

Liberty

May 2003

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Orwell for Moderns

War

The High Cost of Victory

by R. W. Bradford

Why the Antiwar Movement Failed

by Stephen Cox

The Logic of Conquest

by Stefan Herpel


Ending the Drug War

by James Gray

When War Was a Hard Sell

by Bruce Ramsey

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"War and Authority are companions; Peace and Liberty are companions." — Ben Tucker

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Letters

I Believe . . .

Bombing for peace is logical. The "Patriot Act" is patriotic. Good Americans don't protest or question their government. Corporate executives can be entrusted with our elder citizens' health care. Forests need to be cut down in order to save them. Oil companies will protect our environment. Our enormous new budget deficits are no problem. Preemptive war is legal by international law. We can liberate Iraqi civilians by launching 8,000 missiles into their cities, and shooting our incredibly radioactive plutonium-laden "depleted uranium" bullets all over their country. The world's people support this slaughter, and Jesus thinks it's okay too.

Mr. President, I believe. . . .
I believe. . . . I believe.

David Singelyn

Warner Springs, Calif.

Death Is Cheap, If It's Not Yours

"Give me liberty or give me death." With those words, Patrick Henry entered the history books. In his article, "Freedom and the Wolves" (March), Timothy Sandefur expresses a similar sentiment. He opines it was worth "600,000 deaths to free the slaves; would have been worth it at twice that number; and, indeed would have been cheap at a thousand times that price." Wow!

Mr. Sandefur, when Patrick Henry said, "Give me liberty or give me death," he meant his own death, not the deaths of 620,000 others. But, even at that, a lecture hall permits a certain bravado not so easy to muster on the far reaches of the old plantation. The slaves did not rise up, did not rebel, spoke no speeches, because they knew death would be a certainty. Instead, they clung to life and they clung to hope. They clung to life, as we all do, Mr. Sandefur, because, however wretched that life may be, it is all we

have. And, though the lives of 600,000 others may be cheap, our own is dear.

Frank Ricciardone
San Diego, Calif.

The Remarkable Generosity of Timothy Sandefur

Timothy Sandefur is remarkable for his generosity in the number of lives he would have been willing to sacrifice to free slaves in the 1800s. The 600,000 lives he sees as being cheap to free slaves is far less than he seems willing to pay to influence an argument "at the price of oceans of blood and mountains of bones." With this enthusiasm I can imagine he would have been proud to be among them. Would Sandefur have blocked as vigorously the many Europeans from receiving passage to the New World in exchange for years of indentured labor?

For instance, would he jeopardize his life to prevent Charles W. Nash, when just six years old, from being sent here to work for room and board and no wages for 15 years? Young Charles didn't think too much of the idea either. He ran away at the age of 12 and eventually became a giant of the early automobile industry (and gave employment to Walter Chrysler). Every descendant of Africans I have asked did not regret that their ancestors arrived here, rather than being left behind under their African slavemasters. The talented black professor and author, John McWhorter, seems to confirm this (see his book *Losing the Race* and the recent *Authentically Black*).

I would expect a libertarian to be far more imaginative — for a free market solution to slavery. If abolitionists were so determined to end slavery that they would send their sons to war to destroy, murder, and be killed, then why could they not, instead, have gone to slaveowners and bought as many slaves as their consciences and finances would permit? Not only would it have saved the obscene destruction of lives

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and property at a fraction of the cost, but it would have accelerated the end of slavery and its unfortunate derivatives. Slaveholders might have begun to value their "assets" with more affection, and bettered their circumstances.

Rather than fight Lincoln's holy, misguided war, reason would have permitted states voluntary separation. If peacefully granted secession then, reunification might have been requested and granted long ago. But if not, through free trade both independent nations (and each state) could be competing, as they should, for greater liberty and prosperity — transferring less to freeloaders — and with the wisdom to let all states and nations run their own affairs with neither subsidy nor federal interference. I have absolutely no doubt that statesmanship such as this would have made us more prosperous and left us with more of our constitutional liberties.

Charles Schisler
North Palm Beach, Fla.

The Right of Secession

Ben Franklin said treason was a term used by the winners to define the losers. The logic used by Timothy Sandefur in "Freedom and the Wolves," suggests a similar definition of secession: secession is a term used by the winners to discredit the losers. Sandefur says the South could not secede from the Union legitimately because it had slavery. By that logic, Mexico was right to put Davy Crockett against the wall and shoot him and Patrick Henry should have been given death when he asked for it.

Sandefur suggests that the actions of the Southern states regarding secession were arbitrary and not actions of "We, the People" and, therefore, void. The Southern states elected delegates to special conventions and, at those conventions, the delegates voted for secession (you know, representative government) with the exceptions of Virginia and Texas, which each held a plebiscite. Their reasons for voting in favor of secession were varied, but among them were taxes, especially tariffs (you know, the same reason we seceded from England).

The Union did not have the high moral ground in the War Between the States. Article I, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution made slavery legal.

Lincoln's "Emancipation Proclamation" did not apply to the Union, where Slavery was practiced during the War Between the States and was not abolished until December 1865. By that time, the war was over.

If the War Between the States was about slavery, why didn't the Union send ambassadors to the Southern states to inform them they could secede from the Union after they freed the slaves? If the War Between the States was about slavery, why didn't the Union grant secession after the war was over and the slaves were freed? Does anyone think the average Confederate soldier charged the hill saying, "Slavery! Now and Forever!"? Do people know Robert E. Lee freed his slaves before the war or that Thomas "Stonewall" Jackson never had any slaves?

At issue is not whether the South should have seceded from the Union but, rather, whether the South had the right to do so. If Sandefur were to argue that the South was unwise to use violence to secede, I would join him. If he had argued that slavery was unjust and should have been fought against, I would be on his side at once. If he had claimed that John Brown was right in what he wanted to do, I would be on his team. I do not enjoy defending governments; not even governments much better than most — U.S.A., Texas Republic, The Confederacy, etc. — but secession is a *right*.

Sandefur asks us to use our imagination to picture a black child under the Confederacy. I ask you instead to look at the condition of black children under our federal government. The U.S. Government has destroyed many black children and their families. Its welfare system has taken many fathers away from the home. Its drug laws have caused chaos, making the streets unsafe for children (and everyone else) in many black neighborhoods. Its schools have failed to educate. Its taxes have caused poverty. Its Social Security system harms everyone, but harms blacks more than whites because they are forced to join sooner and they, on average, die younger. It robs blacks and everyone under it of the ability to leave a bigger inheritance to their children. Its Food and Drug Administration kills people, including

blacks, by stopping cures from being marketed.

The proper role of government is the protection of rights. Our government is failing because it is not interested in the protection of rights, but in obedience. The real question is not what our forefathers did, but what we will do.

That is why I am working to make the Libertarian Party successful. The Libertarian Party can be the vehicle for the first non-violent liberation revolution. This is not an easy task; the task even seems impossible. But, at least, it is one we can achieve without killing 620,000 people.

Jim Burns
North Las Vegas, Nev.

Slavery and Freedom

As a reader new to *Liberty* but not to the cause of freedom and, as a native son of Texas, I find Timothy Sandefur's proposition that independent and sovereign states have no right to secede from the Union to be laughable.

The Tenth Amendment specifies, "The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people." The Constitution does not prohibit the secession of any state from the United States.

Article I, Section 10 does prohibit the states from forming a confederation. However, having acted lawfully and in accordance with their rights guaranteed by the Tenth Amendment, the states that seceded from the Union in 1860 and 1861 were no longer subject to the Constitution and, therefore,

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were free to confederate or ally themselves as they saw fit. As the duly elected representatives of their citizens, the legislatures of the eleven Confederate States of America (CSA) determined it was no longer in the best interests of their people that they should remain a part of the Union.

Contrary to Sandefur's assertions that the Confederacy initiated hostilities, it was the federal government's refusal to withdraw its troops from sovereign territory that provoked an act of self-defense by Confederate batteries against the Union's Fort Sumter. It was the federal government whose powerful guns controlled the approach of any vessel into Charleston harbor. As shipping was vital to the Southern economy, foreign control of a harbor as important as Charleston posed a clear and present danger to South Carolina and the CSA. So, they were clearly within their rights to eliminate this threat, by force if necessary.

As to slavery, I do not mean to suggest it is anything other than evil. But it should not be forgotten that the purpose of the Constitution is not to "deliver us from evil." In 1861 slavery was constitutional in the entire country, and completely legal in states that had not outlawed the practice.

If the real purpose of Lincoln's prosecution of hostilities against the Confederacy was to free the slaves, why did he wait until 1863 to make his Emancipation Proclamation? And why the the Proclamation leave slavery legal in the Union? Why did the Union wait for nearly three years after the Proclamation to outlaw slavery? One may only surmise the true motive for Northern aggression — the South did not invade the North, after all — was to be found elsewhere. Few wars are waged for anything other than economic reasons, so that seems a reasonable and likely motive for Lincoln. Clearly, Lincoln only used the issue of slavery to further his own agenda.

Slavery as an institution was doomed when Lincoln took office in 1860 just as surely as the necessity for factory workers was doomed with the advent of robotic manufacturing.

The Constitution demands power flow from the people, to the states and, lastly, to the United States. Today, we have allowed our political foundations

to be inverted, to the point that the federal government is now the supreme sovereign of the land, the states are its barons, and the people are subservient to both. The sovereignty of the people and of the states, along with 617,000 human lives, was the true casualty of the Civil War. Ironically, we have all, no matter our skin color, become enslaved to a federal master. Like the harsh and unjust treatment some Negroes received at the hands of their white masters, this new slavery only will end when we take matters into our own hands — when we kill the master and so slip our chains.

Tony Smith
Chattanooga, Tenn.

Smoked

I have never in my lifetime felt so stirred up by someone's opinion as I was when I read Michael Christian's "City of Smoke," (Reflections, March). I am very much a non-smoker and I resent the stand Mr. Christian takes on smoking in public. I'll skip the lecture on all the evils of smoking and stick to how this practice affects *my* freedom to enjoy dinner in an otherwise inviting social atmosphere. Why should I have to be subjected to smoke as someone who chooses to forego this indulgence? How dare Mr. Christian suggest that non-smokers ought to leave if the smoke is bothersome. My choice not to smoke in no way infringes on anyone else but people who do smoke heavily infringe on my rights. I'm not so inconsiderate of Mr. Christian's rights as he is of mine. I wouldn't dare suggest that he leave. I only ask for the common courtesy that he and other smokers please not smoke in an enclosed space. That's simply not fair.

M. L. Conley
Broadway, Va.

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Reflections

Citizenship has its privileges! — On March 16, after an Israeli bulldozer ran over an American college student who tried to block the Israelis from razing a home owned by Palestinians in Gaza, Israel issued an official apology, calling the incident “a regrettable accident,” and started an investigation. Also that weekend, Israelis killed seven Palestinians, an incident that they did not investigate, and for which they did not apologize.

— R. W. Bradford

Out-taxing the communists — A new bill in Communist Cuba allows private-farm co-ops to distribute 70% of their profits, reducing the state’s take to 30%, which happens to be below the tax rate in capitalist America, whose income tax has become dangerously “progressive,” i.e. re-distributive. The top 5% of taxpayers now pay over half of all income taxes paid, whereas the top half of taxpayers pay 96% of taxes.

In addition to the unfairness and economic consequences of such a system, there are important public policy concerns. Where half the population pays no tax, many people have no stake in cutting taxes or government spending, and the politics of envy take root. To be in that top 5% of taxpayers, by the way, which includes both individual and joint returns, one need earn \$120,846, hardly extravagantly rich.

— Adrian Day

Three mile deep sixed — That happy blur of white you saw on the horizon last month was the massed surrender flags of armies of trial lawyers. Believe it or not, they have abandoned their pirate frigate, Three Mile Island. For 25 years they have cruised the litigious seas seeking plunder. But in early January an appeal court turned a deaf ear to a lower court, which granted dismissal of all charges vs. the Three Mile Island owner, General Public Utilities.

It’s all over. According to the courts, nobody died or sickened that fateful day the reactor leaked. Nobody’s malady can be traced to escaped radiation, although a couple thousand plaintiffs sought fiscal balm for every bodily ill they’d

ever encountered (which would have been followed by a class action suit including every man, woman, and child in the state of Pennsylvania).

I lived in the Boston suburbs for years, and every time a blizzard plugged up our streets and driveways, the headlines roared “Blizzard Kills Dozens.” Heart attacks, of course. Nobody questioned how many imperfect Boston hearts would have shut down with or without shoveling the drive. Nor did it occur to the headline authors how many Bostonians enjoyed lobster Newburg longer because of the exercise opportunities furnished by that beneficent snowstorm. Give ‘em time. Sooner or later, the lawyers will figure out how to sue a blizzard. But just maybe the defeat of the Three Mile Island suit will at least slow them down.

— Ted Roberts

History for Dummies™ —

In a recent article, David Frum made a good point regarding the 1960s civil rights movement: many leaders of the movement were far more radical than we tend to recall nowadays, which suggests that “we should have a measure of understanding and tolerance for those white southerners who opposed [them].” Not

because we sympathize with segregation, but out of simple honesty, and because history is much more interesting that way. This came to mind because I was recently quite disappointed in Taylor Branch’s *Pillar of Fire* (the second part of his history of the civil rights movement; sequel to his very good *Parting the Waters*). It’s not that I wish he’d attack the civil rights movement — I don’t. But portraying the movement as if it’s the angels vs. the devils is much less interesting than the reality.

One example — Branch writes about California’s 1964 Proposition 14, which protected the rights of property owners to refuse to sell to people, if they chose (pp. 522–523). Now, Prop. 14 was obviously a backlash, in part, against the 1964 federal Civil Rights Act, which limited property rights by prohibiting owners from refusing on the basis of race to sell houses to people. Now, I think you have the right not to



SHCHAMBERS

“I’ll have the ‘Great Satan Salad’ and the ‘Filthy Pig’.”

sell your property if you don't want to, even if you're racist, because I believe in property rights, not because I think Jim Crow was good. But defenders of Jim Crow would also favor Prop. 14. Thus there were complicated reasons to support Prop. 14, and even if one disagrees with those reasons, one should at least address the fact that these arguments existed.

But here's how Branch characterizes it: "A warning sign was buried beneath election reviews [from the 1964 election]. California voters embraced both Johnson and a constitutional right to segregated neighborhoods, as promoted by Ronald Reagan and the real estate industry." So to Branch, the whole thing comes off as good guys vs. bad guys — idealistic liberals against the wicked "real estate industry" and a racist Ronald Reagan, who advocated a "constitutional right to segregated neighborhoods" — rather than the far more interesting and complicated fact that some favored and others opposed Prop. 14, for *many* reasons, and not all of them crazy or evil. Reagan was many things, but he wasn't racist, and his support of Prop. 14 was not based on a "constitutional right to segregation" — it was based on his belief in freedom of contract.

But it is also true that the Goldwater campaign winked at racists, and hardly went out of its way to denounce segregation. History, like other things in life, is much more interesting when told objectively.

— Timothy Sandefur

Word watch — Ours is a technical age, which means that all of us have tens of thousands of technical terms at our disposal, and millions of opportunities to use them wrong.

"Wrong" doesn't mean "colloquially" or "metaphorically." It's all right to play with technical expressions, so long as you don't fall on your ass. (That's a technical expression for what used to happen a lot when I played sports in school.) For example: I'm tired of hearing this expression, but there's nothing in itself objectionable about calling a trip to the restroom a "pit stop." Nevertheless, every word we use is chained to its associations. So when Greta Van Susteren, who's smart enough to know better, recently referred to the visit of a video crew to a certain locality as "making a pit stop" there, she neglected to notice that she was creating an image of guys with cameras and reflecting sheets either (A) getting their tires changed and their axles

greased, literally, or (B), metaphorically, taking a piss. I'm sure she didn't intend either one.

Of course, many technical terms get misused because people simply don't understand the original meaning and image. Almost everyone equates "parameter" with "perimeter," despite the fact that "parameter" doesn't mean "limit or boundary" but a certain kind of term in a mathematical function. It must be admitted that if "parameter" had been properly understood by people in general, it would never have attained its current celebrity status, but that's true of a lot of celebrities. It doesn't mean that you have to hang around with them.

"Paradigm" has been similarly misunderstood. It started out as a technical term used by grammarians. A paradigm is a pattern: "goofball, goofballs, goofball's, goofballs'." It's not, except by a weird extension, the kind of extension that reveals one's ignorance of the meaning of the word, a synonym for "what ought to happen," as in "the president's paradigm for Social Security reform." Neither is it a synonym for "scenario," as in the kind of question that's always being asked in press conferences: "Uh, sir, uh, what's your, uh, paradigm, what's your scenario, for the way this thing is gonna play itself out?" "Scenario" is closer to the mark than "paradigm," but its original meaning — "a screenplay, or outline of a dramatic work" — connects it with things that somebody controls, as an author controls a play, not with situations that humans lack the power to determine. You can ask about God's scenario for the nation's future, but you shouldn't ask about the president's scenario. Not unless you want to commit the nation's most common theological mistake, the confusion of the president (any president) with God.

"Oh, you're just being a purist."

"Yes, and purists are the only people you need to worry about when you're choosing words."

"Oh."

All technical terms have a capacity for extension, and misextension. Consider those once obscure computer words "interface" and "input," words that are now used to obscure all other, more specific images of human collaboration. "Input" routinely wipes out "influence," "advice," "interference," "assistance," "help," and all their verbal cousins and aunts, while "interface with" schemes to destroy "talk with," "meet with," "argue with," "inform," "learn from," "confide in," etc. etc. Bad, bad words, "input" and "interface" — words that masquerade as other words, take their nests, and murder them.

Perhaps the worst impostors of this kind are "positive" and "negative," charlatans that sneaked into respectable homes and offices during the 1960s and 1970s and are still there, boldly taking the jobs of other words. I know what I'm talking about. Until a few years ago, I used those words, too. Then I woke up. I realized the nature of the fraud that had been perpetrated on me. "Positive" and "negative" apply to photography and electricity, not to human attitudes. Oh, they originally played one or two minor roles in the human drama. A "positive" opinion was a definite one. To say that someone "negatived" a proposal was a fancy way of saying that someone turned it down. Now, however, "positive" is used for everything from "grudgingly agreeable" to "wildly



"My horoscope said I'd rise to great heights."

enthusiastic," and "negative" replaces everything from "gingerly dismissive" to "violently opposed." Those two silly, blustering terms have proven themselves capable of slaughtering whole armies of more precise locutions.

Let's get rid of them. If you're pressed for time, or if you simply don't want to specify *how* violently somebody loves or hates something, you can always fall back on "favorable" and "unfavorable." At least then, you'll be saying something human. Humans don't have positive and negative poles, but they do have favorable and unfavorable reactions.

Two other technical terms are of special concern right now, because there's evidence that they have escaped their proper confines and are about to stalk the earth freely, laying waste to all they meet.

One of these expressions is "begging the question." It's a technical term for a mistake people make in arguing. It means "supporting a claim with a claim that is itself unproved, or supporting a claim with an irrelevant argument." Example: X argues that drug laws should be abolished because they drive up the price of drugs and create a class of criminals who profit by selling drugs at inflated prices. Y replies by arguing that no one really needs to use marijuana anyway; people are better off without it. Y has begged the question.

"Begging the question" is a very useful term. But the awful news is that (on television, at least) it's no longer being used to tell people, "You're not making sense; shut up"; it's being used to tell them, "That's interesting; give us more

We may live to see a world in which murderers heave the bodies of their victims off the end of the Santa Monica Pier, in plain view of the thousands there assembled, and cannot be convicted.

nonsense. We're *begging* for it." Somebody comes on TV and says, "We have crime because we don't devote enough money to public education," and the host says, "But that begs the question: how will taxpayers be convinced that more money is needed?" Enough said. Watch out.

The other marauding expression — and this one is more dangerous, because even the dictionaries have dropped their guard against it — is "corpus delicti." Older dictionaries define this as "the basic element of a crime; as, in murder, the death of the murdered," or "the sum or aggregate of the various ingredients which make a given fact a breach of a given law." Unfortunately, "corpus" suggests "corpse" to the ignorant mind. Still more unfortunately, we live in an age in which the media have become obsessed with true-crime coverage. Television is always looking for the body of the Capitol Intern or the Northern California Mom or some other luckless citizen. Television hires "experts" to talk about these matters, and the experts say things like, "Well, Dick, it's mighty hard to charge somebody with murder when the body has never been recovered. You just don't have the cor-

pus delicti!" Wise nods all around. But you certainly *can* have the corpus delicti without the corpse; all you need to have is the evidence of a crime.

When I was a kid, there was a TV series set in San Francisco during the gold rush. One of the little dramas in that series was a comedy showing the people of San Francisco making fools of themselves because folks kept being murdered and everybody knew who was doing it, but the culprits couldn't be brought to justice because the bodies were hung with weights and dropped into the bay. "We can't prosecute; we don't have the corpus delicti!" Eventually, someone thought to look in a dictionary and discovered that "corpus delicti" doesn't mean "corpse." So everybody heaved a sigh of relief and went out and hanged the murderers. That's how I learned the truth about this mysterious expression. Nowadays, however, you may look in a dictionary and find that "the body of a murder victim" is actually listed as a possible meaning of the term. We may live to see a world in which murderers heave the bodies of their victims off the end of the Santa Monica Pier, in plain view of the thousands there assembled, and cannot be convicted because some juror found a modern dictionary.

That's the paradigm I foresee. And it doesn't make me feel very positive.

— Stephen Cox

ANWR nonsense — With the current war jitters, gasoline prices have spiked above \$2 a gallon in some places. This has led our friends in the Department of the Interior to do a public-relations push for oil drilling in the Alaska National Wildlife Refuge so that we can "reduce our dependence on foreign oil."

I hate to break it to our fearless leaders, but the price we pay for fuel is based on world market prices. The most optimistic projections are that ANWR will add less than 1.5 percent to world oil production over the next 50 years. If ANWR were in production today, the \$1.99 you paid for gasoline this morning might have been \$1.96 instead. Big deal.

Why is it safer to drain America first? If we are really concerned about oil dependence, let's keep ANWR in reserve. Then, when the Saudis, Venezuelans, Canadians, or whoever threaten to cut off our oil supply, we can just thumb our noses and say, "We can get oil from Alaska anytime we want."

— Randal O'Toole

Thieves' paradise — An Arab student living in England exclaimed, "September 11th was a great day. Osama Bin Laden is a great man and all Americans deserve to die." His neighbor, an Englishman, replied, "I hate Arabs and Muslims." A unpleasant exchange, but one without fist-cuffs, just words.

One of the men was hauled into court under the newly minted Anti-Terrorism Act. Which man? The Englishman, of course. He narrowly escaped jail time only because of his "remorse." (He was sentenced to community service and fined.)

Meanwhile, a homeowner who shot a burglar while defending his family has been put in jail. The career criminal who burgled him has been convicted more than 30 times for burglary and other violent crimes. He has been given government aid to sue the homeowner. The homeowner, a farmer living in a rural area whose home had been broken

into several times in the past, has been denied parole because he is deemed a danger to future burglars.

The chief justice has directed judges not to imprison first or even second-offense burglars. One judge took this to extremes, freeing a professional burglar with 51 previous convictions, saying he hoped the man would give up drugs and develop his talent for writing poetry. British police solve only 12 percent of burglaries, usually offering victims only a free session of "distress counseling" and not even attempting to solve the crime — unless, of course, the homeowner attempted to resist the burglary, in which case the homeowner is arrested.

Only 30 percent of police time is spent on crime; the rest is devoted to paperwork, community work, teaching anti-racism, and so forth. Johnson suggests the fundamental problem is a lack of moral right and wrong, wherein crime is viewed simply as a social problem. But the police do have time for the really important crimes. Well-known country writer Robin Page was arrested and detained in a police cell after telling a countryside rally that rural dwellers should have the same rights as blacks, Muslims, and gays. Similar sentiments expressed by Prince Charles, though causing some stir, did not lead to his arrest. — Adrian Day

Justice: rude, wild, and terrible — I was recently looking through the new biography of Justice William O. Douglas (*Wild Bill* by Bruce Allen Murphy). The book has raised eyebrows because it is the first real biography of the controversial judge, and it shows that hardly a moment of his life was untouched by lies, vanity, manipulation, and overwhelming rudeness. Douglas was a crass, unpleasant, arrogant man, an incurable womanizer who reveled in abusing his employees.

Murphy calls attention again and again to Douglas' rudeness, but does this really matter? Does the fact that Douglas was an unpleasant man make him a bad judge? Murphy says no, and in reviewing the book, Judge Richard Posner agreed: "Murphy is right to separate the personal from the judicial. One can be a bad person and a good judge, just as one can be a good person and a bad judge."

That may be true, but one cannot be a truly *rude* judge and be a good judge. There's a reason the word "courtesy" contains the word "court" — courtesy evolved during the Renaissance, as the forms of behavior appropriate at court. Today, much of the law is based on courtesy, especially at the Supreme Court level. There is no constitutional provision, or law, which sets out the procedure, for instance, whereby four judges agree to bring cases before the Court. The "conference" procedure justices use to decide cases is not set out in any law, either. All these things are decided by tradition and compliance — in short, by courtesy.

