships." It wouldn't matter whether such force is used to achieve political or social goals, or private ones, let's just have a little less of it. Of course, a huge reduction in brute force would be more than welcome, but let's at least have a little less.

"A little less brute force, please." I could shout that from the rooftops. I could even go up to my devoted statist neighbor and say: "Yes, I realize you would have government guarantee everyone a job, pay everyone's medical bills, feed the hungry, house the homeless, subsidize the farmers, and so on, but can't we use just a little

A rose
is a rose
is a rose
is a nose
is a rose
is a hockey
puck...



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We would be standing on the moral high ground with our principle held high for all the world to see. For who could possibly be against us? Only those advocating *more* brute force.

"But how could you possibly advocate more brute force? You must be some sort of sadist. Do you experience a secret joy in brutalizing your fellow human beings or having it done to them by government? Perhaps by identifying yourself with an authoritarian system that initiates brute force against countless others, you are manifesting a subconscious lust for power over others. I realize that the Nazis and the Fascists were on the side of an increased role for brute force for the sake of social control, but haven't we outgrown such reactionary methods? Can't we be just a little more civilized, a little more humanistic, a bit more benevolent towards others?"

Yes, I am certainly in favor of helping the homeless, but let's not reach for a gun or a club by which to brutalize our brothers and sisters in our efforts to help the unfortunate. We might think of thousands of more creative and more benevolent ways by which to help them. Reaching for the instruments of brute force is a rather primitive, knee-jerk reaction to a legitimate problem.

Yes, I am against those nasty drugs: alcohol, heroin, tobacco, cocaine, caffeine, you name it. But let's not compound such problems by brutalizing others, let's not compound the problem by increasing the level of violence within the human community. A little less brute force, please.

Personally, I applaud the bleeding-heart do-gooders of the world. I tend to be one of them. The world could use a lot more people out there doing good, caring for the unfortunate, and so on. But imagine a do-gooder armed with political power, armed with the guns of government. Imagine a do-gooder wielding a gun or a club by which to initiate—or threaten to initiate—brute force against his fellow human beings in the name of "doing good." Only a twisted sense of logic or a perverted moral sense could justify such depravity.

Meanwhile, millions of real do-gooders, not morally perverted power-mongers, do exist and are out there every day doing good in the real world. They work and produce goods for the masses, they may share part of their incomes with the less fortunate, they may spend hours of their own time doing good, or they

may simply show compassion and decency in their everyday dealings with other people. But they don't wield or advocate the guns and clubs of political power as an instrument of "doing good." It would take someone with a sadistic streak, or perhaps a devoted fascist mentality, to advocate initiating brute force against one's fellow human beings and calling it "doing good."

With our new principle, we would be traveling in exactly the same direction the party purists would have us travel. As each reduction in brute force is attained, we would advocate still a little less brute

force (ideally, until there was none)—always moving in the direction of the holy ones who would stand as our guiding lights. But with one difference: with our new principle, we could perhaps move a lot faster, we could perhaps move with a much broader base. We might even become a viable political movement. And no longer would some one like Ed Clark have to hide or hedge or compromise his principle. And I could get this damned membership renewal off my desk and out for the mailman.

Just a little less brute force, please. □

Spend a week discussing the ideas of liberty!



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Essay

The Fires of Yellowstone

by Jane S. Shaw

They are out now. But last summer's conflagration had many lessons for those concerned with the eco-system—not the least of which was that political power has influenced diverse environmental groups to unite in *avoiding* an unpleasant truth.

Do you remember the threat to the Old Faithful Lodge, the evacuation of Yellowstone National Park's gateway towns, and the \$120 million ultimately spent to put the fires out?

As these details fade into history, we are getting a different view of the fires—a picture of the conflagration as one of the best things that ever happened to Yellowstone. Articles in prominent publications after the fires focused on the positive side: *Science News* told its readers about "After the Flames: Awaiting the Regeneration of Yellowstone"; *Science* reported on "Ecologists' Opportunity in Yellowstone's Blaze"; and *The New York Times Magazine* presented "The Case For Burning."

The upbeat tone of these articles has more to do with the power of a political lobby, supported by a government information machine, and the ignorance of the public than it has to do with scientific consensus about the effects of the fires.

To be fair, the fires did some good. From 1886 until 1972, all fires had been suppressed in Yellowstone Park, as park managers reflected the wisdom of the day, which was that the parks should be havens from destruction, human or natural. In 1972, the policy changed to allow lightning-caused fires to burn.

But nothing was done to suppress the buildup of the previous 86 years. So, in 1988 the flames burned out of control.

It might have been different if the on-the-ground Park Service managers had the freedom and incentive to manage fires the way private organizations do. For examples, The Nature Conservancy sets fires deliberately at its Pine Butte Preserve in northern Montana, one of the last lowland habitats of the grizzly bear. But the leaders of the politically important environmental groups dominate Park Service policy and they consider deliberate fires "unnatural," just as they consider suppressing fires "unnatural."

Yellowstone's fires are the second chapter in a story that started a few years ago when Alston Chase, a former philosophy professor who moved out to a Montana ranch, began writing *Playing God in Yellowstone*. His 1986 book was a devastating critique of the condition of the wildlife in Yellowstone. His thesis can be summarized by saying that the park is out of kilter; elk and bison are overrunning the place; and animals such as grizzly bears, beaver and antelope are disappearing because park managers are following a "natural regulation" or "hands off" policy. The "let it burn" philosophy is part of that.

Chase's criticism stunned a government agency that has long basked in the warmth of public approval and environmentalist support. It was particularly galling because Chase was close to Yellowstone—he was chairman of the Yellowstone Association, a quasi-private group of prominent citizens that supposedly advises Yellowstone management.

Park Service officials responded to Chase's criticisms by saying that there is no wildlife problem. Although the evidence is pretty strong the other way, these officials do have power on their side. The top environmental leaders, the ones who move in and out of government posts, pretty much wrote the policy. These people, like Nathaniel Reed, a board member of the National Audubon Society and a former Assistant Secretary in charge of parks at the Interior Department, oppose any serious criticism of the Park Service.

"There's a sense among environmentalists that you should rally behind the bureaucracies that are your friends," explains Thomas Graff, an attorney for the Environmental Defense

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Discussion

Eyeing the Top of the Pyramid

"If one wants to change the culture of our day and age," wrote Jeffrey Friedman in the March *Liberty*, "then one goes to the top of the intellectual pyramid—to the professors who educate [the] intellectuals—and works one's way down." By failing to recognize this fact, he argues, libertarians have wasted their efforts. Two of *Liberty's* editors challenge Friedman's thesis.

Mr Friedman at the Apex

Murray N. Rothbard

The trouble with Mr Friedman's article is that, written as it is from the apex of his beloved "intellectual pyramid," his view of the rest of us peons down below has gotten murky and obscure. His opinion of life and history is ass-backwards: applied to *previous* centuries, his simplistic view of the Pyramid is one-sided enough; applied to the present era it is dead wrong. In the current age of TV and modern communications, the Pyramid is often upside-down and a two-way street. All too often, Friedman's cherished intellectuals, like politicians and Supreme Court justices, *follow the election returns*. That is, to put it in economic jargon, they are often demand rather than supply-oriented. After the 900,000 votes of the Clark campaign in 1980, lo and behold, and as if by magic, many economics textbooks devoted an entire section to a respectful and fairly accurate account of libertarianism. But after Friedman and his buddies jumped ship in 1983 following their defeat at the presidential convention, and the Bergland vote fell to 227,000 the following year, for some obscure reason the textbook writers high on that Pyramid (though not of course up in the stratosphere with Comrade Friedman) lost all intellectual interest in libertarianism and it disappeared from the pages of textbooks. On a lower but still highly

important level, Mr Friedman's vaunted opinion-moulders recently went into whirlwind changes, as their estimate of George Bush speedily moved from unelectable preppy wimp to vital man-of-the-people.

By Mr Friedman's theory, we at the bottom of the pyramid are expected to forget about politics or journalism or the real world: our only intellectual duty is to pour all our financial resources into the few Masters at the apex of the pyramid and then be content to wait a thousand years until the goodies of liberty seep slowly down to the social bottom.

But no—by Mr Friedman's own self-serving version of the trickle-down theory, we at the bottom of the pyramid are expected to forget about politics or journalism or the real world: our only intellectual duty is to pour all our financial resources into the few rarefied Masters at the apex of the pyramid (say, into *Critical Review*, which he edits) and then be content to wait a thousand years until the goodies of liberty seep slowly down to the social bottom. As for those of us

who are so moronic or impatient that we find politics more exciting than participating in the turgid hermeneutical dialogue up there at the pinnacle—well, Mr Friedman will graciously allow us to run some political campaigns, but *only*, mind you, in order to win respectability from his academic buddies.

But oh my friends, how libertarianism will be transformed after the thousand-year trickle-down—in fact is being transformed *right now* at the pinnacle! For, you see, the one thing that respectable left-liberal academics (and who *else* is respectable up there?) will not stand for is libertarianism that is harsh, consistent, clear-cut, hard-edged, "dogmatic." They will only admit to the pantheon of respectability—and tenure—a libertarianism that is suitably qualified, hesitant, confused, turgid, oh-so-very "open," in fact a "libertarianism" that sounds very much like half-assed, relativistic Marxism badly translated from the Old Bulgarian! So: who is influencing *whom* in that dizzying atmosphere at the apex of the pyramid? Only one guess is needed.

Mr Friedman's concept of the Pyramid is dead wrong on another, related count. He forgets that in the bad old days of the nineteenth century, many intellectuals and opinion-moulders, yea, even some of the thinkers at the apex, actually wrote in lucid English. Ponder—and shudder to—the fact that John Stuart Mill was a best-selling author; even his book on logic sold well! But the

guys at the top these days write in an inscrutable, hermetically sealed jargon which can influence no one (certainly no second-hand opinion-moulders!) except graduate students in hot pursuit of jobs and tenure—the most pitiful captive audience in the world.

Mr Friedman is also wrong on the other major point of his article. He has the odd view that *politics* makes intellectual attitudes narrower and more dogmatic, and hence the reason why, in my inveterate pursuit of narrowness and dogma, I changed my mind and joined the Libertarian Party. The truth is precisely the reverse. If you want intellectual purity and consistency, you had best stick to discourse with four or five friends. To leap into a mass movement, a political party, means that inevitably you will have to deal with a much broader range of thought, and the fight for even broad consistency (let alone the delights of narrow dogma) is much more difficult.

No, the reason for my change of mind is much simpler, if less vivid and demonic than Mr Friedman's version. When the Libertarian Party was founded in 1971, I thought that there were only ten or twelve libertarians in the whole country, and so the idea of a Party seemed absurdly premature. I soon found out different: that the Party, even in its formative days, was a marvelous method of finding, energizing, and *creating* libertarians. (My god, it short-circuits his Sacred Pyramid!) Despite the travails and headaches, I have been a happy member of the Libertarian Party since I joined in the spring of 1973.

There is, of course, nothing new about Mr Friedman's call for "openness" and respectability. For a century, our culture has been stifled and our intellectual wells poisoned by what can only be called "bullshit liberalism": the idea that it is man's highest (top-pyramid) calling to search for the truth, but that God forbid he ever *finds* it, for then he becomes a narrow, unrespectable, controversial, "dogmatist!" God forbid, too, he ever writes in plain English, for that too is a bottom-pyramid failing. Because if ever one *finds* the truth, especially if one finds a truth as lovely and inspiring as libertarianism, then watch out! For then one is in danger of spending the rest of one's life, not only trying to refine and elaborate the theory, but worse yet, actually trying to embody that theory of liberty

in real-world political institutions! That is *one* strategy of life, one that apparently irritates the likes of Mr Friedman, and even (horrors!) diverts resources from his beloved apex.

The alternative strategy, the strategy suggested by Mr Friedman, is to be "flexible" enough to adapt and mould your former principles in order to cozy up to the gravy train of funds, power, and respectability, wherever you happen to be placed on the Pyramid. At the lower parts of the Pyramid, this means sucking up to the Reagan/Bush administration, or running Pete duPont for President; in the heady and stratospheric zone where Mr Friedman has his being, this means questing for academic posts and tenure by plunging into the mire of liberal-Marxoid hermeneutics. While the rest of us drones wait forever and kick in resources—if, of course, we can stomach the spectacle. □

What's Wrong with Friedman's Pyramid

R. W. Bradford

Jeffrey Friedman's "The End of Political Activism" is an important contribution to the discussion of the strategy of advancing liberty, not only for his criticism of the Libertarian Party strategy (which has been discussed at considerable length in these pages), but for raising the whole issue of how political beliefs and ideas are spread through society. Society in the more civilized parts of the world today is organized almost exclusively on a democratic basis. That is, the opinions of the majority of each country's citizens establishes governmental policy. Yet libertarians spend relatively little time examining the issue of how people get their opinions and beliefs.

The Problem with the "Pyramid of Knowledge"

Friedman argues that they gain them via a very specific process: "The 'second hand dealers in ideas'—mass-media and entertainment figures and other opinion leaders—simply retail the original ideas of the creative thinkers, for consumption by the masses . . . In our society, opinion leaders . . . take their cues from expert opinion—i.e., from those even higher on the intellectual pyramid—which they propagate not just by interviewing the likes of Lester Thurow on the news, but, much more importantly, by exercising the judgment moulded by their own

years of secondary and post-secondary education under the tutelage of experts. If one wants to change the culture of our day and age, then, one goes to the top of the pyramid—to the professors who educate [the] intellectual—and works one's way down."

The theory that beliefs are spread from creative thinkers to professors to Dan Rather to the man on the street has a lot of appeal to libertarians. For one thing, most libertarians consider themselves to be intellectuals, so the theory flatters them by convincing them of their own power. For another, the theory has been propounded by Ayn Rand, probably the most influential libertarian thinker. (Rand often responded to questions by her followers about getting involved in political action by saying, "It's earlier than you think," and an explanation that the ideological revolution she advocated had to occur first among intellectuals, after which it would reach the general public via the same mechanism that Friedman delineates.)

Alas, Friedman offers no real defense of the theory: all he offered in his essay was a summary. This is unfortunate. For one thing, with only a few minutes reflection, I can think of several

Of course, the elitism implicit in Friedman's thesis is not really an objection to it. If his thesis is true, the fact that it is elitist and leaves non-"creative thinkers" with nothing to do but slave away and send money to Friedman and his friends is also true, whether the non-"creative thinkers" like it or not.

opinions that came to be very influential in society that did not follow this pattern:

- Christianity: During the early years of the first millennium, Christianity spread throughout the Roman world and eventually took political control of it with little initial help from the intellectual community. Nor did the revival of Christian fundamentalism in the last several decades, after a century of intellectual-led "liberalism," spread because of support from intel-

lectuals and scholars.

- National Socialism: During the 1930s, the Nazis took control of the German state and society via the democratic process with negligible support from the academic or intellectual communities.
- Ku Klux Klanism: During the 1920s, the Ku Klux Klan became a very powerful influence in many parts of the U.S., including most of the South, as well as such northern states as Indiana, Colorado and Oregon. Its racist, nationalist ideology had scant support in the academy.
- Anti-abortionism: During the past two decades, the idea that abortion ought to be treated as a crime by law has steadily grown in influence in the U.S., despite hostility to the notion from virtually the entire academic and intellectual community.

In fact, it sometimes seems that the process is precisely the opposite of Friedman's model: opinion leaders, academics and intellectuals often get their ideas from the community at large (Friedman's "masses"). During the 1980 presidential campaign, it seemed to me that the news media spent an inordinate amount of time trashing the views of Ronald Reagan. Almost immediately after the election, I could perceive a gradual shift: the magnitude of the victory apparently had a subtle effect on the thinking of Dan Rather and Tom Brokaw.

The same thing seems to have happened in the academic world. The landslide victory of Reagan and the 920,000 votes for Ed Clark in 1980 made the idea of less government a lot more respectable and was a boon to the careers of many libertarian-oriented academics. Twenty-five years ago, there were few options open to the young libertarian or classical liberal: a few individual sympathetic scholars at one institution or another, maybe a scholarship or fellowship if one could convince an institution that his views were not too unrespectable. Now, judging from the accounts I read from the Institute for Humane Studies and the Mises Institute, the academic options are many and the fellowships opulent. Why this change? Is it because the leftish establishment has suddenly developed a respect for the idea of human liberty? Or is it because political candidates advocating liberty have succeeded in the political quasi-

marketplace? Now I am not suggesting that the sole cause of this happy development can be found with the advance of libertarian ideas among voters. But I

The fundamental problem with Friedman's thesis is not that there is no truth to it, but that it is simplistic. Some opinions have their origin with intellectuals, but others have their origin in the bourgeoisie, others in the underclass. Some are spread via Friedman's paradigm, others by word of mouth, others by the sword.

think it is foolish to dismiss that explanation totally.

The fundamental problem with Friedman's thesis, I believe, is not that there is no truth to it, but that it is simplistic. We live in a complex world, a world in which opinions and beliefs are spread in many ways. Some opinions and beliefs have their origin with intellectuals; others have their origin in the bourgeoisie, others in the underclass. Some are spread via Friedman's paradigm, others by word of mouth (i.e. between individuals of equal intellectual status), others by the sword. It is simply an error to posit one model (the creative thinker-to-professor-to-Dan Rather-to-the-masses model) as *the* way that opinions and beliefs permeate society.

There are two other elements of Friedman's thesis that I believe deserve comment:


Its implicit elitism: What are those who advocate liberty but who are not professional intellectuals to do? According to Friedman, about the only effective thing they can do is to work hard at their nasty little jobs and send their earnings off to libertarian think tanks and scholarly journals (i.e. give money to Friedman and his colleagues). This

is elitism with a vengeance: non-"creative thinkers"—whether they be doctors or lawyers or factory workers or ditch-diggers—not only waste their time when trying to promote liberty (aside from giving money to Friedman et al); they presumably are expected to sit at the feet of the "creative thinkers" and lap up whatever is offered to them in the way of libertarian thinking.

Of course, the elitism implicit in Friedman's thesis is not really an objection to it. If his thesis is true, the fact that it is elitist and leaves non-"creative thinkers" with nothing to do but slave away and send money to Friedman and his friends is also true, whether the non-"creative thinkers" like it or not.

The problem of learning when to take the story to the masses: Presumably at some point, enough headway among the elite will have been made that it can let the "masses" (as Friedman characterizes non-intellectuals) in on their knowledge of liberty, but how is one to know when the day finally arrives? It seems to me that even from within the model for the transmission of political opinions that Friedman proposes this day cannot be calculated, but is identified only by the success or failure of such transmission; that is, by the success that "mass media and entertainment figures and other opinion leaders" (Friedman's terms) have in selling their ideas to the "masses."

This, I submit, is precisely the situation today: Friedman's "masses" are beginning to pick up on the idea of liberty. As evidence, I cite the popular success of Ronald Reagan's "get-the-government-off-our-backs" rhetoric, the growth of the Libertarian Party, the increasing resistance to tax increases, and the growing consensus that less government is



Baloo

"Remember — Maintain eye contact."

preferable to more. (Don't get me wrong: I'm not suggesting that the battle is won. I only suggest that things look better than they did 25 years ago.)

Even from within the framework of the Hayekian-Randian theory of dispersion of political opinion that Friedman apparently advocates, the demarcation between the nascent stage of an ideological development (when only "creative thinkers" need apply) and the distributive stage is a fuzzy one—a line that can only be discovered by continual experimentation.

About Murray Rothbard

Among the many points in his provocative essay, Friedman argues that Murray Rothbard has worked to make libertarianism into a narrow, dogmatic philosophy: "[Murray] Rothbard may have been a skeptic about the LP, but he soon jumped on the bandwagon because he saw that the political strategy furthered a style of libertarian thought he had already done much to establish—a polemical dogmatism that is indispensable to a 'movement,' but which closes that the minds of its members, narrows their interests and makes them less complete human beings."

This view contrasts sharply with my own experience with Murray Rothbard. Four years ago when I was planning the to launch this magazine, I wrote Murray Rothbard, soliciting his advice, making it clear that *Liberty* would publish a wide range of libertarian thinking. Murray didn't know me from Adam, but was sufficiently interested to take time from a conference where he was speaking to discuss the matter. Our conversation covered a wide range of issues relevant to the proposed periodical: editorial matters, people who might write for it, circulation, the problems of launching a new periodical, people to approach for further advice. Murray freely and generously offered me advice on the issues where he was knowledgeable, and deferred on matters where he had no experience. I explicitly reiterated my intention to publish a periodical open to the full range of libertarian thought, which did not upset Murray at all.

Murray reiterated his support for a periodical open to the full range of libertarian thought in a letter to me a few weeks later: "It seems to me that any good libertarian magazine will have to define, right from the start, what sort of

stuff it will put in. It can consistently express the views of its editor (like *Libertarian Forum*) or it can be genuinely diverse. Either way is fine with me."

Murray has been true to his word: he has contributed both his advice and writing freely, written a letter soliciting subscriptions, helped us recruit writers, and made frequent editorial suggestions. All this he has done on behalf of a journal that explicitly opens itself to the full range of libertarian thinking, including frequent criticisms of many of his

Rothbard has contributed both his advice and writing freely, solicited subscriptions, helped recruit writers, and made frequent editorial suggestions. All this he has done on behalf of a journal that explicitly opens itself to the full range of libertarian thinking, including frequent criticisms of many of his own most passionately held beliefs.

If Rothbard is trying to cast the libertarian movement into a dogmatic mold, as Friedman charges, he has a strange way of going about it.

own most passionately held beliefs. On more than one occasion, he has told me that some essay or another that we have published, including some written by me, have infuriated him. He has criticized my editorial judgment once or twice. But on no occasion has he suggested that we change *Liberty's* open editorial policy. On no occasion has he argued that we should exclude one or another brand of libertarian thinking from our pages.

Now I ask you: is this the record of a man who is seeking to establish "a polemical dogmatism that is indispensable to a 'movement,' but which closes the minds of its members, narrows their interests and makes them less complete human beings," as Friedman argues? If Rothbard is trying to cast the libertarian movement into a dogmatic mold, he has a strange way of going about it. □

Andrew B. Lewis "Ghost Dancing"

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force of will, not to hear and understand any utterance audible to him in a language he knows, much less a command backed by the threat of lash and block.

