

# Liberty

In Defense of  
Jim Bakker and  
Zsa Zsa

January 1990

Vol 3, No 3

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(see page 5)

## What it means The Death of Socialism What it means

— Also —

### The Greenhouse Effect: Myth or Danger?

*by Patrick J. Michaels*

### Ayn Rand and Objectivism

*Barbara Branden* speaks frankly about life within the Rand circle, what is living and what is dead in the philosophy of Objectivism, and her ex-husband's intimate memoir about his affair with Rand.

### How Rockefeller Soaked the Poor: We're Still Paying Today

*by Richard Kostelanetz*

Plus: *Sheldon Richman* on the Ugliness of World War II;  
*Karl Hess* defends Elitism; *Murray Rothbard* on Punching Out Senators;  
*David Bernstein* on Kids' TV; *Andrew Roller* on Adults' TV

"Above all things: Liberty!" — John Selden

# Letters

## All Wet

As a New Yorker, I feel it is important to address some of the points Mr. Bradford made in his article "A Rustic in New York" (November 1989). Having been to the Olympic Peninsula several times, I would attest to its beauty if you like the sea and rain, the mountains and rain, and isolation and rain. In short, it's a beautiful place for a retreat if you like rain. On the peninsula after a week of rain, people are wont to tell you how nice the weather was on a day in the previous month, or how beautiful it will be in July and August, or to remark about how green the grass is (with all the rain, why not?).

Now it's true there are days in the summer in New York when the horizon is obscured by "a yellow brown haze." But most of the year, the air is cleansed with the haze being blown out to sea. Los Angeles and Denver can make no such claim even though Port Townsend might. When the rain stops. Given this, I must object to the statement that we endure the worst government if only to point out, as did Murray Rothbard ("Loathing the Fear in New York," November 1989), that we will now be treated to one that will be worse, and just missed getting one worse still.

As to your comments on cabs, bums, crime and the like being less than advertised, while they are true, it would be appreciated if you keep them to yourself. This ruse is one that we New Yorkers use to keep down the tourist population. In spite of the best efforts of Hollywood, the news media, and our own inhabitants to maintain our rotten reputation, the city streets still bustle with camera-happy visitors from all nations.

Concerning the cultural advantages of the City, I believe that these lie primarily in the people and their diversity. Where else other than Epcot can you go from China, to Italy, to Korea within a few blocks? In New York, you can experience the little Odessa of Brighton Beach, Scandinavia in the little Norway of Brooklyn Heights, Germany in Yorktown, to say nothing of the better known Black, Hispanic, Korean, Chinese, Italian, and Jewish experiences, all for a \$1 subway ride. In New York it is no oddity to be in a restaurant and hear French, Italian, German, and Japanese spoken all about you. It's no

wonder that New Yorkers frequent Europe more than others—at least they know how to read the menus!

No, Mr. Bradford, New Yorkers do not believe that everything worth seeing is in New York. Most of us will grant you your majestic Cascades that seem to almost grow out of the surf, your verdant landscape, and clean air. What New Yorkers do believe is that there are a great many things worth seeing in New York. And, moreover, a great many interesting people worth meeting. It seems you have found that, too. For this we're glad. Just please don't tell too many people.

Joseph R. Fragola  
New York, N.Y.

**Bradford replies:** The ruse used in these parts to keep down the tourist population is rain. Port Townsend has an average rainfall of 18.57 inches per year, versus the Big Apple's average of 44.28 inches.

## In Fine Tenure

I wonder if Richard Kostelanetz realizes how deep the connection between his two concerns—avant-garde art and tenure (September and November, 1989)—really is. It is amazing how far society will go to grant an avant-garde artist tenure and psychic insulation. I am thinking of Ezra Pound whom Kostelanetz quotes approvingly. Pound was granted "tenure" at St. Elizabeth's Hospital in Washington, DC, where he wrote some of his greatest poems and also taught many of his disciples. Pound was "far out," so much so that society had to put him away.

All of which leads me to say I am still not sure if tenure is a good or a bad thing for college teachers. Maybe it's good if the teacher is a libertarian and maybe it's bad if the teacher is a socialist. Or is it the other way around?

David Herman  
Los Angeles, Cal.

## No Comparisons

It comes as no surprise to me that Robert Nozick has joined the statist camp (per Loren Lomasky, "Beyond Philosophy," November 1989). This could have been predicted as far back as 1974, when in *Anarchy, State and Utopia*, Nozick identified his concept of self-esteem. To the "old" Nozick, self-esteem is based upon

evaluating "how well we do something by comparing our performance to others." As a cure for poor self-esteem, Nozick looks to society to "have a diversity of different lists of [comparative] dimensions and weightings" upon which individuals should base their self-esteem. This leaves an individual's self-esteem at the mercy of other people's value judgments.

This is a very unlibertarian view and also an inaccurate view self-esteem. Self-esteem is not mere performance comparisons with others; it is the recognition of self-worth based upon one's positive evaluation of that which makes skills, knowledge and values possible—one's own rational faculties and inner self. Authentic self-esteem, Nathaniel Branden noted, is experienced when one has proven oneself competent to promote one's own existence and worthy of achieving happiness.

Unfortunately, there are many who feel that self-esteem is based on social comparisons. When accepted, this view results in a loss of identity, a poor self-image, a reliance on pleasing others, and a propensity to see oneself and the world through the eyes of others. This is the primary cause of neurosis, and I believe it is the primary reason for the acceptance of altruist/collectivist ideals. Almost without exception, those who hold a seriously inadequate concept of self and self-esteem advocate the subjugation of the individual to the parasitic desires of the collective.

Like it or not, rational self-interest is libertarianism's ethical foundation. This specifies that each individual should be free to choose and pursue his or her own values, while respecting others' individual rights. Like other statist, Robert Nozick finally concluded that this is a bad thing and that *his* list of "dimensions and weightings" should be imposed on everyone using the government's power of brute force.

Alexander N. Knight  
Irondequoit, N.Y.

## Living in the Present With Nathaniel Branden

I find it extremely unfortunate that your magazine has apparently taken a hard-line editorial stance against the works and accomplishments of Dr. Nathaniel Branden. Dr. Branden is a man of many worthy achievements, and has helped me immensely in my own pursuit of personal growth and well-being.

My own experience speaks to me

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# Liberty

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louder than any defamatory remarks made by someone whom I do not know and whose own credentials at evaluating psychological accomplishments are questionable. I don't care who was "right" or "wrong" in the Ayn Rand Cult days. I care about the total picture, unlike some unobjective writers whose tendency to live in the past bequeaths them to bitterness.

James E. Britton  
Newport, N.H.

## The Unkindest Cut of All

I looked in disbelief at the title of the article, "Against a Capital Gains Tax Cut." Was this the *New Republic*, *The Nation*, or *The Washington Post*? No! It was *Liberty*. I am amazed that *Liberty*, a magazine that is part of a movement virtually overflowing with economists, would publish an article that is so uninformed about the economics of capital gains taxation.

It appears that Michael Christian studied at the Dan Rostenkowski school of economics. He accepts the knee-jerk view that to tax capital gains at a lower rate than ordinary income is to create a "loop-hole" or a "tax benefit." (Why shouldn't the higher rate on ordinary income be considered a tax penalty?) If he had even scratched the surface of the economics literature on the subject he would have found that there is a strong case to be made that capital gains should not be taxed at all.

An income tax that includes interest income is inherently biased against saving and investment. The reason for this is simple. The returns to saving are taxed while the returns to consumption are not. For example, say I have \$100 of disposable income and my choice is to spend it on a new tape deck for my stereo or put it into my savings account where it will draw interest (or put it into stocks where I would expect to earn a capital gain). If I buy the tape deck, no further tax is due. I enjoy the use of the tape deck—the returns to consumption—tax free. If I put the money into my savings account, I must pay tax on the interest—the returns to saving. Hence a bias is created against saving and in favor of consumption. The best way to eliminate this bias is to exempt the returns to saving—whether they are in the form of interest, dividends, or capital gains—from taxation.

This is not an argument for subsidizing savings and investment, but for *not penalizing* it. There are several other effi-

ciency-based reasons—to avoid taxing the same income twice, to guard against taxing inflationary gains—for at least having a lower tax rate on capital gains. If Mr. Christian has a refutation of these arguments, that's fine, but to ignore them is either negligent or ignorant.

Roy Cordato  
Auburn, Ala.

## The Gains from the Cut

In his essay, "Against a Capital Gains Tax" (November 1989), Michael Christian claims that from the premise—a capital gains tax cut will encourage investment, it does not follow that a capital gains tax cut should be implemented. I don't dispute this but this is not the only reason for advocating a cut in the capital gains tax (in fact, I don't think many libertarians would say this is the best reason for such a cut).