For instance, in 1973, a group of anti-war activists asked Justice Thurgood Marshall for an injunction to halt bombing in Cambodia. Marshall refused, on the grounds that military decisions belong to the president. But the activists didn't give up; they contacted Douglas. Court tradition required Douglas to refuse to issue an injunction when a colleague had already refused, but Douglas issued it, rejecting what he called Marshall's "predilections." Of course, the full court reversed Douglas within hours, hiding its embarrassment under legal prose: "In the ordinary course, a Justice acting as

a Circuit Justice would defer acting with respect to a District Court order."

Douglas' "Wild Bill" image makes for spectacle, but in the end, it was corrosive to the order and courtesy demanded of a stable legal system. One can be a bad person and still be courteous — so one can be a bad person and a good judge. But Douglas' rudeness ultimately undermined respect for him, his opinions, and the law itself. He was both a revolting human being, and a truly terrible judge.

— Timothy Sandefur

Cubs and the city — The Chicago Cubs are upset because a couple of apartment buildings that for decades have been looking down into Wrigley Field, one of the few privately-owned sports facilities left in professional sports, have been converted into bars that charge a fee to watch the game from the rooftops. The ball club planned to build Wrigley Field's bleachers higher, blocking the freeloaders' view. The city of Chicago responded by declaring Wrigley Field a historical landmark, making it impossible for the club to do any modernization without swimming through a swamp of red tape.

It used to be an honor to be recognized as a historical site, but of late the restrictions put on private property owners have made historical status a bane to be avoided at all cost. Once a building is declared historic, it is virtually impossible to do anything other than rehab the property, and structural changes are strictly forbidden, even if they are an aesthetic improvement. For instance, one of the proposed regulations at Wrigley Field would apply to the ivy growing on the walls, requiring a lengthy process just to replace a dead plant.

Historical preservation committees are populated by old hippies whose brains have been severely crippled by the '60s, and who have a difficult time navigating ordinary urban landscapes. They oppose structural changes because they have a tendency to bump into things unfamiliar, like Dick Van Dyke and his ottoman. Historical preservation is how they keep from getting lost in their own neighborhoods.

— Tim Slagle

Hayek at Harvard — Can a Harvard economist who named his dog "Keynes" be trusted as the next chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers? N. Gregory Mankiw was named to replace Glenn Hubbard. Steve Moore of Club for Growth condemns Mankiw for attacking supply-side economists as "charlatans and cranks" and "snake-oil salesmen" in his bestselling economics textbook. But I demur.

I've known Greg Mankiw for years, and he has gradually transformed himself from a Keynesian to a neo-classical free-marketier. Mankiw purged his negative comments about the Reagan supply-side revolution in the new edition of his book. In his *Fortune* columns, he praised Milton Friedman and school vouchers. He endorsed Bush's call for tax cuts and reform of Social Security. His claim to fame: He is the first Keynesian to turn Keynes upside down. Recall that Keynes called his pro-government demand theory a "general" theory, while relegating the classical supply-side theory to a "special" case. Mankiw reverses the order. He starts his textbooks with the classical model as the "general" theory,

and puts the Keynesian "short-term" model at the end as a "special" case. I wouldn't be surprised if he names his next pet "Hayek."

— Mark Skousen

Now, more than ever — A few days before the April *Liberty* went to press, I saw a poster in my small town announcing a meeting to organize a local anti-war group. I couldn't attend the meeting — I don't have time for much of anything but work when press dates loom — but I did call the organizer. She was, not surprisingly, an elderly leftist long experienced in opposing war. In the course of our conversation, she told me that she had discovered a great anti-war spokesman and a great resource for those opposed to the war. The spokesman was Ron Paul, Texas congressman and 1988 Libertarian Party presidential candidate; the resource was his website.

A few days ago, *The Wall Street Journal* published an article about how Paul has gained a national reputation as a critic of the war, while maintaining his popularity within his conservative Texas constituency.

Is this the first time a libertarian politician has gotten a national following by advocating a libertarian position on an extremely important national issue? I think so.

Paul's emergence as an articulate opponent of the war raises an intriguing idea: would he consider challenging George W. Bush for the GOP nomination? He's run for president before, though that ambition doesn't seem to burn as brightly as it once did. But he just might give it a shot.

Certainly, Republican voters deserve an opportunity to protest the war. There is substantial opposition to it among Republicans and conservatives, but no Republican or conservative leader is articulating it except Pat Buchanan. He is by now an old warhorse who has run for president as many times as William Jennings Bryan and has unfortunate anti-foreign, anti-immigrant, and anti-trade baggage weighing him down further. And besides, he shows no inclination to run.

That leaves Ron Paul, an articulate and attractive candidate with a national following that crosses the political spectrum. It's extremely unlikely that he can wrest the nomination from George W. Bush. But he might help expose Bush's nonsensical case for war and, in so doing, bring closer the day when America retreats from its imperial ambition, making itself — and the entire world — a freer, happier, and more prosperous place. And who knows? No one thought that Eugene McCarthy's quixotic challenge to Lyndon

Johnson in 1968 had any chance of success. McCarthy didn't win the nomination, but he brought down LBJ and brought the end of the Vietnam war closer.

The last time I voted for a Republican presidential candidate was in 1968, when Richard Nixon had two libertarians among his closest advisors and I was yet to learn what a liar and hypocrite Nixon was. But I'd break that streak to vote for Ron Paul.

— R. W. Bradford

Pyongyang's nuclear calling card — To understand what's going on in North Korea, which seems on the surface to be antagonizing the United States in a reckless and opportunistic fashion, it might be helpful to step back a bit and consider the recent history of the Korean peninsula.

South Korea has grown into an economic powerhouse, while North Korea is still an isolated basket case that can get attention mainly by rattling its large and possibly nuclear but overall rather creaky saber.

In early February, the North Koreans announced that they were reactivating their nuclear facilities, which have been shut down since 1994 (although the regime has admitted it has carried on a secret program to make nuclear weapons). Then, the North Koreans blustered that, if the United States launched an

attack on Pyongyang's nuclear facilities, it would trigger a "total war."

Since the South Korean capital, Seoul, is only 30 miles from the demilitarized zone and could be reached with artillery and, since North Korea in 1998 tested a missile that arched over Japan, both countries hope it's bluster and would prefer to defuse the situation. The United States is involved because we have 37,000 troops in South Korea and President Bush named North Korea as part of the "Axis of Evil." Also, the U.S. exposed North Korea's secret nuclear program last October without a game plan to deal with the consequences.

"What's really going on is the North's leaders are trying to come in from the cold without sparking a rebellion in which they lose their heads," Chalmers Johnson told me on the phone. He's a University of California emeritus professor of political science and Asia specialist whose recent book, *Blowback*, predicted many of the consequences of U.S. involvement in so many overseas squabbles. "North Korea fears the U.S. will come after them after it deals with Iraq, and wants, in its bizarre and clumsy fashion, to get U.S. attention and reach an accommodation," he said.

The U.S. has no good options, so it's time for a dramatic



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move. We should quietly tell South Korea it can say that if North Korea behaves, the South will get U.S. troops — which function as a tripwire rather than effective defense anyway — off the peninsula. Then we can leave the problem of easing North Korea into the modern world to its neighbors.

— Alan W. Bock

Enlightened cynicism — I was leafing through my old copy of Bartlett's *Familiar Quotations*, looking for something else and there it was: the La Rochefoucauld page.

I hadn't seen La Rochefoucauld in quite a while. It was good to meet him again. He hadn't changed a bit. He was still the haughty Francois, Duc de La Rochefoucauld (1613–80), author of the *Maxims*, several hundred expressions of the cynical wisdom of the Enlightenment. He was still the author from whom good people shudder and turn away.

That's unfortunate for them. If they studied La Rochefoucauld, they might learn something about what naked goodness is up against, and arm themselves accordingly.

It's not a *bad* world that La Rochefoucauld describes. His idea that every "virtue" is associated with some "vice" can

As La Rochefoucauld advises, don't trust to the love of justice: "The love of justice is simply, in the majority of men, the fear of suffering injustice."

work both ways. Even hypocrisy has a relationship to something good: "Hypocrisy is the homage that vice pays to virtue."

On the other hand: "The gratitude of most men is merely a secret desire to receive greater benefits."

Perhaps you don't like to hear that. But he has worse things to say: "True love is like ghosts, which everybody talks about and few have seen."

Would you be better off if you didn't consider that possibility? Perhaps you'd feel better. I know that I would. I also know that my sensitivities are wounded when I hear La Rochefoucauld say that "to succeed in the world, we do everything we can to appear successful." I would rather think that to succeed you just do a good job. It would be



"I'm afraid I might get fired — the boss just found out that I work here."

more pleasant, after all, to cherish the simple faith of the character in Conrad's *Secret Agent*, who "set before him a goal of power and prestige to be attained without the medium of arts, graces, tact, wealth — by sheer weight of merit alone." Before people act on such a faith, however, they should at least be warned that their tactics may not work. That's what La Rochefoucauld does. He provides the warning.

While I'm praising him, I'll sound my own warning. He's not always right. I don't believe that "the understanding is always the dupe of the heart." There is such a thing as objectivity, and there are ways of arriving at it. I must admit, however, that the understanding usually has about as much chance with the heart as a ball of string when the cat gets it.

Some of the other maxims are doubtful or contradictory. It may be true that "we need greater virtues to sustain good fortune than bad." I suspect that it is. If you want moral instruction, you know instinctively that you're more likely to find it in people's deathbed scenes than in the amorous episodes of their 19th year. But it may also be true that "neither the sun nor death can be looked at steadily."

Then there are differences in interpretation. Maxims have to be interpreted in the light of one's own experience, and my experience sometimes differs significantly from that of La Rochefoucauld. When he says, "What men call friendship is only a reciprocal conciliation of interests, an exchange of good offices," and when he goes on to call it "a form of barter from which self-love always expects to gain something," I think he's right, but not in the way he thinks he is. He's thinking about people who abandon their friends when they no longer expect to gain any concrete rewards from them; I'm thinking about friends who stick by each other because they always expect to gain something of spiritual importance to themselves.

Yet his basic principle is right: there is an economy in friendship, just as there is an economy in everything else. I don't mind being told that my friends like me because I have something to offer them. That's a worthwhile addition to my own "self-love."

I also don't mind being told about certain personal characteristics that, my author insists, I share with everyone else. It may not be pleasant to learn some of these things, but if I'm going to navigate the shallows that lie within me, I need to know where they are. After a few sharp nudges from La Rochefoucauld, I'm prepared to admit that "we," meaning "I," "rarely find that people have good sense unless they agree with us," that "usually we praise only to be praised," and that "we would rather speak ill of ourselves than not talk about ourselves at all." The proof of that last saying is before you.

Of course, the strength of a maxim is the pleasure we get from the way it's put. That's what makes us willing to confront any critical message it delivers. If someone tells me, "You don't care how much I suffer! You don't feel bad about me at all!", I will tell him, in all seeming sincerity, that he's wrong. Of course I care. I care very much. Don't you accuse me of not caring. I care about your problems just as much as you do — you miserable piece of slime. But when La Rochefoucauld tells me, in his droll way, "We all have strength enough to endure the misfortunes of others," I

immediately succumb. "You're right!" I admit. "I have no empathy at all."

La Rochefoucauld is not especially fond of adverting to political issues, but when he does, he usually has something important to say. Libertarians often think of the Enlightenment, which was the cradle of our political conceptions, as a time of high idealism. Thomas Jefferson. Thomas Paine. The storming of the Bastille. But one reason why liberty was able to be born into the world was that people like La Rochefoucauld had shown that liberty was not simply a matter of high ideals. People had always cherished high ideals. Liberty could only be enjoyed when they came to terms with the fact that high ideals, in themselves, were as much the problem as the solution. Ideals had always been used as an excuse for destroying liberty. Only when ideals, as such, were distrusted could the necessary checks and balances be devised. As La Rochefoucauld advises, don't trust to the love of justice: "The love of justice is simply, in the majority of men, the fear of suffering injustice." When you understand that, you can start thinking, as the fathers of our constitution thought, about ways of turning the fear of suffering injustice into a basis of limited government and the system of equal justice it is capable of maintaining.

The cynical wisdom of the Enlightenment is not to be found only in La Rochefoucauld. You can find it in Adams, Hume, Chesterfield, Johnson, Smith; you can find it in the most brilliant commentary on the American form of government, Madison's tenth *Federalist* paper; and you can find it in the 20th-century libertarians who are most mindful of the Enlightenment — Garrett, Hayek, Paterson. If liberty finally got its start, it was because people like La Rochefoucauld prepared the way for it. If it is still alive, it is because other people understood how that way was prepared. Live in the world, these people say; but live with both eyes open.

— Stephen Cox

Hope for Libertarians? — For decades, Libertarians have been rolling out the same strategy: we'll nominate for president someone who is a good spokesman for libertarian thinking, we'll raise as much money as we can among ourselves, try to get as much publicity as possible — maybe this year we can get in the debates! — and hope to get enough votes to make somebody pay attention to us. Some years we get more votes than others, but no matter how hard we work, no matter how much money we spend, no matter what our choice for presidential candidate — a renegade Republican congressman, an unknown California attorney, an unknown former legislator from the nation's least populous state, a best-selling author whose last bestseller happened 25 years ago — we capture the votes of two or three or maybe four out of every 1,000 voters.

If you always do what you've always done, you'll always get what you've always got. That tired old adage may be obvious to everyone except those Libertarians who figure that in 2004 the LP should nominate a talk-show host or a guy who's run a couple of low-level races and garnered an embarrassingly small vote share, then raise as much money as we can, and try to get as many votes as possible. Who knows, we might get into the presidential debates!

That's why the emergence of two unannounced outsider candidates for the LP presidential nomination is so encour-

aging. L. Neil Smith, a science fiction writer from Colorado, is certainly different. He ably represents the flaky fringe of the party, with all its enthusiasm and wonderfully weird approaches to America's problems. (I remember his proposal that we threaten to bomb Iraq with pig urine during Gulf War I.) Smith is a smart and charming guy. I doubt he'd do any better than the more-of-the-same approach of the announced candidates, but it's hard to believe he could do appreciably worse. And his wit, charm, and radicalism might just attract some real support.

Jim Gray, a judge from Orange County in California and author of *Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed and What We Can Do About It*, proposes another approach: make the party the vehicle of protest against the War on Drugs. I've written and spoken on behalf of this notion for nearly a decade, so naturally I look upon Gray's candidacy with a lot of sympathy. The theory is that if the LP is ever going to get enough votes to be noticed, it must come up with a breakthrough issue, one that will motivate ordinary voters to abandon their habit of voting only for Republicans and Democrats and cast their ballots for a fringe candidate.

Surveys show that as many as a third of the voting population favors legalization of marijuana. Voters in seven states have legalized marijuana for people suffering from horrible diseases (only to have first a Democratic and then a Republican administration undo the laws at the point of the bayonet). Yet, except for a few radical Democrats representing university districts and maverick libertarian-Republican congresscritter Ron Paul, marijuana legalization is opposed by virtually every major party politician. Last I heard, there were a million Americans in jail for marijuana possession. They can't vote, but they all have families who would rather have them home. And only God knows how many parents suspect their teenage kids might be messing with marijuana — and don't want them arrested, or their own homes confiscated by the drug warriors.

The theories behind the candidacies of Smith and Gray are unproven. They may work, they may not. But unlike the theories behind the two announced candidates Gary Nolan and Michael Badnerik, these strategies have not been tried

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over and over again with a record of nothing but failure.

— R. W. Bradford

You can always tell a Harvard man —

I've read several autobiographies by Ivy-educated intellectuals of my generation with a certain empathetic interest, including David Horowitz's *Radical Son* (1997) and Victor Neiderhoffer's *The Education of a Speculator* (1996), and once thought about doing a collective review of them. Alston Chase's *Harvard and the Unabomber* (2003) is not an autobiography per se but a biography written by someone whose life was similar in several respects to his subject's. Though Chase is several years older than Ted Kaczynski, each graduated from Harvard, where their public school backgrounds made them feel socially alienated; each obtained doctorates elsewhere and became university professors before "throwing up," as the British would say, their tenure-track academic jobs to live sparsely in the state of Montana. Though older than Ted Kaczynski, I went as a public-school boy to a nearby Ivy League college, where I, too, felt socially awkward, graduating, as Kaczynski did, in 1962 (when I returned to New York City, which I've scarcely left since); so the cultural world portrayed in this book's pages frequently corresponded to mine as well.

For example, Chase frequently notes the influence that Paul Goodman's *Growing Up Absurd* (1960) had upon Kaczynski and other undergraduate outsiders at the time, though it wasn't included in the curriculum. Its theme was identifying the oppressive "system," which was Goodman's all-purpose euphemism for inhumane institutions. (Apparently not literary, Chase misses the complementary influence of the Beat writers who were popular outside the classroom at that time.) Reading Goodman in the early '60s made me think that a life of self-employment would be best for me, though I later learned that my much-less-educated Levantine Jewish ancestors had always regarded working for anyone else as ipso facto "slavery." When asked for a superlative about myself for my class's 25th reunion booklet, I couldn't resist submitting "longest unemployed — 242/3 years."

Among the required readings in the Harvard General Curriculum taken by all undergraduates there in the late 1950s were the writings of Lewis Mumford (1895–1990), then renowned as an extraordinary self-educated polymath. While he was a good literary critic and a great architectural critic, he was also a Luddite who wrote *Technics and Civilization* (1934) and later portentous books critical of technology's impact upon people and society. After passing 40, Mumford lived not in New York City, where he was born and raised, but in an upstate hamlet named, no joke, Amenia. (Goodman, another native New Yorker, died young, not in the City but in northern Vermont.)

At Brown University, whose curriculum was thankfully less regimented, Mumford's advocate was an odd Viennese émigré trained as a mathematician (like Kaczynski) but with broader intellectual ambitions. Then named George W. Morgan, he taught a supra-departmental "University" course that claimed not to teach an identifiable subject but the *truth*. That has always been a dangerous move in any hierarchical, isolated community devoid, as Brown was, of worldly correctives.

Reluctant (or unable) to write and publish, Morgan cleverly restricted his seminar to only a select few, inevitably gathering an ambitious but unsophisticated group to hear his preachings. Needless to say, Mumford was Morgan's favorite living prophet. Since I learned early from anarchists such as Paul Goodman and Henry Miller to fear authoritarian preachers, I avoided this guy and have avoided Truthmen since. (Some of the best lessons learned at school are negative.) So prominent intellectually was Morgan at Brown four decades ago that I was surprised to find nothing — *nothing* — on him in a Google search, which has become the principal measure of cultural presence, not to mention immortality. Perhaps the ultimate fate of minor Luddites is Internet invisibility. Whether any Morganites became rural recluses I do not know. His mentor Mumford, who currently scores a respectable 15,000 Google hits, now strikes me as a fool who was incidentally a truly awesome architectural critic.

One truth that should not be missed is that t(pr)eaching has always been more serious at Ivy League schools, no less at Brown than Harvard, in part because students are thought to be more impressionable to ideas and more likely to have intellectual careers. A professor who moved from Princeton to a branch of CUNY once told me that his students at the former became lawyers whom he would later meet in his professional life; his former students at Lehman College in the Bronx became taxi-drivers whom he would subsequently meet in his social life.

In addition to dubious intellectual influences, Kaczynski suffered from becoming a paid guinea pig in experiments conducted by Henry Murray, perhaps the most distinguished American academic psychologist of his time and a close friend of Mumford. (My most significant other met them, both together and apart, at Harvard in the mid-60s when her father was the Norton Professor of Poetry.) With wisdom gained by time and research, though limited by Harvard's continued refusal to release all relevant papers, Chase portrays Henry Murray as a manipulative Svengali who not only gladly peddled his intelligence to governmental agencies, including the CIA (which established a whole division reflecting his influence), but whose "research" wrecked individual lives, including Kaczynski's. "Was his motivation not perhaps science at all," Chase warns, "but what Germans call *schadenfreude* — taking pleasure in others' discomfort?" An amphetamine dependency contributed to Murray's operational self-confidence.


Kaczynski's Luddite readings at Harvard were not enough to make a Unabomber, Chase suggests, nor was his social alienation there as a kind of proto-nerd. The catalyst was Henry Murray. One truth is that, then and probably now, Harvard is no less devoid of pernicious academics — no less a part of the academic "system" — than, say, Podunk U. After all, other young men at Harvard around the same time were among the first Americans to take LSD. Parents who congratulate themselves on the superficial "success" of their children are, like Kaczynski's, unlikely to identify dangers.

Indeed, one recurring theme of this book is the stupidity of many accredited psychologists, especially those who allowed their hypotheses about the Unabomber to be quoted (and thus published) before his capture. "The psychological profilers repeatedly vacillated," Chase writes. "At first, they described the killer as an obsessive-compulsive white man



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
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
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
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
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who had a string of menial jobs, moving frequently. Given his evident talent at constructing bombs, they theorized he may have been a carpenter or machinist, and an extremely neat dresser. Later, they surmised he might be a college professor." To Chase, Kaczynski was less congenitally crazy than the victim of bad ideas and bad people. A third factor, no doubt more persuasive to some than others, was misfortune in his rare relations with women.

Chase's book inadvertently portrays the underside of Ivy alumni — the bright guys who wouldn't be remembered in the alumni magazines, some of whom left the visible workaday world to pursue their visions. The classmate who remembered Kaczynski best at the time of his arrest was a middling poet named Gerald Burns, another public-school alumnus, also class of 1962, who died in 1997 in Portland while working as a dishwasher at Arby's and a clerk in an independent bookstore. Another classmate of theirs was an aspiring novelist in downtown Manhattan three decades ago. I recall him boasting that he would give his fiction only to "major publishers," which was his mistake, because most of his literary contemporaries who survived decades later favored smaller publishers. The last I heard this sometime "writer" was living modestly along the coast of Maine. A third classmate is an orchestra conductor who graduated with a magna in history and literature, perhaps the most prestigious humanities major, but now works mostly as a midweek proofreader at Standard and Poor's in New York. Though Harvard degrees might bring advantages to most alumni, they were, in the arts at least, finally not enough.

Kaczynski spent nearly 20 years — literally the best years of his life — in high-minded terrorizing. Rather than give up his Luddite mission and perhaps live the remainder of his life in a Montana cabin of 120 square feet, he sought influence — rather, *influence*. He so clearly believed in the press he was generating that with the false promise to desist from additional bombings he could intimidate national newspapers into publishing his manifesto. Once his words appeared in print, his younger brother could tell the authorities who authored them and exactly where to find him. So serious was the older Kaczynski about his Luddite ideas that, once arrested, he refused to accept the insanity defense proposed by his initial lawyers. To his death, no doubt, he will be a Harvard boy.

— Richard Kostelanetz

Fly the monopolistic skies — There was a time in the mid-20th century when the only U.S. flag carrier internationally was Pan American World Airways. If you flew over the Pacific, there was no choice. You could only fly

on the wings of Pan Am. Pan Am was a price-fixing cartel of one, subject only to the politicized restraints of the federal government. This was good news to Pan Am executives and maybe their employees, a group of people numbering 10,000 at most. But it was bad news to millions of people: makers of airplanes, business travelers, adventure travelers, tourists, and anyone involved in the tourist trade. Opening the airways over the Pacific to competition allowed opportunities and cheap tickets to flourish, thereby benefitting the millions.

Time and the preponderance of beneficiaries are the great allies of free markets, especially in a democracy — a system that enthrones majority rule. Sooner or later those millions who love authentic Peking duck, surfing in Maui, want to see family in Shanghai, or build airplanes for Boeing — they will outvote the several thousand executives, employees, and majority shareholders of Pan Am. Pain for few, pleasure for many.


Granted, economic justice took several decades, but eventually the law of large numbers prevailed: not directly in a plebiscite on the governmental perversion that constrained a free market airline network, but recognition by politicians of the political benefits to be gained by rewarding many and penalizing few.

Now consider what happens in a non-democratic country like China. The overlords of a billion Chinese have made a frightening discovery: their subjects, despite decades of torture by radio, TV, marketplace walls, truck-borne loudspeakers, pamphlets, political telemarketers, skywriters, and specially-trained parrots strategically placed in the home of key community leaders, are unmoved. The typical Chinese buyer is as frugal as his American counterpart. He prefers to pay, say two yuan rather than three or more yuan for a bowl of rice flavored with a spoonful of sesame oil and a few chunks of marinated pork. And the same attitude prevails toward airline tickets. Shocked bureaucrats are certain of this phenomenon because, springing up like weeds in a formal garden, are discounters of tickets. Thriving discounters who wantonly violate the government guidelines on ticket prices. Did I mention that most of the airlines that buzz in Chinese skies are government owned? Well, they are. This means that ticket discounters, though they befriend the consumer, are enemies of the state.