Richman makes a distinction between slavery and aggressive coercion. There is no such distinction. Slavery is aggressive coercion. Controlling the will of another is not directing the consciousness of another. A master controls a slave directly by limiting the options available to the slave. He offers the choice of obedience or pain, or possibly death. He controls the slave indirectly by training him to accept this state of affairs.

Richman's argument turns in circles on a concept known as "self-ownership." This is a strange sort of ownership in which the object owned cannot be bought, sold, loaned, borrowed or stolen. Why distort the language?

I do not own myself. I am I and not an object to be bought, sold, borrowed or stolen. My personal, social, and political liberty consist in the scope of options available to me at any given moment. If, for example, the only options available are obedience to another or having the flesh carved from my back with a bull-whip, then I am enslaved. Had I been fool enough to enter into a contract with those conditions, I would entertain the option of running away or getting control of the whip.

So what is to be done? Does libertarianism collapse without Neo-Kantian *a priori* justification? Richman implies, inaccurately I hope, that his might. Mine doesn't.

The very fact that my rights are vulnerable to usurpation, violation, and destruction, the very fact that forces exist that can restrict the options available to me—the very fact that techniques and technologies exist which can expunge from my mind the very memory of those rights—makes libertarianism a clear (contingent, not *logical*) necessity.

Ethan Waters insists that there are two libertarianisms (see his "The Two Libertarianisms," *Liberty*, May 1988). I believe there are more. It is good manners and good sense to accept as many libertarianisms as there are libertarians. It may be that the only common ground is the principle of the non-initiation of force. □

Introduction

Anti-Imperialism on the Right

by Bobby Taylor

Leftists aren't the only ones who protested America's plunge into Imperialism.

In the minds of most Americans, modern conservatism is virtually synonymous with the war on communism. Eight years of one of the most conservative presidencies in recent history has produced a mixed legacy of foreign intervention—agonizing defeat in Nicaragua, melodramatic overkill in Grenada, bittersweet triumph in Afghanistan. In the fire of these twilight battles with the “Evil Empire” has been forged a policy—the “Reagan Doctrine”—that has committed this nation to covert destabilization efforts throughout the world. Containment has been abandoned in favor of active, if somewhat subtle, rollback.

A little over seven decades ago, a liberal academic by the name of Woodrow Wilson began a campaign that conservatives of today have taken up with a vengeance—a campaign “to make the world safe for democracy.” Ever since that time, foreign policy decisions have seemed less and less concerned with national security and the protection of lives and property here at home, and more and more concerned with running the affairs of other nations and peoples and imposing home-grown institutions on the benighted heathens of the Third World. American conservatives, usually averse to government intervention domestically, have wholeheartedly endorsed its use abroad, oblivious to its indirect effects on domestic institutions and to its quite direct effects on world peace.

To criticize conservative ideology on this point would be somewhat im-

precise, however, for modern conservatism is but one strain of a rather rich system of thought with roots deep in American history. Dissent has been the rule, not the exception, within the American conservative tradition, and while foreign interventionism may be the consensus position of modern conservatives, it is certainly not the only position—nor has it always been the consensus one, for that matter. The “old Right” of American conservatism, which included such men as Albert Jay Nock and Felix Morley, had a quite different view of foreign policy. The old Right tradition, extending from the early twentieth century into the 1950s, was extremely critical of government power in all its manifestations. Its basic foreign policy directive was nonintervention, and it was suspicious of all those who sought to remake the world through State power. Individual liberty was the foremost value to the old Right, and its adherents saw war and militarism as two of the greatest threats to liberty.

When war came, the old Right would willingly open itself to the opprobrium of a war-crazed public by crit-

icizing the government and denouncing military conflict. Long after the liberals and progressives had found themselves a comfortable niche in the government war machine, Right individualists stood virtually alone, battling the insanity of the moment. Their writings have

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survived to inspire and counsel a new generation of libertarian and conservative scholars.

What follows is a brief examination of the foreign policy ideas of three

members of the old Right and one modern scholar who reflects their influence: William Graham Sumner, an American sociologist who taught at Yale in the late nineteenth century and opposed the Spanish-American War; Frank Chodorov, an editor and writer deemed

"the founding father" of the post-WWII Right; Robert Taft, Republican leader and opponent of interventionism; and Robert Nisbet, former professor of sociology at Columbia University and a communitarian conservative critic of present U. S. foreign policy.

Against Empire

William Graham Sumner (1840–1910) was one of the pre-eminent thinkers of his age. He had impeccable conservative credentials: he was an advocate of *laissez-faire* and free trade; he believed, as a Social Darwinist, in the innate inequality of men and accepted economic competition as a process of societal natural selection; and he upheld the traditional Protestant work ethic as "conducive to wholesome family life and sound public morality."¹

Unfortunately, Sumner's reputation has become clouded in recent times because of his adherence to Social Darwinism, which is viewed by many modern social scientists as an elaborate rationalization for imperialism and racism. This view is deceiving: Social Darwinism was twisted by contemporary politicians to serve as a rationalization for *their* designs for territorial expansion and imperialistic domination. Sumner, who was *the* American Social Darwinist, was also a tireless opponent of war and imperialism. His stinging criticisms of the Spanish-American War and of American efforts to subdue the Filipinos, and his participation in Boston merchant Edward Atkinson's "Anti-Imperialist League," mark him as one of the premier conservative non-interventionists.²

One of Sumner's finest essays on American foreign policy is the ironically titled "The Conquest of the United States by Spain," which argues that by engaging in the Spanish-American War, the United States had won an empire but lost a republic: "we have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies."³ Adopting the aggressive policies of the Old World necessarily entails abandoning our liberty and "throwing the Constitution into the gutter."⁴ Sumner has nothing but contempt for the born-again "internationalists" in Congress,

who have been the foremost proponents of protectionism:

The people who have led us to shut ourselves in, and who now want us to break out, warn us against the terrors of "isolation." Our ancestors all came here to isolate themselves from the social burdens and inherited errors of the old world. . . . When the others [Europeans] are crushed under the burden of militarism, who would not be isolated in peace and industry? When the others are all struggling under debt and taxes, who would not be isolated in the enjoyment of his own earnings for the benefit of his own family? . . . What we are doing is that we are abandoning this blessed isolation to run after a share in the trouble.⁵

The term "isolationist," used to smear Sumner and later opponents of global adventurism, is clearly inappropriate for a man who spent an entire book—aptly entitled *Protectionism*—systematically demolishing protectionist myths and advocating free trade.

Sumner argues that by engaging in the Spanish-American War, the United States had won an empire but lost a republic: "we have beaten Spain in a military conflict, but we are submitting to be conquered by her on the field of ideas and policies."

Sumner advocated peaceful cultural and economic exchange among all the world's peoples. As Murray Rothbard notes with characteristic sarcasm, "[f]oreign intervention is 'international' only in the sense that war is. . ."⁶

Sumner's foreign policy writings—especially "War" and "The Conquest of the United States by Spain"—are remarkably prescient. As Sumner spells

out the political maladies of his time, one can't help but be struck by their similarity to those of modern America. Sumner on "bipartisan foreign policy co-operation": "it has become almost a doctrine with us that patriotism requires that we should hold our tongues while our interests, our institutions, our most sacred traditions, and our best established maxims have been trampled underfoot."⁷ Sumner on the Grenada invasion: "it will be established as a rule that, whenever political ascendancy is threatened, it can be established again by a little war, filling the minds of the people with glory and diverting their attention from their own interests."⁸ Sumner on Ollie North: "[i]t is of the essence of militarism that under it military men learn to despise constitutions, to sneer at parliaments, and to look with contempt on civilians."⁹ Sumner's most frightening prediction—chiefly because it has been fully realized—comes in "War," written in 1903, in which he foresees the bloodbath of twentieth-century totalitarianism:

Never, from the day of barbarism down to our own time, has every man in a society been a soldier until now; and the armaments of to-day are immensely more costly than ever before. There is only one limit possible to the war preparations of a modern European state; that is, *the last man and the last dollar it can control*. What will come of the mixture of sentimental social policy [socialism] and warlike policy? There is only one thing rationally to be expected, and that is a frightful effusion of blood in revolution and war during the century now opening.¹⁰ [emphasis added]

Sumner wrote at the threshold of a new era in American history, an era in which his ideas on economic and foreign policies would come to be regarded as naive and parochial. History, however, has justified his views. After nearly three-quarters of a century of "Wilsonian idealism" in foreign policy, accepted as the gospel by both Democrats and Republicans, America is saddled with global military commitments and an onerous military-industrial complex, and the world is constantly at the brink of nuclear destruction. In our quest for a just world order, we have abandoned the very principles that would make such an order possible. As Sumner would tell us if he

were alive today, the most precious of these principles is individual freedom:

Now, the great reason why all these enterprises which begin by saying to someone else, We know what is good for you better than you know yourself and we are going to make you do it, are false and wrong is that they violate liberty; or, to turn the

same statement into other words, the reason why liberty, of which we Americans talk so much, is a good thing is that it means leaving people to live out their lives in their own way, while we do the same. If we believe in liberty, as an American principle, why do we not stand by it?¹¹

Founding Father

Frank Chodorov (1887–1966) was called “the founding father” of the post-war Right by conservative M. Stanton Evans.¹² During the dark years of the Depression and World War II, when the old Right tradition had reached an all-time low, Chodorov almost single-handedly kept the spirit of individualism alive. Chodorov served as editor of *The Freeman*, analysis, and *Human Events*, using his position to rally readers against the decay of individual responsibility in a society that was slowly surrendering to the ideals of statism. Even in his 70s, Chodorov continued energetically to serve the conservative movement by acting as associate editor of *National Review*, by completing his autobiography *Out of Step: The Autobiography of an Individualist*, and by teaching annually at the Freedom School in Colorado.

By the 1950s, however, Chodorov had begun to lose favor in the conservative movement he had helped found. The issue of communism and the Cold War was splitting the Right, and Chodorov had come down on the “wrong” side of the issue. He was a committed isolationist and an adamant opponent of the witch-hunting and war-mongering that had captured most of the conservative movement. Chodorov struggled in vain against the Right’s devoted Cold Warriors. The interventionist “Buckley faction” emerged triumphant, and Frank Chodorov was unjustly relegated into obscurity by later conservative leaders. But his cogent analyses of foreign policy are remarkably consistent with conservative ideology, and in reading them one is introduced to the rich tradition of the old Right, which has been clouded by the New Right’s sorry pack of militarists and moral crusaders.

Chodorov’s opposition to foreign in-

terventionism was derived from a belief that formed the basis for all of his social thinking: political power is evil and corrupting, and those who wield it are suspect. To quote Chodorov’s “Isolationism” essay, “as isolationism is a natural attitude of the people, so interventionism is a conceit of the political leader. There does not seem to be area enough in the world to satiate his desire to exercise his power . . .”¹³ Chodorov, like Acton, held that “power corrupts, absolute power corrupts absolutely.” He therefore urged that political power be minimized and that citizens jealously guard their liberties against the encroachments of politicians. Our diplomatic and military establishment (“a monstrous bureaucracy with a vested interest in interventionism”¹⁴) is the chief source of the impetus toward foreign meddling, meddling that Chodorov viewed as directly opposed to the national interest and to the wishes of the American people.

In his writings on this subject, Chodorov hit on a topic that would be echoed by revisionist historians: the role of large corporations in influencing American foreign policy. Multinationals—whose board members and large stockholders show up with amazing frequency in our diplomatic corps—have often manipulated American foreign policy decisions in order to protect investments in the Middle East, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Long before the New Leftists stumbled upon this phenomenon, however, old Rightist Frank Chodorov had written about it in one of his most celebrated essays, “A Byzantine Empire of the West?”:

When what was later recognized as American imperialism stepped off the continent into the Caribbean, the prime purpose was to “help our lit-

tle brown brothers,” the secondary one to “remember the Maine.” That our sugar interests profited, that some of our bank stocks likewise prospered, must be put down to sheer coincidence; no evidence of premeditated complicity is adducible. And so, if we go through with this empire-building business, it is quite possible that certain oil and mining stocks will “hit new highs,” certain communications systems will improve their financial position, certain investment trusts will pay out bigger dividends. But that there is any conspiratorial connection between such a result and the loans to Greece and Turkey [Truman Doctrine] will always be an unprovable conjecture. Such is the genius of the cartel.¹⁵

Chodorov was no slavish apologist for big business. He recognized that unless a policy of strict political isolationism was adopted, corporate interests would exercise inordinate influence on

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foreign policy decisions. For Chodorov, however, the best way to curtail such corporate power was to deal with its source—political power.

Like most members of the old Right, he viewed foreign conflict as a danger, first and foremost, because it reduced liberty and aggrandized state power domestically. “A Byzantine Empire of the West?” specifies the implications of Cold War doctrine:

If we go along with this poking into the business of Europe, what will happen to the liberty we have left in America? Already there is a “Red” witchhunt afoot, and experience tells us that when the exigencies of the situation require it the definition of *Red* will include every person who raises his voice against the

going order. Mass hysteria will conveniently support such a definition. So that, in the shadow of the impending "emergency," the outlines of a crowded concentration camp can already be detected.

If war comes—and when did imperialism not bring it?—the worst of what we call communism will come with it. The essential dogma of this creed is that the individual exists only for the purposes of the state. In that respect it must be identified with all other forms of statism, from pharaohism to nazism. Now, when the existence of the state is at stake, even the fiction of individual liberty cannot be tolerated. This is particularly true under the totalitarianism necessitated by modern warfare. Therefore, when our imperialism comes to grip with the empire of the commissars, the very thing we are presumably fighting to preserve will go by the board. Automatically, our liberties will vanish into—communism.¹⁶

Chodorov's fears have proven to be well-founded. As Robert Higgs argues in his recent book, *Crisis and Leviathan*, wars have a "ratchet effect" on governmental power: during war state powers increase dramatically, and they

are only partially given up when peace returns. Chodorov understood this process; he opposed military meddling abroad in order to preserve freedom at home.

Chodorov left a legacy of writings singularly clear and principled, a legacy which modern conservatives have unwisely chosen to ignore. The New Right's obsession with Soviet communism has blinded it to the more serious threat that our own government poses to individual liberty. As he would argue, the chief ideological conflict of our age is not between American state capitalism and Soviet state communism, but between individual freedom and statism of all varieties. He would argue that this conflict will never be settled on the battlefield, but only in the realm of ideas:

Communism is not a person, it is an idea. True, communism without communists is an imaginative notion, just as sin without sinners cannot be. But you cannot get rid of the idea that has possessed the communist by killing him, because the idea may have spread and you cannot destroy every carrier of it. It is better, therefore, to attack the idea than to attack the natives.¹⁷

tions was based on the principle that this policy was the best way to avoid disputes with other nations and to maintain the liberty of this country without war. From the days of George Washington that has been the policy of the United States. It has never been isolationism; but it has always avoided alliances and interference in foreign quarrels as a preventive against possible war, and it has always opposed any commitment by the United States, in advance, to take any military action outside of our territory. It would leave us free to interfere or not interfere according to whether we consider the case of sufficiently vital interest to the liberty of this country. It was the policy of the free hand.¹⁹

As columnist Nicholas von Hoffman noted in a tribute to Taft, his foreign policy "was a way to defend the country without destroying it, a way to be part of the world without running it."²⁰

The object of Taft's foreign policy criticism was not intervention *per se*, but rather "Wilsonian idealism," or the idea that America had the duty to remake the world in its own image. Roosevelt might talk about his desire "to establish a moral order throughout the world,"²¹ and Henry Luce might proselytize for a benevolent "American Century," but Taft recognized such talk as nothing but window dressing for a new American imperialism:

We are to dominate the world as England is said to have dominated it during the nineteenth century, but . . . the domination will be much more effective. We are to be the senior partner in the control. Russia and China will be left to their continental interests, while, with the British as our helpers, we will look after the oceans and the rest of the world. . . .

. . . it is completely contrary to the ideals of the American people and the theory that we are fighting for liberty. . . . It is based on the theory that we know better what is good for the world than the world itself. It assumes that we are always right and anyone who disagrees with us is wrong. It reminds me of the idealism of the bureaucrats in Washington who want to regulate the lives of every American along the lines the bureaucrats think are best for them. . . . Certainly however benevolent we might be, other people simply do not like to be dominated, and we would be in the same

Mr. Republican

Robert Taft (1889–1953) served as a Republican Senator from Ohio from 1939 until his death. He ran unsuccessfully for the Republican presidential nomination in 1952 against Dwight Eisenhower. Taft was given the title "Mr. Republican" for his firm defense of conservative principles in an era dominated by New Deal liberalism. Individual liberty and limited, constitutional government were foremost in his political philosophy, and his pursuit of these objectives proved a constant irritation to Roosevelt, to Truman, and to a number of members of Taft's party.

While Taft was a popular leader who eventually became the titular head of his own party, his views on foreign policy did not sit well with either Democrats or Republicans. He was an advocate of strict neutrality up until the bombing of Pearl Harbor, and following the war he served as a tireless critic of the Cold War and of American involvement in Korea. He infuriated his colleagues in Congress

by refusing to join in the hysteria over the Nazis and Soviets; as he said in a St. Louis speech, "there is a good deal more danger of the infiltration of totalitarian ideas from the New Deal circle in Washington than there will ever be from any activities of the communists or the Nazi bund."¹⁸

Robert Taft was by no means an "isolationist," though he was accused of being one by liberal interventionists like Arthur Schlesinger and the editors of *The New Republic* and *The Nation*. Taft simply believed that the chief aim of our foreign policy should be the protection of the lives and property of American citizens and the maintenance of national security, strictly defined. As the following passage from his book *A Foreign Policy for Americans* suggests, he was an admirer of the traditional American foreign policy of cautious non-interventionism:

Our traditional policy of neutrality and non-interference with other na-

position of suppressing rebellions by force in which the British found themselves during the nineteenth century.²²

Taft feared that "benevolent" imperialism, in addition to inflicting injustices upon foreigners, would fundamentally change the character of government and society. True to his old Right instincts, he felt that incessant intervention abroad would convert the United States "into a militaristic and totalitarian nation as Rome turned from a Republic to an Empire."²³

Taft was especially concerned about the foreign-policy powers that had been assumed by Presidents Roosevelt and Truman under wartime conditions. He felt that Roosevelt's decision to occupy Iceland and convoy British ships prior to the Second World War should have been made by Congress, and he viewed Truman's decision to enter the U.S. into the Korean conflict as an "absolute usurpation of authority by the President."²⁴ Taft viewed the President's discretionary authority to send troops anywhere in the world—even to areas where war was imminent—as a threat to peace and to Congress's constitutional authority to declare war. As events leading up to the

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Vietnam War showed, his point was well taken; the War Powers Act of 1973 was a first step in returning these powers to their proper place, Congress.

During his long tenure in office Robert Taft suffered much criticism for his foreign policy stance. He was smeared as an "isolationist," ridiculed as "naive," and condemned for "obstructing" the interventionists' self-proclaimed crusade to liberate mankind from the Kremlin's yoke. The Vietnam War and Watergate, however, have served to vindicate him, and his criticisms of foreign meddling and executive

power have now gained a justly deserved recognition. Taft was a fierce anticommunist, but like Chodorov he recognized that the fight against communism was ultimately ideological, not military. Victory for freedom will never be achieved until we ourselves choose to live by the ideals of the free society:

A war against communism in the world must finally be won in the minds of men. The hope for ultimate peace lies far more in the full exploitation of the methods I have suggested than in a third world war, which may destroy civilization itself. Far from establishing liberty throughout the world, war has actually built up the development of dictatorships and has only restored liberty in limited areas at the cost of

untold hardship, of human suffering, of death and destruction beyond the conception of our fathers. We may be able to achieve real peace in the world without passing through the fire of a third world war if we have wise leadership. Communism can be defeated by an affirmative philosophy of individual liberty, and by an even more sincere belief in liberty than the Communists have in communism. In the United States we see the product of liberty to be the greatest and most powerful nation the world has ever seen, with the happiest people. If we rise to the power of our strength, there has never been a stronger case to present to the world, or a better opportunity to dissolve darkness into light.²⁵

The Conservative Quest

Robert Nisbet (1913–) is a former professor of sociology at Columbia University. His writings range from history and ethics to sociology and political thought. The breadth and depth of Nisbet's studies almost prevent efforts to place him under any particular ideological heading. His criticism of our bloated federal bureaucracy is matched in intensity by his criticism of modern America's atomistic individualism. Still, from a political perspective, we can place him in the Burkean line of communitarian conservatives. He fears monolithic state power, for it destroys intermediate institutions of family, church, business, and locality—the very fabric of human community. In *The Quest for Community*, he argues for "a type of State [that] is inherently pluralist and, whatever the intentions of its formal political rulers, its power will be limited by associations whose plurality of claims upon their members is the measure of their members' freedom from any monopoly of power in society."²⁶

In contrast to most modern conservatives, however, Nisbet is openly critical of U. S. foreign policy during the twentieth century. "The Lure of Military Society," a chapter in his book *The Twilight of Authority*, focuses on America's drift toward militarism. The lure of the military society, according to him, is its promise of community and shared purpose, which are conspicuous-ly absent in our large and impersonal

commercial society. Unfortunately, war's promise is a false one: military conflict inevitably leads to the centralization of power, the destruction or subordination of smaller social groups, and the loosening of moral and cultural strictures on individual behavior. All of this erodes the true foundations of community.

In "The Lure of Military Society," Nisbet traces the rise of American militarism from our entrance into World War I, through the New Deal, World War II, and the Cold War, and finally to the contemporary period. He points out the martial elements in Roosevelt's New Deal:

It was no doubt in perfect keeping with this [war mentality] that Hugh Johnson, who had presided over the military draft in World War I, should have been chosen by FDR to head the NRA, which, with its industry-dominated political councils given absolute power over prices, wages, and profits and its power to replace by administrative fiat all ordinary market mechanisms, was America's first experience with Fascism, though it was not seen in precisely that light by most liberals at the time; indeed when it was declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court, most of the response of liberal intellectuals consisted of verbal assault on the Court and, then, an almost monolithic willingness to endorse FDR's effort to pack the Court.²⁷

Nisbet argues that the New Deal and World War II institutionalized militarism in American culture and provided the groundwork for our disastrous post-war meddling overseas.

