

Liberty

The Road to Colonialism in Somalia

February 1993

Vol. 6, No. 3

\$4.00

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by Wendy McElroy

Perot's 200-Proof Populism

by Bill Kauffman

Bill Clinton, Accidental President

by Chester Alan Arthur

The Agony of Malcolm X

by Jesse Walker

The New Civic Religion

by R. W. Bradford

Eastern Dystopia, Western Myopia

by Ronald F. Lipp

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February 1993

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Letters

Mantle of Non-Science

Jane Shaw's review of the universally used textbook, *Environmental Science* by G. Tyler Miller, Jr., finds alarm in its misuse of science ("Nonsense and Non-science," September 1992). At my state's flagship institution of higher education, the University of Colorado, Boulder, the academic department called Environmental, Population, and Organismic Biology sports two professors teaching Global Ecology and Introduction to Environmental Science. The former believes that we are inevitably running out of resources (both biological and economic); the latter believes that population growth is the root of all threats to the planet's ecology.

Students in their classes are of a piece: ardent, pessimistic, true believers. When the problem of old growth forest cutting is met with the suggestion, "Well, why not buy them? Like the Nature Conservancy does . . . ?" An indignant, hopeless reply comes, "There's no money."

The enemies of truth and freedom are a powerful, well-entrenched orthodoxy. Is there any hope for enlightenment? Only a very few, older, world weary class members appeared clueful enough to be skeptical of the biologist's self-interested jeremiad; other younger students cried out over Julian Simon's works, "He's just lying!" Denial seems to aid true belief, ensconced by the mantle of science.

T. J. Olson
Boulder, Colo.

Storm Solution

As a survivor of Hurricane Camille (1969), I agree with almost all of R. W. Bradford's commentary ("Just say 'No' to hurricane victims?" November

1992) on the politics of hurricanes. But I also believe that he missed the most important issue from the standpoint of both liberty and human suffering which was the failure of building codes.

Hurricanes do damage three ways: Storm surge, tornadoes, and gusting wind. The first two will destroy or severely damage most residential structures no matter how well constructed. However most properly built homes should suffer *no structural damage* from sustained winds alone. This was exactly the experience of the Mississippi Gulf Coast during the 220 mph winds of Hurricane Camille.

The majority of the severe damage in south Florida was due to poorly built homes, *in spite of the building codes*. Some will say that more government is the answer. But a simpler and cheaper answer is available, the *private* building inspector. Today, most of these inspectors work for prospective home buyers but could just as easily inspect a home during construction and certify the structure (based on practical, rather than politically compromised, construction standards.)

This would be cheaper for the average home buyer/builder than more bureaucracy or the services of a high-skill, high-priced architect. The inspectors would be policed by the same methods as other professions (trade associations and public reputation). Additionally, banks and insurance companies could make loans and policies contingent on a building certification from a qualified inspector.

Had such an approach been used in south Florida and Hawaii, the taxpayers, the insurance companies, the banks and most of those who lost their homes would have all been far better off.

Jim Ober
Baton Rouge, La.

Irrelevant Criterion

Grant Kuhns (Letter, November 1992) claims I had suggested, in an earlier *Liberty* letter, that "it is illogical to assume that the prohibition of abortion would give rise to a bootleg abortion industry."

On the contrary. I am quite *sure* that

were abortion to be made illegal again, a "bootleg" abortion industry would arise. The point I was attempting to make in my earlier letter — apparently unsuccessfully — is that this is no reason per se not to make abortion illegal, just as the fact that some murders take place anyway, is no reason not to make murder illegal.

Adrian Day
Annapolis, Md.

Facing the Universe

I happened to be rereading Aldous Huxley's *The Doors of Perception*, and was struck by a passage: "To be shaken out of the ruts of ordinary perception, to be shown for a few timeless hours the outer and inner world, not as they appear to an animal obsessed with survival or a human being obsessed with words and notions, but as they are apprehended, directly and unconditionally, by Mind at Large." And I was reminded of James Ostrowski's recent article ("War on Drugs, War on Progress," September 1992).

Ostrowski is quite correct to identify the ultimate motive of the "war on drugs" as religious in nature, an attempt to suppress an entire worldview that psychoactive drugs allow. The reason that the government wants to suppress these drugs is *not* because they are harmful, but because they have *positive* applications. Psychoactive drugs allow states of consciousness which, if widespread, would mean an end to the power and privileges of the gang that currently dominates our country. Who could take a George Bush, Bill Clinton, or a Ross Perot seriously once he/she has looked into the face of the universe?

This is also why religion hawkers like Jerry Falwell have joined the crusade against drugs. Obviously, if the average person can have a metaphysical experience without turning over ten percent of their income to the Moral Majority then the religious racketeers are out of a job!

This is also why the proponents of drug legalization have fallen flat. They continually argue on grounds of the drug warrior's choosing. What is needed is a public position which propagates the use of psychoactive drugs as a means to enhance mankind's under-

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Letters Policy

We invite readers to comment on articles that have appeared in *Liberty*. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity. All letters are assumed to be intended for publication unless otherwise stated. Succinct, typewritten letters are preferred. Please include your phone number so that we can verify your identity.



Un- common policy sense.

What Has Government Done to Our Health Care? by Terree P. Wasley. The crisis in health care is the result of a long history of government meddling in the medical marketplace. In a variety of ways the state has limited the supply of and overstimulated demand for medical services. Wasley's prescription for reversing the ills of the system is to give consumers the power to control their own health care spending. 1992/160 pp./\$19.95 cloth/\$10.95 paper

A Search for Enemies: America's Alliances after the Cold War by Ted Galen Carpenter. The passing of the Cold War is the most important development of the late 20th century. Yet Washington clings tenaciously to a host of obsolete, expensive military alliances, including NATO, that have the potential to embroil the United States in conflicts unrelated to its vital interests. Carpenter proposes withdrawal from those entangling alliances and a policy of nonintervention. 1992/212 pp./\$22.95 cloth/\$12.95 paper

Liberating Schools: Education in the Inner City edited by David Boaz. America's most innovative education analysts take a good look at American schools—especially those in the inner city—and offer proposals for major structural reform. The book, which includes the editor's thorough critique of the public school system, presents a compelling case for choice in education. 1991/220 pp./\$25.95 cloth/\$13.95 paper

Quagmire: America in the Middle East by Leon T. Hadar. The author challenges the Washington foreign policy consensus, which demands that the United States remain the dominant power in the Middle East. After examining American policy through the Persian Gulf War and arguing that the United States cannot impose order in the region, Hadar concludes that it is time for America to disengage from the Middle East and adopt a policy of benign neglect. 1992/240 pp./\$23.95 cloth/\$13.95 paper

Patient Power: Solving America's Health Care Crisis by John C. Goodman and Gerald L. Musgrave. The price of health care and insurance is skyrocketing because few people spend their own money on medical services. The authors' innovative solution is to restore power and responsibility to consumers by allowing them to buy their own tax-free medical insurance and to set up tax-free medical savings accounts. The result would be a consumer-directed system of competition and innovation. 1992/550 pp./\$29.95 cloth/\$19.95 paper

Sound and Fury: The Science and Politics of Global Warming by Patrick J. Michaels. The author, an environmental scientist, writes that despite the current hype and science-by-press-release, the greenhouse effect poses no serious threat to the world we know. The most disturbing finding of his study, however, is the willingness of some to distort science to expand the government's control over our lives. 1992/208 pp./\$21.95 cloth/\$11.95 paper

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standing of the universe. How could the government compete with that? If the government wants a religious war on drugs then it is time for the reformation.

Joseph Miranda
Northridge, Calif.

Voting "No" on Criticism

Just about every article about the Libertarian Party in the past year has been dripping with negativity, pessimism, and even a little hostility. I like controversy, and even criticism — but I like *positive, empowering* criticism, not something which makes me feel depressed! I worry about the new LP members who will be deluged with this

negativity. Will they give up in their struggle for liberty before it has even started? While I realize that *Liberty* is not the *LP News* could you write some positive articles for a change?

Mark Sulkowski
Buffalo, N.Y.

Shoot to Kill

Why is the most venomous letter-writing in *Liberty* usually directed at those who criticize the Libertarian Party? It's as though when someone challenges The Party — as in Orwell's *1984* — the orders are to shoot to kill.

The LP's primary goal is to attain political power. But isn't it much more honest to advocate liberty through the

power of ideas and persuasion rather than by force?

Scott Garfinkel
Brookline, Mass.

Voting "Yes" on Criticism

I especially enjoyed your collective critical analysis of the Libertarian Party presidential candidate Andre Marrou and how he relies on knee-jerk one-line slogans and has the charisma of a real estate salesman.

I'd rather vote for Russell Means any day.

John Elmer
Minneapolis, Minn.

Another Dissatisfied Customer

I debated about wasting a stamp on you, but you publish interesting and enlightening articles. Sadly, you'll never see another dime of money from me until you lose your catty preoccupation with Rand and Libertarian Party bashing. I don't need to pay for something I can see for free on "Geraldo."

Gary N. Graziano
Oroton, N.Y.

Christianity and Libertarianism . . . continued

As I understand Jan Narveson's criticism ("Libertarianism, Christianity, and Other Religions," November 1992) of my article, "Libertarians and Christians in a Hostile World" (July 1992), he is making two different arguments.

The first is to criticize religious faith per se. For instance, he asserts that a belief in a moral code promulgated by a supernatural creator is illogical, but in my view, at least, belief in a created order is as logical an explanation of the world as the contention that everything developed accidentally and haphazardly. Professor Narveson and others may not be convinced of the former case, of course, but that doesn't mean it is contrary to logic.

Narveson continues this tack by questioning the validity of sacred scripture as a basis for Jewish and Christian morality. Obviously one's conclusion as to the authority and validity of the Law and the Prophets, the Bible, and the Koran will largely determine one's belief in the authority and validity of the respective faiths. There are logical reasons to believe in the truthfulness of Scripture, though obviously many people disagree. Moreover, practical experience suggests a divine purpose in the traditional Jewish and Christian moral codes, that, for instance, the prescription that sex remain within the marriage covenant reflects the largest created order. In short, while pleasure may indeed be achieved in other ways, there

are terrible (and increasingly deadly) consequences of violating such norms.

In his second line of argument, Narveson contends that a libertarian can be a Christian only so long as he believes that God is a libertarian, that is, does not believe in using force on human beings. Yet the fundamental question is factual, not philosophical: is there a supreme being, and if so, has He revealed himself? My answer on both counts is *yes*. The fact that God himself is "coercive," i.e., will eventually enforce his moral law, does not mean that to believe in him is contrary to libertarianism. I also believe in gravity, which consists of force (it pulls people against their wills down cliffs, for instance), but that belief makes me no less of a libertarian.

Only if I believe that God demands that I be the enforcer, and *use the state* for that purpose, could I not call myself a libertarian. There are obviously Christians, Jews, and especially Moslems who hold such an opinion. However, the purpose of my article was to argue against that theological perspective for Christians. While Christianity is not per se libertarian, it is consistent with a libertarian political view. In short, one can be both a Christian and a libertarian, and there are many issues on which Christians and libertarians can and should cooperate.

Doug Bandow
Washington, D.C.

Rockwell, sí; Walls, no

How can Thomas D. Walls make fun of an important libertarian intellectual like Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr? ("Raising Hell in Houston," November 1992).

Rockwell is the author of such important scholarly works as *Man, Economy and Liberty: Essays in Honor of Murray N. Rothbard*. His accomplishments in 1991 alone take up nearly two full pages in "Accomplishments 1991," published by the Ludwig von Mises Institute.

Walls' sneering remarks about how Rockwell "regaled a group of young libertarians with off-color jokes," or reporting that Rockwell apparently lied when asked whether Ron Paul was at the Buchananite party were really tasteless. I personally doubt that a good Christian gentlemen like Mr Rockwell told "off-color" jokes, and if he told untruths about Ron Paul to the young libertarians, he certainly had a good reason.

Thomas D. Walls isn't fit to shine the shoes of Llewellyn H. Rockwell, Jr, and you aren't fit to publish his name in your sleazy magazine.

R. J. Williamson
Philadelphia

Reflections

Milking human kindness — The government of Mozambique has announced that it is cutting the income tax rate on foreign aid, thus creating the world's first example of supply-side dictatorship. —JSR

Like a conquering province — Washington, D.C.'s political leaders, such as Marion Barry and Jesse Jackson, want President-elect Bill Clinton to make statehood for the District of Columbia a priority. But no true advocate of justice should settle for mere statehood. D.C. Nationhood! That should be the rallying cry. It's only right. —SLR

Gesundheit — George Bush ended every one of his campaign speeches with the words, "And God Bless the United States of America." President-elect Clinton now ends his speeches with a shorter version: "God Bless America." Alas, this first sign of economy from the Arkansas Democrat may mean nothing more than allegiance to the Irving Berlin song to which the Democratic Party owns the copyright.

But why do these politicians say such things? Perhaps they subconsciously acknowledge that, with them in charge, the country sorely needs help from a Higher Power.

Is there a better example of "taking the Lord's name in vain" than the religious posturing of these two probates? —TWV

Civil rights progress — Detroit is famed in police circles for having an integrated, affirmative-action police force, free of the ugly taint of racism. This is why the Malice Green case, in which the defenseless Mr Green was beaten to death by a gang of cops, is such a landmark. We Michiganders may not have eliminated police brutality, dammit, but at least *our* death squads are *integrated*. Liberalism marches on. —JW

Whitewash — A year ago, the *Portland Oregonian* decided that as a matter of editorial policy, it would no longer print the names of sports teams that might be construed to have racial overtones. Henceforth, on its pages, the Atlanta Braves would be referred to as the Atlanta baseball team, the Washington Redskins as the Washington football team, and so forth.

I immediately wondered what they would call their city's only major league team, the Portland Trailblazers. After all, the term "Trailblazer" refers to Native Americans who marked trails through the forest by blazing a notch on trees. Apparently, this thought never occurred to the *Oregonian*, because it continued to report on "the Blazers" in their sports pages.

But perhaps it occurred to the management of the Trailblazers. At any rate, this year the Trailblazers begin their

televised basketball games with a film of covered wagons heading west, with the players on the team riding along in period costume on horseback. Apparently, we are to think that the word "Trailblazer" refers to scouts or guides on wagon trains.

This is not only bad etymology. It is bad history, for, like all good basketball teams, the Trailblazers consist almost entirely of people of African descent. In Oregon's constitution of 1857, African Americans (then known as "Negroes") were denied the right to enter or inhabit Oregon. —RWB

The agony of defeat — And so on an otherwise unremarkable November day it all came crashing down for him in despair and ignominious defeat. To be sure, the denouement was not unexpected. For weeks the media had been reporting that this was the opponent who would finally and decisively do him in. Insiders weren't surprised — or at least they claimed not to be.

Still, those of us who had with greater or lesser attention followed his career all these years couldn't help but blink in something like disbelief. For his had been a life of triumph built on triumph. It bespoke a seemingly irresistible destiny to prevail no matter what the commentators might proclaim, no matter how great the odds. Coming of age in an America still struggling to extricate itself from the Great Depression, he was, even as a boy, endowed with gifts that marked him for special distinction. Although privileged above others, he disdained the temptation to coast on unearned laurels. The ethic in which his parents raised him was the old-fashioned puritanical creed of service and self-denial, of doing for others rather than seeking for oneself. It took. During World War II he emerged as a genuine hero in the fight against the totalitarian powers. Then like millions of other young men of his generation he came back to his special girl, went to work and made a few dollars. He could have made many more, but his enduring passion was public service. And serve he did in a remarkable number of capacities both here and abroad, sometimes in the glare of publicity and other times operating under deep cover.

To be sure, he had his critics — and I won't deny that I sometimes numbered myself among their company— who labeled him an anachronism, yawned at what we took to be tedious moralizing, snickered at his squarer-than-square mannerisms, derided him as an ideological eunuch who didn't have a clue about how to adapt to a world that, ironically, he had more than almost anyone else been instrumental in making safe for democracy. Chinks in the armor were visible to those with eyes to see. Yet when the end came it was with breathtaking abruptness. Could it have been only a year ago that he was riding high, only a year since friends and admirers acclaimed him and potential foes scurried away from

confrontation? So affirms the calendar.

Just a year ago the old man appeared invulnerable — and now he is gone, defunct, another victim of the twentieth century's brutal habit of chewing up and spitting out its most eminent figures. But before we rush on to new enthusiasms and new heroes we might take a minute to pay tribute to a man who, though not without flaws, never ducked a challenge and always played within the rules. The bell tolls, the torch is passed, an era ends. Rest in Peace, Superman. —LEL

The apostasy of Marge Schott — A year ago, the Cincinnati Reds baseball team fired a front-office employee. He sued for damages. In his deposition, he claimed that he was fired because he objected to the racist remarks of the team's owner, Marge Schott, a rather rough-hewed woman heretofore most famous for her lapses of grammar and insistence that her dog be allowed to run around the ballpark and defecate on the artificial grass. Ms Schott, it seems, had referred to African Americans as "niggers," to Japanese as "Japs," and to people of Jewish ethnicity as "Jews."

The immediate reaction was that Marge Schott ought to be punished heavily, perhaps even relieved of ownership of her baseball team. It seems only fair, the argument goes, to punish her, since football commentator Jimmy the Greek and baseball executive Al Campanis were fired for expressing views about the relative ability of African Americans and European Americans. The owners of the other teams are meeting to decide what punishment the pungent Ms Schott deserves.

This is dismaying to me. For one thing, the sports world is not a single monolithic organization, in which one policy must be enforced on everyone. "Baseball" did not fire Al Campanis, nor did "football" fire Jimmy the Greek. Campanis was fired by his employer, the Los Angeles Dodgers; the Greek by his employer, a television network. In both cases the stated reason was that racist opinions makes a person a bad employee, plausible in the case of football commentators or baseball executives. But Ms Schott is not employed at all. She is an *owner*.

Which brings up the real problem with the calls for punishment.

Her accusers have not suggested that she has acted in a racist manner, aside from suggesting that only one of 45 front office employees is an African American. The Reds would have about five African Americans in the front office if they hired

precisely in proportion to the U.S. population as a whole. Unfortunately, the team that the Reds put on the field last year, included eight African Americans among its 25 members. That's about three times the number it would have if it hired strictly in proportion to the nation's ethnic makeup. If anything, an analysis of the Reds' hiring practices suggests that it is skewed toward African Americans, since they are disproportionately represented on the playing field, where salaries dwarf those of front-office personnel. Nor is the charge of racism helped any by the fact that she hired a black man as her team's manager.

Stripped of its verbiage, the charge against Ms Schott is that she harbors *bad opinions*, evil, racist attitudes that may be inferred from her choice of language.

This raises an interesting question. Suppose that in the 1950s, a baseball team owner had used the word "comrade" and the phrase "capitalist lapdog" in private conversations. These terms suggest that their speaker is sympathetic to communism, which was seen in those days as bad an opinion as is racism today. Would Ms Schott's accusers have called for such an owner to be stripped of his team, or otherwise punished?

Had that happened during the anti-communist 1950s, I would expect liberal opinion to rush to the defense of the owner. Which is exactly what it ought to do today. Marge Schott may be tasteless. She may even harbor bad opinions. But these are not crimes. This is America, where we treasure diversity and every man or woman has a right to his or her own opinion, whether those opinions are right or wrong, good or bad, correct or incorrect. —RWB


Up your ante — Headline of a page one article in the *New York Times* (Nov. 21, 1992): "Fervid Debate On Gambling; Disease or Moral Weakness?" Of course, it would never occur to the editors at the "newspaper of record" — in reality, tight-assed officers in the intellectual bodyguard of the Nanny State — that there might be a third alternative in this idiotic "debate" they've concocted: namely, that gambling's fun! —RR

Shallow beauty — Bill Clinton, like Reagan and JFK, puts surface shimmer above all else; the image, the carefully crafted image, is all that matters. He has "youth," "vitality," "energy," "charisma"; he's out to give us "change" and "unity" and everything "new." He's the choice of a new generation, the real thing, the pause that refreshes. Why ask why? —JW

Happy trails — You may have thought that nothing good came out of the Los Angeles riots. If so, you were wrong. Bozeman, Montana, is getting some new bike trails.

I read about this in *Community Food News*, the newsletter of my local food cooperative.

Steve Guettermann of the Montana Conservation Corps told his hiking partner Chris Boyd, president of the Gallatin Valley Land Trust, "Guess what? We just got \$100,000 from the Bush Administration and we have to spend it before September 30th." Boyd passed this on to reporter Michele Corriel, who reports that the money "came as a result of the Los Angeles riots. In a typical political



"You'd better come quick, Sire — Your Secretary of State cut your National Security Advisor's head off!"

maneuver, Bush and company decided that they had better make a showing on behalf of the underprivileged and poverty stricken youths of America setting aside most of the \$500 million for the largest cities. But they didn't want to leave out rural America so funds were dispersed to all 50 states."

The money went to a quasi-private agency in Bozeman, the Human Resources Development Council, which had to find disadvantaged youths in the Bozeman area to use it, and turned to the Montana Conservation Corps for help. Actually, only \$7,200 was used for bike and hiking trails, paying for a crew of eight youths to work on the trails. (Boyd's Land Trust came up with matching funds.)

The state of Montana received \$3 million in all — not bad for a state that hasn't had a riot in years. —JSS

The winner and new champion — In the warm luminous glow of the Clinton Ascendancy, as America's fearless newsmen lay down their poison pens and compose mash notes worthy of Hugh Sidey, we can no longer call our beloved new president "Slick Willie." We must come up with a kinder, gentler sobriquet. Mr Clinton's self-applied nickname, "The Comeback Kid," has a '30s boxing-movie ring to it, so I suggest the shorter, spikier "Champ." The tag is derived from Gerunifer with a G's demure memoir in *Penthouse*. "He was a champ at eating pussy," offered Miss Flowers. Though you'd never know it from Hillary's wicked witch of the North Shore glare. —BK

Anarchy, anyone? — If government is instituted to protect us from the predations of one another, what are we to make of one recent congressional action? Worried about a crime spree in our capital city, our noble lawmakers have extended the region protected by the private security firm Congress contracts with to include the parts of the city that surround the Hill area. It seems the legislators who lived in those areas felt more secure being protected by a non-governmental protection agency than by the D.C. cops. All I can say is, if it's good enough for Congress . . . —JW

Canadians wise up, eh? — American readers will be gratified to learn that Ovide Mercredi, Canada's best-known aboriginal leader and one of the architects of the new constitution presented to Canadian voters in a national referendum last October, publicly styles himself a follower of the teachings of Mahatma Gandhi. But even the apostles of unconditional love have memory lapses. On October 27, one day after Canadians voted to reject the new constitution, Mr Mercredi gravely announced on national television that the vote had been a rejection of the legitimate aspirations of his race. Faced with mass racism in white society, it was time at last for Indians to turn away from legally sanctioned forms of activism.

Unfortunately, within another 48 hours the vote totals from Canada's Indian reservations were published. Over 70 percent of Indians had voted against the new constitution — rejecting it by a substantially wider margin than either French Canadians or English Canadians had done. A mumbled apology issued forth from the Assembly of First

Nations, aborting Mercredi's transformation from Martin Luther King to Malcolm X.

Mercredi's story is a metaphor for what happened nationwide in the referendum. Collectively, Canadians of all races and cultures made the decision to ignore the advice of the leadership that had manufactured a constitutional crisis and then demanded ratification of a new, hastily conceived deal that would restore order — and cement the grip of the present elite on the levers of power.

The deal was unanimously supported by Canada's political elite. All three well-established federal parties, every provincial premier, and six of ten leaders of provincial opposition parties supported the accord, as did the country's business, labor, and media elites. The accord had the support of almost every special interest in the country — which it certainly deserved. Every interest group imaginable was given special mention in one part or another of the accord. As a result the legal text was over 15,000 words long. The section dealing with Indians alone was longer than the entire United States Constitution.

Tens of millions of dollars were devoted to marketing the new constitution — first for a feel-good campaign, then for a

Canadians of all races and cultures made the decision to ignore the advice of all major political parties, every provincial premier, and six of ten leaders of provincial opposition parties, as well as the country's business, labor, and media elite.

series of dire warnings that the country would disintegrate if Canadians made the mistake of voting "No" (Canada would be "like Beirut," warned one former Prime Minister). Organized opposition to the deal was so spotty that the organizers of public debates had to turn to complete nobodies — me, for instance — to debate well-known public figures. On the strength of being a low-level *apparatchik* in the only federal party to oppose the deal, I was invited on different occasions to debate one cabinet minister, two MPs, and a recently retired top bureaucrat.

The willingness of so many Canadians to vote against the new constitution seems to have been based precisely on the fact that their elites were practically bursting in their anxiety to see the deal endorsed. I hope the mood lasts. In their post-referendum rush to distance themselves from the accord, Canada's leaders have been declaring their intentions to "focus" on the economy," (i.e., to spend lavishly on half-baked employment schemes). Canadians will have lots of nay-saying to do in the months ahead. —SJR

Kicking the habit — Term limitation measures were on the ballots of 14 states. In every state, they were passed easily; on average 66% of voters supported them.

This is all to the good. Term limits would require Congress to completely restructure the way committees are selected and maintained, that is, how power is divvied up on Capitol Hill,

thereby giving the bloated institution the enema it so sorely needs. Though it is no doubt true that Congress would find a way to constipate itself under a regime of term limits, before it does so it may very well be forced to face up to such pressing problems as runaway entitlements, ubiquitous pork, the yearly budget deficits and the national debt.

Meanwhile, the mavens of the status quo are squirming, desperately trying to explain away the phenomenon. The most widely proposed excuse they offer is that *term limitations are expressions of voter outrage, nothing else*. They wish.

The absurdity of most of the attacks are apparent. Most contemptible is the characterization of term limits as "undemocratic," as "restricting the voters' rights." Where were these folks when Reagan was prohibited a third term as president? Where were they when California was cutting taxes by plebiscite?

Luckily, voters see through such half-truths. I have the sneaking suspicion that voters realize that *they* are also part of the problem. Restricting whom they can vote for (in the future) is surely seen by many who vote for term limitations as a way of putting temptation out of reach. Just as a smoker trying to quit the habit gives away his unopened cartons of cigarettes, so the voters disqualify long-term incumbents. There is no real "paradox" (as the pundits proclaim) in voting for term limits *and* for your current pork-providing incumbent. It is similar to signing up at a Schick Center *and* lighting up the last cigarette in your pack. —TWW

The hundred year diet — Do you ever wonder if people change? I mean, do they change in some fundamental way, not just in the way they vote but in their basic expectations about life, or about themselves — about what they should look like, for instance?

The answer, of course, is yes, people do change; and that's why we're not still running around in forests painting ourselves blue. But it's sometimes a shock to see how much people can change.

I've been reading an account of the lives of Dwight L. Moody and Ira D. Sankey, leaders of the late-nineteenth-century American evangelical movement. My source informs me that Sankey was 5' 10" tall, and "his weight of 220 pounds was considered ideal by the people of his day, who did not have the modern mania for slimmness." (I'll say they

didn't.) Moody was only 5' 8" tall, but when he was 38 years old "he weighed a solid, muscular 245 pounds and showed no signs of the enormous corpulence that would soon overtake him." No one guessed that he might have a weight problem.

This will help to put things in context for people concerned about the need to take off a pound or two. The standards by which we judge our basic physical identity are, after all, quite changeable. Just wait another hundred years, and you may not have to worry about those french fries. —SC


New Marxists for old — In mid-November, 2,000 or so Marxists converged on the campus of University of Massachusetts at Amherst to discuss the state of their faith after the fall of the Soviet Union. The mood was euphoric. Steve Cullenberg, professor of economics at UC Riverside declared: "I think it's an exciting time to be a Marxist." With the Soviet Union gone, it seems, a lot of obsolete baggage can be jettisoned. Participants — academics evidently in the great majority — had 140 panels to choose from among, the "hottest" on Marxist literary and cultural theory. No surprise here. Marxism is essentially an arcane vocabulary, a system in which the world is translated into a specialized discourse. This is what a certain kind of intellectual revels in. There is no reason why the translating, back and forth between Marxism and other systems — feminism, deconstructionism, whatever — as they faddishly come and go, can't continue forever.

Meanwhile, this new breed of Marxists attach themselves to every and any attempt to sap the society of private property. As always, they dishonestly decline to state their alternative forthrightly and to compare it in detail with capitalism. One wonders how these UMass Marxists are any different from the Russian intelligentsia of Plekhanov's time, with *their* exciting, new ideas.

Really, isn't enough enough? Haven't Marxists done enough harm with their economic and philosophical rubbish that has blighted the lives of hundreds of millions of real human beings, most of them much better specimens than they are? By what right do they propose to begin their endless experimenting now on Americans?

I am a libertarian and a believer in freedom of speech. *But if I weren't* — if I were drawn to codes of politically correct speech for the sake of the common good — then it isn't drunken fraternity boys shouting "nigger" and "faggot" that I would silence. It would be the Marxist academics, proven mortal enemies of the freedom and welfare of the human race. —RR

I believe in miracles — Bill Clinton claimed the election was about change, and it sure looks like it. Democratic rhetoric changed almost instantly after the election. The team that promised economic revitalization and budget deficit reduction is now talking about a choice — one or the other. Clinton has stated that in the short term the deficits will probably have to go up to "jump start" the economy. Before the election, he maintained that the deficit weakened the economy; now more deficits will save it. And the candidate who peddled so much hope is now cautioning the electorate that there will be no miracles. I don't see



"Psst — Is this the Bourgeoisie or the Proletariat?"

why not: Bill Clinton turned into Michael Dukakis virtually overnight. —JSR

The bottom line — When you combine the votes of any two of the three top voter-getters in the presidential race, the total is greater than that of the third candidate. That's as close to victory for "none of the above" as the American system allows. —SLR

Dump it at 1600 Pennsylvania Ave — I almost voted for H. Ross Perot. The night before the election, he declared Patsy Cline's "Crazy" his official campaign song, and danced with his wife before thousands of supporters. Early on Election Day, when a reporter asked him what he thought his movement had accomplished, he told him that "we had fun." *Damn*, I thought to myself. *I hope this man does as well as possible without actually winning.*

I actually voted for Andre Marrou, even though my conscience tells me that I probably shouldn't be voting at all. I didn't find out about the *best* candidate until after the election was over, when I read about the St. Louis Airport Project. That site, it seems, contains the nuclear waste left over from the Manhattan Project; no one has yet been able to figure out what to do with the deadly stuff. So the St. Louis Greens decided to nominate it for president — if it won, it would be shipped into the White House. Good idea, huh? I think so.

Meanwhile, a group calling itself the Anarchist Party endorsed George Bush, on the grounds that he "would cause the most chaos." After four years of Clinton, we'll be able to compare his record with Bush's and see whether or not these Anarchists are right. —JW

Another war made in the USA — Let the record show that George Bush's final legacy to the world was a new trade war, set off by threatening absurdly high tariffs on certain European agricultural products.

Well, a *skirmish* is more like it. The politicians in Europe came to a tentative agreement with the Bush Administration, agreeing to a little less subsidy than before. A truce was declared. But French farmers are rebelling, and the likelihood of the agreement holding is slim. President-elect Clinton may obtain office only to find himself in the middle of a major diplomatic maelstrom.

Which is the last thing the world or America needs. Consider history. The worldwide system of bilateral trade agreements and tariffs "experimented with" earlier in this century helped set off and lengthen the Great Depression. Today, the West, with its rickety, debt-ridden economies, needs another such bout of protectionism like it needs another set of dictators. If it gets the one, it will probably get the other. Protectionism has consequences.

Of course, nowhere is the free trade ideal set in place. No nation has the high moral stance to demand from others "fair" trade policy; *every* nation has some idiotic trade protections. The U.S., for instance, is riddled with agricultural and industrial subsidies, tariffs, "voluntary trade agreements" with other nations, etc. The idea that our lame duck President defended some ideal of "trade policy justice" is absurd. Among world leaders, Bush is as black a crackpot as any kettle on the international stove-top.

As world leaders set the terms for trade, we should recognize that the term "trade war" is itself misleading. It suggests all the clichés of statist economic crankism: evil multinational corporations and upstart industries greedily engaging in "cut-throat competition." But trade wars are not commercial wars. They are contests among regulators and taxers. The weapons are not goods and services, but laws. The tactics are not improvements in quality and price, but expropriation or interdiction. The pretext for starting such wars is not an army of

The term "trade war" is misleading. It suggests all the clichés of statist economic crankism. Trade wars are not commercial wars. They are contests among regulators and taxers. The weapons are not goods and services, but laws.

rogue industries behaving in "monopolistic" fashion, but coddled industries, heavily subsidized by government legal favor and tax-supported largesse.

Though a "trade war" may *sound* like an evil of capitalism, it is nothing more, or less, than one of the many evils of the state. —TWW

Man with a plan — I didn't and don't vote, and I feel no guilt. A loss by any of the major candidates would have delighted me, so I tried not to think about the necessary logical implications of a loss by the other two. Besides, it's not as if there was anything I could have done about it anyway.

But for those of you who *did* vote for the winner (which I understand is the only purpose of voting, right? If you don't vote for the winner, you've "thrown away your vote"), I present this cautionary quotation, culled from a speech given by winner Bill Clinton on May 18 before the National Steel and Shipbuilding Company:

"Let me say that we ought to begin by doing something simple. We ought to say right now, we ought to have a national inventory of the capacity of every operation like this one in the United States and every manufacturing plant in the United States: every airplane plant, every small business subcontractor, everybody working in defense.

"We ought to know what the inventory is, what the skills of the work force are and match it against the kind of things we have to produce in the next twenty years and then we have to decide how to get from here to there. From what we have to what we need to do. Now, that's what we need to do with the peace dividend."

Now, on the basis of this statement, we can conclude that Clinton is perhaps the most ambitious and economically ignorant totalitarian ever to achieve national power, in our country or maybe any other. Not just 5-year plans — a *20 year plan*, comprehensive enough to include *everyone's* skills and a complete inventory of, I suppose, everything in the country. The mind boggles, even curdles.

And Bill as the man with the plan, effortlessly directs everyone everywhere they need to go — and, of course, none of

us consumers had better dare throw a spanner in the works by, perhaps, developing our own interests, skills, expectations, or desires any time in the next twenty years. After our initial powerful moment of introspection to come up with an inventory of our skills, interests and so on — reported in full to Bill Clinton — we all need to sit back for the next twenty years and let him do his thing, assigning and reassigning people and products willy nilly, hither and yon, to satisfy the undoubtedly perfectly prescient Bill, Robert “Fourth” Reich and the rest of the crew. I can’t wait to watch it all happen. —BD

No tribute for “defense” — One of Hillary Clinton’s causes is a leftist lobby gratingly denominated the Children’s Defense Fund. I thought you would like to know something about the methods of public information by which the Fund, and similar groups perennially convinced of their superior knowledge and righteousness, “defend” children.

The *Detroit News* analyzed some of these methods in an editorial, “The Children’s Defense Fund,” which it published on August 16. The *News* rebutted the CDF’s argument for increased government spending on welfare programs. (You wouldn’t expect the CDF to argue for job-creation by private enterprise, would you? That would be preposterous.) The CDF’s argument was based on the contention that there has been a steep rise in the number of children living beneath the poverty line. The CDF’s contention was allegedly supported by Census figures on the incomes of poor people.

The *News* pointed out that the Census figures to which the CDF and other groups of welfare activists resort when they wish to become hysterical do not include the majority of cash (and non-cash) assistance that poor people already receive from government. According to the *News*, the amount of existing government support (and dependency) that the Census figures missed amounted to “\$158 billion in welfare benefits, equal to \$11,120 for every poor household in America.” This is just for 1990, and it does not include such non-cash assistance as food stamps and Medicaid.