The state policy of China, unmindful of popularity and the law of large numbers, is to keep ticket prices high. Consequently, the state airlines, they figure, will grow financially robust and eventually be able to compete internationally. It's classic protectionism; shelter for the frail, indigenous infant. Nurture the incubated industry with artificially high prices. Sooner or later, goes the script, it will bless its overcharged victims with jobs and pay heavy taxes to the state. Eventually, all will benefit. But initially, it's pain for many, pleasure for few. That's the plan. And in a regulated society when the will of the people is replaced by a central planning office, it shall be done.

According to news reports, those discounters (who, like their entrepreneurial U.S. comrades, want to get rich by offering cheap tickets) will face criminal penalties. If the authorities believe that will work, we ought to send over a few hundred fast-talking American salesmen who offer a heck of a bargain on an aged, but well known bridge in Brooklyn.

—Ted Roberts



Gulf War II

The Costs of Victory Over Saddam

by R. W. Bradford

By the time this issue reaches its readers, the United States will have invaded Iraq.

In this special section, Liberty examines the cost of the war, the motives of the warmongers, the sad state of the anti-war movement, and the conduct of the war.

The U.S. will be at war by the time this magazine reaches you. President Bush has promised us war by March 19, unless Saddam Hussein resigns or is booted out of office by his own military, and neither seems likely. Like it or not, Saddam appears to remain in firm control of the military and shows little inclination to resign and face an American firing squad.

Normally, I don't put a lot of confidence in the promises of politicians, but George W. seems bound and determined to invade Iraq, no matter what the consequences.

America's invasion of Iraq will have enormous impact on our lives. Already, it has cost us billions of dollars in increased defense spending: the cost of sending troops to the area and returning them, without including the cost of the war itself, is already \$23 billion. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates the cost of fighting the war at \$14 billion the first month and \$8 billion per month after that. Occupying Iraq will run at least \$12 billion a year, and may run many times that figure. No one knows how long the occupation will last.

All this occurs in the context of an exploding budget deficit, which the CBO estimates will add \$1.8 trillion to the national debt in the next ten years, providing that we do not invade Iraq, all the 2001 tax cuts are allowed to expire, no further tax cuts are enacted, spending increases merely keep pace with inflation, and Bush's Medicare expansion is not enacted. (If this last measure is enacted, in ten years, the annual cost of that program will be about \$1.7 trillion per year, or about \$6,000 for every man, woman, and child in the country.) Health and Human Services Secretary Tommy Thompson has admitted that the Bush proposal will "hasten the program's slide toward insolvency," reports the *Washington Post*.

But the president plans to expand spending even more. If his defense spending bills are enacted — and they are going to have to be, if we are going to invade the other members of the "Axis of Evil" — we will soon be spending

more than we did at the peak of Ronald Reagan's Cold War defense buildup.

To keep the national debt from growing to absurd levels, Bush must either increase taxes or crank up the printing presses at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing. Inflation is the dirtiest and sneakiest tax of all, robbing the elderly of

The war on Iraq is a new government program, and as with most new government programs, its advocates have misrepresented its costs.

their savings, turning generation against generation, and increasing the cost of capital (thereby, hurting productivity). Either way, you and I will pay.

Of course, it is far from certain that the war will go as planned.

There is a word for what you're doing when you invade another country and maintain control indefinitely by force of arms, even if you say you're doing it to "build democracy." That word is imperialism. And if there's one lesson that we should learn from the 20th century, it is that imperialism doesn't work.

Consider how the century began. Over half the world's territory was controlled by three great European empires: Britain, France, and Russia. Europe also had another great power, Germany, which aspired to become a genuinely imperial power.

In 1914 World War I began, with Germany and a few pitiful allies pitted against the three great empires and their allies. Within three years, the three great empires were at the point of losing the war. It was only the intervention of the United States, still a free republic, despite its tiny overseas empire (Hawaii, the Philippines, Puerto Rico, and a few flyspeck islands), that saved the allies. The war destroyed one of the huge empires, Russia, replacing it with a brutal communist dictatorship, and left Britain and France scarred forever.

Germany rose again against the same empires, and again, it was the intervention of the United States that saved them. Even so, long before the century ended, Britain and France had lost their empires and become minor powers, while Germany and the U.S. — the same two powers that had never put together an empire — were the world's economic powerhouses.

Of course, the 20th century's experience isn't unique. Other conquerors have had the same problem: just look at what happened to the empires of Napoleon, Alexander the Great, and just about every great empire ever assembled. (Okay, I'll admit that the Roman Empire lasted a lot longer. It's the proverbial exception that proves the rule.) If you want to understand why empires virtually never last, read *The God of the Machine*, Isabel Paterson's idiosyncratic but brilliant 1943 book on war and empire.

How will the war go? I don't think anyone really knows.

Many people believe our technological advantage is so great that we will simply invade and slaughter, in the manner of the Battle of Omdurman in 1896, where a technologically superior British army killed 10,000 Muslims while suffering only 48 casualties. They may very well be right.

But the problem the U.S. faces is not the cost or casualties of the war. It is the cost and casualties of the peace. The invasion and conquest of Iraq may very well lead to a protracted occupation that will make the U.S. occupation of South Vietnam seem like a Sunday school picnic.

Please don't misunderstand what I'm saying here. I think Saddam is a terrible dictator, and it would be a wonderful thing if he were replaced and democracy blossomed in the desert of Iraq. The question is: just how much are we willing to pay to get rid of him? Is it worth the lives of thousands of American men and women? Is it worth severe damage to the economy and to our way of life? Is it worth the surrender of our civil liberties and property rights?

There's another important question: can we build a liberal democratic society in Afghanistan or Iraq? In the other members of Bush's hallucinated "Axis of Evil," North Korea and Iran? In all the other dictatorships of the world? In any of them? And, if it is possible to build democracy, can it be built on the foundation of invasion, conquest and slaughter?

These are questions for the American people to answer, through their elected representatives. Right now, most Americans don't seem to be very worried about the costs. The war on Iraq is a new government program, and as with most new government programs, its advocates have misrepresented its costs.

Back when I was in high school, the Democrats ran television ads showing a man putting a dime in a pay phone to make a telephone call, while the announcer explained that that dime was what Medicare will cost each American per month. That was what we were told in 1965. Now, as soon as Bush's new expansion of Medicare is implemented, every American — every man, woman, child, and babe in arms —

To keep the national debt from growing to absurd levels, Bush must either increase taxes or crank up the printing presses at the Bureau of Engraving and Printing.

will pay an average of \$500 per month for Medicare and allied programs.

I remember that dime and that commercial when I hear White House budget chief Mitchell E. Daniels Jr. say that he is not worried about "today's deficits, and tomorrow's for that matter."

Maybe invasion is the only way to deal with Saddam. Maybe it's worth impoverishing ourselves and losing our freedom to get rid of him. But let's not underestimate the costs of the war, or of Bush's other huge expansions of government power. □

Gulf War II

Meanwhile, on the Anti-War Front

by Stephen Cox

The only trouble with the anti-war movement is that it's populated with left-wing twits.

In recent months, as I've watched the small fluctuations in the opinion polls regarding public attitudes toward the president's handling of Iraq, I've often wondered how different the numbers might be if the anti-war movement were not, in essence, an anti-Bush, anti-Republican movement. Each day, I receive a torrent of anti-war emails; each day, I hear anti-war speeches on television and radio. The great majority of these messages are mere diatribes or rants, shrieks of anger against the president. They take for granted all the notions they need to prove: the idea that Bush is provoking war simply to grab Near East oil; the idea that he is "fixated" and "obsessed" with "world domination"; the idea that he is a "racist" who nonchalantly "plans to kill 500,000 Iraqi children," and many ideas of like temper.

None of this rhetoric surfaced in response to President Clinton's attacks on Iraq, Somalia, Haiti, or Yugoslavia. On those occasions, in fact, very little anti-war rhetoric surfaced at all, except as emitted by the stray libertarian or conservative isolationist. I cannot recall a single Democratic congressman showing up on TV to tell us that war never solved anything, or to ask how many children must be killed before the president had his way. This says something about the tendency of domestic politics to drive foreign politics in the United States. To realize that if Bush were in favor of abortion and against school prayer and capital punishment, millions of anti-war voices would be hushed — that is a strange realization, and an ominous one, no matter what you think of the specific merits of the case

for attacking Iraq.

More clearly than ever before, I believe, the great liability of the anti-war movement is . . . the anti-war movement. It is a movement that programmatically refuses to separate itself from radical left-wing sentiment. As far as I can tell, the leaders of the great majority of public demonstrations are motivated by the agenda of the hard left and are using Bush's preparations for war against Iraq (overtly a fascist dictatorship) as an exhilarating new way of combatting capitalism and the Republican Party. When Sean Hannity and Alan Colmes interviewed two leaders of the recent school walkout-in-protest-of, one of the two responded to questions about what kind of war he *would* support by listing World War II (of course) and Castro's revolution (oh, really?). The other one sat listening with an inane smile on his face. Of course, the whole idea of walking out of high school and college classes to protest a war is incomprehensible except in terms of a protest against established institutions that is merely adopting one particular war as an excuse.

It's not just the organization of the anti-war movement that's in question. It's the disreputable character of its personnel. The Senate's great spouter of anti-war views is Teddy Kennedy, that lifelong apostle of peace and exemplar of human dignity. The media's great exponents of pacifism are a little mob of Hollywood stars who think that the way to stop war is to get their followers to jam congressional offices with calls and faxes, thus relieving themselves of the inconvenience of showing up in person to display

their self-righteousness. When two Los Angeles radio guys urged their listeners to retaliate by doing the same thing to the business offices of the stars, they were threatened with legal action to get the FCC to prevent them from mounting such protests. Thus do the important people in Hollywood

Oh, I see. Writing a shelf of insipid historical novels and catty books of essays constitutes proof of seniority in the Americanism department.

defend (other) Americans' right to dissent and engage in peaceful, though annoying, protest.

No, I'm not talking about any of the good arguments against this war, or war in general. I may not buy them all, but they certainly exist. You'd never know it, though, once the current anti-war gang got going. The text of their little drama is so contemptible — a mishmash of sentiments about war always being the worst option (again, oh really?), predictions of calamity, and the aforementioned slanders of Bush — that one immediately turns to the subtext. In most cases, this is the argument that we, or at least I, am obviously smarter than you, or at least he (the president), so therefore I should be running the country and determining its foreign policy. There is no other way to explain Senator Kennedy's remarks, ever. There is no other way to explain the angry prattle that one hears on NPR and PBS. And there is no other way to explain such phenomena as . . . Gore Vidal.

Can there really be such a person? Listening to him being interviewed, one weighs the odds, and considers it probable that there isn't one. An opportunity to do so occurred on March 5, when the real or supposed Vidal visited Alan Colmes' radio show. Colmes, a modern-liberal opponent of the war, kept trying to make sense of what Gore was saying, and Gore kept preventing him from making any. Gore's theme was the stupidity or evil of the president; his evidence was the allegation that no fighter planes were scrambled on 9/11 until after all the damage had been done. This isn't true, but never mind — what was his point? He refused to say that he was accusing Bush of being the kind of leader who plots to destroy the lives of thousands of fellow-citizens in order to concoct a crisis in foreign affairs. Oh, no, he wasn't saying that. He wasn't one of "you people" (journalists) who know nothing of "fact" and deal only in "opinion." Well, Colmes asked, aren't you giving us your opinion? No, I'm giving you the facts. But aren't you suggesting an opinion? No, just the facts. But aren't you *insinuating* an opinion? No! No! No! Well, then, why are you on my show?

One thing led to another, and Vidal announced that he, Vidal, had always been a good American, better than "most other people" in this country. Curiously, Colmes then accused him of arrogance, to which accusation he replied, "I've spent my whole life writing about America." Oh, I see. Writing a shelf of insipid historical novels and catty books of essays constitutes proof of seniority in the Americanism department. When callers finally intervened in the by-then very embittered discussion, it emerged that Vidal's alleged facts about the airplanes weren't facts at all. But that didn't matter: *he* was still correct, in his own eyes.

With opponents like that, is it any wonder, any wonder at all, that the president does so well in the polls? □

What's cash got to do with it? — At the brink of war a new theory arose to explain why George W. Bush wanted to invade Iraq: to protect the dollar as the world's reserve currency. Saddam Hussein threatened the hegemony of the dollar, the theory went, by pricing his oil in euros.

There is a certain type of mind that leaps for the "insider" explanation, available only to those in the know. It is the type of mind that thinks it is sophisticated to say, "always follow the money." Not that they follow it, only that they say that.

The earlier assertion of that type was that war was about oil. Bush had been an oilman (sort of) and Cheney had run an oil-services company. The invasion must be about "control" of Iraqi oil.

What would that mean? Without a war, America had already limited the amount of oil Iraq could sell. Did an invasion mean taking the oil, selling it and keeping the money? That was not something America was likely to do. It would cost more politically than it would pay and no precedent for this type of action had been set.

But this currency explanation — that was even cooler,

because it was less obvious. Not that it stood up to even the first barrage of questioning.

Was Iraq important enough to influence the value of the dollar?

What country had ever strengthened its currency by starting a war? Would an addition of \$100 billion or \$200 billion to the U.S. national debt, on top of rock-bottom interest rates, strengthen the currency?

Could it be that Bush pretended to care about terrorism and "weapons of mass destruction," but that in private what really got his goat was Saddam's preference for the euro?

I recall the Nixon tapes. These reached right through the fog of public relations and spun to what the chief executive was thinking. And he was not thinking of currencies.

When H. R. Haldeman brought up the plight of the lira, Nixon snapped, "I don't give a shit about the Italian lira." It was the only mention of currencies that I remember from the tapes. Nixon was not interested in currencies. He was thinking about squeezing North Vietnam for political concessions. He was thinking about who was going to win, and who was going to get credit. That is what war is about. Not money.

— Bruce Ramsey

Gulf War II

The Logic of War

by Stefan B. Herpel

There are many reasons that a country wages war; the official reason, the real reason, and the myriad explanations given to sell the former and obscure the latter.

If the war hasn't started by the time this issue of *Liberty* hits the newsstand, it likely will start very soon thereafter. We have had a lot of time to think about and digest the administration's arguments for war, and it is important, I think, to try to determine what has really driven the thinking of American policymakers.

Whatever one may think about the merits of past American military engagements, history suggests that official reasons for war frequently do not correspond to the actual reasons. Government has often relied on various forms of deception to build public support for, or overcome public opposition to, war. There are typically two parts to the official deception. One is to conceal the factors that are really driving the war policy. The other is to emphasize considerations that are invalid or, while conceivably valid, are in fact of little or no importance to the policymakers themselves.

Generally, an attempt to analyze what is really driving a government's war decision will not, by itself, provide a basis for assessing the necessity or morality of the war. Once the real reasons for a war are discerned, they may turn out to be valid, despite their concealment by the government. Likewise, the reasons the government has disingenuously offered to the public to justify the war may actually have merit, despite the fact that policymakers have privately rejected them. One can imagine, for example, a government dominated by policymakers of a realpolitik mindset rejecting as irrelevant a humanitarian argument for war, while invoking that argument in its public pronouncements precisely because it knows it will appeal to a certain segment of the population, thereby expanding the base of public support for

the war. Even so, if the government is not telling the truth about its reasons for embarking on something as important as war, we ought to know about it.

George Kennan, the venerable historian and diplomat, recently observed that, because of all of the unforeseeable consequences that wars inevitably have, the prejudice in the current age should always be against war, as long as there is some peaceful policy option. My own view has been that the known risks and costs of a second Gulf War plainly outweigh its benefits, and that a continuation of the policies of containment and deterrence (with an inspection regime) is preferable to war.

Lately, however, I have wondered whether there is a need to revisit my utilitarian calculus, as the distance we have advanced toward war and the implications of reversing course at this late stage are immense.

After threatening for more than a year to remove Hussein by force, and after having moved more than 200,000 troops into the region, pulling back now, in the midst of anti-war protests here and around the globe, will likely embolden our adversaries and cause allies in dangerous regions of the world to re-evaluate their ties with the U.S.

Let's consider the situation, and the reasoning that we are faced with.

The Official Reasons for Gulf War II

1. *The Alleged Link Between al Qaeda and Saddam Hussein*

The administration has repeatedly stressed the connection between Hussein and al Qaeda. A link between a secular Muslim government like Hussein's, which has executed mul-lahs, and a fundamentalist organization like bin Laden's has always seemed suspect. If there were truly a link, revealing it

would be a powerful way to galvanize public support for a war, because of the fear and sense of vulnerability engendered by Sept. 11. But the administration has notably failed to support this charge with credible evidence.

The claim that the government floated for months in late 2001 and 2002 was that Mohammed Atta, the chief hijacker in the 9/11 attacks, had met secretly with an Iraqi intelligence agent in Prague in April 2001. The CIA at some point concluded that this claim could not be corroborated, and government officials eventually stopped talking about the

Governments have long relied on various forms of deception to build public support for or overcome public opposition to war.

alleged meeting without ever acknowledging the lack of reliable evidence to support it.

In his speech before the United Nations on February 6, Secretary of State Powell offered different evidence in an attempt to substantiate his claim of a "sinister nexus between Iraq and the al Qaeda terrorist network." This time, the principal evidence concerned a terrorist named Abu Musab Zarqawi and a terrorist organization, Ansar al-Islam. Powell claimed that Iraq was harboring "a deadly terrorist network headed by Zarqawi, an associate and collaborator of Osama bin Laden and his al Qaeda lieutenants." During his speech, the secretary also showed a photograph of what he said was a chemical and explosives factory being operated by the terrorist organization Ansar al-Islam in a Kurdish area of north-eastern Iraq. According to Powell, the organization has ties to the regime in Iraq and has given sanctuary to al Qaeda operatives who fled during the war in Afghanistan.

This was an important speech and there is every reason to believe that Powell was making the Bush administration's best case for a connection between Hussein and bin Laden's group. But at least two significant weaknesses in the secretary's case were quickly exposed. Ansar al-Islam is an organization that has engaged in terrorist acts in Kurdistan, and is intent on replacing the two dominant political factions in Kurdistan, the KUP, and the KDP. A *New York Times* article that appeared the day after Powell's speech quoted a senior official of the KUP, who was said to be familiar with intelligence on Ansar al-Islam, as saying he did not "know anything about this compound." The article also reported that Kurds pointed out that Khurmal, the village named on the photo, was not controlled by Ansar al-Islam, but was instead controlled by Komala Islami Kurdistan, a more moderate Islamic group. Moreover, if there is a chemical plant in that part of Iraq, the secretary did not explain why the U.S. had not "taken it out," especially given the close relationship the U.S. has with the Kurdish leadership in Kurdistan and its continuing overflight operations in northern Iraq.

As for the allegations regarding Zarqawi, CIA Director George Tenet, offering Congressional testimony on February 12, qualified much of what Powell had said or implied in his U.N. speech. Tenet said that Zarqawi was not "under the

control" of Hussein. He indicated that Zarqawi took money from bin Laden, but also that Zarqawi and al Qaeda were independent.

Kenneth Pollack, the former Clinton administration official who advocates the war option, acknowledged last year in *The Threatening Storm: the Case for Invading Iraq*, a book that is drawing praise from both supporters and opponents of the war, that, so far as we can tell, any ties between bin Laden's group and Hussein are "tenuous and inconsequential." Secretary Powell offered nothing in his speech of February 6 that would warrant a different conclusion. Indeed, the secretary's new evidence of a link was, at best, only marginally better than the earlier evidence.

It is, of course, possible, as President Bush has stated, that at some time "Iraq could decide . . . to provide a biological or chemical weapon to a terrorist group or individual terrorists." Hussein *could* sell or give away weapons of mass destruction to al Qaeda, despite their ideological and political antagonism. But it also *possible* that other states, states that are more active in the arms trade than Iraq, such as Iran, North Korea, and China, could transfer WMD or important components used to manufacture them.

In any event, what is pertinent is not the existence of a possibility, but rather our best assessment of its probability. Pollack, who maintains that "terrorism is the least of the threats posed by Iraq to the interests of the United States," argues persuasively that this is unlikely. He notes that Saddam has distanced himself from international terrorist groups in the last two decades "because he cannot be certain how they will act and how their actions will affect his own security." This concern would be "ten times" greater if WMD were involved, Pollack says, which explains why, to the best of our knowledge, Saddam has never previously made such weapons available to terrorist groups. Indeed, Pollack contends, Saddam knows that if the United States were to "tie [him] to an act of terrorism conducted with WMD, he would

Because of all of the unforeseeable consequences that wars inevitably have, our prejudice should always be against war as long as there remain peaceful policy options.

pay an exorbitant cost for it."

Removing Hussein from power would indeed make it practically impossible for him to transfer WMD to any terrorist organization in the future. But it simply does not make sense to think that our policymakers have chosen war for the purpose of eliminating an unlikely possibility, especially given all the known risks and direct costs (between \$100 and \$200 billion, by most estimates) of a second Gulf War, which include some of the very risks the war is ostensibly designed to prevent. As former NATO Supreme Commander General Wesley Clark recently observed, if our military action divests Saddam of effective control over his own WMD before U.S. forces have an opportunity to assert control, the chemical

and biological weapons that he surely still possesses could fall into terrorist hands. Another risk is that Saddam will be driven into an unholy tactical alliance with al Qaeda, and that terrorist attacks will be launched to coincide with a war.

There is also a risk that while Saddam is going down to defeat, he will launch a missile with a chemical warhead into Israel, prompting Israel to strike back with WMD of its own, or that Hussein will use biological or chemical weapons against Shiite or Kurdish populations in Iraq.

There are, of course, additional known risks other than those the war is supposedly being waged to prevent. One is that Hussein could destroy infrastructure, including oil wells and related equipment, during an attack. Another is that war could inspire the overthrow of moderate Arab states, or lead to inter-ethnic fighting in Iraq of the kind that occurred in Yugoslavia following the fall of its strongman, Tito. The veteran journalist Arnaud de Borchgrave, who knows Pakistan well, has said that a second Gulf War could even lead to a breakup of Pakistan, with anybody's guess as to who would end up with control of that country's significant arsenal of nuclear weapons. Perhaps the most serious risk to the West, which I happen to think is a virtual certainty, is that war will lead to increased anti-Americanism in Muslim populations and to more terrorism against Americans and their interests. Bassam Tibi, a moderate Muslim scholar who teaches in Germany, argued persuasively in his 1997 book, *The Challenge of Fundamentalism*, that the first Gulf War led to a dramatic increase in militant Islamic fundamentalism. And we know that the first Gulf War was a major inspiration to bin Laden and his network in their jihad against the West. A second Gulf War, whose objective of regime change is far more ambitious than that of Gulf War I, will likely lead to even greater radicalization of Muslim populations throughout the world.

In short, in light of all of the known risks of this war, it is not plausible that the mere possibility of WMD transfer to al Qaeda has motivated policymakers in the Bush administration to embrace the war option.

Nevertheless, the government's statements regarding ties between al Qaeda and Hussein appear to have had the desired effect on public opinion. A Knight-Ridder poll conducted in early January of this year showed that 65% of respondents believed that Iraq and al Qaeda "are allied and working together to plan new acts of terrorism." That belief has even colored public views of who was responsible for the Sept. 11 attacks. Despite the fact that fifteen of the hijackers were Saudis and none of the remaining four were Iraqis, 21% of the respondents in that same poll believed that most of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqi citizens, 23% believed that some of them were, and 6% believed that one of them was. A New York Times/CBS News poll conducted in early March of this year revealed that 45% of the respondents believed that Saddam Hussein was "personally involved" in the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center.

2. Iraq's Military Threat to the U.S. and its Allies in the Gulf

President Bush has pressed the case for war by saying that "the Iraqi dictator must not be permitted to threaten America and the world with horrible poisons and diseases

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and gases and atomic weapons." The idea of Saddam acquiring a nuclear weapon is not a salutary prospect. But the notion that the acquisition of a limited nuclear capacity would pose a direct military threat to the U.S. is not credible. Nor would

Saddam pose such a threat even if he were eventually to develop nuclear weapons with sufficient range to reach the U.S. Just as leaders of the Soviet Union understood the consequences of initiating the use of nuclear weapons, so Saddam would have to know that any nuclear attack against the U.S. would be met with overwhelming retaliation.

While President Bush has suggested that the only conceivable reason Saddam wants a nuclear weapon is to use it, this is an obvious fallacy. There are undoubtedly regional reasons why Saddam wants such weapons — Israel has many nukes and Iraq's arch enemy Iran is closer to develop-

A link between a secular Muslim government like Hussein's, which has executed mullahs, and a fundamentalist organization like bin Laden's has always been dubious.

ment of a nuclear weapon than Iraq is — and nuclear weapons would enhance Saddam's prestige in the Arab world. We know from the history of the Soviet Union during the Cold War that having a large arsenal of weapons does not necessarily carry with it an intent to use them against a foreign adversary. Acquiring one or two nuclear weapons would give Saddam greater influence over other Gulf states (some of them our allies), but there is little chance that he would actually use the weapons against any neighboring state unless he were attacked first with similar weapons.