He develops and expands these arguments in his most recent book, *The Present Age*. In a chapter entitled "The Prevalence of War," he finds two forces working relentlessly "to yield America an ever-larger military"²⁸: the symbiotic

pandering military power is the power of an idea—"Wilsonian idealism." Nisbet sees in Wilson the genesis of a moralism in our foreign policy that often endangers legitimate national security interests. Ever since World War I, he argues, the United States has considered herself a world nanny:

From Wilson's day to ours the embedded purpose—sometimes articulated in words, more often not—of American foreign policy, under Democrats and Republicans alike oftentimes, has boiled down to America-on-a-Permanent-Mission; a mission to make the rest of the world a little more like America the Beautiful. Plant a little "democracy" here and tomorrow a little "liberalism" there, not hesitating once in a while to add a pinch of American-style social democracy.³⁰

Paternalistic internationalism has blinded many Americans, says Nisbet, to the real world of foreign relations, especially with respect to communism. Despite the rift between Russia and China, and despite the consistent nationalism of Soviet leaders, some conservatives persist in believing "the defunct Trotskyist dream of Russia not a nation but instead a vast spiritual force leading all mankind to the Perdition."³¹

Robert Nisbet's critique of American foreign policy is not a paean to pacifism

by any means. Nisbet is quite cognizant of the Soviet threat; he simply questions whether we should "sweep into the American-Soviet maw every little brush-fire war that breaks out in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America."³² The paternalism and moralism permeating American foreign policy have drawn our eyes away from what must be the overriding goal of any such policy—the preservation of a free society at home:

No nation in history has ever managed permanent war and a permanent military Leviathan at its heart and been able to maintain a truly representative character. The transformation of the Roman Republic into the dictatorial empire was accomplished solely through war and the military. Is the United States somehow the divinely created exception to this ubiquitous fact of world history? Not, assuredly, if instead of a foreign policy based upon national security and finite objectives associated with this security, we indulge ourselves in a foreign policy with an "itch to intervene," and a purpose flowing out of the preposterous fantasy of a world recreated in the image and likeness of that city on a hill known as the United States of America. That way lies total confusion abroad and an ever more monolithic and absolute military bureaucracy at home.³³

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relationship between the military and certain commercial and intellectual interests, and the continued dominance of "Wilsonian idealism" in our foreign policy establishment.

Taking a cue from Eisenhower's 1961 farewell address, Nisbet notes the interest armaments manufacturers have in the production of ever more expensive weapons systems. Rationalizations for these expenditures have been provided by the "military intellectuals" of the age—the McNamaras, the Bundys, the Rostows—who long to be next to the seat of power. Together, these groups create a momentum toward militarism that is virtually unstoppable:

Even if there were no Soviet Union or its equivalent to justify our monstrous military establishment, there would be, in sum, the whole self-perpetuating military-industrial complex and the technological-scientific elite that Eisenhower warned against. These have attained by now a mass and an internal dynamic capable of being their own justification for continued military spending. That is how far the military—its substance and its mystique—has become fused with economic and intellectual life. Take away the Soviet Union as crucial justification, and, under Parkinson's Law, content of some kind will expand relentlessly to fill the time and space left.²⁹

The second great force toward ex-

The Challenge of the Old Right

The old Right tradition, far from being monolithic, draws its support from many different sources. The one thread that unites all of the authors I have considered is their emphasis on the effects that foreign interventionism has on domestic institutions. An aggressive foreign policy must be supported by large and intrusive armed forces, which must in turn be supported by a huge domestic military-industrial complex. Such a complex invariably distorts the market and rots the foundations of a free market economy, an institution that conservatives at least claim to support. Interventionism also undermines constitutional government. The executive is of necessity given great discretionary power. Civil liberties are threatened; national service and censorship often result.

Meddling abroad means the destruction of freedom at home. Here is the

point that few modern conservatives sufficiently heed. The endless wars and "police actions" of this century have been the chief culprits in the destruction of individual freedom and limited government in America. The State now consumes nearly 40% of the average citizen's earnings; where would a couple more jungle wars place this figure? How many more stifling regulations and monopoly privileges can our system sustain?

These are the questions the reflective conservative must ask himself. The old Right, recognizing that war was the great generator of government power, opposed it at all costs. Libertarians, in their dialogue with conservatives, should not forget this tradition within the conservative movement, and not hesitate to challenge the New Right with the ideals and ideas of the Old. □

The notes are on page 68

Murder by Suicide

Reverend Bobby Waters knelt before the painting of Jesus.

A
story
by
Jeffrey
Olson

There is more than one way to skin a preacher. There's more than one way to fulfill a contract. Sometimes they are one and the same.

Was I wrong, Lord? he thought. Shouldn't the Cathedral be a monument to the glory and power of your love—not to the deceit and avarice of a clan of murderous, dope-dealing hoodlums?

Bobby Waters clenched his hands, reliving his anger of the moment when he'd learned the truth: Pyramid Enterprises, the consortium that had loaned him the money to construct his lifelong dream, the Cathedral of Living Waters, was nothing more than a front for the Sicilian Brotherhood.

Of course, the Mafiosi are only men, Waters thought, sinners desperately in need of Christ's redemption. As a Christian, it is my duty to lead them to salvation.

But there was only one way the money—and their souls—could be cleansed: the loan had to be made into a gift, a donation in the spirit of Christ.

— ♦ —

"So you're telling me he doesn't care about his wife, his children, his friends?" Alberto "the Boss" Cassignaro glared at his long-time consigliere, Sal Pantaleoni.

"You're telling me he doesn't care about his own life?"

Sal Pantaleoni examined the platinum cuff links of his sleeves and answered mildly, "It was more in the spirit of, 'We're all ready to die for the greater glory of God.'"

Cassignaro snorted. "Which means his Cathedral. I would like to see what praises he sings to God after his wife has been missing for a week."

"That kind of publicity can only hurt us, Alberto."

"You think losing forty million dollars is good publicity?" Cassignaro demanded. "You know what that makes us look like? Can you see anyone giving us respect if we do nothing?" Cassignaro settled back, and resumed in a calmer voice. "Besides, who says we have to do anything publicly?"

Sal smiled at him, a kindly, patient smile. "Who wouldn't be able to make the connection, my friend?"

"All right, Sal." Cassignaro braced his hands on the coffee table between them as if restraining himself. "You tell me. What do we do?"

"We find someone who can be discreet. Someone who can make things seem different from what they are."

"Lucy?"

"I don't think so. He lacks . . . refinement." Sal rubbed the graying hairs along his temples, his lips pursed. "But there is someone . . . his name's McDroogle . . ."

Cassignaro raised an eyebrow and gave him a crusty smile. "Oh? Can't say as I know anyone in the organization by that name."

"He's strictly freelance. No one knows who he is—he doesn't make exchanges in person. But I've heard only good things about his work."

"Like what?"

"Armand, in Paris. Blew his brains out in a crowd in front of a cafe. McDroogle was supposed to have arranged that."

"How in the hell did he do that?"

"I don't know. But that's his method. He makes people kill themselves."

Cassignaro let out a hoarse laugh. "Well, whatever people want to believe. But I trust your judgment, Sal. If you think this will work, you make the arrangements."

"He's very expensive, Alberto."

"If he can do what you say he can, it'll be worth it," Cassignaro sighed. "Find him for me."

Reverend Bobby Waters stood in front of the full-length bedroom mirror in his Hilton suite, adjusting his tie, holding his tall, lean body straight and proud. He smiled—and his eyes twinkled boyish mischief and good humor. Another smile, and he looked mature, personable—the kind of man you'd buy insurance from. He brushed back his thick blond hair and cleared his throat.

"And the Lord God saith . . ." He coughed again, sifting the gravel from his deep, baritone voice. "And who among us has not sinned?" More softly. "Please join us in prayer—"

"Maybe later," said Alan Simpson, grinning in through the opened doorway. "Right now the car's waiting."

"Well, I'm ready." Waters did a playful spin in front of his trusted aide and best friend. "What do you think?"

"Billy Graham, eat your heart out," laughed Simpson.

Minutes later they were in the back seat of the limousine, cruising smoothly toward downtown New York.

"Heard anything more from those thugs at Pyramid?" Waters asked casually.

"Ah . . . nothing concrete." Simpson eyed the driver, two seats ahead of them, and lowered his voice. "But I have the feeling they're not going to forgive and forget, Bobby."

"Stop worrying, old friend. The Lord will provide. He hasn't let me down yet, has He?"

"I know. Still . . ."

"Alan, when I learned who was behind that loan from Pyramid, I had no choice. If I'd known before, you know we'd never have accepted it. But it's too late, now, my friend. The Cathedral is over half finished. All I can do is make sure they don't reap any profit from it." Waters shook his head, his smile expressing inner peace. "No, Alan, it's God's will that this money be used for salvation."

Bobby Water's favorite moment had come. He stood before the multitude, hands raised, serene in spiritual transport. As the people swarmed upward toward the stage he was certain he felt

the power of God surging through him.

"Jesus loves you," he called to them. "Come forward and receive Him. His love will make you whole."

The line that formed to the stage held the milk and honey of his profession: old, arthritic women, middle-aged men with chronic backaches and gastric ulcers, wheelchair-ridden cripples. A potpourri of the physically and spiritually bereft, their faces uplifted to him in hope. Some of them had volunteered on the impulse of the moment; others had been selected and carefully screened by Alan Simpson. Waters had no idea where Alan found his people, but his selections consistently provided the most dramatic moments in the service.

Waters touched, comforted and prayed his way through the line of people. And then came one of Alan's special ones. Fat and slumping in his wheelchair, ensconced in layers of soiled and shredded clothing—redolent of cheap wines and wretched streets—a fresh import from the worst part of the inner city. The stage assistants wheeled the man toward center stage, where Waters met him, microphone in hand.

"What is your infirmity, my friend?"

Waters lowered the microphone in time to catch an earsplitting belch. In the stunned silence that followed, Waters stole a glance at the cameras off stage and imagined fifteen million viewers blinking in newly aroused curiosity. He took a deep breath, making himself hold the microphone steady before the wino's pink cauliflower nose.

"Drank too much." His voice emerged in a gravelly, Irish brogue. "Legs gave out."

"Ah. But are you willing now to accept Jesus Christ as your Lord and be born again in His love?"

The man stared up at him with red, malevolent eyes. Then, as the microphone hovered a few inches from his face, he lifted his soiled scarf and noisily blew his nose.

"Hell yes," he said, wiping his nose with his sleeve.

Waters withdrew the microphone as if from an electric shock. He glanced urgently at Alan across the stage. Alan shrugged helplessly.

Nothing to do but go on. And may the Lord God give me strength.

Steeling himself, he placed a hand on the man's filthy head, and—holding the microphone well away—muttered a short prayer. The wino kept his eyes on him, his face split in an ugly grin.

Waters drew back quickly and shouted into the microphone. "Rise! Rise and accept the blessing of the Lord!"

Bracing himself—with some help from the stage assistants—the man slowly pried himself from his wheelchair. He rose shakily to his feet. Finally, things were starting to go right.

The man screamed in anguish and fell flat on his belly. He began to crawl toward Bobby Waters like a paraplegic toad.

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"I want my drink!" he bellowed, holding out a quivering, bandaged hand. "You promised me a drink!"

Bobby Waters accepted the whiskey from Alan Simpson with trembling hands. He sat hunched over on the couch in the living room of his suite, his hair falling in unruly bangs over his eyes as he stared down into the glass.

"Go ahead, Bobby," said Alan. "It can't hurt this once."

Waters wrenched the drink to his lips as though striking himself. He finished it in one gulp. "I still don't understand, Alan . . . How could you have let that creature onto the stage?"

"All I can say is that he was a sweet old guy when I interviewed him. A bit down on his luck, but perfect for the show" Alan frowned, deep creases lining his face. "I take full responsibility, Bobby, I want you to know that."

Waters held up his hand. "It could have happened to anyone, Alan."

Simpson bowed his head. "Thank you, Bobby."

"Well, when will my wife be arriving?"

"Her flight's due in at eight AM. She should be able to join you for breakfast."

"Thank the Lord." He smiled for the first time since they'd returned. "It will be good to have her here."

"Well . . ." Simpson consulted his watch. "I'd best be getting on. I'll see you for lunch, tomorrow. Don't stay up too late, old buddy."

"Don't worry about me," said Waters, grinning weakly. "I think this stuff is already putting me to sleep."

But Bobby Waters was still drinking when the doorbell buzzed thirty minutes later.

"Room service!" a cheerful voice rang out. "Special delivery!"

Apprehension inched its way through his numbed brain. I'm drunk, he thought dully; I shouldn't be seen like this. But the doorbell rang again. He stumbled to his feet and sucked in his breath. He walked slowly to the door.

A strikingly beautiful young woman in a maid's uniform greeted him with a tray of hors d'oeuvre and a bottle of champagne. "Courtesy of the hotel," she said, "as a gesture of appreciation for your patronage."

"Thank you, but isn't it a little late—"

Waters staggered back as the woman moved easily past him into the room. "You don't look well. Let me help you."

"That's quite all right . . ." But he allowed himself to be guided to the nearest chair. "Well . . . thank you, Miss . . ."

The girl's large hazel eyes looked into his, and he felt as though he were being caressed. He swallowed.

"My pleasure," she said, her voice a soothing contralto. "May I pour for you?"

"I . . ." Waters blinked as the woman handed him a glass, her smooth, delicate hand lightly brushing his. "I think I've had enough."

"Please." Her face was only eight inches from his own, full heart-shaped lips forming a sensuous smile. "For me."

He took a long sip, and felt his muscles completely relax. He watched as her beautiful mouth blurred and the color of her lipstick suffused the room. He heard her voice gently reassuring him as he sank into oblivion.

The doorbell jolted him awake. He stirred gingerly, grimacing as the insistent buzzing pierced his head. He slowly focused on the clock at the side of the bed. 9:45 AM? So late. . . . Funny, I don't even remember going to bed. Could I have been that drunk?

He pushed himself out of bed. First things first. Get the bathrobe. Then the door . . .

He was halfway across the bedroom when he realized that someone was in his bed. It was a young woman with long dark hair and hazel eyes, who was now perched up on a pillow watching him.

"My God! You're still here!" He wrenched open the bedroom closet and pulled on his bathrobe.

"But . . . what are you doing?"

She wet her lips and smiled. "What does it look like, lover?"

"No! . . . That can't be right . . ." Waters felt his face color beneath her frankly appraising stare. "I remember . . . you pouring champagne . . ."

"Better get the door, lover."

"Don't call me that!"

In the main room, the door burst open. A tall, stately woman entered, followed by an apprehensive-looking Alan. Waters slipped out of the bedroom, making himself smile as he shut the door firmly behind him.

"Oh darling!" his wife cried. "When you didn't answer the door we were worried so we got the clerk to let us—"

Her words fell into dead silence. Both she and Simpson were staring with stricken eyes at something over his shoulder.

"Oh, I'm sorry, Bobby," purred the girl, completely naked in the bedroom doorway. "I didn't know you had guests."

Fifteen minutes later, the girl was met outside the hotel by a heavy, squattish man in a blue business suit. His handshake enclosed several large bills.

"How did it go?"

"Beautiful." The girl counted, then smiled. "Thanks for the tip."

"Thank you, my dear."

"I don't understand it." Bobby Waters had his face in his hands, peering through his fingers at the empty champagne bottle on the table before him. "I remember this maid. She said she'd brought complimentary champagne."

His wife's words fell into dead silence. Both she and Simpson were staring with stricken eyes at something over his shoulder.

"Oh, I'm sorry, Bobby," purred the girl, completely naked in the bedroom doorway. "I didn't know you had guests."

Alan Simpson watched his friend with not entirely sympathetic eyes. "The hotel disclaims any knowledge of the girl or the champagne, Bobby."

"I know. It just doesn't make sense." Waters lifted his head, gazing at Simpson with reddened, watery eyes. "How can I make Edna believe me, Alan? I didn't do anything to that girl!"

"I guess it will just take a little time . . ."

"Alan, I'm telling the truth. I didn't do anything!"

Simpson held up his hands. "Okay, I believe you. But you must admit, it doesn't look good. Listen, why don't we just cancel tomorrow's service? Plead sickness in the family or something. Go home. You need some rest."

"But I can't run away now, Alan. It would make me look guilty."

"I don't know, maybe it would still be for the best. After last night I'm beginning to think this town is jinxed."

Bobby Waters sat up straight and looked his friend in the eye. "God does not play dice with the universe," he intoned. And then suddenly the weariness and tension slipped from his face; his eyes cleared. "And that's it, Alan! I'm being tested. Everything's gone so well in my life so far that it's time I faced some adversity . . . Don't you see? It's God's plan."

"I hope so, Bobby."

Waters gave him a smug smile. "It's His way of testing me, Alan. You'll see."

Bobby Waters reclined comfortably in the back seat of the limousine, eyes closed, a smile playing on his lips. I know the game you're playing, Lord. Do you worst. Your will is my blessing.

"Happy dreams, Reverend?" The driver was talking to him.

Waters opened his eyes, still smiling. "Couldn't be better, I feel good. I feel like something special is going to happen." He sat up. "How far are we from the auditorium?"

The heavy-set man behind the wheel shuffled his shoulders. "Not much longer." His voice had a light, pleasant Irish lilt. "I'm taking a shortcut."

Waters sat back, a slight frown easing onto his face. Around them the noise level was rising, and the busy streets of the inner city seems to be closing in. Neon lights proclaimed x-rated theaters and massage parlors, video arcades and disco bars. Hustlers, pimps and panhandlers vied for space on the sidewalks.

"Driver, where are we?" Waters demanded. "This doesn't look to be anywhere near the auditorium."

"I told you, Reverend. Taking a shortcut."

"Driver, I'm supposed to be backstage in fifteen minutes—"

The brakes screeched. A tall black man in a yellow and lavender suit careened in front of them, then fell out of sight. Something thudded against the front fender as they jerked to a stop.

"Oh no!" cried Waters, grasping his door handle. "Why couldn't you have watched where you were going!"

"Take it easy, Rev. Just a fender-bender."

Waters rushed out around the front of the car. The black man was sitting a few feet from the fender, clutching his right leg. A crowd was gathering around them.

"Are you all right?" Waters asked.

The black man regarded him balefully. "My career with the

Knicks is over . . ." Then his face brightened. "Hey, ain't you that preacher-man? Yeah, I seen you on the news once."

"Yeah, Lionel honey, that's him all right!" came a nasal, high-pitched voice at their side.

Waters suddenly noticed that they were surrounded by a forest of long, brown legs—legs that led to satin-sashed waists and mini-skirted bottoms.

"Watcha starin' at, honey?" one of the women cooed, and general laughter broke out.

"Hey, you all better stop this jivin' and take me to a hospital," the black man growled. "I think I got a concussion or somethin'"

"Shor, Lionel, and we'll come too!" one of the women giggled.

"Now just a minute—" Waters croaked. "They can't all fit in the car!"

"In that bi-i-ig thing?" A lithe black woman in velvet red hotpants and matching tube top crooned. "Half of New York could fit in there, baby."

"We'd better get moving if you want to make your date, Rev," said the driver. "I'll drop you off and then I'll take them to the hospital."

"Okay, okay!" Waters threw up his hands. "Let's just get going!"

Waters found himself jostling for position as they crammed into the car. Waters ended up with the velvet red hotpants and tube top planted on his lap.

"Drive like hell," said the black man. "This is an emergency!"

The roar of the engine and the screaming of tires assaulted Waters as they whiplashed around the first corner. He clung desperately to the door handle, at the same time trying to ease the girl with the hotpants off his lap. Instead of moving, she undulated her behind under his hand.

"I always thought you preachers were hot stuff," she murmured.

"Please—" The car braked, accelerated—throwing her against him. "Please, I can't be seen like this . . ."

"What's the matter?" the black man demanded. "You prejudiced or somethin'?"

"Listen," said the girl on his lap, removing a joint from her purse. "I think we should all just relax. What d'you say, sugar?"

She lit up, and the limo filled with sweet-smelling smoke.

Ten minutes later the limousine careened onto the curb in front of the Kessler Auditorium, where a bevy of reporters and supporters of the Bobby Waters Crusade were waiting. At the front of the crowd, a beaming Alan Simpson had Edna Waters at his side. Flashbulbs and cheers rent the night as the limo's doors opened.

Bobby Waters stumbled, hacking, out of the car—Lionel, hotpants and the other women emerging in his wake. There was an explosion of flashbulbs.

"Bobby, Bobby," said Alan Simpson in a tense, miserable whisper. "What have you done?"

"Had an accident . . . bringing them to the hospital—"

Behind them, two of the police officers assigned to door security were sniffing around the limo; one of them crawled inside.

"Nice to meet y'all," said Lionel, pulling abruptly away. He made a sharp gesture to his women, and then they were all melting into the crowd.

The two cops left the limousine. One of them held a ziploc bag full of white powder.

"Reverend Waters, your car is full of dope, sir."

Waters stared at him dumbly.

"That must belong to those other people, officer," said Simpson. "And the car is provided by Limousine Emporium."

"I see. Where's the driver?"

Waters looked around, "I don't know. He was here just a minute ago."

The officer cleared his throat. "Well, perhaps you could come down to the station, ah, tomorrow, Reverend Waters, and give us a statement."

"Fine," said Alan.

"Now if you'll excuse us, officer, we're running a bit late."

But Bobby Waters lost his balance. As he stumbled forward, pills, plastic bags and paraphernalia rained from his pockets. The crowd gasped.

Bobby Waters let his breath out slowly, lifting his face to the heavens. His eyes had assumed a look of accusation.

Bobby Waters lost his balance. As he stumbled forward, pills, plastic bags and paraphernalia rained from his pockets. The crowd gasped.