The fact is that rather than creating incentives for certain investments, a tax cut can be looked on as lowering disincentives. This does not conflict with the idea that an unhampered market is the most efficient way to produce and allocate goods and services.

Even if Mr. Christian's argument that a capital gains tax cut will do little to encourage investment in productive, domestic endeavors is accepted as sound, it is still a good idea because, to use Mr. Christian's phrase, "freedom from government meddling is in itself a worthy end." And, conceived of as a lowering of disincentives rather than as a creation of incentives, this tax cut is indeed a step toward freedom from government meddling, and as such should be supported by libertarians.

Mark Turiano  
Auburn, Ala.

## Exegesis

Contrary to Jane Shaw's assertions ("The Reformed Church of Ecology," November 1989), I did not disparage either Murray Rothbard's or her writings on ecological matters (R. Formaini, "The Theology of Ecology," September 1989). My argument was that neither of their approaches can ever be decisive against theological ecology. She provides no argument to the contrary in her reply.

Further, "substantive contributions" to the literature on any subject require a good deal more space and effort than one tends to devote to short pieces for a magazine such as *Liberty*. I agree that such a contribution is sorely needed. Perhaps

my earnest critic will provide one?

Naturally, I do not deny that environmental damages exist and ought to be dealt with and I certainly agree that free markets can and will deal with them. So what? Jane seems to think that this is all some kind of educational problem that can be solved with a good book or two and a few essays in *Regulation* magazine.

Yeah, sure. And incidentally, how does one reconcile Meryl Streep's idiotic pronouncements with "high intelligence?" Does concern for the environment release one from the normal canons of intellectual exercise, or is Streep Jane's personal friend?

Further, I wish Jane and all her fellow public policy institute soldiers much success with their attempts to make government policies better than they might have been without the benefit of their efforts. In the final analysis, however, we all live with those residual policy outrages that they fail to stop or to modify along libertarian lines. In other words, their attempts to make policy rational can be only partially successful and that was a subsidiary point in my article, to wit: once you accept the basic *right* of the state to guard the environment, then you have already lost the war and all else is a rear guard exercise.

Finally, I am flattered that with a mere three page edit in a magazine of some 4,000 total circulation I was able to insert myself in the environmental progress door, delaying all the good efforts of those who better understand these issues. It must be the overpowering "nihilism" that permeates my article!

I diagnose mild hysteria induced by sloppy reading. My prescription is a tranquilizer and a rereading of my article, preferably with a good dictionary close by so that when incorrect adjectives such as "nihilistic" float into conscious view, the appropriate remedy is readily available.

R. Formaini  
Plano, Tex.

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## Letters Policy

We invite readers to comment on articles that have appeared in *Liberty*. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity. All letters are assumed to be intended for publication unless otherwise stated. Succinct, typewritten letters are preferred. Please include your phone number so that we can verify your identity.

# Reflections

**Dan Quayle Theory # 137** — George Bush is a closet anarchist. He plans to resign when the time is ripe and leave the United States without a government. —RFM

**Blackmale in the Pentagon** — Homosexuality has long been grounds for medical discharge from the U.S. armed forces. Homosexuals are considered unstable, and a threat to unit cohesion, effectiveness and morale. However, a recent report by the Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center may help to change this conventional wisdom. The Center examined the school conduct records, thinking skills, adjustment to military life and substance abuse problems of 166 gays and lesbians who had been discharged from the military because of their sexual preference. The homosexuals outperformed their heterosexual counterparts in all areas except substance abuse, and it is probable that, were they not subjected to the pressures of keeping their sexual identities a secret, the abuse levels would drop to normal.

The study is being given a high profile by legislators such as Rep. Gerry Studds (D, Mass) who want to see the Pentagon change its anti-homosexual policy. However, the effort faces considerable opposition. A longer 1988 study by the same Center also concluded that homosexuals should be allowed to enter military service, but was rejected because it did not address the "security risk" which homosexuals present. Gays in the military are, according to the Pentagon, subject to blackmail, the favored recruitment device of the KGB and other foreign intelligence services.

There is an element of illogic in this assertion. If gays were allowed to join the military openly, everyone would know they were gay, and thus they could not be blackmailed. On the other hand, if the policy is left as it is, gays, who will join the military anyway, are perfect extortion targets, because they can be threatened with exposure and subsequent discharge. So it would seem that the interests of national security would be best served if gays were not only admitted but welcomed into the armed forces—or is that too reasonable? —JSR

**Pineapple Face?** — Note that the media are habitually referring to the distinguished Generalissimo of Panama, Manuel Noriega, as "pineapple face." Isn't that displaying a remarkable and brutal insensitivity toward the pockmarked? Surely they will soon hear from the Pockmarked League of America. —MNR

**That ol' double standard** — Suppose a natural event that has been long expected causes widespread damage over a wide geographic area inhabited by millions of people. Suppose further that about 2/3 of the deaths caused by the disaster occurred because of the failure of a single structure. Suppose also that the builders and owners of the failed structure had known for decades that it was improperly designed and was bound to cause substantial casualties if the widely anti-

pated natural disaster ever happened.

Would there be a public outcry against the owner and builder of the structure? Would he be denounced as a murderer? Would he be told he had blood on his hands? Would he be sued for millions or billions of dollars, and perhaps bankrupted?

In the Alaska oil spill last spring, not a single human being was injured, let alone killed, yet the press and public have engaged in an orgy of denunciation of the owner of the oil tanker at fault. In the collapse of a hotel in Kansas City, the papers teemed with indignation against the hotel's owner.

Then why is it that there has been no public outcry about the collapse of Interstate-880, the Oakland freeway whose collapse crushed 42 people to death during the San Francisco earthquake? According to news reports, the owner of the freeway (the State of California) has known for *decades* that even a moderate earthquake would cause it to collapse, and the state had attempted some minor repairs that it knew did not correct the problem.

The reason, I suspect, is that the press and public have a double standard: when damage or death is the result of the negligence of a business enterprise, the crime is heinous; when damage is the result of the negligence of the government . . . well, it couldn't be helped, and I'm sure glad I wasn't on I-880 at 5:04 P.M. on October 17. —RWB

**Celebrity abuse** — On July 14, Paul Kramer, a Beverly Hills policeman, stopped a Rolls Royce driven by an elderly lady and asked to see her license. Alas, her license had expired, whereupon the officer ordered the driver from her car. What happened next is disputed: according to the officer, the diminutive, elderly lady verbally abused him and assaulted him. According to the lady, the officer verbally abused her, woman-handled her, and finally provoked her to slap his face. None of this would have attracted much attention except that the woman was the professional celebrity Zsa Zsa Gabor.

Of course, the prosecutor ignored the nature of her "crime," choosing instead to paint a horrible picture of a woman who believes she is better than her neighbors who keep their driver's licenses current and are polite to police officers. The jury convicted Zsa Zsa and threw her upon the mercy of Judge Charles Rubin.

Alas, the judge was not merciful. The diminutive serial polyandrist "not only slapped the face of Officer Kramer out there on Olympic Blvd, but by her vituperative and denigrating comments she has verbally slapped the faces of every prosecuting witness that appeared in this case and she was not satisfied with that but she turned around and slapped the face of every American . . ."

He sentenced her to 4 days in jail, 120 hours of community service, and a fine of \$2,936.50 (not to put too fine a point on it). He also ordered her to pay \$10,000 to compensate the state for the extraordinary expense of the case because of her "milking this case for publicity." She certainly wasn't the only one to seek publicity: Officer Kramer is reportedly seeking a career as a mo-

vie actor, and Judge Rubin appeared in court with makeup, carefully coifed hair, and a rehearsed speech. As lagniappe, Judge Rubin explained, "Now I have been involved in the criminal law system for 23 years and I've developed some familiarity with persons who display some psychological or emotional difficulties. I've observed a hyper or manic quality to Miss Gabor's behavior that absolutely would not—and I repeat not—amount to a legal defense in this case"—this happened in California, after all, where psychological expertise is nearly universal—and ordered her to seek the services of a psychiatrist.

What had Miss Hungary 1936 done to deserve this penalty? She had been pulled over by a highway patrolman and hassled about a minor oversight (her driver's license was expired). When the officer got obnoxious, she did what any American worthy of this great nation would do in the same circumstances: she slapped the smart-ass punk. Given her slight stature and advanced age, it is apparent that she was a threat to nothing but his supercilious pride. —EOW

**Clergy abuse** — The Rev. Jim Bakker was recently tried and convicted of fraud. In the course of his television ministry, he told his flock that if they contributed \$1,000 to his ministry, he would give them free admission to his amusement park and a room in his hotel for 3 nights per year. Unfortunately, he didn't have enough hotel rooms to satisfy all the donors.

To hear the prosecutor explain it, Bakker was a businessman who committed fraud on a grand scale, taking poor people's money on false pretenses to finance his sexual escapades, his wife's makeup and his dog's air-conditioned home, leaving the poor contributors in wretched condition.