3. Iraq's Violation of U.N. Resolutions

This issue requires little comment. The Security Council declared in Resolution 1441 (2002) that Iraq was in violation of Resolution 687 (1991), which, among other things, required Iraq to provide an accurate and complete disclosure of all aspects of its programs to develop weapons of mass destruction. There is no doubt that Iraq has violated that resolution. But there are many countries that are in violation of U.N. resolutions, including Turkey, Morocco, and Israel, and those violations are seemingly of little or no importance to the U.S.

There are two other considerations that suggest that Hussein's violation of U.N. Resolutions is not what is driving American policy. When President Bush and other officials first broached the subject of war, they made clear that its purpose was to effect regime change in Iraq, and not merely to coerce Saddam into behaving differently (as was done in Gulf War I). While regime change could presumably be authorized by the United Nations if that were deemed necessary to compel compliance with earlier U.N. resolutions, deciding beforehand to use such a drastic remedy demonstrated that the Bush administration had embarked on

a policy that was completely divorced from the legal framework of the U.N. President Bush ultimately made a decision to attempt to seek U.N. Security Council approval for a war, but the fact that he came to this decision late, and has since made it clear that the U.S. will go to war with or without U.N. approval, means that the institutional imperatives of the United Nations will be observed when it is in the interests of the U.S. to do so, and disregarded when it is not.

4. Humanitarian Reasons

Saddam Hussein is undeniably a brutal despot, presiding over a cruel and repressive regime. President Bush has suggested that removal of Hussein would improve the lot of his people:

On Saddam Hussein's orders, opponents have been decapitated, wives and mothers of political opponents have been systematically raped as a method of intimidation, and political prisoners have been forced to watch their own children being tortured. America believes that all people are entitled to hope and human rights, to the non-negotiable demands of human dignity. . . . Our demands are directed only at the regime that enslaves [the Iraqi people] and threatens us. When these demands are met, the first and greatest benefit will come to Iraqi men, women and children. The oppression of Kurds, Assyrians, Turkomans, Shi'a, Sunnis and others will be lifted. The long captivity of Iraq will end, and an era of new hope will begin.

Even in the speech from which these remarks were taken, however, they were offered as an afterthought, not as a principal reason for going to war with Iraq, and that is how they are usually presented. In any event, there are many cruel and terrible dictators in the world, and many regimes that treat their citizens miserably. One thinks immediately of the Sudanese government, which since 1984 has waged a terrible war in the South (only recently halted by an uneasy truce) that has claimed more than a million of its citizens' lives. Charles Taylor, the leader of Liberia, has not only been a brutal despot in his own country, he also sponsored the rebels in neighboring Sierra Leone, whose main method of terror was to hack off the limbs of civilians, including children. There

has been no talk by this administration of regime change in the Sudan or Liberia. In short, the lot of Iraqis may be improved by Gulf War II, depending on how the war is conducted and its aftermath, but this is not a consideration that provides an important motivation to American policymakers.

The Actual Reasons for War

1. Oil Security

Administration officials are quick to denounce any implication that oil is a factor. For example, Richard Perle, the chairman of the administration's Defense Policy Board, said recently, "I find the accusation that this administration has embarked upon this policy for oil to be an outrageous, scurri-

In a poll conducted just before Bush's final deadline for invasion, 45% of Americans believed that Saddam Hussein was "personally involved" in the attacks on the Pentagon and World Trade Center.

lous charge." Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said in an interview with Al-Jazeera, the Arab television network, that suggestions that oil is behind U.S. policy are "[u]tter nonsense." The secretary added, "This is not about oil, and anyone who thinks it is is badly misunderstanding the situation." The suggestion that it is "outrageous," "scurrilous" or "utter nonsense" to claim that oil is a factor is sheer hyperbole. After all, in *A World Transformed*, a 1998 book co-authored by the first President Bush and Brent Scowcroft, his National Security Advisor, Scowcroft justified the first Gulf War by saying that our "vital interests" were such that "we couldn't possibly allow Iraq a stranglehold over the oil sup-

plies of the industrialized economies." Bush I echoed that point by alluding to the "economic stakes of Iraq's invasion," which he described as flowing from "the economic impact of Saddam's control of so much of the world's oil supply."

But there are compelling reasons to believe that oil is no less important to Gulf War II than it was to Gulf War I. Kenneth Pollack, the former Clinton administration official who is a proponent of war, has not been as reticent as administration officials in citing concerns about oil supplies and prices as a primary reason for waging Gulf War II. In *The Threatening Storm*, Pollack contends that Saddam hopes to use the acquisition of nuclear weapons to fulfill his goal of "call[ing] the shots in a grand Arab coalition" of Middle Eastern states. Pollack believes that if Saddam were to achieve his goal of "dominance of the Gulf oil region and its oil supplies," that "would constitute a dire threat to U.S. national security."



SACHAMBERS

"Oops! I think we just took out Paris!"

Saddam "threatens the economic health of the world," Pollack argues, "because all of the evidence we have suggests that if [he] controls the Gulf oil fields, he will use this power to advance Iraq's political interests, even to the detriment of its economic

interests and the world's." He would "be willing to cut or even halt oil exports whenever it suited him [in order] to force concessions from his fellow Arabs, Europe, the United States, or the world as a whole." Pollack goes so far as to claim that if Saddam were to attain that kind of dominance over the other oil-producing states in the Mideast, the result could be a "new Great Depression."

Plainly, the oil motive is a plausible one, especially for those decision-makers within the administration who believe that, if Saddam were to dominate the Gulf region, he could cause oil to be used as an economic weapon against the U.S. and the West. There is evidence that points to oil as a principal factor underlying the administration's Gulf War II policy. As reported by the Columbia University economist Jeffrey Sachs and others, the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy of Rice University completed a study (together with the Council on Foreign Relations) in April 2001, which was reportedly presented to Vice President Dick Cheney, who was then heading the Energy Policy Development Group (also known as the "Energy Task Force"). The study, which was entitled "Strategic Energy Policy Challenges for the 21st Century," concludes, for a variety of supply and demand side reasons, that the energy sector is in "critical condition" and predicts that an energy crisis, not unlike that of the early 1970s, "could erupt at any time." The Baker Institute study notes that the U.S. "has forged a special relationship with certain key Middle East exporters, which . . . we assumed, would adjust their oil output to keep prices at levels that would neither discourage global economic growth nor fuel inflation." The pre-Sept. 11 study suggests that those

The most serious risk to the West is that war will lead to increased anti-Americanism in Muslim populations and to more terrorism against Americans.

assumptions might no longer be justified because "[t]hese Gulf allies are finding their domestic and foreign policy interests increasingly at odds with U.S. strategic considerations, especially as Arab-Israeli tensions flare."

The Baker Institute study emphasizes the importance of two Gulf states to any future energy problems — Saudi Arabia and Iraq. Saudi Arabia is the world's largest exporter of oil and has the world's largest known reserves. Iraq, even with U.N. and multilateral sanctions in place, is still one of the largest exporters and, at 112 billion barrels, has the second largest known reserves. The study emphasizes that Saudi Arabia has been our key oil ally but indicates that its ability to remain cooperative on oil pricing and supply is questionable, in part because of the actions of Iraq, our prin-

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cipal oil adversary:

Iran and Iraq accuse Saudi Arabia of seeking higher production rates to accommodate the economic interests of the United States, Japan, and Europe at the expense of the needs of local populations,

creating internal pressures in the Arabian Gulf region against a moderate price stance. Bitter perceptions in the Arab world that the United States has not been evenhanded in brokering peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians have exacerbated these pressures on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council countries and given political leverage to Iraq's Saddam Hussein to lobby for support among the Arab world's populations.

But Iraq has done more than just impose political pressure on Saudi Arabia and our other oil allies in the region. According to the Baker Institute study, it has periodically elected not to sell all the oil it could in an attempt to drive crude prices higher, and it has otherwise "demonstrated a

Saddam has distanced himself from international terrorist groups because he cannot be certain how they will act and how their actions will affect his own security.

willingness to threaten to use the oil weapon." While Saudi Arabia has thwarted those efforts, the study concludes that its continuing ability or willingness to do so cannot be taken for granted:

Over the past year, Iraq has effectively become a swing producer, turning its taps on and off when it has felt such action was in its strategic interest to do so. Saudi Arabia has proven willing to provide replacement supplies to the market when Iraqi exports have been reduced. This role has been extremely important in avoiding greater market volatility and in countering Iraq's efforts to take advantage of the oil market's structure. Saudi Arabia's role in this needs to be preserved, and should not be taken for granted. There is domestic pressure on the GCC leaders to reject cooperation to cool oil markets during times of shortfall in Iraqi oil production. These populations are dissatisfied with the "no-fly-zone" bombing and the sanctions regime against Iraq, perceived U.S. bias in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and lack of domestic economic pressures [on the U.S.].

The Baker Institute study reports that Saddam has also been engaged in a "clever public relations campaign" designed to link Arab oil policy with the Arab-Israeli conflict, and to "stir up anti-American sentiment inside and outside the Middle East." Saddam has succeeded to some extent in "recast[ing] himself as the champion of the Palestinian cause . . . among young Palestinians."

Finally, the study recognizes that the U.N. and multilateral sanctions imposed on Iraq have created a policy dilemma for the U.S. On the one hand, sanctions (especially prohibitions on foreign investment in Iraq) have "had a severe effect on potential Iraq production," and relaxing them would "quickly add capacity to world oil markets." On

the other hand, allowing more Iraqi oil to come to market would "encourage Saddam Hussein to boast of his 'victory' against the United States, fuel his ambitions, and potentially strengthen his regime." Saddam could use oil revenues to build weapons of mass destruction, which would make him even more powerful in the region. The study does not discuss war as an option, and instead recommends an easing of sanctions coupled with "highly focused and enforced sanctions that target the regime's ability to maintain and acquire weapons of mass destruction."

Vice President Cheney's Energy Task Force issued a report on May 17, 2001 which is known as the "National Energy Policy." That report, like the Baker Institute study, emphasizes the idea that America is now facing "the most serious energy shortage since the oil embargoes of the 1970s," and warns of more serious energy problems in the future that, if left unsolved, "will inevitably undermine our economy, our standard of living, and our national security." The portion of the "National Energy Policy" report dealing with international issues of energy policy describes Saudi Arabia as having been "a linchpin of supply reliability to world oil markets," but does not mention concerns about the future dependability of Saudi Arabia that were evident.

It is not plausible that the mere possibility of weapons transfers to al Qaeda has motivated the Bush administration to embrace the war option.

While it would have been impolitic for the Bush administration to voice those concerns publicly, it is easy to imagine hard-headed realists in the administration like Cheney and Rumsfeld entertaining them. It should be remembered that Cheney and Rumsfeld were serving in high-level positions in the Ford administration when the Arab oil embargo wreaked havoc on our economy and contributed to Gerald Ford's defeat in the 1976 presidential election.

The "National Energy Policy" report does not mention Iraq by name, but it plainly recognizes the policy dilemma posed by the U.N. sanctions regarding Iraqi oil exports and foreign investment, and recommends a policy review of sanctions with respect to their impact on U.S. "energy security." In addition, it acknowledges that another policy challenge is posed by the periodic efforts of OPEC to cut back on exports and cause an artificial rise in price, without mentioning Iraq's role in those actions. Again, one can easily imagine Cheney and Rumsfeld sharing the Baker Institute's view that those actions of OPEC are, in part, the result of pressure from Iraq, which has attempted to exploit the widespread belief in the people of the Arab states that the U.S. is not being evenhanded in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

The report also observes that by 2020, "Gulf oil producers are projected to supply between 54 and 67 percent of the world's oil." As such, it concludes, this region will "remain vital to U.S. interests" and to "world oil security," and the

Gulf will therefore "be a primary focus of U.S. international energy policy."

The Sept. 11 attacks would have provided an impetus — and a political opportunity — to go to war over oil security issues of the kind described only five months earlier in the Baker Institute study. Following the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, concerns about the dependability of Saudi Arabia as an oil ally could only have intensified as the role of bin Laden and other Saudi nationals in both the hijackings and the funding and promotion of militant Islamic fundamentalism generally, became increasingly clear. Meanwhile, the administration appeared to reject one of the principal oil policy prescriptions of the Baker Institute study — the recommendation that the U.S. make serious efforts to defuse tensions in the Arab-Israeli conflict. If anything, those tensions have been allowed to worsen since President Bush assumed office. With that policy option ruled out, the most important remaining proposal of the Baker Institute study was the recommendation to phase out oil-related sanctions against Iraq, a proposal that would have had the undesirable effect of strengthening Hussein politically and militarily in the Gulf region.

Removing Hussein by force and replacing him with a friendly regime offered some clear advantages over relaxation of sanctions. War would simultaneously eliminate our principal oil adversary and create a new oil ally to supplement or perhaps replace the questionable Saudis. Iraqi oil could be tapped and brought to market without fear that it would strengthen an unfriendly regime and lead to greater use of the oil weapon against the West. And the level of public fear that was engendered by 9/11 would make it far easier to sell a war to the public than before, at least if it was pitched as something necessary to combat terrorism.

One lesson learned from the first Gulf War was that oil and its effects on the economy did not sell. In *A World Transformed*, the first President Bush and Brent Scowcroft acknowledged the public relations disaster caused by Secretary of State James Baker's statement in November 1990 that the reason we were prepared to fight Gulf War I was "jobs, jobs, jobs." Concern about pitching Gulf War II in this way would be even greater today, because this time Hussein has done nothing nearly as conspicuous as invading a neighbor state.

2. Protection of Israel

Another factor driving this war is the belief that it will promote Israel's security interests. A recent article in the *Washington Post* reported that supporters of Ariel Sharon believe he and Bush have "the closest relationship in decades, perhaps ever, between a U.S. president and an Israeli [head of] government." Sharon has made no secret of his desire for regime change in Baghdad, describing it as of "vital importance." And he and Bush are also in agreement with the policies that Sharon's Likud government has been pursuing with respect to the Palestinians.

A number of Bush's neoconservative advisers, including Defense Policy Board Chairman Richard Perle and Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, are longstanding hawks on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and strong advocates of regime change in Iraq. According to a report in the *Washington Post*, Perle was part of a study group that, in

1996, proposed to Israel's then prime minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, that he abandon the Oslo peace accords and reject the idea of trading "land for peace." The *Post* quoted the study group as recommending that Israel should "focus on removing Saddam Hussein from power in Iraq."

Stanley Hoffmann, a distinguished Harvard historian, has been particularly blunt in his criticism of the influence of this faction in the administration, insofar as it tends to view Israel's interests as coinciding with those of the U.S.:

And finally there is a loose collection of friends of Israel,

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who believe in the identity of interests between the Jewish state and the United States — two democracies that, they say, are both surrounded by foes and both forced to rely on military power to survive. These analysts look at foreign policy

through the lens of one dominant concern: is it good or bad for Israel? Since that nation's founding in 1948, these thinkers have never been in very good odor at the State Department, but now they are well ensconced in the Pentagon, around such strategists as Paul Wolfowitz, Richard Perle and Douglas Feith.

Disconnect

by Bruce Ramsey

The feeling of being isolated, not personally but politically, began for me Sept. 11, 2001, and has grown worse. I had supported George W. Bush, even argued for him in these pages, and held out some hope for his time in power. By late summer 2001 he had just pushed through his cut in income and inheritance taxes, and had continued to support individual accounts within Social Security. I liked that.

On Sept. 11 it was as if someone had gone down into the cellar, retrieved an old war movie, and said, "Attention everybody. Now we're gonna watch this." Pundits noted how George W. Bush was so presidential. Well, he was. He knew what to do.

So did the conservatives. I still shake my head at how the conservatives — not the stupid ones, but the smart ones — joined the parade at the first flag unfurling. They had no doubts about a War on Terror. A police action against al Qaeda I could understand. But a War on Terror? A war on militant Islam? A war to politically reconstruct the Middle East? What the hell?

The conservatives marched away. Their radio talk shows, to which I tuned regularly, are now war, war, war, all the time, and a disgusting mockery of the French as "cheese-eating surrender monkeys."

The left is saying what I am saying if you stop at the first slogan, "No Iraq War." I have one of those signs in my window. But I am not one of them. Never have been.

I focus in and out of the news in a dispirited way. It is daily minutiae of a dull game — votes in the Security Council, what the French said, whether Saddam has violated U.N. resolution something-or-other, what Hans Blix said, blah blah blah. Everything the inspectors find is a reason for war and everything they don't find is a

reason for war. There is no focus on essential questions.

Recently I saw a story about the missiles that Iraq had not given up. The TV showed several of these white-finned cylinders, perhaps two feet in diameter, stacked on the back of a truck. No mention of the range. Three newspaper accounts later, I found their suspected range, 93 miles.

Iraq has missiles that go 93 miles. Well.

Then there is all the talk of "weapons of mass destruction." The announcers no longer say what sort of weapons those are, but I remember they are chemical, biological, and nuclear, and I am cynical about why such radically dissimilar things are put in a common category, and given that particular name. I am skeptical of whether any of them is a threat to me.

I listen to my president and he says he must disarm Iraq to protect the United States. I don't believe him. I didn't believe everything my government said before, but I did, in fact, believe many things it said. Now I find that some of the things Saddam Hussein's government says actually make more sense, and that is not a comforting thought.

I see American troops, young and robust, eating their pouches of hot jambalaya. They are my country's soldiers. I don't want them killed. And yet I don't yearn for their triumphal entry into Baghdad because I don't want them to be in Baghdad. I think of the taking of Seoul by the Marines in 1950, half a century ago, and that American troops are still in Korea, and that their being there is part of a whole other problem that I might be thinking about.

I think of a cold beer.

Sharon and the neoconservatives in the administration not only believe that removal of Hussein will greatly reduce a significant security threat to Israel, but also reportedly would like to see democracy established in Iraq, in an attempt to promote it elsewhere in the Gulf. They believe that, because democracies are less likely to be hostile in their foreign relations than dictatorships are, democratization of Iraq and other Arab states would be beneficial for Israel.

If this view actually carried the day within the administration, then the establishment of democracy in Iraq could be viewed at least as a subsidiary motive for the war policy. But in contrast to the views of the neoconservative faction in the Pentagon, many in the State Department doubt that democracy can be readily established in Iraq or other Middle Eastern countries because the political traditions in those nations are so antagonistic to it. They also believe that, even if conditions allowed for the establishment of democracy, there is a very real risk that militant fundamentalists could win power in democratic elections in most of the Arab states. Lending credence to that fear, Arnaud de Borchgrave has reported that "two highly placed Saudi non-royals" told him that, if free elections were held in Saudi Arabia today, and bin Laden were running for prime minister, he would "win in a landslide."

The State Department view (and the presumed view of Cheney and Rumsfeld) has apparently prevailed, as the Bush administration announced recently that a post-War Iraq would be ruled by a U.S. military government for two years following the war. The plan, reportedly, is to remove the top echelon of the Baath Party leadership of Iraq, while leaving the rest more or less in place under U.S. military rule. In the end, the establishment of democracy in Iraq does not seem to have assumed importance even as a secondary factor underlying U.S. war policy.

3. Preserving American Credibility

Richard Perle and others have stressed that maintenance of U.S. credibility absolutely requires that we wage war if Hussein does not comply with our demands. If the U.S. backs down now, in the face of protests here and in Western Europe, our adversaries will be emboldened, and our allies will no longer regard us as dependable. Likewise, retired General Wesley Clark, who was opposed to the run-up to war with Iraq, now says that we have gone so far in threatening war and moving troops into position that we have to

engage in war to preserve credibility.

This, however, is probably a superfluous factor to those who have supported war from the start for other reasons. Indeed, some commentators have implied that Perle and other advisors may have intended from the beginning to create a situation in which the credibility argument could be convincingly invoked.

Of course, those opponents of war who regard the U.S. as a "rogue superpower" will not be concerned about any damage to U.S. credibility that would result from a pullback of our forces.

4. Politics

The political climate created by Sept. 11 made this war possible. Without Sept. 11, the U.S. almost surely would have continued to address the problem of Saddam with some version of the containment and deterrence measures it had been using since Gulf War I, perhaps combined with

Without Sept. 11, the U.S. almost surely would have continued to address the problem of Saddam with the containment and deterrence measures it had been using since Gulf War I.

some easing of foreign investment prohibitions in Iraq. It is also likely that the ability to fight Gulf War II with an all-volunteer military, as opposed to a draft, has contributed to public support for the war.

Author and political commentator Joe Klein goes further than this, suggesting that one political angle to the war is "the Karl Roveian hope that all those perplexed elderly Jewish Pat Buchanan voters will butterfly over to the Republican column in 2004." Others have suggested that the real Roveian hope is that the war will deflect attention from the administration's failure to capture bin Laden in the year and a half after the president said he would get him "dead or alive," and its failure to address the more urgent situation in Pakistan, where al Qaeda cells are freely operating and, according to some captured al Qaeda fighters, working to develop chemical weapons and rudimentary nuclear devices, and where some 11,000 madrassas are still teaching 750,000 Pakistani boys that "jihad is the noblest of human endeavors." Rove would not be doing his job if he were not considering the political advantages of a second Gulf War, but it is hard to assess the extent to which such considerations may be driving policy.

If Gulf War II is won quickly and with a minimum of casualties on both sides, the divergence between the government's stated reasons for going to war and the real reasons will become less important even to people who are aware that there is a difference. That, in my view, would be unfortunate. A government that deceives the people about something as important as war cannot be trusted to tell the truth during times of peace. □



"You may have already won the war . . ."

Gulf War II

The New Terrorists

by R.W. Bradford

It's a whole new world.

I first became aware of the profound evil of totalitarianism when, as a child, I learned how the Nazis and Communists treated the people they captured. They held their prisoners in secret locations, depriving them of what they were used to and comfortable with: food, sleep, water, knowledge of time, and whether it was day or night.

They played on their prisoners' secret and darkest fears, used physical force against them, made them wear black hoods, held them in "stress" positions for hours on end, gave them "encouragement" to talk by pistol whipping them and even, in some cases, by capturing their children to provide them with an incentive to talk.

Not a pretty picture. Enough to convince me of the perfidy of the Communist and Nazi brutes who terrorized the world only a couple generations ago.

How does it look when the inquisitors are not Communists or Nazis, but contemporary Americans?

Every phrase I've used to describe totalitarian treatment of captives is a direct quotation from a *Wall Street Journal* article titled, "How Do U.S. Interrogators Make a Captured Terrorist Talk?" (March 4). All these tactics are legal, a White House spokesman told the *Journal*, because "al Qaeda prisoners are 'unlawful combatants' who enjoy neither constitutional rights nor the protections of the Geneva Convention, which govern treatments of enemy soldiers."

"The standard for any type of interrogation of somebody in American custody is to be humane and to follow all international laws and accords dealing with this type of subject," Bush spokesman Ari Fleischer said on March 3.

"That is precisely what has been happening and exactly what will happen."

Just what do "international laws and accords" keep a government from doing to a prisoner? Well, there are two things that are prohibited by the UN Convention on Torture: inflicting "severe" pain or suffering or transferring a prisoner to a jurisdiction that inflicts "severe" pain or suffering.

What does this mean in practical terms? "You're just limited by your imagination," explained a person identified by the *Journal* as a "U.S. law enforcement official," because the treaty has no enforcement mechanism.

But there's one other thing the administration won't be able to do: it won't take the prisoners to the U.S. or to "someplace like Spain or Germany or France" or "near a place where he has Miranda rights or the equivalent of them," a "senior federal law-enforcer" told the *Journal*.

But should our forces capture enemies at all? Within the administration, there "has never been any consensus [on whether to kill or capture] because it's such a sticky issue," one Bush administration official told the *Journal*.

Some officials think shooting them down in cold blood is a bad idea. "Look, even if we think it's unlikely [the captive] would talk," an FBI official told the *Journal*, "we don't necessarily know that." But, the *Journal* reported, killing them on sight also has strong support within the administration. Some officials argue that our forces should simply kill terrorists, without making any attempt to capture them, especially if the captives are well-known, because holding them would run the risk that a public outcry would arise to let the prisoner have his day in court.

Although the Bush administration has said that prisoners will eventually be tried by "military tribunals," no tribunals have actually been set up, and officials fear that actually trying the prisoners might bring bad publicity.

The Pentagon has said that the tribunals will be run by three to seven military officers, who will have the power to close the proceedings and withhold evidence from the defendant. The defendant cannot be compelled to testify in court, but the testimony he makes while being questioned — that is, being held in a "stress" position, being denied food and sleep, being beaten ("a little bit of smacky-face," is the way one government interrogator put it), being

blindfolded and reminded that their captors also hold their children and being threatened to be sent to a country where actual "severe" torture can be used to make them talk — is admissible. And the defendant has the right to attorney of his own choice, provided the attorney is a U.S. citizen with a security clearance. And after the detainee is convicted, he has the right to "make a statement" before he is sentenced.

It's a good thing that this is a government of laws, not of men. Only Yahweh knows how we'd treat these prisoners if we were a dictatorship, like Hitler's Germany or Stalin's Russia. □

Bust out the duct tape! — So, U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld created trouble for British Prime Minister Tony Blair — inadvertently or not, who can be expected to tell — by commenting that the U.S. could take Iraq all by itself, with or without British troops. Antiwar Brits pounced on the comment and suggested the British troops already there should come home and study war no more.