Bobby Waters let his breath out slowly, lifting his face to the heavens. His eyes had assumed a look of accusation.

The magnificent expanse of steel, cement and glass that was the Cathedral of Living Waters thrust upward in a series of steeples and spires that threatened to impale Heaven itself. In the very highest of the steeples, at the very pinnacle of the massive twenty-story structure, was the private suite of Reverend Bobby Waters.

Waters stood on the balcony, ignoring the curious eyes of the construction workers at the Delaware Plaza project across the street. As he gazed at the skyline of New York.

For most of the last three weeks he'd been alone. Only Alan Simpson had entered the building, bringing newspapers and groceries.

The newspapers and magazines scattered over the table in the living room chronicled the events of the last few weeks. There were articles on his impending divorce, the fiasco with the bowery bum and the ensuing accusations that his miracles were performed by "cripples-for-hire"; articles on the scandal at the Kessler Auditorium and on his alleged connections with "underworld crime," a host of hostile editorials and exposés.

After the incident at Kessler Auditorium, he'd lost half of his followers overnight. Now, after three weeks of character-assassination by the popular press, his supporters had dwindled to a fanatical few. A congressional investigation into the connections between organized religion and organized crime had been scheduled, with the Waters Crusade first on the list.

Of course, there were as yet no formal charges pending in the drug scandal, but a lot of questions had not been answered. Questions that baffled Bobby Waters as much as anybody.

And now, with his hair grown long and ragged, and a week's worth of beard, Bobby Waters stared at the New York skyline, contemplating his fate.

I built it for You, God. I did it all for You: the services, the charity drives—the Crusade itself. And now this. How could

You have let this happen to me?

Waters went back inside and raised his eyes to the painting of Jesus that always inspired him in his moments of need. The soulful eyes regarded him with the compassion of the infinite.

"Did I sin, Lord?" he addressed the portrait softly. "Was I wrong to refuse to repay the loan? Was I wrong to have built this testimonial to You?"

"You built it as a testimonial to your own pride, my son."

Waters jumped back, hairs prickling on his neck. Had he really heard that?

"Who—who's there?"

"Look outward, my child."

And he saw it. Or rather, Him. Floating, incorporeal, just beyond the balcony—like a reflection of his deepest longings: flowing robes and hair, sensitive but strong, masculine features framed in dark beard. Though Waters had not imagined

Him as being quite so heavy of build.

"Savior!"

He fell to his knees. This was what he'd always hungered for. The Man who took your hand at the end and said, "All is forgiven." The Man who offered the final fulfillment.

"Then I was wrong," Waters uttered in a small voice. "I mean, about the building."

"The truth shall set you free," said the gentle apparition.

"But what should I have done, Lord?"

"You should have given freely of all that was given to you. Only then could you have done honor to me."

"Forgive me, Jesus!"

"Yes, my son." The figure held out his hand. "It is time, Bobby. Come join me. Now."

Waters looked into his Lord's eyes. Luminous, so full of love. He stood up on rubbery legs and stepped toward the edge of the balcony.

"I'm coming, Jesus!"

The construction workers across the street watched in disbelief as Reverend Bobby Waters embraced the air beyond the balcony, then began his twenty-story descent.

Inside, behind an aperture in the brick wall above the never-used fireplace, a projector was softly switched off.

"Now, that's the best news I've had in days." Alberto Cassignaro chomped happily on his cigar, beaming at his consigliere. "That Bible-pissing bastard goes crazy before the contract on him is fulfilled. Pfft!" He sprayed smoke and saliva and threw up his hands. "So! There goes our problem—and we don't even have to pay for it! What do you think of that, Sal?"

Sal massaged the frown growing on his face. "He claims credit for it, Alberto. And the man did die . . ."

"Come on, come on." Cassignaro's mouth whitened around

his cigar. "Fifty men must have seen him walk over that balcony of his own free will. You know what I think? I think he should give us a refund on our deposit. He never did a goddamned thing."

"I don't know, Alberto. . . ."

"The preacher was crazy, Sal. Everyone knows that. He used drugs, for Christ's sake."

"True. Still—"

"You did tell him we refuse to pay, didn't you, Sal?" Cassignaro's voice was ice. "It would displease me if you hadn't."

Sal sighed heavily. "Yes, Represente."

"Good. Then enough of this talk. We should speak of celebration." Cassignaro leaned forward and clapped his hands together. "Tomorrow is my little Sophie's birthday. I've arranged for a band to play in the patio. They'll use Black Beauty for accompaniment."

"You're letting them use your piano?" Sal asked, startled. "It took a crane to move it down last time."

Cassignaro laughed. "And they're using a crane this time. But Putricini is going to sing happy birthday, and nothing is too good for my baby."

Sal smiled sheepishly. "Ah . . . I thought I heard an engine out back."

"Come. Let's go to the balcony."

They watched from the back balcony as the huge Bösendorfer concert grand was maneuvered painstakingly out of the loft's window. A hook and cable had been attached to a series of straps supporting the instrument, and the crane was gently positioning itself below.

"I can't watch," chuckled Cassignaro. "Let's go back inside."

Then they heard the whining sound of high-tension cable turn. The Bösendorfer, having somehow swung free, was hurtling like an ebony demolition ball toward the cement at the edge of the swimming pool. It struck with a thunderous crash, its main body bounding toward the pool belching cacophonous chords and ivory keys.

The cigar fell from Cassignaro's drooping mouth, and his face went a shade lighter than pale.

"You goddamned idiots! I'll kill you! I'll kill all of you!"

Cassignaro broke from Sal's restraining grasp and raced down through the house into the carnage of his backyard. Huffing and wheezing, he charged through the remains of the Bösendorfer toward the crane—but then stumbled and went down hard on one knee.

"Sorry about the slip, Mr. Cassignaro," said a kindly, musical, Irish voice. "Can I give you a hand up?" □

Karl Hess, Jr., "Man, Nature, and State," *continued from page 19*

effect—and chlorofluorocarbons—culprit of ozone depletion) could be limited in order to achieve desired levels of air quality. The high cost of these permits, resulting from their scarcity, would be a strong economic incentive for improving air pollution control technologies (or for producing alternative products). China, by the way, has already adopted similar free-market practices.

The important feature of this proposal is that the state would play a minimal role. People would not be restricted from polluting. They would only be required to bear the costs of their activities—a requirement consistent with a free society. The fact that polluters would be allowed to make the key decisions on how much pollution to generate (at the micro level) and the best technologies for controlling it would release the power of human diversity. The direct costs of acquiring pollution permits and the opportunity costs of holding them would be the ecological cue spurring on the technological innovations needed to spare earth from further environmental insults.

It is true that the setting of maximum pollutant levels and the enforcement of pollution rights would involve coercion or the threat of coercion. The setting of

pollutant ceilings would be equivalent to the initial establishment of property rights on unoccupied land. Individuals or groups competing for those rights would have to decide through negotiation or political means the rules by which they would settle the new territory. The reality facing each claimant, even in the absence of an organized state, would be the inevitability of coercion should negotiation fail. Enforcement of pollution rights would be similar to the enforcement of property rights.

The bottom line, of course, is that pollution is coercive; it is aggression. A formal state need not exist to justify or allow self-defense against polluters. Indeed, the initiatives taken so far by non-federal interests in combatting pollution suggest to me that local communities would be more effective than federal bureaucracies in ending environmental degradation if the powers reserved to the centralized state were devolved to them.

I recognize that market or decentralist solutions to environmental problems in this country do not begin to remedy global pollution. However, market and decentralist solutions are infectious. I have considerably more faith in the possibility of a world epidemic of freedom

than I do in the possibility of a conglomerate of world states leading unwilling citizens to environmental salvation.

Conclusion

Environmental problems are real; they are serious; they will not disappear with wishful thinking. It is nature's economy, not man's, that ultimately holds the fate of all earthly life. Hospers' challenge must be met if liberty is to mean anything in the real world. I have suggested a possible direction: an ecology of liberty.

Lasting environmental solutions reside neither in the province of the state nor in the doctrinaire application of private property rights. Those solutions, and the environmental ethics that accompany them, are fellow travelers. They will be found, I believe, in the heartland of American liberty—in the midst of the diversity of a pluralistic society—among the elements of community which Charles Murray, quoting Edmund Burke, affectionately calls "little platoons." But the ecological workings of these "little platoons" will depend on power and responsibility. Such is the ecology of liberty. □

Reviews

The Voice of Reason: Essays in Objectivist Thought, by Ayn Rand, edited with additional essays by Leonard Peikoff. NAL Books, 1988, 353 pages, \$18.95.

The Voice of Bitterness

Justin Raimondo

For those of us who want to remember Ayn Rand at her best—that is, as an original and talented novelist and exponent of individualism—the latest collection of her nonfiction works is not a happy occasion. *The Voice of Reason*, a collection of her nonfiction edited by Leonard Peikoff, is Ayn Rand in a bad mood.

Over sixty pieces are reprinted in this volume, the majority written during the Seventies. Those years saw the bitter split among her followers, the end of the organized Objectivist movement, the illness of her beloved husband, Frank O'Connor, and a devastating illness of her own. The style and spirit of the material written during that dark period is permeated with a growing sense of intellectual isolation, bitterness, and a daunting loneliness. Peikoff tells us, in "My Thirty Years With Ayn Rand," an otherwise unrevealing memoir, that "when she greeted you, for instance, she often asked not 'How are you?' but 'How's your universe?' Her meaning was: 'How's your view of the universe?'" Given the style of these later essays, by the early 70s Ayn Rand's universe had narrowed considerably.

The inclusion of some of her best early pieces, like the passionate paean to Marilyn Monroe, "Through Your Most Grievous Fault," only underscores the point. Next to the merciless clarity of "The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Our

Age," her first Ford Hall Forum lecture (1961), the murky accusations that characterize "The Psychology of Psychologizing" are puzzling to anyone unfamiliar with the particulars of Rand's life. In the former, Rand was dealing with wide-ranging (and startlingly original) abstractions; the latter essay is an epistle of hatred ostensibly directed at those who claim to be psychological authorities. It is actually a thinly-disguised attack on her ex-associate, psychologist Nathaniel Branden, who had by that time been cast into the outer darkness.

There is a great psychic divide that splits the material gathered in this collection right down the middle. The dividing line is 1969, the year she broke with psychologist Nathaniel Branden, her chief disciple who successfully promoted her philosophy of Objectivism. The last lines of "The Psychology of Psychologizing" illustrate the unfortunate tone that crept into much of her later writings. "The mind is a processing organ; so is the stomach," writes Rand. "If a stomach fails in its function, it throws up; its unprocessed material is vomit. So is the unprocessed material emitted by a mind."

Except for the above example, the first part of *The Voice of Reason*, is free of this unrelieved crankiness. "Altruism as Appeasement," an exposé of the process by which the intellectuals sell out their own intelligence, is a perceptive psychopolitical study that reads as if it might have been written yesterday. There is

real fire in the early stuff, as in "The Intellectual Bankruptcy of Our Age," and a sense, as in her epistle "To Young Scientists," that we are dealing with important issues. But by the time we get to the fateful year of 1969, Rand the optimist, who supposedly believed in the impotence of evil, could focus on nothing but evil.

With the writing of "Apollo 11," an account of her trip to see the launching of the Apollo 11 rocket in the summer of 1969, Ayn Rand seems to have turned a corner. As a piece of writing, "Apollo 11" is on an altogether different plane than most of the rest of this volume. Here is where Rand's novelistic skills come into full play; her technique of highlighting physical details to illustrate a philosophical or even a political point, her method of stylizing without descending into caricature, her ability to do a character sketch or describe a location in just a few deft strokes.

As an indication of her growing bitterness, "Apollo 11" is quite explicit. After defending the U.S. space program from those who claim that the money ought to be spent on the poor starving children and the homeless, Rand shows signs of genuine weariness. "But if we do continue down the road of a mixed economy, then let them pour all the millions and billions they can into the space program. If the United States is to commit suicide, let it not be for the sake and support of the worst human elements . . . Let some of its lifeblood go to the support of achievement and the progress of science. The American flag on the moon—or on Mars, or on Jupiter—will, at least, be a worthy monument to what had once been a great country."

From this point on, much of Rand's literary output was devoted to denouncing the many evils she saw proliferating around her. She wrote on everything from U.S. foreign policy to affirmative action, subjects about which she had very strong (and often correct) opinions and very little knowledge. This is particularly true of the last section, devoted to

"Politics": see the essays "Representation Without Authorization," "The Invested Moral Priorities," "Hunger and Freedom," and "How to Read (and Not to Write)." Here is Ayn Rand at her worst: lashing out at the first available target, no matter how inconsequential, and railing for pages at enemies both real and imagined without regard for either facts or syntax. It didn't matter by that time; she wasn't interested in arguments anymore. Her *Ayn Rand Letter* was filled with sermons to the choir, continued chiefly out of a sense of duty. Worst of all, these later essays are *boring* in their deadening repetitiveness and the unrelenting contempt for everyone and everything outside her dwindling circle of followers. She also has the startling habit of referring to the characters in her novels as if they were real people, instead of the products of her extravagant imagination.

Two essays stand out in their crankish wrong-headedness; "The Lessons of Vietnam" and "About a Woman President." The former is a case of literary and political schizophrenia that starts out promisingly and ends up in a welter of misinformation and contradictions. In assessing the fall of South Vietnam, she falls back on her own experience in the Russia of 1917, and her prose is crystal clear. "I was in my early teens during the Russian civil war. I lived in a small town that changed hands many times . . . When it was occupied by the White Army, I almost longed for the return of the Red Army, and vice versa. There was not much difference between them in practice, but there was in theory. The Red Army stood for totalitarian dictatorship and rule by terror. The white Army stood for nothing; repeat: *nothing*. In answer to the monstrous evil they were fighting, the Whites found nothing better to proclaim than the dustiest, smelliest bromides of the time: we must fight, they said, for Holy Mother Russia, for faith and tradition." Summing up that battle, she says: "The Whites had icons. The Reds won." No one was better than Ayn Rand at exposing the intellectual shabbiness of the political right and pointing out the right's vital role in pav-

ing the way for the triumph of collectivism.

Unfortunately, the rest of the essay degenerates into a red-baiting attack on opponents of the Vietnam war. Smearing the anti-war movement as being "pro-North Vietnam," Rand perpetuates the myth that the U.S. was somehow stabbed in the back at home, and thus prevented from winning. In spite of her earlier attacks on the very idea of "the public interest" and the "national interest," Rand invokes the latter to justify U.S. support to the Taiwanese dictatorship as well as Israel. Although she claims that the U.S. "had no selfish

Here is Ayn Rand at her worst: lashing out at the first available target, no matter how inconsequential, and railing for pages at enemies both real and imagined without regard for either facts or syntax. It didn't matter by that time; she wasn't interested in arguments anymore. Her Ayn Rand Letter was filled with sermons to the choir.

reason to fight" the war in Vietnam, "because we had nothing to gain from it," and "the lives and the heroism of thousands of American soldiers . . . were sacrificed in compliance with the ethics of altruism," nowhere does Rand come out and say it was right to pull out. She asks the right questions—"What—and *who*—got us into that war? . . . How did a war advocated and begun by the liberals (mainly by President's Kennedy and Johnson) become the conservatives' war?"—but never comes up with any coherent answers.

Far worse, however, is "About a Woman President," which, I must confess, I found to be completely unintelligible. According to Rand, a woman could not want to be President. "It is not a matter of her ability, but of her *values*." As to why this is so, we are supplied only with empty assertions in the form of vague and unprovable generalities. It is as if this article had been written in some language of her own invention, with no internal clues and no Rosetta Stone to decipher its arcane meanings. For someone who saw herself as the last of the advocates of reason—"or the first of their return"—Rand's complete irrationality on this subject is oddly insistent, as is

Peikoff's decision to reprint this embarrassing article.

Just as Peikoff's talents as editor succeed in capturing Ayn Rand at her worst, so his own literary contributions to this volume add nothing original or exciting to the Objectivist canon. They are pastiches of the master, for the most parts, which often descend into parody. His "Religion Versus America" is a rehash of themes first uttered by Rand in the early Sixties (see her "Faith and Force: the Destroyers of the Modern World," "Conservatism, An Obituary," and many other articles in which she took on religious and traditionalist conservatives).

This is updated and embellished with the sort of scholarly apparatus, such as footnotes, generally missing from Rand's own nonfiction. (In any case, she rarely quoted sources other than her own works.) "Assault from the Ivory Tower: The Professors' War Against America" is a diatribe which purports to prove that

"Today's college faculties are hostile to every idea on which this country was founded, they are corrupting an entire generation of students, and they are leading the United States to slavery and destruction." The evidence? "In preparation for this talk," says Peikoff, "I asked Objectivists around the country to tell me what they are being taught in college on basic issues." The resulting horror stories are what passes for evidence, these days, in Objectivist circles. Rand used this same technique herself on innumerable occasions, the most memorable being "Is Atlas Shrugging?", a commentary on items from her "Horror File." But the "Horror File" consisted of actual news items about outrages perpetrated by the "mystic-altruist-collectivist axis." What made the "Horror File" horribly fascinating and sent shivers down Objectivist spines was that these outrages were reported as if they were perfectly normal everyday events; Peikoff's retailing of stories from the Objectivist gossip mill, delivered with an unbearable smugness, fails either to convince or entertain.

In his autobiography, Bennett Cerf floats the theory that Rand would have been far better off without her coterie of disciples and professional flatterers.

Peikoff's epilogue, "My Thirty Years With Ayn Rand: An Intellectual Memoir," is the eerie proof of it. Eerie because it is written with a monomaniacal urgency that often goes beyond self-parody. In an orgy of ritualized self-abasement, Peikoff relates that when Rand got mad at him "over some philosophical statement I had made," she usually "remained calm because she understood the cause of my statement: that I still had a great deal to learn. But other times she did not . . . grasp fully the gulf that separates the historic master, to whom the truth is obvious, from the merely intelligent student. Since her mind immediately integrated a remark to the fundamentals it presupposes, she would project at once . . . the full, horrendous meaning of what I had uttered, and then she would be shocked at me." Poor Peikoff; how she must have terrorized him!

Aside from maudlin and often-told stories about how Rand and her husband called each other by cutesy little pet names, (he was "Cubbyhole," and she answered to "Fluff") and such data as her favorite candy (Godiva chocolates), Peikoff's sketch of Rand is strangely impersonal, as if an artist of the non-representational school had painted a portrait of Rand in the abstract mode. He strives to describe her mental processes, in tedious, bloodless detail.

This memoir reveals very little about Ayn Rand, but everything we need to know about Leonard Peikoff. After launching into a vicious attack on unnamed "wishy washy people" who "did what they had to do in order to get from Ayn Rand what they wanted," he excoriates some of Rand's ex-followers who "are now publishing their memoirs in the hopes of getting even with Ayn Rand at last—and also of cashing in on her corpse." As executor of her estate Peikoff, too, is cashing in on her corpse—in fact, as her "intellectual heir" (as if such a title as "intellectual" could be inherited!) what he wants is a monopoly on the lucrative Ayn Rand industry that has grown up after her death.

The problem with Rand, he tells us, is not that she was too cranky and suspicious, but that she was too trusting and benevolent. "Each time she unmasked one of these individuals," says Peikoff, "she struggled to learn from her mistake. But then she would be deceived again by some new variant." What was she sup-

posed to learn? That she couldn't trust *anyone*, that *no one* was her equal, and that she might as well give up looking?

Peikoff relates a conversation with Rand to illustrate his view of her predicament: "You are suffering the fate of a genius trapped in a rotten culture," said Peikoff. One can almost see her wincing at this rather obvious flattery. "My distinctive attribute," she would retort, 'is not genius, but intellectual honesty.' 'That is part of it,' I would concede, 'but after all I am intellectually honest, too, and it doesn't make me the kind of epo-

chal mind who can write *Atlas Shrugged* or discover Objectivism.' 'One can't look at oneself that way,' she would answer me. 'No one can say: 'Ah me, the genius of the ages.'"

This was, of course, precisely the manner in which Peikoff and her other followers encouraged her to view herself: besides leading to a kind of enforced isolation for Rand, it reinforced their own view of themselves as the persecuted but noble Elect and kept her attention focused on her own narrow circle.

Rand's present day followers invaria-

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
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bly mimic the least admirable aspects of her personality, and nothing illustrates this better than Peter Schwartz's poisonous "Libertarianism, the Perversion of Liberty," which, after several printings in newsletter and pamphlet form, is at last given permanence by its inclusion in this book. In a crude attempt to smear practically every libertarian writer of note, he rips quotes out of context and argues that libertarianism is the enemy of all values, a variant of nihilism out to destroy Western civilization by means of brute force. I must admit being a little nonplussed to discover that my own efforts to broaden the libertarian movement to include blacks, Chicanos, gays, and other minorities was, in reality, a campaign "to lash out against the 'system' and the state with machine guns and hand grenades." Where does he get this from? From an article I wrote six years ago for *Libertarian Vanguard*, which discussed alternative theories of organizing political groups. Needless to say, there was no mention of either machine guns or hand grenades. His other smears—against Murray Rothbard, Milton Mueller, and others—are on the same level.

What is Schwartz's problem? After wading through his hateful diatribe, we finally discover (p. 330) that "The Libertarian movement was created in order to adopt a 'united front' approach to liberty, that is, to spread out a broad umbrella under which a motley collection of people, irrespective of their philosophies, could gather in a joint effort to advance freedom." This enrages Mr. Schwartz, who, like all Objectivists, holds that everyone must agree on *everything*—from epistemology to esthetics—before any joint action can be taken. In other words, until everyone agrees that Immanuel Kant is the root of all evil and that Rachmaninoff's music is far superior to Mozart's, we are all doomed to put up with whatever the collectivists care to dish out. This ultra-sectarian stance, if adopted by libertarians or *any* political group would turn it into something resembling the Objectivist movement—i.e., a pathetic little sect.