That’s quite something to miss, isn’t it, for either the Census or the CDF? Corresponding amounts, of course, are missing from the family incomes of people who are not on welfare but who are being steadily impoverished by their government, with the able assistance of thoughtful and caring lobbyists for the poor — people who love the poor so much that they make sure there are more of them. —SC

The road to colonialism — Every day, television shows us starving children in Somalia, followed by the heads of American politicians and pundits, explaining what in their learned judgment “we” ought to do to relieve the suffering. The images of the starving children are horrible, the sort of images that play to Americans’ hearts and inspire generosity.

But, the talking heads explain, it’s not a simple task of sending food. When we send food there, it is stolen by criminal gangs, who distribute it to their own supporters, leaving the starving children with empty plates. The solution, the heads explain, is to send the U.S. Army along with the food, and to send it in such numbers that the gangs will not even think about challenging it. The consensus thus established, the U.S. is about to send some 30,000 American soldiers to this vi-

olent desert land on the horn of Africa. As I write these words, the discussion has turned to weightier matters: should the troops be sent under the aegis of the United Nations? Can the U.N. intervene at all, given that its charter prohibits on military action except when invited by a legitimate government? Should the U.S. put its troops under U.N. command?

In the meantime, I wonder, does any of this make sense?

The starvation is caused, not by crop failure, but by political failure. The talking heads know this. They have explained that Somalia has no “legitimate government,” thus the U.N.’s problem getting “invited” in, our inability to deliver the relief supplies to those in need, and the much more fundamental problem — the unstable situation in which economic activity like the production and distribution of food is virtually impossible.

The talking heads propose nothing to address this more fundamental problem. They propose only to enforce a truce in certain areas until the bellies of the starving children are filled, then to withdraw. What happens then? With the U.S. Army

Unable to accept the fact that we are powerless to stop starvation in Somalia, we head inexorably backward toward colonialism, and with it toward carnage and disaster.

gone, what will keep the gangs of brigands from returning to their old ways? How soon will the Somalians again be starving?

The talking heads don’t talk about this now. But once our troops are in place and the food distributed, they will have to face these questions. Is there any doubt how they will propose to “solve” this problem? The only way to prevent degeneration back to the current situation is for the invaders to establish a new government and put the gangs under some sort of control. This would be tantamount to imperialism, though we would no doubt call it by a different name. It would have all of imperialism’s problems — it would be expensive in terms of life and treasure, unproductive, and politically unstable.

In the meantime, the pathetic faces of the starving children of Somalia continue to stare at us on television. Unable to accept the fact that we are powerless to solve their problem, we head inexorably backward toward colonialism, and with it toward carnage and disaster. —RWB

Get out the teen vote! — Libertarians differ from liberals in understanding the state as the principal instrument of unacceptable social discrimination. We oppose state-determined quotas for the same reason that we oppose state-enforced segregation; we decry compulsory education because it assumes that people below a certain age are unable to decide for themselves whether they should stay in school — that they therefore must be lesser human beings. One issue we have not confronted, however, is restricting the right to vote only to those above seventeen.

You may recall that a century ago women were not al-

lowed to vote; that African-Americans in many states found it almost impossible to vote; and that not too long ago the voting-age was twenty-one, not the current eighteen. The first inequity was successfully attacked by the Suffragette movement, the second by the civil rights movement. Reforms were achieved when the public became convinced that certain groups of people were not, as we say, second-class citizens. And the voting age was lowered from twenty-one to eighteen on the reasonable grounds that anyone old enough to be conscripted into the military was old enough to vote.

Think about it seriously: there is no reason to restrict voting to those eighteen or over — no good reason at all. When I saw the footage of Chelsea Clinton accompanying her father into the voting booth on election day, I realized that only state-enforced ageism kept her from entering it alone. Teenagers in general are no less knowledgeable or passionate about electoral politics than their elders, and certainly no stupider, no less discriminating, or no less susceptible to vulgar appeals. Once the electorate is expanded to Americans as young as thirteen, we might think about lowering it further.

On a more practical level, no issue can more vividly introduce young people today not only to both libertarian and democratic principles but to the Libertarian Party. (Given Chelsea's mother's past advocacies, don't be surprised to find her eventually supporting it.) Since children, not to mention their parents, would never think of advocating a lower voting age, the candy is ours to grab. —RK

Millions for liberty, but not one damn cent for blather —

In the wake of the 1988 election, I wrote a study demonstrating that the use of television advertising could substantially increase vote totals for Libertarian Party candidates. In counties in Kansas where the local LP had bought ads for Ron Paul, the LP vote was up 317% from 1984; in counties where no ads were shown, the LP vote was up only 158%. Before long, there was a consensus among LP members and leaders that television advertising was needed in future campaigns.

This year, the LP purchased more than \$135,000 worth of ads on behalf of Marrou, yet Marrou's vote total was embarrassingly small. This raises two questions: Is television advertising really a good idea? Does it really build vote totals?

The second question is easy to answer. Virtually all the evidence we have is that television advertising builds vote totals. It is virtually certain that without his television advertising, Marrou's vote would have been even smaller.

But I do not think the television ads were a good idea this time, despite the fact that they helped increase Marrou's vote total. This probably sounds a bit odd, coming from me, so I shall explain myself.

The ads developed for the campaign explicitly eschewed any sort of libertarian idea or policy. The ad most widely used was intended to say, basically, "Regular politicians are bad. We aren't regular politicians. Vote for us." The others made no attempt to get votes at all: they merely criticized the networks for not reporting LP vote totals on election night.

Whether these ads were more effective at getting votes

than real libertarian ads would have been I do not know. Nor do I particularly care. The reason the LP exists and the reason we give money to its campaigns is the advancement of liberty. We do not maximize liberty by appealing to voters who have no idea of what we advocate. If we want to make an unprincipled run for office, we may as well be Republicans or Democrats.

Buying television ads is not enough. In the future, the LP should remember what the L stands for. It might also remember that in 1980, the Clark campaign showed us that it is possible to produce television ads that present libertarian ideas in a way that is attractive to voters. —RWB

Roll over and vote — As a westerner, I have been hearing for years that media projections of Presidential winners before the polls close on the west coast are unfair to west coast citizens, effectively disenfranchising them, and that, despite this unfairness, it is still important that "everyone vote." Dan Rather struck this latter note *ad nauseam* during his pathetic CBS election-night coverage even as state after state showed clear Clinton victories, and while deliberately refusing to state the obvious election of Bill Clinton.

One theory behind the notion that voting is vitally important is that the vote totals express the general will, and that those who don't vote don't get counted. In actual fact, voting expresses a "general will" only when voters *do not think* about other voters' voting preferences and strategies. It doesn't take a study of Public Choice economics to realize that the "second guessing" of other voters' behavior can dramatically change election results ("If I vote for my first choice, who doesn't seem to have a chance, then I will be helping the partisans of the guy I *really hate* by not supporting my second choice, who does have a chance of winning. So I'll vote for the clown who at least is not *wholly* evil, even if pretty bad.") In a regime of voter knowledge, vote totals express the mutual fears and suspicions of the voters, not their *actual* wishes. And thus the calls for publicly enforced *ignorance* (bans on exit polling, media reporting of early returns, etc.), all to allow the outcome to conform to the "general will."

But this is futile. We all have *some* knowledge of the general trends of voter interest. It is in this realm of second-guessing, after all, that the media has its most influence. And



"I want to insure domestic tranquility."

most voters have a pretty good idea of how an election is going to go before election day. *All* major elections are hopelessly skewed by voter second-guessing *now*.

So west coast complaints are without much foundation. The typical late-in-the-day west coast voter has no need to "second-guess" other voter choices; after all, he *knows* how others voted, and that his own vote will make no difference. So he can, in good conscience, vote his preference (the ostensible aim of every believing democrat). We might thus expect "true" voter preferences to show up in the late returns in the western states.

But things aren't this simple. Many western voters, apparently, jump on the bandwagon of winning candidates. Others choose not to vote. And then there's "sour grapes" voting. Many of my non-libertarian relatives have voted Libertarian, mostly, I think, to express dissatisfaction. (Why Libertarian and not some other party? Probably because they have heard me talk about the LP.)

Representative democracy is too messy to make any clear sense of it. People who put a great deal of stock in it are deluded. —TWW

Voting one's interest — Word from the Harvard economics department is that staff and student body voted unanimously for Clinton just to get Robert Reich out of Cambridge. —JSR

Silver lining blues — Let's get one thing straight right now. I don't like the results of the last election. I don't like Clinton one little bit.

But the results aren't all bad news. Clinton's ability to be "effective," in his own big-government terms, is severely limited.

First, almost nobody likes him. 43% of the popular vote is not a "mandate," especially when the 43% was acquired in opposition to so feeble a candidate as Bush. And, nobody at all, trusts Clinton.

Second, Clinton's active supporters worked for him only because they expected him to procure for them a larger share of the federal pie, and that pie has already been pretty well eaten. If a larger pie is going to be baked, the apples will have to be stolen from somebody else's well-guarded orchard. Clinton could try to create money, as he has promised to "create" jobs, by resorting to inflation; but if he tries this, the old folks who are living on fixed incomes will turn their pools loose on him right away. He could try Reagan's trick of transferring costs of social welfare programs onto the states, but most of the states, which are constitutionally required to balance their budgets, are not likely to take this lying down, and that goes for the big-spending liberals in state legislatures even more than it does for the conservatives. He could try — he will try — more borrowing, but the bond markets will respond by running their rates up. He could — and he will — try to sneak into the orchard by imposing taxes on business (for "job retraining," "health care," and so forth) but declining to call them "taxes." Business, especially small business, represents a lot of votes that will be reluctant to endorse that kind of scheme. Already Clinton is doing his best to vaporize expectations of actual new money going to any of his supporters' pet causes.

Third, Clinton's efforts to satisfy his supporters with symbolic victories, pies in the sky, will not only fail to satisfy the more robust appetites among them but will create obvious causes of opposition among the many conservatives who voted for him in the absence from the ballot of any real conservative. Appointing officials of NOW to positions of public prominence will be a great way of arousing visceral opposition.

Fourth, the defeat of Bush, which can be directly attributed (A) to the country-club Republicans who urged him to compromise on a tax increase, and (B) to the moral-majority Republicans who urged him to prattle about family values, joins the discrediting of those two politically incompetent groups. The door is open for libertarian conservatives, the real idea people of the Republican party, to bring good economic and political arguments to the fore, and win the next election on that platform.

The task of libertarians during the next four years is easy. We simply have to keep saying the plain truth. We have to keep saying all those simple things that Bush and his friends couldn't seem to wrap their minds around. We have to ex-

The task of libertarians during the next four years is easy. We simply have to keep saying the plain truth. We have to keep saying all those simple things that Bush and his friends couldn't seem to wrap their minds around.

plain, simply and clearly, to everyone and all the time, that an increase in government power means a decrease in individual and social welfare. We have to encourage our friends among the Republicans to explain things to the voters just as simply and clearly. Because that's the way to win. —SC

Lose one for the Gipper — It was a rather mean-spirited election campaign, but one generous act stood out: Ronald Reagan's last-minute barnstorming for Bush.

At 81 years old, Reagan didn't have to do this, and he certainly owed no debt to George Bush. Reagan's popularity got Bush elected the first time, though Bush did little to acknowledge it.

Bush never accepted supply-side economics, even though Reagan's tax cuts led the wealthy to increase their share of the tax burden (the top 10% of taxpayers paid 49.3% in 1980; by 1988, they paid 57.2%). He repudiated Reagan's modest efforts to deregulate and to cut spending. The number of pages in the Federal Register, which records regulatory actions, was 25% higher in 1991 than in 1988, and the number of employees in the Environmental Protection Agency was 25% higher in 1992 than in 1989. Total federal spending was \$1.475 trillion in fiscal 1992, a 17% increase in real terms over 1988. And it represented 25.2% of gross domestic product, compared with 22.1% in 1988. According to the Cato Institute, Bush has been increasing real domestic expenditures at a faster rate than any

president since John F. Kennedy.

During the campaign, Bush's indifference to Reagan continued. I never heard Bush mention Reagan's name, and, either by negligence or design, Reagan's speech at the Republican convention was broadcast outside of prime time. Apparently, Bush didn't even understand Reagan's appeal: He let Bill Clinton take over the role of the optimist and apostle of hope, while Bush remained dour, gloomy and apologetic.

I guess Reagan is just a nice guy, willing to try to save a sinking ship, even though it abandoned him. —JSS

What's so special about health care? —

For the past few years, especially during political campaigns, people have been telling us that every American deserves access to "quality health care." Practically everybody seems to accept this claim; certainly nobody running for political office has disputed it. How did this proposition achieve axiomatic status?

I have heard no one, not even the most devout adherent of a religious faith, claim that every American deserves access to "quality religious care." Yet the importance of the condition of one's earthly equipment would seem to pale by comparison to that of one's eternal soul. How can we rest while so many of our fellow citizens slide inexorably into everlasting fire and brimstone for want of adequate religious guidance? Surely a modest subsidy to the priesthood, at minimum, is called for.

A government that fails to insure the universal provision of such a priceless service, can hardly be expected to meet the need for universal access to "quality" transportation. I notice that some of my countrymen are reduced to driving American-made automobiles, some of them twenty or thirty years old, while others must make do with motorcycles or bicycles. Why not a Mercedes Benz in every garage? Which only reminds us that not everyone has a garage. How can we call ourselves a world-class nation when our government fails to guarantee at least a two-car garage for everyone?

Needless to say, a garage ought to be hooked onto an "quality" house, which calls to mind the pressing necessity for government to guarantee everyone access to a three-bedroom house with rec room and two fireplaces.

But alas, we hear no clamor for universal access to "quality" religious instruction, transportation, garage space, or anything else — just health care. So there must be something

quite special about this particular service.


Could it be the relation of health care to the preservation of life itself? Perhaps. But many other goods and services also have a close connection with the preservation of life — including transportation and housing. After all, you are far less likely to die in a traffic accident while driving a Mercedes than while driving a Yugo. And people who live in trailer houses are notoriously susceptible to being swept away by hurricanes and tornadoes. Many goods and services are related to life expectancy, including education. So does everyone have an equal right to admission to Harvard?

Suppose we grant that health care has a more direct and immediate relation to the maintenance of life. Now we must ask whether people really regard life as all that important. If health care is so distinct and categorically more important to people, why don't people act as if that were the case when they decide how to spend their own money? Hardly anybody spends the entire budget on health care. Evidently, at the margin, health care has no more value than other things, including the trivial things consumers purchase in vast profusion. At the margin, which is where all decisions are made, a dollar spent on the doctor's services has no more value than a dollar spent on the clown's services.

Why, if health is so important, do people voluntarily place their health at risk so frequently and in so many ways? They smoke, they eat and drink to excess, they drive recklessly, they use dangerous recreational drugs, and behave in countless other ways in a manner that they know places their health at risk. They readily trade off the expected condition of their health against a great variety of alternative satisfactions. By so doing they demonstrate that health itself, much less the services that contribute to the preservation of health, is just another desirable thing, categorically no different at all from cups of coffee and tickets to the movies.

So why the clamor for universal access to health care alone? My hunch is that the furor represents little more than a diabolical — and increasingly successful — effort by the news media and their favored politicians to move toward complete government control of still another sector of the economy (about one-eighth of the GNP). For if health care is left to the market, people will demonstrate that it's just another good and that the market can make provision for it just as well as it makes provision for automobiles or candy bars. The myth that people's right to health care stands on a higher plane serves to

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justify a government takeover, and once the takeover is complete, there will be no opportunity for health care suppliers and consumers to show how much better they might have coordinated their plans through the market process. —RH

"All the lies fit to print" — The New York *Times* prides itself on being the nation's "newspaper of record," the one reliable source of all important news. So naturally, when I wanted reliable election returns, I turned to the *Times'* special section "The Elections," a full 24 pages of information and election returns published two days after the election.

Among the interesting facts I learned were the following:

- Clinton got 43% of the vote, Bush 38% and Perot 19%.

That adds up to 100%, so it's plain that other candidates and write-ins amounted to less than half of one percent.

- Among U.S. Senate races, Republicans and Democrats got 100% of the vote in 25 of the 35 Senate races.

- The only Senate race in which a Libertarian got any votes was in Georgia, where LP nominee James Hudson apparently got 3%.

But all these "facts" are false. On the presidential level, the *Times* simply ignored the 650,000 people who voted for other candidates (or "none-of-the-above").

Almost 220,000 — 5% — of Pennsylvania's voters cast their ballots for Libertarian Party nominee John Perry. The *Times* reported that there was no third party votes. More than 330,000 — 7% — Ohio voters voted for Martha Grevatt of the Workers' World Party. Again, the *Times* reported there were no third party votes. In all, the *Times* falsely reported that the major parties took 100% of the vote in at least 15 Senate races where third party candidates received more

In all, the New York Times falsely reported the results of at least 15 Senate races and 39 House races. Not content with reporting false information as news, the Times went on to present false information as history.

than 1%. It also failed to report the 18,214 — 4% — votes LP nominee Kate Alexander got in New Hampshire, though it did report the 9,577 votes independent Larry Brady received. In all, the *Times* ignored at least 1,000,000 votes for the Senate by reporting that the Republicans and Democrats received 100% of the vote. It also inaccurately identified LP Senate nominee Kiana Delamare in Arizona as an "independent."

The *Times* also falsely reported that the major parties got 100% of the vote in at least 39 district races for the U.S. House or Representatives, where the Libertarian Party candidate received at least 1% of the vote, thereby ignoring the votes of over 200,000 citizens.

Apparently, reporting false information as news is not enough for the *Times*. It also reports false information as history. It devoted a sixth of a page to a list of the "Strongest Third-Party Finishes," which it explains lists all candidates

"winning more than 1 percent of the vote." The list begins with Theodore Roosevelt, who got 27.39% of the 1912 vote, when he ran as a Progressive, having lost the Republican nomination. Then we have such familiar names as Robert LaFollette, Strom Thurmond and George Wallace, and such unfamiliar names as John G. Wooley (Prohibition, 1900) and Allan L. Benson (Socialist 1916).

But nowhere on the list is the name of Ed Clark, who received 920,859 votes of 86,495,678 cast in 1980. It may be too much to expect the learned editors of America's newspaper of record to be able to do math, though one might think that the development of cheap and reliable pocket calculators would have permeated the *Times'* newsroom by now.

But don't be tempted to think that the *Times* is conspiring against third parties. The Republicans didn't fare much better. In a feature titled "New in the United States Senate," the *Times* devoted 30.5 column inches to profiles of the 11 new Senators elected on November 3. The *Times* devoted 26 column inches to the newly elected Democrats and 4.5 column inches to the newly elected Republicans. The *Times* published pictures of 5 of the Democrats and no Republicans. The voters gave the Democrats a 7-4 victory. In the *Times'* article, the Democrats fared quite a bit better: 26 to 4.5. In the *Times'* photos, the Democrats won 5 to 0. —RWB

Speech, speech! — Not long after winning the Nobel Prize for Literature, Joseph Brodsky advised writers to prepare their Nobel acceptance speech "beforehand." Why? "When you are awarded the Nobel Prize, you have only a month to write it." In that case, here is my effort:

"I would like to think that this prize of over a million dollars was awarded to honor professional independence and courage, to honor a rich succession of literary inventions in more than one area, to honor my efforts to support and even publish less successful colleagues, to honor critical recognition in more than one genre and more than one art and thus my doing a large amount of first-rate work in more than one area; that the award recognized my publishing with smaller literary publishers (rather than large conglomerates) books that attract a few enthusiastic readers rather than a mass public, my contributing generously to small literary magazines that are the foundation of American culture, my political integrity in eschewing professional positions that embody power, my exposure of professional corruption and deceit, my refusal to exploit privileges offered by my peculiar background or to flatter writers more powerful than myself, my persistently defending the importance of esthetic values against those who would compromise them for one or another merchandising angle, because all these are things that, as we know, Joseph Brodsky did." —RK


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
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Summit. Dismayed by the doomsday fears expressed at the summit, they deplored the "irrational ideology which is opposed to scientific and industrial progress and impedes economic and social development." The scientists invited others to sign the Heidelberg Appeal. At the latest official count (in October), 1,660 had signed, 62 of them Nobel Prize winners.

The Heidelberg Appeal didn't get a lot of press attention here, but it must have caused some ripples. Now we have the "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity." This was signed by 1,575 scientists, including 99 Nobel Laureates, and was organized by the Union of Concerned Scientists. This group says that human beings and the natural world are on a "collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. . . . No more than one or a few decades remain before the chance to avert the threats we now confront will be lost and the prospects for humanity immeasurably diminished."

Among other things, the group recommends moving away from fossil fuels to "more benign, inexhaustible energy sources," expanding conservation and recycling, and stabilizing population. (Given the Union's suspicion of all things nuclear, it's not quite clear what energy sources the group is talking about. But vagueness and hyperbole are part of winning the hearts and minds of people, and that is what this battle is all about.)

So, there you have it. Surely 62 Nobel Prize winners can't be wrong. On the other hand, 99 probably are. —JSS


Gary Becker and the meaning of life —

Herbert Spencer once wrote that life is "the definite combination of heterogeneous changes, both simultaneous and successive, in correspondence with external coexistences and sequences." Most people, of course, hate such definitions, so they are not likely to care much for Gary Becker, 1992 recipient of the Nobel Prize for Economics. After all, Becker is the man who defined "altruistic" as meaning "that *h*'s utility function depends positively on the well-being of *w*." Like Spencer's definition of life, it is precise. At first glance, Becker's definition seems simpler than Spencer's contribution. But not so his elaboration:

$$U_h = U[Z_{1h}, \dots, Z_{mh}, \psi(U_w)]$$

and $\partial U_h / \partial U_w > 0$

where U_h and U_w are the utilities of the altruist and his beneficiary respectively, ψ is a positive function of U_w and Z_{jh} is the *j*th commodity consumed by *h*.



"I'm not sure about the meaning of life, but I've got it narrowed down to either mountains, snow, or wind."

It is easy to make fun of such constructions, but they have their place — an important place — in intellectual life. And libertarians, who have been exposed to so much nonsense about egoism and altruism, should pay especial attention to Becker's treatment of this topic.

But it is not just because of Ayn Rand's baleful influence that many libertarian readers react negatively to such theorizing (that is, their utility functions are negatively affected by exposure to Becker's work, or, their utility functions positively depend on a negative appraisal of Becker's work, or . . .). The long stretches of algebra and symbolic logic in Becker's books are formidable, and it is easy to dismiss equilibrium theories of marriage, sex, procreation, infidelity, etc., as unrealistically simplistic. And I must say that I, too, am floored by Becker's assumption that tastes do not change over time.

Nevertheless, Becker has had an important and largely wholesome effect on the economics profession. Prior to Becker, the assumptions of economists about such topics as family behavior, race, and sex were so broad and poorly thought-out that whole ideologies could slip in and pretend to science. (Just think of socialism's effect on educational thought.) But now, methodological individualism has its foot completely in the door of the economics profession. Can *normative* individualism be far behind?

Yes, Becker is pretty much a free-marketeer. A member of the Chicago School, he is a colleague of some of the most important economists of our time: Milton Friedman, Ronald Coase, the late George Stigler, a host of others. The curious reader who wishes to see what the Nobel Prize Committee is up to these days, or simply wishes to engage in a little mind-expansion, might try reading his books. *A Treatise on the Family* (from which I took the above quotation), *Human Capital* and *The Economic Approach to Human Behavior* are certainly worth the effort, though they are definitely *not* written for the economic novice. His prose is very clear, but wading through the math is no picnic. (I am reminded of the adage that an Austrian economist is an economist who can't do calculus. Perhaps this is why I lean towards the Austrian School.)

So what is a mathematophobe to do? Becker writes columns for *Business Week* which are eminently readable. He has appeared on television news-interview shows. But these forums will hardly do. Thankfully, his wide influence has had a happy side-effect: he has been "popularized." Henri LePage's *Tomorrow, Capitalism* offers a simple overview of his work. It is not only readable, it is *exciting*. Fellow Nobel Laureate Theodore Schultz's *Investing in People* is a good popular exposition of the Chicagoite population theory that Becker has contributed so much to, and is also one of the best attacks on the modern Malthusians. (Alas, it is out of print. But it is available in used book stores and at any good library.) And David Friedman's *Price Theory* wittily excurses into the far reaches Becker has made home.

So: What is the meaning of life? I won't say that Gary Becker answers that question with any degree of finality. But by applying simple economic theory to areas other than stock markets and budget deficits, Becker has made a noble effort to make life more understandable.

And I am happy he got the Nobel Prize.

—TWW

Election '92:
gospel truths

The New Civic Religion

by R. W. Bradford

Elections in the United States are best understood as ritual of a new religion. Consider the carnival that just passed by . . .

Now that the election is past, the press has moved its focus from why Bill Clinton should be elected to what a wonderful human being he is and what a swell president he will be. So far as I can determine, Jacob Weisberg is the only Clinton-fawner who has had even the vaguest of second thoughts. The overwhelming majority of other newsfolk remain enamored of their man, and act more like public relations flacks than reporters.

What else is new? I recall after the Reagan victory in 1980, many in the press turned away from dumping on Reagan and began to fawn over Ronnie as though he were a movie star. I remember Dan Rather grovelling before Pat Robertson after Robertson's surprise victory in the Iowa caucuses in 1988. Who can forget the "Kennedy-mania" that gripped the press (and the country) after JFK's hair's breadth victory over Nixon in 1960? Or the "Trudeau-mania" that swept Canada after loony Pierre's election in 1968?

Part of this swooning is simply success-worship, a characteristic trait of *Homo americanus*. Just as Americans conclude that money-making is evidence of intelligence in a businessman, so they conclude that electoral success is evidence of wisdom and moral virtue in a politician. Another element is simple boot-licking: the President has many jobs to hand out, and some members of the press corps hope to follow in the heroic footsteps of John Chancellor, Ron Nessen and Pierre Salinger. And the President has favors to dispense to reporters, ranging from granting private interviews to calling on a reporter at a press conference.

But there is more to this swooning, I am convinced. It is a natural element in the civic religion that has replaced Christianity as America's faith. This religion has many tenets, and though they are generally not stated baldly, they underlie much of public life in America. Among those dogma are several that go a long way toward explaining the mysteries of the electoral and post-electoral process.

Each of our votes really makes a difference. This belief underlies the repeated exhortation to "get out and vote," and the whole array of variations on the argument, "If you care about the future of your country (or your own future), you should vote." The proposition that each of our votes makes a difference is absurd, even on the face of it. Once in a great while an election, invariably at the local level, is tied or won by a single vote. When this happens, the proponents of voting publicize it far and wide, citing it as evidence that "every vote counts." In reality, the extreme rarity of such cases illustrates the fact that your vote really doesn't make a difference. If you doubt this, ask yourself how many times you have voted and how many of the elections involved would have different outcomes if you hadn't voted. The answer for virtually all Americans is the same: in a lifetime of voting, their vote has never swung an election.

A corollary to this proposition underlies the two-party monopoly: *Don't waste your vote* by voting for an independent or third party candidate. Your vote is a valuable possession because it really makes a difference, but you waste it if you don't vote for a candidate with a chance of victory (i.e. a major party candidate). Of course, this makes even less sense than the original proposition that your vote makes a difference. In the overwhelming majority of elections, one of the two contending major party candidates have no more chance of winning than minor party candidates. Why, for example, would any proponent of the "don't waste-your-vote" argument vote for Bush? By election morning, his chance of victory was the same as Ross Perot's or Andre Marrou's: virtually none at all.

Voting is a virtue in and of itself. "At least he voted," people will say. The Advertising Council produces "get-out-the-vote" advertisements imploring people to vote even if they are so ill-informed, indifferent, or unmotivated

that they have no opinion. Some of these ads even suggest making up one's mind while in the voting booth.

Of course, this makes no sense. Is it really virtuous to go to the polls to vote your own narrowly defined self interest, which may be completely contrary to the common good? Is it virtuous to cast unreflective, thoughtless, ignorant votes? Apparently most Americans think so, else why would people respond favorably when someone says, "I didn't know who I was going to vote for until I got in the voting booth, but I voted."

Winning an election confers a mandate upon the victor, thanks to its demonstration that Americans have a consensus on the important public issues they face. Virtually every election is followed by earnest explanations that the election constitutes a "mandate for change" or an "mandate to stay the course," not to mention platitudes like, "the people have spoken."

This is idiotic. For one thing, very seldom is an election won with any substantial margin. Of the 42 presidential elections held under the current electoral system, 15 were won without a majority of voters. Two were won by candidates who finished second in the popular vote. Obviously there were no mandates in these cases.

But it is difficult to perceive a mandate even in the most lopsided victories. Consider the two presidential elections in which the winner amassed the largest victory: Lyndon Johnson's election in 1964 with 61.2% of the vote and Richard Nixon's election in 1972 with 60.7% of the vote.

Lyndon Johnson captured 61.2% of the vote in 1964. Naturally, Johnson claimed the people had granted him a mandate for substantial policy changes. Yet in 1960, when Johnson ran for vice president with Kennedy on substantially the same platform, the ticket received only 49.7% of the vote and in 1968, Johnson was so unpopular that he felt obliged to drop out of the presidential race. When Johnson's vice president tried to carry on the LBJ program, he managed to capture only 42.8% of the vote.

Did the American voters change their minds twice within that 8-year period about what direction they wanted the country to go? Or was Johnson's huge majority in 1964 the product of other factors — say, sympathy for the martyred JFK, a desire to stabilize government in the wake of the assassination, and a panicky fear of Barry Goldwater, who had been portrayed in the press as a lunatic?

In 1972, Richard Nixon captured 60.7% of the vote. Yet four years earlier, he was elected with only 43.4% of the vote. Two years after his landslide victory, he was forced to resign from office, and in the subsequent election his party's nominee (and his hand-picked vice president) captured only 48.8% of the vote. Did the voters intend a mandate to enact Nixon's program in 1972? Or did they vote for

him for other reasons — for example, gratitude at his having wound down the Vietnam war, a fear of the widely perceived radical leftism of the opposing candidate, or a desire for stability after the chaos of the 1960s?

"Let the word go forth, from this day and hour, that a new generation of Americans . . ." intoned Jack Kennedy upon his election. Yet fewer than half of Americans voted and fewer than half of those voting cast their ballots for Kennedy; he out-pollled his opponent by a margin of about 0.15% (i.e. one vote out of every 600 cast), at least according to official figures, which probably reflect significant vote fraud. Meanwhile, the opposition party made major gains in the Congress.

Of course, there are some electoral victories that do constitute mandates for change. A careful examination of electoral history reveals three "mandate" elections: 1980 (Ronald Reagan), 1936 (Franklin Roosevelt), and 1920 (Warren Harding). Reagan wrested the presidency from an elected incumbent by a substantial margin, brought numerous members of his party into Congress, and was re-elected by an even larger margin. And he did so running on a platform that differed from current and recent past policies, and was very well known to voters.


Roosevelt had ousted an incumbent in 1932, but that year he ran on a platform of smaller government, lower taxes, the gold standard, and a balanced budget. Upon his election, he immediately abandoned this platform and adopted policies diametrically opposed to much of it. The

fact that FDR promised one program and delivered another without upsetting the voters supports the hypothesis that in 1932 the voters were primarily rejecting Herbert Hoover, not issuing a mandate for the radical program that Roosevelt eventually enacted. By 1936, Roosevelt's program was partially enacted, and voters knew what he was about; he was re-elected with an even larger majority.

In 1920, Harding captured the White House from the opposition with 60.5% of the popular vote, on a platform calling for a return to isolationism, tax reduction, and smaller government. He died in office before having a chance to run for re-election, but not before his program was largely enacted. His successor was re-elected with 54% of the vote, despite the entrance into the race of one of the most credible third-party challengers of this century. (Robert LaFollette captured 17% of the vote.)

But that's it. Try as I might, I cannot see that any other presidential election qualifies as a "mandate for change." That's three elections out of 42, or one election every 84 years, wherein the voters demonstrated anything resembling a mandate for change. In most elections, the electorate splits its votes pretty evenly between two candidates whose programs are very similar. The voters intend no mandate at all.

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
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Armed with our mandate, our leader is able to solve our problems. When Nazism was in flower, Americans liked to make fun of the *Führerprinzip*, or "leadership principle." Yet in our own country, we observe it with religious fervor. If we elect the right person president, he will solve our problems. In times of crisis, the right man comes to the fore, takes charge, and America continues to fulfill its destiny as the greatest country on earth.

I think it is safe to say that the United States has only faced two great crises in its history: the unraveling of the Union that culminated in the Civil War, and the Great Depression that seemed to threaten revolution. In the first case, the winner of the critical election won with less than 40% of the popular vote, the smallest vote to elect any president since political parties took hold. Lincoln's election itself precipitated the Civil War, which resulted in the loss of over 620,000 lives, the destruction of billions of dollars of property, suspension of the Constitution, and the imposition on the nation of conscription, income taxes, and inflationary paper money. In the second case, the nation elected as its president a man who enacted and imposed a political program hardly different from that of Mussolini or Hitler (aside from Hitler's racism), and from which the U.S. still suffers.

Of course, both Lincoln and Roosevelt the Younger are remembered today as great men who saved their nation. These were cases of self-fulfilling prophecies: whoever is leader of any nation during any crisis will be remembered as a great man if the nation prevails. Since Americans are enamored with the *Führerprinzip*, they are inclined to give

Why, for example, would any proponent of the "don't waste-your-vote" argument vote for Bush? By election morning, his chance of victory was the same as Ross Perot's or Andre Marrou's: virtually none at all.

credit to their leaders when they prevail in a crisis. In fact, the United States prevailed and prospered despite the actions and policies of Messrs Lincoln and Roosevelt. They were not great men; they had greatness thrust upon them. And greatness would have been thrust upon anyone else elected in 1860 or 1932.

How well does the electoral process work? Look at the results. In the half century since World War II ended, we have used this electoral process to select:

- a power-hungry career politician, who has never had a job outside politics;
- a second-rate clubman, incapable of uttering a coherent sentence;
- a modestly successful actor who turned to politics when his movie career faltered;
- a peanut farmer, dependent for his living on a government-granted license guaranteeing a substantial income;
- a career politician, who used the power of his office to undermine the electoral process;

a megalomaniac who made himself a multi-millionaire while in elected office, raised taxes repeatedly, and got us into a war that cost billions of dollars and tens of thousands of American lives;

- a playboy pushed into office by his ambitious father;
- a retired military leader;

a failed haberdasher, who advanced in politics as the agent of a corrupt political machine.

Can you imagine any of them achieving anything in any other field? Which of these men, if he hadn't pursued politics, could have been a successful scientist? a successful writer? a successful anything? Sure, the clubman made some money in business as a young man, before he began to pursue power on a full-time basis. Yeah, the military man was a bigshot in World War II, but this was a case of greatness thrust upon the man. Sure, the playboy "won" a Pulitzer Prize, but his book was written by a hireling and the prize was awarded only after his father spent a fortune campaigning for it. Only the actor had anything resembling a successful career outside politics.

Indeed, the two presidential contenders during this same period who demonstrated genuine character were soundly defeated. I refer, of course, to Barry Goldwater and Eugene McCarthy, both men of conviction, and considerable decency and honor. Goldwater won his party's nomination, only to face humiliating defeat in the voting booth. McCarthy managed to unseat the incumbent president of his own party, but failed to come close to capturing its nomination.

Once the people have spoken, we must unite behind our leader. This is a correlation of the last two principles. We give our leader a mandate and he solves our problems. But if we perversely refuse to unite behind our leader, then his hands are tied, and our problems may get worse.