The jury bought these dubious propositions and convicted the by-now-pathetic Rev. Bakker. And the judge meted out "justice." For his "crime," the Rev. Bakker was sentenced to 45 years in the slammer, with possible parole after 10 years, and fined \$500,000—a punishment far greater than the typical murderer-rapist is dealt.

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*A clergyman or politician is no more able to keep his word than a cat can respect property lines, or a 5-year-old boy can keep his promise to keep his good clothes clean on the way home from Sunday school.*

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The outrageousness of the Rev. Bakker's conviction and the heinousness of his punishment are manifest. In essence, the Rev. Bakker was accused of what the airline industry calls "overbooking." But in the airline industry, the practice is perfectly legal. The airlines know that some of the people who reserve seats on a flight will not show up. Therefore, as a matter of routine, they sell more seats than are actually available. On those occasions when too many passengers with reservations actually show up for a flight, what happens? Do Federal Marshals run in with leg-irons and haul away the employees or owners of the airline?

No way. Instead, the airline offers bribes to get enough passengers to agree to take another flight. Usually the bribes are "free" flights, but if not enough passengers accept this compensation for being "bumped," the airlines must offer cash. What happens if they offer less cash than the passengers want? They raise their bid. All the way to \$400. Then, by Federal Law, the airlines

are off the hook.

The Rev. Bakker has every reason to believe that some of the people who signed up for his 3-day hotel room and amusement park would not show up. So he overbooked. Presumably, if too many people showed up, he would do the same as an airline: offer them a freebie to stay at another motel, or even cash. Like the airlines, he could give them \$400 and tell them to go to Hell. But, noooooo! What's good enough for the airline passengers is not good enough for contributors of the Rev. Bakker. What's fair for airlines is a criminal offense worse than murder or rape for the Rev. Bakker.

But the punishment of the Rev. Bakker is pernicious for a much more fundamental reason. Since when are the promises of men of cloth considered to be valid legal contracts?

One of my hobbies is listening to religious leaders slicker cash from their flocks. My particular favorite, heard on the radio more than a decade ago, was crafted by a learned Rev. Dr. of considerable holiness, who told the story of a poor fellow down to his last \$10 who happened to attend one of the Rev. Dr.'s prayer meetings. Moved by the spirit of the Lord and oblivious to his own great need, the man put that \$10 bill in the collection plate. Then, as now, the Rev. Dr. had assured his flock that the Lord would repay them tenfold. As the man left the church and walked down the street, worrying about his future, he turned the corner and, "Behold! An Angel of the Lord appeared! . . . And in the hand of the Angel was a *brand-new \$100 bill!*"

Now I don't recall that this Rev. Dr. was arrested for promising a 10-to-1 return. I don't recall hearing anything about an SEC investigation. The bunco squad wasn't called out. No, a few weeks later, while scanning the nether regions of my AM dial, I again encountered this same Rev. Dr., making a similar pitch.

The reason is simple: The Bill of Rights guarantees both freedom of speech and freedom of religion, offering the holy orders a certain exemption from civil law and customs. Furthermore, most Americans, aware of the long tradition of treating with impunity behavior by men of the cloth that would constitute fraud if committed by mere mortals, believe the clergy to be a special class in our society, a class exempt from ordinary legal and moral standards.

The exemption from ordinary standards of decency and honesty was for years recognized in the legal doctrine called "benefit of clergy," under which clergymen were exempt from the death penalty for otherwise capital crimes. Although this doctrine was gradually repealed during the 19th century, vestiges of it remain today.

Consider the promise made by just about every clergyman: if you will believe, or profess, or dedicate your life to an incorporeal, ineffable, omnipresent, omniscient, miracle-dispensing Being—or better still, make a generous donation to His agent on earth (yours truly!)—then you will be rewarded on Earth or in Heaven, or both.

This sales contract is clearly far more fraudulent than the Rev. Bakker's deal. Maybe there was no room at the inn for some of the Rev. Bakker's flock. But how many people have collected on the promises of peace of mind or happiness—not to mention eternal bliss?

Why then were the traditions and laws of this country perverted to put the pathetic Rev. Bakker behind bars for a half century? The major reason, I think, is the clergyman's lust, first for the innocent young Jessica Hahn and later for male employees. A cleric is free to promise his parishioners anything to induce them to give him money, but if he pokes his secretary, the peo-

ple's wrath will be felt.

The clergy is not the only profession exempt from ordinary legal and moral standards by virtue of tradition and expectation. The other major class that traditionally is allowed to lie and cheat without punishment is government officials. As with ministers of the Gospel, politicians' promises are traditionally broken so universally and uniformly that *scarcely anyone notices the event*. Candidate Reagan promised that he would *never* allow the government to spend more than its revenue; as President, his government *tripled* the national debt. No one cared, and Mr Reagan is now honored as one of the nation's greatest presidents.

Or consider what happens to a political leader who gets caught with his hand in the public's pocket: typically, he resigns his post, writes his memoirs, takes up a position as a lobbyist or Wall Street executive, and pockets a generous pension, mostly tax-free for the rest of his days. The most prominent elected leader to be forced from office in the past decade is the Hon. Mr. James Wright, the Speaker of the House of Representatives, who cost the nation's taxpayers billions of dollars by interfering with investigations into the fraudulent activities of various fatcat contributors to his campaign. How has he been punished? He is provided with three full-time staffers, an allowance of \$120,000 to maintain an office plus \$67,000 for stationery and phone calls, free use of the mails, a pension of \$200,000 per year, plus the right to unlimited Chicken McNuggets at any McDonald's, all at the expense of the same taxpayers whom he defrauded, and spends his time giving speeches at \$10,000 a pop and working on a new book, for which he has been paid a massive advance. (Okay, so I was kidding about the McNuggets.)

What has happened to his junior colleague, the Hon. Mr. Tony Coelho, who was caught taking a bribe disguised as an investment? In addition to his generous pension, he makes a million dollars a year as a Wall St executive, despite the absence of any qualifications for the job. He was recently honored at a black-tie charity affair in Washington, emceed by Dan Rather and attended by his former colleagues (that is, those who haven't yet been caught with their fingers in the till).

The exemption of politicians from ordinary standards of honesty is widely recognized in the world of commerce as well. For example, most print shops require politicians to pay for all printing in advance; most radio stations, television stations and newspapers require that all political advertising must be paid in cash up front, and even the phone company requires political campaigns to pay large deposits prior to connection of phone lines.

All in all, I think the doctrine that clergymen and politicians should be exempt from ordinary standards of honesty is a good one. So far as I can see, a clergyman or politician is no more able to keep his word than a cat can respect property lines, or a 5-year-old boy can keep his promise to keep his good clothes clean on the way home from Sunday school. Just as we would take for a fool the person who kicks his cat for straying into a neighbor's yard or whups his son for stopping on the way home from church to climb a particularly interesting-looking tree, so we should take for a fool the person who wants to punish politicians or clergymen for failing to keep their promises. —EOW

### ***Another casualty in the War on Drugs*** —

The victims of the War on Drugs are not just boat-owners who get caught with a guest who has a marijuana seed in his pocket, ghetto grocers whose cash register is emptied by the cops because one bill tested positive for crack, dopers who have to pay higher prices for their recreation, and school kids subjected to strip

searches. The War strikes even the high and mighty.

Consider piteous Kitty Dukakis. Married to a millionaire politician, born and reared in wealth, accustomed to the accoutrements and perquisites of power, Kitty seemed pretty safe. Sure, she has been addicted to speed for years, but as a member of the power elite, she bought her drugs at her drug store with her doctors' prescriptions. Like most wealthy addicts who have legal connections for their drugs, she handled her addiction pretty well. It had so little impact on her life that her husband Mike didn't even know about it for more than 20 years. This is all the more remarkable in light of the fact that Kitty and Mike shared an extraordinarily close relationship, according to press reports during his heroic dash for the Presidency.

Anyway, Mike and the world found out about Kitty's "problem," and Kitty's life has taken a turn for the worse. Deprived by her loved ones of the amphetamines she craved, she turned to ethyl alcohol, available at any liquor store. Her loving family hid the liquor from her for her own good. Deprived of what had become part of her daily routine, she turned to what was available around the house. The only drug she could lay her hands on was rubbing alcohol in the medicine chest. It looked and tasted a lot

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*Is Kitty really better off under her family's "tough love," inspired by the national anti-drug mania? Is it better for her to poison herself than to continue her regular use of amphetamines or alcohol, an addiction that had so little impact on her life that those close to her didn't even notice it?*

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like drinking alcohol, so what the hell. Chug-a-lug.