It is ironic, though, that Schwartz chose to attack libertarians by saying that "Libertarianism's relationship to Objectivism is not merely that of an enemy, but of a parasite. Without Objectivism there would, ironically, be

no Libertarian movement today." It is true that the libertarian movement would be different, perhaps much smaller, if Rand had never existed. But for Schwartz and his confreres to throw around words like "parasite" is a dangerous game for them to play. For the truth of the matter is that it is Schwartz—and Peikoff—who are truly parasitical. For years they have been feeding off Ayn Rand's corpse, basking in her radiance, using their own robotic (and hideously distorted) version of her ideas, with Peikoff claiming to be her "intellectual heir." Would their second- and third-rate scribbles have attracted

the least amount of attention if they hadn't managed to sneak them into a book with Ayn Rand's name plastered all over the cover? What have they ever created on their own?

Peikoff tells us in the Introduction that "This is the final collection of Ayn Rand's articles and speeches that I plan to publish." If true, this means that the lucrative Ayn Rand industry, which sprung up after her death, may be in the doldrums for a while. But not to worry. No doubt Peikoff, Schwartz & Co. will find other ways to exploit Rand's name. □

Senatorial Privilege: The Chappaquiddick Cover-Up
by Leo Damore. Regnery Gateway, 1988, 496 pages, \$19.95.

The Senator from Chappaquiddick

Stephen Cox

On the night of July 18–19, 1969, Senator Edward M. Kennedy attended a party on Chappaquiddick Island, which lies off the coast of Massachusetts, adjacent to the larger island of Martha's Vineyard. He left the party sometime around midnight. Abandoning his chauffeur, he and Mary Jo Kopechne, a former campaign worker for his brother Robert, drove toward one of the island's beaches. En route, their car ran off a wooden bridge and plunged into a narrow, pond-like inlet, landing upside down.

Kennedy escaped from the car, but instead of summoning aid for his entrapped passenger from a number of nearby houses whose lights could be clearly seen, he walked a mile or so back to the house where the party had been held. He drew two of his friends out secretly, and they headed back to the bridge, where the friends dove unsuccessfully for Miss Kopechne while Kennedy lay on the bridge rocking back and forth and moaning, "Oh, my God. What am I going to do?"

His friends insisted that Kennedy, a

lawyer by profession, immediately report the accident. Kennedy, however, was more interested in allowing matters to take their course without his intervention. When his friends pressed him too hard, he dove off the Chappaquiddick ferry dock, where they were discussing the issue, and swam back to his hotel on Martha's Vineyard. During the night, he emerged from his room to ask a hotel employee what time it was, thus establishing his presence someplace other than Chappaquiddick. In the morning, he chatted at length with acquaintances and was in the process of making breakfast dates when his helpful friends of the night before caught up with him. (The Chappaquiddick-Vineyard ferry, which had shut down for the night, was now operating.)

They again tried to convince him to report the accident, and they were at last successful—but only because a tow-truck had finally been sighted on its way to the bridge. An obliging chief of police took Kennedy's (misleading) statement and declined to question him further, later seeing no need to carry on any meaningful investigation. Kennedy, for his part,

declined to say anything more about the affair, except for a brief and bathetic speech, several days later, to a national television audience. In this speech, he attributed his failure of nerve to "shock," and invoked his and his family's moral courage in facing such times of trial as had once more befallen them. In court, he pleaded guilty to leaving the scene of an accident without reporting it and received a two-month jail sentence, suspended. Soon after, he went to church, where Msgr. William Thompson concluded Mass with the singing of "America the Beautiful," in "tribute," as he said, "to Senator Kennedy."

The position of Mary Jo Kopechne's body, when it was finally recovered from the car, indicated that she may have survived for some time, breathing a small pocket of air that was trapped with her in the overturned vehicle.

Despite the sensationalistic subtitle of Leo Damore's book, which brings Machiavellian conspiracies to mind, his story of the Chappaquiddick case is most remarkable as a meticulous account of the stumbling banality of evil.

Damore covered the case as a reporter for a local newspaper, and he has done enormous research since then. The most remarkable aspect of this research is his long series of interviews with participants in the affair, including Joseph Gargan, Kennedy's cousin and one of the two close friends who attempted to save Miss Kopechne's life. Damore is by no means pleased with Kennedy, but he has controlled his indignation sufficiently to allow himself to produce the definitive account of an accident that changed history—for it was Chappaquiddick, more than anything else, that unmade Ted Kennedy's presidency.

Damore's personal politics do not emerge. This is, however, a highly political book. It is one of the most detailed records extant of politics as it is lived at both ends of the spectrum, local and national. No doubt Kennedy's nationally-famous friends labored mightily to "cover up" his character and actions; they wrote his misleading speech, they issued testimonials to his vital role in the republic, they postured for him in front of cam-

eras. But the "cover up" that really mattered went on at the local level, among ignorant people overawed by Kennedy's fame, people who felt that he stood for some great, amorphous good and who gave him such breaks as they fuzzily thought any regular guy (who happened to be a Kennedy and a U.S. Senator) was entitled to. It's not exactly a conspiracy,

The "cover up" that really mattered went on at the local level, among ignorant people overawed by Kennedy's fame, people who felt that he stood for some great, amorphous good and who gave him such breaks as they fuzzily thought any regular guy (who happened to be a Kennedy and a U.S. Senator) was entitled to. It's not exactly a conspiracy, and it's not exactly lurid. It's just real life. But real life can be fascinating.

and it's not exactly lurid. Even Kennedy's famous friends—not to mention Kennedy himself—seem painfully confused and ignorant. It's just real life: and real life can be fascinating, particularly when it is clearly and unpretentiously chronicled.

Damore is a clear, unpretentious narrator; the only distressing defects in his prose are his tendency to dangle modifiers ("A fixture for years as advance man, Gargan's absence was too conspicuous not to be accounted for," p. 423) and to omit the word "that" just when it is really needed: he writes a lot of sentences like, "But so inadequate had his examination been, even Kennedy was dissatisfied with it" (p. 360). But Damore has the good sense to let the characters in his drama reveal themselves in the quality of their own words and actions.

They are a curious crew. There is the Senator who is elected solely by reason of his close ties to his family but who is unable or unwilling even to write a eulogy for his brother Robert's funeral. Damore quotes one of Ted Kennedy's speechwriters as observing that he "felt pretty funny" about that speech. "Because, how could we know what he felt about his brother? He just said write something on the theme of love. I thought maybe that was one speech he shouldn't have asked us to write" (p. 172).

There is the local police chief who spends his time giving press conferences rather than interviewing witnesses. As one state policeman remarked, the chief

was so involved with the press that "if they stuck a potato in front of him he'd talk into it like it was a microphone" (p. 179). There is the state policeman himself, who secretly collaborated with Kennedy's defense by revealing the nature of the investigation that might incriminate him: "I'm thinking of Ted Kennedy going into the inquest frightened, not knowing what's going to be dropped on him. My whole thought was, I knew Ted Kennedy lied on TV. I didn't want him to go into an inquest and get caught in another lie. This time when he tells his lie in the inquest, he can stick with the lie and they have to swallow it. He could walk into the inquest knowing there wasn't going to be any bombs dropped on him"

(pp. 343-43). And there is this same policeman later on in his life: "When Kennedy ran against Carter and he was screeching and yelling, I said to myself: 'Christ! This man doesn't deserve to be President'" (p. 422).

There is the pathetic nonsense of a district attorney telling a grand jury that was eager to investigate the case: "We don't really believe he did it on purpose do we? We know that a murder wasn't committed. It was just an unfortunate accident" (p. 390). And there are pathetic statements of quite another kind, from the parents of Mary Jo Kopechne. Shocked and bewildered by the tragedy and its gruesomely bungled investigations, facing the possible exhumation of her daughter, Mrs. Kopechne said, with simple feeling, "I don't want my little girl's body dug up—my tiny, lovely baby" (p. 271). She wanted to believe Kennedy's story, but she was baffled by the "inconsistencies and contradictions" in the case: "Nobody seemed to be following the case properly. The district attorney was falling apart, going from question to question; he'd get an answer but didn't follow through. There were so many questions I could have asked he never thought of asking" (p. 396).

Every reader can echo Mrs. Kopechne's sentiments. But it's unfair to blame the attorneys, politicians, and police without blaming the public, too. One of Kennedy's acquaintances observed, dismissively, that "the Kennedys were fun and had a lot of glamor. We thought they belonged in Hollywood, not

Washington" (p. 255). But even the spectacle of Chappaquiddick and its aftermath was insufficient to remove Ted Kennedy from Washington; and perhaps this is true because the public has confused cinematic with political judgment.

How else can we explain the fact that sizable numbers of Ted's disappointed supporters wound up in the camps of George Wallace and Ronald Reagan, whose politics are apparently so distant from those of the Kennedys? How else can we explain the public toleration of Kennedy's post-Chappaquiddick declarations about returning to the Senate to be "a voice of reconciliation that appeals to the best within people," "to give voice to the powerless groups that exist within our society" (p. 400)? No philosophy, no coherent program, no settled principles lay behind such words. It is safe to assume that the public understood them, not as a failed attempt to define a political philosophy but as a successful attempt to project an image. It is safe to assume that the public has always judged the Kennedys in the way in which it judges characters on the screen—as more or less successful projections of a story that includes a more or less coherent narrative line and certain more or less intense dramatic episodes. Kennedy was returned to the Senate by people willing to applaud a protagonist's ability to get himself into and out of a series of interesting scrapes, meanwhile mouthing the sort of verbiage appropriate to protagonists.

Everyone who deplores such phenomena eventually turns to the Bible for sufficiently withering words. My choice in the present instance is Jeremiah 5:30–31: "A wonderful and horrible thing is committed in the land; the prophets prophesy falsely, and the priests bear rule by their means; and my people love to have it so: and what will ye do in the end thereof?" □

Erratum

In Jeffrey Friedman's March 1989 article, "The End of Political Activism," there was an error in the last paragraph of the second column on page 50. The first sentence should have read:

"Far healthier skeptically to inventory our beliefs and to view those that seem valid as *insights* we can share with the world, but that do not prevent us from learning from the world, even from parts of it we used to see as 'evil.'"

Freedom as a Value: A Critique of the Ethical Theory of Jean-Paul Sartre by David Detmer. Open Court Books, 1988, 271 pages, \$29.95, \$15.95.

Existentialism and Liberty

David Gordon

Murray Rothbard has often reminded us that libertarianism is a political doctrine. Belief in it requires no commitment to a particular system of ethics, let alone a metaphysics. Most libertarians, however, will gravitate toward a view that accords high value to freedom. It would be odd, though not contradictory, to think freedom of compelling political significance while also deeming freedom of little intrinsic value. (There is no contradiction since someone might think political value a quite minor affair.)

Jean-Paul Sartre, the subject of David Detmer's outstanding study, was hardly a libertarian. Nevertheless, if Detmer's well-argued case is right, libertarians have much reason to be interested in the ethics of this dissident French Marxist. Sartre claimed that freedom is the highest value; if his arguments for this position are compelling, political disputes should not bar the way toward a close perusal of his ethics. Further, Detmer makes no attempt to connect Sartre's ethics with any political position. The case for libertarian interest in Sartre is all the stronger—if his conception of freedom strikes us as defensible and important.

But an objection at once arises. Although Sartre believed that human beings are free, did he not also think of this condition as unfortunate? A famous phrase tells us that man is "condemned to freedom"; another that "hell is other people" [emphasis added]. These seem no mere rhetorical effusions. In *Being and Nothingness*, Sartre presents human beings as continually caught in the web of bad faith. They attempt, with utter futility, to deny their freedom. They find no respite: romance, for instance, comes to grief in the attempt to subdue the

other while yet respecting his or her independence.

As for the role of freedom in ethics, does not Sartre go too far? He reduces all ethics to choice: how can one escape the arbitrary on his seemingly nihilistic view? And the "freedom" about which he speaks so much impresses one as peculiar. He holds that one is always free, no matter what the external circumstances. But do we not find much in life imposed on us, regardless of whether we choose it?

On the reading just given, libertarians—along with everyone else interested in sound thinking—might well give Sartre's philosophy a wide berth. Herein lies exactly one of Detmer's principal contributions. He contends that the portrayal of Sartre just advanced misrepresents the facts entirely. Only a few authorities, such as Sartre's lifelong consort Simone de Beauvoir, have correctly understood his thought. He has been victimized by caricature and uninformed hostile assault.

Detmer lays the foundation for his careful analysis of Sartre's ethics with a discussion of the theory of knowledge. Sartre denies that the mind is a substance: consciousness is intentionality—the relation of being directed outward toward the world. Of course, I can become aware of myself: but this awareness does not reflect a substance that exists whether or not I think of it.

A skeptical problem now arises. Sartre claims to offer a description of how the world appears to consciousness. He cannot then distinguish between appearance and reality: at the level of description, the world is what it appears to be. If so, how can Sartre exclude the possibility that what we see is created, as well as seen, by consciousness? Should he not, like Edmund Husserl, "bracket" questions of existence? Sartre's confi-

dence in a world that exists apart from consciousness appears misplaced.

Sartre responds by claiming that any object that we see can be viewed from an infinite number of perspectives. We know, for example, that we are looking at a desk; but no single view, or set of views, exhausts the desk's appearances. The desk always is more than it appears. Since the mind cannot contain an infinite number of perspectives, the desk must exist "outside" the mind, i.e., in reality.

Whether Professor Detmer himself endorses this argument is not clear: much of the first chapter, he tells us, is intended simply as exposition. In any case, the argument seems weak. How do we know that all the "desk-like appearances" form part of a single object? An opponent of realism would hardly grant Sartre an assumption that so obviously begs the question against him. Further, no reason has been offered to speak of an "infinite" series of perspectives, even if desks and other objects exist outside the mind. No doubt we can view an object from continually varying points in space, but this hardly guarantees that what we see must in each case be different.

Perception, however, is not Detmer's chief concern, and he soon turns to his central theme of freedom. Here, he convincingly shows that many of Sartre's critics, including so eminent a philosopher as Maurice Merleau-Ponty, entirely distort his view of freedom. Sartre sharply distinguished between ontological and practical freedom. Ontological freedom, in Sartre's usage, is the alleged fact that an individual always has various ways of construing the situation in which he finds himself.

It certainly does not follow from this that everyone always has desirable alternatives available or that one is always at liberty to do whatever one wants. Quite the contrary, Detmer abundantly shows that Sartre recognizes many limits to freedom. Often things have the bad grace to resist us, and other people frequently fail to accede to our wishes. Sartre pays explicit and detailed attention to what he terms the "coefficient of adversity" that objects impose

against us.

Also, when the actions of several people connect with one another, the outcome may differ from what anyone expects, even if the actors have allowed for the coefficient of adversity. The "unintended consequences of human action" will of course strike a familiar note to readers acquainted with Friedrich Hayek's works. Sartre's idea closely parallels Hayek's. Sartre terms this phenomenon "counter-finality." Readers interested in this notion may find it worthwhile to examine Sartre's use of it to analyze the French Revolution in *The Critique of Dialectical Reason*.

Detmer shows with great polemical force and ardor that many of Sartre's critics ignore his distinction between the two sorts of freedom. Here Detmer's precise and far-reaching knowledge of Sartre's work emerges to best advantage. Anyone inclined to criticize Sartre on freedom will hesitate before the risk of a confrontation with so formidable a defender as Detmer.

Libertarians have much reason to be interested in the ethics of this dissident French Marxist. Sartre claimed that freedom is the highest value; if his arguments for this position are compelling, political disputes should not bar the way toward a close perusal of his ethics.

The difficulties for Sartre are not yet over. Granted that Sartre can avert the strictures of many of his critics by means of the distinction between ontological and practical freedom, of what value is the former? Sartre's one-time colleague Maurice Merleau-Ponty was strongly inclined to deprecate the importance of ontological freedom. The ability to look at a given set of circumstances in different ways gives one by itself no freedom of action. Perhaps "The mind is its own place, and in itself can make a heaven of hell, a hell of heaven," but few today will find plausible this view of Milton's Satan.

Detmer once more claims that Sartre has been misread. Ontological freedom is not confined to an "inner" realm distinct from the world. Persons always have alternative actions available to them: whether these alternatives have much value or not—a question important for practical freedom—leaves un-

touched the issue of whether alternatives exist.

As usual, Detmer's point is cogent. But if Sartre's ontological freedom is taken his way, rather than the way Merleau-Ponty looked at it, how do we know that individuals always may choose among various courses of action? Sartre offers no argument; and the fact that we usually have choices hardly suffices to show that we never do not.

The vagaries of ontological freedom largely have interested Sartre's fellow philosophers. Another aspect of Sartre's thought has aroused more concern among the public: the hopeless portrayal of human beings inextricably bound by bad faith.

Detmer solves this problem with an audacious stroke. He admits that most of *Being and Nothingness* does present a bleak picture of human life. But Sartre always holds open the possibility of "radical conversion." By a process of mental purification, one may cease to live in bad faith. Although he referred several times

to this more hopeful view, Sartre never so long as he lived published the treatise on ethics in which he proposed to discuss radical conversion in detail. Here exactly lies Detmer's boldness. Because of the referenc-

es to radical conversion,

he contends that the bulk of *Being and Nothingness* is intended only as a partial view of man rather than a complete picture of the human condition. Detmer backs his striking position with strong textual support. And although contrary to the popular picture of Sartre, Detmer's interpretation agrees with that of Simone de Beauvoir.


Discussion of radical conversion leads naturally to the analysis of Sartre's ethics. Detmer here continues his careful exposition of Sartre but comes forward also as a philosopher in his own right; he criticizes Sartre at several points and suggests modifications of his views.

Sartre, as everyone knows, stresses choice and subjectivity. This stress emerges clearly in a famous example which portrays a young Frenchman in World War II faced with a choice between joining the Free French and caring for his aging mother. Sartre thinks that there is no "correct" answer to the

problem. Only the person himself can decide. Unlike the Randian position, according to which the requirements of ethics follow from man's nature, Sartre reduces ethics to free decisions.

Detmer presents with his usual care this part of Sartre's thought; but it hardly accords entirely with his own predilections. Detmer considers at some length the considerations Sartre offers to support the view that values are subjective and finds them all wanting. In one place Sartre contends that if values were objective—if it were a matter not of choice but of discovery whether something is good or bad—then God would exist. Sartre, resolute in his atheism, takes this to reduce to absurdity the objectivity of values. Detmer replies not by defending theism but by denying the relevance of God's existence to ethics. In support, he criticizes a version of "divine command" ethics along standard lines. He also cites Sartre himself as elsewhere denying that God's existence is relevant to ethics.

Detmer's denial that objective truth about values depends on God's existence seems convincing. But after quickly putting to one side the rather crude version of divine command ethics he discusses, he goes much too far in claiming to have shown the irrelevance of God to ethics. Might it not be the case that, if God exists, we have obligations in some respects different from those we have if he does not? Also, one of the arguments Detmer deploys against the divine command theory appears dubious. He says that one might just as well define "wrong" instead of "right" as what God commands. Though the fault may well be mine, I entirely fail to see the force of Detmer's point. He is, of course, right—if the divine command theory lacks all plausibility. But his implied assertion to that effect is not an argument.



"I know everything is futile, but what good would it do to give up?"

(This, of course, is not to endorse the divine command theory.)

Detmer makes a strong case that Sartre has failed to show that all values are subjective. But even if Sartre has not proved his point, why should we deny his claim? Detmer notes that sometimes it seems evident to us that certain things are right or wrong. Somehow, it does not ring true to say that we *choose* to regard Stalin's purges as morally bad. Detmer does not think that all questions of right and wrong are matters of fact—some do indeed depend on choice. Equally, though, some do not.

This is Detmer's view; but why accept it, rather than the full-blown subjectivism of Sartre or some other view distinct from both? Detmer appeals to intuition. He means by this not some occult faculty but rather our direct perception that something is the case. To those who spurn resort to intuition, Detmer offers a challenge. How can intuition be escaped? An argument depends on certain premises and principles of reasoning which must at some stage simply be accepted. We cannot have argument upon argument going back to infinity. Detmer's case for the objectivity of some moral judgments is very ably presented and manifests the author's considerable philosophical gifts. It deserves the attention of anyone interested in ethics.

A few details of Detmer's arguments seem questionable. These arise mainly when Detmer buttresses his points by reference to various analytical philosophers. He asserts that "good" designates a relation rather than a property on the ground that the goodness of an object cannot vary in entire independence from its other properties. If something is good, anything exactly like it will also be good. But why is this sort of independence necessary for good (or anything else) to be a property?

Detmer also cites with favor a linguistic argument purporting to show that "good" designates a relation rather than a property. The argument proceeds by the use of examples such as the following: If a bus is a mode of transportation, then a blue bus is a blue mode of transportation. But if a knife is a tool, it does not follow that a good knife is a good tool—it depends on the purpose for which the tool is to be used. "Good," then, does not behave like words that designate properties.

This linguistic curiosity hardly

seems decisive. If one says that an axe is blunt, we ascribe a property to the axe: yet a blunt axe is not a blunt tool but probably a sharp one. Even if the argument always "went through" in the proper way Detmer assumes, why cannot it be taken to show that words denoting some properties behave differently from others?

One further quibble. It is not true that, on Russell's Theory of Descriptions, it is unknowable whether the present King of France is bald. Since there is no such person, the theory assigns all statements predicating properties to him the truth-value "false."

To return to the main thread of the book, Detmer contends that on Sartre's view of ethics, especially if one accepts his own "objectivist" variant of it, a strong case exists that freedom is the highest of all values. This returns us full circle: here, if Detmer is right, lies the issue susceptible of arousing libertarian interest in Sartre.

The importance of freedom, Detmer thinks, in part can be seen intuitively. (By "freedom" he means both ontological and practical freedom.) Is it not obviously true that people ought to have a wide and significant range of alternatives from which they can choose? Further, Detmer agrees with Sartre that much of value is subjective. The necessary condition for all of these values is freedom: this offers an additional reason for rating freedom of supreme importance.

If one accepts Detmer's intuitive procedure, he has strong grounds for the claim that freedom is an important value. But how does it follow from this that freedom is the *highest* value? Detmer offers no comparison of freedom with other values, and it is not evident how intuition can here assist him. So far as concerns the point that nonobjective values depend on freedom, this may well be true. But this avails nothing in the question before us unless one accepts the premise "a necessary condition of a value is itself a value." This seems false. To use one of Robert Nozick's examples, it is valuable to be cured from cancer, but a necessary condition for this state of affairs is that one has had cancer.