The commentator on ABC-TV who exhorted us to unity behind our new leader and excoriated Sen. Bob Dole for saying that he expected his party to provide critical oversight on Clinton based his beliefs on the *Führerprinzip*. (He stopped short of accusing Dole of treason, barely.)

The desire for a mandate and for unity takes many amusing forms. My own favorite example was USA *Today's* headline the morning after the election: "LANDSLIDE." This was an enthusiastic characterization, to say the least, considering that Clinton got a smaller percentage of the popular vote than Michael Dukakis got when Bush clobbered him in 1988.

In fact, since our current electoral method has been in place, only two presidents have ever been elected with a smaller portion of the popular vote than Clinton's. In 1912, Woodrow Wilson took advantage of a split in the Republican Party to sneak into the presidency. Wilson's administration brought us the income tax, World War I, the effective abolition of freedom of speech, and national prohibition. In 1860, Republican Abraham Lincoln was elected with 39.6% of the vote, thanks to a split in the Democratic Party. His election brought us the Civil War and all its attendant horrors. Let's hope Clinton's administration will be better than these.

The Civic Religion has many other doctrines, equally unexamined, equally idiotic, but all serving a critical function. They are lies on which our civic life is based. □

Election '92: how it happened

The Blunder Thing

by Chester Alan Arthur

Democracy is that system of government under which the people, having 60,000,000 native-born adult whites to choose from, including thousands who are handsome and many who are wise, pick out a Coolidge to be head of the state. It is as if a hungry man, set before a banquet prepared by master cooks and covering a table an acre in area, should turn his back upon the feast and stay his stomach by catching and eating flies. —H. L. Mencken

A lot has changed since Mencken penned those words more than six decades ago. For one thing, the array of those who might be considered for the presidency is vastly expanded, both by custom (the genre now includes women and African-Americans) and by population growth. Yet somehow, out of the 190,000,000 Americans qualified to be president, the choice came down to Bill Clinton and George Bush, or possibly Ross Perot. Faced with this absurd menu of candidates, a plurality of the minority that voted elected Bill Clinton.

Because people like to believe that they live in a rational world and that the institutions of their country are efficacious, they are inclined to view elections as a case of the better man winning. The winning candidate, people like to believe, merits victory on the basis of his superior ability. A somewhat more sophisticated version of this prejudice is that the winning candidate is the one who runs a better campaign, the one who better judges the temper and addresses the needs of the people.

Hogwash. Clinton won the 1992 presidential election primarily because he was lucky. He was elected because he happened to be in the right place at the right time. His victory was the product of two extraordinary developments that no one foresaw: the public relations dance of H. Ross Perot and the incredible foolishness of George Bush.


Two years ago, no one guessed that the 1992 Democratic nomination was a desideratum. George Bush had clobbered Michael Dukakis in the 1988 election, and his popularity was soaring. He was president at the same time that communism collapsed, and Americans, not very sophisticated in their

analysis, saw in this coincidence evidence of Bush's greatness. He had conquered Panama, striking a decisive blow against drug-use and showing up that lousy little greaser dictator. Best of all, he had kicked Saddam Hussein's ass, winning a war with hardly an American casualty. The world was ours, and George Bush was the most popular president since John F. Kennedy on November 23, 1963.

"Bush had nothing to do with the collapse of communism," I wrote at the time, "but in the bovine mind of the American voter, he gets credit. He will bask in sky-high approval ratings until the economy falters or he is found in bed with a sheep."

Bush avoided the ovine variant of the Jimmy Swaggart problem, but he couldn't avoid the softening economy. Retail sales slowed, unemployment inched up, real estate values declined, and support for Bush dropped. Even so, as 1992 began, Bush looked like a sure winner. The Democrats were disorganized, *Pax Americana* prevailed, and Bush maintained a substantial lead in the polls. And to ensure his overcoming his many problems, Bush had a campaign staff waiting that had proved its genius in his come-from-behind victory in 1988.

The wiser Democratic hopefuls — Mario Cuomo and Al Gore — stayed out of the race, figuring Bush was a dead-cinch winner. But a bunch of second-tier Democrats threw their hats in the ring, realizing the odds were very long, but hoping a long shot might pay off. A retired senator from a very liberal New England state, a former governor of California who had spent time in an ashram in India after being tossed from office by a huge majority, an obscure governor of a tiny, poverty-stricken southern state,



and a couple of sitting senators from farm states fought ignobly for the nomination.

The rest is history. For once, a single Democrat quickly emerged as front runner. The press, fearing the public might lose interest in the campaign, anointed a billionaire eccentric with credibility, and the Ross Perot campaign had a boomlet. Perot's campaign had two major themes: the economy is a mess and George Bush is a clod. Of course, Perot was correct on both points, but this was merely a coincidence.

On the economy, Perot rightly identified two causes of America's economic malaise: the perennial and institutional budget deficits and the unwillingness of the American government to take charge of the economy to help the U.S. regain its lead in heavy industry and high tech. His focus on the deficit problem made sense, but his treatment was as bad as the disease: tax increases. His proposal that we elect an experienced businessman as president and have him take command of the economy is nuts, of course. In a lesson he (and his supporters) apparently missed in the news about the collapse of communism, complete central control of the economy (*à la* Stalin, Mao or Perot) works even worse than the partial control practiced in the U.S. and Western Europe. But his railing about the economy gained adherents, as any nutty economic theory seems to do in this country. And he helped keep the focus of the campaign on the economy, and spread the perception that something new was needed.

Perot's hatred of Bush dates back to some perceived slight he suffered at the hands of Bush a decade or two past. But personal hatred is never very popular with Americans, so Perot expressed his animus in rather conventional politi-

Politics is not about reality. It is about perception of reality. What was important in 1992 was that Americans perceived an economic crisis and wanted a scapegoat to blame it on.

cal terms: he incessantly criticized Bush, sometimes sensibly, other times idiotically. All the while, he said hardly a single critical word about Clinton.

By the time the Democratic Convention rolled around, the constant attacks from Perot and the blahness of the economy were taking their toll on Bush. Meanwhile, Clinton had planned a convention as a gigantic public relations event. In the one touch of genius in his campaign, he scheduled all the left-liberal nuttiness that plagues the Democratic Party for a single night, Tuesday, July 14. That just happened to be the night that baseball's all-star game was played. In a single touch, he satisfied his party's nutty fringe (the certified oppressed groups, open-handed feminists, minorities, homosexuals, etc.) while the great majority of voters liable to take offense at the orgy of demands, begging, guilt-tripping and gobbledegook were busy watching baseball. But the rest of the convention was a show for middle Americans, designed to stress how different Clinton was from the sort of left-liberal hacks the Democrats like to nominate.

On Thursday, just before Clinton gave his acceptance

speech, Perot dropped out of the race, virtually endorsing the Democrat Clinton.

Suddenly Clinton was ahead in the polls. Even at that point, the race was Bush's to win.

It's All Up from Here

It was Bush's darkest hour. But the strategy that would have won him re-election was obvious, even to Bush himself.

Clinton (and the news media) had repeatedly said that the economy was the paramount issue of the campaign. The public perceived the economy to be a mess, and was looking for someone to blame. The economy, by any conventional measurement, was not in terribly bad shape. Sure, unemployment was up, and people were inclined to think they were in a recession. But things were no where near as bad as in 1932 or 1980, the other times this century that an incumbent President had been turned out of office.* In 1932, banks were failing, the stock market was dead, people were losing their life savings, and unemployment stood at 25%. In 1980, interest rates were over 21%, inflation was over 10%, unemployment stood at 9%, and the stock market was a disaster. In 1992, inflation stood at 3%, unemployment stood at 7%, interest rates were around 6%, and the stock market was booming. The more fundamental problems that America faces — the decline of its industrial base and the weakening of its financial power are institutional in nature. They result from the arrogant and popular consensus that American workers deserve to be the best-paid in the world, irrespective of their productivity, that all Americans are entitled to infinite spending on medical care, that regulation of business is a good thing, and other firmly held clauses of the American credo. But obviously, these clichés cannot be challenged in a political campaign, any more than a British politician could challenge the similar elements in the British credo during the long decline of Britain from 1920 to 1970.

Politics is not about reality. It is about perception of reality. What was important in 1992 was that Americans perceived an economic crisis and wanted a scapegoat to blame it on. Clinton, with the very important aid of Ross Perot, put the blame on Bush, leaving Bush in such bad shape that he was quickly comparing himself to Harry Truman, who came from behind in 1948 to win re-election.

At this point, what did Bush need to do to win? The answer is obvious: blame the economic mess on somebody else, preferably somebody associated with his opponent.

And good luck had provided George Bush with a perfect scapegoat for the nation's economic problems: Congress. Blame the economic mess on Congress and tell the American people the only way to fix things is to get a new Congress. Attack Clinton only tangentially as an agent of the "old politics," as a member of the Democratic Party that had con-

* Except for 1912, of course; but this was a very special case. In 1908, incumbent president Theodore Roosevelt decided against running for a second term. As a result of the immensely popular Roosevelt's strong support, Taft easily captured the presidency. In 1912, Roosevelt repudiated Taft and ran as an independent. Taft, who had never been very popular, finished a distant third and Democrat Woodrow Wilson captured the White House with a minority of the popular vote. It's as if Reagan had retired in 1984, turned the presidency over to Bush, then got fed up with Bush and come out of retirement to challenge him in 1988. Come to think of it, that wouldn't have been such a bad thing . . .

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Congressman Sam Steiger, 1976

In 1976, I was the Arizona Libertarian Party's candidate for the congressional seat held by Morris Udall.

I lectured people who weren't interested. I debated when I should have discussed. I talked when I should have listened. I talked down to everyone.

If there was an offensive, shocking way of presenting a libertarian position—I used it.

Every so often, people would try to agree, but I didn't notice. I

couldn't take 'Yes' for an answer.

My campaign taught me how to lose friends and alienate people.

Finally, it sunk in. My problem wasn't other people. It was the man in the mirror. Me.

Do You Lose Friends And Alienate People?

Some libertarians have a more-rational-than-thou attitude. Or smarter-than-thou. Or more-principled-than-thou. Or more-ethical-than-thou.

Are your 'discussions' really lectures? Do you try to convince by beating the other person into submission? Do you behave like a tormentor, not a mentor?

And when you fail to persuade, do you blame the listener? The other person isn't rational enough, or intelligent enough, or good enough? It's always their fault?

That is the road to permanent failure.

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The people you don't convince are showing you what does not work. Are you paying attention?

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The Art Of Political Persuasion.

I felt stupid and embarrassed by my campaign in 1976. But I was determined to salvage something from my experience. I wanted to learn the art of political persuasion.

I began to read. It's now over 1,000 books on psychology, epistemology, semantics, salesmanship, cybernetics, self-help, hypnosis, communication and creativity.

I interviewed specialists in communications and persuasion. I asked questions and took notes.

I applied the scientific method to everything I learned. I tested every approach, technique and format. I observed and listened.

I began to write up my results. *How To Get Converts Left & Right* and *The Late, Great Libertarian*

Macho Flash were published by *Reason*.

I followed these with more articles: *The Militant Mentality*, *The Myth Of Mushrooms In The Night*, *Leveraging Liberty With Language* and *Intellectual Judo*.

The libertarian audience wanted more, so I launched a seminar. *The Art Of Political Persuasion Marathon Weekend Workshop* has been offered all over the United States and Canada.

Then, I tested my teachings in the field. I was the organizer and fund-raiser for the 1988 *Marrou VP Campaign*, *Project 51-92* ballot effort and the 1992 *Marrou For President Campaign*. Between Fall 1987 and Fall 1991 I raised more than \$500,000 for these projects. \$519,344 to be exact (source: FEC).

Now, after 12 years of study, testing and results, I have produced a three hour audio tape learning program: *The Essence of Political Persuasion*.

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Andre Marrou, 1992 Libertarian Party presidential nominee.

"I've personally listened to Michael Emerling's political persuasion tapes several times. This program is great. It's a necessity, not a luxury, for all libertarians."

Jim Lewis, 1984 Libertarian Party VP nominee and 1992 *Marrou For President Campaign* Manager.

"Michael Emerling's political persuasion tapes are superb. I have listened to them many times. I continue to be impressed by the power and sophistication of his techniques."

Vince Miller, President of International Society For Individual Liberty (I.S.I.L.).

"I have a set of these political persuasion tapes. I had to learn it before I could teach it. Thank you very much, Michael Emerling."

Marshall Fritz, founder of Advocates For Self-Government

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trolled both houses of Congress practically without interruption for 60 years.

Aside from that, all Bush had to do was act Presidential, occasionally remind the voters that he was the triumphant warrior who conquered Panama and Iraq, and take credit for masterminding the collapse of communism. And it wouldn't have hurt anything to dump the moronic Dan Quayle from his ticket, replacing him, say, with war hero Colin Powell.

But the focus of his strategy had to be an attack on Congress. Congress has never been a prestigious institution, but in the summer of 1992 its reputation was near its lowest point in history. More than a quarter of the members of the House of Representatives had bounced checks in the massive House Bank scandal. Dozens of members of Congress decided to retire rather than face the voters. The so-called gridlock that afflicted government had two components: the Democratic Congress and the Republican presidency. When the Democrats tried to blame all the problems on the Republicans, the Republicans didn't even defend themselves, let alone take the offensive.

Meanwhile, two profoundly important anti-Congress and anti-Democratic Party issues were sweeping the land: the balanced budget amendment and term limits. Like the House check-bouncing scandal, these issues were ready-made for exploitation by a Republican president. Congress had failed to balance the budget for more than 30 years. Congressmen had become arrogant to the point of seeing nothing wrong with writing rubber checks. Congress had

What should Bush have done? Stump the country and denounce Congress. However unpopular he may have been, he was not as unpopular as Congress.

voted itself so many perks that it was practically impossible to oust an incumbent.

What should Bush have done? The answer was obvious.

Stump the country and denounce Congress. Tell voters that we need a balanced budget amendment to force the power-drunk Congress to get spending in line. Fire the members of his administration (e.g. Dick Cheney) who had bounced checks, indignantly telling the American people that he could not tolerate such behavior. Demand term-limitation for members of Congress, just as we already have term-limitation for the presidency. Make the election a referendum on Congress. However unpopular Bush may have been at this point, he was not as unpopular as Congress.

Bush Blows It

But Bush didn't. He refused to follow that course, instead going against his own personal values and running for president on a goofy platform crafted by the nutball religious right. The Republican convention was a disaster, from Pat Buchanan's virtually fascist speech the first night to Pat Robertson's lunatic speech the second, to the celebration of Bush's mega-family the third. The American people watched

at least a few did and they yawned. The only people moved by the carefully staged proceedings were those already firmly in Bush's camp: the religious right. (C'mon, what chance was there that the anti-abortionists and family-values crowd were going to jump to Clinton, with his well-publicized extra-marital affairs, his support for the right to abortion and gay rights, and his shrill leftist wife?) The Democrats scheduled their pandering to their embarrassing special interest groups for the night of baseball's All-Star game, when those most likely to be offended were not watching. The Republicans spread theirs out for days, for anyone even cursorily interested to watch.

After the convention, Bush flailed around for issues. Once in a while he hit upon a good one, but he didn't have a clue about how to exploit it. He endorsed term limits and the balanced budget amendment but didn't make much of these issues. He didn't take the moral high ground on the check-bouncing scandal, apparently because he couldn't bear to fire his staffers who had bounced checks in Congress. (Wouldn't they have been willing to fall on their swords for their boss, *à la* John Sununu?)

For all Bush's rhetoric about how he was another Harry Truman, he ignored the crucial lesson of Truman's come-from-behind victory: he refused to run against Congress. He refused to focus his campaign on the one way he could win, or on anything else, for that matter.

The high point of the Bush campaign — the one moment when it was possible to believe that Bush could pull it together — was Ronald Reagan's wonderful speech at the Republican Convention. It was pure Reagan, a marvelous articulation of the American idea, a rousing call to action in defense of American values and vision. Characteristically, the Bush campaign scheduled the speech for the small hours of the morning when the television audience was at its smallest. Late in the campaign, Reagan made a valiant effort to save Bush. He failed. It is tempting to praise Reagan for his loyalty and his guts. But maybe he was trying to expiate his guilt for foisting George Bush on the American people in the first place.

Bush's failure to focus the campaign on Congress is hardly surprising. Bush is so unfocused in his thinking that he can barely talk. In thirty years of public life, he has never shown any commitment to any idea or any skill in articulating the aspirations of his constituents. His success resulted from his personal loyalty to those in his party, his willingness to play by the rules, his sheer persistence.

Bush's idiotic campaign strategy handed the presidency to the Democratic nominee. Clinton didn't really need to campaign, and he hardly did. Oh sure, he toured the country by bus and jet, staging photo opportunities and handling reporters' softball questions. But he was merely going through the motions of a campaign. His campaign was that of an incumbent with a huge lead, confident of victory if only he avoids mistakes. Mario Cuomo would have done just as well. So would Jerry Brown. So would Mickey Mouse.

Bush could have been re-elected. He managed to blow the tremendous advantages of incumbency and the prestige he had as a heroic conqueror and the mastermind behind the collapse of communism, and lose the election to a compulsive liar who had dodged the draft and spent most of his

continued on page 30

Election '92: prophecy

Clinton, the President

by Chester Alan Arthur

Both friends and enemies of Bill Clinton think they know him. But they don't.

What sort of president will Bill Clinton be? A lot of political conservatives are panicky about Clinton's election. Rush Limbaugh, for example, sees Clinton as some sort of left-wing monster who will raise taxes, increase welfare spending, and ultimately turn the U.S. into a socialist ant farm — unless the public wakes up and pays more attention to Rush.

As much fun as Rush Limbaugh is, I have to warn you: he is totally nuts on this issue. Bill Clinton is no more a left-winger than I am. He has a public record of more than 20 years that reveals him to be a politician whose ideology consists of one single proposition: *Bill Clinton ought to run things*. No other principles are evident at all.

Despite his claim to be an environmentalist, he has allowed chicken-factory operators to fill Arkansas' rivers with chicken manure. Despite his claim to support organized labor, he has lured industry to Arkansas by touting its anti-union legislation. Despite his claim to support education, Arkansas has just about the worst schools in America.


Sure, Clinton made some promises during his campaign to gain support from the Democratic Party's left-wing constituencies: more money for government employees (especially school teachers), more spending on the environment, higher taxes on the rich. Sure, he has political debts to labor unions (especially government employee unions), to minorities anxious for more government aid, to environmental lobbyists, and other groups vying for a more prominent place at the government trough.

Before you get too worried about these promises, remember that Bill Clinton is a liar, and an extraordinarily skilled

one, as he demonstrated in the Jennifer Flowers affair. He supports whatever policies he thinks will best enhance his own personal power and popularity. But he has a long record of backing out on solemn promises, of giving his word to one side on an issue, then supporting the other when he saw a personal advantage in doing so. That is how he earned the nickname "Slick Willie," and why he was so unpopular with both the left and the right in Arkansas. As president, Clinton will be glad to stab those who elected him in the back, just as he stabbed everyone in Arkansas from anti-abortion activists to environmentalists.

More than two months before he takes office, Clinton has already taken a stab at one important ally. Clinton openly courted gays and lesbians, accepted their campaign contributions (more than \$2.5 million, according to the *New York Times*), and promised to end discrimination against gays and lesbians by the federal government within his first 100 days in office. On election night, gays and lesbians took to the streets to celebrate Clinton's victory. "This is a rite of passage for the gay and lesbian movement," said Urvashi Vaid, executive director of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Forces. "For the first time in our history, we're going to be full and open

partners in the Government." In virtually his first act as President-elect, Clinton announced that the armed forces would no longer discriminate against gays. But when military leaders objected and it became evident that rank-and-file soldiers opposed the move, Clinton quickly backed off his commitment. "I have made no decision on a timetable," he said on Nov. 16, and left the door open for wa-



tering down the anti-discrimination order. So much for his promise, and for the \$2.5 million gays gave to his campaign and the 3,250,000 million votes they cast for him, versus 650,000 votes they cast for Bush.

Ordinarily such skill at mendacity and willingness to break one's word are major assets to a politician. In Clinton's case there is a problem: his confidence in his skill as a liar is so great that he has no prudence in choosing when to lie. His lies about his anti-war activities, his draft-dodging activities, and his dope-smoking were foolish on two grounds. There was substantial and credible evidence to prove he had lied. Those lies didn't gain him anything. The majority of his generation opposed the war and smoked marijuana while in college (and actually inhaled), and the overwhelming majority of men of his generation did everything they could to dodge the draft. Other politicians have admitted to these *faux pas* without the voters punishing them. If Dan Quayle can remain the darling of conservatives after admitting he "experimented" with the evil weed, then certainly Bill Clinton could have survived such an admission.

So far, his compulsion to lie to enhance his popularity has not been a problem. The electorate was so fed up with George Bush's bumbling, incoherent lies and charmed by Clinton's novelty that they simply ignored the evidence of Clinton's mendacity. But the public's mood is mercurial, and it may grow tired of his compulsive lying. On the other hand, his brilliantly delivered lies may help maintain his popularity.

In the absence of any convictions aside from his lust for power, the character of the Clinton presidency will be determined by the kinds of incentives he faces. What sort of pres-

Clinton sticks knives in the backs of political acquaintances the way LBJ kissed babies: with great frequency and no inhibitions.

ures will be brought to bear on him? What sort of policies will seem likely to advance his political power?

These are difficult questions to answer. The winds that blow an unprincipled individual like Clinton change with public opinion. And public opinion changes very quickly indeed. In less than two years, George Bush went from being America's most popular president to being dumped from office with the smallest percentage of votes of any incumbent president ever — even less than Herbert Hoover got in 1932 at the depth of the Great Depression.

While it is impossible to predict with precision what sort of policies Clinton ultimately will support, one thing is certain: *Clinton will not address the fundamental problems that confront America today.*

Clinton cannot address the fundamental economic problems this nation faces because practically all the constituencies that supported him favor continuation of the ruinous policies of higher taxes, higher spending, and greater government regulation. He might be willing to turn on some of his supporters, but he will not turn on *all* of them.

Of course, there has been an example or two of a politician turning on his supporters and restoring his country to some sort of sanity. In Argentina, for example, the nutball Peronists elected Carlos Menem in 1989. The Peronist policies of huge government subsidies for public works and high wages for everyone, combined with ruinous regulation and huge government deficits, were what got Argentina into an awful mess (inflation of 200% *per month*) in the first place. Nevertheless, Menem soon initiated a huge and successful privatization effort. But cases like Menem's are extremely unusual, and occur only when the situation is desperate. The U.S. is wealthy enough to go on for a long time with huge deficits, subsidies to favored constituencies, and the other policies favored by Clinton's supporters without the situation getting as bad as that in Argentina. More likely, the U.S. will continue a long, slow decline. If you want to know what to expect in the U.S. during the next 50 years, look at what happened in Britain between 1910 and 1970.

More important, Clinton will never address fundamental problems because doing so requires a serious intellectual understanding of how the economy functions and a commitment to doing what is best for the country. Clinton's commitment is to enhancing his own personal power; that is virtually all that he cares about.

What will the Clinton presidency be like? Most likely, it won't be much different from the Bush presidency, except that Clinton will raise taxes faster than Bush did (Clinton promises to raise the top income tax rate from 31% to 36%; Bush raised it from 28% to 31%), will have bigger budget deficits (all those hungry government employees and welfare-bums to feed), and will increase the acceleration of regulation above its already high rate under Bush.

Many people see Clinton as another Jimmy Carter: a southern governor who managed to patch up the old Democratic coalition of labor, blacks and government employees and win the presidency. I don't agree. Carter had a considerable amount of personal integrity. But there are important similarities. Neither had a clue about how to manage the economy, and both had substantial debts to traditional Democrat constituencies. The *effect* of Clinton may be remarkably like the effect of Carter.

But more likely, Clinton's presidency will take the form of Lyndon Johnson's. Like Johnson, he is compulsive about maintaining and enhancing popularity. Like Johnson, his sole interest in life is the pursuit of power and its perks. Like Johnson, he is so accustomed to lying to achieve his ends that the concept of truth seems to have lost all meaning for him.

But there are two major differences between Clinton and LBJ. Clinton is a far better public speaker than Johnson, a skill that should serve him well. Unlike Clinton, Johnson realized that his credibility with power brokers and politicians required that he generally keep his word when he made a deal. Sure, if there was a tremendous amount to be gained, he would knife an ally in the back. But Clinton sticks knives in the backs of political acquaintances the way LBJ kissed babies: with great frequency and no inhibitions. Clinton seems totally convinced that his charming and skillful lying can see him through any problem.

It should be a very interesting presidency. □

Election '92: vox populi

Perot's 200-Proof Populism

by Bill Kauffman

Populism is strong stuff. You can defeat it on the floor of the Senate, send it home to bed on election day, castrate it and call it a "new covenant," but the appeal of Perot's electronic town-hall shows that the people still like it.

By campaign's end, Ross Perot was bedaubed with the usual smears — dictator, demagogue — that blacken anyone who threatens the cozy *status quo*. (Ask Huey Long or George Wallace or Malcolm X.) The Vital Center has triumphed again: the palefaces set aside their petty quarrels long enough to rout the rumbustious redskins and send the rebel chief, bloody but unbowed, back to Texas.

No Perotism quite so frightened our rulers as his proposed "electronic town hall" by which citizens would give their representatives an ear full of *vox populi*. Ed Rollins and the other mercenaries who hopped on and off the Perot gravy train were reportedly aghast that their wagon master actually *believed in that direct democracy stuff*. Now that the Clinton morning has dawned, the threat of the plebiscite can be reinterred, quietly and without ceremony.

The details of the electronic town hall were always sketchy: Perot had no stable of bought-and-paid-for policy wonks to grind out legislative sausage.

The referenda he envisioned were mostly advisory, although the votes on taxation may have been binding. Even foreign policy was to be reviewed by the benighted multitude; this really invited derisive snorts. Imagine: a working stiff in Iowa having a say in the momentous question of war and peace!

In fact it was on this very ground that Perot's radical but inchoate plan stood on firmest terra. A national referendum on war was a staple of middle American populism in the final days of the old republic. The Anti-Imperialist League demanded a nationwide vote on the annexation of the Philippines. As anti-Hun propaganda heated up in 1915-16, William Jennings Bryan and senators Robert LaFollette and

Thomas Gore advanced variations on the referendum model.

The Great Commoner declaimed: "I so believe in the right of the people to have what they want that I admit the right of the people to go to war if they really want it. There should be a referendum vote about it, however, and those who voted for war should enlist first, together with the jingo newspaper editors."

The people never got the vote, but they sure got the war(s).

The war referendum's most famous incarnation was as the Ludlow Amendment, namesake of an Indianapolis Democrat who, as a cub reporter, visited his city's first citizen, ex-president Benjamin Harrison. The old general, rocking on his front porch, lectured young Louis Ludlow, "We have no commission from God to police the world." The lad never forgot.

Ludlow's amendment stated that "except in the event of an invasion of the United States or its Territorial possessions and attack upon its citizens residing therein, the authority of Congress to declare war shall not become effective until confirmed by a majority of all votes cast thereon in a nation-wide referendum. Congress, when it deems a national crisis to exist,

may by concurrent resolution refer the question of war and peace to the citizens of the States, the question to be voted on being, Shall the United States declare war on _____?"

Like Perot, Ludlow claimed that technology (in his case radio) made feasible a national vote. Americans would listen to debates between interventionists and isolationists; an informed citizenry would then march to the polls (or drop a



postcard in the mailbox) to determine whether Johnny would go marching off to war. In an uncanny (and unconscious) echo of Ludlow, Perot told *TV Guide* that until American homes were equipped with interactive televisions, postcards might serve as ballots.

Ludlow's amendment reached the House floor only once, in December 1937, and was defeated in a procedural vote, 209-188. Ah, conundrum: Ludlow enjoyed widespread popular support (68% in a Gallup Poll) but, absent a binding referendum, so what?

Our ancestors were cast in the roles you'd expect. Arthur Krock (now played by David Broder) huffed, "No more fantastic proposal has ever had serious consideration in Congress." The *New York Times*, in best Larchmont-lord-dismissing-the-uppity-Irish-maid fashion, sniffed, "The consensus of well-informed opinion is strongly against this plan." Well, gee, in that case I guess we'll just drop the whole thing . . .

George Bush's hero, Henry L. Stimson, presented the establishment case. "When we come to the important question of whether we shall submit to a major surgical operation we do not hold a popular referendum among our friends and count noses." No, we defer to "chosen experts" to whom we have "entrusted the determining factors of our fate." They are "extremely conservative in deciding to fight," Stimson assured readers in a statement that has aged poorly, rather like the putrescent corpse of a Dakota doughboy rotting in Belleau Wood.

The Perotian town hall is 200-proof populism. Its elevated view of The People recalls blind Senator Gore, who once said, "The voice of the people is the nearest approach to the voice of God." Perot told us that we were "the owners of the country," a locution alarming to our rulers, who regard folks west of the Hudson and the Beltway as halfwit Klansmen who can't be trusted to run our own schools or raise our own kids.

The people are now seen as a rude beast who must be taxed and disciplined and regimented and placated with mildly titillating TV shows. Their involvement in law-making would run afoul of the Constitution! scream our legion of Klocks, whose calm was unruffled when George Bush twice committed the impeachable offense of ordering U.S. troops into war without a formal congressional declaration. "Congress cannot be counted on to check the

Administration in any war crisis." The National Council for the Prevention of War understood this six decades ago. Can anyone today seriously demur?

The most cogent criticism of the electronic town hall, made by the weekly *In These Times*, is that the bounds of debate could be set "by the corporate media and the leadership of the Democratic and Republican parties." The mind numbs and the eyelids droop at the thought of the free-wheeling iconoclasts John Chancellor, Tom Brokaw, Ron Brown, and William Bennett demarcating the limits of acceptable opinion. Which they do now, come to think of it.

The electronic town hall ought to be dedicated to major questions of policy that can be answered Yes or No: Shall the U.S. declare war on [fill in the enemy of the week]? Shall the personal income tax be raised/lowered by X percent? The public should hold a veto over war and tax questions; votes on other issues can be merely advisory.

Basic liberties must be placed beyond electoral negation, as Perot made clear. Congress must remain — or be restored to its position as — the premier law giving body. Of course it's folly to expose relatively minor issues (e.g. the legal drinking age) to nationwide popular vote, but isn't the greater folly permitting Uncle Sam any say at all in such matters?

If the Republic to which the Republicans insist we pledge allegiance still existed, there might be valid forceful objections to national referenda. As it is, plebiscites are a last ditch chance to keep our rulers from stealing our money and sending our kids off to kill and die in foreign wars. Letting the people speak — nice phrase, Mr Wallace — is a first step toward overturning the empire and restoring the republic. Don't let the Incumbent Party and its servile corporate press bury Ross' best idea. □

Arthur, "Bush Blows It," continued from page 26


years as governor fornicating with bimbos and networking with yuppies. He deserved his fate, just as America deserves its fate in the hands of Clinton.

The most remarkable thing about the election just past is that George Bush could have been re-elected, despite his bad luck and the array of forces against him, but he decided instead to shoot himself in the foot.

God bless the United States of America! □

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Election '92: sideshow

Behind the Electoral Disaster

by Chester Alan Arthur

Libertarians hoped for their biggest vote ever. They got their smallest.

On November 3, more than 100 million Americans went to the polls to cast their votes for president. About one out of every 350 of them chose to vote for the Libertarian Party nominee, Andre Marrou. That was about 35% fewer than voted for LP nominee Ron Paul in 1988, despite the fact that the total number of voters was up 10% and Marrou's name was on the ballot in all 50 states (Paul appeared on the ballots of only 46). Marrou's share of the total vote was down 47% from Paul's. And Marrou got only 30.5% of the non-major candidate vote, the lowest LP total since 1976. No longer is the LP the preferred means of protest for voters: its small lead in this category was the result of its being on the ballot in far more states than any other minor party.

The best way to evaluate the relative performances of LP presidential nominees is to compare their vote totals in the 29 states in which their names have appeared on every ballot since 1976. The results are not encouraging:

1976	.35%
1980	1.21%
1984	.33%
1988	.49%
1992	.28%

Most amazing of all, in 30 of 50 states Marrou set a new record for the *lowest Libertarian Party vote total in history*. On

this unhappy list appear all three of Marrou's "home" states:

- In Alaska, where the LP is traditionally strong and where Marrou served in the state legislature, he took a minuscule 0.55% of the vote, down 80% from the LP's previous worst showing.

- In Nevada, his current home, he captured 0.37% of the vote, down 63% from the LP's previous worst showing.


- In Texas, where he was born and reared, he got only 0.32% of the vote, down 43% from the LP's previous worst showing.

Put plainly and simply the performance of Andre Marrou was the *worst* of any LP candidate.

Marrou's dreadful performance caught just about all LP activists and leaders by surprise. Former Marrou campaign manager Michael Emerling kept a written record of vote predictions. Various campaign officials estimated between 600,000 and 1,500,000 votes. Emerling himself predicted 400,000. My prediction (made in the last issue of *Liberty*) of 300,000 was the only one anywhere near the final tally. On election day, Steve Givot, who had managed the campaign since April, thought Marrou would get more than 3,000,000 votes!

But I can appreciate the logic of those who thought Marrou would do better. After all, the LP was on the ballot in all 50 states, and had managed to do so at much lower

New Record Low Votes for LP Presidential Nominees



cost than before. The LP has grown tremendously during the past four years, both in membership and in financial resources. The LP purchased national television spots for the first time since its impressive showing in 1980, and Marrou had campaigned full time for more than a year, far longer than any previous candidate.

These were all genuine advantages. So how could Marrou get only 288,000 votes?

What went wrong?

The success or failure of a political campaign depends on three factors: the candidate, the management of the campaign, and the political climate. The most successful campaigns are the product of good management, an attractive, articulate candidate, and a public susceptible to the candidate's message or his charms. But the best candidate won't do well if his campaign is mismanaged or the public is hostile to his campaign. Nor can a well-run campaign save a bad candidate. And a bad candidate or a poorly-run campaign can seldom win, even in the best political climate.

Coming into the 1992 election, Libertarians had reason for optimism. In 1990, the LP had doubled its vote share in Congressional races, thanks to growing voter dissatisfaction with "politics as usual." As 1992 began, a weakening economy, an incoherent president and a bumbling and corrupt Congress had further alienated voters. Contestants for the Democratic Party's nomination competed in distancing themselves from Washington. An extreme-right winger challenged the incumbent Republican president and consistently captured 20% or more of the vote. But this was no

Put plainly and simply the performance of Andre Marrou was the worst of any Libertarian Party candidate.

victory for his far-right rantings: in states where his name was not on the ballot, "none-of-the-above" got a similar percentage of the vote.

Furthermore, the LP was in very healthy condition. Its membership stood at 9,104, its highest in history. It was in good financial shape and had already achieved ballot status in 23 states.

So how did the LP do so badly? Even within the LP, spin doctors are at work. According to the most widely promulgated theory, the political climate was the problem. Sure, the public was alienated, angry and receptive to new ideas and new candidates. That was just the trouble, the spin-doctors argue. The public was so receptive to alternatives to politics as usual that a major, highly visible candidate put together his own campaign and stole votes away from Marrou.

This theory is nuts. Libertarians should remember that when conditions are right for third party or independent challenges, other candidates are *likely* to emerge. It has always amazed me that Libertarians always seem to plan

their campaigns on the premise that theirs will be the only credible challenge to the Republicans and Democrats. True enough, in 1984 and 1988, when voter dissatisfaction was low, the LP mounted the only national challenge to the two-party oligopoly. But in 1980 and 1992, voter dissatisfaction was high. Other politicians — John Anderson and Ross Perot — perceived the opportunity for a successful challenge and jumped in, leaving Libertarians surprised, hurriedly returning to their drawing boards to revise their strategy.