The resulting trip to the hospital put her name back in the headlines, and gave most voters yet another reason to rejoice that they had chosen George Bush over her husband Mike. Barbara Bush may be fat and wrinkled, the antithesis of cool, but at least she isn't embarrassing anyone by doing an imitation of a Bowery bum.

In the meantime, one has to wonder: Is Kitty really better off under her family's "tough love," inspired by the national anti-drug mania? Is it better for her to poison herself than to continue her regular use of amphetamines or alcohol, an addiction that had so little impact on her life that those close to her didn't even notice it?

Perhaps I read too much into Kitty's ordeal. A friend suggests another explanation of her behavior: after a 25-year binge, Kitty sobered up, look a good look at her husband, and reached for the first bottle she could find with POISON on the label.

—RWB

***Killer tax cuts*** — Perhaps the most ludicrous reaction to the California earthquake is the assertion that the deaths were the result of Proposition 13, the citizens' initiative that stopped the geometric growth of taxes in the nation's largest state. This theory has been advanced by Ted Koppel, star of ABC-TV's *Nightline*, political cartoonist Paul Conrad, columnist Lou Cannon, and California Assemblyman Richard Katz.

Now, the quake deaths nearly all resulted from the collapse of government-operated roads and bridges, which are financed by state and federal gasoline taxes, both of which are exempt from Proposition 13, and both of which have increased by a whopping

30% since Prop 13 passed.

So the obvious question is: Just how did the tax-limiting Prop 13 cause the deaths? Or is it simply a matter of turning every disaster or semi-disaster into an excuse to expand the state? — RWB

**Speaking truth to Bryant** — On the October 17 episode of NBC's *Today*, Bryant Gumbel grilled Rev. Ralph Abernathy about descriptions in his new book, *And the Walls Came Tumbling Down*, of the Rev. Martin Luther King Jr.'s last night on Earth. Apparently King, a man of some appetite, spent parts of the night with two women, then slapped a third who complained that he had not been with her. Not one of the three was King's wife. Gumbel, instead of accepting the fact that King was a man with normal desires (even though some might call them "immoral"), criticized Abernathy for giving "great comfort to those who would like to demean the memory of Martin Luther King." Abernathy explained that he wanted King to look like "a human being, not a god, not a saint." He also noted that King's proclivities are well-known, and there was little in the book that hadn't been revealed elsewhere. Still, Gumbel pressed the Reverend, saying that Abernathy had to know that "this would hurt [King's] family," and pointing out that the book had been "repudiated now by almost every black leader, every major black official in this country."

Throughout the interview, Gumbel's face showed disbelief, incredulousness, frustration. There was clearly much more than objective journalism involved. Emotion had taken control. But when Gumbel referred to the line from "The Man Who Shot Liberty Valance" about how when truth collides with legend the author should write the legend, he crossed the line from journalist to mythologist. Abernathy was unmoved, and responded simply that "Ye shall know the truth and the truth will set you free."

Any such realistic approaches to the life of a revered man will generate this sort of criticism. And perhaps Bryant's emotionalism is understandable; he is a young African American who was politically socialized in the King era. But one mark of a professional journalist is the ability to face soberly and objectively situations which conflict with his or her world view or predispositions. Evidently Bryant Gumbel failed this test. —JSR

**Guerilla reply mail** — Somehow, a few years back, somebody got the idea that I was a Republican National Committee Sustaining Member, and they've been sending me membership cards ever since. It's a handsome thing as such cards go, and it's very handy to cash checks with. But no matter. The point is that they've gone farther this time and sent me a survey to fill out. Since they're paying the return postage, I took advantage of the opportunity to advise that Quayle resign and be replaced with Walter Williams (in answer to the "Do you approve or disapprove of the job Dan Quayle is doing" question), that drugs be legalized, and that we abolish HUD, HHS, and the Departments of Education and Energy.

So don't throw those surveys away. Do as I do, and who knows?—you may find a fellow thinker doing scut work for the Republican Party. —RFM

**Economic jumbo-mumbo** — The Nobel Prize in Economics for 1989 went to Trygve Haavelmo of Norway. He is credited with developing econometrics, the branch of economics that attempts to mathematically model economies and predict the future. A commentary on the "science" broadcast on National Public Radio's "All Things Considered" program

October 11 was instructive in understanding Haavelmo's contribution. After describing how Haavelmo replaced simple statistical analysis with his new methods, the commentator noted that econometrics is "not a perfect science." If it were, he explained, all economists would agree on things like the size of next year's budget deficit. But, he added, the shortcomings are not in Haavelmo's techniques. The problem is rather that human behavior is "erratic" and cannot be described in "one or even a hundred equations." In other words, econometrics is fine, but we acting human beings won't cooperate, which is like saying a new molecular theory is fine, but the molecules don't do what the theory predicts.

Aristotle said that in any discipline the method should con-

### Guest Reflection:

**Avant-Garde Redneck** — Virtually every critic, journalist, scholar, curator and fundraiser concerned with the arts has taken a position on Senator Jesse Helms's amendment, which (in reaction to Andres Serrano's "Piss Christ," a crucifix immersed in the artist's urine, and to the Robert Mapplethorpe photos of male genitalia) would forbid agencies of the United States government—notably the National Endowment for the Arts—to fund obscene, anti-religious, or bigoted works of art.

All the articles I have seen by arts professionals have taken an identical position: the Helms amendment is an infringement on free speech, it amounts to censorship, it would politicize the NEA and similar organizations by asserting the right of ignorant Congressmen to make aesthetic judgments, and it would gravely undermine American cultural life.

It is embarrassing to identify myself with a redneck reactionary like Jesse Helms, but I feel compelled to defend what the whole arts community is calling an act of fascism.

It is perhaps irrelevant to note that the Serrano and Mapplethorpe works are trashy examples of everything wrong with American cultural life, and should have been denied funds simply on the basis of their lack of artistic value. That is a matter of artistic judgment. It is, however, a matter of political judgment to note that a refusal of government to fund a work of art has not the slightest thing to do with censorship, since the publication or exhibition of the work itself is in no way forbidden; that the NEA is already thoroughly politicized, its peer-review panels consisting of an ideologically monolithic elite of "arts experts"; that if a work of art responds to the real spiritual needs of its society, it ought to be able to find in the free marketplace people who need it enough to pay for it; that it is inherently unjust to force taxpayers to finance art they find offensive; and that—here's an old-fashioned fascist rallying cry—there should be no taxation without representation.

Alas, we live in a topsy-turvy society, where persons who should be most in favor of freedom—namely, artists—instead rally for statist compulsion, and where persons who care nothing for the arts or the values they embody—namely, the anti-intellectual right wing—lobby to ensure that the conditions of free artistic production and consumption be preserved: where an apostle of avant-garde creativity like me finds himself allied with Jesse Helms.

—Jonathan Saville

form to the subject. Not so in mainstream economics, where the subject is expected to conform to the method. —SLR

**Minority report** — I don't know if you can learn much these days from taking Freshman comp, but you can certainly learn a lot from teaching it. The latest revelation came when I was grading the rough draft of a student's paper dealing with the Progressive era. In an otherwise quite sensible and comprehensible piece of writing, I came across a sentence something like this: "Although women had made many advances, they were still a minority." Now, remember how naïve I am. A minority of *what*, I asked myself. And I just marked the spot with a question mark and waited to ask the student about it.

"Did you leave something out here?" I asked.

"No. I don't think so."

"Well, what did you mean by 'minority' here?"

"They were a minority. Women were still a minority."

"I'm sure they weren't . . . [then came the dawn!] . . . Ah! — What does 'minority' mean, the way you used it here?"

"They couldn't vote. You know, they couldn't have certain jobs."

So we proceeded to look up "minority" in the dictionary together, and we both learned something about the English language and how dangerous it can be. This is a bright kid. She knows what words mean, by and large. But somewhere along the line, while going through our fantastic secondary school system, she's learned that "minority" means "group without rights." There are probably several million people who think it means just that.

The moral of this is that when you or I talk about or write about public affairs, and we use the word "minority" anywhere, the chances are excellent that many seemingly-literate people are not going to understand what we're saying at all, and even worse, are going to think that they do understand it when they don't.

"Humpty Dumpty, call your office!"

—RFM

**Investing in Senators** — How many crooks are there in the U.S. Senate? The correct answer is: at least six and no more than 100.

So far this year, we have learned that Alfonse D'Amato, John Glenn, Dennis DeConcini, Don Riegle, Alan Cranston, and John McCain are crooks. D'Amato effectively took over the Department of Housing and Urban Development, controlling its billions of pork barrel dollars, funnelling vast sums into the pockets of friends, associates and political contributors. The remaining five received "contributions" from Lincoln Savings and Loan totalling about \$1,300,000 and then interceded on its behalf when federal regulators began to discover its massive fraud against the taxpayers. It all began in 1984, when Charles Keating, Jr, purchased Lincoln, and began to use it as a source of low-cost money he could invest in high risk ventures. It was a no-loss situation for Keating: if the ventures went belly-up, the S&L would be out the money, and the taxpayer would pay off the depositors; if the ventures paid off, Mr Keating could make a huge profit, thanks to the availability of low cost deposits. It was also a no-win situation for the taxpayer. Ultimately, it looks as if the scam will cost the taxpayer about \$2,500,000,000.