On one point, though, I do not think there can be disagreement. Detmer has written an insightful and provocative study that is a must for those interested in Sartre, ethics, or both. □

There is more to Nevil Shute than *On the Beach*.

Novelist of Achievement

Phillip Salin

I've often been surprised at how easy it is for admirable artists and works of art to go unnoticed by most of the people who would really enjoy them. What a waste, on both sides: authors, directors, composers are deprived of their proper audience and appropriate recognition; the audience is deprived of potential enlightenment and enjoyment.

This problem is particularly acute for worthy "old" works of art. One might expect critics to help maintain awareness of admirable works and artists, but the majority of critical analysis is only Monday morning quarterbacking, scoring points on an artist for what he didn't but might have done in his most recent performance. Such criticism overlooks the simpler, more basic functions of publicizing and market-making, of helping to bring together a work and its proper audience.

That is my purpose here: to introduce you to an author, to pique your interest in buried, under-praised, or forgotten writings. In this brief survey, I'll highlight a handful of Nevil Shute's novels, as well as his autobiography, *Slide Rule*.

Individualist Visions

Born in 1899, Nevil Shute wrote twenty-five books between 1923 and 1960, the year of his death. Most of his stories involve aviation, which is not surprising, because writing books was Shute's second career. His first was in the infant airplane and airship business of the 1920's and 1930's. He worked for a series of companies, as junior assistant designer, chief calculator, deputy chief engineer, and managing director (i.e., president). When he quit the airplane business he was head of Airspeed, Ltd, with over 1000 employees.

Shute is so simple and straightfor-

ward in his style, so decent and modest in his characterizations, that you might think he's not saying much. And then, bit by bit, you realize how perceptive he is. How very decent and good-hearted.

Shute's people are believable, and, for the most part admirable. His situations, even the most melodramatic, are also believable. For this reason, they reflect on real life in ways that many works of fiction do not. Although several of his plots do contain a fantastic element (e.g., involving strange dreams or inexplicable hunches), these are generally plot devices rather than the core of the book. There is also a curious (and refreshing) absence of villains in most of his stories. The tension generally comes from attempting to accomplish a difficult task, rather than from any artificial need to overcome malevolent human adversaries. Shute's plots emerge naturally from the attempts of his main characters to try to get a job done right.

On the Beach (1957) is Shute's most readily available book, but is quite atypical of him. If this is the only Shute story with which you are familiar, you cannot avoid getting a very mistaken impression of his work, and possibly of his purposes in writing the story itself. Shute was not a passive man, but *On the Beach* portrays a world that has allowed itself to fall into a fatal situation from which there is no escape; life on Earth is doomed by the unintended consequences of a nuclear war. Shute's dry, painful understatement about this tragedy could lead to an impression of fatalism, but familiarity with his other works makes clear that Shute's objective was to inspire horror in order to motivate preventive action while it is still possible.

On the Beach succeeds admirably at inspiring horror and motivating readers to prevent a catastrophe. But it fails to offer any specific analysis of what ought to

be done. I think this was wise. By avoiding simplistic solutions, Shute avoids the impression that the problem is amenable to such solutions. Much of the book's power derives from its harsh refusal to offer an easy way out. This, indeed, is a common theme in his work: the reality of hard problems, and our responsibility for noticing and addressing them as well as we can.

With similar purpose, in a novel written shortly before World War II, Shute focused attention on important issues of civil and personal defense. *What Happened to the Corbetts* (1939, published in the U.S. as *Ordeal*), was meant to inspire improved preparations against bombing attacks that Shute, quite rightly, considered imminent.

A Town Like Alice (1950) is a good introduction to Shute's works. Part of the action takes place in Malaya, during World War II; the remainder in England and Australia. The complex plot is skillfully handled, with many compelling scenes. The story concerns a legacy whose beneficiary is Jean Paget, Shute's most enduring heroine.

I won't say more about the narrative, since it contains a number of surprises, except to emphasize the importance of commercial themes in what, at first glance, is primarily a romance-adventure story. One such theme is the importance of avoiding prejudice in accurately evaluating another person's business judgment. Another is the virtue of company towns. I'd be surprised to find another work of fiction from the early 1950s with a more positive view of capitalism and entrepreneurship than *A Town Like Alice*.

No Highway (1948) is a cliffhanger about integrity, eccentricity, personal responsibility, judgment and management. It exemplifies what is most attractive about Shute's work: he clearly sees the impact each individual has on the lives of his or her family, friends, and co-workers. He clearly illuminates the tremendous responsibility each of us has, not just in the "major" choices, but in seemingly "insignificant" ones as well: the decision whether or not to provide minor, timely assistance to a stranger; the decision about whether to act before one is sure of the facts; the decision to re-examine a cherished presupposition, even when one doesn't have to.

The narrator, Dr. Dennis Scott, is manager of an aviation research estab-

ishment. Slowly, just as in real life, facts begin to present themselves to Scott's attention suggesting that *perhaps* there may be a materials flaw in a new commercial airliner. The plot involves tracing the steps by which one of several possibilities becomes a probability, and then, only at the end, a demonstrable fact. The central conflicts of the story stem from the necessity for each character to take responsible action before the uncertainty has been resolved.

Shute skillfully intertwines two very different kinds of uncertainty: uncertainty about technology and about people. The reader comes to realize that we often have to take action based not on our own judgments, but on the judgments of others. The crux is, how should we decide whose judgments to rely upon, and how far?

The story centers on a modest, dedicated, irritating, highly eccentric man, Theodore Honey. As the story unfolds, each of the other characters has to decide how to think about Honey and how to treat him. Their decisions, as well as Honey's responses to those decisions, determine the outcome.

For many years the actress had been out of touch with the hard realities of life. She had not been short of money for thirty years and she would never be again. All her working life had been spent in the facile world of honky-tonk, of synthetic emotion and of phoney glamour. Now she was getting a glimpse into a new world, a world of hard, stark facts, a world in which things had to be exactly right or people would be killed . . . She was beginning to perceive that little insignificant men like Mr. Honey were the brains behind that world . . .

Shute's main characters are not supermen or superwomen. They are strong human beings, and Shute concentrates his efforts on showing what makes them strong: integrity, hard work and training, and an occasional helping hand, particularly one guided by a similar sensibility. There is no arrogance or solipsism in his writing; as a result, we see human beings engaged in co-operative enterprise, each person good at some things and not so good at others. It's a refreshing contrast from the normal run of super-heroes and

anti-heroes. Here we have recognizable, believable heroes and heroines, who differ from us in degree of competency and perceptiveness, but not in kind. I think this is the main source of Shute's enduring (albeit relatively unsung) popularity.

Round the Bend (1951) has two main themes: the hard work and attention to detail required to build up a business (in this case, a cargo airline), and the need for traditional religions to adapt to the requirements of modern life. The story takes place in the Middle East during the late 1940s, when the oil boom was just starting. Much of the book describes the birth of a new oriental religion that emphasizes the virtue of excellence in one's work. In the light of recent history, it is sad to reflect on how different Middle Eastern politics might be if something like Shute's path had been followed instead of the Ayatollah's.

He said quietly, "you're saying, in effect, that we must work on the assumption that Shak Lin's divine."

"God damn it," I said angrily. "I tell you he's not. I know him, and he's just a damn good engineer who's going round the bend a bit. That's all there is to him."

"A damn good engineer who's going

I think of Shute as the author of novels of achievement. In each book, the protagonist works to achieve an admirable goal in an admirable fashion, with intelligence, sensitivity, energy, and integrity.

round the bend a bit," he said thoughtfully. "It wouldn't have been a bad description of the Prophet Mahomet, only he was a damn good merchant."

The singularity of Shute is readily apparent: who else would combine a positive vision of business enterprise and an original view of religion in the same work?

Although Shute was not a libertarian, he was a vocal opponent of government meddling in business, confiscatory income and inheritance taxes, and other aspects of socialism. This fitted right in with what one obituary writer referred to as his "almost pathological distrust of politicians and civil servants." In 1950, unwilling to put up any longer with the British Labour government's disastrous policies, he voted with his feet and emi-

grated to Australia. Both *The Far Country* (1952) and *In the Wet* (1953) contain biting criticisms of conditions in England under socialism.

The latter book explores the political implications of then-current trends in the British Commonwealth, extrapolated 30 years into the future. Shute explicitly criticizes traditional democracy for its tendency to give too much political power to people who have done nothing to earn the respect of their peers. Shute's proposed solution is unorthodox: as in our world, every individual gets one "basic" vote, but as many as six additional votes can be earned—by education, military service or foreign travel, raising children and staying married, earning significant income, ministering a church, or—the highest honor of all—gaining special grant from the Queen.

We got a totally different sort of politician when we got the multiple vote. Before that, when it was one man one vote, the politicians were all tub-thumping nonentities and union bosses. Sensible people didn't stand for parliament, and if they stood they didn't get in.

This scheme strikes me as neither workable nor desirable. It is insufficiently radical, and too arbitrary—how many

years of education? at what schools? does a minister of the Universal Life Church qualify for an extra vote? Nevertheless, *In the Wet* remains interesting because of the importance of Shute's

underlying concern that there is something wrong with the idea that all men's opinions are worthy of respect and should be weighted equally in politics. That Shute was willing to say this in print in 1953 showed both courage and an uncommon independence from intellectual fashion.*

While *A Town Like Alice* shows the birth of a company town, *Ruined City* (1938, U. S. title: *Kindling*), shows the near-death of one. As with most of Shute's stories, the plot builds on personal experiences. Indeed, I recommend reading this book after his

* Readers interested in the "multiple vote" idea may also wish to read Mark Twain's brief satiric essay "The Curious Republic of Gondour" (1875), reprinted in *Mark Twain: Life as I Find It*, ed. Charles Neider (Garden City: Doubleday, 1961).

autobiography, *Slide Rule*, which discusses in detail his opinions about management's conflicting responsibilities to shareholders and employees. Just before writing *Ruined City*, Shute was in much the same position as his protagonist, responsible for raising and making money, and preserving the jobs of over 1,000 employees during very tough times.

Ruined City is a "there but for the grace of God go I" story, in which the main character concocts an elaborate scheme to resurrect a moribund town and create jobs in the midst of the Great Depression. Shute seems to be pushing his readers, asking them "And how far would you go to get out of this mess?"

Every machine that's put into a factory displaces labour. That's a very old story, of course. The man who's put to work the machine isn't any better off than he was before; the three men that are thrown out of a job are very much worse off. But the cure isn't Socialism—or if it is, I'm too much of a capitalist myself to see it. The cure is for somebody to buckle to and make a job for the three men.

My favorite part of *Ruined City* are the chapters in which the protagonist has to obtain consent of a foreign government to back his scheme. Shute provides us with a vivid, step-by-step account of bribing Balkan officials during the 1930s. Entirely a piece of fiction, no doubt.

Trustee From The Toolroom (1960) was Shute's last novel. It tells of a quiet man who is suddenly confronted with an obligation that requires him to travel halfway around the world and back on minimal funds. The plot has many amusing twists exemplifying the book's opening motto: "An engineer is a man who can do for five bob what any bloody fool can do for a quid."

If *On the Beach* is Shute at his grimest, *Trustee from the Toolroom* is Shute at his most optimistic. Unlike his other books, in which success comes only by overcoming extreme difficulties and dangers, this one shows a man steadily pursuing a goal by a series of small, thoughtful steps. The protagonist is entirely successful at achieving his goal: retrieving a lost treasure, and returning it to its right owner. In the process, he dis-

covers both modest fame and sufficient fortune to become a wealthy man. He even acquires a child. When the story begins, he appears a very isolated man; but by its end he turns out to have a rich and varied network of friends and admirers who are much like himself, decent and accomplished individuals.

If this story has any villain, other

Many of Shute's books contain passages showing the protagonist ignoring or subverting laws of all kinds. His ethic seems to be that whenever laws conflict with personal or family interests of decent people, laws should be ignored.

than ocean storms, it is governments. Shute takes obvious pleasure in showing us the careful steps by which the hero, despite modest means, manages to overcome every government-created roadblock he encounters. Many of Shute's books contain similar passages showing the protagonist ignoring or subverting laws of all kinds, but Shute never discusses how one is to decide which laws, if any, should be obeyed. His ethic seems to be that whenever laws conflict with personal or family interests of decent people, laws should be ignored, short of creating more trouble than this is worth.

Shute's other novels are also interesting. *The Chequer Board* (1947) attacks racial prejudice. *Pastoral* (1944) vividly portrays a wartime romance. *An Old Captivity* (1940) intertwines description of a hazardous flight to Greenland with strange dreams about the Norse in America. *Most Secret* (1945) draws on Shute's experiences managing the development of innovative weapons during World War II. *Landfall* (1940) and *Requiem for a Wren* (1955, U.S. title *The Breaking Wave*) represent two completely different treatments of the same plot germ: the psychological effects of errors committed in time of war.

Shute's early books *Stephen Morris* (1923), *Marazan* (1926), *So Disdained* (1928) and *Lonely Road* (1931) contain colorful descriptions of the early days of aviation, as does *The Rainbow and the*

Rose (1959). *Rainbow and the Rose* and *Lonely Road* also include memorable uses of stream-of-consciousness narrative.

Man of Achievement


My special favorite of Shute's books isn't fiction, though it reads as if it were: *Slide Rule—the Autobiography of an Engineer*. Published in 1954, *Slide Rule* focuses on the period in Shute's life when

he was a doer, building aeronautical machines and aeronautical companies. It is full of memorable experiences and observations, but the jewel of this book is the detailed, knowledgeable and pointed first person narrative

of the direct competition between a government designed airship, the R101, and a privately-designed airship, the R100.

In the late 1920's, when the Zeppelin was still expected to out-compete the airplane for long distance air travel, airships were a very big deal, with military and propaganda significance. The R100 was the 747 of its day and Shute had much of the hands-on responsibility for its development.

The controversy of capitalism versus State enterprise has been argued, tested, and fought out in many ways in many countries, but surely the airship venture in England stands as the most curious determination of this matter. The Cabinet Committee heard all the evidence, and had difficulty in making up their minds. Finally, in effect, they said, "The Air Ministry at Cardington shall build an airship of a certain size, load-carrying capacity, and speed, and Vickers, Ltd. shall build another one to the same contract specification. By



"Sire, the Department of Labor has come up with a great idea..."

this ingenious device we really shall find out which is the better principle, capitalism or State enterprise." I joined the capitalist team.

Thus begins an amazing, outrageous, true story. Shute tells it as one who is outraged still, 25 years after the event. He does not mince words:

A man's own experiences determine his opinions, of necessity. I was thirty-one years old at the time of the R101 disaster, and my first close contact with senior civil servants and politicians at work was in the field of airships, where I watched them produce disaster. That experience still colours much of my thinking. I am very willing to recognize the good in many men of these two classes, but a politician or a civil servant is still to me an arrogant fool till he is proved otherwise.

In a passage with implications for defense policy today, he concludes:

The one thing that has been proved abundantly in aviation is that government officials are totally ineffective in engineering development. If the security of new weapons demands that only government officials shall be charged with the duty of developing them, then the weapons will be bad weapons, and this goes for atom bombs, guided missiles, radar, and everything else.

Shute shows how government mismanagement caused the R101 program to fail at every step, and by every measure—financial, technical, political. The end came on R101's maiden voyage, October 31, 1930, when she crashed and burned near Beauvais, France. Of the 54 persons on board, only six survived; all

the officers, all the government officials, and all the passengers perished. Following this crash, all airship development in England was terminated. R100, the entirely successful "capitalist airship," which Shute's firm had built more quickly, on a tighter budget, and to the required specifications, was rolled over with a steamroller and scrapped—even though it had already flown to Canada and back, without difficulty.

Suddenly out of work, Shute decided to try his hand at starting an airplane manufacturing company. The second half of *Slide Rule* is the story of the birth, growth, and eventual disappearance-by-merger of Airspeed, Ltd. It is a story that can provide valuable lessons and moral support to anyone with visions of

continued next page

You Can't Pogo Home Again

Rex F. May

After a long hiatus, "Pogo" is back, and both as a fan (I read the strip faithfully even back in the 50s, when I was just a tadpole) and as a cartoonist, I have mixed feelings. Doyle and Sternecky, who have revived the strip, are apparently even younger than the Vice-President. In an interview, one of them said something to the effect that the strip would be liberal, but that there was no way to be more liberal than Walt Kelly was.

I think that's a bad call, and I think it's an indication that the new "Pogo" may fail. I didn't know Kelly, but I know people who did know him, and Walt Kelly wasn't knee-jerk about anything. I wouldn't go so far as to claim Kelly as a proto-libertarian, but liberal doesn't cover him, either.

After first glance at many of the old collections, one might be inclined to put Kelly on the left. He certainly was hard on Joe McCarthy, Nixon, Agnew, George Wallace, and the John Birch Society. But look a little deeper, and you see equally devastating treatments of Khrushchev, Castro, and Mao, and some unkind portrayals of Bobby Kennedy, Lyndon Johnson, and of course, Congressman

Frog, who seems to represent every district these days. And there's a pretty enlightening sequence where the right-wing redneck wildcat and the Russian Pig Khrushchev character slowly begin to resemble each other physically, very much like the Pig-Farmer scene in *Animal Farm*. So if Kelly was a liberal, he was at the worst one of those old-fashioned cold-war democrat liberals that really don't seem to exist any more, Jeane Kirkpatrick notwithstanding.

Well, Doyle and Sternecky have a well-drawn strip, at least, and that's no mean accomplishment. Unfortunately, they've started off with little else than an elephant who only vaguely resembles Reagan and a horned rabbit who resembles Bush rather more. But the Bush-rabbit is portrayed as being neurotically insecure, which is not the persona the real Bush has shown. The unhatched egg Vice-President the rabbit is carrying around is more clever. (Parenthetically, here, congratulations to the Indianapolis Star for carrying "Pogo," despite its intensely anti-Quayle trend—I'm sure it could get away with dropping it.) But I'm afraid the anti-republican sequence has gone on long enough, and it's time to

come up with a Skunk that looks like Jim Wright or a pissant that drives Volkswagens with female campaign aides off bridges. If these two kids don't start trashing the lefties along with the righties, they won't be carrying on the Walt Kelly tradition at all, and Kelly's real successor will still be Berke Breathed of "Bloom County."

It's hard to judge the humor of the strip. Walt Kelly was a hard act to follow in every way, and it's impossible for an old aficionado like me to evaluate it without automatically making the comparison. The drawing is amusing, every bit as cute and funky as Kelly's was. The use of Southern dialect works most of the time. I would think that a neophyte would appreciate this strip, and would find it superior to most of the politics-oriented comic strips around. It says political things, and manages to be funny most of the time. A difficult trick to pull off. I'll give it an 85 because it's easy to dance to.

And finally, isn't it sad and ironic that Walt Kelly died in 1973, only three years before Pogo actually was elected President? □

starting a risky, capital intensive business.

Much has been written . . . about the provision of risk capital for industry, but few of the authors who pronounce so learnedly upon this subject have ever had the job of looking for the stuff. Men who start businesses upon a shoe string and battle through to success are frequently reluctant to recall and publicize their early disappointments and rebuffs. . . .

I had to think and talk quite hard . . . I had to convince my chairman . . . that a policy of caution, of doing what everybody else was doing, could never bring us through to an established position in the industry. If we did only what the large, conservative firms of the industry were capable of doing we should inevitably lose to them . . . Our only hope was to lead the way. . . .

Shute goes on to tell the story of how he and his colleagues built Airspeed from scratch into a profitable airplane manufacturer. Before it was merged into de Havilland in 1940, Airspeed had designed and developed the twin-engined Oxford, one of the main British training airplanes of World War II; over 8,000 Oxfords were built.

Shute strongly preferred commercial aviation to military aviation. He makes perceptive criticisms of military procurement procedures and the perverse incentives they produce:

From that time onwards, I think I began to lose interest in the company that I had brought into being. Civil work was coming to an end and all new design projects were of a military nature . . . Ahead of the managing director of Airspeed, Ltd. stretched an unknown number of years to be spent in restraining men from spending too much time in the lavatories in order that the aeroplanes might cost the taxpayer less, with the reflection that every hour so saved reduced the profit ultimately payable to the company. In time of war the sense of national effort will galvanize a system of that sort, and does so; in time of peace it tends to make a managing director bloody-minded. I think it did with me.

Few books on 20th century English authors mention Shute's writings. Julian Smith's biography, *Nevil Shute* (Twayne, 1976) appears to be the only serious analysis to date. Shute seems to have no natural base of reviewers, critics or

popularizers, being neither a "literary" author nor a genre writer of thriller, romances, or speculative fiction. Yet his books contain all these elements.

Unlike most works of fiction, they also contain a sense of realism about matters of business and technology. Too many authors reveal complete ignorance of what people who work as engineers or managers actually *do* for a living: try to get something useful done within real constraints of time, money, uncertainty,

and personalities.

I think of Shute as the author of novels of achievement. In each book, the protagonist works to achieve an admirable goal in an admirable fashion, with intelligence, sensitivity, energy, and integrity. As Shute shows, such novels can be entertaining, instructive, and celebratory of man's capacity for purposeful, moral action. The world would be a better place if there were more works like these, and more writers like Nevil Shute. □

Booknotes

What It Takes — A literary critic once reviewed William Morris's poem *Love is Enough* with three words: "No it isn't." I am tempted to make a similar remark about Walter Williams's *All It Takes Is Guts: A Minority View* (Regnery Books, 1987, \$16.95). It (being, apparently, the making of responsible political judgments) takes a good deal more: honesty, curiosity, sympathy and perspicacity, to name just four. Fortunately, Williams has these qualities as well, so it would be unjust for me to dismiss his latest book simply because I don't like the title.