It's not like Libertarians have a monopoly on independent challenges to the major parties. Libertarians must remember that the only time they are likely to have the field to themselves is when the political climate for independent challenges is lousy. Every LP campaign strategy should reflect this political reality. Libertarians must prepare to move to the forefront when voter dissatisfaction runs high, to grab the position of challenger for themselves. Or they must accept the fact that they will be back in the pack with the nut parties. But whining over the fact that someone other than they noticed voter dissatisfaction and jumped into the race is only an excuse for failure.

The emergence of Ross Perot certainly cut into the LP vote total. But with voter dissatisfaction so high, the emergence of a credible independent like Perot was inevitable, like souvenir vendors at a parade or hookers at a Republican convention.

And the failure of the Marrou campaign went well beyond the problems engendered by the emergence of Ross Perot. If the steep decline of the LP vote were solely the result of Perot sopping up independent votes, then we could expect other third parties' vote share to decline in the same way. But that didn't happen. The LP vote shrunk by 35%, the aggregate vote of other minor parties shrunk by only 22%. The LP share of the third party vote actually shrunk by more than 5%. (Oddly, the *LP News* headlined its election coverage with "LP Solidifies Standing As *The Third Party*.")

Plainly, we must look beyond the "Perot factor" to find the cause of the electoral disaster.

The Campaign

Getting your candidate's name on the ballot is the first major hurdle of any third party or independent campaign. The LP managed to get on the ballot in all 50 states, plus the District of Columbia. This it had achieved only once before, in the 1980 campaign, when vice presidential nominee David Koch anteed up over a million bucks to help finance the campaign. Even the competent 1988 campaign of Ron Paul failed to get on the ballot in four states. And the LP managed this feat at relatively low cost. Getting on the ballot is a major task, invariably beset with emergencies. LP Treasurer Bill Redpath, who ran the ballot access campaign deserves a medal for his efforts.

Another remarkably effective job was done by MeMe King, who arranged Marrou's media appearances. Marrou had appearances on radio talk shows all over the country, plus national exposure in both television (Larry King, MacNeil-Lehrer) and print (*People*, *USA Today*). Another

plus: the campaign raised a substantial amount of money, and put a record number of volunteers into the field.

I have an unscientific way to gauge of the effectiveness of an LP campaign: the number of times I see or hear something about the LP candidate in the news media. (I exclude sightings that I sought out after being told where to look; e.g. if a friend calls up and says, "There's an article about the LP in *People* magazine.") By this standard, the 1992 campaign was a major improvement over the campaigns of 1984 and 1988, though it lagged far behind the 1980 campaign. I made dozens of sightings in 1980, though I didn't keep count. In 1984 I kept count, but it wasn't much of a job: the final number was zero. Things weren't a lot better in 1988: in February, I saw Ron Paul on CNN's *Crossfire* while channel-surfing. But that was it. The final count for 1988 was one sighting. This year, the count was way up: a newspaper article on Marrou's victory in the primary in Dixville Notch, New Hampshire; a syndicated column on the Marrou campaign by William Safire; an interview with Marrou in *Backwoods Home* magazine; a short feature on Marrou in *USA Today*. Four sightings: three more than in 1988 and four more than in the invisible 1984 campaign.

I only managed to see one television spot, and this was the result of an assiduous effort. I called Steve Givot, the Marrou campaign staffer in charge of television advertising, and got the schedule of Marrou ads on CNN Headline News for several days. I recorded several four-hour slots in which the ads were supposed to appear and reviewed the tapes, but never spotted an ad. I finally saw one at 2:05 a.m. election day; I had been told where and when to look.

The campaign could have done better with its television advertising. Determined not to make the mistake of ignoring television as the Ron Paul campaign had done, the LP and the Marrou-Lord campaign spent \$136,000 on television advertising. Unfortunately, most of it was spent on spots on local and cable television, where the cost per advertisement is relatively low, but the cost per thousand viewers is relatively high. Only three ads were placed on over-the-air networks, all on the evening before the election.

An even bigger problem was the content of the ads.

"The ads have no libertarian content whatsoever," explained Steve Givot, the LP executive in charge of television advertising. Ideological ads were rejected because many voters reacted negatively to them when they were tested. Rejecting an ad because many voters react negatively makes good sense for major political parties. After all, for

them, winning the election is everything, and that usually means winning a majority of votes.

But Libertarians have no real prospects of capturing the presidency. For them, success is getting 1% of the vote; 2% would be hailed as a miracle. The task the LP faces is coming up with reasons to motivate people to vote for their candidate instead of one that might win. You can't get people to vote for you when you have no prospect of winning unless you give them a reason. After eliminating any expression of libertarian ideas, the ads could only suggest that people fed up with the Republicans and Democrats ought to vote for the LP. This is not a compelling argument.

The ads that ran election eve didn't even go that far. They merely condemned network coverage of past elections for failure to report Libertarian votes. They did not offer a single reason for anyone to vote for a Libertarian candidate.

But this is a small criticism. A political campaign is a substantial enterprise, decisions have to be made quickly, and mistakes are inevitable. Overall, the LP campaign was pretty well managed. But it operated with one major handicap.

The Candidate

There's not much doubt that Marrou was a bad candidate. He lacked the stature of Ron Paul, the financial resources of Roger MacBride, the support that Ed Clark had mustered. More importantly, he was far less articulate than any previous LP candidate. Listening to John Hospers or Roger MacBride or Ed Clark or David Bergland or Ron Paul talk about politics, you could visualize a freer, better future, and appreciate the breadth and vigor of libertarian ideas — you could see libertarianism as a revolutionary and important vision. Listening to Andre Marrou, you often got the idea that Libertarians are some sort of goofy



700,000
VOTES

300,000
VOTES

200,000
VOTES

right-wing nuts who favor drugs.

Marrou also presented problems on the campaign trail. There was the "woman problem." The trail of angry and bitter women in the wake of Marrou's campaign appearances didn't help build the party; often his abandoned conquests left the party, sometimes taking other activists with them. His proclivity for inappropriate jokes of a sexual nature also caused problems. One Marrou staffer suggested that there might be an inverse correlation between Marrou's appearances on radio talk shows (where his "humor" was often evident) and his vote totals.

Then there is "the character issue."

Although he had managed to keep it quiet, Marrou had been dodging bill-collectors for years. Along the way, he had engaged in what appear to be acts of petty fraud, and left personal debts for the campaign to pay.

Those on Marrou's campaign staff knew of his liabilities as a candidate even before his nomination, but felt that with their help he could overcome his handicaps. But as 1992 began, campaign staffers Perry Willis and Jim Lewis had begun to learn about his character problems, and were increasingly frustrated with his liabilities as a candidate. In February, Perry Willis telephoned LP Chair Mary Gingell to advise her of the problems with the campaign.

Things continued to get worse. In early April, Willis had had enough. He prepared a bill of particulars, in the form of a lengthy memo.

Addressed to "Libertarian VIPS — LIMITED CIRCULATION," the nine-page memo detailed the "Fraud,

The only time Libertarians are likely to have the field to themselves is when the political climate for independent challenges is lousy.

deceit, misrepresentation, and financial irresponsibility by Andre Marrou." It listed 55 specific instances of Marrou's problems, charging him with everything from outright fraud to gross waste of campaign money on personal expenses to a history of running out on debts to abusing campaign workers. Among the more amusing highlights:

- Marrou had been divorced four times, not twice as he had always said.

- When Marrou moved to Alaska, he stopped making court-ordered child-support payments to his second wife.

- When Marrou rented his home to his campaign (he had moved to New York where he lived with his fiancée, LP Senate candidate Norma Segal), he had mentioned that he was behind two house payments. But he had failed to explain that he had failed to pay six monthly and two balloon payments, resulting in the campaign facing immediate foreclosure. He also failed to warn them that the phone and water were about to be cut off for failure to pay the bills. The campaign avoided the embarrassment of foreclosure by making a partial payment and negotiating an understanding with the note holder, and got the phone and water back by paying the outstanding bills (\$375 for the phone, \$15 for the

water), plus hefty deposits. "Six months and two balloon payments behind is very different from two months behind," the memo noted. "Andre either lied to us or he is an air head. You decide. Our experience leads us to consider both theories equally plausible."

- Among the papers the staff had discovered in the house Marrou had rented to the campaign were unopened bank statements for Project 51-92, the political action committee he had formed to help the LP obtain ballot status in all 50 states.

- "Because of Andre's personal behavior, activists in four states (Arizona, New Hampshire, Michigan and Massachusetts) have asked that we not send Andre back to their state. When criticism from activists was reported to Marrou, "Andre's response is always, 'Libertarians are all assholes. Who are you going to believe — them or me?'"

- He repeatedly tried to arrange to have his fiancée travel with him at campaign expense, sometimes hectoring the staff into agreement. "Andre requested again and again that he and his fiancée be brought to Vegas for Christmas, at campaign expense. Perry protested that he had no use for Andre in Vegas during that period, let alone Norma [his fiancée at the time]. Andre persisted, and Perry finally gave in. The total cost was well over \$1,000." He also took his fiancée with him at campaign expense on trips to Alaska and to Dixville Notch, New Hampshire, and to extend his stay there at the luxurious Balsam Hotel (\$284 per night) beyond the length recommended by Michael Pearson, his Dixville Notch campaign manager.

- He frequently treated reporters in a foolish fashion, e.g. he "verbally assaulted" one, "engaged in a shouting match" with another. In New Hampshire, he was a half hour late for an interview because he didn't respond to staffers knocking at his hotel room door, though the staffers could hear him and his fiancée inside the room.

- Probably the most serious charge involved Project 51-92. Without telling other officers, he applied for and got a credit card in the name of the corporation, which he proceeded to use for personal expenses. He had made false statements on his credit card application.

Willis's memo was circulated to staffers MeMe King and Jim Lewis, former campaign manager Michael Emerling, and to LP vice presidential nominee Nancy Lord, with the idea that all would sign it and pass it on to the LP National Committee, scheduled to meet in a few days. All but Lord agreed to sign. Lord was reluctant to sign, fearful that she might appear to be trying to undermine Marrou and obtain the presidential nomination for herself. With the date for the meeting closing in, Emerling prepared his own bill of particulars, including 21 pages of documentary evidence, and sent copies by Federal Express to every member of the National Committee.

In a tense meeting, the Committee discussed the charges in Emerling's letter and questioned Marrou for seven hours. Although several of those present believed the evidence to be quite convincing, the committee ultimately decided against removing him from the ticket. NatCom members have told me two reasons for their decision. They were concerned about the legality of such a move, though the provision of the LP By-Laws allowing the National Committee to

remove a nominee for violation of the LP platform would seem to have justified his removal. NatCom members were also reluctant to embarrass the campaign, and concerned that such a controversy would reduce financial support from members.

It was plain, however, that Marrou could no longer work with his staff or competently manage his campaign himself. The NatCom took control of the Marrou campaign, dispatched an LP employee to Las Vegas to bring all campaign records back to Washington where they could be sorted out, set up a special fundraising effort to provide Marrou with money to pay his debts, and glossed over the whole problem in an article in the *LPNews*.

Whether this was a prudent decision remains a subject of debate, but many in the LP have doubts about the wisdom of the cover-up. Removing a presidential nominee for financial improprieties may have obtained substantial and favorable publicity, the sort of media "breakthrough" that the LP has fantasized about.

Under the direction of Steve Givot, Steve Alexander, and Steve Dasbach (henceforth known as "the Steves"), things didn't get a whole lot better. By June, Givot, who had emerged as *de facto* campaign manager, was writing a nasty letter to Marrou, with copies to other campaign staffers. "If I wanted to design a scenario in which a campaign would really get fucked up, it would be a candidate who is totally irresponsible. It is my assessment that this is precisely what is happening with this campaign." He proceeded to support this charge by taking Marrou to task for some of the same problems that Willis and Emerling had observed earlier. "FACT: When we spoke about the need to phone in daily, I explained that it was necessary so that we could start putting out regular news releases You were, quite reasonably, insistent that nothing be sent out prior to your knowing about it Well, sir, we have failed to send any news releases for the last week because you didn't do your part — a simple fucking phone call. I guess you were too busy getting laid to make a quick call!" Givot cited ten more such "FACTs," before concluding by telling his candidate, "It is time for you to start acting like a professional politician, not like a fifteen-year-old who expects the world to cater to him and who accepts no responsibility for his state of affairs If you find [this] embarrassing, great! You should be embarrassed by your recent behavior."

On October 27, Givot circulated a mock press release on Marrou-Lord stationary, quoting Marrou confessing to a range of problems: "I dumped my fiancée for a tryst with someone I had known less than 48 hours, I bitch about getting media scheduled, then cancel media appearances at the last minute for arbitrary reasons without contacting my campaign staff. I bitch about press releases being sent without me seeing them, but I never call the person issuing them so there is no fucking way the poor soul can get an approval. I have more rules governing my availability than the FAA puts on airline pilots. I require the campaign to spend thousands to satisfy my prurient sexual whims"

And so the campaign bumped and sputtered along. When it was over, a collective sigh of relief went up from his staff. A week before the election, when *People* magazine reported that Marrou was "retiring from politics," the reaction

among LP leaders was celebratory. "We have it in writing," one told me, "he has promised never to run again." There was also a lot of guffawing at his stated reason for his retirement: running for office "cost me nearly a million dollars in lost income." When Marrou reiterated his retirement announcement at an election-night gathering, *de facto* campaign manager Steve Givot left the party for a few minutes. He later explained that he had gone to the men's room where he could shout with glee and jump up and down in celebration.

How had it happened? In defense of those involved, Marrou brought some strengths to the campaign. When he

"Well, sir, we have failed to send any news releases for the last week because you didn't do your part — a simple phone call. I guess you were too busy getting laid to make a quick call!"

was properly briefed, he responded pretty well to reporters' questions, especially on television. He was also a very effective lobbyist for easier ballot access laws. And those around him suffered from wishful thinking. As Perry Willis put it, "I was guilty and so were NatCom and Michael Emerling of overlooking his character problems and of wishful thinking — hoping we could work around his personal quirks that were hurting the campaign."

How many votes would a better candidate have received? One LP leader told me that he figured the total would have run about 500,000. When I expressed surprise at the figure, he added that he meant that Marrou would have drawn 500,000 votes if it weren't for "the character issue," and that he didn't have a good idea of how much higher the total would have been if the LP had nominated an attractive, articulate candidate. A former Marrou staffer told me he figured that an LP candidate other than Marrou would have pulled 1,200,000 votes. He based this estimate on an extrapolation of votes cast for LP Senate candidates. I haven't seen his data, but it appears he ignored the Perot factor, so I think it safe to say that he over-estimated the damage Marrou did to his own campaign. Another party leader told me that although Marrou was a terrible candidate, no other candidate would have done any better, thanks to the Perot factor.

My own best guess is that, given the growth of the LP, the Perot candidacy, and the climate of voter opinion, a candidate without Marrou's drawbacks would have drawn somewhere in the range of 600,000 votes.

A Silver Lining?

The news was not nearly so bad elsewhere for Libertarians. Over a million people voted for an LP Senate candidate, in the 20 states where the LP fielded one. On average, the Senate candidates received 5.05 times the vote of Marrou. The LP received 1.95% of the vote in those races. In Georgia, LP candidate James Hudson got 3% of the vote, enough to force a runoff between the other two candidates. Hudson endorsed the second-place finisher, Republican

Paul Coverdell, as did the Republican Liberty Caucus. Coverdell accepted the endorsement of the libertarians, an act that earned him an attack from Democrat Wyche Fowler. Coverdell went on to win the runoff on Nov 24.

Similarly, I am told, LP candidates did quite well running for lower offices. Voters elected four LP members to the New Hampshire legislature, though three of these also ran on the Republican ticket and the fourth also on the Democratic ticket. And the LP achieved ballot status in 18 states, more than it ever had at this point in the electoral cycle.

The relative success of LP candidates lower on the ballot is not surprising. There is almost always an inverted pyramid in the LP election returns: the higher the office, the lower the vote. Last year, I mentioned to Dick Boddie that I expected he would certainly get more California votes in his Senate race than would Andre Marrou in his Presidential bid. He repeated the story to LP founder David Nolan, who offered to bet me \$100 that Marrou would outpoll Boddie in California. This would be a sucker bet: in 1984, LP Senate candidates outpolled the relatively weak LP presidential nominee (David Bergland) by an average of 82%; in 1988, LP Senate challengers topped a stronger LP presidential nominee (Ron Paul) by an average of 40%. Of the 27 cases where the LP had both senate and presidential candidates on the ballot in 1984 and 1988, the presidential nominee received more votes in only four cases. In an unusual fit of mercy, I declined Nolan's bet. As it turned out, Boddie got almost as many votes in California as Marrou got in the entire country.

Does the relatively strong showing of LP Senate candidates demonstrate an underlying LP strength? Or does it re-

The LP advances human liberty even when it loses elections. It has helped to change the political dialogue in this country.

fect the paucity of other alternatives to major party candidates in a year when voter dissatisfaction with Congress was at its highest ever? My own guess is that it is mostly the latter, and when the voters get over their anger toward incumbents, LP vote totals will soften considerably.

The trend of higher LP votes as a result of voter hostility toward politics-as-usual was very evident in 1990, when LP candidates for Congress on average doubled their vote from 1988. A careful examination of the 1990 election revealed that the increase in LP vote totals occurred without any correlation to LP campaign efforts. In numerous cases, candidates saw their votes double or triple despite the fact that they didn't bother to campaign at all.

Even in states where libertarian opinion seems strongest, the LP did very poorly. Colorado, where voters enacted term limits in 1990 and the toughest limits on taxes ever enacted in this country, the LP presidential vote fell by more than 60%.

The 1992 ballot proposals provide some fascinating data. There is a clear libertarian position on 25 of the 27 ballot proposals reported by the *New York Times*. Of these 25 proposals, voters agreed with the usual libertarian position 23 times. Fourteen of the 25 proposals were for term limits, a very popular notion in this anti-incumbent year. But even if you eliminate those from consideration, voters agreed with the libertarian position on 9 of 11 issues.

So it is plain voters are amenable to libertarian policy. Yet the Libertarian Party could muster only 0.28% of the presidential vote and 2% of Senatorial vote. This strongly suggests that the political entrepreneurial skills of those active in the LP are not very well developed. The plain fact is that no one in the LP has figured out how to turn libertarian sentiments into Libertarian Party votes. It's time to consider the question: is the LP the best way to pursue libertarian goals in the electoral process?

Abandon the LP?

In 1988, when I interviewed various Libertarian Party activists and leaders during the first hours and days after the election, virtually everyone was very discouraged. How, they wanted to know, could we do all this work and spend all this money and still only get 432,000 votes? They were discouraged, depressed and angry.

My reaction was different. I considered Ron Paul's 432,000 votes an impressive accomplishment. It was the LP's second-best total, and its second-best performance as a percentage of votes cast. Paul had improved the performance of 1984 nominee David Bergland by 90%. The LP had demonstrated that it was the vehicle of choice for protest voters, obtaining 48% of all the non-major candidate votes.

But all that has changed. The sharp decline in LP votes for president has conclusively demonstrated that the proposition that the LP is on the verge of becoming a major political force is just plain false. When the LP came from nowhere to get 171,000 votes in 1976, the notion that the LP was the party of the future seemed credible. When its vote total shot up to 920,000 in 1980, the day when the LP would one day challenge the Republicans and Democrats seemed almost at hand. The 1984 collapse to 227,000 votes was a step backward, but it was generally dismissed as the result of the horrible internal split in the LP at its nominating convention in 1983. The LP was back on the growth track in 1988.

But with the pathetic showing of the LP ticket in 1992, it is plain for all to see that the LP is not on the way to becoming a major force in electoral politics, let alone on the path to victory. It is increasingly plain that the LP has become a sideshow in the American political circus — a sideshow worth visiting, perhaps, worth a feature in *USA Today* or *People* magazine, but not an important factor in any sense of the term.

Not surprisingly, libertarians active in the Republican Party are renewing their call for LP members to join them in their efforts. There certainly are reasons for libertarians to involve themselves with the Republican Party. For one thing, the Republicans are generally open to libertarian ideas. For another, the Republicans are always looking for intellectual leadership. Perhaps most importantly, the Republicans are under siege from a lunatic group of evangelical Christians

establishing His Kingdom on Earth.* There is a genuine danger that the nut evangelical right will capture the Republican Party, transforming it from a party sometimes supportive of libertarian notions to one that practically always opposes liberty. Libertarians could play an important role in defending the pro-market, pro-individual liberty, pro-choice position within the Republican Party. And in the process, they could achieve considerable influence, and win a few elections along the way. In the election

just past, three former Libertarian Party activists were elected to state legislatures as Republicans (Duncan Scott in New Mexico, Greg Kaza in Michigan, and Penn Pfiffner in Colorado), in addition to the three LP members elected to the New Hampshire legislature while running on both the Republican and Libertarian tickets. Indeed, it seems to me that those LP activists who have their sights set on electoral victory would do well to join the Republican Party. In some localities, they have won victories on the ballot or in court that saved taxpayers enormous amounts of money.


But I am not convinced that winning elections is the *raison d'être* of the LP. I have been active in the LP since 1972, and I have never been convinced that electoral victory is a possibility in the short or even medium term. The purpose of the LP is to advance human liberty, not necessarily to win elections.

And the LP does advance human liberty, even when it loses elections. It has helped to change the political dialogue in this country. Some of the ideas Libertarians have advanced have moved into the mainstream: ideas like deregulation, privatization, and drug legalization. And Libertarians have helped promote such ideas as term limits, tax cuts and limits, and school choice.

Furthermore, LP campaigns help introduce libertarian ideas into the marketplace. For all the intellectualness of the libertarian movement, LP campaigns are one of the most effective ways of spreading libertarian ideas. This is not surprising: electoral campaigns are virtually the only circumstance under which most Americans are interested in politics — at other times, talking politics is generally considered to be in questionable taste.

Plainly, the time has come for Libertarians to abandon the notion that the LP is about to challenge the domination of Republicans and Democrats. Can Libertarians be happy realizing that victory is not in their grasp? Can we be satisfied with helping to change the direction of the American political dialogue while spreading libertarian ideas?

* I do not mean to suggest that evangelical Christians are all lunatics or even that most evangelicals involved in the Republican Party are lunatics. I refer to those who want the Republican Party to have an explicitly "Christian" agenda. Some of my best friends are evangelical Christians, as the saying goes.)



So I know that I am satisfied with a party whose influence is peripheral. But that's not news. I have never been convinced that the LP was about to be a major force. The intellectual tide has gone against liberty for decades, and I don't think it is about to change directions very quickly. But I remain convinced that the LP has a critical role to play in this important struggle.

But I don't know what answer other Libertarians will have to these questions. Different people have different temperaments, different interests, and different perceptions. I suspect that many will abandon the LP for other parties, and that some will begin to be active in both the LP and another party.

In the meantime, it seems safe to say that the LP will survive, if not necessarily prosper. Its membership is growing, and the willingness of its members to give it cash is growing even faster. I suspect that the terrible showing of Andre Marrou and the relatively strong showing of candidates lower on the ballot will touch off a movement within the LP to abandon the presidential race in 1996 to concentrate on races lower on the ticket.

But I doubt such a movement will succeed. For one thing, the party professionals are all convinced that the presidential race is a powerful way to raise funds (and pay their salaries). For another, dropping out of the presidential race will signal a retreat. More importantly, no party can credibly aspire to national leadership without running a presidential candidate. It is also relevant that, in terms of cost per voter reached, the cheapest way to advertise on television is to buy time

on the major, over-the-air networks, and the presidency is the only national political race for which such national advertising is relevant.

And we should remember, a well-managed, well-financed presidential campaign can provide coat-tails to those lower on the ticket, as happened in 1980, when presidential nominee Ed Clark outpolled 12 of the 15 LP senatorial candidates. He did so despite the fact that he faced the competition of John Anderson, a major independent candidate.

As an institution, the Libertarian Party is vibrant and healthy. As a political party, it is nearly comatose. For Libertarians to become a genuine political force, we must develop our political entrepreneurial skills. We must identify a candidate of the quality of Ed Clark, develop the means of financing a serious race in 1996, and develop a management team that won't repeat the mistakes of the past.

It's a very tough order. □

Appraisal

Revolution Betrayed

by *Ronald F. Lipp*

Something has gone seriously wrong in eastern Europe's transition from the privation of socialism to the prosperity of free markets.

The third anniversary of the revolution of '89 has passed, a minor footnote to the daily news of inaugural plans, stock market gyrations, and Super Bowl previews. The throngs in Wenceslas Square, the fall of the Berlin Wall, and the bloodshed of Bucharest and Timisoara recede from the

mind. Revisionists in both the United States and Russia are busy weaving their theories that American anti-Soviet resistance retarded, rather than advanced, the capitulation of the Soviet regime. And yes, the nuclear freezers are constructing a theory giving themselves credit for communism's collapse.

Meanwhile, central Europe staggers through its reforms. Government subsidies stave off the constant threat of massive bankruptcies, while privatization of state factories proceeds at a snail's pace. Farther east and south, things are worse. The coup of August 1991, which gave Gorbachev his due reward and offered evidence that there is sometimes justice in the world, is obscured in an endless succession of plots and intrigues as Russia continues its humiliating descent from heartland of the Evil Empire to belligerent international beggar.

In a broad arc from the Carpathian Mountains to the Caspian Sea, real or incipient bloodshed is a palpable reality. The carnage of Serbs against Slovenians, Croatians, Bosnians, is only the most appalling and unspeakable case. In Armenia, Azerbaijan, Nagorno-Karabakh, Moldova, Ossetia,

Georgia, Transylvania, Ruthenia and elsewhere ethnic violence has already claimed thousands of lives and the potential for uncontrollable warfare is an omnipresent reality.

Something has gone seriously amiss in the transition from totalitarianism and privation to freedom, free markets and prosperity. The heady expectations of three years ago have taken on a sour taste; the movement to reconnect the east bloc satellites with the west is sputtering; the hope of exporting western values to former Soviet states is in jeopardy. The time of counter-revolution and Jacobinism is everywhere. The future course of these societies hangs in the balance. At this historic moment, the west has lost its will and, perhaps, its capacity to play its crucial part.

• • •

In the flush of revolution, everyman loved free markets and knew just what they meant. An endless cornucopia of fresh fruit, computers, and BMWs. Rich uncle coming from America or Germany, throwing bags of money at every would-be entrepreneur. No pain, all gain. And the new politicians as-

sured him it was so.

And it has been so, for a few people in a few places, Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. There is a new vigor in Warsaw. The deadly, Stalinesque Palace of Culture, which looms over the city like a mausoleum now bustles with business. The sweaty part of capitalism — the flea market stalls that popped up in 1990 like mushrooms after the first rain are now permanent structures filled with real goods that real people want to buy. The "uptown" shops are full of western merchandise and people are buying.

Prague and Budapest too are undergoing transformation. Prague, in particular, is emerging as one of the great tourist centers of Europe. New shops are opening, hotels are rising, restorations of long neglected treasures of baroque and Jugendstil architecture are underway everywhere. The Czechs, having totally nationalized their economy in 1948, are proceeding with a massive reprivatization, restoring property wherever possible to its original owners (or their heirs), conducting private and public sales where

it is not. They are engaged in what may be the largest per capita denationalization of property in the world's history.

For the rest — Slovakia, Romania, Bulgaria, Albania, the broken pieces of Yugoslavia, and everywhere further east — the good fortunes have been few and made at great peril or in ways that won't bear close examination in the light of day.

And everywhere there has been a price. Warfare and chaos in the worst cases. Spiraling inflation, undreamed of unemployment, and massive bankruptcies in the Lucky Three. Worst in Poland because it has moved most rapidly. Worse to come in Czechoslovakia and Hungary.

And the money has dried up. Rich uncle stayed home. He put his money in mutual funds or lost it in the S&L crisis or invested it in the family business in Dresden. And when he did come, he had a lot of questions to ask about return on investment, repatriation of profits and other unpleasant and confusing issues. To be sure, there has been some investment, but since the revolution of 1989 the West Germans have put more new money into the East German lands in a single year than the total infusion of investment from all sources into all other central and eastern European countries combined for the entire three-year period.

The political and economic transformations have been both painful and chaotic. The pain inflicted in the transformations has exacerbated insecurity about the even greater changes to come. It also has strengthened the seductive lures of the resurgent communist, who whispers in the public ear, "You were better off in the good old days when everyone knew where he stood." The democratic reformers who led the exodus from communism have suffered serious erosion of their moral authority and popular support. And this deterioration has been accompanied by the divergence of opinions and fragmentation of political parties which is natural to any emerging order. The price paid has been a heavy one.

In Poland, the Solidarity movement split within months after putting its first government in place (led by Prime Minister Mazowieski) and soon lost its mandate to lead. With the collapse of the Polish reform movement, the coun-

try has seen three fragmented and unstable governments in quick succession. Solidarity demonstrators now chant, "He isn't one of us anymore." They refer to President Lech Walesa.

In Czechoslovakia's parliamentary election in June 1992, candidates of the successor party to Civic Forum failed to win a single seat; its counterpart in Slovakia — Public Against Violence — has virtually disappeared.

In Romania, the former Communists of Ion Iliescu came in first in the October 1992 parliamentary elections, but struggled to form a government. In a move typical of the irony of eastern politics, they consider ex-Prince Dimitrie Sturdza as a possible premier. The same result emerged from the concurrent elections in Lithuania, where

In the flush of revolution, Everyman loved free markets and knew just what they meant. An endless cornucopia of fresh fruit, computers, and BMWs.

the communists heavily outpolled the Saujudist movement. Only a year ago, the Saujudists, led by Vytautis Landsbergis, spearheaded the successful struggle for independence from the USSR. Today inflation is rampant, economic performance is plummeting, and fuel is short as winter approaches. In Russia and the Ukraine, economic reforms are compromised as a ransom to threatening reactionary movements. In Georgia, Tadjikistan, and elsewhere, "strongman" authoritarianism has seemed at times on the verge of taking over, and it very well may yet in Russia.

In country after country, a struggle is underway between democratic movements on the one hand and resurgent communists or their fascist successors on the other.

As in the past, central and eastern Europe is a seething cauldron of ethnic and national rivalries. As these emerging nations yoke up their agendas of unresolved conflict, the current environment of economic and political instability is the perfect medium for

development of violence. The multiple conflicts in devolving Yugoslavia, the fighting in Moldova, across the Caucasus, and elsewhere is well known. The potential for enlargement of this conflict is enormous.

Almost without exception, these conflicts are not limited to local political or ethnic clashes, but reach across and destabilize the borders of adjacent countries; creating the potential for real regional conflict. Moreover, they occur in regions where major powers have an interest and thus involve the relations among those powers. The conflict between the Yugoslav republics has already strained relations between Germany and its European allies. As the bloodshed spreads across the Balkans, it increases the risk of conflict along the borders with Hungary, Romania, Albania, Greece and Turkey, arouses the passions of related ethnic populations in those countries, and indirectly affects the EC and NATO through their general concerns for European stability and their specific relations with the Greeks and the Turks.

And for the first time, disturbances have resulted in the call for Russian troops to be sent outside the country to quell an ethnic conflict in a neighboring country. Against the backdrop of historic incursions into satellite countries and Afghanistan, and coming at a time of growing nationalist fervor in Russia, the long-term implications of this development are ominous.

Nowhere is the issue more clearly focused or immediate than in Czechoslovakia. The events of '89 had a special quality there, captured in the phrase "the velvet revolution." It was represented in the mind's eye by the peaceful throng of a half million crowding Wenceslas Square in Prague demanding freedom by their presence, and personified by the whimsical playwright, Vaclav Havel and the Civic Forum movement. It lacked the steadfast bravery and endurance of the decade-long Polish revolt (to which all these revolutions owe a great debt), the strategic importance of German reunification, the horrific brutality of Romania, and the high drama of collapse in the USSR. But it brought something else potentially more important than any of them.

Czechoslovakia was a special, al-

most unreal, place from the first, like a fragile crystal. It was created in 1918 by unification of two closely related nationalities of the Hapsburg empire, the Czechs and the Slovaks, and survived a scant twenty years until its sacrifice to Nazi aggression and western cowardice in 1938. But that fleeting moment was, at least on the Czech side, a kind of

Of leaders, there presently are none. John Major is no Margaret Thatcher, and Francois Mitterand is hardly even himself. Bill Clinton may, indeed, be George Bush . . . but what could be more depressing?

golden age. Centered in one of Europe's most beautiful capitals and proud of its vibrant bourgeois culture, it was the sole country in central or eastern Europe to preserve democracy and reject fascism during the turbulent '20s and '30s. It was able to do so in part because of the ideal of humane democracy exemplified by its founding father, Tomas Masaryk.

The Velvet Revolution hoped to preserve that humane spirit. Its founding father and national hero, Havel, espouses that ideal; the leader of its national government, Vaclav Klaus, is an avowed disciple of the libertarian economic philosophy of Milton Friedman. None of the former Soviet countries appears more dedicated to creating a genuine free market founded on principles of real private property rights. And by virtue of its geographic position, none seems better positioned to serve as a bridge between east and west.

Yet the country is poised to begin a divorce of Czechs from Slovaks at the beginning of 1993. That event will mark the first break-up of an emerging European country. And it will occur despite consistent polls showing decisive majorities of both Czechs and Slovaks to be opposed to the break-up.

The dissolution of Czechoslovakia will occur in part because of long-standing conflicts between the two

sides and in part because of serious blunders by both Czech and Slovak politicians. The Slovaks feel oppressed by the Czechs, despite (and perhaps because of) substantial subsidies from them and are hobbled by a relatively primitive economy, heavily dominated by agriculture and Soviet-era military and industrial factories. Slovak unemployment is four times the Czechs' rate. Czech plans for rapid privatization, promotion of free markets, and abandonment of communist social welfare institutions are viewed ominously by the Slovaks. Slovakia's distress is the inevitable product of conditions there and, in some degree a result of Czech heavy-handedness. But the Slovak reaction is also a consequence of the nearly complete lack of western involvement in development of the Slovak economy, disinterest in providing technical assistance to the Slovaks, and the absence of western moral support for development of free markets and individual rights in central Europe.

As a result of these factors, moderate democratic and pro-free market politicians, including the Slovak branch of Civic Forum, were swept aside in 1991 by a succession of increasingly nationalist and authoritarian politicians who have pandered shamelessly to Slovak fears and resentment. Of late, Slovaks have shown every sign of hesitating at the brink of divorce; in fact, a bill providing for its terms failed in its first presentation to the federal parliament in October. But the Czechs, attentive to the benefits of ending Slovak subsidies and the Slovak drag on the Czech's own reforms, now seem determined to separate.

Disengaged from the democratic and capitalist influence of the Czechs and isolated from the west, the new Slovakia is poised to become the first central European country to revert to socialism, nationalism, and authoritarian rule. Slovak leaders have increasingly endorsed a socialist welfare program, are substantially gutting freedom of the press, and are eroding other individual liberties.

In keeping with a time-honored tradition, they also are applying considerable energy to abusing their Hungarian ethnic population. Slovakia is a country of 5.5 million, with a Hungarian minority of nearly 700,000, concentrated in the

southern portion of the country, near the Danube River. On the far shore lies Hungary itself, with its own Slovak minority of more than 100,000. Tensions are already high, thanks to ethnic discrimination, and are further inflamed by a festering dispute over Slovak determination to dam and divert a stretch of the Danube to supply Slovak electric needs. There are some in Czechoslovakia who fear war between the countries. That seems unlikely, particularly in view of Hungary's dependence on western business and its aspiration to membership in the EC. But the potential for terrorism and insurrection is undeniable. The parallel to Northern Ireland is striking.