Now Sen. D'Amato claims his lassoing of federal megabucks for a swimming pool for his hometown and subsidies for the purchases of homes by his rich pals and their kids was all done for the public good. Similarly, Senators Glenn, DeConcini,

Riegle, Cranston and McCain positively bristle with indignation at any suggestion that their interference with the audit of Lincoln Savings and Loan was anything other than their looking into a matter on behalf of a constituent. None of them told the Home Loan Board to lay off the investigation, at least not explicitly, though it's hard to know how else a federal employee will interpret being called on the carpet by five powerful Senators. But there is a limit to the credulity of the American voter, who cannot remember the last time five U.S. senators called to the carpet a government employee that had been hassling *him*, or any of his friends, for that matter.

Three observations:

1. Unlike the ethics crisis involving House Democrat leaders Jim Wright and Tony Coelho, this one has a bipartisan ring to it: two of the crooks so-far identified are Republicans, and a third first came to Washington as a Republican. There is good reason that corruption in the Senate is more bipartisan than in the House: corruption is a function of power, and the House has so

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*Senator-buying is a good investment: the expenditure of \$1.3 million allowed Charles Keating and his buddies to loot the taxpayers to the tune of about \$2.5 billion—a return on capital of 1,823%. Maybe we can pay off the National Debt by allowing the Treasury to invest directly in Senators.*

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long been so dominated by a single organization, the House Democrats, that it simply isn't worth corrupting Republicans. On the other hand, the Democratic hold on the Senate is tenuous; Republicans controlled it as recently as three years ago, and remain a large and powerful minority.

2. Senator-buying is a good investment. The expenditure of \$1.3 million to the pockets of Sens. Glenn, DeConcini, Reigle, Cranston and McCain allowed Charles Keating and his buddies at Lincoln Savings to loot the taxpayers to the tune of about \$2.5 billion—a return on capital of 1,823%. Maybe we can pay off the National Debt by allowing the Treasury to invest indirectly in Senatorial bribes.

3. It is particularly revolting to hear Keating claim to be a poor-but-honest businessman being unjustly hassled by the bureaucracy. I am as sympathetic to victims of the Feds as any man, but in this case, the evidence is pretty plain that Keating took advantage of the availability of deregulation and federal deposit insurance to pick the taxpayer's pocket. And prior to his financial hooliganism, Keating was a longtime crusader against freedom of the press, acting as Chairman of the Citizens for Decent Literature and a member of the Meese Commission.

—RWB

**Punching out Senators** — One of the most delightful moments in the history of TV occurred on Wednesday, October 25. It was after one of those tedious tree-planting ceremonies in Washington. Senator John Glenn (D, Ohio) had just helped plant an official tree, and was talking to a TV reporter when Michael Breen, a young engineer, walked up, and pow! punched him square on the jaw. It was a unique bit of *cinema verité*. As the cops seized Mr. Breen, the Senator walked around, rubbing his jaw, muttering: "I haven't been hit that hard in twenty-five years."

What was Breen's motivation? The answer is still murky. Breen linked his dramatic act with the alleged message that the Virgin Mary supposedly delivered to three youngsters at Fatima, Portugal in 1917. The message warned about Bolshevism and urged penance for sins—but in the hearts of some Catholics lurks the belief that Our Lady of Fatima had conveyed a secret message that the Popes have been carefully guarding ever since—a message presumably about future disasters with some sort of darkly right-wing content. At any rate, Breen was apparently in some way linking the San Francisco earthquake of the week before with the Fatima message, and felt he had some important revelation of his own to convey to the world.

Breen's attorney, Barry Stiller, concluded that Breen is "just a very nice young man who I think is a little confused." Probably so. But one observer heard Breen, just before he punched out the Senator, mutter, "The earthquakes are starting, the earthquakes are starting." I like to think that Breen had come up with the charming theory that tree-planting *causes* earthquakes, and that he had to act to call the world's attention to this insight. —MNR

**Proud, but gender-neutral** — Apparently there's one thing that unites conservatives and libertarians—a reverence for language that uses male terms to mean male and female. In the September issue of *Liberty*, Rex F. May mocked college English teachers for "kowtowing to the cultural commissars" by using "slasher pronouns" such as he/she and himself/herself. And in the September issue of *Chronicles* (a culturally conservative journal published in the Midwest), William F. Campbell decried the triumph of inclusive language over "not only tradition and elegance, but even reason."

I join them in condemning punctuational curiosities and clumsy neologisms. But why doesn't someone on the Right take seriously the idea of trying to make language more inclusive? Does the Right have to treat this issue as a litmus test of political belief as the Left does? You don't have to endorse awkward terms to reduce the number of times you use "he" to mean he or she, or to stop saying "men" and "mankind" when you mean "people" or "humankind."

Imagine that the world consisted of two races, black and white. What word would we use for the entire group, consisting of both blacks and whites? If we are to follow the preference of Campbell and May, we would use "blacks" to mean everyone, or "whites" to mean everyone. Which term we would use would probably reflect the political power of one group relative to another, and some people might feel mislabeled if they are black and described as white or vice versa. Isn't it fair to suppose that women might similarly dislike being called men?

True, this analogy has a flaw. Those who use "men" to mean "men and women" intend to be inclusive, whereas the terms "black" and "white" are used to differentiate. Logically, however, the error of calling one sex by the other's name is parallel to calling one race by the other's name.

The defenders of the "once-proud" English language (to use May's term) must be sorry that we dropped the second person forms "thou" and "thee." —JSS

### **Nothing new under the hyperpatriotic**

**sun** — During the War of Yankee Aggression (1861–65) shortage of legitimate coin of the realm led to various expediences in both nations. In the Confederate States, where the shortage of specie was acute, a solution was sought in paper money, with predictable results. In the Northern Dominion where fiscal

pressures were less intense, small change was provided largely by privately issued tokens struck on the exact standard of the under-supplied cent. About eleven thousand designs are known, including a few Southern examples. Most feature patriotic slogans and symbols or else carry an advertising message for the issuing business.

Recently, while examining a collection of such tokens, I was struck with the topicality of one of them. The obverse displays a flag, the date 1863, and the inscription "The Flag of Our Union." The reverse states "If Anybody Attempts to Tear it Down, Shoot Him on the Spot." A lot more pithy and to the point than any of the currently proposed laws and amendments, wouldn't you agree? —WPM

**Public choices in ecotopia** — On November 7, voters of Seattle overwhelmingly voted to increase taxes to hire additional policemen, but voted against raising taxes to "help kids" via a complicated measure that would increase spending on welfare and the public schools. This puzzled the commentators on Seattle television: why raise taxes for one purpose but not the other?

The "children's initiative" lost by a margin of more than 2 to 1, but the leaders of the campaign were encouraged that they had galvanized a new movement in favor of increasing state spending on children. Curiously, the constituents of this movement were public school teachers, social workers and other direct recipients of the increased taxes.

As nearly as I can tell, not one of these puzzled opinion leaders found it significant that the tax increase to "help kids" was a sales tax that all voters would have to pay, but the tax increase to hire more police was a tax on business enterprises. Is it possible that voters are happy to tax others for their own gain, but not to tax themselves?

The best hypothesis the commentators could come up with was that the "children's initiative" lost because "kids couldn't vote." Maybe they were right: maybe the only people who will vote for a tax increase are those who directly benefit from it . . . especially if they do not have to pay for it. —RWB

**Race with no winners** — New Yorkers are already engaging in the predictable orgy of self-congratulation about the historic election of their first black mayor, David Dinkins, and of what this supposedly shows about the spread of racial tolerance in the city. *Don't you believe it.* The election was "historic" all right, but in a completely different way. This mayoral election polarized the city racially as it has never been split before. New York's Jews, a center of liberalism who have voted overwhelmingly Democratic since the beginning of the New Deal, voted almost as overwhelmingly for the Republican Rudolph Giuliani. Jewish voters at exit polls on Election Day *said* that they voted two to one for Giuliani, but, voters systemically *lied* to the pollsters, who forecast a 10 percent margin for Dinkins when it actually turned out to be a slim 2 percent. The Forest Hills-Kew Gardens section of the borough of Queens, traditionally Jewish middle-class liberal Democrat, voted by a remarkable 3 to 1 for Giuliani, while conservative Democratic Borough Park district of Brooklyn, consisting of Hasidic Jews, voted for the Republican by no less than 5 to 1. The middle-class Jewish district of Riverdale in the Bronx went Republican by 60 percent. Even the Upper West Side of Manhattan, traditionally very left-wing and the stronghold of left-wing Jewish intellectuals, went for Dinkins by only 57 percent—this in a district that usually piles up 3 to 1 Democrat majorities.