So let the truth be said: *All It Takes Is Guts* is an engaging collection of his political commentary, gathered from his syndicated newspaper column. Most of the essays deal with racial issues and the importance of individual freedom. If you have read his book *The State Against Blacks* you know what to expect. Williams ably deals with issues of economics, race, and politics on a level that anyone can understand. If you are not familiar with the writings of Williams, you should pick this book up. You will not be disappointed. —Timothy W. Virkkala

The Truth About Social Security — Answers to questions about government programs are usually complicated or inaccessible. And sometimes deliberately so, as in the case of Social Security. Anyone trying to understand the basics of the program is confronted with a bewildering array of issues, acronyms, departments, figures, conflicting histories, and jargon.

And forget trying to get information from the Social Security Administration over the phone. I once tried, while writing a paper on Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI). I was routed through dozens of departments, and three times I was told that the one person with whom I needed to speak wasn't at his desk. The fourth time, the bureaucrats played a cruel joke on me by landing me in the sandwich shop in the basement of the building. They must have gotten a good laugh.

But there is hope: the Institute for the Research of the Economics of Taxation (IRET) has done the world a great service by publishing *The ABCs of Social Security* by Aldona E. Robbins (IRET, 1988). It is the most lucid, concise, and up-to-date presentation of the basics of Social Security available today. For those looking for solutions to the crises facing the system, it lays the proper and necessary groundwork.

Robbins structured her book in sections: on the program's origins, operations, policies, and its future. Most helpful, though, is that the subsections give concise answers to typical questions that might be asked: "How did social security come about?" "What do retired workers actually receive?" and "Is social security *really* insurance?" Some of the answers will surprise you: for example, the benefit payments made to retired workers have been paid by current workers (rather than out of an accumulated fund) since 1939.

Robbins bravely tells the truth about the future of social security—and yes, it's bleak. When baby boomers retire, for ex-

ample, "the payroll tax rate would have to increase by almost 12 percentage points to pay benefits social security is currently promising." This is sobering analysis, indeed.

Now, if only someone would do a comparable job by writing *The ABCs of the Welfare State*, the *Federal Reserve*, and the *Pentagon*.
—Jeffrey A. Tucker

The Expected Empire — L. Neil Smith's *The Crystal Empire* (Tor Books, 1987) is on the bookstands right now, and his loyal readers may want to pick this one up. It does not seem to be connected to his "Probability Broach" series, though it is an alternative history with a "many worlds" twist.

Unlike many of his other books, it has no very explicit connection with libertarianism. It is what is usually referred to as a "rollicking adventure," and not bad as light entertainment. The best I will say for it, though, is that it is at least readable, in Smith's workmanlike, occasionally amusing style, and never devolves into incoherence, as did his regrettably bad *The Gallatin Divergence*. But it is also nowhere near as entertaining or as peculiar as other Smith efforts, such as *Their Majesties' Bucketeers* and *The Nagasaki Vector*.

There is lots of bloodshed, and a Man vs the Empire finale, with, of course, the Man winning. Pretty much what you might expect.
—TWV

Guide to Political Philosophy

— The difference between a dictionary and an encyclopedia is simple: a dictionary provides definitions and brief explanations, while an encyclopedia provides articles and surveys. But the nature of the difference becomes much less straightforward when the reference work is devoted to a single subject. The *Harvard Dictionary of Music*, for example, has an encyclopedic breadth and depth. The same can also be said for some dictionaries of politics and philosophy.

These thoughts came to mind as I was reading through *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* (Basil Blackwell, 1987, \$75.00). I could only compare it to my present reference work on the subject, Roger Scruton's *A Dictionary of Political Thought* (Hill & Wang, 1982). Though the articles in the Blackwell are often much longer, some of Scruton's articles also run on for pages, and with similar depth. In fact, the chief difference between the two (other than

the mundane fact that my Scruton is in paperback and the Blackwell is in a handsomely produced hardback) seems to be that while the Blackwell was most at home in philosophy, Scruton excelled in economic theory, an area where the Blackwell is deficient.

This deficiency is the only reason I hesitate to recommend the Blackwell. Though the article on "Classical Political Economy" is excellent, there is no comparable article on neo-classical economics, the marginalist revolution, the Austrian School, or, even, Public Choice. There is not one reference to James Buchanan, for instance! Scruton, on the other hand, has fine entries explaining marginal utility, public choice theory, and a whole host of related concepts.

In philosophy, however, the Blackwell is superior. The articles written by editor David M. Miller are particularly excellent; I especially appreciated his fine discussion of utilitarianism. The volume also contains articles by writers familiar to libertarian readers: Jeremy Shearmur's article on F. A. Hayek and David Gordon's on libertarianism are both fine entries. There are also articles by Robert Nisbet, Hillel Steiner and others.

Nearly every entry is followed by a bibliography listing numerous books, with one or two marked as especially important. I found these markings to be both helpful and amusing: though I could agree with most of them, sometimes the choices seemed a bit odd. In almost every case of a discussion of a famous author, for instance, the recommended works were not the ones written by that author, but by a contemporary scholar. This seems to go against the grain of a proper program of reading the classics, but probably fits with contemporary collegiate practices.

In any case, *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* is a welcome addition to any good reference library.
—TWV

A Different Deal — Brad Linaweaver's *Moon of Ice* (Arbor House, Morrow, 1988, \$17.95) belongs to one of the most fruitful sub-genres of science fiction—the alternate history. In this sub-genre, history is explored by assuming a pivotal change, and extrapolating from that point futureward.

The pivotal event in Linaweaver's

story is the impeachment of Roosevelt for Pearl Harbor. He's removed from office. Peace is made with the Third Reich, but the Pacific War is continued till the Japanese surrender. Still, the present-day world is strangely familiar. The United States is confronted by a slave empire, but it is Nazi rather than communist. We see that it doesn't make a great deal of difference whether slavery is based on racism or the class struggle. Except for the Nazi empire, the world is actually a better place, largely because the New Deal collapsed and the United States returned to a non-interventionist stance. In this alternate history, the United States is a freer place than it is in actual history.

The book is layered. It opens with the editor of the *American Mercury* planning to meet with Hilda Goebbels to arrange publication of her autobiography. Then we enter a deeper level and read her autobiography. And finally, we reach a still deeper level and read the last entries of the diaries of her father, Joseph Goebbels. Of course, both Hilda and Joseph Goebbels died at the end of WW II in a suicide/murder. Linaweaver has perfectly captured the personality of Goebbels, and used him as a vehicle to teach us many things about Naziism, WW II, and the history of the period in general.

Moon of Ice, on another level, is the answer to the big question we're frequently asked: if non-intervention had been our policy, wouldn't the Nazis have won the war? Linaweaver suspects that they very well might have, but takes that result in turn to its logical conclusion, and forces the reader to rethink the entire situation.

We can now add *Moon of Ice* to the list of great libertarian science-fiction novels.

—Rex F. May

The Rivalry Between Capitalism and Socialism

— Don Lavoie's *Rivalry and Central Planning: The Socialist Calculation Debate Reconsidered* (Cambridge University Press, 1985, \$39.50) is a fascinating work of scholarship. Lavoie considers rival accounts of the famous "socialist calculation" debate initiated by Ludwig von Mises. He defends the Austrian position that Mises and F.A. Hayek actually won the debate, and that the apparent victory of Lerner, Lange and others was the product of their own

misinterpretation of Mises's and Hayek's arguments.

The debate, you may recall, was over the question of whether or not it was possible to organize all productive and distributive enterprises in society according to a central plan initiated and directed by the State. Mises, in his classic essay "Economic Calculation in the Socialist Commonwealth," (which was incorporated into his brilliant treatise *Socialism*) said that the classic socialist enterprise must inevitably fail. Without private property, free exchange and rivalrous bidding (competition) no society can coordinate the values and plans of its members.

The most interesting aspect of Lavoie's treatment is his somewhat novel thesis that there is little difference between the arguments of Mises and Hayek. According to Lavoie, standard accounts of the debate regard Hayek's re-statement of the argument as a partial retreat only because almost all non-Austrian economists misunderstood where both Mises and Hayek were coming from—namely, the Austrian School of economics. The mainstream economists interpreted the Austrian challenge in terms of standard neo-classical equilibrium theory, thus emasculating the power of the critique. Hayek's contributions *seemed* so different from Mises's because he was more aware of the gulf separating Austrian and neo-classical theory, and thus reformulated the argument, somewhat, to mitigate misunderstanding. He and Lionel Robbins also clarified and extended the argument in their replies to the socialist "solutions" to the problem. Unfortunately, their care and subtlety were lost on most modern economists, who were unable to work their way out of what Murray Rothbard calls the "Walrasian box" of standard neo-classical analysis.

Though this very readable book may someday be superseded (I still have problems with several of its points), it is nevertheless a must for anyone with an interest in the history of economic theory or in the debate over socialism and capitalism. —TWV

The ABCs of Fear and Loathing — Michael L. Young is a university professor and partner of a public opinion research firm. In *The American Dictionary of Campaigns and Elections* (Abt Books, 1987, \$24.95), he

has written a book of interest both to scholars and to practitioners. Those who are addicted to politics will want to read it cover to cover. Most, however, will be satisfied to use it as a reference source to support *ad hoc* answers to rather specific questions. I found it useful for a quick study of the state of informed opinion about third parties in general and the

Libertarian Party in particular.

As I usually do with reference books on politics, I quickly looked to see if the Libertarian Party is even mentioned. It is. On p. 152, Young describes the L.P. as "a minor party . . . that regularly runs presidential campaigns and fields candidates for federal and local offices in many states . . . strongest in Alaska and

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Periodicals

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Personal

Gay Libertarian Man, 28, is interested in contacting other men. Nonsmokers only. Occupant, 4 Bayside Village Place, #307, San Francisco, CA 94107

parts of the western United States . . . at least some organizational structure in most of the states . . . attracted some national media attention in 1980 . . . however, the party has not had much political success. . . ."

I then looked to see how this description compares with those of other third parties. Lo and behold, the only other third party described is New York's Liberal Party, which isn't a true third party (it is usually content to endorse Democratic Party candidates). I guess that means that we're king of the hill when it comes to third parties.

Young is actually quite sympathetic to third parties and to their ballot access problems. He describes third party ballot access as "a major chore," "particularly burdensome," and "bewildering." He says "the Democrats and Republicans . . . have made it as difficult as possible for parties other than their own to gain access to the ballot."

In several places, Young not-so-subtly attacks the two party system. According to a 1971 study that he cites, only 22 states have genuine two-party competition. Single member districts and gerrymandering have made most races non-competitive. He approvingly describes several alternatives to single member districts, including proportional representation.

If Michael Young is at all representative of informed observers of the American political process, it may be possible for us—in the right state at the right time—to challenge single-member-district voting. It would have to be a state where members of one of the major parties feel unfairly treated by the gerrymandering of their entrenched competitors. It would have to be a state where we have one of our stronger state parties and possibly where there are other third parties already organized. It would have to be a state where citizens can qualify constitutional amendments for the ballot by petition. It would have to be: California. —Clifford F. Thies

A Primer of Political Economy

—Most people become interested in economics out of an interest in politics. It is for this reason that the old term "political economy" still circulates: it honestly proclaims politics as in some way related to economics.

It also explains why what I consider the *ideal* method of introducing a person

to economic theory—careful study of Carl Menger's *Principles of Economics*, along with a quick reading of Alfred Marshall's *Principles* (or some other even more standard text, such as Alchian and Allen's *University Economics*) just to give the reader a feel for the language of non-Austrian economics—is such a bad idea. It is not practical in most cases: it is not well suited to the needs of the average reader, and does not engage the interest of a person seeking political solutions.

Which brings me to *The Free Market Reader*. A person seeking resolutions to contemporary problems will find them here, ably presented by members and associates of the Ludwig von Mises Institute. *The Free Market Reader* is a collection of short essays on a variety of economic subjects, written from the viewpoint of Austrian economics, but in a fashion that is accessible to the layman. The solutions to the problems posed are, happily, hard-core libertarian. And the writers write clearly and simply. He who reads may run . . . to buy more copies for his friends.

Among the writers in this volume are a number who appear regularly in *Liberty*: Sheldon Richman, Jeffrey Tucker, David Gordon, and Murray Rothbard. (As a matter of fact, Rothbard contributed 25 of the 76 essays in the collection.) Among the subjects discussed are many that do not find extensive coverage in *Liberty*, such as rent control, inflation, depressions, balance of trade "problems," taxes, and a host of other issues of the day. In fine, the volume is perfectly suited to the beginner in economics—or the beginner in libertarianism. —TWV

Escape from Siberia —

November 19, 1939, was a bad day for Slavomir Rawicz: Russian security men came to his home in Poland near the Soviet border and arrested him on the charge of espionage. After a long interrogation, he was found guilty at a quick trial and sentenced to 25 years of hard labor in Siberia. (The main evidence against him was that he spoke Russian.)

The Long Walk (Nick Lyons Books, 1984, \$9.95) is his story. But it is not, as you might expect, primarily the story of the brutality of totalitarianism. It is, rather, a travel narrative.

He began his journey packed tightly in a cattle car on the Trans-Siberian

Railway. In December, 1940, he and his fellow prisoners detained near Irkutsk, where they were chained behind Soviet wood-burning trucks for a two-month walk to their work camp. This is a fascinating story in itself, but just a prologue.

After about four months in the Siberian camp he and six of his fellow prisoners decided to escape. The only supplies for the trip that they were able to accumulate in camp were a knife, an axe head, some dried bread, some animal skins and one bag per man to throw the supplies into. Everything else they needed on the trip they had to find, create, be given, or do without.

Their journey took them south across Siberia along the east shore of Lake Baikal, through Mongolia, across the Gobi desert, through Tibet, and over the Himalayas to India. They kept to themselves through the Soviet Union because they feared discovery and re-arrest. Night travel was out (none of them knew how to navigate by the stars), so they hid in Siberia whenever they encountered people and suffered through the heat in the Gobi desert.

In Mongolia and Tibet, they encountered people who had very little, but shared what they had. As an Ostyak (tribal herdsman of Siberia) explained to Rawicz, their people had traditionally left food outside the door at night for the "unfortunates" as they called the Siberian prisoners.

Fortunately, the little band of travelers came from assorted backgrounds that gave them a pool of knowledge to draw from. There were 3 Poles, a Lithuanian, a Latvian, a Yugoslavian, and, amazingly, an American. (As Rawicz said, he expected to "meet the flotsam of a European upheaval" in the hands of the Russians, but not an American.) The group also provided the extra push to keep going. When one might want to give it all up and never move again another was always getting up saying "let's go" and all would follow.

This astounding tale of human endurance, perseverance, and ingenuity to survive the most incredible suffering in order to achieve freedom is awe-inspiring and entertaining. Its concise style conveys the tension and excitement of their journey. There are amazing adventures on practically every page. Once I began reading it, I could not put it down.

—Kathleen Bradford

Videonotes

"No Actors. No Scripts. No Bull." — That's the way the Fox TV network ballyhoos its new Saturday night series, *Cops*. The action in this slice-of-life documentary takes place in Broward County, Florida on Florida's "Gold Coast," an hour north of Miami. Nearly all the police activities in the film were related to the attempted apprehension of "vice" offenders and suspects.

The conduct of the police officers profiled in *Cops* is shocking:

In a busy airport (apparently the Ft. Lauderdale airport) a plainclothes police woman asks men to open their luggage for her and permit her to frisk them. All the men agree, even going so far as to raise their hands obligingly for her and handing over their IDs. The woman is accompanied by an assistant, and has back-up plainclothes police readily available. The woman admits off camera that she cannot tell which passengers coming through the airport terminal are possible drug couriers.

A female cop on patrol tells some women wearing suggestive clothing to "get off my street" or she will arrest them. She warns others that if they attempt to catch a ride in a passing car she will arrest them.

A male cop on patrol tells various white people that he will arrest them if they don't get themselves and their cars out of a purportedly all black neighborhood. He says, "I'm the only white face in here and you don't belong here."

All this happens in "The Land of the Free," whose national icon is the Statue of Liberty. Until I saw this television show, I didn't realize that we Americans are required to cede our right of public passage to the whims of a police officer, and I certainly didn't think the police were empowered to segregate us on the basis of our skin color. Nor was I aware that plainclothes police can arbitrarily stop us in an airport and harangue us into permitting them to frisk our person and open our luggage and spread it about the floor of an airport terminal in the search for drugs.

Gore Vidal recently claimed that America has become a police state. After watching *Cops*, I'm inclined to agree. Where is the opportunity for our citizenry to exercise individual rectitude when

they are reduced to the status of rats responding to governmentally induced stimuli? I hope you will watch *Cops* to acquaint yourself (or re-acquaint yourself) with police psychology and methodology and their continued attacks on our rights.

No emergency or exigency was present to justify this assault. None of the situations depicted in *Cops* involved anything other than routine police work. And the female cop in the airport was no bombshell; men weren't going out of their way to get their crotches frisked by her.

No. It was all routine—routine denial of rights, routine assault on citizens, routine arbitrary and naked exercise of state power.

—Andrew L. Roller

The Spirit of Enterprise — Hollywood doesn't treat big business very well. Most films either trivialize corporate enterprise—such as last year's Lily Tomlin and Bette Midler vehicle *Big Business*—or else present it as a nest for criminal activity—the best recent example being the 1988 film, *Best Seller*, brilliantly acted by Brian Dennehy and James Woods. But there are always exceptions (such as *Working Girl*) that suggest that Hollywood's failure is the result not of conspiracy but of limited imaginations.

Fortunately, *small* business is treated better on film. I recently viewed the charming 1970 film *Quackser Fortune Has a Cousin in the Bronx*. Set in Dublin in the late sixties, this film tells the tale of an independent-minded young Irishman, Quackser Fortune (Gene Wilder). He provides a public good, for his own profit and on his own initiative: he removes horse manure from the streets of Dublin. He runs around the city with his deluxe, home-made wheelbarrow, scooping and hawking, "Fresh horse manure! Two shillings a bucket!" The women of the city buy it for their gardens, and everyone is happy—except for his family members, who find his occupation disgraceful.

Unfortunately, the source of his good fortune—the horse-drawn milk wagons that add to Dublin's quaint Old-world flavor (and smell)—are phased out by command of a progress-minded city council. Quackser finds himself in the

position of the proverbial buggy-whip manufacturer: in need of another line of work. The film covers his traumatic period of adjustment, complicated by a romance with an American college student (Margot Kidder), who Quackser discovers is more of a free spirit than he.

Considering the subject matter, this film could have been made into a farce, a social satire, or even a tragicomedy. Instead, it is a light comedy and slice-of-life that respectfully (though playfully) celebrates the entrepreneurial spirit.

—Timothy W. Virkkala

Videotape Frees "Prisoner" — "I am not a number, I am a free man!" Some readers will recognize this evocative phrase as part of the opening sequence of "The Prisoner," the television series that aired in the U.S. in the summer of 1968. The brainchild of George Markstein and Patrick McGooohan—who played John Drake in the earlier series "Secret Agent"—was and is one of the most innovative, entertaining and intellectually challenging television series yet produced. Few television shows explore so many topics central to libertarian thinking, and none are as engrossing.

McGoohan plays an intelligence operative who has decided to resign his position. He is kidnapped and taken to "The Village," a luxurious self-contained community of indeterminate location, cut off from the rest of the world by sea and mountains. It is populated both by people who know too much and by the indistinguishable "warders" who watch over them. No names are allowed: inmates and warders alike are assigned numbers and wear large identification pins, though McGooohan, Number Six, refuses to cooperate.

The forces running the village, through the medium of Number Two—played by a different actor in almost every episode (Leo McKern is especially memorable in this role)—are out to break Number Six. They want "information," and are particularly interested in why he resigned. For his part, Number Six seeks to discover the identity of Number One. The viewer is kept in the dark on both counts.

The seventeen episodes of "The Prisoner" chronicle attempts by the warders to get the information they desire, and the efforts of Number Six to escape. In the process, the show explores several important themes: the encroachment of the state on individual freedoms;

the abuse of modern computer and surveillance technology ("Be seeing you" is the ironic Village farewell); the nature of the total state and its administrative hierarchy; the use of force and counterforce; and the struggle to maintain one's identity in the face of the levelling effects of all of the above.

"The Prisoner" is visually as well as intellectually stimulating. Patrick McGoochan, cool and hard-edged, plays the role of the individualist hero to the hilt. Intelligent, sly, innovative, autarkic, tenacious and athletic, he is a continual vexation to the Village. Atmosphere was provided by the set, the Portmeirion resort in Wales; the colorful "mod" costumes of its inhabitants; the hi-tech gadgetry; the stark purposelessness of Village life; the arcane Pennyfarthing bicycle symbol; and the roaring, balloon-like "Rover" that pursues those who try to escape.

"The Prisoner" is more than espionage adventure and more than Orwellian thriller. It explores a realm where science fiction and Franz Kafka meet. The final two episodes ("Once Upon a Time" and "Fallout") are surreal exercises that make the first fifteen look commonplace by comparison—which is saying a great deal. *Every* episode is almost unclassifiable in standard terms.

Because "The Prisoner" has a definite (though not definitive) ending, I advise novice viewers to see the episodes in order if at all possible. No doubt because of the small number of episodes, networks rarely run "The Prisoner," and when they do, the show usually appears late at night or on weekend afternoons. All 17 episodes, however, as well as the pilot (which is almost identical to episode two, "The Chimes of Big Ben"), are available on videotape.

In the first episode the Prisoner informs Number Two, "I will not be pushed, filed, stamped, indexed, briefed, debriefed, or numbered. My life is my own." If you have ever felt that way, see this series.

—James S. Robbins

Politics Carried on by Other Means — *The Manchurian Candidate* is

a strange candidate for best theatrical release of the year, yet it would have had my vote. It is a slightly preposterous black-and-white thriller that debuted in 1962 and last year was re-released to theaters. While many *Liberty* readers will hail another 1988 re-release—the Italian production of Ayn Rand's novel *We the*

Living—I strongly prefer the deft plotting of this production of Timothy Condon's political thriller.