It's not that it isn't fun sometimes to hear Don Rumsfeld talk — he's often candid and has less concern about whom he might offend with an occasional indiscreet comment than most boring government officials. But sometimes he might do well to put a sock in it. Or perhaps Tom Ridge can finally find a use for some of that famous duct tape. — Alan W. Bock

Hardly unique — It is almost universally said and believed that the current war is unique in American history, because America is attacking first, instead of responding to attack.

You may regard this as bad or good, but it's not true.

It wasn't a British attack that initiated the War of 1812; it was a decision of the American leadership, led by the so-called War Hawks. It wasn't a German attack that initiated America's entry into World War I; it was a decision by President Wilson. And it wasn't a Spanish attack that initiated the Spanish-American War. Spain was trying to appease the United States, which insisted on going to war.

Don't be misled. History didn't start today.

— Stephen Cox

An oily theory — It's fun to say the war in Iraq (I'll assume it's underway by the time this sees print) is all about oil. While there will almost certainly be beneficiaries of a

war with Iraq that puts the U.S. in charge of the oilfields — and most of the beneficiaries will be U.S. and British companies, with the Russians, Chinese, and French frozen out — going to war for oil is hardly an efficient way to get cheap oil. If we really wanted cheap and abundant supplies the best bet would be to declare peace and open trade. War might redistribute the beneficiaries of oil (at the expense of American taxpayers and American military personnel) but it won't make oil cheaper or more abundant. I suspect the war is really about projecting American power, increasing American influence, protecting Israel, and positioning the United States to go after the next target in the War on Terror. And I find that prospect a lot more chilling, frightening, and potentially destabilizing than a crude scramble for crude that seems to some war opponents the essence of evil.


— Alan W. Bock

Top 10 Reasons to Conquer the World — A number of people who call themselves libertarians are arguing that many benefits will accrue if the United States government attacks Iraq. Prevent future terrorist attacks. Stop the diffusion of weapons of mass destruction. Save the poor Iraqis from a nasty dictator. Make the world safe for democracy. That sort of thing.

I don't know why they stop with just Iraq. Seems to me these people should have the courage of their convictions. The following is a brief list of some of the many benefits that will accrue if the United States government simply takes over the entire world:

1. Stop the threat of Islam easily, by having Congress declare it a cult and ending mosques' tax-exempt status.
2. Eliminates the unpatriotic option of "America: Love It or Leave It."
3. Easier to justify all those American troops around the globe.
4. No more need to suck up to the French.
5. Everyone could benefit from Social Security.
6. How else to pay for prescription drugs for seniors?
7. Current federal budget spread out among all those new taxpayers equals lower taxes!
8. Inspiring words of Emma Lazarus . . . "Give me your poor, your weary, yearning to breath free . . ." achieved automatically.
9. No more foreign wars.
10. Less chance Florida would decide presidential elections.

— Ross Levatter



"His new belly dancer turned out to be from an Iraqi hit squad."

Dismalization

by Timothy Sandefur

We can't abolish slavery or do stem-cell research or have gay marriage because these things treat people as "mere" agents and ignore the "higher" things of social belonging.

About a year ago, I had an after-dinner conversation with a conservative (drunk, of course, as so many conservatives like to be after dinner — *beer good, marijuana bad!*), on the subject of the libertarian view of marriage. We had begun by talking about homosexual marriage, but, as usual, he trotted out the standard and comforting lie that libertarians don't care about moral things. In particular, he was mortified at my speaking of marriage as a type of contract. "You mean, you think marriage is a *contract*?" he asked. "Like when I hire a plumber to fix my toilet?" Of course, he chose the toilet because he wanted to choose something distasteful; one might point out that a contract to pay a heart surgeon to do bypass surgery on you is also a contract, like when you hire a plumber to fix your toilet. (William Blackstone spoke of marriage as a contract, as did Edward Coke. Indeed, it was not until the 11th century that marriage became a sacrament of the Christian church.)

Since then, I have continued to reflect on this "mere contract" notion. It's an incident of something I think I'll call "dismalization." I'm not an economist, but I know enough economics to confuse laymen. I do know that economics is a fascinating science, providing profound insights into both social institutions and the behaviors of individuals. And yet it is often called the "dismal" science. Not long ago, Eugene Volokh pointed out that this term originated in Thomas Carlyle's 1853 pro-slavery pamphlet, *Occasional Discourse on the Nigger Question* (sic):

Truly, my philanthropic friends, Exeter Hall philanthropy [i.e., abolitionism] is wonderful; and the social science — not

a "gay science," but a rueful — which finds the secret of this universe in "supply and demand," and reduces the duty of human governors to that of letting men alone, is also wonderful. Not a "gay science," I should say, like some we have heard of; no, a dreary, desolate and, indeed, quite abject and distressing one; what we might call, by way of eminence, the dismal science. These two, Exeter Hall philanthropy and the Dismal Science, led by any sacred cause of black emancipation, or the like, to fall in love and make a wedding of it — will give birth to progenies and prodigies: dark extensive moon-calves, unnameable abortions, wide-coiled monstrosities, such as the world has not seen hitherto!

Now, consider what this passage is saying. Economics is "dismal" because it treats individuals as "mere" economic agents, rather than recognizing the social bonds that connect these individuals — the social bond, in this instance, being slavery. Slavery is more essentially human, more meaningful, in some visceral, organic, essential sense. An economic interpretation of human behavior, by contrast, is somehow *inhuman* — "atomistic" — ignoring some qualitatively superior principle which "makes us human." This principle is never defined and, indeed, people such as the conservative with whom I was conversing would say it cannot be defined, because it exists on a higher plane than mere social sciences.

Lest it be thought that I exaggerate, consider the following from federal Court of Appeals judge and former mem-

Economics is "dismal" because it treats individuals as "mere" economic agents, rather than recognizing the social bonds that connect these individuals.

ber of Congress Abner Mikva. Asked to write a foreword for a law review symposium on public choice theory, Mikva produced a surprisingly bitter attack on the articles in the symposium. He wrote:

Mathematics has always held a strong allure for many social scientists, whether they be economists, lawyers, or political scientists. There is something so orderly about a discipline that has precise, finite, dependable, predictable answers to almost all of its problems. . . . Despite its seductiveness, however, the postulates of mathematics usually provide only fool's gold for human problems.

I think back on the emotional stimuli that I have experienced in my policymaking days — anger, love, envy, hope, optimism, pessimism, fear, worry, compassion, sternness, a sense of history, despair for tomorrow, and a sense of *déjà vu*. I was not and am not unique. Most policymakers are driven by these emotions in conflict. Because, unlike decisions in the economic sphere, policymaking is not one-dimensional, it cannot be charted on a graph. Until the day when our governmental institutions are run by machines, instead of people, I do not believe theories like those of the public choice model adequately explain the way our government works. Until we start voting for the computer, I will dissent from the public choice advocates.

Put aside the suggestion that perhaps what's wrong with our country is precisely that our politicians make their decisions on the basis of *emotional stimuli*, instead of logic, reason, or science. What's more interesting is that Mikva does not directly attack the economic methodology or the validity of the conclusions. His point is that the very *idea* of describing legislative behavior from the perspective of public choice theory is itself invalid, because it overlooks some human essence. It's wrong because it's demeaning.

A true economist would respond with the (doubtless correct) economic explanation that it is to Mikva's advantage, as a federal judge and a former legislator, to believe his actions are inexplicable from the perspective of public choice theory, which views political conflict as a struggle to take over bureaucracies for self-interested reasons; something Mikva himself would call shabby. But I find it more interesting how his attitude toward economics parallels the criticisms that Stephen Jay Gould frequently leveled against evolutionary psychology. Like Mikva, Gould called Richard Dawkins' theories "reductionistic" and demeaning, and when Dawkins demanded a specific critique of his methods or conclusions, Gould never proffered any: he simply continued shouting "reductionism!" to the end of his life.

I won't suggest an economic explanation for the theme I see in these three things, but a memetic explanation instead

(which would doubtless have irritated Gould). There's an advantage to a meme which can convince its host that it's more noble in some indefinable sense. A meme for "dismalization" benefits from the fact that the explanations of economists and evolutionary theorists are generally made in boring classrooms and libraries, while the romanticization of, for instance, slavery, can take advantage of the rush of adrenalin and vigor of witnessing an event up-close, and so forth — the "blood and iron" factor. Take an example from C.P. Snow's *The Two Cultures*, when he quotes a passage from D.H. Lawrence, who is, in turn, commenting on a passage from Dana's *Two Years Before The Mast*, in which a sailor named Sam is flogged by his captain. Lustily describing Sam's flowing blood, Lawrence concludes, "The Captain has a new relief, a new ease in his authority, and a sore heart. There is a new equilibrium, and a fresh start. The physical intelligence of Sam is restored, the turgidity is relieved from the veins of the Captain. It is a natural form of human coition, interchange. It is good for Sam to be flogged."

Lawrence feels some sort of energetic thrill from the physical savagery of the beating — a sexual thrill, even; he describes it as "coition." I don't mean to say that Lawrence is an inhuman monster; on the contrary, I think everybody feels, to some minor degree, an attraction to certain savage thrills. As Conrad wrote in *Heart of Darkness*, "Yes, it was ugly enough; but if you were man enough you would admit to yourself that there was in you just the faintest trace of a response to the terrible frankness of that noise." Perhaps this attraction really is some vestige of our animal ancestry. I don't know. But I do find it interesting that the appeal to dismalism is usually made in defense of older, traditional, socially-accepted things. One rarely hears the reverse: arguments for *innovation* made on the grounds that the *status quo* is somehow "dismal" while the innovation, whatever it might be, is somehow "more human." Instead, it's usually in defense of old traditions — and almost always, traditions which lack any other conceivable defense — that one hears

Statists denounce dismalism to protect their own vanity and political institutions that lack any valid defense.

the dismalist argument. We can't have gay marriage, because gay marriage treats marriage like a "mere" contract, which is dismal. We can't abolish slavery because it treats people like atomistic individuals, ignoring social connections, which is dismal. We can't have laissez-faire capitalism, or stem-cell research, or just compensation for regulatory takings, because these things treat people as "mere agents," as "isolated individuals," and ignore the "higher things" of social belonging, or the "needs of living in a society," and so on and so forth. Mikva, Gould and the rest use dismalism to preserve the ghost in the machine, either to protect "human dignity," their own vanity, or political institutions that lack any valid defense. □

How to Win the Drug War

by James Gray

The drug war has trampled our liberties, broken up families, and done nothing to stop the flow of illegal drugs. So how can people of good will end this pernicious war?

For more than two decades I was a soldier in the War on Drugs. In the course of my career, I have helped put drug users and dealers in jail; I have presided over the breakup of families; I have followed the laws of my state and have seen their results.

At one point, I held the record for the largest drug prosecution in the Los Angeles area: 75 kilos of heroin, which was and is a lot of narcotics. But today the record is 18 tons. I have prosecuted some people, and later sentenced others, to long terms in prison for drug offenses, and would do so again. But it has not done any good. I have concluded that we would be in much better shape if we could somehow take the profit out of the drug trade. Truly, the drugs are dangerous, but it is the drug money that is turning a disease into a plague.

I saw the heartbreaking results of drug prohibition too many times in my own courtroom. I saw children tempted by adults to become involved in drug trafficking for \$50 in cash, a lot of money to a youngster in the inner city, or almost anywhere else. Once the child's reliability has been established in his roles as a lookout or gofer, he is trusted to sell small amounts of drugs. Of course, that results in greater profits both for the adult dealer and his protégé. The children sell these drugs, not to adults, but to their peers, thus recruiting more children into a life of taking and selling drugs. I saw this repeated again and again. Like others in the court system, I didn't talk about it.

More than once, I saw a single mother who made a big mistake: she chose the wrong boyfriend, a drug dealer. One day, he offered her \$400 to carry a particular package across

town and give it to a fellow dealer. She strongly suspected that it contained drugs, but she needed the money to pay her rent. So she did it. And she was arrested, convicted, and sentenced to five years in prison for the transportation of cocaine. Since the mother legally abandoned her children because she could not take care of them, they all came to me, in juvenile court, to be dealt with as abused and neglected children.

I tell these mothers that unless they are really lucky and have a close personal friend or family member that is both willing and able to take care of their children until they are released from custody, their children will probably be adopted by somebody else. That is usually enough to make a mother hysterical.

Taxpayers shouldn't be very happy, either. Not only does it cost about \$25,000 to keep the mother in prison for the next year; it also costs about \$5,000 per month to keep a child in a group home until adoption. For a family of three, that means that our local government has to spend about \$145,000 of taxpayer money for the first year simply to separate a mother from her children. And it falls upon me to enforce this result. I do it, because I am required by my oath of office to follow the law. But there came a time when I could be quiet about this terrible situation no longer.

I concluded that helping to repeal drug prohibition was the best and most lasting gift I could make to my country.

On April 8, 1992, I held a press conference outside the Courthouse in Santa Ana and recommended that we as a country investigate the possibility of change.

Since that time, I have spoken on this subject as often as possible, consistent with getting my cases tried. Most people listen; some agree, and others still want to punish me for my attempts to have an open and honest discussion of drug policy. I remember a short introduction I received before one of

The major parties will never begin the process of ending the War on Drugs. It takes another party to do that — one that holds dear the principles of liberty.

my talks, which was along the lines of: "I know you all want to hear the latest dope from the courthouse, so here's Judge Gray."

During the next few years, I worked on a book to expose the evil anti-drug crusade. In 2001, my book, *Why Our Drug Laws Have Failed and What We Can Do About It — A Judicial Indictment of the War on Drugs*, was published by Temple University Press. It was the culmination of my experience as a former federal prosecutor with the United States Attorney's Office in Los Angeles, criminal defense attorney in the United States Navy JAG Corps, and a trial judge in Orange County, California since 1983, experience which had long before convinced me that our nation's program of drug prohibition is not simply a failure, but a hopeless failure.

In February, I took another step to end the War on Drugs. After being a Republican for all of my adult life, I registered as a member of the Libertarian Party. I realized that the major parties will never begin the process of ending the War on Drugs. It takes another party to do that — one that holds dear the principles of liberty. I had taken the "World's Smallest Political Quiz," and discovered that I was already a libertarian. I was frustrated and concerned about our country's lack of principled leadership, the direction of our economy, and the continued subversion of the protections of our Bill of Rights. The Libertarian Party is my natural home. And it is the Libertarian Party's historic mission to begin the peace process in the War on Drugs.

Drug prohibition has resulted in a greater loss of civil liberties than anything else in the history of our country. The United States of America leads the world in the incarceration of its people, mostly for non-violent drug offenses. Statistics show that all racial groups use and abuse drugs at basically the same rate, but most of those incarcerated are people of color. The War on Drugs has contributed substantially to the increasing power, bureaucracy, and intrusiveness of government. And, of course, the sale of illicit drugs is by far the largest source of funding for terrorists around the world. If we were truly serious about fighting terrorism, we would kill the "Golden Goose" of terrorism, which is drug prohibition.

It is important to understand that the failure of these laws is not the fault of law enforcement. It makes as much sense to blame the police and the criminal justice system for the fail-

ure of drug prohibition as it would to blame Elliot Ness for the failure of alcohol Prohibition. The tragic results are the fault of the drug laws themselves, and not those who have been assigned the impossible task of enforcing them.

"We the People" are facing radicals at the controls of government who are impervious to the harm they are causing. When the head of the Drug Enforcement Administration expressly flouts the will of the people as expressed, for example, by California's medical marijuana Proposition 215, that is one thing. He is a policeman, enforcing the law as ordered. But what about when the head of the Department of Justice subverts that will? When John Ashcroft, as the United States Attorney General, directly acts against the expressed will of the people in this area, simply because he disagrees with it, he is not being conservative. We should call this action what it is: extremist. And when various officials of the federal government use our tax money actively to oppose state ballot initiatives all around the country, we should call that what it is: illegal.

The Republican and Democratic parties are invested in the drug war, committed to it. If we wait for them to act against drug prohibition, we will be waiting a very long time. However, we Libertarians are singularly in a position to help. I suggest that the Libertarian Party make the issue of the repeal of drug prohibition the centerpiece issue of all state and federal political campaigns for 2004. R. W. Bradford has made a similar argument in speeches over the past several years, and in an article in the December 1999 *Liberty*, and so possibly have others. The idea is not original with me, but it is a good idea.

I understand that, historically, the Libertarian Party has been largely unsuccessful in putting its candidates into office. But that can change, and in many ways the voters are ahead of the politicians on this issue. If we can make it clear that every vote for a state or federal Libertarian candidate represents a vote to end the War on Drugs and we capture only a third of the votes of people who want drug reform, we will get ten percent of the vote. That would be enough to

For more than two decades I have been a soldier in the War on Drugs. I have helped put drug users and dealers in jail; I have presided over the breakup of families; I have followed the laws of my state and have seen their results. But it has not done any good.

make us a political force to be reckoned with and to put the drug war into the nation's political debate.

I want to make this very clear. If we focus our campaign on the drug issue, people who agree with us will not worry about "throwing away their vote" on a third-party candidate. For a change, every vote will be seen to matter.

Many Americans have seen and suffered through the unnecessary harms perpetrated by our failed drug policy.

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Advantage: Hollywood

by Jacques Delacroix

American movies dominate the global marketplace. This is a good thing. Even in France.

At first blush, globalization would seem to be a good thing: it facilitates the spread of literacy, the diffusion of useful technologies, and socio-economic progress. Nevertheless, a large segment of public opinion in this country and, apparently, a larger segment in Europe and certain other countries (such as India), takes a jaundiced view of this globalization, seeing it as a clandestine domination to further "exploitation" of the already poor and weak by the already rich and powerful. I searched far and wide for novel economic damage to the poor of this world, beyond the predictable, localized, transitory dislocation predicted by economic theory. I found none. Instead, I discovered one truly new phenomenon of the past 50 years: the global hegemony of the American cinema.

Hostility to this particular kind of globalization is not new: in 1946, French motion picture workers demonstrated on the Champs-Élysées to protest the dominance of American movies in France. Since then movie theaters have multiplied everywhere in the world, including in poor countries, television has achieved a near-global reach and video-cassettes have proliferated unchecked.

Between 1970 and 1995, according to UNESCO figures, the American share of global motion picture production rose from less than 9 percent to about 45 percent. Of 65 countries reporting for 1995, 1994, and 1993, only four imported more movies from any country than they did from the U.S.: Azerbaijan, Tadzhikistan, Uzbekistan, and Iran. Even Cuba imported more movies from the U.S. than from any other country.

Some 600 to 750 movies are produced in the U.S. every

year, roughly as many as are produced by the 33 European countries together. Only the Chinese, Japanese, and Indian industries are of similar magnitude. Hong Kong and China produced about 450 per year in the mid-'90s. Between 250 and 300 are turned out in Japan each year but they do poorly worldwide, except for animated products. For India, estimates range from a low of 400 to 500 movies per year in the past ten years to a high but probably reliable 800 to 900 between 1991 and 1993. A little fewer than one third of these films are produced in Hindi, the rest in Tamil and other languages.

Although the foreign revenue figures of the Indian movie industry are still modest, of the order of \$250 million per year recently, its products are said to be present in a wide variety of countries, including some beyond the Indian diaspora, such as Japan, Russia, and much of the Middle East (CIO 2002), Indonesia, and even Pakistan (Chatterjee, 2002) as well as in the former Soviet Central Asian republics (UNESCO, 1995:8-1). We all remember that the re-opening of Afghan movie theaters after the rout of the Taliban regime was widely reported by the international press as having been celebrated with Indian movies.

Westerners familiar with them as well as university-educated Indians often treat Hindi-language ("Bollywood") movies dismissively. In the context of the present discussion, this might be a mistake. Although they tend to have childish

plots and to display exaggerated acting, they also feature music, singing, and energetic dancing on a scale not seen in Hollywood since the '40s, often beautiful scenery, and increasingly, satisfying violence. It would not be surprising if this cocktail appealed powerfully to the large segment of the world population that is illiterate or poorly educated (mostly in the Third World). The American cinema's hegemony may soon be challenged from this quarter. (Even as Indian audiences increasingly appreciate American movies.) "Globalization" cuts more than one way.

Approximately 430 to 450 movies were produced in the Philippines in 1994 and 1995. If this is a new and durable trend, the Philippines should be added to this list. In addition, Colombian, Brazilian, and Mexican films might qualify: the made-for-television soap operas shown in many parts of the Third World and in the former Communist countries have hard numbers but they are difficult to come by.

But it is American cinema that dominates global entertainment. People watch American movies wherever it's not forbidden. By contrast, Americans watch few foreign movies. In 2000, the share of European movies shown in the European Union was estimated at 23%, the balance was almost entirely American. Most European pictures don't do well in Europe outside of their national markets. Hence, if an exact count

Those with a knack for turning out or distributing certain goods will supply others, for the benefit of all.

were done of the spread of French movies in the U.K., or of German movies shown in Italy, the numbers would be minuscule. Even when a prosperous and educated country such as France erects devices of economic dissuasion against foreign (read "American") movies, the results are underwhelming: about 60% of all admissions in France are to American movies, fewer than in Germany (about 75%) but about the same as in Sweden.

The massive asymmetry in film exports between the U.S. and the rest of the world may be the result of any number of factors. The fact that foreign movies occasionally do well in the U.S. market — *Life is Beautiful* from Italy and the first Pokémon cartoon from Japan — suggests that public preference, and possibly language barriers, are more likely to be issues than American distribution superiority. Yet, language barriers may be less significant than one would guess. Luc Besson's *Jeanne d'Arc (The Messenger)*, released in 1999, purportedly produced in English to make it accessible, registered 3.07 million admissions in the European Union in that year, against 40 million for *Star Wars Episode 1*. Even *Patch Adams* did better. *The Messenger* flopped so badly in the U.S. that admissions and revenue figures are hard to find. For 1999 also, only one British production and two U.K.-U.S. co-productions, all in English, figure among the top worldwide 50 admission getters. In Belgium where practically the whole population understands French, French-made movies usually obtain less than a 10% market share, against an 80% share for American movies.

The U.S., with its large monolingual population, consistently provides a more munificent environment for the movie industry than does the European Union. The U.S. movie market also grows somewhat faster: from about 1,000 million cinema admissions in the U.S. and about 600 million in the EU in 1987, to about 1,400 and 800, respectively, in 2000.

This is similar to other national specializations. The Italians and the French, who always produced wine for themselves, also provide much of the wine for the rest of the world. Some of their best buyers live in other wine-producing countries such as the U.S., Germany, and Switzerland. This is exactly the situation international trade is supposed to generate. Those with a knack for turning out or distributing certain goods will supply others, for the benefit of all. Note also, that under relatively free trade, it's possible for producers from historically excluded areas to challenge the hegemonists: see the current success of Australian wines in the U.S.

Do Movies Influence?

The belief that movies are potent agents of change, especially with respect to values, is instinctive and widespread. Typical of this unexamined belief is the assertion by one Indian journalist that, "United States-based Indians take their kids to the [Indian] movies to reinforce cultural values. Weak on plot, the movies promote respect for seniors and the benefits of arranged marriages." Yet, there are not many hard facts substantiating the idea that movies or television do anything to people's values or attitudes. Professional students of the cinema tend to be skeptical that they do anything at all.

In *American Audiences on Movies and Movie-Going*, Tom Stempel, a teacher of cinema at Los Angeles City College, has selected 158 people haphazardly (rather than at random) to tell everything they know, remember, and think about movies. The result is a wonderfully live document that shows that a movie's effect depends on the viewer's age, sex, life experience, length of experience as a movie-goer, the largely accidental material and social conditions under which a movie is viewed, and of the company one keeps while viewing it.

Many of Stempel's respondents reminisce on how a particular movie made no impression on them, or a bad impression the first time, while they enjoyed it the second time, or vice versa. Movies often serve as markers of one's personal life, like the Kennedy assassination or the Sept. 11 attack, without having a meaning of their own. Viewers often report that they do not take seriously the movies that made the strongest impression. These include *Star Wars*, *Raiders of the Lost Ark*, *Close Encounters of the Third Kind* and *Jaws*.

This speaks to the issue of "encephalokleptophobia," the fear that the screen is stealing one's mind: viewers don't give much attention even to those movies to which they say they pay attention. The only two examples in the book of movies durably altering attitudes (and even behavior) are *Jaws* and *Psycho*. Several viewers said they ceased enjoying swimming in open waters and even stopped swimming altogether after seeing *Jaws*. A couple said they were afraid in the shower after seeing *Psycho*.

Stempel recounts that, in the 1920s, a morality league, convinced of the evil spread by movies, spent \$200,000 — at least \$2 million in today's dollars, a munificent amount — to have social scientists study the impact of movies, only to be told

that more often than not, movies don't affect attitudes. He also cites several critics, including Charles Champlin of the *Los Angeles Times*, to the effect that movies exist only by the "consent of the entertained," a posture that constitutes the overall conclusion of his book.