Other whites voted almost unanimously for Giuliani; non-Jewish whites voted 85 percent for Giuliani, and this was the *underestimate* given at the exit polls.

How, then, did Dinkins squeak through, by 50 to 48 percent? Two reasons: first, the Puerto Ricans, who had long split from the black voting bloc, supported Dinkins by 70 percent; and, more important, the blacks turned out overwhelmingly and in unprecedented numbers, voting almost unanimously for Dinkins. Usually, black turnout rates at elections are far below those of whites; this time, however, while 55 percent of all eligible voters turned out, over 65 percent of eligible blacks trooped to the polls. Exit polls estimated 93 percent of the black vote to Dinkins, but once again, this probably underestimated the black support to Dinkins by a considerable margin—as in the case of whites, some blacks lied out of fear of being considered “racist” by the pollsters. Thus, the Crown Heights-Bedford-Stuyvesant black region of Brooklyn voted 54,546 for Dinkins as against 1,273 votes for Giuliani, a stunning percentage of 97.7 for the Democrat. The rather less militant black voters of Harlem voted 54,170 for Dinkins as against 3,764 for Giuliani, which comes in at the official estimate of 93.5 percent for Dinkins.

Put another way, the “outer boroughs” of New York, eternal Democratic, voted a margin of 53,000 for Giuliani, and it was only Manhattan, the most leftwing borough in the city, that supplied the 95,000 margin that allowed Dinkins to slip through.

Far from the election being a harbinger of tolerance, New York has slid ever closer to eventual race war. An old friend of mine—a lifelong libertarian who generally votes New Left Democratic—remonstrated with me on the phone just before the election for my stronger opposition to Giuliani. “Murray, have pity on those of us who still live in New York,” he pleaded, “because if Dinkins wins, *they* will take over.” *They* meant two conjoined forces: blacks and leftists, for indeed Dinkins, while personally a calm, unthreatening figure, is surrounded by leftwing ideologues, mainly black, including Jesse, but also by such long-time white socialist activists as City Councilwoman (now Borough President of Manhattan) Ruth Messinger.

Indeed, amidst the euphoria of Democratic victory, outgoing mayor Ed Koch, who lost by 10 points in the Democratic primary but whom most observers concede would win an election *today*, issued a stern warning against many of Dinkins’s cherished programs. In particular, Koch warned against two proposals of Messinger that would serve to destroy what is left of the housing stock already gravely crippled by fifty years of rent control. For Dinkins favors imposing rent control on retail stores, as well as preventing landlords from keeping apartments off the market while waiting for more profitable use. Koch also attacked such destructive statist proposals of Dinkins as imposing the concept of “comparable worth” for municipal jobs, as well as favoring municipal unions with even greater privileges than they now enjoy.

As for the outgoing mayor, don’t cry for Ed Koch. His spirits have recovered nicely from defeat, and he is happy and chortling as he looks forward to his next career: What else? Cleaning up on the lecture circuit, where Koch will be entertaining his audience at about \$30,000 a pop. New York City, however, is not going to be so lucky; it’s in for a helluva ride.

A final note on the polls: happily, for those of us who dislike the arrogant determinism of the pollsters as well as their heavy influence on political campaigns, they came a cropper this time. Not only did the exit polls predict a 10 percent win for Dinkins, but the highly respected *Daily News*-CBS poll, taken only two

days before the election, forecast a 14 point victory for Dinkins, while the Gallup-*Newsday* poll predicted a 15 percent margin. The pollsters, of course, blamed the public; they *lied* to the pollsters, especially wherever race matters. Well, tough patootie, fellas. How about you highly paid professionals taking the fall, and going into a more legitimate line of work? —MNR

**Anarchy in the USA** — Lenin wrote that anarchism is “often a sort of punishment for the opportunist sins of the working class movement.” Of course, his experience with anarchism came at a time when the movement was serious and, in some circles, important. He could recall the vicious struggles at Congresses of the Second International over whether or not to expel the anarchists. When they finally were cast out, they established the “Black International,” which persisted at least until the Spanish Civil War. Lenin lived at a time when the syndicalist wing of the anarchist movement had an important (which is not to say beneficial) impact on the political landscape by assassinating heads of state and other political notables. To Lenin, anarchism was a threat, one to be treated seriously.

Today, anarchism seems to be nothing more than “Left child-

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*Some of the anarchists voiced concern that the government wasn’t doing enough to help the disadvantaged, and demanded government assistance for housing and other social programs. “State Anarchism” was born.*

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ishness,” if the latest North American Anarchist Conference is any indication. The Conference was held at the Horace Mann Middle School in the Mission District of San Francisco (not to be confused with Tom Mann, U.S. syndicalist, known for his frenetic ranting of “We must destroy!” at the 1893 anarchist conference in London). The anarchist organizers (that grand contradiction in terms) had hoped to improve the image of anarchism through hosting a series of lectures and discussions (e.g., “Anarchy 101,” and “TV: Totalitarian Technology”). However, most of the 1000 people who showed up were not straight-laced intellectuals, but a cross section of the alternative culture; punks, hippies, mystics and other free spirits, engaging in festive, unstructured, anarchic behavior. Mirroring the Old Left/New Left disputes of the 1960s, Joey Cain, one of the organizers, complained of a lack of historical sense among the younger anarchists. “A lot of people think anarchism started 10 years ago with the Sex Pistols,” he said. It’s hard to blame the punks for the misunderstanding, though. The Sex Pistols sold a lot more albums than Chernyshevskii or Emma Goldman.

Despite the philosophical confluence between libertarianism and anarchism, the sentiment at this conference was decidedly anti-capitalist and anti-property. Jef Strohl, a participant from Oakland, said that capitalism is to blame for most of the world’s problems. “There is enough in this world for all of its need, but not enough for all of its greed,” he stated. “Half the people here have no chance of getting a well-paying job or buying a house.” (Half the people there also had shaved heads and only a nodding acquaintance with soap.) Others, betraying something of a confusion as to what anarchism is usually thought to be, voiced concern that the government wasn’t doing enough to help the disadvantaged, and demanded government assistance for housing and other social programs. “State Anarchism” was born. But not everyone op-

posed the free market. Karry Koon, from McVerytown, Pa., had a brisk market in political pins, particularly those featuring the anarchist "Circle-A" symbol. "The pagan designs are also going well," the young entrepreneur said.

The Conference ended with a spontaneous riot, to the dismay of the organizers, who hoped for something more respectable. But the "riot" was a pretty pathetic specimen of Propaganda of the Deed. This was no Haymarket Bombing or Homestead Steel Strike. Windows were smashed, in defiance of Hazlitt's *Economics in One Lesson*. A Coca-Cola delivery truck, symbol of dreaded capitalism, was hijacked. Trash cans, unable to flee, were burned. But there were no injuries, and thirty anarchists were arrested. For some reason, nationwide sympathy has failed to manifest itself. Such is the state of anarchism today. Kind of feels good to see a group in worse shape than the Libertarian Party. —JSR

**Hats off!** — Not surprisingly, as soon as Congress passed a law prohibiting the "desecration" of the flag (oops, The Flag), certain radicals made headlines by burning the same. Though I was not one of those certain radicals (certainty is not my bag), I could not help but sympathize with them. Jingoistic laws like this deserve to be challenged. State worship, "Americanism"—the whole servile civic religion that self-proclaimed patriots have been shoving down the throats of innocent children ever since freedom and the rule of law became inadequate for "good Americans"—is badly in need of challenge, and if the Supreme Court will once again decide against the statist, I cannot help but raise a cheer.

Still, I doubt if I could bring myself to burn a flag. As symbolic acts go, flag-burning is far too extreme for my temperament. Furthermore, it is expressive of a severe, unambivalent attitude, and my attitude to both America and its symbology is nothing if not ambivalent.

It is not that I am not patriotic, in my own way; it's just that I am not patriotic in other people's way. For instance, my version

of patriotism influenced me, years ago, to decide not to recite the odious Pledge of Allegiance. I reasoned that pledging allegiance to a symbol that was usually carried by the most despicable of criminals (that is, politicians) would be as unpatriotic an act as I could imagine. It would fly in the face of what I regarded as my American values: life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness. I believed that the right to govern should rest on the consent of the

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
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governed, and that the nobility of the American experiment consisted in the principle of limiting governments by the same rule of law that limits the activities of the common folk; no symbol of America (I reasoned) should be allowed to work against these ideals. So I dissented.