The response by the west to the re-emergence and travails of the new European states has deteriorated into impotence and, at least in the United States, virtual amnesia. This regression has several roots. The most important anti-communist, pro-free market political leaders have left the scene, replaced by more insular, disinterested successors. Political scandals, national elections, and gathering economic crises have heightened the local preoccupations and national introspection.

In the United States, the recession constrained government financial commitments and further inhibited already timorous businesses from undertaking new overseas investments. One might have expected the first Presidential election since the collapse of Soviet hegemony to have confronted the issue of the role of the "sole remaining superpower" and the shape of the "new world order." Instead, public distress over President Bush's apparent indifference to domestic problems, coupled with the xenophobic protectionism of Clinton and Perot, trashed any possibility of real debate over policy toward the ex-Soviet bloc. President Bush's one election campaign nod to eastern European concerns — a proposal to establish an enterprise fund for the Baltic nations, to be underwritten with a \$45 million contribution over three years — was an embarrassment of half-hearted tokenism.

The western European nations have shown no greater steadfastness. Germany is reeling from the disastrous economic consequences of Chancellor Kohl's election tactic of redeeming Ostmarks at a rate of 1:1, the political

repercussions of the Bundesbank's curmudgeonly determination to quench the inflationary consequences through monetary policy, and the rising neo-Nazi violence against Gypsies and other foreigners sweeping the eastern districts of the country. In Germany, there always lies just below the surface the tension between arrogance and guilt, between hatred of the other and hatred of one's self. Stalinism and Nazism

The real dystopia is in the Western world. We are self-absorbed, fixated on the near term and preoccupied with the superficial. And it isn't just that hard times limit the money for aid or investments.

speak to the same heart, especially in the east. It is difficult to recall that barely a year ago public commentators dreamt of a mature, self-confident Germany donning the mantle of leadership of a united Europe.

What united Europe? Remember Maastricht? EC '92? The European Community is confronted with the collapse of Maastricht, the realization by the Eurocrats that EC '92 will not fulfill their dream of establishing a unified statist regime across the continent, and continuing crisis in trade negotiations with the United States. Full membership by Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Poland is now said to be 10 to 15 years off, EC countries are undergoing serious second thoughts about allowing free movement of eastern and southern Europeans across their territory, and the EC appears committed to maintaining high barriers against entry of products like Polish produce and Slovak steel which might cost votes of French farmers and Belgian factory workers.

And of leaders, there presently are none. John Major is no Margaret Thatcher, and Francois Mitterand is hardly even himself. Bill Clinton may, indeed, be George Bush . . . but what could be more depressing? With the passing of the Cold Warriors, the unify-

ing theme is gone. With the passing of the '80s, the welfare state remains fundamentally in place and as destructive to the human spirit as ever and the spirit of free market reform has largely petered out.

Nowhere is the collective impotence and amnesia more compelling and appalling than in the disintegration of Yugoslavia and, especially, the case of Bosnia. In a stroke, the lie is put to hope for peace in post-Cold War Europe and genocide is reintroduced to the continent. Quite aside from the political and military implications for a united Europe or a new world order, not even the plight of massive suffering of innocents in the European neighborhood is given serious attention. While nations and societies of do-gooders roundly condemn Germany for stanching the flow into it of 50,000 refugees a month from across eastern and southern Europe, their own policies are quite another matter. Of 8,000 Bosnian survivors of torture and starvation in the Serbian prison camps, some 6,000 remained in detention as winter approached for lack of host countries to

accept them as refugees. Norway agreed to take 92 families, the United States 300, and so forth.

So we have come to dystopia. Throughout the newly emerging central and eastern European world, the movement from communism to free markets and individual rights is in distress, broken down, or — even in the most successful of these countries — in a time of great testing. But the real dystopia is in the western world. We are self-absorbed, fixated on the near term and preoccupied with the superficial. And it isn't just that hard times limit the money for aid or investments. The real need in these countries is even greater for intellectual support and moral sustenance. Neither the Germans nor the Japanese, for all their economic achievements, have the social character or civic philosophy to fill the need. There is only one place to get it: the original source, the home of those 18th century farmers who did it the first time. I wonder if we still have the capacity to do it or to understand as libertarians, for our own quite selfish purposes, why we should try. □

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In Freedom's Way

by James Ostrowski

Government grows inexorably; rollbacks of power are rare. Libertarians need to recognize the structural reasons why. Not that it will help much.

In 1960, the libertarian movement did not exist. The word *libertarian* was not in people's vocabulary. In the past three decades, that situation has changed. Libertarianism's currency is such that E. J. Dionne's highly influential book, *Why Americans Hate Politics*, treats libertarianism as a major force. Plainly, the influence of libertarian ideas — aimed at reducing government power — has grown tremendously. Which is curious, since a tremendous growth in government power over our lives has occurred during the same time.

Why does government continue to expand at the same time that libertarian ideas are becoming better known, more popular and more respectable? The answer to that question lies in certain structural features of our political life which are largely independent of the climate of ideas.

Structural Obstacles to Change

1. *Rational apathy.* The average citizen has no incentive to acquire an intricate knowledge of the superiority of the market over government. This phenomenon is called "rational ignorance." Furthermore, even those who have such knowledge have little economic incentive to engage in political action based on it because the costs of such action far outweigh any likely benefit received. This can be called rational apathy.

Rational apathy explains why special interest legislation is routinely enacted. Even though average citizens are continually nicked and dined to death by government policies that favor special interests, they have no economic incentive to do anything about it because the costs of taking successful action far outweigh the benefits. A person paying fifty dollars a year extra because of the sugar quota might spend a lifetime fighting to repeal the quota and still fail, and even if he succeeds, he gains only \$50 per year. But the incentive structure of special interests is quite different. When Michigan sugar beet farmers successfully lobby for sugar quotas, each farmer's income is increased by thousands or tens of thousands of dollars each year. Thus they can afford to expend substantial resources on lobbying and still come out well ahead.

2. *Government-induced poverty.* As Ludwig von Mises argued, each government intervention into the market causes problems that make further intervention seem necessary and wise.

That is, *government creates its own demand.* For example, occupational licensure of attorneys forces the price of legal services up out of reach of many people. Government then creates programs to supply the poor with legal services and forces attorneys to provide free legal services.

The general effect of all government action (beyond the minimal state) is to make people less wealthy than they would be otherwise. Less wealthy people then become the major constituency for government programs designed to supply them with some of the goods and services they cannot afford because the government has made them poor. Rational ignorance and rational apathy explain how people can be manipulated in this way. By continually impoverishing people through government growth, government continually expands the constituency for further government growth.

Government, for example, has impoverished large numbers of working

class people who are thus unable to afford medical care; and, it has also enacted regulations that have raised the cost of medical care to the point where it is out of the reach of a large portion of the population. Is it any surprise that popular support for socialized medicine is at an all time high? Is it any surprise that a public unschooled in economic theory and which knows only the choice between no health care and socially-provided health care favors the latter?

Government-induced poverty not only strengthens leftist calls for greater welfare spending, but also rightist calls for greater social controls. As Hans-Hermann Hoppe has argued, government causes poverty; poverty increases time preference, or the rate at which an individual prefers to consume goods now rather than later; increased time preference leads to actions that bring immediate satisfaction at the expense of long-term welfare, such as drug use, promiscuous sex (leading to illegiti-

It is the very growth of the libertarian movement that will likely keep government from growing so fast that it destroys the market and society, forcing libertarian change.

mate births), crime, and gambling. Welfare programs in turn encourage still more self-destructive behavior by softening the negative consequences. Increases in these behaviors in turn lead to conservative calls for more and tougher social control of these actions, usually by criminal law. Social controls such as drug laws, by creating destructive black markets, cause further poverty and stimulate even stronger support for welfare spending.

To make matters worse, poverty and social decay at home encourage the state to intervene militarily in other countries' affairs to distract attention from domestic problems and to rebuild national morale by targeting a foreign scapegoat. Foreign adventurism harms

the domestic economy and provides successful examples of the forceful use of state power, and this stimulates support for more right- and left-wing domestic intervention. Economic, social, and foreign intervention reinforce each other by causing problems that lead to calls for even further economic, social, and foreign intervention.

3. *The productivity of the mixed economy.* Drastic social change requires a certain degree of desperation among the opinion leaders in society. After all, in supporting such change, they put their own privileged status at risk. As Thomas Jefferson said, "All experience hath shown that mankind are more disposed to suffer, while evils are sufferable, than to right themselves by abolishing the forms to which they are accustomed."

In the United States, opinion molders are mostly members of the upper middle class. Ensclosed in exclusive suburbs, urban townhouses, and rural estates, the upper middle class enjoys one of the highest standards of living ever known. Under the circumstances, it is not surprising that opinion leaders do not demand drastic social change of the sort that libertarians advocate.

The cause of their high standard of living, of course, is the small portion of the market that remains free to operate. Even a partially free market, by producing substantial wealth, prevents sufficient desperation from occurring which could in turn force a freer market into operation.

It is the balance between high living standards for the opinion-leading upper middle class and lower living standards for the working class and poor that is essential for maintaining government growth. If the working class became substantially wealthier, they would in general be less likely to support government growth. If the upper middle class gets poorer, they would be more likely to support free market ideas in order to recoup their previous status.

4. *Government influence over political ideas.* Government controls the elementary and secondary schools almost exclusively, determining what is taught and who teaches it. It controls public universities and research centers. It influences even private universities

through research grants and student funding.

Government subsidizes artists, writers, actors and television and film producers. It fully employs a large number of intellectuals who tend to get choice jobs in academia and the media when

Even though average citizens are continually nicked and dined to death by government policies that favor special interests, they have no economic incentive to do anything about it because the costs of taking successful action far outweigh the benefits.

they leave government service. Through the FCC, the government subtly stifles dissent in the electronic media. Government, directly or indirectly, pays for considerable pro-government advertising. Incumbent office-holders can draw vast amounts of private funds for pro-government propaganda, since contributors know they will be rewarded from the public trough in the form of special interest legislation.

In our society, government control over political ideas is not heavy-handed, as it is in totalitarian countries. But government control of the educational process and subsidies to various arts provides a consistent set of incentives for people to advocate further expansion of government power.

The Future

Government expands because the beneficiaries of special interest legislation desire ever greater wealth and power and find government a convenient tool to achieve this aim, thanks to government's unique position as the only human enterprise that defines the legal limits of its own power. So long as partially free markets produce enough to support the living standards of the middle class, government induces "crises" that increase demand for further expansion of government

power and subsidizes and controls opinion leaders, and the democratic process encourages "rational apathy" from voters, the possibility for a roll-back of state power is slim. Indeed, history seems to confirm this theory: the power and size of the United States government has been steadily increasing ever since the Constitution replaced the Articles of Confederation.

Government contractions, on the other hand, are much less frequent, and less well understood. Virtually all contractions can be traced to one of the following causes: certain kinds of revolution (United States 1776, but not Russia 1917); losing a war (Germany 1945), and social and economic collapse (Soviet Union 1991). Government tends to grow until stopped by a catastrophic event of some kind.

If, as appears to be the case, the United States is unlikely to experience revolution, the loss of a war, or total economic collapse in the foreseeable future, then the chances that government will contract here are not good.

Because all of the main obstacles to government contraction are structural features of political life in the United States, there does not appear to be much that can be done about them. These structural obstacles have withstood pressures from the growing libertarian movement for the last thirty years.

Curiously, libertarians have expended little energy on the problem of

changing these institutional impediments to the implementation of libertarian ideas, the roll-back of government power, and the revitalization of the historic movement toward human liberty. The problems that lie ahead are difficult.

Libertarians might, for example, try to combat rational apathy with educa-

It is time for libertarian thinkers and think tanks to put aside their single issue monographs and op-ed pieces and ponder the question: how do we go from statism to freedom without a road map to guide us around the barriers in our path?

tional programs designed to instill civic virtue. But how could they overcome people's rational ignorance and apathy about such efforts?

They might try to limit the productivity of the mixed economy by supporting more government growth. But this would be self-contradictory, hopelessly confusing, practically impossible and, I think, immoral.


To reduce government-induced poverty, libertarians would first have to shrink the size of government. But

we cannot, because government-induced poverty creates a strong constituency for Big Government. Likewise, to eliminate government's enormous control over political ideas, we would first have to end all the programs through which government exercises that control. But we cannot, because of the climate of political ideas those programs helped create.

It is the very growth of the libertarian movement that will likely keep government from growing so fast that it destroys the market and society, forcing libertarian change. Government growth stimulates libertarian activity which in turn tends to slow the rate of government growth, preventing the catastrophe that could lead to a free society.

The growth of the state and the slow decline of human liberty will likely continue because their causes are continuing. There does not appear to be anything that can or will be done about it. In all likelihood, America will muddle along, stagnating for the next fifty years or more.

In light of that sad reality, perhaps it is time for libertarian thinkers and think tanks to put aside their single-issue monographs and op-ed pieces for a moment, and ponder the question: how do we go from statism to freedom without a road map to guide us around the barriers in our path? What we need is strategic thinking as good as our policy analysis. If we do not get the former, thirty years' worth of the latter will have been in vain. □



Racism and Civility

by Leland B. Yeager

Careful and frank discussions of race have gone out of vogue. It's time for straight talk.

Racist dispositions appear to have a biological basis. What implications follow?

F. A. Hayek argued¹ that a tendency toward certain dispositions and thoughts is innate in the human psyche. This tendency results from natural selection operating over hundreds of thousands of years before people finally developed agriculture, elaborated systems of private property, and began living in cities. Until about ten thousand years ago, humans lived in small hunting and gathering bands. They worked and migrated together in intimate collaboration, sharing the booty of the hunt. Natural selection favored the instincts for such solidarity and sharing because they served the purposes of survival and reproduction. (It is almost standard to suppose that the evolutionary process in small groups worked through kinship selection, inclusive fitness, and reciprocal altruism.) Hayek mentions instincts "to serve the known needs of our known neighbours . . . [and] to join with our fellows in the pursuit of common purposes. These are the basis of the small society and what, in a million years of existence in small groups, became part of our physiological make-up."²

These inborn instincts are less appropriate to impersonal cooperation in a market economy of nationwide and worldwide extent. Yet several thousand years have been too short a time for further biological evolution to restrain them. (Cultural evolution, as Hayek explained, works different-

ly. In particular, acquired cultural traits can be transmitted to later generations.)

Hayek's specific concern was to explain why collectivistic and socialistic thinking continues to have appeal — inappropriately — even in a great, impersonal, market-coordinated society. His insight lends itself to a further application. It helps explain a tendency to feel relatively comfortable with members of one's own group, however conceived, and to feel diffident toward outsiders. Hayek conjectures that those individuals who first broke with the inward orientation of their group and traded for profit with outsiders incurred moral opprobrium. He further alludes to this aspect of inherited instincts in mentioning³ William James' concept of the "moral equivalent of war." The nearly universal phenomenon of war and ethnic tensions — exemplified every day in news from around the world — also suggests some deep-seated basis for particularistic instincts.

Hayek is not alone in writing about solidarity and reciprocity within small groups and diffidence toward devi-

ants and outsiders. Herbert Spencer's *Principles of Ethics*⁴ deals with many of these ideas, as do the more recent writings of Robert Axelrod, Richard Alexander, Andrew Oldenquist, and Alexander Rosenberg.⁵ Similar notions go back at least as far as Charles Darwin.⁶ Darwin recognized sympathy and mutual aid as narrowly confined, while "the tribes inhabiting adjacent districts are almost always at war with each other."⁷ He sometimes made these observations about the higher social animals in general, among whom sympathy and aid "are by no means extended to all the individuals of the same species, only to those of the same association."⁸ "[W]ith all animals, sympathy is directed solely towards the members of the same community, and therefore towards known, and more or less beloved members, but not to all the individuals of the same species."⁹

Darwin seems not to have been a racist (or not beyond the sense in which we all have inherited racist tendencies). In his chapter "On the Races of Man," Darwin notices "numerous points of mental similarity between

the most distinct races of man."¹⁰ He draws on personal observation to support his belief in "the close similarity between the men of all races in tastes, dispositions and habits."¹¹ Nor was Darwin a Social Darwinist: he did not believe that whatever survived from law-of-the-jungle rivalry among human beings would be for the best. On the contrary, he looked forward to

Tendencies toward group particularism remain wired into our brains. To resist the more unfortunate consequences of that reality, we should frankly admit it to ourselves and to each other. We need not wallow in idle guilt about our biological inheritance.

the strengthening over time of habits of sympathetic kindness.¹²

As Darwin would have agreed, finding a genetic basis for some trait is not to justify it. Explanation is not appraisal; "ought" cannot follow rigorously from "is" alone. We have no reason to suppose that natural selection works optimally; nature does not aim at particular goals. Understanding how evolution probably fostered racism helps, if anything, to call it into question, especially under conditions quite different from those in which it originated.

Tendencies toward group particularism remain wired into our brains. What implications follow? To resist the more unfortunate consequences of that reality, we should frankly admit it to ourselves and to each other. (Here and in what follows, the word "should" recommends behavior conducive to a harmonious society.) We need not wallow in idle guilt about our biological inheritance. (Present-day Americans, in particular, have little — relatively little — to be ashamed of and should build on their accomplishments.) We should recognize that in large societies of extensive but impersonal cooperation, racist tendencies are no more appropriate than are the socialistic habits

of thought that Hayek diagnosed. Although people cannot properly be blamed for their genes, they are responsible for their discretionary behavior. Being alert to one's own racist tendencies, as to one's inappropriately collectivistic attitudes, is a start on overriding them.

Despite our alertness, racist and ethnocentric tendencies are bound to surface occasionally in unintended ways, making grounds for censorious accusations all too easy to find. We should no more make an unnecessary issue out of traces of inborn racism in others than we would call unnecessary attention to peculiarities in people's personal appearances.

We should not abuse statistics in eagerness to find fault. Employment patterns or other patterns not mirroring the racial composition of some supposed reference group do not necessarily prove invidious discrimination. Supposedly disproportionate numbers may result from chance, from innocuous historical circumstances, or from people's voluntarily associating with others whom they know best and feel comfortable with.

Speaking of statistics, we should recognize that stereotypes are often reasonable and that acting on them does not necessarily show evil intent. People do not and cannot know everything relevant to their choices. In particular, people cannot have full and accurate information about each other as individuals — about their qualifications as students, employees, entrepreneurs, and borrowers, about moral character and trustworthiness, about criminality or respect for the law and for other people's rights, and about benevolent or neutral or hostile intentions. This unavoidable ignorance is one of the hard facts of reality. In the absence of full and complete information, one must make do with statistics, probabilities, indications, and scraps of conventional wisdom. Fear is not necessarily blameworthy. A woman alone on a dark street is only prudent, not deliberately insulting, in taking evasive action on perceiving two vaguely ominous young men a block away. A taxi driver may be understandably if not admirably wary about whom he accepts as a fare — if not out of fear of

the passenger himself, then out of fear of the unsafe destination that the passenger might specify.

To identify behavior as response to a stereotype does not necessarily either justify it or condemn it. It simply means recognizing it as a possible sign of a problem to be faced. The solution may not be easy. (For example, does imposing quotas and racial preferences neutralize unfortunate stereotyping or aggravate tensions instead?)

But the difficulties should be faced head on.

Each of us should try to see things from the other's point of view. We should try to cultivate a sense of humor about unintentional little signs of wired-in traits of thought, just as one tries, out of politeness, to make light of Freudian slips in speech. We should avoid waving a red flag before the racist proclivities of others. We should avoid, for example, flagrant illogic in discussing race-tinged issues of public policy. We should try to avoid reinforcing the grounds for unfavorable stereotypes. We should avoid flagrantly differentiating ourselves or our

A woman alone on a dark street is only prudent, not deliberately insulting, in taking evasive action on perceiving two vaguely ominous young men a block away.

own groups in ways that are liable to appear deliberately disrespectful of others. (On the other hand, cultivation of one's own ethnic heritage can contribute both to the personal self-esteem of some people and to healthy diversity in society. Ethnic groups largely define themselves and honor their history, languages, and traditions voluntarily, while race classifications are usually imposed on the victims).

All in all, a Hayekian analysis of racial issues mandates just what is called for by the higher intellectual virtues: tolerance, prudence, careful reasoning, and a dollop of common sense. □

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Challenge

The Half-Open Door

by R. K. Lamb

Open immigration is a fundamental tenet of the libertarian program. But does it *really* make sense?

When I moved to Hong Kong in 1989, I thought it was a disgrace that so few Chinese were sympathetic to the Vietnamese boat people. More than 55,000 were penned up in camps, and hundreds more were arriving each week. "The average Hongkonger," I wrote, "would shove them all back out to sea if he had anything to say about it" (*Liberty*, March 1990).

From time to time some U.S. Congressman comes here and says the same thing. The Vietnamese are running from communism. So are the 60,000 Hong Kong Chinese who emigrate each year, fearing China's domination after 1997. How can the Hong Kong people expect any sympathy if they show none toward people, however poor, who are their moral equivalents?

The Hong Kong people I knew didn't look at it that way — and I don't either, after living here three years. The Hong Kong people are emigrants, not refugees. They have money. They have professional qualifications. They speak English. And they have played by the American rules. They have filled out pages of forms. They have answered all sorts of questions the U.S. government never asks its own citizens, such as the name of every social, political or community organization they have ever joined. They have certified that they have never been convicted of a felony. They have disclosed their fi-

nances, and taken medical exams. And they have waited patiently to get their turn under the hugely oversubscribed U.S. quota. The line for Hong Kong brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens is about nine years long.

Refugees are different. They are emergency cases, exceptions to the rules. U.S. policy is to accept only those screened as political — people who can prove they have a "well-founded fear of persecution" if they go back. Most cannot prove this. More than 90% of the Vietnamese boat people are routinely screened out as "economic migrants." The U.S. will not accept them, nor will any other country.

To the Hong Kong Chinese, the Americans have every right to shut their own door on such gate-crashers. When George Bush sends Coast Guard cutters to shove the Haitians back into the arms of the *tontons macoutes* he's doing just what Malaysia or the Philippines or Japan does. Shouldn't the U.S. be polite enough not to lecture other countries?

Some of my readers, I suspect, will argue that America should let them all in: immigrants, refugees, everybody. This is pretty much the most common view among libertarians. Every political question is to be decided by reference to first principles. According to their moral axioms, immigration restrictions are as difficult to justify as apartheid, or a quota on men's shirts.

But free immigration is difficult to argue for in today's world. No rich country allows it. States that have given up quotas on goods retain it on new residents. The European Community is on the verge of allowing free movement of labor. Portuguese and Greeks will be allowed to work in England and Denmark — something not certain to be welcomed by the English and Danes. The proposal does not apply to non-EC peoples such as the Turks, Algerians or Poles. The U.S. and Canada have agreed to free most trade over a 10-year period. They did not free labor, residency or citizen-

ship. They are not even discussing doing these things with Mexico.

It's a similar tale with refugees. The Germans, who take few immigrants, are bound by their constitution to take all refugees. It's an unusual offer for a rich country to make, and thousands of Vietnamese, Romanians and Gypsies have taken them up on it. One result has been widespread resentment and roving gangs of neo-Nazi "skinheads." Germany's open door for refugees is about to slam shut.

When the subject of immigrants and refugees comes up with libertarians, it's usually in an argument with someone who wants to stop them.

The real question of immigration is not about principles; it's about numbers.

With gusto, libertarians cite studies that show that immigrants and refugees have been a benefit to America. They argue that America ought to "keep the door open." But the door is *not* open. The status quo is controlled immigration.

The real question of immigration is not about principles; it's about numbers. U.S. law allows 700,000 immigrants a year. That's less than three-tenths of 1% of a 252-million population. These slots tend to go to the affluent and educated. They can read the rules, hire the lawyers, fill out the paperwork. A lot of them come over as students and figure out a way to stay on. Some, like a former South African colleague of mine, go through a long rigamarole. He had to find an employer to swear that he had skills not available in the United States. He had to move cross country and change careers to get his green card. An uneducated man never could have done it.

The 700,000 limit allows the U.S. to seem to be a lot choosier about its new citizens than it actually is. It is admitting 74% of them simply because they have a relative in the United States. One person gets in and petitions for his

wife and kids, brothers and sisters, and their kids. Only 20% of slots are for people with needed job skills. Canada and Australia are more open than the U.S. in this regard; America could follow their lead and let more people in as investor-immigrants. It could let in only those with money, skills, or PhDs.

But under free immigration it would take everybody.

The flow of refugees has been about 30,000 in most years — a small fraction of the immigrants. How these fare in the U.S. depends mainly on the kind of life they had before. Some, like the middle-class Cubans, have been successful. Others, like the Hmongs, a 16th-century people from Indochina, haven't. In early 1988, of 20,000 Hmongs in the Fresno, California, area, 70% were on welfare. Despite their high-school valedictorians, a higher percentage of Vietnamese are on welfare than of blacks.

Millions of people around the world whose governments criticize the U.S. still dream of emigrating there. The Philippine Senate had just kicked out the Subic Bay Naval Base when my Filipino maid said: "Sir, is it true that the U.S. could take back the Philippines as a state?" She had heard this proposed on a radio call-in show back in her homeland. Lots of people had called in and supported it. The educated, elite Filipinos I knew (the kind who were running the Philippines) were outraged. But this provincial girl was for it. She was a bit hurt when I told her the Americans wouldn't want her country back; it was too poor.

She would love to emigrate. She had a cousin in California who worked at a gas station — and had bought a car. His own car! Think of it! Maybe she could land one of those high-paying gas-station jobs! The only easy way for a 23-year-old Filipina to get in was to marry an American. She would have done it except that she was already married, and in her country divorce was forbidden. She had a friend, a single Hong Kong maid, who had almost married a South Carolina man by mail-order.

The maid's presence in Hong Kong also tells a story. There are about

70,000 here. They are subject to Hong Kong's only minimum wage: \$413 a month plus room and board. By comparison, a live-in maid makes \$31 a month in Manila, \$30 in Jakarta, \$21 in Bombay. Many of the maids here have college degrees; the second one we hired gave up a job as a nurse at \$120 a month to be a "domestic helper" for us. If Filipinas were allowed to work in America for — for what? \$500 a month? \$750? \$1,000? — you could have them by the millions. Day care? Who needs day care? Babysitters? Never heard of 'em. A dishwashing machine? No need. Get a maid, and she'll cook your dinner and do the dishes, too.

You can hire a Filipino maid in Vancouver for \$583 a month. The only reason you can't have one in the U.S. is the immigration law. If that law were changed, every middle-class American could have a domestic servant. Think of the social revolution *that* would entail. And that falls far short of open immigration. There is no

Three years ago, the boat people had my sympathy. Now I, too, get tired of them and their demonstrations. I begin to think of them as the unwanted cousin who camps out on my doorstep and demands a seat at the dinner table.

open immigration to Hong Kong: try to find a Vietnamese maid. There is simply a contract-labor system.

Under free immigration, there would be no contract-labor plans, and no distinction between immigrants and refugees. Anybody who gets in, stays in. What would that be like in a world of mass communications and Boeing 747s? Who knows? Back in the pre-World-War-I days, the United States was a long, hazardous, expensive trip away. There were only so many Irish, Italians and Norwegians who dared try it. People know more now. They are bolder. Tens of millions

of people can raise the money to buy the ticket (by borrowing it, which is how so many maids get here). And the Mexicans, Guatemalans and Salvadorans can just take the bus.

Just imagine it. Shiploads of boat people. Haitians, Dominicans, Jamaicans, Javans, Punjabis, Pathans, Yorubas. You could have people camped on school playgrounds, in city parks, along the streets, and in Shantytowns speaking strange languages. People who believed in executing blasphemers and circumcising women. Men who piss against walls along public avenues. You'd have people selling candy door to door — not to help the Camp Fire Girls, but to feed their families. And not Camp Fire mints, either, but strange, gooey stuff concocted over campfires.

The minimum wage would be swept away, welfare swamped, food stamps shredded. Upper-middle-class salaries wouldn't be affected much, but the going rate for ditch-diggers, lawn mowers and newspaper boys would collapse. White teenagers would vanish from behind the counter at McDonald's. The garment industry would make a comeback, as would leatherwork and toys. Many people would benefit, to be sure — but most of them would be foreigners. Americans at the low end of the wage scale would be hit hard. The "homeless" would go out of business. No one would give 'em a dime.

A big American city would become more like Jakarta or Mexico City — a middle-class world of education, cars and microwave ovens surrounded by struggling people in cardboard shacks.

Great, you say. Survival of the fit-

test! End this apartheid of international frontiers! End this labor protectionism! Let every man compete free and equal — all three billion! No doubt the economists can prove that the gain in utility would be greater than the loss. They'd probably be right. Especially for all those Bengalis and Vietnamese now living on \$200 a year.

Well, it *does* fit your principles. But I'm not sure you'll want to live in such

With open immigration, a big American city would become more like Jakarta or Mexico City — a middle-class world of education, cars and microwave ovens surrounded by struggling people in cardboard shacks. I'm not sure you'll want to live in such a world.

a world. In America today, even a lousy job pays \$4.25 an hour. Even poor people have TVs and cars. I know libertarians who live in, or have lived in, that world. With free immigration, kiss it goodbye.

Me, I don't want to live in Jakarta. I live in Hong Kong, which is already close enough. Every day I see grown men in the streets selling wind-up panda bears, babies' T-shirts and boiled squid on toothpicks. The television reminds me that less than 10 miles from my home, 55,000 Vietnamese boat people are penned

behind barbed wire. There's lots more where they came from: Vietnam is only about as far from here as Seattle is from southern Oregon. Accept the Vietnamese refugees, and another 55,000 would be here quicker'n you

could say "Ho, Ho, Ho Chi Minh."

Hong Kong won't take them. It's a Chinese city, and the Vietnamese are foreigners. Americans get all indignant over this, but it's the same attitude taken by the Thais, the Malaysians, the Filipinos, the Indonesians, and of course, the Japanese. Nobody here in Asia wants to be somebody else's melting pot.

This little city-state can't entertain such a thought. It is the most densely populated place in the world. It doesn't even allow citizens of China to live here, except for an elite handful. I've heard arguments that it ought to allow more, but never that it ought to let them all in. Immigration control is supported by Beijing, by London and by the Hong Kong people. There is no other way — because China's GNP per head is \$325, and ours is \$14,100. (America's is \$21,500.)

The boat people knew that they would be put in camps. The camps have been here for years, and have been publicized in Vietnam. The people came here anyway, just for the chance that someone would take them. But nobody will.

Three years ago, they had my sympathy. Now I, too, get tired of them and their demonstrations. I begin to think of them as the unwanted cousin who camps out on my doorstep and demands a seat at the dinner table. These people have to go home. They have to be forced to go home so the other 69 million Vietnamese won't come here. Like the Hong Kong Chinese, I begin to get disgusted with the namby-pamby British government, which talks about "mandatory repatriation" but seems to be too genteel to drag screaming refugees onto air-planes.

In the world of the 21st century, America is going to have to do the same thing. You won't have to shut the door on everybody. You're a big country and a rich country, and what's more, a melting pot. You can let in your 700,000 immigrants a year. You can probably let in more, especially if you pick them more carefully. You can let in a few refugees, and pat yourself on the back for being so humanitarian. But don't kid yourself that you have an "open door." Nobody does. □



"Planting a little edelweiss does *not* make me a hedonist!"

Ba/oo

Just Deserts

by John Hospers

There are many ways to think about justice. How many of them would you trust with your life?

Though no fan of capital punishment, I have to take exception to some of J. Neil Schulman's remarks in his article "If Execution Is Just, What Is Justice?" (September 1992).

Schulman first condemns retribution, then shifts to why the State should not be the determiner of punishment. These are two very different subjects. A word about the second one first:

The State as arbiter

The State is often assumed to be your *delegated agent* in doing whatever it does. According to Hobbes, you have delegated to the State your right to self-defense so that you won't have to go about with weapons ever at the ready. You have also delegated to the State the power to arrest, try, and punish. The trouble with this, of course, is that it just isn't true: you and I never delegated any such powers to the State. We weren't even consulted; we were "born into the system." Nor were we consulted about any of the other matters the State takes unto itself, such as transport, enforcement of contract, property allocation, and care of the indigent. One might defend the State in at least some of its functions on grounds of utility, but not of contract (not even implicit contract, though I can't go into that here).

If the State isn't supposed to carry

out the tasks of defense, adjudication, and punishment, then who should? Private vengeance will hardly do: if the aggrieved party administers the punishment, he will almost always overestimate the offense against him: a person with a delicate ego may gladly administer capital punishment for the crime of stepping on his toe. Perhaps then a defense agency of the sort envisioned by David Friedman would do. But there are problems when different agencies devise and enforce different sets of rules: you may fall under the jurisdiction of an agency that punishes you by its rules, to which you did not consent.

If you require that the decision to punish must satisfy everybody, then you have a problem, no matter who or what makes the decision. The killer's mother ("He's really a good boy") and the victim's widow ("He killed my husband, so kill him!") will seldom agree on how severely he should be punished, regardless of who decides on the punishment. If Schulman thinks that he rather than the State or someone else should make the decision, what about other people who

disagree with him?

Retribution

The main focus of Schulman's paper is retribution itself. I think he misconceives it. Retribution is not revenge, and is not based on the desire to "get even." Retribution is an attempt to achieve *justice*; and justice, in the context of punishment as elsewhere, means *treatment in accord with desert*: each person should be accorded whatever he or she deserves. The retributive theory of punishment is often, and more correctly, called the *deserts* theory of punishment.

Retribution is not at all the same as "an eye for an eye." That punishment should in some sense "equal" the crime is held only by the (largely discarded) *mirror-image* version of retributivism, that the punishment should be the mirror-image of the crime itself. Thus, the punishment for murder should be death: a victim's life has been taken, so the murderer's life should also be taken. But even the Book of Exodus did not take this quite literally: it didn't take it to mean that if you took out someone's eye your

eye should be plucked out. In any case, the mirror-image theory cannot be generalized: if death is the proper punishment for murder, what is the proper punishment for rape? Should the man who stole \$100 be punished by having \$100 (or some larger amount) taken from him (assuming he has it)? A punishment may "fit" a crime without itself resembling the crime.

A much preferable version of retribution is *proportionality*: that the punishment should be proportioned to the offense. There can be lots of disagreement about specifics within the limits of this formula. Some people believe that drug-dealers deserve punishment, but most libertarians do not think so. Still, there is an overall general agreement about certain fundamentals, e.g. that murder is more serious than assault and battery, which is in turn more serious than shoplifting. The retributive theory says that the more serious the crime, the more severe is the deserved punishment: e.g., that a purse-snatcher doesn't deserve to be put away for 40 years, and therefore such a sentence is unjust; and that a person who has been "railroaded" for a crime he didn't commit should not be incarcerated for it, even though he may be a

If the State isn't supposed to carry out the tasks of defense, adjudication, and punishment, then who should?

public nuisance and there might be great social utility in locking him up.

Proportionality need not entail the death penalty. Perhaps the murderer deserves not death, but an extended prison term, or prolonged restitution to the victim's family. All these are retributive options, and one could argue which (if any) of them is deserved. But the basic concept in it all is desert (deservingness). What you deserve depends on your past record, not on what good might be brought about for society by putting you behind bars. Retribution is *because-of*, not *in order-that*.