There is also striking anecdotal evidence that movies are impotent to alter values. Canadian commentator Michael Adams, writing in *The Globe and Mail*, argues persuasively that twenty years of increasing exposure of Canadians to American movies and television are associated with a strong value divergence between the two neighbors: as Americans became more patriarchal in their outlook, Canadians, including French Canadians, veered more toward egalitarianism in matters of gender.

The strongest evidence that the screen affects people comes from studies of television violence. Beginning as a curious skeptic, two years ago I surveyed the literature, both secular and scholarly, and accept that there may be a relationship to violent behavior. My change of heart was effected by a careful and tentatively exhaustive meta-analysis by Paik and Comstock published in 1994 in *Communication Research*. These scholars pieced together 217 empirical studies done between 1957 and 1990 and relating television viewing with anti-social behavior. They show robust and statistically significant cumulative evidence that exposure to television violence is associated with a propensity to engage in anti-social behavior. However, their meta-analysis is based on studies that are short on hard field measures of violent behavior and also conceptually and methodologically independent from the independent variables, according to the authors' own description. This raises technical issues and poses the question of unintended ideological bias. Moreover, the studies do not take into account that violence-prone individuals may be more likely than others both to commit anti-social acts and to seek violent stimuli.

A 1999 editorial in the usually careful British medical journal *The Lancet* asserts that, contrary to a widespread impres-

Viewers often report that they do not take seriously the movies that made the strongest impression. These include Star Wars, Raiders of the Lost Ark, Close Encounters of the Third Kind and Jaws.

sion, "It is inaccurate to imply that the published work (more than 1,000 scientific studies) strongly indicates a causal link between virtual and actual violence." Scholarly students of the media often point to the same lack of resolution. Thus, in a review of the National Television Violence Study 3, covering the years 1994-1997, Steven Chaffee comments in the *Journal of Communication* that criminal violence is decreasing at the same time as exposure to television violence is increasing.

There are more sophisticated approaches to the issue of movie influence, but they are few and far between, I think. A study by a Native-American sociologist (unfortunately a

small study but sophisticated in design), brings a subtle answer to the question of what movies do to people (Shively, 1992). The author tries to capture how matched groups of whites and Sioux Indians perceive a classic Western movie where the bad guys are Comanche Indians. All subjects enjoy the movie; all say they like Westerns; all respondents, whites and Indians alike, state that they identify with the intended good guys — John Wayne and another white actor. Asked

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why they like who they like however, the whites mostly single out the moral integrity of the characters; the Sioux emphasize in the same proportions the bravery of the same characters; the whites appreciated the intelligence of the characters while the Sioux pay tribute to their toughness. While most of the whites think the movie is a good historical document, none of the Sioux thinks so.

The Virtuous Global Effects of American Motion Pictures Hegemony

If one concedes screen products may generate or encourage violence, one must also accept the possibility that they may affect behavior in socially desirable ways. Thus, Michael Curtin argues in the *Journal of Communication* that satellite television circulates beneficently subversive (i.e., non-traditional) images of femininity. A moving testimony comes from the Albanian novelist Ismail Kadare: during the long night of Albanian communism, in which Albania was the most isolated country on Earth, frequent exposure to garden-variety Western television courtroom dramas ultimately induced among Albanians a distaste for personal blood feuds.

I pose the question: what virtuous influence may American movies have on the rest of the world and in particular on the poor and downtrodden?

Even if movies don't do much directly to alter either values or behavior, they inadvertently carry factual information. American movies are shot mostly in the U.S. and Canada. They are directed mostly by American directors or by Americanized Brits. Although Hollywood is one of the world centers of political correctness and of left-wing piousness, Hollywood films cannot help but convey to global audiences important realities of American life — generic features of life in Western, secular, democratic, capitalist societies. Among these:

- Technological wizardry: from the parting of the Red Sea to *Jurassic Park's* terrifying dinosaurs, the American cinema showcases its mastery of the natural world — even if its immature purposes enrage French intellectuals. Most people in the Third World and in the former socialist countries are farmers, miners, or industrial workers, living in direct contact with production. It's no mystery to them that improve-

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Milk for the Masses

by Michael Dahlen

Why does the government program to provide better nutrition to poor mothers and their kids actually provide inferior nutrition to wealthy mothers and their kids?

Government entitlement programs have earned a reputation for squandering taxpayers' money, fostering dependency, and exacerbating the conditions that they were meant to alleviate.

For two years, I worked as a nutritionist for Women, Infants, and Children (WIC), a government program designed "to safeguard the health of low-income women, infants, and children up to age five who are at nutritional risk by providing nutritious foods to supplement diets, information on healthy eating, and referrals to health care."^{*}

Both women and children are eligible to receive WIC vouchers redeemable at a participating supermarket for milk, cheese, eggs, peanut butter, juice, and cereal. Infants under one year old are eligible to receive vouchers for formula, infant juice, and infant cereal. In Pennsylvania, where I worked, there are two infant formulas that WIC provides: Similac and Isomil. WIC will also provide other formulas but only with a doctor's prescription. The women on the program also receive nutrition counseling and education.

In order to qualify for WIC, individuals must have a nutritional risk and meet income requirements. The nutritional risk requirement is basically meaningless, however, because WIC guidelines define "nutritional risk" so loosely that almost anyone would qualify. For example, if you consume "only" two servings of vegetables a day instead of three, which is the recommended amount, then you are at "nutritional risk" — a qualification that is met by most Americans. In the two years that I worked at WIC, I saw thousands of individuals and every single one of them had a "nutritional risk" as defined by WIC guidelines. It is on the dubious basis that you have to have a "nutritional risk" to qualify for WIC that it is promoted primarily as a nutrition program rather than as the welfare program it is.

The other requirement is that family income must be "at

or below 185 percent of the U.S. Poverty Income Guidelines," based on family size. As of this writing, a family of two, for example, must have a gross income under \$1,841 per month. For a family of four, it must be under about \$2,791 per month. These requirements cover the contiguous 48 states, D.C., Guam, and U.S. territories; Alaska and Hawaii have higher income allowances.

In addition, those receiving Medicaid automatically qualify for WIC regardless of their income. At the clinic where I worked, there were several children on the program whose families were making over \$60,000 per year and even some making over \$100,000 per year. These were cases where the family had a child with some kind of medical condition, disease, or disability that had automatically qualified the child for Medicaid, and which, in turn, automatically qualifies the child for WIC.

In order to determine whether a family meets the income requirements, they are required to show recent pay stubs, child support stubs, SSI stubs, etc. WIC re-certifies its participants every six months. At these re-certifications, WIC has to re-verify every family's income to determine whether they still qualify. If a family's income changes between its re-certifications, they are not required to report it to WIC. In other words, if a family is re-certified today and it meets the income requirements, then it will receive WIC vouchers for the next six months regardless of whether its income rises above WIC requirements during that period.

If someone is self-employed, then he or she is required to

^{*}From the website of Food and Nutritional Service of the Department of Agriculture.

show us last year's income tax return. Let us say hypothetically that a self-employed individual's income for 2002 qualifies his family for WIC. In 2003, his business picks up and his income rises above WIC levels. Even though his income would currently be too high to qualify for WIC, his family

At the clinic where I worked, there were several children on the program whose families were making over \$60,000 per year and even some making over \$100,000 per year.

will be able to stay on WIC for longer than an additional year because WIC will not see his 2003 income tax return until some time in 2004.

People in certain situations can easily qualify for WIC by deception. For example, if two people in a family are working and we ask them to provide proof of their family income, they can easily just show us one individual's pay stub and say that that is their only source of income and WIC would have no way of knowing otherwise.

Welfare and Dependency

The ostensible purpose of government welfare programs is to help poor people get out of poverty, but the people running these programs have a vested interest in creating more poor people and keeping them dependent. More poor people means more people who qualify for welfare, which means more funding for welfare programs. My supervisor's concern was always our "numbers." If this month's caseload increased from last month's, she was happy. A story related by a co-worker illustrates welfare administrators' vested interest in keeping poor people poor.

A few years before I started, the organization that I worked for had an anniversary party. A woman who had been on WIC for years was invited and was paid a special tribute. The organization was celebrating the fact that this woman has been endlessly dependent on government hand-outs! If actually helping poor people were its goal, the organization would celebrate people who got off welfare and became able to make a living for themselves.

Some defenders of welfare programs claim that such programs do not create dependency because no one really wants to be on welfare. Besides, these defenders say, welfare is hardly enough to live on. Two experiences that I had at WIC undermine this argument.

One woman on WIC had recently married the father of her children. Before they married, they had separated for a while before getting back together. She told me that, economically, things are harder for her now than when she was a single mom without any income, even through her husband is working. As a single mom, she was on WIC, cash assistance, food stamps, Medicaid, and other programs that paid for her rent and utilities. She also told me that during that period, since the government basically paid for all her expenses, she was on easy street and did not have a care in the world. Then she stated, "I can see why people fall into the trap and become dependent on the system." Now, thanks to her husband's good job and steady income, she no longer qualifies

for any welfare programs, except WIC.

The second experience of mine involves another woman who came into WIC with her family to be re-certified. As I verified her husband's income, I discovered that he had earned significant overtime pay, which had pushed his family above the income requirements by quite a bit. I told the family that they no longer qualified for WIC because their income was too high. The husband said to me that he had been unaware that we counted overtime pay, but I explained to him that I have to count it if it is on a regular basis. "So what you're telling me is that I shouldn't work overtime," he said. "I shouldn't try to make more money. I shouldn't try to get ahead." In one sense, this guy was exactly right. That is the implicit message government entitlement programs send to their recipients. What incentive is there to work or to work more if you are just going to lose your entitlement benefits? As this guy was leaving my office he said, "I guess I'll quit working overtime."

The Benefits of WIC

When I was an undergraduate majoring in nutrition at Penn State, I was required to take a course in community nutrition. The professor of this class discussed a cost-benefit analysis that had been done for WIC, which concluded that every dollar spent on WIC saves two dollars in medical costs. Unfortunately, I do not know the source of the study or how those figures were arrived at, but I have my doubts as to its validity.

Consider the effect of WIC on breast-feeding. Breast-fed infants generally have a better immune system and get sick less often. One of my duties as a nutritionist for WIC was to promote breast-feeding and to educate pregnant women regarding its benefits. The vast majority of women on WIC, however, decide not to breast-feed. Why? I suspect it is because WIC will pay for formula, but not for breast-feeding. The best way for WIC to achieve its goal of higher breast-feeding rates would be to stop providing formula. But free formula is what attracts most women to WIC in the first place. Without free formula, more low-income mothers

The vast majority of women on WIC, however, decide not to breast-feed. Why? Because WIC will pay for formula, but not for breast-feeding.

would breast-feed out of necessity. More infants would be breast-fed and would therefore be healthier.

This is one reason why I doubt that every dollar spent on WIC saves two dollars in medical costs. In addition, I was able to observe the appalling inefficiency of government welfare programs. Research by economist Thomas Sowell demonstrates that only 30% of all the money devoted to welfare actually gets to its recipients. The other 70% is eaten up in administrative costs. Compare this to private charities such as The Salvation Army where over 80% of the money it receives gets to recipients.

Today, people are less inclined to donate money to private charities aimed at helping poor individuals. They do not have as much money to donate as they otherwise would because of the excessive taxation required to fund government entitle-

ment programs and they think that the government is taking care of the problem. Historical evidence confirms this. Milton Friedman has pointed out that "the heyday of laissez-faire, the middle and late nineteenth century in Britain and the United States, saw an extraordinary proliferation of private eleemosynary organizations and institutions. One of the major costs of the extension of governmental welfare activities has been the corresponding decline in private charitable activities."

If we did not have any government entitlement programs like WIC, more people would donate money to private charities, which are more efficient and effective in helping poor people than the government is. Even if it were true that every dollar spent on WIC saved two dollars in medical costs, the fact is that, if the field were left to private charities, it is very likely that every dollar spent on a private charity would save substantially more than two dollars in medical costs.

What about the benefits of increased nutrition education provided by WIC? Most women on WIC couldn't care less

about the nutrition education that WIC offers. They are on WIC simply to get free food. As a former nutrition educator for WIC, I would estimate that less than 5 percent of the participants I saw had any real interest in the information I was giving them.

WIC fails at every level. It saps productivity from the economy by taking wealth from its producers and putting it into non-productive bureaucratic overhead and by discouraging the productive labor of welfare recipients. It is clear that WIC fails to improve the nutrition of its recipients by offering them quick fixes like free baby formula and Cheerios. Welfare programs like this create a sense of entitlement and foster dependency. They serve to perpetuate a class of people whose most basic needs are increasingly met through government programs, rather than through their own productivity. Such dependents resist self-responsibility out of conditioned habit. People conditioned in this way can be counted on to be concerned with increasing welfare programs, which only reinforces the perniciousness of the welfare system. □

How to Win the Drug War, *from page 34*

And many of these people are organized. By the time this article is published, I will have contacted all the drug policy reform groups I know, such as the Drug Policy Alliance, Families Against Mandatory Minimums, Common Sense for Drug Policy, Families Against Three Strikes, the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana Laws, the Marijuana Policy Project, the Drug Policy Foundations of Texas, Hawaii, and New Mexico. I will call their members to join me and become dues-paying members of the Libertarian Party, and request their friends and family members to do the same.

The people in these groups are frustrated by the absence of a tangible national movement that they can support. In addition, in many ways they have learned through their experiences to share libertarian principles and values. The more people who register Libertarian, the more public attention

will be paid to the issue of drug policy reform. This, in turn, will attract additional members, and additional attention. I think this plan will be successful, because most of the people in these groups are active; they are committed; they vote, and they have friends who vote.

Today, most Americans realize that our country is not in better shape with regard to the use and abuse of drugs and all the harm and misery that accompany them than we were five years ago. They also are beginning to understand that since that is the case, we can have no legitimate expectation of being in better shape next year than we are today unless we change our approach. Accordingly, many of our fellow citizens are beginning to realize that it is okay to discuss this subject.

Whether they know it or not, Americans are looking to the Party of Principle for guidance and leadership. Our slogan in 2004 should be "This Time It Matters." □

Advantage: Hollywood, *from page 37*

ments in living conditions are often earned through technological progress.

- Abundance for ordinary people: in America, regular people own cars and trucks. There is more than enough food for all; even the poor — especially the poor — are obese. Even if they look sloppy, Americans wear clothes of good quality. The blue-collar class lives mostly in individual housing of impressive size and comfort.

I note that the unintentional transmission by movies of glimpses of the prosperity of ordinary Americans precedes by years the invention of the word globalization. I saw James Dean in *Rebel Without a Cause* as a French teenager in the late '50s. I remember experiencing difficulty connecting mentally with the movie because I could not figure out where it was taking place. I understood Los Angeles well enough but I had trouble grasping the fact that the proximate setting was a high school because so many of the boys had cars, a privilege few European adults enjoyed at the time. Once I had grasped the inescapable truth, it nudged my perception of the possible.

- Individual freedom: those houses and automobiles are some of the best supports to personal autonomy ever devised. At the movies, American women commit adultery in vast throngs. Their husbands or lovers may murder them, or they may be punished by fate, but mostly they get off scot-free. They are never beheaded or stoned to death. Homosexuals are often mocked in American movies but the mildness of the mockery suggests that there is no throwing them from tall buildings or toppling heavy walls upon them, as was done in Afghanistan under the Taliban. In crime dramas, poor members of racial minorities who are railroaded by corrupt authorities have a lawyer to defend them in court. Third World revolutionaries may have trouble dealing with this fact.

It seems to me that the most dramatic example of globalization, the worldwide domination of the American cinema, even including its most vulgar emanations, cannot be cited ritualistically as evil. Its ability to shape values is limited, but inasmuch as it does influence them, its unintended message is the possibility that human wants may be satisfied and basic human dignity respected. □

Reviews

Why Orwell Matters, by Christopher Hitchens. Basic Books, 2002, 211 + xii pages.

My Orwell Right or Wrong

David Ramsay Steele

At the end of his book on George Orwell, Christopher Hitchens solemnly intones that "'views' do not really matter," that "it matters not what you think but *how* you think," and that politics is "relatively unimportant." The preceding 210 pages tell a different story: that a person is to be judged chiefly by his opinions and that politics is all-important.

Why Orwell Matters is an advocate's defense of Orwell as a good and great man. The evidence adduced is that Orwell held the same opinions as Hitchens. Hitchens does allow that Orwell sometimes got things wrong, but in these cases Hitchens always enters pleas in mitigation. Hitchens' efforts to minimize the importance of Orwell's objectionable views, or in some cases his inability to see them, paint a misleading picture of Orwell's thinking.

Orwell's Anti-Homosexuality

One way of playing down Orwell's non-Hitchensian views is to attribute them to his unreflective gut feelings. We are to suppose, then, that when Orwell thought things over, he anticipated the Hitchens line of half a century later, but whenever Orwell slid

into heresy, it was because he allowed himself to be swayed by his intense emotions.

Of Orwell's opposition to homosexuality, Hitchens says: "only one of his inherited prejudices — the shudder generated by homosexuality — appears to have resisted the process of self-mastery" (p. 9). Here Hitchens conveys to the reader two surmises which are not corroborated by any recorded utterance of Orwell, and which I believe to be false: that Orwell disapproved of homosexuality because it revolted him physically, and that Orwell made an unsuccessful effort to subdue this gut response.

Orwell harbored no unreasoning, visceral horror of homosexuality and he did not strive to overcome his disapproval of it. The evidence suggests that, if anything, he was less inclined to any such shuddering than most heterosexuals. His descriptions of his encounters with homosexuality are always cool, dispassionate, even sympathetic. His disapproval of homosexuality was rooted in his convictions. He was intellectually and morally opposed to it.

Compare Orwell's opposition to homosexuality with his opposition to inequalities of wealth and income. Both of these standpoints involve an element of moral disapproval, but both

are reasoned and thoughtful, both draw upon an elaborate theoretical structure conveyed by an ideological tradition — in the first case, *fin-de-siècle* preoccupation with degeneracy, in the second, socialism. How apposite would it be to dismiss Orwell's income-equalitarianism, one of the foundations of his socialism, by saying that it was an involuntary shudder, that he could not rid himself of an inherited, unreflective prejudice?

Orwell's anti-homosexual position (definitely not "homophobia," which would suggest irrational fear) flowed naturally from beliefs and values about which he was quite forthcoming, though he never provided a systematic exposition. Orwell held that modern machinery and urbanization were inhuman and degrading. City life was rootless, alienating, and demoralizing. Although there was no going back to the organic rural community which had been shattered by the industrial revolution, any more than there was any going back to religious faith, both losses were sad and wrenching — in this respect, Orwell's outlook is akin to that of Mr. and Mrs. Leavis. Industrial and scientific progress could not be stopped without unacceptable consequences, but were essentially malign.

Orwell was decidedly against birth control as well as feminism and homo-

sexuality.¹ He singled out "philoprogenitiveness" (a high valuation for having children) as one of a handful of essential precepts of any viable society. He believed (as did most intellectuals in the 1940s) that western society was beset by a crisis of declining fertility. He routinely equated decency with masculinity and masculinity with virility and physical toughness. He expressed contempt for people who took aspirin. He did not welcome reductions in the working day or increasing affluence, because more leisure and more comforts were liable to lead to enervating softness and a life of meaningless vacuity. As was remarked by someone who knew him well, his human ideal would have been a big-bodied working-class female raising twelve children.²

Though I cannot unpack all this here³, it forms part of a coherent and cogent worldview, and relates Orwell to the "anti-degenerate" thinking of influential writers like Max Nordau. During the Second World War, Orwell repeatedly insinuated, or more than insinuated, that "pacifists" were homosexuals and therefore cowards. The "nancy poets," Auden and his friends, were a favorite target. Apparently no one ever explained to Orwell that *ad hominem* arguments are generally fallacious, and he often made his point by unfairly questioning the motives of those whose views he was combatting.

Above all else, Orwell was a rhetorician and a propagandist. He doubtless sincerely believed that homosexuals were more inclined to be cowards and therefore more inclined to be politically against war. But he certainly chose this kind of argument because he thought it would work as an instrument of persuasion, and perhaps it did. One remarkable thing, though, is that the "pacifist" views Orwell assailed in this manner were precisely the opinions he had himself held until quite recently, and had enthusiastically propounded for almost a decade.

Among advanced and humane thinkers in Orwell's day, there was still an overwhelming consensus that homosexuality was pathological. This had been the view of Krafft-Ebing and of Freud, for instance. The theory was still popular among intellectuals that the alienation of urban life encouraged

masturbation, which led to various perversions, especially homosexuality. It is not especially surprising that Orwell, who was never one for intellectually striking out on his own, would assimilate this predominant view. At this time, anything perceived as sexual ambivalence was quite commonly taken as a symptom of decadence and disintegration, as witness, among many examples, the figure of Tiresias in *The Waste Land*.

In the mid-1930s Orwell resisted conversion to socialism because he associated it with cranky and degenerate practices, including vegetarianism,

Orwell held that modern machinery and urbanization were inhuman and degrading. City life was rootless, alienating, and demoralizing.

nudism, teetotalism, and sexual abnormality. After he had become a socialist, he saw these associations as a liability to the socialist movement, and therefore saw it as incumbent upon him to fight against them within the left. He perceived middle-class people as more susceptible to crankiness than working men, and went out of his way to emulate what he identified as working-class habits, even to the extent of slurping his tea out of his saucer. Orwell's *machismo* is therefore intimately linked with his worship of the proletariat.

Orwell's Anti-War Phase

Another of Hitchens' techniques is to tell us what Orwell must have been thinking when he arrived at his mistaken views. He reconstructs Orwell's thoughts so as to offer a rationale for Orwell's views which is acceptable to present-day political correctness and to Hitchens, while it may not be the rationale that would have occurred to Orwell. Here's an example:

So hostile was Orwell to conventional patriotism, and so horrified by the cynicism and stupidity of the Conservatives in the face of fascism, that he fell for some time into the belief that 'Britain', as such or as so defined, wasn't worth fighting for. (127)

Notice that Orwell "fell," rather than reasoned his way, into this position. Because Orwell's anti-war standpoint up to August 1939 is an opinion that Hitchens disagrees with, it is implicitly attributed to Orwell's emotional reactions, and these reactions are presented sympathetically. We are invited to admire Orwell's motives and ignore his arguments.

However, this reconstruction of Orwell's motives for being a "pacifist" is not convincing. It is not a report of the reasons given by Orwell, or by the bulk of the left, whose anti-war theories and attitudes Orwell shared. You would hardly guess from Hitchens' remarks here that Orwell observed the growth of anti-fascist pronouncements by Conservatives and viewed them with concern as signs of warlike intentions towards Nazi Germany, or that he condemned the Chamberlain government for its arms build-up.

Orwell's view, prior to his conversion to a pro-war position, was very much in line with the "pacifism" of the left, harking back to the First World War and expecting the next war to be similarly indefensible. If, as Hitchens quite reasonably does, we take Orwell's real career as a writer as starting in October 1928, then for more than half of that career Orwell was a "pacifist." Orwell joined the Independent Labour Party and his anti-war views were quite similar to those of other I.L.P. members; he left the I.L.P. after he began to support the war.

Orwell accepted the common leftist view that "fascism" was nothing other than capitalism with the gloves off, and that going to war would make Britain fascist (or speed up Britain's going fascist, which was probably inevitable in due course) so that no true "war against fascism" was possible. War against fascism, then, could only be a feeble pretext for a war driven on both sides purely by the economic rivalry of capitalist states.

Here, as time and again throughout Hitchens' book, we see Hitchens concealing from his readers (inadvertently, for Hitchens does not quite grasp it himself) that Orwell has a reasoned way of arriving at conclusions Hitchens doesn't like. Orwell, of course, did not think up the reasoning or conclusions for himself, but adopted

both from the leftist discourse of the times, though within the range of views on the left, he selected some positions in preference to others, and then engaged in controversies with fellow leftists.

The Banality of Orwell's Politics

Hitchens praises Orwell for having noted that Catholics tended to be pro-fascist. But it is misleading to present this as though it were an isolated *aperçu*, without mentioning that Orwell was doggedly anti-Catholic. In a letter to a girlfriend he casually dismisses one writer as "a stinking RC,"⁴ though there may be an element of self-mockery here with respect to his own anti-Catholicism, which was notorious among his acquaintances, for earlier in this letter he refers to "my hideous prejudice against your sex, my obsession about R.C.s, etc." Orwell was very much a Protestant atheist; in his youth there had been a vigorous Catholic movement in British letters, against which he reacted strongly; Orwell saw the Catholic Church as an old and still formidable enemy of freedom of thought.

It's perhaps necessary to add, since this seems so strange today, that Orwell lived in a culture where it was unquestionably the done thing to make derogatory or laudatory generaliza-

Orwell was decidedly against birth control as well as feminism and homosexuality. He singled out a high valuation for having children as one of a handful of essential precepts of any viable society.

tions about entire groups of people, however defined, and at the same time minimal good manners to treat individual members of those groups with complete respect, as well as sporting and decent to take individuals as one found them. On a personal level, Orwell was open and considerate to homosexuals, Catholics, and Communists.