It is the story of a programmed man, a man so "brain-washed" that he does not know that he is a trained assassin, programmed to murder on command. It is an effectively plotted tale, holding your attention so well its implausibility passes unnoticed. The fine cast (Laurence Harvey, Frank Sinatra, Janet Leigh, Angela Lansbury) makes the film succeed where it could easily have failed. Lansbury's chilling characterization of the domineering and conniving politician's wife is stunning. Can this be the same lady who plays Jessica Fletcher in the dull television series "Murder, She Wrote"? What difference a good script can make!

Its quasi-ideological stance makes the film all the more remarkable: it is unremittably anti-Communist *and* anti-anti-Communist. It is only by the longest stretch of imagination that I can understand why this film was controversial when it came out, and why it was shelved after the Kennedy assassination. It makes me feel good to have grown up after McCarthyism died, and after respect for a mere president could force a movie out of circulation.

—TWV

Disobedient Heroes — *Saboteur* is second-rate Hitchcock, but second-rate Hitchcock can still be worth watching. It stars Bob Cummings as a man implicated in a crime he did not commit, on the

run from the law, and seeking those who actually plotted the crime. (This was one of Hitchcock's favorite themes, earlier used in *The 39 Steps*.)

What makes this particular tale interesting, from a libertarian point of view, at least, is that while this is a war-time flick, Hitchcock manages to turn what could have been a propaganda film into a very amusing essay in "conscientious objection." Save for the final calling in of the authorities, all the heroic acts depicted in this film are deliberate acts of disobedience against the state. This not only includes the hero's attempts to escape from the police all the while trying to gain information about the real villains, but also the many acts of kindness dealt him by strangers. I especially enjoyed the scenes with the circus performers, and their hiding him from the long arm of the law.

Though the film does not quite work as it was intended (let's face it, Bob Cummings was not a great actor, and the film is marred by some rather static moments), there are many of the hallmark Hitchcock touches; more, even, than in many of his more successful films. Not the least of these, of course, is the concluding scene on the Statue of Liberty, which was such a good idea that when Hitchcock recast the plot into *North by Northwest*, he decided to conclude at yet another national monument, Mt. Rushmore. Though this later effort was near perfection, *Saboteur* is, despite its imperfections, still eminently worth watching.

—TWV

Jane S. Shaw, "The Fires of Yellowstone," *continued from page 32*

Fund (a newer, not-so-Establishment environmental group). While publicly ignoring Chase where possible, Reed and his cohorts vilified him privately. They almost succeeded in discrediting him, but the Yellowstone fires tended to vindicate his charge of inappropriate management.

The Park Service banned the book from Yellowstone's Park Service bookstores, and the other members of the Yellowstone Association forced him to resign. The reaction of the top environmental lobbyists (whom Chase calls the "conservation elite") was a bit more subtle. With the belated exception of *Amicus*, the journal of the Natural Resources Defense Council, none of the leading environmental magazines even reviewed

the book. They didn't castigate it; they ignored it.

As far as I can tell, the policies in Yellowstone are not being seriously debated by people who profess to be most concerned about them and who clearly influence them. The response to the fires is another reminder that political power corrupts, and that includes the power of political lobbyists.

Were Yellowstone Park in private hands, blind faith and knee-jerk defenses would give way to serious scrutiny. With the owner's wealth at stake, the park's actual condition—its rare landmarks, its wildlife, its forests—would matter. Without ownership, politics prevails. □

Letters, continued from page 6

1989) touches on a subject that first occurred to me in 1953, when President Eisenhower announced his "safe driving days." The public really got behind Ike, and traffic deaths increased by 10%.

The traffic safety movement is not just a useless expenditure of our tax dollars, it is actually counter productive of its alleged objective, "to save lives and reduce accidents." Let's drop back to the Prohibition Era, roughly 1920 to 1935. During that 15 years total traffic deaths tripled from 12,700 in 1920 to 36,369 in 1935.

So we repealed the 18th Amendment, and stopped busting drunk drivers. Did deaths and accidents increase? Nope. In fact, for the next 25 years, 1935 to 1960, although drivers, cars, and total miles travelled all increased faster than before, total deaths stabilized at an average of 35,000 per year. This *in spite of* Ike's "safe driving days" campaign, which shot the death totals almost—but not quite—to 40,000.

So how did we get up into the 50,000s? Well, there was a huge governors' traffic safety conference in 1961 and a resulting "crackdown" on speeders. Total deaths were 38,091 in 1961. In 1971, total traffic deaths were 54,381. Fastest increase in deaths since 1920–35.

C.E. Windle
Redmond, Wash.

Sewing Your Wild Oath

The LP "Loyalty Oath"—mentioned in the interviews with libertarian luminaries (Jan. 1989)—or non-aggression truce has always bugged me, not because it says too much, but because it says so little.

"I certify that I do not believe in or advocate . . ." Who cares what you believe? Do murderers advocate murder? Do thieves believe in theft? Would either hesitate to sign such a pledge if there were any motivation for them to do so?

" . . . the initiation of force . . ." This is ambiguous. Force may be interpreted as violence or as mass times acceleration. All action requires initiation of force in the physical sense, but even restricting the phrase to the first meaning doesn't make it accurate. A boxing match will involve violence, yet I don't think that libertarians need forswear such activities. The essential missing ingredient is consent.

Someone may do whatever he wishes with me or my property as long as he has my consent. Without consent, my property and I are out of bounds. Furthermore,

does "initiation of force" refer only to assault, or to theft and fraud also? Whether to include property or not should be made explicit.

" . . . as a means of achieving political or social goals." Why the restriction? Do libertarians advocate violating consent as a means of achieving personal goals, as long as the goals are non-political and asocial? Obviously not.

I suggest the truce be updated to the following: "I certify that I will not violate another's person or property without consent; nor do I advocate such violation, even as a means of achieving admirable social or political goals." Even this may be misinterpreted—one person's violation may be another's "How do you do?"—but it hits closer to the mark than the original.

Lorraine Bier
Austin, Tex.

Ominous Parallels, Obvious Pilferings

Most noticeably absent from Ethan O. Waters' review of Robert LeFevre's (auto)biography ("The Wonderful Wizard of Liberty," March 1989) is a discussion of the parallels which existed between the Great I Am cult and the "education" enterprise at Larkspur. Prominent among these was the pine tree logo of Rampart College. It just so happens that on those occasions when Mama Ballard preached in LA there were always pine trees lined up on each side of the stage where she held forth. This and other telling parallels suggest that Rampart College was only another branch of the same cult.

The reviewer briefly discussed LeFevre's "odd notion of aggression." His interpretation of this odd notion had a familiar ring to it. It is my guess that it was derived in part from Mr. Watner's own reading. In any case, it was just as faulty.

LeFevre's doctrine, plagiarized from the writings of such 19th century liberals as William Graham Sumner, et. al., gives no recognition to the right of aggression. There is no principle or body of law authorizing anyone to act directly against the will of anyone else. The LeFevre doctrine doesn't bar people from using aggression whenever they want to. It simply strips aggression of any and all niceties that happen to be the fashion at any given moment.

The libertarian principle, on the other hand, authorizes a person to commit aggression against another under prescribed conditions. It grants such a person the au-

thority vested in governmental functionaries to do what he feels necessary to achieve satisfaction. It sets no limits on what a person can do to this end. Nor does it impose limits on the delegation of authority to others who could be of help. Furthermore, it requires the person it defines as the aggressor to submit to this authority. It, in fact, lies at the very heart of the State itself. And yet its propounders insist that it is the very essence of anti-Statism.

The reviewer sees things in terms of rights or permits. LeFevre's doctrine has no place for such idols. The actor has to decide for himself what he thinks is expedient. Knowing how people are inclined to react to aggressive acts, he will be inclined to avoid aggression. However, there is nothing in the doctrine that proscribes aggression, for any reason. The reviewer is therefore misleading the reader when he contends that under the LeFevre doctrine a person isn't permitted, for example, to defend himself by slitting an attacker's throat. LeFevre never pretended to be authorized to issue or deny permits to anyone to do anything. He wasn't disposed to assuming the authority of the State. (As an Army officer during WWII, though, he did have the job of brainwashing draftee soldiers as to why they were fighting the "good war.")

A couple years before LeFevre passed away to the Great I Am in the sky, I happened to point out in a letter to him the compatibility between his doctrine and conscious egoism. To my surprise, believe it or not, the stuff really hit the fan. It seems I had unwittingly touched a raw nerve. Along the way, I learned of his previous hostile encounters with Laurence Labadie, S.E. Parker, and James J. Martin—each and every one a dyed-in-the-wool egoist. I managed eventually to extricate myself from the flypaper having reached the conclusion that it didn't really matter what LeFevre thought of the LeFevre doctrine since it was essentially a recycling of ideas from antiquity.

Alan Koontz
Berkeley Springs, W. Va.

No Hierarchy Here

I was taken aback by a "Reflections" article by Murray Rothbard titled "Greenhouse Defects" (Jan 1989). Is this a put-on?

I have always assumed that libertarians show common sense. But Rothbard's attack on environmentalists as "anti-human," if taken at face-value, reflects not only arrogance but also an ignorance which seems almost intentional.

continued on next page

Notes for "Right Dissent" continued from page 42

1. "Sumner, William Graham." *Encyclopedia Britannica*. 1987 ed., p. 386.
2. Murray Rothbard, *For a New Liberty* (New York: Macmillan, 1973), pp. 279-80.
3. William Graham Sumner, *War and Other Essays* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1911), p. 297.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 315.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
6. Rothbard, *op cit.*, p. 280.
7. Sumner, *op cit.*, p. 302.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 313.
9. *Ibid.*, p. 314.
10. *Ibid.*, pp. 29-30.
11. *Ibid.*, p. 305.
12. M. Stanton Evans, "The Founding Father," *Ideas* (Spring-Summer 1969), p. 61.
13. Frank Chodorov, *Fugitive Essays* (Indianapolis: LibertyPress, 1980), p. 334.
14. *Ibid.*, p. 335.
15. *Ibid.*, p. 342.
16. *Ibid.*, p. 348.
17. *Ibid.*, p. 326.
18. *New York Times*, 21 May 1940, p. 16, col. 1.
19. Robert Taft, *A Foreign Policy for Americans* (New York: Doubleday, 1951), p. 12.
20. Nicholas von Hoffman, "Warnings Out of the Woodwork," *Washington Post*, 17 May 1971, sec. E, p. 1, col. 1.
21. Taft, *op cit.*, p. 16.
22. Taft, address at the Grove City College commencement, 22 May 1943.
23. Taft, address to Ohio Federation of Republican Women's Organizations, 22 Sept. 1941.
24. Taft, "The President Has No Right To Involve the United States in a Foreign War," speech to the Senate, 29 March 1951.
25. *A Foreign Policy for Americans*, p. 121.
26. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Quest for Community* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 284.
27. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Twilight of Authority* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), p. 184.
28. Robert A. Nisbet, *The Present Age: Progress and Anarchy in Modern America* (New York: Harper and Row, 1988), p. 24.
29. *Ibid.*, pp. 28-9.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 32.
31. *Ibid.*, p. 38.
32. *Ibid.*, p. 24.
33. *Ibid.*, p. 39.

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"A Conspiracy of Silence" continued from page 26

local officials must certify their vote tabulations to delegated state officials, often the State Commissioner of Elections or the Secretary of State. The states must eventually certify their popular vote totals to the Federal Election Commission. The official results from a November election are finally published in the *Congressional Quarterly*, the following Spring.

3. The *World Almanac and Book of Facts* is a standard reference book, found in schools and libraries and available in paperback at supermarkets and drugstores. Copies will also probably be found on the desks of a great many print and broadcast journalists; according to the publisher, Scripps-Howard, copies are provided free to "all members of the trade." I have found the *World Almanac* to be a particularly reliable and comprehensive source of information on US and state governments. Its election coverage has been noted for its comprehensive state by state, candidate by candidate coverage. In National Election years, thanks to NES, the *Almanac* can go to press within hours of the polls closing. The publisher touts this quick turnaround time on the advance order blank for their 1989 volume "... why wait for our famous Presidential Election results ...?"

4. Larry Sabato of the Political Science Department of the University of Virginia on C-Span, Nov. 6, 1988. This writer was able to speak to Mr. Sabato during this same call-in program, and to inquire about his opinion of the new NES vote gathering plans. He seemed somewhat skeptical as I described it, but defended the policy as "expedient" and another example of what he called "inherent—and in my opinion, quite proper—bias against third parties in this country." Mr. Sabato also indicated that having more than 2 parties was "fine for some third world country, but not for a 'super power' like the United States" since "too many choices" were bound to "lead to chaos and a lack of consensus." Presumably

Mr. Sabato regards with approval the USSR's one party system—the ultimate in stability and consensus.

5. While some write-in candidates were not covered in those years, this is understandable since many states do not even count write-in votes for quite some time after the election.
6. Paragraph 3, affidavit of Robert Flaherty, 6 Nov. 88 (*Populist Party of NJ v. NES, et al*, Docket #: 88-4754(JCL), US District Court, District of NJ).
7. Defendants' Memorandum of Law, 6 Nov. 88 (*Populist Party of NJ v. NES, et al*, Docket #: 88-4754(JCL), US District Court, District of NJ, p. 6-7.
8. November 88, *LP News*.
9. According to Silvia, the Ron Paul people withdrew from the suit literally hours before the scheduled court appearance. Early in November, Nadia Hayes had FAXed Silvia signed copies of the petition, but had never provided the required supporting affidavit. Silvia's calls were not returned, and no one at the Texas office was able to assist her. They did not seem to know how to contact Nadia or anyone else who would have authority to sign an affidavit. On November 6th, on the way to court, Silvia "whited out" all references to Ron Paul or the Libertarian Party. Possibly, the law suit business is just something which "fell through the cracks" during the eleventh hour shake-up at the Ron Paul headquarters. (See, the January issue of *American Libertarian* for an account of Ms. Hayes' departure from her position of campaign coordinator.) Attempts to discover what had taken place proved fruitless.
10. *NY Times v. United States*, 403 US 713 (1971).
11. This writer had, prior to the December third meeting, sent a report on the status of the Populist suit along with portions of the pleadings filed to officers and representatives of the National Committee, urging them to obtain legal counsel and consider the possibility of legal action. I did not attend the meeting in Oklahoma City but, according to Joseph Dehn III, since the NatCom's legal counsel, Bill Hall, had researched the law and recommended against legal action, the proposal never reached the floor.

Letters, continued from previous page

To equate a "cosmic" point of view with one that is "non-human" ignores the fact that being human goes beyond the mere confines of skin and bones. (Ask most biologists or any physicist.) Humans are more than their bodies, more than their petty self-interests, more than their desire to make a profit at the expense of the environment and the overall quality of life on this planet.

Rothbard would apparently be quite satisfied removing the entire rain forests of Brazil for a few quick bucks.

Rothbard seems also to establish an artificial hierarchy where humans are better

than animals; animals are better than insects; insects are better than plants. This is just one half-step away from racism. Life is one; there is no hierarchy.

Is Rothbard serious when he says that environmentalists intend to "stop using energy and bring in socialism?"

If I've missed the joke, I'm embarrassed. If not, let's hope that if Rothbard develops respiratory problems from the excessive ozone in large cities or skin cancer from the depletion of ozone in the higher altitudes, he will realize he was mistaken in calling environmentalists anything but humanists.

Michael P. Barbee
Healdsburg, Calif.

Notes on Contributors

"Baloo" and "Shiong" are *noms de plume* of Rex F. May, whose cartoons appear in numerous periodicals.

Kathleen R. Bradford is copy editor of *Liberty*. Her hobbies are weaving, cats and basketball.

R. W. Bradford is editor of *Liberty*.

Stephen Cox, a senior editor of *Liberty*, is Associate Professor of Literature, University of California, San Diego.

Johnny Fargo is a railroad worker in Los Angeles, California, and a "perpetual part-time student" at a local college.

Margaret M. Fries is a free-lance writer in upstate New York, where she raises eggplants, cats, questions, eyebrows and—occasionally—hell.

David Gordon is a fellow of the Social Philosophy Center at Bowling Green State University and an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Karl Hess, Jr., lives in Las Cruces, New Mexico, where he is completing a book on ecology, *Visions Upon the Land: Man and Nature on the Western Range*, for the Cato Institute.

Mike Holmes, a contributing editor to *Liberty*, is also editor of *American Libertarian*, a monthly newspaper.

Andrew B. Lewis is a writer who ran aground in northern Mississippi.

Jeffrey Olson is a self-employed musical instrument repairman living in Woodland, California.

Bob Ortin lives in southern Oregon, where his "Burons" are regularly featured in a local paper.

Justin Raimondo is a founder of both the Radical Caucus of the Libertarian Party (now defunct) and of

the Libertarian Republican Organizing Committee (alive and kicking).

Sheldon L. Richman, a contributing editor of *Liberty*, is director of public affairs at the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University.

James S. Robbins is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy.

Andrew L. Roller is a former launch officer for nuclear missiles in the United States Air Force. He currently lives in Sacramento, California.

Murray N. Rothbard, a senior editor of *Liberty*, is the author of numerous books and articles, including *Ludwig von Mises: Scholar, Creator, Hero*, recently published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Phillip Salin is a computer scientist and entrepreneur who lives in Southern California.

Jane S. Shaw is Senior Associate of the Political Economy Research Center of Bozeman, Montana.

Bobby Taylor is a staff columnist for the University of Tennessee's *Daily Beacon*.

Clifford F. Thies is Assistant Professor of economics and finance at the University of Baltimore.

Jeffrey A. Tucker is managing editor of *The Free Market*, the monthly publication of the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Timothy Virkkala is assistant editor and staff hermeneutician of *Liberty*.

Ethan O. Waters is an avocado rancher who lives in California.

G. Duncan Williams is a long-time Libertarian Party participant-critic.

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"Libertarianism: Open and Closed" John Hospers examines a variety of vexatious problems that confront libertarians, and the two distinct ways libertarians react to them: "closed libertarians" insist that certain universal principles be applied rigidly and without exception; "open libertarians" insist that the whole range of human knowledge and experience must be considered.

Terra Incognita

San Diego, Calif.

Provocative suggestion to help reduce airport congestion, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

San Diego City Council 8th District candidate proposed that a second major airport be built in San Diego so that Lindbergh Field "can be used just for incoming flights."

U.S.A.

The ideal life, according to America's leading patriot, as quoted in *Life* magazine:

"I'd much rather be doing something that produced a more tangible benefit—something that someone could use, something that somebody could eat . . . My idea of heaven would be to have a sailboat in the front yard," Ollie North said. "Or maybe I'd just go to Tucson and farm a cactus or something."

Oroville, Wash.

Latest casualties from the front in the War on Drugs, as reported by the *Seattle Times*:

When a search of a pregnant woman's purse revealed that she was carrying cigarette papers, U.S. Customs authorities at this remote border crossing seized the automobile that the woman and her husband were driving and fined the couple. Because the couple had no funds left after the fine, the eight month pregnant woman and her husband had to hike six miles to the nearest town.

Berkeley, Calif.

New plans to End Poverty in California, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

The Berkeley Youth Commission endorsed a proposal, by a seven-year-old, to solicit contributions from the University of California at Berkeley and the Berkeley Police Department to help "children in need" get haircuts.

Washington, D.C.

How the Senate Minority leader supports the symbol of freedom, but not the freedom to use the symbol, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

"We can't let the symbol of our freedom be sullied," commented Bob Dole, about a recently passed measure that provides fines and imprisonment for those Americans who incorporate the Flag into works of art in ways not favored by Congresspeople.

Tokyo, Japan

Peculiar mourning ritual of inscrutable Orientals, as reported by *The Wall Street Journal*:

"When Hirohito died, the television networks broadcast 48 hours of documentary material on the emperor's life and times. Interest apparently wore thin after a few hours. Video stores later reported that rentals of pornographic videos soared."

Los Angeles, Calif.

How the nation's Second City takes responsibility for educating its children, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

The Los Angeles Unified School District, which "serves" 600,000 students, spent \$3.5 billion last year. It employed nearly 100,000 people, of whom 25% were classroom teachers.

Kansas City, Mo.

Latest advance in personnel management, as reported in *Weekly Federal Employee's News Digest*:

"The Social Security Administration's Kansas City regional office fired an employee because she brought case files home to do additional work on her own free time.

"Her Union, the American Federation of Government Employees, denounced the dismissal as too severe a penalty."

Los Angeles, Calif.

The logic of government planning versus the chaos of the marketplace, as reflected by a headline in the *Los Angeles Times*:

"Housing Is Necessary, So Rent Control Is Justified"

Washington, D. C.

Latest proposal advanced by William Bennett, the Bush Administration's "Drug Czar" to insure victory in the War on Drugs, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

The Federal Government should declare certain areas "Drug Zones," in which the constitutional rights guaranteed Americans will be "temporarily" suspended.

San Diego, Calif.

Interesting assessment of international relations and new frontier of speculative fiction, propounded by Nobel Laureate Mother Teresa and reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

The greatest threat to world peace is abortion, Mother Teresa told a group of 6,000 of her admirers, shortly after she received an honorary degree from the University of San Diego.

According to Scripture, she added, the Virgin Mary, while pregnant with Jesus, visited her cousin Elizabeth, pregnant with John the Baptist. Think of what the world would have been like, she observed, if both babies had been aborted.

Garberville, Calif.

How California's "Campaign Against Marijuana Planting" (CAMP) has "made life miserable for the violent, big-time pot merchants who have been running roughshod over Northern California," according to California Attorney General John K. Van de Kamp, whose Bureau of Narcotics Enforcement oversees the program and earned praise from the President as a "prototype" for the "cannabis suppression strategy," as reported the *Grand Rapids (Mich.) Press*:

Early on the morning of July 15, Greg Wellish was jolted from bed by the sound of trucks rumbling down the driveway of his secluded homestead. Wellish ran outside and found armed officers hunting for his vegetable garden.

Garbed in Army camouflage, armed with semi-automatic pistols and Swedish brush axes, waving a search warrant gained after having taken aerial pictures of Wellish's 'illicit' garden, about 10 CAMP officers marched through his yard and found not a patch of pot plants, but a trove of squash, broccoli and snapdragons.

(Readers are encouraged to forward newspaper clippings or other documents for publication in *Terra Incognita*.)

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
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