Conveniently, by the time I made this decision I was no longer required to recite the thing. Not so conveniently, I have often found myself in a somewhat similar position, where I am expected to stand in respect for the flag as the National Anthem plays. Though I believe that sitting while the musicians go through the leaps of their variant of "Anacreon in Heaven" is too disrespectful (people might think I am a communist, or against freedom, or something), doing what everyone else is doing seems too respectful of the unthinking patriotism of the obedient masses. My solution to this crisis of ceremony is novel enough that I recommend flag-burners to follow suit. When the anthem is played (or worse

yet, sung), I stand up, take off my hat and place it over a portion of my anatomy somewhat removed from my heart. I call this the "CYA gesture," and though most people do not notice it, I do not hesitate to explain when asked by anyone who looks unlikely to assault me in response.

So, if you feel compelled to show your dissent by burning a flag, show at least a little respect for the common opinions of mankind (or at least Americans) by refraining from chanting, swigging beer, shouting names, or making rude gestures to the police. Write a solemn declaration—perhaps mimicking Jeffersonian language—and have someone soberly read it for the assembled dissidents and voyeuristic cameramen. And, as the flag goes up in flames, why not salute it, or play taps? If flag-burners claim to stand for ideals that flag-burning laws unconstitutionally abridge, they should show respect for the ideals they wish to uphold by recognizing that, to many people, Old Glory once stood for those same ideals. —TWW



What it means  
**The Death of Socialism**  
WHAT IT MEANS

# Now the Real Struggle Begins

## Seven Observations on the Death of Socialism

by R. W. Bradford

*George Bush seemed doleful to the reporters he summoned to his office after hearing the news that the Berlin Wall had fallen.*

*"You don't seem elated," one reporter observed.*

*"I am not an emotional kind of guy," Bush replied.*

*"Well, how elated are you?"*

*"I am very pleased."*

*Well, I am not sure whether I am a more "emotional kind of guy" than the President, but I didn't respond to the news that the Wall was being torn down in his hang-dog fashion. The collapse of the Berlin Wall and the attendant disintegration of socialism is cause for celebration for all who love humanity and especially for those who love liberty.*

*But the collapse of socialism is occasion for more than celebration: it is also cause for reflection and observation.*

### **Observation 1: The faith is broken.**

Last spring, Hungary legalized the Boy Scouts; this fall, it enacted a new constitution and is now a self-proclaimed Western-style republic. Its Communist Party reformed as well, reorganizing itself as a Western-style socialist party. Poland held a free election, which was won by a non-Communist party.

The Soviet Union has held elections with non-communist candidates, admitted to war crimes during World War II, tolerated a considerable amount of dissent, acknowledged the crimes of its secret police, and even supported such previously forbidden notions as private ownership of capital goods.

In Vietnam, a communist backwater, free-market thinking is tolerated and the state has begun to allow basic commodities to trade at market prices.

On October 18, Erich Honecker, the hard-line leader of East Germany, who only a few months earlier was seen as the most secure leader of any communist government, was ousted by his party in an attempt to satisfy the angry mob in the streets. It was not enough: on November 4, a half million people rallied against the government in East Berlin. Three days later the entire Cabinet quit under pressure, and the next day Honecker's Stalinist replacement resigned his government position, victims to its enraged citizenry emboldened by its unaccustomed exercise of power. The next to go belly up was Todor Zhivkov of Bulgaria, who had held power for 35 years, the longest tenure of any communist head of state.

On November 9, the East German state agreed to allow its citizens to travel freely in other Eastern Bloc countries, including those that had opened their borders to the West. Thousands of East Germans went West. This did not satisfy the people. In the most dramatic event to date, the East German state decided to open up its borders to emigration and travel directly to the West. In effect, the Berlin Wall, which had symbolized the slavery that communism had become, fell. The state said the Wall would be retained as a military barrier, but the people of both Berlins had another idea: they began tearing it down with hand tools, tossing chunks of concrete into the streets below.

Berliners were intoxicated by the new freedom. Students from the West streamed into the East, giving flowers to the *Volkspolizei*, who only a few days earlier had orders to kill anyone who approached the Wall. East Berliners toasted their new freedom with West German

champagne. Prices rose on the Frankfurt stock exchange. People all over Germany rejoiced.

"More liberty begets desire of more," John Dryden observed three centuries ago. Appetites for liberty stimulated, the massed people of Eastern Europe demanded more and more liberty. In a desperate attempt to hold onto some remnant of power, the Communist Party of East Germany announced that free elections would be held, appointed non-Communists to the Cabinet, and began an investigation of Honecker, who only a month earlier had held near absolute power. Egon Krenz, the former chief of secret police who had taken over for Honecker, gave interviews to West German television, desperately trying to portray himself as a liberal; a few days later he resigned with his feet to the fire. Fully half of the residents of Prague took to the streets in protest against their government, which had resisted liberal reforms. On November 24, the Czech Politburo resigned. On December 5, Erich Honecker was placed under house arrest.

Meanwhile, nearly every so-called "democratic socialist" party in the West has acknowledged the inadequacy of centralized planning, thereby retreating from the fundamental principle of socialism.<sup>1</sup>

As the *Economist* observes: "The Swedes did that in the 1930s, the West Germans at their famous Bad Godesberg congress in 1959. Spain's socialists recanted in the 1970s. France's too have done so in practice, though they prefer not to avow the change. The party's line on the mixed economy, laid down by Mr Mitterand, is stand-pat: no more privatization, no more nationalization. Britain's Labor party was torn apart by Hugh Gaitskell's attempt at reform 30 years ago, and was still dreaming grandiosely of state intervention and state enterprise under Harold Wilson's prime ministership in the mid-1970s; it has gone pretty quietly along as Neil Kinnock has shuffled its ancient dogmas aside in the 1980s."

Socialism is in retreat around the world. That is to say, the notion that the state ought directly to control the economy for the benefit of all is no longer widely believed. No longer do people commonly see socialism (or its revolutionary clone, communism) as an idealistic system, building a new and better society, its noble ends justifying its sometimes brutal means.

Socialism has lost its high moral ground that it had gained during the late 19th century and held since.

### **Observation 2: The failure of socialism to deliver the goods precipitated its collapse.**

For decades, the attitude of the communist leadership toward the masses was, "Let them eat promises." They told their subjects that they were gaining on the West economically and that before long they too would have decent automobiles, edible food, watches that keep time and the other accoutrements of civilized living. At first, they could point to progress in some areas. In heavy industry and public education, for example, the communists did gain on the West. But this was clearly the result of two factors. First, the communists lavished resources in a few "showcase" projects, while ignoring production of other goods. Secondly, the areas in which they chose to compete were most often areas where the state's heavy hand was limiting growth even in the West, where education is essentially a government monopoly and heavy industry is often hobbled by state-empowered labor unions and extensive regulation.

Such goods as were offered to the workers of the communist states were of inferior quality, when available. In Eastern Europe, the process of acquiring a car involved filing an application, waiting for years—sometimes even decades—and then paying an exorbitant price for a poorly crafted version of an automobile designed in the West twenty years earlier. The price of food in government stores was usually reasonable, but the quality was awful, the waiting in line opprobrious, and the availability sporadic. The most available consumer good in the Soviet Union was vodka, cheap to produce and sold at steep prices by the government monopoly. So the Soviet worker lived in his tiny apartment in his crumbling apartment building, ate garbage for food, was watched over by secret police, and drank his vodka, trying to forget.

The Soviet experiment began by promising paradise to the worker. It ended by giving him something quite unique in the modern world: a steadily declining life expectancy. After 70 years of promises not kept, the people stopped believing the promises.

The situation in Eastern Europe was worse than that in the Soviet Union. Here traditional tolerance of authoritarian government is much weaker than in Russia. And here people could see life in the West on television. The East German worker could see that his West German counterpart worked no harder than he, but enjoyed a vastly superior lifestyle.

Western television also stimulated demand for other Western consumer goods: freedom and democracy. Through the window of television, the subjects of socialist states saw that people in the West could speak their minds, live where they wanted, pursue the occupations of their choice, and choose their own leaders.

The governments of the satellite states tried to narrow the economic gap by importing consumer goods from the West, by borrowing from the West, by buying whole factories in the West. At first the people applauded the improvements. But the gap remained, and seemed to continue to grow. And the Western goods had to be paid for, putting several Eastern European countries on the brink of bankruptcy.

The communist states tried to narrow the political gap by allowing a modicum of freedom and democracy. But everywhere that people were allowed pittance of political freedom, two points quickly became apparent. People liked freedom a lot, and they were not satisfied with the crumbs of freedom they were offered.

None of these developments come as a surprise to libertarians or classical liberals, who understand why totalitarian control of the economy does not work. But until the past decade, this criticism of socialism was purely theoretical: the failures of socialism could be explained away. As the gap between the standard of living in socialist and non-socialist countries widened, the proposition that socialism does not work ceased to be mere theory: it became established historic fact.