In many circles the retributive theory is somewhat out of fashion today, largely because of developments in psychology. The central concept of retributivism, desert, they say, is no longer applicable to human beings. If you say that a person deserves something, such as punishment, you are presupposing that people are free agents, responsible for their actions. But (so goes the objection) people are the products of their genetic heritage and the environmental influences that shaped their personalities into what they are today. Their actions are the inevitable outcome of all these forces acting upon them. This account, if true, would throw out the entire concept of desert.¹

Sometimes the objection is applied to some people but not all. A man kidnaps a young girl, rapes her, then tortures and kills her. Almost everyone, reading of this, is moved to say that he deserves considerable punishment for what he did. But then psychologists remind us that he was himself a victim of abuse as a child, with a drunken non-caring father and a drug addicted mother who locked him in a dark closet for days at a time, and they allege that given these circumstances no other outcome could be expected: we should feel sorry for him but not blame him. However, not everyone is like this: the concept of desert is still applicable to many others, probably to most people most of the time (as we tend to assume without question that it is).

But often the objection is applied across the board: no one is really a free agent, and no one is ultimately responsible for his or her actions. Insane persons and criminal psychopaths are only the obvious examples, but in fact none of us can really help what we do. The punisher can't help what he does any more than the defendant can help what he did.

Hundreds of volumes have been written about various aspects of this problem, with countless subtleties ("what exactly is meant by the phrase 'can't help'?" "When is an impulse 'irresistible'?" which would have to be clarified in order to treat this issue adequately, and I shall say no more about it here. I don't know that Schulman re-

jects the concept of desert; he never mentions it, although it is the root of retributivism. Apparently he believes that his remarks are sufficient to dispose of the entire retributive theory.

Non-retributive views

It's not clear to me whether Schulman opposes all capital punishment because no one deserves the death penalty, or because it is the State that administers it. But assuming he believes that no one deserves it, let's

Hobbes argues that you have delegated to the State your right to self-defense so that you won't have to go about with weapons ever at the ready. The trouble with this, of course, is that it just isn't true: you weren't even consulted.

glance at other views that might consider it justifiable.

1. Many people say that the aim of punishment is to *rehabilitate* the offender. But most attempts at rehabilitation are expensive failures — the impulses of a perennial criminal are too strongly entrenched at an early age to be changed very much, even by lengthy psychiatry. At any rate, rehabilitation wouldn't justify capital punishment: you can't rehabilitate someone by killing him.

2. Others say that the main reason for incarcerating criminals is *protection*. It's not so much that we think they deserve punishment, or even that we want them to suffer, but that we need to be protected from them. Some of them are like wild beasts who have to be kept caged for our protection. Here is a serial killer who would kill and rape again if he were free to move among us, so we lock him up so that he will no longer threaten us. It's him or us, and we don't want it to be us. Even if he can't help what he does, we still need protection from him.

Many people are attracted to this view, but it is extremely difficult to

apply to individual cases. We don't know enough to distinguish dangerous from non-dangerous people. We keep some people in prison for life although they present no danger to anyone (the one-time wife-killer is a typical example). And we release some people, thinking they are no longer capable of violence, and then find that they go on a killing spree. Suppose that when in doubt we keep them all locked up — then we will be condemning many non-dangerous people to unnecessary imprisonment; and if we take a more liberal policy, we will be releasing dangerous criminals into society, and their victims will pay with their lives for our permissiveness. So we are not in a very good position to apply the principle, "Keep them imprisoned if dangerous, and release them if non-dangerous."

In any case, capital punishment enters into this view hardly at all. We can be protected from dangerous people just as well if they are behind bars as if they are dead, except in the unlikely event of escape, or the more likely possibility that some of them will be released on parole.

3. Finally, one may say that the criminal should be punished in order to deter him and others from committing crimes in the future. And, it is said, the death penalty is the ultimate deterrent. Fitzjames Stephen wrote in 1864, "No other punishment deters men so effectually from committing crimes as the punishment of death. Was there ever yet a criminal who, when sentenced to death and brought out to die, would refuse the offer of a commutation of his sentence for the severest secondary punishment? Surely

not. Why is this? It can only be because 'All that a man has will he give for his life.' In any secondary punishment, however terrible, there is hope; but death is death; its terrors cannot be described more forcibly."²

It's not always true, though, that death is dreaded above all other things. Would prolonged torture be

If we still say "Never" to capital punishment, are we not placing a higher value on the killer's life than on that of his victims?

preferred to death? I for one would rather be killed at once than spend a lifetime in prison.

Whether the death penalty is the ultimate deterrent is after centuries of argument still disputed. Some murderers don't think about the consequences of their act at all; if the penalty were being boiled in oil, this would still not deter them. Deterrence works for everyday offenses: if you park in a prohibited zone and get ticketed, you are not likely to repeat the offense many times. But deterrence is not as predictably effective for crimes like murder — too many other factors enter in. Nor are statistics very satisfying on this point: states that have the death penalty have in general no lower murder rates than those that do not. But then, the death penalty is very seldom inflicted, so its

influence may not count for much. And states containing large cities have a higher murder rate than those that don't, and the higher murder rate may be due to that fact rather than to the death penalty; and so on, and so on.


Still, if the death penalty de-

ters more than any other punishment, a case can be made for capital punishment, for if capital punishment really deters people from murder, then many lives are saved. If we still say "Never" to capital punishment, are we not placing a higher value on the killer's life than on that of his victims?

It has been estimated that for every case in which capital punishment is administered, the lives of eight innocent victims are saved.³ We can't be certain, of course; who can tell how many people refrain from murder because of the deterrent effects of capital punishment? But let's assume that the risk of capital punishment is a better deterrent than the risk of life in prison, so that some murders that would have occurred without capital punishment would not occur if capital punishment existed. In that case, the question to put to Schulman is this: if you or one of your loved ones was one of the people whose lives would be saved if there were capital punishment for murderers, would you still be opposed to capital punishment? If the answer is no, then you do have something of a case for capital punishment. Those who are opposed to it on principle seldom face this question. If it was your life that was going to be snuffed out unless there was capital punishment, would you willingly sacrifice your life for the cause of no-capital punishment? This is a troublesome question, and I think it should trouble Mr Schulman and anyone else who takes the view "No capital punishment, ever, no matter what." □

Footnotes

1. See, for example, *The Problem of Free Will*, ed. Willard Enteman (Scribners 1967); *Free Will*, eds. Morgenbesser and James Walsh (Prentice Hall 1962); *Determinism and Freedom*, ed. Sidney Hook (NY Press 1958); John Hospers, Introduction to *Philosophical Analysis*, Chapter 5 (3rd, ed. Prentice-Hall 1988).
2. Fitzjames Stephen, "Capital Punishment," *Frasers Magazine*, 1864.
3. See David Conway, "Capital Punishment and Deterrence," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, Vol. 3 No. 4 (Summer 1974), and Ferdinand Schoeman, "On Incapacitating the Dangerous," *Philosophical Quarterly*, Vol. 16 No. 1 (1979).



"I want to file charges against my husband — I think he's trying to bore me to death!"

Analysis

The Unholy Alliance

by Wendy McElroy

When feminists ally themselves with the religious right in the war against free speech, they betray both their heritage and their future.

Pornography has been a traditional battleground between conservatives, who advocate family values, and liberals, who champion freedom of expression. The political make-up of contemporary feminism is overwhelmingly liberal; the more extreme feminists — called “radical” feminists — are socialist. But since the mid-80s, there has been a startling development. Feminists have been standing alongside conservatives to demand legislation against pornography. Anti-pornography feminists have even joined hands with religious fundamentalists in a common cause.

This alliance makes some feminists nervous. Lisa Duggan, in her essay *False Promises*, expressed concern about future consequences:

One is tempted to ask in astonishment, how can this be happening? . . . But in fact this new development is not as surprising as it at first seems. Pornography has come to be seen as a central cause of women's oppression by a significant number of feminists . . . This analysis takes feminism very close — indeed far too close to measures that will ultimately support conservative, anti-sex, pro-censorship forces in American society for it is with these forces that women have formed alliances.

Radical feminists dismiss the dangers of this alliance. They discount the possibility that the legislation they seek could backlash against the feminist movement. For instance, Catherine MacKinnon wrote:

The question becomes not whether



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one trusts the law to behave in a feminist way. We do not trust medicine, yet we insist it respond to women's needs. We do not trust theology, but we claim spirituality as more than a male preserve. We do not abdicate the control of technology because it was not invented by women . . . If women are to restrict our demands for change to spheres we can trust, spheres we already control, there will not be any.

The unlikely alliance between feminists and conservatives, and the split

within feminism itself, has led to strange spectacles. For example, when an anti-pornography ordinance was proposed in Indianapolis, the law was supported by the Moral Majority . . . even though it had been drafted by radical feminists. Within the local feminist community, however, the ordinance found no support.

The current anti-pornography crusade within feminism is something new on the political scene. It is new in at least two important ways: (1) it sig-

nals a break in feminism from its liberal insistence on freedom of speech; and (2) it offers a revolutionary definition of pornography. The battle over pornography has shifted to new ground.

Pornography is the *bête noire* of radical feminism. To them, pornography is gender violence and a violation of the civil rights of women. It victimizes not merely women who work in the industry or who are exposed to magazines and films; pornography damages *all* women because it contributes to the general degradation of women that is prevalent in our society. Indeed, some theorists go so far as to claim that pornography is the source of society's unhealthy attitude toward women. Pornography is considered to be so damaging that it is linked, in a cause-and-effect relationship, to violent crimes such as rape. Thus, eliminating this form of expression is viewed as self-defense, not censorship.

The legal theorist Catherine MacKinnon has been a key voice in the anti-pornography campaign. In her book, *Feminism Unmodified*, MacKinnon defined the object of attack: "Pornography, in the feminist view, is a form of forced sex, a practice of sexual politics, an institution of gender inequality." MacKinnon claimed that pornography was not a form of expression; pornographic material was — in and of itself — an act of violence:

Pornography not only teaches the reality of male dominance. It is one way its reality is imposed as well as experienced. It is a way of seeing and treating women. Male power makes authoritative a way of seeing and treating women, so that when a man looks at a pornographic picture — pornographic meaning that the woman is defined as to be acted upon, a sexual object, a sexual thing — the *viewing* is an *act*, an act of male supremacy. [emphasis in the original.]

The wholesale condemnation of pornography is a departure for feminism. Since its revival in the early 1960s the movement has been dominated by socialists and liberals; both these traditions advocated freedom of speech. Moreover, pornography tended to be viewed as part of a larger trend toward sexual liberation — a lib-

eration that feminists applauded because it ushered in such things as birth control and the unveiling of women's sexuality.

Lisa Duggan typified this attitude in acknowledging the possible benefits pornography offered to women:

The existence of pornography has served to flout conventional sexual mores, to ridicule sexual hypocrisy and to underscore the importance of sexual needs. Pornography carries many messages other than woman-hating; it advocates sexual adventure, sex outside of marriage, sex for pleasure, casual sex, illegal sex, anonymous sex, public sex, voyeuristic sex. Some of these ideas appeal to women reading or seeing pornography, who may interpret some images as legitimating their own sense of sexual urgency or desire to be sexually aggressive.

Pornography and feminism have much in common. Both deal with women as sexual beings and both attempt to bring this sexuality out into the open. Pornography and feminism also share a history of being targeted by obscenity laws. In particular, the Comstock laws of the 1870s were used not only against pornographic material but also against birth control information. Feminist material — especially lesbian material — has always suffered under laws that regulate sexual expression.

Nevertheless, by the late 1970s sexual liberation was being viewed with suspicion. Pornography was being redefined as an enemy of women. In her book, *Our Blood*, radical feminist Andrea Dworkin explained:

In pornography, sadism is the means by which men establish their dominance. Sadism is the authentic exercise of power which confirms manhood; and the first characteristic of manhood is that its existence is based on the negation of the female — manhood can only be certified by abject female degradation, a degradation never abject enough until the victim's body and will have both been destroyed . . . The heart of darkness is this — the sexual sadism actualizes male identity . . . The common erotic project of destroying women makes it possible for men to unite into a brotherhood; this project

is the only firm and trustworthy groundwork for cooperation among males and all male bonding is based on it.

Sex itself seemed to be identified as sexism. Dworkin continued:

Romantic love, in pornography as in life is the mythic celebration of female negation. For a woman, love is defined as her willingness to submit to her own annihilation.

But the feminist attack on pornography was not merely another cry for censorship. It was more sophisticated than that. Feminists were and are using a strategy that has proved successful with other issues, such as affirmative action. Pornography is being defined as a violation of women's civil rights. Thus, instead of advocating criminal proceedings against pornographers, feminists restrict themselves to civil suits. This approach avoids sticky constitutional questions; in particular, it avoids the First Amendment. It also turns the entire discussion of pornography on its head. Conventional arguments for and against pornography simply do not apply.

Traditional obscenity laws have focused on the connection between pornography and moral harm. One of the standard tests of obscenity came from Supreme Court Justice Brennan in his ruling on *Memoirs vs Massachusetts*:

(a) the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole appeals to the prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is patently offensive because it affronts contemporary community standards relating to the description or representation of sexual matters; and (c) the material is utterly without redeeming social value.

Anti-pornography feminists dwell on the connection between pornography and political harm — namely, the oppression of women. Consider MacKinnon's presentation of how pornography differs from obscenity:

Obscenity law is concerned with morality, specifically morals from the male point of view, meaning the standpoint of male dominance. The feminist critique of pornography is a politics, specifically politics from women's point of view, meaning the standpoint of the subordination of women to men. Morality here means good and evil; politics means power

and powerlessness. Obscenity is a moral idea; pornography is a political practice. Obscenity is abstract; pornography is concrete. The two concepts represent two entirely different things.

In the mid-80s, radical feminists launched a campaign to pass anti-pornography ordinances on a city-by-city basis. By localizing the issue, they by-passed the problem of obtaining a national consensus, which had proven so difficult with the E.R.A. The first or-

When an anti-pornography ordinance was proposed in Indianapolis, the law was supported by the Moral Majority, even though it had been drafted by radical feminists.

dinance — drafted by MacKinnon and Dworkin — served as the model for future ones. This was the Minneapolis Ordinance of 1983. In addressing the Minneapolis City Council, MacKinnon declared:

We are proposing a statutory scheme that will situate pornography as a central practice in the subordination of women . . . The understanding and the evidence which we will present to you today to support defining pornography as a practice of discrimination on the basis of sex is a new idea . . . in particular we want to show how the concept of pornography conditions and determines the way in which men actually treat women . . . and we will show that it is central to the way in which women remain second-class citizens.

Under the ordinance's provisions, a woman who had worked in pornography — a *Playboy* centerfold, for example — could bring a civil lawsuit against her employers for having coerced her into a "pornographic performance." Laws and remedies already existed for fraud or for contracts signed under duress. The purpose of the ordinance was to make "coercion" into a civil matter:

The bigotry and contempt it pro-

motest, with the acts of aggression it fosters, harm women's opportunities for equality of rights in employment, education, property rights, public accommodations and public services; create public harassment and private denigration; promote injury and degradation such as rape, battery and prostitution and inhibit just enforcement of laws against these acts; contribute significantly to restricting women from full exercise of citizenship.

The definition of coercion was all important. The ordinance was clear. Coercion was deemed to be present even if the woman was of age, she fully understood the nature of the performance, she signed a contract and release, there were witnesses, she was under no threat, and she was fully paid. None of these factors provided evidence of consent.

In essence, consent was not possible. In principle, the woman could not be treated as a consenting adult. By definition, coercion was always present in a pornographic act. MacKinnon later explained that, "in the context of unequal power (between the sexes), one needs to think about the meaning of consent — whether it is a meaningful concept at all" (*Toronto Star*, 2/17/92). Gloria Steinem, in her introduction to Linda Lovelace's exposé *Out of Bondage* agreed: "The question is free will: Are the subjects of pornography there by choice, or by coercion, economic or physical" [emphasis added].

In other words, if the woman needed or wanted the money offered, this would constitute economic coercion. The politics of society made it impossible for women to fully consent to a pornographic act. Women who thought they had agreed were mistaken. Such women had been so damaged by a male dominated culture that they were not able to give true consent. Lisa Duggan observed:

Advocates of the ordinance effectively assume that women have been so conditioned by the pornographic world view that if their own experiences of the sexual acts . . . are not subordinating, then they must simply be victims of false consciousness.

Several years ago, anti-

pornography feminists attempted to pass an ordinance in Los Angeles. I was among the feminists who went down to City Hall to argue against the ordinance. The arguments I decided *not* to use are almost as revealing as the ones I settled on.

I decided not to argue that pornography is undefinable and, therefore, not appropriate for a legal system that requires a clear point of enforcement. The Ordinance had defined what it meant by pornography in excruciating — if subjective — detail. To focus on definitions would be to divert the debate into the bogs of what constitutes "dehumanization" or "exploitation." I simply accepted the rule of thumb offered by Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart in his ruling on *Jacobellis vs Ohio*: "I know it when I see it." I assumed that everyone was talking about the same thing.

I also abandoned appeals to the First Amendment. Antipornography feminists had a tangled web of counter

MacKinnon argues that pornography is not a form of expression; pornography is — in and of itself — an act of violence.

arguments, which would require more time to answer than I would be allotted. MacKinnon's arguments are typical:

The First Amendment essentially presumes some level of social equality among people and hence essentially equal social access to the means of expression. In a context of inequality between the sexes, we cannot presume that that is accurate. The First Amendment also presumes that for the mind to be free to fulfill itself, speech must be free and open . . . Pornography amounts to terrorism and promotes not freedom but silence. Rather, it promotes freedom for men and enslavement and silence for women.

If pornography is an act of violence, then the First Amendment is irrelevant.

I also avoided a discussion of privacy rights. Supreme court Justice Thurgood Marshall (*Stanley vs Georgia*, 1969) had maintained:

If the First Amendment means anything, it means that a state has no business telling a man, sitting alone in his own house, what books he may read or what films he must watch.

But, again, if pornography was violence, the issue of committing it in private was beside the point.

The only way to challenge the new attack effectively is to answer radical

ask each woman whether she was degraded by producing or consuming pornography. This left only one objective way to judge the matter. Namely, did women freely chose to work in or consume pornography?

The answer is clear: pornographic models and actresses signed contracts. Women who produced pornography, such as Ms Hefner at *Playboy* did so willingly. Women shopkeepers who stocked pornography chose to fill in the order forms. Those who consumed pornography paid money to do so.

But, radical feminists insisted, no "healthy" woman would consent to the humiliation of pornography. Therefore, women who made this choice were so psychologically damaged by a male dominated culture that they were incapable of true consent. In Minneapolis, the ordinance argued that women, like children, needed special protection under the law:

Children are incapable of consenting to engage in pornographic conduct, even absent physical coercion, and therefore require special protection. By the same token, the physical and psychological well-being of women ought to be afforded comparable protection, for the coercive environment in which most pornographic models work vitiates any notion that they consent or "choose" to perform in pornography.

Pause with me for a moment. Consider how insulting this is to women who have made an "unacceptable" choice with their bodies — that is, women who work in pornography. Anti-pornography feminists label these women as "psychologically sick" because they have made non-feminist choices. These women are called "victims" of their culture.

But radical feminists were raised in the same culture. Presumably, these "enlightened" women wish us to believe that their choices are based on reason and knowledge; somehow, they have risen above the culture in which they were raised. They are unwilling, however, to grant such a courteous assumption to any woman who disagrees with them.

Radical feminists are adamant: Women involved in the production of pornography cannot be held legally re-

sponsible for their actions because they are psychologically impaired by cultural influence. Their arguments need not be taken seriously. Their contracts need not be respected. They are psychologically impaired. If a women enjoys consuming pornography, it is not because she comes from another background, has a different emotional make-up or has reasoned from different facts. No: it is because she is mentally incompetent. Like any three year old, she is unable to give informed consent regarding her own body.

The touchstone principle of feminism used to be, "a woman's body, a woman's right." Regarding date rape, feminists still declare, "No means no." The logical corollary of this is "Yes means yes." Now, modern feminists are declaring that "yes" means nothing. It is difficult to believe that any form of pornography could be more degrading to women than this attitude.

As to whether cultural pressure has influenced women's decisions — of course it has. The culture we live in impacts on every choice we make. But to say that women who participate in pornography cannot make a choice because of cultural pressure, is to eliminate the possibility of choice in any realm. Because every choice of every person is made in the presence of cultural pressure . . . including the choice to become a feminist.

The anti-pornography ordinances were intended to protect women from the consequences of their own actions. But what legal implications does this have for women's contracts? — a right for which past generations fought hard. In the 19th century, women battled to become the legal equals of men, to have their consent taken seriously in the form of contracts and to have control of their own bodies legally recognized. After the anti-pornography crusade, who will take a woman's consent seriously? When the 15th Amendment was proposed in a form that enfranchised black men while ignoring women, the pioneering feminist Susan B. Anthony protested:

We have stood with the black man in the Constitution over a half a century . . . Enfranchise him and we are left outside with lunatics, idiots and criminals.

Regarding date rape, feminists declare, "No means no." The logical corollary of this is "Yes means yes." But modern feminists are declaring that "yes" means nothing. It is difficult to believe that any form of pornography could be more degrading to women than this attitude.

feminists in their own terms. The key questions have become: are all women coerced into pornography? and how does pornography relate to violence against women? Everything seemed to return to the basic contention of feminists: pornography is an act of violence. It is an act committed upon and against unconsenting women.

To begin with, I divided women into two categories: women who were directly involved with pornography — either in production or consumption; and, women who had no direct exposure. The first category was the litmus test. If women are degraded by pornography, surely the women closest to it would be the most deeply affected. At the heart of this question was the problem of pinning down subjective terms such as "degrading." I considered the most important of these subjective evaluations to come from those women who were directly involved in pornography. It was not possible to

To deprive women of the right to make their own contracts is to place them, once again, outside the constitution with lunatics, idiots and criminals. Radical feminists are reducing a woman's consent to a legal triviality. Women are being granted the protection of no longer being taken seriously when they sign contracts. This is not a step toward the dignity or freedom of women.

But what of the women who do not choose to be involved in pornography? What of the women who are offended by it? The simplistic answer is that they should not buy or consume it. Moreover, they should use any and all peaceful means to persuade others that pornography is not a proper form of expression.

But the argument runs . . . whether or not women are directly exposed to pornography, they are still victimized. Pornography is the first step of a slippery slope that leads to explicit violence against women, such as rape. Thus, *every* woman is a victim, because every woman is in danger.

This argument assumes: (1) that pornography impacts on men's behav-

When Susan Brownmiller was asked to supply evidence for her assertions, she snapped back: "The statistics will come. We supply the ideology; it's for other people to come up with the statistics."

ior, (2) that the impact can be measured objectively, and (3) that it can be correlated with sexual violence.

Pornography probably does impact on people's behavior. But it is next to impossible to objectively measure that impact. Human psychology is extremely complex, especially in the area of sexual response. Moreover, the standard of measurement and the conclusions drawn from data usually depends on the bias of the researchers or of those who commission the research.

For example, in 1983, the

Metropolitan Toronto Task Force on Violence against Women commissioned Thelma McCormack to study pornography's connection with sexual aggression. Her research did not support the assumption that there is one. Indeed, McCormack's study indicated that the effect of pornography might be cathartic. It might reduce the incidence of rape. McCormack anticipated a hostile response to her findings. She wrote:

There has been a dissatisfaction with the catharsis hypothesis. This probably reflects a political impatience . . . the catharsis hypothesis offers no support for collective efforts to resolve problems; it also offers no support for those who want to intervene to change the person.

Then, McCormack summarized her findings:

The studies of pornography suggest that the use of pornography has become widespread and that it stimulates sexual activity and sexual fantasy but does not alter established sexual practices. In spite of the more permissive social environments of today, people are still ambivalent about pornography: they believe it is harmful to others, not themselves.

Her report, *Making Sense of Research on Pornography*, was discarded. The study was reassigned to David Scott, a non-feminist committed to anti-pornography. Scott found a clear connection between pornography and sexual aggression. Students, journalists and researchers who tried to obtain a copy of McCormack's paper were told that it was unavailable.

Statistics almost always contain assumptions and biases. Sometimes the bias is an honest one. For example, a researcher who believes that sexual aggression is a learned behavior will naturally ask different questions than someone who believes aggression is an instinct. Other forms of bias are not so honest. For example, when a reporter for the Boston *Phoenix* asked the radical feminist Susan Brownmiller to supply some evidence for her assertions, she snapped back: "The statistics will come. We supply the ideology; it's for other people to come up with the statistics."

But, for the sake of argument, let's assume that a correlation exists between pornography and rape. What would such a correlation prove? If a society with more pornography tended to have more rape, what would this say?

A correlation is not a cause-and-effect relationship. It is a logical fallacy to assume that if A is correlated with B,

Radical feminists are aligning with their two greatest ideological enemies: conservatives and the patriarchal state. Anti-pornography feminists are legitimizing a system they themselves condemn as patriarchy.

then A causes B. Both might be caused by a totally separate factor, C. For example, there is a high correlation between the number of doctors in a city and the amount of alcohol consumed there. One does not cause the other. Both result from a third factor: the size of the city's population.

Similarly, a correlation between pornography and rape may indicate nothing more than a common cause for both. Namely, that we live in a sexually repressed society. To further repress sex by restricting pornography might well increase the incidence of rape. Opening up the area of pornography might well diffuse sexual violence by making it more understandable. In her recent book *Sexual Personae* Camille Paglia contended that women have difficulty in understanding rape because it involves what she called a "blood-lust . . . joy." Paglia wrote:

Women may be less prone to such fantasies because they physically lack the equipment for sexual violence. They do not know the temptation of forcibly invading the sanctuary of another body. Our knowledge of these fantasies is expanded by pornography, which is why pornography should be tolerated . . .

Even in feminist terms, there are compelling arguments for freedom of

speech. Feminist Ann Gronau explained:

Knowledge gives us the power to progress, and without access to information, such as our history, we cannot engage in the necessary process of redefinition and reevaluation. Censorship removes the evidence and hinders the acquisition of knowledge. I believe that this hurts feminism a great deal, for being able

to document our oppression has been, and continues to be, of inestimable value in battling sexism. It was only when pioneering thinkers began to systematically study the great and small documents of social history that they discovered the complicated religious, psychological and medical theories that had been employed through the centuries to prove the "inevitability" of male

dominance. Until this evidence was produced, sexism, as a word or a concept, did not exist.

There is great irony in the spectacle of radical feminists aligning with their two greatest ideological enemies: conservatives and the patriarchal state. In using ordinances, anti-pornography feminists are legitimizing a system they themselves condemn as patriarchy. It is a strange leap of faith. After all, once a law is on the books, it is the state bureaucracy, not NOW, who will enforce it. In *Our Blood*, Andrea Dworkin excoriates patriarchal bureaucracy:

Under patriarchy, no woman is safe to live her life, or to love, or to mother children. Under patriarchy, every woman is a victim, past, present and future. Under patriarchy, every woman's daughter is a victim, past, present, and future. Under patriarchy, every woman's son is her potential betrayer and also the inevitable rapist or exploiter of another woman.

Now feminists are appealing to this same state as a protector.

The final irony is that it is the state — not free speech — that has been the oppressor of women. It was the state, not pornography, that burned women as witches. It was 18th century law, not pornography, that defined women as chattel. 19th century laws allowed men to commit wayward women to insane asylums, to claim their wives' earnings, and to beat them with impunity. 20th century laws refuse to recognize rape within marriage and sentence the sexes differently for the same crime. It is the state, not pornography, that has raised barriers against women. It is censorship, not freedom, that will keep the walls intact.

One of the most important questions confronting feminism at the turn of this century is whether or not women's liberation can embrace sexual liberation. Can the freedom of women and freedom of speech become fellow travellers once more?

The feminist Myrna Kostash answered this question well by paraphrasing Camus: "Freedom to publish and read does not necessarily assure a society of justice and peace, but without these freedoms it has no assurance at all." □

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Reviews

Reclaiming the Mainstream: Individualist Feminism Rediscovered, by Joan Kennedy Taylor. Prometheus Books, 1992, 271 pp., \$24.95.

Is Feminism Obsolete?

Jane S. Shaw

Can feminism be consistent with mainstream classical liberal traditions? Joan Kennedy Taylor thinks so, and she makes her case in *Reclaiming the Mainstream*. To the extent that feminism emphasizes individual rights and opposes the encroachment of the state, she considers it both legitimate and welcome. But feminism that supports quotas for women in employment, "pay equity," and greater state intervention to remedy past wrongs toward women is out of the "mainstream" — or at least ought to be. It's time, in her view, for women to embrace individualist feminism and stop seeking help from the state.

In large measure, *Reclaiming the Mainstream* is a history of the women's movement in the United States, interlaced with commentary stressing its individualistic aspects and identifying the points where it deviates from this tradition. Taylor begins by giving attention to four seminal 18th and 19th century feminists: Mary Wollstonecraft, Margaret Fuller, John Stuart Mill and Charlotte Perkins Gillman. She points out that these thinkers were concerned with obtaining for women the same rights as men. Even the last two, who explicitly endorsed socialism, did not espouse centrally planned government, but viewed socialism as a cooperative, largely voluntary activity.

Taylor continues the narrative, focusing on the U.S., with well-researched information about the many facets of the 19th century women's movement. This movement emphasized obtaining the vote and opening academic and professional doors to women, but had other strands as well, including the movement to abolish slavery (which spurred women to consider their own condition) and the fight to prohibit alcohol (stemming in part from the desire to stop the abuse of wives by drunk husbands).

Taylor then discusses the modern women's movement that began in the late 1960s and goes into some detail about political issues of interest to women, such as the fight for the Equal Rights Amendment to the Constitution, and the development of hiring quotas from civil rights legislation. Her history is usually authoritative and comprehensive. She notes, for example, that gem of Hubert Humphrey's, from the debate over the 1964 Civil Rights Act: "If the Senator can find in Title VII . . . any language which provides that an employer will have to hire on the basis of percentage or quota related to color . . . I will start eating the pages, one after another, because it is not in there" (p.152).

Finally, Taylor discusses what she views as contemporary feminist issues such as abortion, child abuse and pornography. With these, as with the rest of the book, she is conversational,

thoughtful and gently argumentative. In each case, Taylor argues that feminism need not be statist or socialist and suggests that feminism would appeal to more women if it were more attuned to individual rights.

All this strikes me as quite reasonable, but from the start of the book I felt that Taylor wasn't addressing the fundamental question suggested by the book's title, subtitle and publicity material: Should a libertarian be a feminist? In other words, if individual rights are what matters, why should special attention be given to women's rights?

Taylor may have thought that the answer to this question was too obvious to mention. If women have fewer legal rights than others, then libertarians should be in the forefront of the effort to help them obtain equal rights. And in the 18th and 19th centuries (and presumably for centuries before that),

Taylor's emphasis on changes in attitudes really gets to the heart of modern feminism, I think, and she can properly commend consciousness-raising as "the individualist heart" of the modern women's movement.

women, especially married women, had few legal rights. Taylor's chilling quotations from Blackstone's *Commentaries on the Common Law* make clear that under common law in England (and subsequently in the U.S.) women were under their husband's control: "By marriage the husband and wife are one person in law, that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during marriage or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the husband" (45). And Black-

stone says that a husband has a right to "chastise his wife with a whip or rattan no bigger than his thumb, in order to enforce the salutary restraints of domestic discipline" (171). If these quotations are accurate, there was good reason for a feminist movement. However, it should be added (as Taylor does) that by 1871 the courts of one U.S. state, Alabama, had stated flatly that the "ancient" privilege of disciplining the wife through violence was no longer the law there.

As I see it, feminism is clearly justified when the legal treatment of men and women is unequal. But by the late 1960s, when modern feminism emerged, U.S. common law was a far cry from Blackstone's and few statutory laws discriminated against women. (Undoubtedly, there were vestiges of "protective" legislation for women — laws designed to protect workers from competition, heavily pushed by the U.S. labor department. However, Taylor doesn't mention these. And as one who entered the labor force in 1965, I never came across them.)

There was certainly discrimination in the workplace in the mid-'60s. One of the feminists' early complaints was the newspapers' practice of separating job want ads by sex. Feminists tried to change this (by picketing the *New York Times*, for example). Using persuasion to change such traditions is an action that a libertarian can be comfortable with, and if that is feminism I am all for it. (Another "feminist" change I've worked for through personal example and persuasion is to make the language more sex-neutral, with more use of terms such as "humankind.") But I'm not sure that pushing for such changes really encompasses what most people, including Taylor, think of as feminism.

Because there was little legal inequality toward women in the 1960s it is difficult for me to see why a libertarian should have been a feminist in the 1960s — or be one today. But feminism, as the term is now used, is not simply the pursuit of equal opportunity under the law. Taylor discusses many definitions, but doesn't settle on any single one. Perhaps the closest she comes is this: "Yes, all feminists have an identification with and a concern for, women

in general" (126).

In fact, when she discusses modern feminism, Taylor largely leaves behind legal rights. "The strongest impact of contemporary feminism has been social not political," she writes. "Feminism

While many women recognize that balancing career and family is the responsibility of themselves and their families, others believe that they have a "right" to have it all. Given this view, they expect government and business to take steps to enable women to achieve their "rightful" goals.

has changed commonly accepted social expectations as well as the behavior and relationships of individuals" (77).

In other words, much of modern feminism, and certainly the feminism Taylor applauds, has involved changes in attitudes rather than changes in laws. One individualist tradition that Taylor is trying to save or rediscover, then, is the recognition by the individual woman that she has many choices and does not have to follow a socially-prescribed set of rules.

Given this view of feminism, Taylor correctly emphasizes "consciousness-raising" as a major force. Consciousness-raising, a practice popularized in the late 1960s, brought women together to talk about their lives, with emphasis on how being female had influenced their important choices.

As Taylor views it, many women in the post-World War II period "tried valiantly to be 'creative' homemakers," but found their lives unsatisfying. "They knew they were unhappy, but they couldn't make the imaginative leap that would allow them to see themselves changing their lives in a way that would be both meaningful and at the same time, preserve what they valued in the situation they had" (79). For many women, consciousness-raising enabled them to direct their

lives in more satisfying ways. Taylor's emphasis on changes in attitudes really gets to the heart of modern feminism, I think, and she can properly commend consciousness-raising as "the individualist heart" of the modern women's movement (81).

Consciousness-raising has helped a number of women by liberating them from social constraints that made them unhappy, and in that respect it has been a positive development. But consciousness-raising, or at least the new consciousness that resulted, caused harm, too, both for individuals and for our nation as a society of free and responsible individuals. More choices opened up for women, but their responsibilities increased as well, and it's not clear to me that these responsibilities have been fully recognized. On the positive side, women no longer felt that they had to be housewives; they could pursue careers instead, or they could try to "have it all" — that is, they could aim at high-powered careers and still have their families.

But Taylor points out that achieving these twin goals has turned out to be more difficult than expected, a fact that Betty Friedan acknowledged in her 1981 book *The Second Stage*. While many women recognize that balancing these two goals — career and family — is their and their families' responsibility, others believe that they have a "right" to have it all. Given this view, they expect government and business to take steps to enable women to achieve their "rightful" goals. This mentality, I believe, has resulted in pressure for government-provided or government-forced day care and the demand that employers put the preferences of their employees above their profit goals through such benefits as mandatory parental leave.

The more responsibility women place on government or business to help them bring up their children, the less responsibility they are taking for themselves. Together, the increasing intervention of government and the reduction in women's responsibility for caring for children must be harmful to a liberal society. So, although we should welcome the equal rights of women, and certainly must welcome the departure of the era of the legal

subjugation of women by husbands, we should also recognize that there are costs, some of them serious.

So here I am, still mulling over the question that bothered me the entire time I was reading the book: Should a libertarian be a feminist? Taylor has argued persuasively that a feminist can be a libertarian, because a feminist — someone who identifies with and has special concern for women — does not need to seek state intervention that costs others' freedom.