Hitchens often gives the impression that Orwell's opinions were exceptional, and occasionally seems to imply that Orwell was almost isolated. This is a popular take but it won't bear examination. In broad outline, Orwell's political views could scarcely have been more commonplace. For the most part, they were the leftist orthodoxy — and that means the intellectuals' orthodoxy — in the 1930s and 1940s. They were mainly the political correctness of his day, just as Hitchens' views are of his. And on the rare points where this characterization might be disputed, Orwell's views were still far from *outré* in that milieu at that time.

Hitchens' primary exhibit is Orwell's attitude to "the three great subjects of the twentieth century . . . imperialism, fascism, and Stalinism" (5). By "imperialism" Hitchens means only the British Empire: he is an enthusiastic supporter of American imperial expansion today. By "Stalinism" he means Communism, his years on the left having left him with the habit of being semantically charitable to Trotskyists. And within "fascism" he loosely includes both National Socialism and Spanish Nationalism. A crucial premise of Hitchens' thesis is that being simultaneously opposed to these three entities was unusual. This is a simple factual error. Thousands of people held these views.

As an example, let's look at Bertrand Russell, probably the most influential writer of the British left in the 1920s and 1930s, someone who knew Orwell and someone from whose opinions on political questions Orwell seldom greatly diverged (though their views on culture and personal fulfillment were quite unlike). Orwell had a short life, so that some of the writers who had influenced him in his youth outlived him — another was George Bernard Shaw.

Russell was an active and outspoken opponent of the British Empire. He was chairman of the India League, pressing for Indian independence. Russell was always a committed opponent of Fascism, Nazism, and the Spanish Nationalist rebels.

Immediately after the Bolshevik seizure of power in Russia in 1917, Russell displayed some general sympathy for the new regime. He then visited

Russia and wrote *The Practice and Theory of Bolshevism* (1920), shocking many by his bitter opposition to Communism (Bolshevism renamed itself "Communism" just around this time). Russell remained resolutely opposed to Communism until Orwell's death and then until at least 1958 (when he began to soften his opposition to the Soviet Union because of his

He routinely equated decency with masculinity and masculinity with virility and physical toughness. He expressed contempt for people who took aspirin.

belief that the extinction of humankind through thermonuclear war had become a serious likelihood).

In the 1930s, both Russell and Orwell were at first opposed to the looming war with Germany, both were classed as "pacifists," and both switched at around the same time to support for the war. Russell wrote the anti-war book *Which Way to Peace?* (1936), while Orwell wrote an anti-war pamphlet that was not printed and has not survived, though we can figure out much of what it must have said by scattered remarks he made at the time. As Hitchens notes, Orwell also tried to persuade his friends to form an illegal underground group to sabotage the war effort.

Orwell reports that he changed his view about the war as the result of a dream, on August 22, 1939, twelve days before the outbreak of war. Hitchens' statement that Orwell became pro-war when "the war itself was well under way" (127) is thus inaccurate, though it is true that Orwell's new position did not become widely known until after the war had begun. Russell is on record as having switched to support of the war by early 1940. He explained his change of position in a long letter to the *New York Times* in February 1941,⁵ in which he dated his re-appraisal to the Munich agreement, and especially to Hitler's subsequent breach of that agreement by occupying

the whole of Czechoslovakia.

Most leftists at the beginning of the 1930s were anti-war (or, as they were loosely called, "pacifists").⁶ Some remained against the war, but many, including Russell and Orwell, switched to support for a war against Hitler. I mention this to emphasize that in case Hitchens wants to take support for the British war effort as evidence of anti-Naziism, Orwell was a late convert to support for the war effort (as Hitchens, of course, fully acknowledges), and in this respect was a fairly ordinary leftist intellectual of the period. Though there isn't space to document it here, Russell's commitment to all three of Hitchens' correctness tests was more resolute, more unswerving than Orwell's. At times, for instance, Orwell wobbled on the issue of Indian independence, asserting that it was not really practicable (just a few years before it became a reality).

Goodbye to the Empire

Aside from Russell's views, there is much wider evidence for the broad opposition to the empire, to Naziism and Fascism, and to Communism. The tide of leftwing support for dismantling the empire was so strong that the Labour Party, following its landslide election victory in 1945, was able to rush through independence for Burma and India.

After all, what was at stake? There had long been a widespread view within British politics that the empire

for foreign policy, and more self-government would no doubt have arrived even under Churchill.

During the war, the Indian Congress, under Gandhi's inspiration, opposed the war and took the position that the Japanese or Germans would be no worse as rulers than the British. Britain therefore suspended the Congress and imposed martial law in India, an important piece on the strategic chessboard. Though critical of martial law, Orwell (again, like Russell) was not in favor of giving India independence while the war was going on, a position that flowed automatically from his support for the war effort.

Orwell believed that the empire was "a money racket," that Britain benefitted economically from exploitation of the colonies, and that decolonization would necessarily bring about a sharp drop in British living standards. Orwell, writes Hitchens approvingly, "never let his readers forget that they lived off an empire of overseas exploitation, writing at one point that, try as Hitler might, he could not reduce the German people to the abject status of Indian coolies" (44). Orwell might be forgiven for overlooking, in the heat of the moment, that the Indian coolies' status was abject before the British arrived, after which it became less abject, but what to make of Hitchens, all these years later, holding aloft this daft remark as if it were a penetrating observation?

The abandonment of the empire coincided with the beginning of the most rapid rise in British living standards ever experienced. Taken overall, the empire was probably a net drain on British resources. Certainly, there is no clear indication that the British people as a whole suffered economically from giving up the empire.

The Left Loves Orwell

Orwell wrote for leftwing intellectuals, they were his intended audience, and he strained to make his opinions acceptable to them. He was adroit at trimming his utterances to gain maximum acceptability by the left. When, in his final years, he suddenly attained literary fame, he acquired a much larger audience. And this was embarrassing, like one of those Hollywood comedies where someone whispering to an intimate acquaintance discovers too late

that the public address system has been switched on, and his words are being carried to everyone in town.

Hitchens reproduces some choice examples of leftist hostility to Orwell. Any Communist Party member or fellow-traveller, and any orthodox Trotskyist defender of the Soviet Union as a progressive workers' state, was bound to regard Orwell as a bitter enemy. Hence the nasty attacks by Raymond Williams, E.P. Thompson, and Isaac Deutscher, which Hitchens deftly dissects. It is rather surprising that Hitchens doesn't similarly excerpt some of the feminist examples of anti-Orwell diatribe, among which Daphne Patai's is, though sometimes unfair, often quite perceptive.⁸

It is easily confirmable that the bulk of books and articles on Orwell are both leftist in political orientation and very well-disposed towards Orwell. The left has all along been predominantly pro-Orwell. The most common view among leftists is that Orwell is the property of the left, and that it is therefore outrageous if a rightwinger cites Orwell in opposition to totalitarianism. If you start researching Orwell, you soon lose count of the times you have read about the sacrilege of the John Birch Society in using "1984" as a telephone number.

A particularly crude example of the most prevalent leftist view is *Orwell for Beginners*.⁹ The *For Beginners* series is a set of socialist tracts, in the form of easy introductions to modern thinkers illustrated with cartoons. *Orwell for Beginners* is one of the most inaccurate and amateurish of this commercially successful series; it exemplifies the conventional opinion that anyone who mentions Orwell in criticizing socialism is doing something unconscionable, because, to a leftist, Orwell is "one of ours."

Hitchens refers to "the intellectuals of the 1930s" (56) as though most of them were pro-Communist. He mentions Orwell's "innumerable contemporaries, whose defections from Communism were later to furnish spectacular confessions and memoirs" (59). Hitchens is not alone in exaggerating the importance of Communist influence in the 1930s. The notion that most British intellectuals were bowled over by Communism is an inflated leg-

Orwell repeatedly insinuated, or more than insinuated, that "pacifists" were homosexuals and therefore cowards.

was a net drain on Britain's resources and would better be abandoned.⁷ The majority of those in favor of holding onto the empire accepted that the colonies would gradually acquire more self-government until they achieved "dominion status," the stage reached by countries like Canada and Australia. India in the 1930s was already largely self-governing, except

end.

There were those very few intellectuals, like Maurice Dobb and Maurice Cornforth, who remained Communists throughout. There were those promising young intellectuals like Christopher Caudwell who became Communists and died fighting for Communism in Spain. Whether they would have remained Communists for long had they survived a few more years is not certain. I doubt it. There

He went out of his way to emulate what he identified as working-class habits, even to the extent of slurping tea out of his saucer.

were those who enjoyed whirlwind romances with Communism, like Auden and Spender, and who could never furnish spectacular confessions and memoirs because they had nothing spectacular to recall or confess. There were some who left the Party or never joined it but remained devout fellow-travellers. There were some *sui generis* cases, like J.B.S. Haldane, whose wife left him and wrote an informative book that may be considered a slightly spectacular confession and memoir, and who himself faded away without actually breaking with the Communists, or John Strachey, a non-C.P. member who preached the Communist line with great eloquence for a few years, then put it all behind him to seek a career as a Labour politician. Then there were the broad ranks of the left, who may have had spasms of sympathy for Communism now and then, but who were not to be dislodged from support for the Labour Party or the I.L.P., both essentially anti-Communist organizations.

The rarity of the individuals who conformed to the pattern described by Hitchens is illustrated by the fact that Richard Crossman couldn't find a single convincing British example of a former Communist intellectual turned anti-Communist for the landmark volume, *The God that Failed*, and not wishing to go to press without one British specimen, had to make do with

Stephen Spender.

The lack of any such examples did not arise because large numbers of intellectuals joined the Communist Party and never left it. It arose because very few joined the Communist Party at all, and nearly all of those who did left quickly before they could get up to any skulduggery worth memorializing. My guess would be that prior to 1941 more British intellectuals joined the I.L.P. than joined the C.P.G.B. And, it goes without saying, far more joined the Labour Party than either of those. The gigantic Labour Party, with a membership of millions, operated a rigorous and active policy of excluding all members of the Communist Party or any of its front organizations.

To say all this is not to belittle the effectiveness of the Communist Party of Great Britain. It had an extraordinary impact on British political and intellectual life, *given that it was always such a small group of people with so little popular support.*

It might be contended that the real influence of the Communist Party was not in its membership but in the spread of pro-Communist ideas among non-C.P. members. But first, this too can easily be exaggerated. Much of it was akin to Western admiration for Japan in the 1970s. It did not mean that the admirers wanted to do the bidding of the admirees.

Second, Orwell was not as implacable an anti-Communist as is often supposed. *The Road to Wigan Pier*, for instance, has some cracks against the Communists and some compliments to them. It comes down in support of their line *du jour*, the Popular Front, and it dismisses resolutions "against Fascism and Communism" with "i.e. against rats and rat poison,"¹⁰ a remark as idiotically pro-Communist as anything in *Les communistes et le paix*.

But Stink He Does

After Orwell's *Road to Wigan Pier* came out in 1937, Orwell was twitted by Communists, who gleefully quoted his scandalous slander against the English workers: that they smelled. Orwell branded this a "lie" and persuaded his publisher Victor Gollancz to make a fuss about it.

Hitchens indignantly denies that Orwell wrote the sentence, "The working classes smell." Hitchens vouchsafes

that this would be a "damning" sentence, a "statement of combined snobbery and heresy." All his hormones of outrage firing, Hitchens rushes to poor Orwell's defense: Orwell "only says that middle-class people, such as his own immediate forebears, were convinced that the working classes smelled" (46). According to Hitchens, to accuse Orwell of saying that the workers smelled is a "simple — or at any rate a simple-minded — confusion of categories," and he refers readers to *The Road to Wigan Pier*, where what Orwell says about the odiferous working classes can be "checked and consulted."

A pity, then, that Hitchens did not take a minute or two to check or consult it. Orwell broaches the topic of proletarian smelliness by stating that in his childhood "four frightful words" were "bandied about quite freely. The words were: *the lower classes smell.*"¹¹ So far this is consistent with Hitchens' reading, and must have been where

Orwell reports that he changed his view about the war as the result of a dream, on August 22, 1939, ten days before the outbreak of war.

Hitchens stopped. Orwell now pursues this theme for three pages.

At first he does not strongly commit himself on the factual issue of proletarian redolence, though he does imply that the comparative uncleanness of navvies, tramps, and even domestic servants is a matter of observation. He quotes from a Somerset Maugham travel book: "I do not blame the working man because he stinks, but stink he does. It makes social intercourse difficult to persons of sensitive nostril." Then Orwell confronts the inevitable factual question:

Meanwhile, do the "lower classes" smell? Of course, as a whole, they are dirtier than the upper classes. They are bound to be, considering the circumstances in which they live, for even at this late date less than half the houses in England have bath-

rooms. Besides, the habit of washing yourself all over every day is a very recent one in Europe, and the working classes are generally more conservative than the bourgeoisie. . . . It is a pity that those who idealize the working class so often think it necessary to praise every working-class characteristic and therefore to pretend that it is meritorious in itself. (121)

The "meanwhile" indicates that though Orwell feels he can't evade answering the question, he wants to put it in its unimportant place, as an aside to his main argument. He avoids answering it directly or literally, while making his meaning quite clear: the smelliness of the lower classes is not a false belief held by the upper classes, but a fact.

A little later Orwell mentions the notion "that working-class people are dirty from choice and not from necessity," again accepting that they are dirty while trying to leave that point in peripheral vision. "Actually, people who have access to a bath will generally use it" (122). He has already told us that most households don't have bathtubs, which means that the great majority of working-class people don't have baths in their homes. Earlier, Orwell has closely identified being dirty with smelling (119–120), so there is no room to interpret him as accepting the griminess of the lower orders without also acknowledging the olfactory corollary.

We see then, that despite some references by Orwell to the middle-class belief that the lower classes smell, worded almost as though this belief were in itself wrong, Orwell ultimately does not flinch from the objective fact that the English working classes of 1936 are dirtier than their social superiors like himself, and that they therefore smell — though it's not their fault. This is not an invention of Orwell's detractors, as Hitchens heatedly asseverates, but Orwell's very own opinion. And Orwell's opinion on this point is correct.

As an English working-class child in the 1950s, when things were a lot better than 20 years before, I can recall that, though most homes by then had bathtubs, it was out of the question to pay for hot water to be available all the time. The water was heated for the

occasion, and when it was bath night, once a week at most, barely enough was heated for one bath per person; this meant that if the depth of water in the tub exceeded about two inches, it would get uncomfortably cold. (Showers did not become common among the English working class until the 1960s.) You didn't wash your hair as often as you had a bath (so the shoulders of jackets and coats were always greasy, as therefore were places like chairbacks that they frequently touched), and you "could not afford" (the opportunity cost was too high, because of your low income) to change your socks, underwear, or shirt every day. Clothes had to be washed by the housewife, by hand, in a sink, with soap flakes and then hung on a line, every Monday unless it rained, to dry in the wind. Wearing the same clothes for many days or weeks at a stretch is probably more conducive to a noticeable smell than not bathing.

After *The Road to Wigan Pier* appeared, Orwell must have kicked himself for having given the Communists such an easy way to ridicule and discredit him. He blustered, not quite honestly, parsing his written words, trying to make something of the fact that he had never literally said "the lower classes smell," except in attributing these words to middle-class snobs. Yet Orwell had unmistakably intimated that the working classes

Orwell does not flinch from the objective fact that the English working classes of 1936 are dirtier than their social superiors like himself, and that they therefore smell — though it's not their fault.

smelled, and it is both careless and pointless of Hitchens to maintain otherwise.

I've Got a Little List

In 1945 the Labour Party swept to power in Britain, with a landslide electoral victory. Orwell saw himself as a supporter of this government, though

he speedily became disappointed in it.

The British Foreign Office had a covert section known as the Information Research Department, concerned to counteract Communist propaganda. George Orwell supplied this department with a list of names, annotated with comments mainly on their possible Communist connections, but also their sexual habits, their characters, their ethnic backgrounds, and their political soundness generally.¹² Orwell, it now seems to some, was a McCarthyite before McCarthy.

This is a sensitive matter for Hitchens. He has an unbroken record of detestation for "McCarthyism" recently speaking out in condemnation, yet again, of Elia Kazan's cooperation with HUAC in naming old Communist associates, which led to the interminable vilification of Kazan by Hollywood and the mainstream media. Hitchens has also been labelled "Snitchens" by Democratic Party faithfuls, because he gave testimony to Congress corroborating the fact that Sidney Blumenthal had been spreading dirt about Monica Lewinsky at the behest of his boss, the Arkansas Rapist.

Here Hitchens tries to show that there is a great gulf between what Orwell did and what McCarthyites did, but he is not very convincing.¹³ He draws various distinctions, some of which are questionable, while others are quite genuine, though they don't gainsay a certain family resemblance between the two endeavors.

"A blacklist is a roster of names maintained by those with the power to affect hiring and firing," says Hitchens. Why would Hitchens say this, except to imply that Orwell's list was not truly a "blacklist"? Yet Hitchens quotes Orwell as writing that "If it [the listing of "unreliables" by the I.R.D.] had been done earlier it would have stopped people like Peter Smollett worming their way into important propaganda jobs where they were probably able to do us a lot of harm."¹⁴ So Orwell's intention was that his list should be used as (or as part of) a blacklist, to stop suspected Communists from being hired.

In another attempt at exculpating Orwell by legalistic definition, Hitchens says that "a 'snitch' or stool pigeon is rightly defined as someone

who betrays friends or colleagues in the hope of plea-bargaining or otherwise of gaining advantage" (166). Does

Nineteen Eighty-Four made many a Westerner feel like committing suicide and many a Communist subject feel like not committing suicide (because someone outside hell understood what hell was like).

this mean that the same behavior for motives other than "advantage," such as sincere concern about the Communist threat, would grant immunity from these labels? Many like Kazan who told the truth about their involvement with the Communists to the F.B.I. or to HUAC did it as a matter of conscience. And as for the fact that Orwell did not personally know most on the list, Hitchens surely needs to do more work on this angle. Can it be right to report to the authorities one's suspicions of a stranger's Communist sympathies, intending that this will hurt his employment chances, and simultaneously wrong to report one's definite knowledge of a friend's Communist Party membership?

On the *Daily Telegraph's* reference to "Thought Police" in this connection, Hitchens protests that "the Information Research Department was unconnected to any 'Thought Police'." Must conservative newspapers be subject to a ban on the most elementary use of metaphor? Compiling secret government files on the ideological outlooks of people who have broken no law but are suspected of holding certain opinions is surely one aspect of the phenomenon satirized in Orwell's Thought Police.

My point is not that Orwell should not have given this list to the I.R.D., though perhaps he shouldn't, but that Hitchens should be more understanding of "McCarthyism", a term now most often used for activities with which McCarthy himself was not connected. Many of the elements now collectively referred to as "McCarthyism"

were wrong, and there were some horrible injustices. But, contrary to most conventional accounts, there actually was a Communist conspiracy; it was no hallucination. When it is known that the Communist Party is under the control of Moscow and its members are used for conspiratorial work such as espionage and disinformation, should it be out of the question to deny sensitive government posts to Communists? That's what Orwell and Tail-Gunner Joe wanted to do, and I think both of them had a good general case.

There is also a suggestion in Hitchens' account that Orwell and Celia Kirwan, his old flame at the I.R.D., were doing this anti-Communist chore for democratic socialism, which renders it more virtuous. It would surely be hard for Hitchens to argue that democratic non-socialists ought not to be entitled to do anything to combat Communism that democratic socialists are entitled to do. Furthermore, since most Labour voters were not "socialists" even in a very broad sense, there would be something not very democratic about employing a secret government agency for disseminating democratic socialism.

Hitchens is now a militant supporter of Bush's war against what Hitchens calls "theocratic terrorism," though its next step is apparently to terrorize a lot of non-terrorists in secularist Iraq. Any threat posed to Americans by Islamic terrorism today is paltry by comparison with the Communist threat of the 1940s and 1950s. The current "War on Terror" is committing more injustices than were ever committed by "McCarthyism," though the victims this time do not include well-connected academics, bureaucrats, or movie stars. Far from complaining about these injustices, Hitchens smacks his lips at Bush's magnificent "ruthlessness." Hitchens has yet to get his ducks in a row on the question of when it is right to give information to the government.

My own view is that while you shouldn't give the government the time of day on a matter of drugs, pornography, insider trading, or illegal immigration, when it comes to murder, rape, or being a member of the Communist Party and therefore *ipso*

facto a Soviet agent, under the conditions of fifty years ago, you may sometimes, according to the precise circumstances, be morally obliged to cooperate with a government body by telling it what you know. Whereas "McCarthyism" was mainly concerned with people who lied about their past deeds in behalf of a specific organization, Orwell's list was mainly concerned with people's ideological sympathies whether or not these had resulted in illegal acts. This aspect of the comparison surely does not favor Orwell.

Why Orwell Matters, Really

Orwell matters because he was a great writer. Orwell's social and political views are interesting, as are those of Samuel Johnson and Jonathan Swift, but they are most interesting for their nuances and their precise expression rather than for their gross anatomy, which was unexceptional and sometimes fashionably silly.

Orwell wrote two novels worth reading, *Burmese Days* and *Coming Up for Air*. He wrote a wonderful little allegory, *Animal Farm*. He wrote by far the most powerful of all dystopian stories, *Nineteen Eighty-Four*, which made many a Westerner feel like committing suicide and many a Communist subject feel like not committing suicide (because someone outside hell understood what hell was like). He wrote excellent accounts of his own experiences, somewhere between investigative journalism and sociological participant observation.

That's quite a lot for an individual who died at forty-six. Yet there is something of greater weight than all of these put together: the numerous short pieces, the essays, and reviews he turned out rapid-fire, week by week, mainly to put bread on the table. Although Orwell was not an original theoretician, and his ideas, broadly characterized, were all off-the-shelf, he had a superb gift for formulating them sharply, so that their implications appeared fresh and unexpected. These writings sparkle with polemical virtuosity; they throb with life.¹⁵ They will make entertaining reading for centuries to come. □

Notes on page 53.

Does Education Matter? Myths about Education and Economic Growth, by Alison Wolf. Penguin Books, 2002, 332 pages.

The Economics of Education

Stephen Berry

Policy makers of the Right and Left may differ over many things, but of one thing they are certain. Education — and here more seems to mean better — will be the key to success in the knowledge-based economies of the future. As a report to the British Parliament recently put it, "Learning is the key to prosperity. Investment in human capital will be the foundation of success in the twenty-first century." And there is scarce a dissenter to this in the Western World. Whether we look at Europe, North America, Australasia or Japan, the trend in recent decades is inexorably in the same direction. Expenditure on education is increasing, the number of teachers is growing relentlessly and, in many countries, the percentage of students who enjoy the benefits of college education exceeds 50 percent within their particular age group. The United Kingdom which, along with Japan, once practiced a highly selective system to govern entrance to university now sends more than a third of 18 year olds to college. Even the indomitable Swiss finally have cracked. With a strong tradition of apprenticeship, Switzerland fought a valiant rearguard action against the worldwide trend, but now has 15 percent of school graduates registering for university attendance — almost double the level of five years ago.

What could a doubting Thomas say who believed that the expansion of

universities in the West had taken on a political life of its own, that perhaps governments had got it wrong here, too? Until recently he had to hide his head below the parapet, but now all this may be changing. Alison Wolf, a professor of education at the University of London, has written a book which questions many of the assumptions behind the great education expansion and has injected a little iron into the soul of lonely skeptics such as myself.

We should be clear on what the arguments in this debate turn. The more educated do indeed tend to earn more than their less educated compatriots and the economists of education

When employers hire graduates, might they just be looking for a method of ascertaining the ability of a particular candidate, not looking for particular skills?

even go so far as to correlate extra years at college with increments in income. But Professor Wolf wants to critically examine whether it was the time at college which made these high-earning people skilled. She also wishes to question whether if everyone had the same education as the high earners, they would have the same incomes and whether continual additions to the

time spent at college will automatically add to GDP. Even the idea that education and economic success will be closely linked in the globalized 21st century is put under the microscope. It may be just as likely, she maintains, that we have over-educated workforces as that we need more graduates for the hi-tech future.

No one doubts that in the modern world "having the right qualifications in the right subjects from the right institutions" matters. Whichever country you look at, the educated not only earn more, but they are also less likely to be out of work. But when employers hire graduates, might they just be looking for a method of ascertaining the ability of a particular candidate, not looking for particular skills? Wolf maintains that the answer to this question is yes. Education has become a socially acceptable method of ranking people. The better educated on the whole tend to be smarter and work harder, and hiring by credentials is convenient, legal, and unlikely to lead to trouble. The billions of public money poured into education may have, from the economic point of view, resulted in a rather expensive method of job filtering.

Employers are definitely looking for the most able people they can find. How long you stay on at school is closely related to how well you do at school, and years of education are correlated to general intelligence. In addition, years in education are a good indicator of motivation, perseverance, and organizational abilities, all desirable qualities for the employer. If one indicator of educational success, such as a degree or an American high-school diploma encapsulates a whole package of cognitive and personality measures, the employer will be happy.

Suppose, Professor Wolf says, "that everyone left school for good at the age of 15, or even twelve, instead of the modern habit of staying on longer and longer. Suppose too that, before leaving, everyone took some exams which provided a clear ranking of population. How much less productive would the economy, and most of these people, then be?" (p. 30) One might be even more radical and question whether in the scenario outlined by Professor Wolf, with the billions spent

on education returned to the taxpayers to spend as they wish, the economy might in fact be more productive.

Economists who attempt to calculate the economic benefits from education employ a number of concepts. The first is the so-called "private rate of return" to education. This calculates the income people get from education after allowing for both the direct expense of education and any income they may have foregone whilst undergoing education. It involves thinking of education spending as an investment and calculating what percentage return an individual will get for his or her education. The private returns can be described as benefits to individuals who receive the education.

The "social returns" aim to take into account the costs and benefits of education to society as a whole. Economists work out how much

income is received by the educated as a result of their education and what sort of return this offers on the total amount spent, rather than the amount spent by the educated themselves. Most economists are agreed that the social returns, though considerably lower than the private returns, make education a good deal for the public. The Dearing Committee of Inquiry into Higher Education (1997) in the U.K. maintained that since the late 1960s, "the long run social return [to higher education] . . . has run at about seven to nine percent."

But I believe there is a spurious objectivity here. It is indeed possible to obtain figures for lifetime incomes, link these earnings to years spent at school, and compute the costs of schooling in terms of private and public expenditures. It is further possible to calculate a rate of return which will relate the

expenditures to lifetime income differentials. We may even then compare this rate of return to that obtained from non-human capital. But to establish the cause and effect relationship, to show that the income differential is the result of more education, is a rather different 64 thousand dollar question. A close correlation has been found between intelligence and years at schooling and a further correlation between the wealth of parents and the length of schooling of their children. In order to be effective, the rate of return calculations for education have to separate out and quantify such factors as these which might also explain income differentials. I do not believe that this has been done and indeed doubt if it is possible.

There are further problems with income calculations which Professor Wolf alludes to. The concern with wage levels can mislead on the relationship between education and economic growth. An important condition for economic prosperity is a legal system which enforces contracts, and a legal system means lawyers — a conclusion you can't avoid, try how you might. But one should be wary of linking lawyers' salaries too closely with economic growth. The number of lawyers and the salaries they are paid might also have something to do with the volume of law and regulation in a particular society. To assume that because lawyers are well paid we should send even more people to law school to improve growth may lead to results the very opposite of which we wish.

Countries which in the last half-century embraced central planning of the economy also tended to believe in a rapid expansion of the educational sector. UNESCO was being true to form when in 1972 it talked about "a close relationship between educational planning . . . and national overall plans for economic and social development" (40). The upshot of these policies was to generate a plethora of expensively educated bureaucrats and low growth rates. But a rate of return analysis for these people would have shown them (and the economy) benefitting from education when compared with their uneducated fellow citizens. One doubts if the average peasant farmer in

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the Third World would have been too impressed with such an analysis, and might well have pointed out that it is just as possible for more education to mean less growth. The dubious benefits from expanding the number of lawyers and bureaucrats causes Professor Wolf at one point to wryly remark, "On the contrary: it is no more self-evident that, since some education makes some of us rich, more would make more of us richer than it is that 'two aspirin good' means 'five aspirin better'" (28).

If it is difficult to ascertain the importance of education for economic growth by looking at evidence within one country, can we do better by comparing the experience of different countries? Here too, the experience is inconclusive. In 1980 Egypt was the 47th poorest country in the world in terms of per capita GDP. Fifteen years later it was the 48th poorest, though in the meantime the educational sector had expanded considerably. Just about the only thing that Egypt has in common with South Korea of late is that they have both expanded their education sectors. During the last 30 years, South Korea also took care to expand its economy. Although in 1979 it had a smaller proportion of its young people

Switzerland is one of the richest developed countries in the world but the number of young people enrolled at Swiss universities is still way below the average.

in university than Egypt, by 1993 that proportion was much higher. You can be South Korea, enjoy high economic growth and increase the educational sector or be like Egypt, fail economically and still expand education somewhat.

Predictably, it is South Korea which is one of the favorite examples of development economists who wish to make the case for increased spending on education. But there are plenty of examples which run counter to their mantra. The Hong Kong education sys-

tem did not have the central direction and planning of either Korea or Singapore — indeed many of the Hong Kong workforce were illiterate peasants who had fled across the border from China. Yet the Hong Kong economic growth rate over the last 50 years stands comparison with any country's. Switzerland is one of the richest developed countries in the world but its educational arrangements are a cantonal, not a national affair, and the number of young people enrolled at Swiss universities is still way below the average in the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development. The evidence of different countries across the world might just as well show that economic growth results in education rather than education causing economic growth.

Professor Wolf refers to two American economists, Mark Bils and Peter Klenow, who offer an interesting test of this idea. The main argument of the advocates of education expansion is that education increases productivity and therefore the educated have higher wages. It is typically the case that as workers become more experienced and build up skills, they will earn more. This is the so-called "experience premium." As we have seen, in many countries the length of time spent in education has increased for most young workers. Bils and Klenow therefore point out that if the additional education has improved productivity both in the short term (workers have less to learn when they start work) and long term (workers learn faster and more effectively), wage statistics should register the fact. We should expect the "experience premium" to decline over time. Highly educated young workers should get paid more on entry to a job than previous generations did, but accumulate less of an "experience premium" because they have less to learn. Moreover, those countries with the most rapidly narrowing premiums should grow the fastest as they benefit from the increasing number of well-educated young workers.

Bils and Klenow were not able to detect any such trend and the size of the "experience premium" seemed to bear little relationship to the growth

rates of different countries. They were, however, able to detect the phenomenon of the fast-growing economy encouraging and generating further schooling. And well they might. If education provides the certificates which are the recognized and legitimate route to economic success, children will want more of them, especially when they come with a hefty contribution of taxpayers' money.

But maybe the skepticism I have outlined above is ancient history and

If education provides the certificates which are the recognized and legitimate route to economic success, children will want more of them, especially when they come with a hefty contribution of taxpayers' money.

everything is different now? In the new economies of the 21st century, skills and flexibility are all and only education can deliver growth in the new "knowledge economy." "Western economies have moved from manufacturing goods to manufacturing ideas" — or so the purveyors of this turgid jargon would have us believe. What really will be the occupational structure of the new economies of the 21st century?

The "it's all different now brigade" are right to point out that certain jobs such as that of the coal miner have all but disappeared across much of the advanced world, but wrong if they imply that all the new jobs will be ones requiring high degrees of skill. Professional and managerial jobs may have increased in number, but skilled and semi-skilled manual work has correspondingly declined. And have no doubt about it, low-skilled jobs still exist by the millions. Two of the fastest growing jobs of the last decades were "care assistant" in nursing homes and hospitals and answering the phone in call centers. As long as we continue to live in houses and apartments, travel to work, and shop for a rich and varied

array of goods, rest assured that there will still be jobs for people who clean streets and offices, operate supermarket checkouts, pack and deliver boxes, and sort out the plumbing.

There are many reasons why people who do these kind of jobs might benefit from becoming acquainted with the novels of the Brontë sisters or starting a course in the Italian language, but none of them have anything to do with the education for growth arguments peddled by modern policy makers. As Professor Wolf dryly notes, "I find it difficult to construct a convincing argument that more . . . degrees are needed so that people will be educated enough to stack shelves, swipe credit cards, or operate a cappuccino machine effectively." In fact, it's probable that over-education (in the sense that people have developed skills which are not being used) is the norm throughout much of the Western world. In the U.K., some economists have pointed out that large numbers of jobs demand qualifications from their holders which were not required in the past. Increasing the number of people with formal qualifications means that employers can insist on an applicant having more education and view with suspicion anyone without qualifications. The result is quite simply that jobs which once went to people who left school at 16 or 18 now go only to applicants who have degrees. Education has become a race where everybody is running faster and longer but, lo and behold, it is still true that only ten percent of people can finish in the top ten percent.

In this review I have concentrated on the criticisms of the "education means growth" section of Professor Wolf's book as I regard these as her most important and valuable contribution. Before I conclude, I should mention that she covers much more ground in her general discussion of the position of mass education in the modern world. She laments the fact that the increase in student numbers has reduced the average quality of university education and produced the famous "dumbing down" effect. Yet, it's a racing certainty that, if you have increased numbers of students going on to further education, the courses will have to be made palatable and

passable for the majority of students. Otherwise you will have even more people dropping out of college, and in some countries this number has already reached eye-popping proportions.

Professor Wolf points out that the efforts to expand the number of graduates has gone hand-in-hand with government financial stringency to make the entire enterprise feasible. She further maintains that there is an egalitarian thrust to the grand project and this has resulted in the elite universities being squeezed. I must part company with her here. Many of the best universities across the Western world have a growing private income and benefit from considerable donations by their rich alumni. The main sufferers from the large expansion of the education

system over the last 50 years are located outside — not inside — the education sector. The late Peter Bauer noted that foreign aid was largely the transfer of resources from the poor of the First World to the rich of the Third World. The present education system is in fact the transfer of resources from the poor of the First World to the rich of the First World.

I will not end on a discordant note. That someone who works within the academic field of education should question the economic value of education speaks for a certain courage. That Alison Wolf should have done this in a book which is well argued and entertainingly written is better still. This book is a wake-up call to education policy makers the world over. □

Propaganda for War: How the United States Was Conditioned to Fight the Great War of 1914-1918, by Stewart Halsey Ross. McFarland & Co. Inc., 1996, 341 pages.

Propaganda for War

Bruce Ramsey

How did America get itself into World War I? The proximate reason is that German submarines were sinking American cargo ships, which was outrageous and intolerable. But where were the merchant ships going? To Britain. Had they gone to Germany, they would have been sunk by the British.

For the first three years of war, the United States stood aside, neutral in form but "distinctly non-neutral in spirit," writes military historian Stewart Halsey Ross. His book, *Propaganda for War*, describes how Americans were talked into fighting their first war in Europe.

I looked up this book after having read his more recent work, *Strategic Bombing by the United States in World*

War II, which I reviewed for last month's *Liberty* ("U.S. Terror Tactics in WWII"), which had turned a critical eye on American war policy. So does this book. At times it is slow going — Ross is not a sprightly writer — but it describes a piece of history with obvious application to what's happening today.

Like the wars that came after it, World War I was sold as a moral cause — a crusade against absolutism, barbarism, and the "Hun." The British argued that if Germany won in Europe, it would cross the Atlantic and attack the United States. This was far-fetched, but people believed it. The British also argued, writes Ross, "that there could be no negotiated peace with Germany short of total Allied victory, and that England, France, and Russia were, in fact, fighting America's

war. Once the United States was actively a belligerent, the nation's public opinion would be directed to accept nothing less than 'unconditional surrender.'"

Ross tells how Britain set up a propaganda office and went to work grinding out atrocity stories. In Belgium, German soldiers were said to bayonet babies, to nail men to the sides of buildings, and to ravish women and cut off their breasts as a mark of conquest. We have heard such stories in our own time — of Iraqis unplugging incubators in Kuwaiti hospitals, for instance. But today we are more skeptical and are more able to verify stories of this sort. Eighty-five years ago it was easier to maintain a lie, and, Ross says, that's just what the British did. So did the Germans, but their propaganda, he writes, was "never on the scale nor of the consistently high quality of the British effort."

German propaganda was passed on in the German-language press in the United States, which was extensive then. This won some support among German-Americans. But the English-language press was much more extensive, and it was overwhelmingly pro-British. "One month into the war,

In Belgium, German soldiers were said to bayonet babies, to nail men to the sides of buildings, and to ravish women and cut off their breasts as a mark of conquest.

nearly every newspaper in English in the United States was editorially parroting England's propaganda line," writes Ross. He quotes libertarian journalist Gareth Garrett, then an editorial writer at the *New York Times*, about his own newspaper, while it officially claimed to be neutral: "You can't prove it on any one day," Garrett wrote in his journal. "It is the continuing effect that comes from having day after day unconsciously accepted the *Times* appraisal of news values..."

In May 1915, a U-boat sank the *Lusitania*, a British-flag liner sailing

from New York to Liverpool. The Germans claimed that it had been carrying munitions, which it had, but the action also killed more than 1,200 civilians including 128 Americans. Passengers on *Lusitania* had been warned by the Germans, including the famous ad that the German Embassy placed in the New York papers. But they had not been warned on that last day by the British admiralty, who knew where the subs had been operating and that the subs would target the munition laden-ship.

Ross speculates, as does historian Diana Preston in her 2002 history, *The Lusitania*, that First Sea Lord Winston Churchill deliberately kept the *Lusitania* in the dark. "A major diplomatic objective of the British was to bring America into the war; purposefully putting the *Lusitania* into maximum jeopardy would have served that strategic objective," Ross writes. He offers some circumstantial evidence of that, as did Preston, but claims it as a

possibility, not a fact.

How would the U.S. government react to the sinking? The secretary of state, William Jennings Bryan, had been given the job because he had helped Wilson get the Democratic Party's nomination. He was a genuine neutral and he knew the ship was car-

A major diplomatic objective of the British was to bring America into the war; purposefully putting the Lusitania into maximum jeopardy served that strategic objective.

rying munitions. He wanted a measured response, but he never had much say about Wilson's foreign policy. Wilson, the former college professor,

Notes on Contributors

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Stephen Berry has written numerous articles for libertarian and chess magazines.

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David Ramsay Steele is the author of *From Marx to Mises*.

responded belligerently to Germany, virtually demanding the end of submarine warfare. Bryan tendered his resignation and was replaced by Robert Lansing, who supported the Allies' war effort.

So did many in the State Department. The U.S. Ambassador in London, Walter Hines Page, wrote to Wilson that the war "is a world-clash of systems of government, a struggle for the extermination of English civilization or of Prussian autocracy. . . . It is a matter of life and death for English-speaking civilization."

There arose a movement of "preparedness," which was mixed with portents of war. Its leaders were Maj. Gen. Leonard Wood and President Theodore Roosevelt. The old Rough Rider "yearned to be in the seat of power," Ross writes, and by the summer of 1915 "was in full cry." Liberal journalist Walter Lippmann denounced the war party for "its unconcern about law, its radical jingoism, its exaltation of the federal government as supreme, its attacks on civil liberties."

Also in the summer of 1915, J.P. Morgan & Co., the Wall Street finan-

ciers who had bailed out the U.S. Treasury in 1895 and 1907, undertook to bail out the British Empire. It did something the American government would not do, but which Wilson heartily approved: it raised loans for Britain in the United States. By April 1917, American bankers had lent the Allies more than \$2.1 billion gold dollars — loans that paid for the cargoes carried by the merchant ships.

Still America was not in the war. In 1916, Wilson ran for re-election on the slogan, "With honor, he kept us out of war." He had, sort of, and after the *Lusitania*, Wilson had intimidated Germany into stopping its sinking of U.S. merchant ships. But the submarine was Germany's most effective weapon, and Germany's loosening of the noose around Britain did not mean any loosening of the British blockade of Germany. Early in 1917 German war leaders decided to sink everything going to Britain and take their chances with the Americans. In April 1917, that decision brought America into the war.

Then the propaganda became official. George Creel, a journalist of little renown, was named head of the government's new Committee on Public

Information. His job was "to convince a lukewarm population that the nation was engaged in a life-and-death struggle against the forces of darkness," Ross writes. "For the first time in United States history, a government organization not only 'conditioned' all important news originating in Washington, but totally controlled it."

The social and political effect of war was another story, from censorship to the banning of beer and brothels and the renaming of everything German. The government seized the railroads, jacked up the brand-new income tax, drafted men and threw war resisters in jail. Freedom of speech was gone.

Americans allowed their liberties to be curtailed not only because they were now at war, but also because they had been conditioned by three years of propaganda. They had become partisan in thought, outraged at the acts of one side and not the other, and more and more accepting of a not-really-neutral position. When the war ended, more than 100,000 American men had died in a conflict that was none of their business and which served no valid American interest. □

My Orwell, Right or Wrong, from page 47

Notes

1. Orwell himself was sterile. He and his wife adopted a son, whom Orwell devotedly cared for after her death.
2. Most of the above views are clearly propounded in Chapter 11 of *The Road to Wigan Pier*.
3. See my forthcoming book, *Orwell Your Orwell: An Ideological Study* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 2004).
4. *Complete Works*, Volume 10, p. 268.
5. Reprinted in Ray Perkins Jr., ed., *Yours Faithfully, Bertrand Russell: A Lifelong Fight for Peace, Justice, and Truth in Letters to the Editor* (Chicago: Open Court, 2002), pp. 177–182.
6. This term was commonly used to include those who were not strictly pacifists.
7. See for example Peter Cain, ed., *Empire and Imperialism: The Debate of the 1870s* (South Bend: St. Augustine's Press, 1999).
8. *The Orwell Mystique: A Study in Male*

- Ideology* (Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984).
9. David Smith and Michael Mosher, *Orwell for Beginners* (Writers and Readers, 1984).
10. *Road to Wigan Pier* (London: Penguin, 1989 [1937]), p. 206.
11. *Orwell, The Road to Wigan Pier* p. 119. Orwell's italics.
12. George Orwell, *Complete Works*, Volume 20, pp. 240–259. Unfortunately Secker and Warburg have not handled the *Complete Works* happily. The hard-bound edition is available only as a set at a monstrous price. Volumes 1–9 are Orwell's nine book-length works. Volumes 10–20 comprise all of Orwell's other output, arranged chronologically. These last eleven volumes, but not the first nine, have been released in paperback, with no volume number or series title on the cover or title page. None of them can be bought

in a regular way from bookstores in the U.S., though they can be purchased from British suppliers online. They are usually listed by title, with no indication that they belong to the Collected Works. Volume 20 has the title *Our Job Is to Make Life Worth Living*, 1949–50.

13. With the air of one setting the facts straight, Hitchens declaims that the "existence" of Orwell's list "was not 'revealed' in 1996." But no one has ever suggested that it was. The fact that Orwell had passed on this list to a covert government agency was revealed in 1996.

14. Hitchens, p. 163; Orwell, *Complete Works*, Volume 20, p. 103.

15. The essays are now available in one 1,400-page volume: George Orwell, *Essays* (Knopf, 2000). Also invaluable are the four volumes of *The Collected Essays, Journalism, and Letters of George Orwell* (Godine, 2000 [1968]).

San Diego

Curious news from the frontlines in the War on Drugs, reported by the *Seattle Times*:

Two Tijuana businessmen purchased a Nissan Pathfinder at auction from the U.S. Customs Service. When they attempted to cross the border with the truck, Customs discovered 37 pounds of marijuana in a hidden compartment that they had missed earlier. The businessmen were arrested, convicted, and sentenced to a year in prison.

United States

Aramis Laboratories offers a cure for the beer belly:

"Ab Rescue Body Sculpting Gel is an advanced thermogenic formula that tones, tightens, and enhances ab definition. After 8 weeks, when used with your fitness program, your skin will improve by 20% in tightness, 24% in firmness and 38% in tone. Men's Fragrance. \$30."

Houston, Tex.

Sad news for gourmets in the Lone Star State, reported by the *Houston Chronicle*:

Students at Rice University have discovered that the tiny bits of polyunsaturated fatty acids created by cooking meat — barbecue — contribute to Texas' smog problem. Fine particles may be subject to increased regulation if it is found that metropolitan areas do not meet federal air quality standards.

China

Setback in the struggle for natural foods, from the *Straits Times*:

China's health ministry banned the sale of human breast milk after revelations that a restaurant was serving dishes cooked with the milk from rural mothers.

United States

A small victory for personal privacy, from the *Philadelphia Inquirer*:

Several of the nation's leading medical schools have announced that they will abandon their decades-old practice of letting students perform pelvic exams on women without their consent while they are under anesthesia.

Tacoma, Wash.

Sign posted on receptacles inside restroom stalls at the Tacoma Main Public Library:

"For the Safety of our Patrons:
Please place needles and other sharp objects here."

Oslo, Norway

A new variety of esthetic experience, reported by the *Houston Chronicle*:

A flying sheep's head hit a concert goer and fractured his skull at a concert of the metal band Mayhem.

New Delhi, India

Hot air forces parliament to overturn budget proposal as found by the *Seattle Post-Intelligencer*.

Upset by a budget proposal to raise the price of fertilizer, lawmakers in India's lower house of parliament shouted their opposition for four hours. The proposal was overturned.

Healdsburg, Calif.

A athlete reveals how he managed to become a champion without the use of steroids, reported by the Associated Press:

"Whenever you see a tense muscle, they're going rock," said Jeff Johnson, the world champion at Paper, Scissors, and Rock. "If they look relaxed, it's going to be paper."

New Athens, Ill.

Impressive specimen of innovative American entrepreneurship, from the *Chicago Tribune*:

Paul Kinsella of New Athens has launched "Afterlife Telegrams," a service which enlists terminally ill volunteers to promise to deliver memorized messages in the hereafter to the dearly departed of your choice.

Springfield, Mass.

Dispatch from the frontlines in the war between church and mega-store, as reported by the *Concord Monitor*:

Kimberly Coutier has filed a lawsuit against Costco Wholesale Corp., after being fired for refusing to remove her eyebrow ring. Miss Coutier says that she belongs to the Church of Body Modification and wore her eyebrow ring and other piercings as a sign of her faith.

Denmark

Curious activity of Scandinavian Boy Scouts, from the *Anchorage Daily News*:

A Danish scout group acknowledged that it "may have crossed the line" by organizing a game of tag in which adults pretending to be Nazis chased children dressed as Jews around a phony concentration camp.

Europe

Advance in the depravity of dairy products, from *Wine & Spirits Magazine*:


Unilever, an English-Dutch company, has unveiled seven new varieties of its Magnum ice cream, each taking as its namesake one of the deadly sins: avarice, sloth, envy, lust, gluttony, pride, and wrath. "Lust" is vanilla ice-cream covered with a layer of strawberry chocolate; "gluttony" is dark chocolate ice cream with a white chocolate topping.

Alabama

Motto on store receipts of Alabama's state-owned liquor stores:

"GOD BLESS AMERICA
It's the LAW!"

Terra Incognita



Applying the principles of liberty:


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The transition from a Soviet slave colony to a market economy in the Baltic States is one of the world's best-kept secrets. Indeed, Estonia has been rated #4 in the world for economic freedoms – and the other Baltic states (Latvia and Lithuania) are hot on their heels. At their present rate they may soon surpass the United States in the freedom index.

You can be a witness to this remarkable transition and process of discovery by attending and participating in ISIL's 23rd World Conference in Vilnius this July (6 to 11th).



Trakai Castle, Lithuania (14th - 15th century)

and returns to Vilnius at approximately 6:00 PM on the 14th of July. Price is a bargain at only \$549. (shared). It includes travel, hotel accommodations, meals and admission to all attractions.

Periodic updates on the conference will be posted on the ISIL website: <http://www.isil.org>. Or you can get them by signing up for the FREE FMNews, published by Free-Market.net (now a division of ISIL). Or you can write ISIL at the address below for printed materials.

A Stellar Speaker Lineup

Andrei Illarionov (Russia) – chief economic advisor to Russian president Vladimir Putin.

Mart Laar (Estonia) – past Prime Minister of Estonia.

Yuri Maltsev – former advisor to Russian president Mikhail Gorbachev – now teaching Austrian economics in the US.

Jaroslav Romanchuk VP of the official opposition party in Belarus and CEO of a free-market think tank in Minsk. A long-time Objectivist, he introduced Andrei Illarionov to the Russian version of Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* (a project launched with the help of ISIL in 1992).

Other speakers in our kaleidoscope of movement luminaries, include:

- Dean Ahmad (USA)
- Alphonse Crespo, M.D. (Switzerland)
- Algirdas Degutis (Lithuania)
- Louis James (Free-Market.net CEO)
- Elena Leontjeva (Lithuania)
- Christian Michel (Switzerland/England)
- Prof. Jan Narveson (Canada)
- Mary Ruwart (USA)

- Ken Schoolland (USA)
- Remigijus Simasius (Lithuania)
- Doug den Uyl (USA)
- Ramunas Vilpisauskas (Lithuania)
- Plus many more to be announced.

Also included in the conference package is an evening concert at Trakai Castle (see photo above), a visit to "Stalin World" (a theme park chronicling the horrors of communism); an opening reception (July 6), and a closing gala banquet (July 10). Checkout is in the morning of July 11th.

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We've put together an exciting Lithuanian post-conference tour package for you. It will include tours of ancient castles, baroque churches, attractions like the KGB Museum, the Museum of War and the Museum of Devils. There will be tours of the old towns in Kaunas, the resort town of Klaipėda and much more.

This tour leaves from the conference hotel on the morning of the 11th

This conference is hosted by the Lithuanian Free Market Institute and co-sponsored by the Libertarian International (www.libertarian.to) and the Libertarian Alliance-UK (www.libertarian.co.uk)

Registration is only \$599US (shared accommodation) or \$749US (single). This low fee includes all sessions and workshops, most meals, and accommodations in modern facilities, a day of touring (including a visit to Stalin World), plus an opening reception and gala closing banquet.

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