But should a libertarian be a feminist? I'm not sure. Libertarians should be humanitarians; they should care about people who suffer, and try to alleviate suffering when they can. In some cases, they will help women; in others, people who are poor; in others, people who have a different color or creed. But advancing freedom in our society is the paramount goal of libertarians, and I retain some doubt as to whether feminism today furthers that goal. □

***The Great Reckoning: How the World Will Change in the Depression of the 1990s*, by James Dale Davidson & Lord William Rees-Mogg. Summit Books, 1991, \$22.00.**

Crisis! Crisis! Crisis?

John McCormack

James Davidson and Lord William Rees-Mogg predict "Financial Armageddon" during this decade. They foresee a global depression, involving either a deflationary implosion of the financial system or a radically inflationary regime. Davidson expects the former; Rees-Mogg the latter. Both predict the collapse of many major institutions, including banks, insurance companies and large pension plans. These calamities make up only the tip of the iceberg; they also believe that modern welfare states — including the U.S. federal government — face bankruptcy as well.

Davidson and Rees-Mogg are hardly unique in predicting economic crisis and collapse. Writers operating from assumptions and understandings as different as Harry Browne, Douglas Casey, Ravi Batra, and numerous Marxists have predicted financial crises in the recent and not so recent past. This book, however, stands apart from the others because of the wide sweep of its analysis.

The authors' general thesis is that we are at a major transition point in

history: something comparable to the collapse of the Roman Empire into the Dark Ages, the beginning of the Renaissance, or the start of the Industrial Revolution. This transition involves the collapse of many existing institutions and a social and industrial reorganization driven by rapid advances in computer and telecommunications technology.

Davidson, an American, is the founder and chairman of the National Taxpayer's Union. Rees-Mogg, an Englishman, is a former editor of *The Times* of London and a former deputy head of the BBC. *The Great Reckoning* is the second book by this duo. Their first collaboration, *Blood in the Streets*, is filled with similar predictions, most of which the authors are justifiably proud to recount. In that book, published in May of 1987, they forecast over the next few years a major international stock market crash; a severe bear market in real estate, especially commercial real estate; the collapse of communism in eastern Europe, and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

But no one bats 1,000; they acknowledge that two things they forecasted in *Blood in the Streets* have not come to

pass: Japanese real estate prices did not collapse along with Japanese equities and the world as whole has not sunk into depression. However, in the last year, there have been indications that Japanese real estate prices *have* collapsed. This fact has not been widely recognized because so few real estate sales have taken place, and fewer have been publicized. Only the last prediction, of worldwide depression, remains unfulfilled. This prediction has been renewed in *The Great Reckoning*.

Predictably, most book reviewers in the "prestige press" have dismissed the book as extreme, wildly improbable, and hopelessly alarmist. Those who've read Mises, Hayek, and Rothbard will have a much easier time following and accepting Davidson and Rees-Mogg's arguments than those whose economic perspective has been formed by reading Paul Samuelson and other Keynesians.

Much of the book offers general, uncontroversial advice, including health tips and appeals to thrift and good neighborliness. In places, it reads like a latter-day *Poor Richard's Almanac*. The final few chapters are specifically prescriptive in the manner of

The world is at a major historic transitional point, something comparable to the collapse of the Roman Empire into the Dark Ages, the beginning of the Renaissance, or the start of the Industrial Revolution.

many investment guides. This is not where the book's strength lies. Its real value is as a scenario planning tool for investors.

While ostensibly an investment guide, the book is actually much more. The authors take an interdisciplinary approach in exploring the interaction between technology (particularly the technology of force), the development of political institutions, and the effect of both on economic growth and finan-

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cial markets. The authors reintroduce a term, *megapolitics*, to describe their theory that "historic changes in the ways that societies organize are largely determined by the physical limits on the exercise of power." They are quick to deny that they mean that every outcome everywhere is determined by violent struggle. Rather, they mean that the Hobbesian state of nature is always with us. Power, including the defensive power to protect one's property, has a technological basis. Governmental constitutions and private contracts reflect the various parties' abilities to enforce rights and obligations. The kinds of governmental institutions and the kinds of voluntary contracts one enters into are always shaped by the reality of physical force. One need not concur with every historical example the authors offer to illustrate the workings of megapolitics to accept the fundamental validity of the concept.

Davidson and Rees-Mogg believe that technological changes currently underway, particularly improvements in computing power, will lead to dramatic social reorganization. In general, this means extensive decentralization of power resulting from the exercise of power on smaller scale. While most libertarians would applaud such developments reflexively, the authors see many dangers. Despite the easy victory over Iraq, they foresee an inevitable decline in U.S. military power. They fear this development, because they regard U.S. military power (and the power of the British before the World Wars) as the decisive element in the maintenance of international trade and the protection of property rights. While not disputing the predatory nature of governments, they prefer a "monopoly of thievery" to the competition of marauding bands. As much as they admire free-trade entrepôts like Hong Kong and Singapore, they feel that mini-states such as these could not have prospered without a predominant international military power that kept the seas open and generally supported contract and property rights.

The authors paint a bleak picture for much of the rest of the world. While applauding the collapse of communism, Davidson and Rees-Mogg warn that prospects for a free and democrat-

ic Russian Republic are slim. They expect the current Russian economic collapse to lead to a military dictatorship. The declining size of military "critical mass" is likely to lead to a dramatic increase in sovereign or semi-sovereign states in the formerly communist countries. The military confrontation between East and West will be replaced by long-term hostility between the industrialized West and the Islamic world.

Davidson and Rees-Mogg emphasize the historical parallels to other transition periods. They compare the end of U.S. predominance in international affairs and the rise of Japan as the world's premier manufacturing power with the transition from British to American leadership internationally as a result of the First World War. They argue the financial collapse during 1929-1933 was related to that transition period and that the current transition will be accompanied by a comparable debacle.

The authors see many long-term cycles at work. Some, like the debt cycle, have manifestations at least once a dec-

Chaos theory may offer important insights into financial markets. Volatility and crashes may turn out to be integral to the functioning of markets, rather than problems to be fixed by government macro-economic management.

ade but demonstrate vastly greater effects every half-century or so. They believe that one can discern longer term economic cycles, some lasting as long as five hundred years. Ominously, they find us approaching the confluence of several of these cyclical sea-changes.

One period in intellectual history they see coming to an end is what they call the "Newtonian paradigm" in which change occurs in a linear fashion and systems tend toward equilibrium.

While these notions no longer hold sway in physics, they still dominate Keynesian (and, to some extent, Chicago School) economics. Chaos theory, they believe, may offer important insights into financial markets. Volatility and crashes may turn out to be integral to the functioning of markets, rather than problems to be fixed by government macro-economic management. Long cycles may occur despite any effort to maintain "equilibrium." While some "technical" analyses of market prices may be valid their strength may not be apparent using conventional, linear mathematics.

Despite its pessimistic, even apocalyptic tone, *The Great Reckoning* is strangely exhilarating. I would not regret the passing of most of the welfare state institutions the authors expect to collapse. The socio-technological

changes they foresee offer greater personal autonomy and concomitant greater requirements for personal responsibility. Much more unsettling, however, are their warnings concerning the potential horrors of the devolution of power through technological change. I find these prophecies, however, to be less than convincing.

Those who read *Blood in the Streets* know how close to the mark most of their forecasts have come. Even so, we are yet to witness the end of western civilization. Perhaps their dire predictions are overdone and the international economy as a whole may be a more robust and resilient system than they realize. But even if this is the case, readers will still benefit by testing their own assumptions about what will be needed to protect their property and persons in the years ahead. □

a realistic third alternative to this painful dilemma is Allen Buchanan, a Professor of Philosophy at the University of Arizona in Phoenix. He argues that what is really missing, in a world full of secessionist movements, is a compre-

As long as no generally accepted moral framework exists for secession, the justifications presented by each side in any given secession crisis will continue to be logically incoherent, self-contradictory appeals of the "My Country, Right or Wrong" variety.

***Secession: The Political Morality of Political Divorce from Fort Sumter to Lithuania and Quebec*, by Allen Buchanan. Westview Press, 1991, xviii + 174 pp, \$39.95 hc, \$14.95 sc.**

How to Secede in Politics

Scott J. Reid

The first two years of the 1990s have produced a wave of nationalist and secessionist movements unparalleled since the breakup of the Russian, Austrian and Ottoman empires at the end of the First World War. The collapses of Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet Union may be precursors of events to come in other parts of the world. There is reason to believe that Canada and Ethiopia may break apart in the near future and that secessionist movements will grow in strength in Scotland, Sri Lanka, and South Africa. Looking further into the future, there is no reason to believe that the world's great multi-ethnic empires — India, China and Indonesia — will prove any more successful at suppressing their minority

populations than were the Soviets.

Often as not, ethnic violence seems to accompany secession. The outbreak of full-scale civil war in Yugoslavia and parts of the ex-USSR is the first massive bloodshed on European soil since the Second World War. Some commentators have reacted by fondly recalling the days when nationalist fervor was kept firmly under the heel of Communist tyranny. In its day, Yugoslavia was popularly portrayed as the most enlightened and outward-looking of all the Communist states of eastern Europe. It also had the worst human rights record of the lot, because Tito and Co. had to quash the usual liberal-democratic dissidents, as well as the nationalist sentiments of several small nations.

The choice seems to be between secessionist bloodbath or authoritarian empire. One person who thinks there is

hensive moral philosophy of secession. This is such completely uncharted territory for moral philosophy that Buchanan warns readers, "If I have not seen very far, it is because I have stood on the shoulders of midgets" (p. ix).

As long as no generally accepted moral framework exists for secession, secessionist movements will continue to pit those who would use the sword to maintain their empires against those who would use the sword to hack them apart. The justifications presented by each side in any given secession crisis will continue to be logically incoherent, self-contradictory appeals of the "My Country, Right or Wrong" variety.

Certainly this has been the case in Yugoslavia, where the Croats and Bosnians have demanded the right to secede from the Yugoslav federation, but have not extended the same right to their Serb minorities, and where the rulers of Serbia have insisted on the right of every Croatian and Bosnian Serb to live under Serbian rule, but have not extended the same right to the Albanians of Kosovo.

Buchanan's approach is straightforward. He attempts to catalogue the moral arguments that could be used in favor of secession under certain circumstances, and to do the same for those that could be used to oppose secession. When the preponderance of the arguments in any given instance outweigh

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the preponderance of arguments against secession, then that particular secession can be morally justified.

For example, in one of his more important discussions, Buchanan reviews John Locke's classic discussion of political oppression and applies it to the moral right of secession. Locke, of course, argued that the most reasonable response to political oppression is to remove oneself physically from the country in which the oppression is taking place. By remaining within the borders of a country, one is offering one's tacit consent to be ruled.

But, as Buchanan observes, moving may involve costs that are too high for the offended group to reasonably be expected to bear. As well, borders are not as open to the world's huddled masses as they once were. Locke's argument would have sat poorly with the Jewish refugees aboard the St Louis, who were turned away from port after port in 1939. In other cases, as with the Kurds, it is simply impossible for a group to leave its homeland without committing ethnic suicide. In consequence, a strong argument can be made that secession or the removal of part of the territory of a tyrannical state from the grasp of the tyrant is morally justifiable.

Curiously, Buchanan places most of his emphasis on secessions motivated by questions of principle, rather than on those caused by ethnic conflict. America's secession from the British Empire in 1776 and the secession of the south in the 1860s are two of only a handful of historical examples of a secession based on principle rather than ethnic friction. None of the secessionist movements of the 1990s appear to be based on any tangible principle at all beyond the nationalist dictum that each nation should enjoy boundaries coextensive with its ethnic frontiers. More fundamentally, there is a significant gap in his analysis of ethnic conflict. Buchanan does not directly address the issue that inevitably seems to lead to violence in secessionist struggles — the insistence of every seceding minority ethnicity, that its right to self-determination should not be extended to other minorities within its own borders. This is the cause of the wars in Georgia, Azerbaijan/Armenia, Yugoslavia, and now in Moldova, where the

Ukrainian and Russian minorities are attempting to secede from the Romanian-dominated Moldovan republic.

Still, one can infer a basic and reasonable rule from Buchanan's emphasis on evenhandedness: If group "B" has the right to secede from a country governed by group "A," then presumably sections of brand-new country "B" should have the right to secede as well, if only to rejoin country "A." Such a process of smaller and smaller secessions, pursued down to the neighborhood level, could produce new borders with a few usual lumps and jogs, and maybe even the odd enclave. This has been the rule that has been followed in most of the (very rare) examples of successful and non-violent secessions.

Unfortunately, neither this idea nor any of Buchanan's well-reasoned arguments is likely to find a sympathetic audience among the leaders of the nationalist movements that are at the heart of secessionist violence worldwide. There seems to be a deliberate unwillingness on the part of nationalist

None of the secessionist movements of the 1990s appear to be based on any tangible principle at all beyond the nationalist dictum that each nation should enjoy boundaries coextensive with its ethnic frontiers.

leaders everywhere to consider reasoned opinions or to place any value at all on generosity and fair play towards groups other than one's own.

Perhaps a more receptive hearing might be given by the policy makers of the United Nations and the European Community, whose leaders seem hell-bent upon thrusting their organizations into the midst of the world's trouble spots. To judge by their confused discussions of intervention in Yugoslavia, they have no guidance beyond a simple desire to stop the shooting. Interventions in support of clearly-stated princi-

ples of secession that are impartial and fair to all sides would be far more likely to receive a positive response than

the current directionless efforts of George Bush in Kurdistan or of the European leaders in the Balkans. □

Hayek and the Market, by Jim Tomlinson.

Pluto Press, 1990, xii + 162pp., £8.95.

Economic Freedom, F.A. Hayek.

Basil Blackwell, 1991, xii + 415pp., \$40.00.

Hayek Unbound

Gregory R. Johnson

Jim Tomlinson's *Hayek and the Market* is an unusual, stimulating, and vexing little book.

It is unusual because it is the first explicitly left-wing, book-length critique of Hayek in English since Barbara Wootton's *Freedom Under Planning* (London: Allen and Unwin, 1946) and Herbert E. Finer's *Road to Reaction* (London: Dobson, 1946). Published in 1990, it is the first such critique of Hayek that draws upon all of his major published works.

Tomlinson's book is stimulating because of its consistently critical attitude. His tone is neither hostile nor ideological, but skeptical and probing. He manages to engage Hayek's work on a number of levels. Many of his criticisms are on target. (For instance, Tomlinson quite rightly notes that Hayek is grossly unfair to Freud. Indeed, as J.G. Merquior has noted, the two thinkers have much in common.¹) Furthermore, even when Tomlinson's criticisms are off target — and some are *way* off target — they are always at least thought-provoking, forcing one to re-read Hayek's texts and to reformulate his positions.

Stimulating though it may be, however, *Hayek and the Market* is still quite vexing. Although it promises much, it actually delivers very little by way of substantive and searching criticism.

The book consists of six chapters. Chapter 1, "A Biographical Overview," is just what the title says. It introduces not only Hayek's life and major works, but also one of the book's most annoying rhetorical tactics. After summarizing one of Hayek's positions in a few lines, Tomlinson then follows with an equally terse summary or quotation of a critique of Hayek. Hayek says *p*. But Keynes (or Sraffa or Machlup or Robbins) says not-*p*. This is, I suppose, useful for bibliographical purposes. (I discovered several critiques of Hayek that I had not encountered before.) But it hardly serves as a *critique* of Hayek, for it presents only the conclusions of his arguments and those of his critics, but never actually digs into the arguments themselves. Instead of explicating and engaging Hayek's arguments in detail, Tomlinson simply manipulates and juxtaposes appeals to authority, countering contextless conclusions with contextless counter-conclusions.

Chapter 2, "Liberty, Democracy, Law and Justice," surveys some of the central concepts of Hayek's political theory. It also introduces another annoying rhetorical tactic. I call this the "Blame Hayek" ploy. It amounts to a lack of hermeneutical charity and inquisitiveness. Tomlinson frequently encounters aspects of Hayek's thought that he has trouble fitting together. This should not be surprising, given the subtlety, scope, and radicalness of Hayek's work. However, instead of trying to

delve more deeply into Hayek to see if the problematic aspects can be reconciled, Tomlinson simply stops and declares that Hayek is contradicting himself. The problem, however, is usually not Hayek's, but Tomlinson's.

For instance, Tomlinson reminds us of Hayek's traditionalism and social conservatism. Tomlinson then reminds us of Hayek's often quite radical proposals for institutional reform. The conclusion: Hayek is contradicting himself. Or: Tomlinson reminds us of Hayek's commitment to the rule of law. He then mentions that Hayek also gives great place to the discretion of judges in applying and interpreting the law. The conclusion: Hayek is contradicting himself; either the law rules, in which case it must, presumably, apply *itself* — somehow — or the judges apply the law, in which case they rule. In Chapter 4, Tomlinson introduces a dichotomy between individual entrepreneurs and institutions. The Austrian emphasis on entrepreneurship, he seems to hold, is a form of radical, atomistic individualism which ignores the importance of institutional frameworks. But clearly institutional frameworks are important; therefore, the role of the entre-

The only reason for calling the modern welfare state "market socialism" seems to be mere sentimentalism. Socialism in the classical Marxian sense, however, is dead, and Mises and Hayek — and history — have killed it.

preneur is overemphasized to — I presume — the detriment of the technocrat.

These apparent contradictions melt away, however, when one appreciates the central role in Hayek's thought played by the *the primacy of practical reason*. Tomlinson's criticisms all presuppose a particular model of theory and intellectual criticism and their relationship to practice. Roughly speaking, Tomlinson supposes that theory and

criticism require a "transcendental" standpoint, i.e., a standpoint outside of and opposed to history, society, traditions, practices, and institutional frameworks. To understand, criticize, and reform tradition and society, we must somehow first extract ourselves from

Hayek's evolutionism is vague — but this vagueness hardly justifies the uncharitable and sometimes downright stupid attacks it has drawn.

them. In order to obtain objective knowledge, we must, in effect, become angelic knowers, purging ourselves of traditional prejudices and practices and even language. It is only by presupposing this model that Tomlinson can conclude that there are conflicts between being situated in a tradition on the one hand and participating in social criticism and reform on the other — between being situated in a legal tradition and applying the law to particular cases — or between existing in institutional frameworks and exercising entrepreneurial insight and judgment.

Hayek, however, presupposes a different model. For Hayek, an angelic knower purged of tradition, practice, language, and prejudice is impossible. Rather, the human knower is constituted precisely by his language, traditions, prejudices, and practices. Therefore, to get rid of them would not raise us to an angelic knowledge, but rather lower us to the cognitively helpless state of an unsocialized infant. In other words, the traditional account of objective knowledge is mistaken. Objectivity is not gained by leaving history, language, etc. behind; it is achieved through them; they are the instruments of — rather than impediments to — knowing.

Given Hayek's understanding of the knower, there can be no radical opposition between theory, criticism, and reform on the one hand and history, tradition, and practical knowledge on

the other. For Hayek, *theory is simply another form of practical knowledge*; it is the practice by which practice understands itself. Criticism and reform are also forms of practical knowledge; they are the practices whereby practice transforms itself to adapt to new circumstances.

An interesting though sketchy criticism in the second chapter (later taken up in chapter 5) is of Hayek's contempt for political parties and organized pressure groups. This contempt is, of course, understandable given their role in the maintenance and expansion of legalized plunder. Their roles can, moreover, be minimized in the legislature. For instance, one could choose all legislators by random lottery, somewhat like jurors. (Anyone who reads Aristophanes' *The Wasps* can see that having professional jurors is just as bad as having professional politicians; perhaps, then, professional politicians can be eliminated in the same way as professional jurors!)

The important point, though, is that one cannot totally *eliminate* the power of political parties and organized pressure groups, except through coercion. Thus, as Tomlinson points out, the only way to contain their baleful influence is to *bring them into the government*. Tomlinson's model is the corporatism of contemporary Sweden and Austria, in which organized pressure groups make policies. This, of course, is a prescription for *very big* — and, because unified, very powerful — government.

A form of corporatism committed to limited government and the free market could never grant organized interests the power to make laws. *But it could give them the power to overrule those laws that victimize particular groups*. I have long toyed half-seriously with the idea of a bicameral legislature in which only one house would be empowered to *pass* laws. Its members would be insulated from special interests and (almost certainly) limited to one term through random lottery election. The other house would be empowered only to *repeal* laws. Its membership would consist of representatives of organized interest groups, who would act as a check on the tendency for legislatures to pass laws which victimize particular

social groups, usually the small, poorly-organized, and voiceless. (In the present system only those groups which are well-funded, well-organized, and loud can defend their interests, usually while preying on the interests of others. In the system I envision, all a group would need to protect itself is a single representative in the house of appeals.) Through the winnowing process of legislation and repeal, there would be a tendency toward laws that serve the common good in the Hayekian sense — the preservation of the extended order, the maximization of life chances for all — without having to depend either on the limited knowledge of legislators or their good intentions to seek the common good.

Chapter 3, "Evolution, Reason and Morals," is almost wholly insubstantial. Tomlinson reminds us that Hayek stresses over and over the dangers of the replacement of the abstract, individualistic, and self-interested ethics of the extended order with the solidaristic and altruistic ethics of the tribal band. The latter, Hayek thinks, are most ap-

Is Hayek's account of the dangers of the interventionist welfare state refuted by historical experience? It is true that we are not all serfs today. But Hayek did not claim to be forecasting an inevitable historical trend. Rather, he argued that if certain policies are pursued, then — freedom will be lost.

propriate for families and small subgroups within the extended order. Tomlinson points out, however, that the reverse is also a problem: the solidaristic and altruistic ethics of the family and the small group are being eroded by the values of the market order.

Tomlinson is not specific about how, precisely, this is happening, but it is easy enough to guess what is bothering him. For example, the idea of marriage as an ethical institution that

demands that we alter *our* preferences to make *it* work has been replaced with the idea of marriage as a business contract which can be dissolved as soon as it does not serve the preferences we started with. Marriage and family are no longer ethical institutions that demand the *evolution* of our selves and our interests. Rather, they are there simply to serve the interests and preferences of the self that is already in place.

Tomlinson actually claims that Hayek would applaud such a situation, treating marriage and the family simply as transient, voluntary arrangements to serve given preferences (p. 131). Now, some libertarians would applaud this model of marriage. But, then again, many of them have lousy marriages. Many, moreover, are frozen at the usually adolescent level of maturity at which they decided that, from then on, they were going to enter only those relationships that served, rather than challenged, the preferences already in place.

But this sort of rationalistic individualism is completely foreign to Hayek's

work. Hayek does not argue that all aspects of human life should be conducted like market transactions. This is why he says that the ethics of solidarity and altruism are *appropriate* to the family. Furthermore, he was aware of the problem, writing in *The Fatal Conceit* that, "if we were always to apply the rules of the extended order to our more intimate groupings, *we would crush them.*"²

Interestingly enough, Tomlinson also goes on to argue (130-131) that Hayek is a "family values" man, but that this is a problem. The family, Tomlinson claims, is a deeply coercive, inequalitarian, and unfair institution, and this is bad; thus the family is in need of external political intervention to make it more voluntaristic and egalitarian . . . sort of like market interactions (although Tomlinson would not think so).

These sorts of contradictions pop up all over the place. On one page, Tomlinson stresses the importance Hayek places on the moral and institutional frameworks of the market process. A few pages later, Hayek is accused of

having an abstract, ahistorical concept of the market that ignores the importance of differing institutional set ups. This makes one wonder if Tomlinson is not simply beating Hayek with any stick that comes easily to hand.

Tomlinson also castigates Hayek for being vague about what, precisely, are the values he thinks conducive to capitalist civilization. Hayek reiterates that traditions which esteem the family and private property have a clear survival advantage. He also makes statements such as the following:

They [the early *bourgeoisie*] esteemed the prudent man, the good husbandman and provider who looked after the future of his family and his business by building up capital, guided less by the desire to consume much than by the wish to be regarded as successful by his fellows who pursued similar aims. . . . Its [the market order's] mores involved withholding from the known needy neighbours what they might require in order to serve the unknown needs of thousands of unknown others.

Reason Papers

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No. 17 (Fall 1992)

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Financial gain rather than the pursuit of a known common good became not only the basis of approval but also the cause of the increase of general wealth.³

Now, this may be rather abstract, but does Tomlinson literally not know what Hayek is talking about? Given this description, would he be unable to distinguish a bourgeois from, say, a hunter-gatherer, a technocrat, or a liberal bleeding heart?

Tomlinson also takes Hayek to task for the vagueness of his evolutionism. Hayek's evolutionism is vague — but this vagueness hardly justifies the uncharitable and sometimes downright stupid attacks it has drawn.⁴ But even if Hayek's evolutionism were completely indefensible Tomlinson's sort of criticisms are not sufficient to demonstrate it. For instance, Tomlinson thinks it very telling to observe that evolutionary considerations do not apply to human culture because man has no natural predators (47). Well, what about other men? Perhaps Hayek's emphasis on cultural *group competition* and selection is not so stupid after all.

Chapter 4, "Full employment, Inflation, Welfare and Trade Unions," deals largely with a body of Hayek's later work that has not, to my knowledge, been given a comprehensive treatment elsewhere. After having lost the battle with Keynes and Cambridge over the direction of inter-war economic policy and having published *The Pure Theory of Capital*, Hayek turned most of his attention to political theory and abstract methodological and "meta-economic" issues, producing such works as *The Road to Serfdom*, *The Counter-Revolution of Science*, "The Use of Knowledge in Society," "Individualism: True and False," etc.

It was not until the 1970s, with Nobel prize in hand and the post-war Keynesian consensus falling apart around him, that Hayek re-entered the fray of monetary theory and policy. Most of these works of the '70s and '80s were published by London's Institute of Economic Affairs. They have now been collected together and published by Blackwell under the title *Economic Freedom*, with a brief Introduction by Norman Barry.

Economic Freedom is a useful and

welcome volume, deserving a paperback edition and the widest possible readership. It belongs in every library. *Economic Freedom* brings together *A Tiger by the Tail: The Keynesian Legacy of Inflation* (a 1978 collection of timely excerpts drawn largely from works of the

Hayek is not a laissez-faire absolutist but an advocate of the "social market economy." He does not think that the consumer preferences served by the market at any given time are sacred. They are, rather, subject to moral evaluation and political alteration.

1930s and '40s); Hayek's radical proposals for the privatization of money, *Denationalization of Money*, "Market Standards for Money," and "Choice in Currency"; his critiques of Keynesianism, including his Nobel Lecture "The Pretense of Knowledge"; "1980s Unemployment and the Unions"; and several other policy-oriented essays. Also included is "The Confusion of Language in Political Thought," one of Hayek's late political essays which is especially important for understanding the relationship of Hayek's thought to classical political philosophy. Reading these essays together underscores both Hayek's originality and the hopelessness of the thesis that he is a timid conservative. It's remarkable to see the radicalness of the conclusions that can be reached through "immanent" criticism of the status quo.

Tomlinson's survey of these late works is one of the most interesting parts of his book, but it is still pretty thin stuff. He points out many small problems with Hayek's accounts of inflation, labor unions, and the post-war Keynesian consensus, but his dismissal of Hayek's proposals for currency reform is wholly cavalier. Also flawed is Tomlinson's claim that Hayek's account of the dangers of the interventionist welfare state is refuted by

historical experience. Yes, it is indeed true that we are not all serfs today. But Hayek did not claim to be forecasting an inevitable historical trend. Rather, he argued that *if* certain policies are pursued, *then* — in the absence of countervailing forces — freedom will be lost. But the policies have not been pushed to the ultimate extreme and countervailing tendencies such as stagflation have appeared. Moreover, Hayek's own dire predictions have played some role in slowing down the progress of interventionism. Hayek would be the first to celebrate the fact that he has been "proven wrong" by historical events.

Chapter 5, "Hayek and Socialism," and Chapter 6, "Conclusions: Hayek at the End of the Twentieth Century," continue in the venerable "market socialist" tradition of hemming, hawing, and hedging in response to the Misesian and Hayekian critiques of central planning. Tomlinson's main point is that the Mises-Hayek critique applies only to an idealized socialism; they successfully prove that complete central planning is impossible, but they do not prove that various forms of "market socialism" are impossible.

The trouble with this approach, however, is that it allows socialism to escape the Austrian critique only by turning it into a blurry, moving target. Suddenly socialism becomes "market socialism" which on Tomlinson's account is indistinguishable from what passes for capitalism today: the mixed economy. The only reason for calling such a system "market socialism" seems to be mere sentimentalism. Socialism in the classical Marxian sense, however, is dead, and Mises and Hayek — and history — have killed it. Furthermore, the "market socialist" mixed economy becomes more susceptible to the Mises-Hayek critique once its elements are un-mixed.

For the sake of argument let me stipulate that the mixed economy consists of interventionism, redistributionism, and market capitalism. I shall define interventionism as any regulation that attempts to replace production by private firms and co-ordination through the market price mechanism. Examples of interventionism include nationalization of industries and wage

and price supports and controls. Redistributionism consists of any attempt to alter the demand structure *within* the price system as opposed to interventionist attempts to alter the price system as such. Examples of redistributionism include inflation, subsidies, and any sort of direct transfer payments.

Now, interventionism is subject to the Mises-Hayek critique; see, for example, Mises' *A Critique of Interventionism*. Therefore, one can make a strong case against any attempt to replace the price system. Tomlinson, however, simply waves away the argument against interventionism as an instance of the slippery-slope fallacy without actually criticizing its account of the mechanism by which interventionism must of necessity spread through an economy.

Redistributionism, however, is quite another matter. Hayek is not a laissez-faire absolutist but an advocate of the "social market economy" in the original sense of that term, i.e., Hayek holds that all economic production and activity should be undertaken by private firms co-ordinated by the free market's price mechanism. He does not, however, think that the consumer preferences served by the market at any given time are sacred. They are, rather, subject to moral evaluation and political alteration. For instance, social safety-nets, subsidies for the arts, school-vouchers, and taxes on luxuries and "sins" do not seek to alter or replace the market. Rather, they merely re-direct demand within it.

The critique of redistributionism is the next frontier for libertarian social theory. Israel M. Kirzner's *Discovery, Capitalism and Distributive Justice* is a significant contributor to the economic critique of redistributionism. Charles Murray, Marvin Olasky, and David Beito have made powerful historical and sociological arguments that redistributionism is both harmful and unnecessary, and it seems likely that many more economic, sociological, and historical critiques can be offered. The issue is also, of course, a fertile field for moral philosophers.

The point to be recognized here, though, is that to the extent that market socialism is interventionist it is subject to the Mises-Hayek critique. And to the

extent that it is redistributionist, Hayek is not subject to Tomlinson's critique. Granted, Hayek is much less of a redistributionist than Tomlinson, but the point is that both of them agree in principle that the state can reallocate resources by political means.

Who should read *Hayek and the Market*? I suspect that the book will be of greatest benefit to those who seek a clip of "intellectual ammunition" against Hayek: those who are generally unsympathetic to him, who wish to convince themselves that he need not be taken seriously, and who wish to do so without having read his work. Hayek scholars will also benefit from reading *Hayek and the Market* for it does stimulate thought and provide a few choice quotes. Besides, they have a scholarly obligation to keep up on the literature.

However, those hoping for a deep and serious critical discussion of Hayek will have to wait a little longer. □

notes

- 1 J. G. Merquior, "In Quest of Modern Culture: Hysterical or Historical Humanism," *Critical Review* 5, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 399-420. See esp. pp. 413-415.
- 2 F. A. Hayek, *The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism*, ed. W.W. Bartley, III (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988), p. 18.
- 3 F. A. Hayek, *Law, Legislation, and Liberty*, vol. 3, *The Political Order of a Free People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), pp. 164-165.
- 4 For a good example of a less-than-fair attack on Hayek's evolutionism, see Jeffrey Friedman's claim that for Hayek, "whatever evolves is right" in his "Postmodernism vs Postlibertarianism," *Critical Review* 5, no. 2 (Spring 1991), p. 155.

A Declaration of War: Killing People to Save Animals and the Environment, by Screaming Wolf. Patrick Henry Press, 1991, 161pp., \$8.95.

War With the Animal Kingdom

John Hospers

The book that most dramatically called attention to human cruelty to domestic animals (principally on "factory farms") was Peter Singer's *Animal Liberation* (1975). Then came Tom Regan's *The Case for Animal Rights* (1983), which not only insisted that we not abuse animals but also argued that animals have a right to our care, that animals have as much of a right against human beings as one human being has against another.

But all this is tepid stuff compared to the latest volume, *A Declaration of War* (1991), by an unnamed individual who calls himself Screaming Wolf. Human beings, he says, have been massively guilty of exterminating much of the animal kingdom, of polluting the Earth, of overpopulating it with so little care for the future that starvation

and famine must be the inevitable result, and of decimating the animal kingdom and the entire environment in the process. It is time, he says, to take action to save the animals and plants before human beings doom them all to destruction. It is too late for talk or even peaceful agitation. If animals are being used in experimental laboratories in a local university, it is not enough to walk in front of the building with placards protesting the practice; we must take over the building, by armed might if necessary, even killing the people in charge in order to protect the animals.

If in the building across the street your sister were being raped or members of your family being murdered, you would do whatever was in your power (says the author) to save their lives. You would not stand outside and demonstrate or write a letter to your congressman. Even threatening the peo-

ple with fear of dire consequences if they continued the practice would do no good — we have to implant in the guilty persons a deadly *fear* of what we will do to them if they do not cease and desist, and there will be no such fear if we do not sometimes carry out our threats. We must initiate a guerrilla war against all persons who use animals in laboratories, or use their skin for clothing, or hunt animals for food or sport, or eat the flesh of animals at all. *All* of these people are guilty of animal-murder, and must be brought to account like all other murderers. Our first duty is to rescue our animal brothers and sisters from their human aggressors.

All persons, he says, are guilty, even those who do not abuse animals or eat their flesh, for we are all a part of a civilization in which the systematic destruction of animals is a part of its way of life. For example, we all use roads and ride in cars that kill animals by the thousands, and we have taken over the plains and forests that are the rightful domains of animals and put homes and stores and factories in their place, killing most of the animals in the process. And since this process is sure to continue if unchecked, and the human population will continue to expand and take ever more of the animals' domain, the only hope for the animals is the elimination of the human race from the planet.

A radical thesis, indeed. One cannot accuse the author of being unwilling to face the implications of his own position. But what about the position itself? Here are just a few thoughts:

1. When you compare the killing of animals with the torture or rape of your sister, you are *assuming* that the two cases are on par with each other. Should one really feel the same way about a bird being mistreated (tearing its wing off, for example) as one would about one's sister being raped or one's

It is time, says "Screaming Wolf," to take action to save the animals and plants before human beings doom them all to destruction.

mother being murdered? We don't even feel that way about *people* who are unknown to us: I am distressed that some people in Bangladesh are being killed, but there is little I can do to change this, and even the most empathic person will hardly feel duty-bound to rescue *all* victims of aggression. (He would be very busy if he did, and his life would be very short.)

2. And with the animals there is a much greater difference. We know very little about how the animal *feels*. Nevertheless, we are quite sure, for example, that the cow grazing in the pasture does not *fear* its death in the slaughterhouse, the way a person just imprisoned in a police state fears imminent torture and death.


3. Moreover, pain and death are par for the course throughout nature. The snake poisons or constricts its prey; the

predator catches and eats its prey without any regard to its misery; the cat plays with the still-alive mouse before eating it. What people do to animals is a small thing compared to what animals do to each other. The fate that nature has in store for animals is early death from predators, or disease, or cold, or starvation. Virtually no animals in nature live to a ripe old age. I think that if I were an animal I would prefer to be

adopted by a human owner who would take care of me, even if the owner would kill me in the end, because the fate I would have in wild nature would be far less merciful. Yet Screaming Wolf says that animals adopted as pets should be eliminated along with the human race itself.

4. Some people march on clinics where abortions are performed and damage the equipment and threaten the women who came there for abortions. They do not exhibit any toleration for differences of opinion — they don't say, "We are against abortion, you are for it, and we'll agree to disagree peaceably." They assume that they are right, and they impose their convictions on others by the use of force. A civilized society cannot long endure in this way. (Not that Screaming Wolf would wish it to survive.) How is Screaming Wolf's call to violence different from what is practiced by the anti-abortionists? To them, the fact that (as they see it) human babies are being killed is all-important, though disputable; to Screaming Wolf, the fact that animals are being killed is all-important, though the conclusions he draws from this are eminently disputable. He simply has not shown that "My family is being murdered" is on par with "Some squirrels are being killed" — and in the absence of proof, the use of force against one's enemies is recommended instead.

We can be quite outraged at people killing animals by the thousands just for sport, or keeping them caged in tiny quarters for their entire lives, or raising them in crowded pens under horribly unsanitary conditions and then killing them by slow degrees in slaughterhouses, and yet stop far short of Screaming Wolf's "final solution to the problem of humankind." If all creatures are of value because they are alive and want to stay that way, is this not also true of human beings? In spite of humanity's many sins, is there not a unique value in the existence of creatures with intelligence, language, and a conception of the future and how to mold it, that exists nowhere else among the animals? Would it really be a better world if it were merely a domain of "nature, red in tooth and claw?" □



"'Habitual criminal' nothing! — I never use the same M.O. twice!"

Malcolm X, Warner Bros./Largo International, Marvin Worth, producer, Spike Lee, director. Written by Arnold Perl and Spike Lee. Starring Denzel Washington, Angela Bassett, Albert Hall, Spike Lee.

Malcolm X Reborn

Jesse Walker

Spike Lee's *Malcolm X* is above all else a movie about rebirth. Malcolm Little, the ambitious yet delinquent son of a militant preacher, is reborn as Detroit Red, a high-stakes hustler, thief, pimp, and drug addict. Red is reborn as Malcolm X, black separatist follower of Elijah Muhammed and the Nation of Islam. Malcolm X becomes El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz, mature fighter for social justice. And in death, all these personalities are transformed into X, the ubiquitous symbol of African-American rebellion and pride. Few have worn as many faces as Malcolm, but Denzel Washington's excellent acting, buttressed by the maturing skills of filmmaker Lee, creates a convincing portrayal of a man who never stopped growing — not even in death.

The movie has acquired its share of controversy, not all of it connected with its content. It went overbudget. It took too long to shoot. Its director was accused of overcommercializing his topic. Poet Amiri Baraka (*né* LeRoi Jones) claimed that Lee was "too bourgeois" to make a movie true to Malcolm's legacy. More mainstream voices were alarmed that a movie sympathetic to Malcolm X was in the works at all.

Prejudiced filmgoers may well retain their prejudice at the end of the show. Those who attend with an open mind, however, will see a tribute, not just to one black militant, but to the ideals of self-reliance, personal growth, and justice.

Rebirth and Fatherhood

Early in the film, the Ku Klux Klan burns down Malcolm's house for his father's radical, back-to-Africa preaching;

his father grabs his wife and children and runs outside, firing a gun to drive the Klansmen away. In revenge, the Klan straps him to a railroad track. The insurance company refuses to help his surviving family, and it is difficult for Malcolm's mother to provide. Malcolm and his siblings are soon taken by the government's social workers from their mother, who dies in an asylum.

With each subsequent rebirth, Malcolm adopts a new father substitute, all ultimately unsatisfactory: whites, gangsters, would-be prophets. He is not able to come to terms with the loss of his father until the last years of his life.

The central rebirth experience of the movie comes when Malcolm is sentenced to eight to ten years in the penitentiary for burglary. Thrown into solitary confinement for refusing to state his prison number, Malcolm spends days cut off from the world in a metal womb. He emerges with his spirit completely eroded. A fellow prisoner takes Malcolm under his wing and introduces him to the teachings of Elijah Muhammed, leader of the Black Muslims or Nation of Islam. After hesitating, Malcolm eventually wholly embraces the Muslim worldview. Upon his release, he begins working his way up the Nation's hierarchy, organizing and preaching in mosques and on the street.

Spike Lee's ideological ambiguity has never served him better than it does here. Sometimes the Nation seems a positive force for self-discipline and self-reliance, helping *lumpenproletarian* ex-cons kick drugs and live respectable lives within a strong moral framework, while defending black men and women against the predations of the white state, especially its police arm. The Black Muslim philosophy would set

any of today's media-labelled "black conservatives" a-smilin': rejection of white paternalism in favor of black self-help; religious institutions as the base for the new social order; support for the formation of black businesses and economic power; rejection of "immoral living" (drugs, adultery, etc.); demands for neighborhood power and community control of public institutions; a fervent belief in the right to keep and bear arms. But there is a difference between what conservatives practice and what they preach, and while the last remnants of the Old Right (notably, Murray Rothbard) praised Malcolm X at the time, the conservative mainstream preferred to label him "violent" and an "extremist" for suggesting that blacks defend themselves against the violence of others.

Lee does not shy at all from the negative aspects of the Nation of Islam. The sweeping anti-white racism that denounces all Caucasians as "devils," the paleolithic attitude toward women (a banner at one Muslim gathering declares them "our most precious property"), and the cult-like adoration of Elijah Muhammed are never glossed over, and while the issue of whether

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the Black Muslims were guilty of extortion is not raised, the fact that many leading ministers feathered their nests quite well with Nation funds is portrayed, and with a vengeance. As the movie progresses, it rapidly becomes clear that while Malcolm has saved himself from a life of crime, he has not attained any sort of Nirvana.

The breaking point comes when he discovers that Elijah has fathered children by unmarried members of his

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flock, and that the man who introduced him to Islam in prison now denounces him behind his back. His faith shattered, he tries to continue his work, but eventually splits with the Nation. He makes a pilgrimage to Mecca, there rejects anti-white racism, and emerges born again once more, as El-Hajj Malik El-Shabazz. He will now work with whites who share his black nationalist goals, try to be a better husband and father, speak for himself rather than for Elijah Muhammed, and disassociate himself from the Nation's corruption.

In many ways, Malcolm has now become his father; indeed, a sequence in which someone (probably the Nation of Islam) firebombs his house is deliberately filmed so as to recall the Klan's attack on his father's home at the beginning of the film. This is his final rebirth before his tragic death; through it, he finally becomes his own man. All of his father figures have failed. Now, the only father he recognizes is Allah. El-Hajj Malik Shabazz thinks his own thoughts and says his own words, and will be a role model — and provide "manhood" — for others.

Malcolm X was frequently accused of advocating violence; in fact, as he repeatedly made clear, what he supported was *self-defense*. Of course, any thug can claim to act only in self-defense; indeed, the Black Panthers (in their later incarnations) demonstrated just how much gangsterism can be performed by a nominally defensive organization. But Malcolm X, so far as we can tell, seemed to practice what he preached. Indeed, he was a frequent *victim* of violence, sometimes private (the Klan, the Black Muslims), often not. The greatest oppressor in the film is the social worker who breaks up Malcolm's home, the schoolteacher who tells young Malcolm Little to drop his idea of becoming a lawyer, the cops, the prison guards, the FBI.

When "the violence of Malcolm X" is condemned, it is usually contrasted with "the peaceful tactics of Martin Luther King." In his Black Muslim period, Malcolm X spoke very harshly of "Uncle Tom so-called Negro leaders" like King, who "teach us to love our enemies"; after his pilgrimage he seemed open to a reconciliation. In general,

though, King does not come off well in this movie. Perhaps the film's funniest moment comes when we see two government agents eavesdropping on a teary, oh-how-I-miss-you-and-the-kids

The greatest oppressor in the film is the organized violence of the state: the social worker who breaks up Malcolm's home, the schoolteacher who tells young Malcolm Little to drop his idea of becoming a lawyer, the cops, the prison guards, the FBI.

phone call between Malcolm and wife Betty Shabazz. "Compared to King," says one agent, "this man's a monk."

But then, this is not a movie about Martin Luther King. Nor, more importantly, is it a movie about violence against anyone but black people. The liberal clichés that dominate so many discussions of Malcolm X are absent here.

Judgment

There are problems with this picture. The closing post-assassination collage includes a few moments I found a little hokey. Some plot threads are left in need of greater resolution; at the same time, some of the resolutions involve plot devices that appear out of nowhere. Some of this is to be expected, of course; compressing a whole life into one movie is difficult, even if the film is over three hours long.

There is also the issue of trust. Lee does a good job of leaving open unanswered questions about Malcolm's life (was he killed by the Nation of Islam? the U.S. government? both, acting in concert?), but much of the man's biography is still a mystery. Some Muslim acquaintances of mine, for example, insist that Malcolm was returning to the Black Muslim fold right before his assassination and that Alex Haley covered this up in *The Autobiography of Malcolm X*. Of course, they were reciting the official Nation of Islam line; if the Nation was indeed involved in killing Malcolm X, it

is hardly to be trusted. But then, Haley, a known plagiarist, is hardly the most trustworthy source in the world either.

Perhaps whole sections of what we "know" about Malcolm's life are more mythic than true. The same day I saw *Malcolm X*, I attended a press reception for deposed L.A. police chief Darryl Gates. He reported meeting with Malcolm and Elijah Muhammed and asking the former how much he "really believed" the faith he was preaching. According to Gates, the reply was something like, "You say what you

have to say to get the message across" — ambiguous enough to suggest that perhaps Malcolm was more interested in politics and power than in religion. But then, Darryl Gates is himself one of the least trustworthy men in the country.

Today, Xs have become a major fashion statement, but the man who inspired them is still largely unknown. Perhaps this movie will help rectify that oversight. But Lee's movie is as much about X, the myth, as it is about Malcolm, the man. □

Booknotes

Keep Your Laws Off My Body

— You own your body. Or, that's the theory, anyway. In practice, of course, you no more own your body than you own real estate: taxes must be paid, and restrictions are everywhere, mounting in number and severity. Consider just one example: selling rights to future harvesting of your organs. Go ahead, try it. The medical establishment expects you to *give* them away.

This is one abridgment of freedom and market activity that rarely gets discussed. Thankfully, Jim Hogshire has filled this gap in his amusing trade paperback, *Sell Yourself to Science* (Loompanics, 1992, iv + 160pp., \$16.95). Subtitled "The Complete Guide to Selling Your Organs, Body Fluids, Bodily Functions and Being a Human Guinea Pig," it may not answer *all* my questions on this subject, but it answers most. Hogshire presents the information in an amusing and lively style, and with an attitude that bears little resemblance to your usual libertarian pamphleteer: "There is nothing immoral about renting or selling your body. The idea that there is something wrong with this is rooted in the same tradition as the fantasy 'if you work hard enough someday the boss will notice you and promote you.' In other words, it serves the purposes of those folks who have no problem with breaking your back all your life then, when you are dead, mining your corpse for life-saving organs. On the contrary, one can make a very good case that *refusing* to allow people to sell the most personal of all property is immoral, resulting in the waste of re-

sources and the loss of life" (iii).

Hogshire is quite aware of the social benefits of fully marketable property rights, and he provides several good arguments for their extension into the medical arena. But his focus is not on the social ramifications of personal freedom, however; it is on the ways in which you can, *today*, sell your body parts and fluids, and rent your body for medical experimentation. But, let's admit it: for most people, the joy of the book is like the joy of playing the lottery — in the fantasy. The idea of being able to "sell yourself to science" is a rather fun daydream, a fantasy of living without working. Like most fantasies, it is available only to a few, the few who take the risks, the few who bother exploring odd avenues of living, the few who are lucky enough to have health and body parts to spare.

Or a dying relative. Hogshire discusses that, too, and how you can profit from familial tragedy. Oh, the silver linings that even a *regulated* capitalism can produce! —Timothy Virkkala

Getting Away With It — Robert Anton Wilson does not add any ideas to his *oeuvre* in *Reality Is What You Can Get Away With* (Dell Trade Paperback, 1992, 140 pp., \$13.00), a screenplay for a film that I suppose will never be produced, but this doesn't prevent it from being marvelously entertaining and enlightening. What other writer, after all, can pull together in one work a passionate love of liberty, absurdist humor, the Church of the Sub-Genius, quantum mechanics, general

semantics, conspiracy theory, a fruitful and fascinating model of the nature and function of the human brain, biting parodies and inspirational embracing of different aspects of "new age philosophy," Orson Welles, flying lasagna, Humphrey Bogart, a geographical vision of human evolution ending in space migration, and dirty limericks?

If you have an answer to this question, let me know right away.

A Wilson fan will recognize every idea, and even many of the same presentations of these ideas, from Wilson's past fiction and non-fiction, but such repetition is both useful and fun. As Herbert Spencer said, "Only by constant iteration can alien truths be impressed upon reluctant minds." Consider *Reality Is What You Can Get Away With* as soul food for the libertarian and a powerful brain enema for anyone. —Brian Doherty

Meet Mr Molecule — The most exciting events in science today are happening in molecular biology. The Human Genome Initiative is triggering

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incredible fantasies, the accumulation of relevant data is accelerating, and medical advances are happening with almost breathtaking speed.

The fact that we will soon have complete blueprints of living organisms to study — that is, we will actually have access to the DNA encoding of genomes —

is of such importance that it has made it hard for me to get excited about much else. There will almost certainly be advances of a practical nature (note the recent developments with cystic fibrosis) intermixed with scientific advances that are truly fundamental (for instance: an understanding of the origins of life).

A good way for the intelligent lay reader to learn about what's involved in this revolution is to read *A Cartoon Guide to Genetics* (Harper-Collins, 1991, 224pp., \$10.00) by Larry Gonick and Mark Wheelis. While it is silly to believe that one can master such an area without long-term sustained effort, it is possible to gain an accurate overview of what is happening without committing yourself to a lifetime of reading. Gonick and Wheelis have a real talent, and even if you know most of the material, this book offers a painless way to review it.

Seven Clues to the Origin of Life, by A. G. Cairns-Smith (Cambridge University Press, 1990, 144pp., \$7.95), is a marvelous attempt to present rather advanced issues in molecular biology in a way that can be appreciated by anyone with a basic interest in the issues involved, though it is probably best first to read Gonick and Wheelis' *Cartoon Guide* to provide some basic understanding. *Seven Clues* is an attempt to lay out the problem of how life began in the format of a Sherlock Holmes mystery. Cairns-Smith presents the relevant clues, and leave it to you to mull them over and deduce what must have happened. It is a carefully constructed, interesting tutorial that is almost poetic in the grandeur of the ideas it presents. You can read it in a couple of evenings, and you will enjoy doing so.

I like to evaluate books in terms of how much I can learn for as little effort as possible. By that standard, these books rank very, very high.

— Ross Overbeek

Up With Sex, Down With Authority — I've said it before, and it is a pleasure to say it again: *The Joy of Sex* (1972) has been, after several million copies, the most influential libertarian book of our time. Its principal, sensible point is that no one has greater authority than anyone else in telling you how to do it. Quite simply, "Bed is the place to play all the games you've ever wanted to play." Since no way is more correct than any other, the book is structured as a catalogue of possibilities, some of them so outlandish they belong less for feasibility than for their contribution to the theme.

What the publishers do not reveal is that its author, Alex Comfort, had pub-

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I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete (signed) Timothy Virkkala



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"... knowledge without wisdom has brought us to the edge of destruction and may at any time push us over the brink."

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lished often in the British anarchist journals of the 1940s and even broadcast over the public radio there. The critic Hugh Kenner portrays the BBC as "even yanking the mike from in front of him. In the days when Eden and Nasser were eyeball to eyeball, the BBC wouldn't let Comfort cry 'Stop Suez!' but he cried it anyway, breaking into the evening newscasts from a mobile transmitter Scotland Yard never tracked down." It is comforting to note that one of the most successful anti-authoritarian books of our time was written by a real anti-authoritarian.

What distinguishes *The New Joy of Sex* (Pocket, 256 pp., \$18.00) from its predecessor is acknowledging that sex is no longer an "extremely safe" recreation; but rather than hysteria, he offers a sanity rare in current writing:

The sexually prudent [heterosexual] adult will (1) strictly avoid partners in any of the high-risk groups — bisexuals, drug users and ex-drug-users, prostitutes, especially in Africa, the Orient and the USA, and partners who have had numerous partners, (2) in any case of doubt, avoid known hazards such as anal intercourse and menstrual intercourse, (3) use both a condom and a local contraceptive (foam or suppository) which gives nonoxynol-9 as its main ingredient, (4) treat all unknown quantities as potential carriers, (5) in a stable relationship, recognize not to take risks and introduce a lethal virus.

Finally, the book reminds us of an economic truth ignored by most "economists" — that the best things in life are free. —Richard Kostelanetz

De Jouvenal Perspective — What do you most remember Martha Gellhorn for? I bothered my friends with this question while reading Carl Rollyson's *Nothing Ever Happens to the Brave* (St. Martin's Press, 1990, xiii + 398pp., \$24.95). Unfortunately all I got was shrugs of the shoulder, suggesting that she is not remembered at all.

Surely she was well-known during her heyday. Martha Gellhorn was a correspondent in the '30s. She covered the Republican War in Spain, she was in Czechoslovakia as the Nazis marched into that unfortunate land, and she witnessed the Russian bombing of Finland.

She was published in *The New Republic*, *Collier's*, *The New Yorker*, *The Saturday Evening Post* and other prestigious journals.

Although she is remembered as a

wife of Ernest Hemingway, libertarians are probably more interested in her relationship with her first husband, Bertrand de Jouvenel, the liberal French journalist who later wrote the classic *On*

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Booknotes, *continued from previous page*

Power. Gellhorn met Jouvenel in 1930, and swept him off his feet. He left his wife and spent the next four months touring France with the glamorous American journalist. They eventually married, finding a unity of beliefs about the world. They separated when Gellhorn could not tolerate Jouvenel's attempts to reconcile left and right. (Jouvenel sounds like an interesting person, though. The grandson of a Catholic royalist and a Jewish industrialist, he was raised in a bourgeois Jewish household, moved to the home of his Catholic father when he was 17, where his father's wife Collette — the famous novelist and actress — introduced him to her friends. After he "failed miserably" when one of her friends attempted to seduce him, Collette took on the task herself. Despite the 31-year difference in their ages, they remained lovers for six years, until he began to earn a following as a writer.)

For Gellhorn, the Spanish Civil War was a contest between good and evil. She was convinced that victory by the fascists meant the end of civilization — at least literate civilization. Her many letters to Eleanor Roosevelt reveal pleas for Mrs Roosevelt to speak to her husband and urge him to commit the U.S. to the Spanish Republican cause. At the same time she had friends who were communists, and she had much kinder words for them and their aims. It is difficult to take many of her deep concerns seriously when she missed the terrors that were occurring in the USSR.

Martha Gellhorn was a genuine celebrity, friend of the famous, witness to thrilling events. Rollyson subtitled his biography of Gellhorn, "The Adventurous Life of America's Most Glamorous and Courageous War Correspondent," yet somehow he managed to be dull. Too bad that the author is incapable of translating her life into something worth reading. Martha Gellhorn refused to give any help in this biography, saying, "A writer should be read, not written about." Perhaps she has a point.—Kathleen Bradford

Getting Technical — I recently picked up a copy of *The Character of Physical Law* (MIT Press, 1967, \$6.95) by Richard Feynman, which has just been released in its sixteenth printing. It is an edited version of a set of lectures to a lay audience Feynman gave at Cornell

University in 1964. This clearly written book is designed for people with no background in physics or natural science. If you want a more thorough discussion of physics, Feynman's complete *Lectures on Physics* series (Addison-Wesley, 1989, in 3 volumes) is available for \$144.75. (Warning: it is the very antithesis of light reading.)

On a trendier note, *Turbulent Mirror* (Harper-Collins, 1990, 224pp., \$14.00) by John Briggs and F. David Peat provides a superb introduction to chaos theory, wholeness and fractals. Briggs and Peat have produced an enjoyable work written from a humanist perspective, combining mathematics theory, history, philosophy, and excellent illustrations. They explore the possibilities of chaos and whether there really is any order to it. And students of political theory, economics or sociology be advised: chaos theory is *very* relevant to your concerns.

—Ross Overbeek

Chicagoite Casuistry in the Funny Papers

Comics are your best entertainment value, I figure, and one of the few niches left in this culture where avant garde sensibilities combine with accessibility and fun. For instance, consider *Tom the Dancing Bug* by Ruben Bolling (Harper Perennial, 1992, \$9.00, pages unnumbered). Not on TV, the movies or novels are you likely to find the likes of the legal maneuverings

of Harvey Richards, lawyer for children (imagine kids calling in counsel to adjudicate disputes arising from childhood "contracts" such as calling "last one to the swing set gets shoulder slugs from every one," and a plethora of other weird common law rules that define a kid's dealing with his peers), the travails of God's roommate (it ain't all angelic choirs and eternal glory), the adventures of a Chicagoite super-hero who stops crime by convincing criminals that their acts of perfidy are not in their rational self-interest (unless, of course, the crook should "bargain with [his] intended victim, coming to a Pareto-preferred outcome!" "Hey, that's right! Um . . . can I kill you for . . . 50 bucks?"). The one-page chart on human morality made simple is worth the price on its own. Clip it and keep it in your wallet for ready reference in most moral dilemmas.

I don't know whether Bolling's sort of humor will make you laugh or just squint and scratch your head. I've seen people react both ways. If you understand that humor requires neither excuses nor explanations and is not reducible to explicable algorithms, you'll likely find that *Tom the Dancing Bug* pays for itself in inopportune embarrassing moments of sputtering laughter in public. It's the kind of humor that sneaks up on you later, hours or days after you've first read it, reducing you anew to a giggling wreck.

—Brian Doherty

Notes to Yeager, "Racism," from page 46

- 1 F. A. Hayek, "The Atavism of Social Justice," in *New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 57–68. F. A. Hayek, "The Reactionary Character of the Socialist Conception," in *Knowledge, Evolution, and Society* (London: Adam Smith Institute, 1983), pp. 38–44.
- 2 Hayek, *ibid.*, 1983, p. 38.
- 3 Hayek, *ibid.*, p. 41.
- 4 Herbert Spencer, *Principles of Ethics* (1897), 2 v. (Indianapolis: Liberty Classics, 1978), I, pp. 345–346.
- 5 Robert Axelrod, *The Evolution of Cooperation* (New York: Basic Books, 1984), chap. 5, co-authored with William D. Hamilton.
- 6 Richard D. Alexander, *The Biology of Moral Systems* (Hawthorne, New York: Aldine DeGruyter, 1987), pp. 1–2. Andrew Older-

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- 8 Charles Darwin, *The Descent of Man* (1871), pp. 387–1000 (combined with *The Origin of Species* [1859], New York: Modern Library, n.d.); chaps. IV & V, esp. pp. 472, 478–481, 484n., 487–489, 490n., 494.
- 9 Darwin, *ibid.*, p. 480.
- 10 Darwin, *ibid.*, p. 472.
- 11 Darwin, *ibid.*, p. 478–479.
- 12 Darwin, *ibid.*, p. 539.
- 13 Darwin, *ibid.*, p. 539.
- 14 Darwin, *ibid.*, pp. 479, 491–494.

Notes on Contributors

Chester Alan Arthur is *Liberty's* political correspondent.

Ace Backwords is an infamous "underground" cartoonist, living pretty much above-board in California.

Gunnar Bergstrom, a cartoonist living in southern California, became a libertarian to annoy his liberal Democrat parents.

Kathleen Bradford is a weaver of fibers and of words, and is copy editor at *Liberty*.

R.W. Bradford is editor and publisher of *Liberty*.

Stephen Cox is Associate Professor of Literature at the University of California, San Diego. His latest book is *Love and Logic: The Evolution of Blake's Thought*.

Brian Doherty is a journalist living in the thick of it, "it" being Washington, D.C.

James Gill is an American living (and drawing) in Europe.

Robert Higgs is the author of *Crisis and Leviathan*, an analysis of government growth in America.

John Hospers is the author of *Understanding the Arts, Human Conduct, An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis, Libertarianism*, and many other works.

Gregory R. Johnson is a graduate student in the School of Philosophy at the Catholic University of America.

Bill Kauffman is the author of a novel, *Every Man a King*.

Richard Kostelanetz is a critic, multi-media artist, anthologist, author, and composer. His musical work, *America's Game*, was recently released on CD.

R.K. Lamb is a U.S. citizen who lives in Hong Kong and is married to a Hong Kong immigrant.

Ronald F. Lipp is an attorney practicing in Sacramento.

Loren E. Lomasky is the author of *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community*, and Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University.

Rex F. May is a cartoonist usually billed under the rubric *Baloo*. He lives in Colorado.

Wendy McElroy is a fellow of the Independent Institute, and the author of *Freedom, Feminism and the State*.

John L. McCormack is an investor living in Connecticut.

James Ostrowski is an attorney and free lance writer living in Buffalo, New York.

Ross Overbeek is a scientist recently returned from a mission to Moscow.

Ralph Raico is Professor of History at the State University of New York, Buffalo.

Scott J. Reid is the author of *Canada Remapped*. He lives in Ottawa.

Sheldon L. Richman is editor at the Cato Institute in Washington, D.C.

James S. Robbins is a foreign policy analyst and lecturer living in Massachusetts.

Jane S. Shaw is a senior associate of the Political Economy Resource Center in Bozeman, Montana.

Timothy Virkkala is assistant editor of *Liberty*.

Jesse Walker is an anarchist living in Michigan.

Leland B. Yeager is Ludwig von Mises Distinguished Professor of Economics at Auburn University.

Coming in *Liberty* . . .

- "The Rise and Fall of Boys' Adventure Literature" — David Justin Ross tells how a robust literature was killed off by people without values.
- "Roy Childs: A Conversation" — Jeff Walker talked with the late libertarian raconteur a little while before Roy's untimely death. The subject was, ostensibly, Ayn Rand, but the conversation veered off into the most obscure corners of the libertarian movement. A delight. Bravo!
- "Where to Live" — The separate states of these United States are not identical. Some tax their citizens as much as four times more than others. We provide a guide to those readers who are thinking of moving . . . for economy's sake.

Terra Incognita

Beijing

Power grows out of the handle of a fly-swatter, as reported in the *New York Times*:

In its bid for the year 2000 Olympics and to push the economy to a "higher stage," Chinese officials launched a campaign to "Mobilize the Masses to Build a City of No Flies." Armed with tons of pesticides, garbage bags, fly-swatters and toilet brushes, the city's retirees and children go on "attack weeks" to achieve the mandated fly level: upon inspection, only one room out of a hundred in Beijing is "allowed to have two flies."

Chicago

The unions are doing what they can to help the economy and Caterpillar Inc. too, as explained in *Business Week*:

Unhappy with management's treatment of them after their strike, UAW locals at Cat have threatened to keep working as usual. That is, "to do no more than is legally required."

San Francisco

Progress is respect for law and gender, as reported in the *San Francisco Chronicle*:

Upset at getting a ticket for double parking, Mohammed Tajamal, 31, yelled at a female meter reader and became the first person to be convicted on S.F.'s new gender and disability-based hate crime law. According to Tajamal, he did yell, but it was a polite protest in Arabic: "she just mistook it for the 'c' word."

State College, Penn.

Advance in racial harmony on campus, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

A black columnist at the *Collegian*, a paper serving Penn State, called for the execution of white people because of the irreversible nature of whites' racism. One sympathetic student responded by carrying a banner reading: "White person. Shoot me."

Tehran

Women's liberation in the stronghold of fundamentalist Islam, as reported by Reuters:

In a relaxation of the moral code in place since the fundamentalist revolution in 1979, women in Iran are now allowed to stay at hotels unaccompanied without a special police permit.

Broward County, Fla.

Evidence that public education improves public health, as reported by *United Press International*:

A licensed nurse at an elementary school in Fort Lauderdale recently tested the urine of an eight-year-old girl after her teacher thought she looked pregnant.

Des Plaines, Ill.

Advance in highway safety, reported by the *Des Plaines Journal*:

It's a "pro-active approach to traffic problems," explains a local officer regarding the checkpoints where they stop one in every five cars without probable cause. "[We're trying to] take people off the street before they have the opportunity to have a traffic accident."

Irving, Texas

More evidence of level-heads and crystalline hindsight in the U.S. Army, as reported in the *Grand Rapids Press*:

The Army has completed an investigation of an incident in 1947, when the 509th bomber group panicked and shot an object from the sky, concluding that "the exploded object in question was not a U.F.O. The object, from the information we have assembled at this point in time, was apparently an as of yet unclaimed flying vehicle of some form that we suspect came from Mexico."

At the time of the incident, the Army reported that the object was an "unidentified flying object." Contemporary independent investigations concluded the Army had shot down its own weather balloon.

Seoul

Note on the spread of *Kultur* in the Third World, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

The German embassy asked two Korean businesses to change their names. The "Gestapo" coffeeshop will keep the name but agreed to re-write their sign using Korean Hangul characters instead of Roman letters. The "Hitler" beer hall, with its swastikas and Hitler matchbooks, will become the "Rhine."

Cleveland, Georgia

Solomonic wisdom in the Deep South, as reported by the *Detroit Free Press*:

Both mother and son were victorious in a legal dispute adjudicated in White county court this August. Kenneth Arrowood was denied \$2,613 for car repair work he had done for his mother. But the judge refused to order him whipped for disobedience, as his mother had requested.

Jakarta, Indonesia

Democracy finds its way in the Third World, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

In Indonesia's just-completed election campaign for members of its parliament, there were a few ground rules. No criticism of personalities or policies was permitted. All three recognized parties had to pledge to support President Suharto. Candidates were warned to "in no way insult the government or its officials."

Vanimo, Papua New Guinea

Advance in jurisprudence, as reported in *Pacific Magazine*:

Recently two men plead guilty and were convicted for using sorcery to kill a villager in the province of West Sepik. The District Court was told that the men were paid \$22 to commit the offense. They then went to the victim's village and promptly "removed" his spirit. A week later the man became ill and died. The malefactors were sentenced to one year in prison, the maximum penalty under Papua's Sorcery Act.

Los Angeles

Proof that Church's Fried Chicken is a culinary delight, as presented by *United Press International*:

Police apprehended a man who robbed a Church's Fried Chicken restaurant and stuffed his pockets full of drumsticks, after their tracking dog followed a trail of bones to an apartment where the suspect was caught with chicken still in his mouth.

(Readers are invited to forward newspaper clippings or other items for publication in *Terra Incognita*.)

Stimulate Your Mind!

with Liberty's Back Issues

continued from inside front cover

January 1991, *continued*

- "The Hope in the Schools," by Karl Hess

- "Gordon Gekko, Mike Milken, and Me," by Douglas Casey

Also: articles and reviews by Michael Christian, Ralph Raico, Loren Lomasky and others; plus special election coverage. (80 pages)

March 1991

- "The Myth of War Prosperity," by Robert Higgs
- "The Life of Rose Wilder Lane," by William Holtz
- "Old Whine in New Bottles," by Jan Narveson
- "The Strange Death of the McDLT," by R.W. Bradford

Plus articles and reviews by Jane Shaw, Richard Weaver, Linda Locke, Krzysztof Ostaszewski and others. (72 pages)

May 1991

- "Christiana: Something Anarchical in Denmark," by Ben Best
 - "Rescind Gorby's Peace Prize," by James Robbins
 - "Journalists and the Drug War," by David Boaz
 - "California's Man-Made Drought," by Richard Stroup
- Plus writing by John Baden, Scott Reid, Leland Yeager and others; and a short story by Lawrence Thompson. (72 pages)

July 1991

- "Say 'No' to Intolerance," by Milton Friedman
 - "I Am a Casualty of the War on Drugs," by Stuart Reges
 - "Depolluting the USSR," by James Robbins
- Plus articles and reviews by David Friedman, Loren Lomasky, Sheldon Richman, Karl Hess, Richard Kostelanetz and others; and Mark Skousen's interview with Robert Heilbroner. (72 pages)

Volume 5

September 1991

- "AIDS and Marijuana," by Robert O'Boyle
 - "Stalking the Giant Testes of Ethiopia," by Robert Miller
 - "The Unraveling of Canada," by Scott Reid
 - "GNP: A Bogus Notion," by R.W. Bradford
- Plus articles and reviews by Bart Kosko, Mark Skousen, Frank Fox, John Hospers, James Taggart, Karl Hess, William P. Moulton and others. (72 pages)

November 1991

- "The Road to Nowhere," by David Horowitz
 - "Women vs. the Nation-State," by Carol Moore
 - "Thelma and Louise: Feminist Heroes," by Miles Fowler
 - "The Boycott of *American Psycho*," by Panos Alexakos and Daniel Conway
- Plus writing by Robert Higgs, Leland Yeager and others; and a short story by J. E. Goodman. (80 pages)

January 1992

- "The National Park Disgrace," by R.W. Bradford
 - "Sex, Race, and the Single Gentleman," by Richard Kostelanetz
 - "Beyond Austrian Economics: Bionomics," by Michael Rothschild
 - "America's Bipartisan Apartheid," by Brian Doherty
- Plus writing by Leland Yeager, David Friedman, Henry B. Veatch, Jane Shaw, Bill Kauffman, Karl Hess Jr. and others. (80 pages)

March 1992

- "Hong Kong After Tiananmen," by Kin-ming Liu
 - "Albert Jay Nock: Prophet of Libertarianism?" by Stephen Cox
 - "P.C. or B.S.?" by Meredith McGhan
 - "Acid Rain and the Corrosion of Science," by Edward C. Krug
 - "Who Really Wrote *Little House on the Prairie*?" by William Holtz
- Plus writing by Ross Overbeek, Karl Hess, Sheldon Richman, Jane

Shaw, Lawrence White, Randal O'Toole and others; and an interview with Pat Buchanan. (72 pages)

May 1992

- "Clarence Thomas: Cruel and Unusual Justice?" by James Taggart
 - "Hong Kong: Where Everyone Has a Job," by Mark Tier
 - "Divorce, Czechoslovak Style," by Vojtech Cegl and Ron Lipp
- Plus writing by Eric Banfield, Karl Hess, David Horowitz, Daniel Klein and others; and fiction by J. Orlin Grabbe. (72 pages)

July 1992

- "Christians and Libertarians in a Hostile World," by Doug Bandow
 - "Returning America's Roads to the Market," by Terree Wasley
 - "The 'Lock' on the Electoral College," by David Brin
- Plus commentary on the L.A. Riots, and writings by David Kelley, Leland Yeager, George H. Smith and others. (72 pages)

Volume 6

September 1992

- "War on Drugs, War on Progress," by James Ostrowski
 - "Virulent Green Growth," by Fred Smith
 - "Property Rights Before and After the *Lucas* Decision" by William H. Mellor III
 - "Wilderness, Church and State," by Robert H. Nelson
- Plus writing by Martin Morse Wooster, Ethan O. Waters, Jane S. Shaw, J. Neil Schulman, and others; and an index to back issues. (80 pages)

November 1992

- "The First Time: I Run for President," by John Hospers
 - "Europe's Money Mess: We've Heard It All Before," Leland Yeager
 - "Raising Hell With the 'Buchanan Brigade,'" by Thomas Walls
 - "The Mystery of the Missing Detectives," by David Justin Ross
- Plus articles and reviews by Gabriel Hocman, David Kelley, Daniel Klein, Richard Kostelanetz, Loren Lomasky and others. (80 pages)

→ Information concerning the first volume (6 issues) of *Liberty* can be found on page 58.

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