### **Observation 3: It is a mistake to depend on the free market's track record of prosperity as a rationale for the liberal social order.**

Okay. Communist parties are abandoning totalitarianism; socialist parties are abandoning state ownership of capital goods. The free market works and socialism doesn't. We're right and they're wrong.

Does this mean that we can look forward to increasing

prosperity as the scope of the state is reduced and the scope of the marketplace increased, with further rolling back of the state as everyone sees how much happier and more prosperous they are as the result of their increasing freedom?

Before we indulge in this fantasy, let us consider what happened the last time the virtue of a social system was measured by its ability to deliver the goods. Let's survey the situation 60 years ago.

In 1929, the liberal social order had been "delivering the goods" fairly efficiently: for a century and a half, the standard of living of just about every class of people in the West had been rising fairly steadily. The Great War had been tremendously expensive, in life and treasure, but prosperity had returned as the liberal economic agenda was re-enacted, with repeated tax cuts in the U.S. and a return to the gold standard in the British Empire. The free market had its enemies, of course. Socialists had been around the fringes of civil society for years, carping about how "unscientific," how "irrational," how "chaotic," how "unfair" the market was. But even if a bunch of radical socialists had taken over the Russian Empire by *coup d'etat* and civil war in the wake of the Great War, and even if some elements in the working class, the clerical class and the intellectual class were smitten by socialist ideas, the liberal social order remained productive and strong.

But all that changed dramatically. During the four years from 1929 to 1933, prosperity ended and depression set in. Employment fell, profits fell, income fell, the stock market collapsed . . . The free market had apparently failed, and the credibility of the critics of the free market rose dramatically. Crank professors of economics at backwater "universities" were plucked from obscurity and made presidential advisors; advocates of goofy economic systems took power in Germany and Britain.

In only a few short years, capitalism was discredited, and a centrally planned (socialist) economy gained a credibility that it had never before enjoyed. Now I am well aware that the social order of the 1920s was a far cry from the liberal social order as libertarians and classical liberals envision it. The market was already hampered by increasing state intervention and whole segments of it (i.e. the credit market) had been nationalized. And I am conversant with libertarian explanations that the Depression was caused not by the free market, but by interventions in it. But this has nothing to do with the fact that in the public mind the Depression was the failure of capitalism and verification of (or, at the very least, strong evidence for) anti-capitalist economic theories.<sup>2</sup>

The free market suffered a loss of faith in the 1930s, just as socialism is suffering a loss of faith today, and for the same reasons. It would be as serious a mistake for market-

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advocates to get smug about the free market today as it was for socialists to get smug about socialism during the 1930s, and for exactly the same reason: we have no reason to believe that market economies will continue to perform strongly.

For one thing, the market economies today are free-market economies only in comparison to the socialist economies. That is to say, they are mixed economies, with a level of intervention that exceeds that prevalent during the 1920s and 1930s. If depressions are caused by intervention, as most libertarians argue, then another depression is at least a possibility and perhaps a likelihood. And another depression could very well be viewed by the public as a failure of the free market, thereby further setting back the liberal social order.

More fundamentally, free market advocates should understand the relationship between their policy prescriptions (prescriptions might be a more accurate word) and economic prosperity. Elimination of government intervention is not a guarantee of economic prosperity. There will be no economic prosperity if, for example, the earth plunges into the sun and all human beings perish.

More practically, economic prosperity requires capital investment and productive work. Even if there is no government intervention at all, it is entirely possible that people will refrain from capital investment or productive work. This is not an entirely remote possibility: as the millennium approached, for example, many Christians stopped planting crops, preferring instead to live off capital, and would likely

### Doors

On the morning when the Berlin Wall finally opened, I washed the floor in my kitchen and straightened out the closet in the spare room, and Peter Nakaji came over to paint the front door. It's an old door and not very strong, and it had weathered badly. Standing in the sun, Peter sanded down the outside surface, now heavily oxidized, and put caulking in the cracks that run like thin Greek letters across the planes and elevations of the wood. Then he applied a double layer of Inca Gold while we drank beer and listened to reports on Cable News. I paid Peter with books and some more beer, and after joking awhile about the disorderly nature of the marketplace, we went out to dinner. Discussing events in Europe, we agreed that we must remain prepared for trouble but that many of our defenses can probably be reduced. We could not agree, however, about history, about whether everything that happens has shape and purpose (like a poem, for instance, or a door) or whether it is only a series of explosions in the protein alphabet. We drank and argued until midnight, and then Peter went home to complete his applications to medical school. I left the door slightly ajar, to allow the paint to dry, and all night long a crew worked under floodlights, smashing up the well-designed white modern wall that we had thought could keep the world divided.

— Stephen Cox

have done so even if they had operated within the context of a completely free market. Similarly, the spread of ascetic ideas or of the increased use of certain drugs (e.g. alcohol, heroin, marijuana, or cocaine) might reduce prosperity in a totally free market. In addition, prosperity can decline in a free market if a disproportionate number of owners of capital invest heavily in ventures that are technically impossible or impractical (e.g. in alchemy).

Nor are totally free markets necessary for economic prosperity, as the experience of the past half century has demonstrated. There is no doubt that the standard of living for Americans (and for the West in general) has risen since World War II, despite the fact that the level of government intervention has risen. (Of course, one can argue that in the long run, the post-war prosperity will end. But *undefined* "long run" considerations are singularly unconvincing: as Keynes pointed out, "In the long run, we all are dead.")

In this context, it is important for libertarians and classical liberals to remember the most fundamental insight of Austrian economics: the market process is profoundly *subjective*, and as a result is in constant disequilibrium. The market is *not* a mechanism, and getting a desired result from an economy is not simply a matter of putting in the correct inputs. Other approaches to economics, most especially the socialist approach, view the economy as a mechanism from which we can get what we need by proper manipulation.

Strictly speaking, the free market is *neither necessary nor sufficient* for economic prosperity. Time and time again, in his treatise *Man, Economy and State*, Murray Rothbard qualifies an economic law with the phrase, *ceteris paribus*, "all things equal." That qualification applies here as well: *ceteris paribus*, a free market is necessary for prosperity. But in the real world, *ceteris* is never *paribus*.

#### Observation 4: The death of socialism presents a crisis for conservatism.

To those reared in America during the Cold War, Communism was a disease that was slowly infecting the world, periodically contaminating people and territory, keeping them in its thrall forever. In grade schools, children sat on the floors in their cafeterias and watched movie documentaries about Communism, seeing the red cancer spread around the world: St Petersburg in 1917; Russia in 1922; Eastern Europe and China in the aftermath of World War II; half of Vietnam in 1954; Cuba in 1959 . . . Communism advanced inexorably and inevitably; all the West could do was slow its progress. "We will bury you!" Soviet leader Nikita Krushchev told Americans. And Americans believed them.

"The [Berlin] Wall is the most obvious and vivid demonstration of the failures of the communist system," John F. Kennedy told us, and we all agreed. The Wall epitomized the totalitarian nature of the communist world—a world in which people were denied the simplest personal right: the right to leave.

It was proof that the subjects of communist states were slaves and that the Western democracies were powerless to do anything about it.

At the surrender of Cornwallis in 1781, jubilant Americans listened to a military band play "The World Turned Upside Down." The rock music that played as jubilant Germans smashed the Wall with sledge hammers and assaulted it with crowbars may seem less appropriate, but one thing is certain: as surely that the world turned one day in 1781, so it turned again on November 9, 1989. It signalled more than the loss of totalitarian power by East Germany. It proved that the notion that Communism is inevitable is just plain false.

The communists were not the only ones whose world turned upside down in 1989. So did the world of the American conservative. Since the 1950s, most conservatives have based their political program on the premise that Communism is conquering the world, and our highest priority must be to oppose it and slow its spread. As a result, conservatives have generally subjugated domestic policy to foreign policy, willing to accept the growth of state power at home as the price that must be paid for a powerful American state to oppose the spread of communism abroad. What good is keeping our economy free if we are going to be conquered by Communists anyway?

This compromise, enunciated as a strategic principle in the 1950s by William F. Buckley, has occurred time and again during the past half century. The most recent dramatic example has been President Reagan's willingness to accept higher spending on welfare in exchange for higher spending on defense, leaving the citizen to pay for both with higher taxes and increased debt, the consequences of which will be felt for decades.

Libertarians, of course, were never fooled by the myth of

**Socialist dreamworld** — Socialists in the United States, living as they are in a dreamworld, cannot come to grips with what is going on in Eastern Europe. Case in point: *The Nation* magazine recently editorialized about the hemorrhaging of population from East to West Germany, almost 50,000 people in a month. How can a socialist find the bright side of this event? Leave it to *The Nation*.

"The exodus of thousands of youthful East Germans across the Austro-Hungarian border cannot be interpreted, as some western commentators would have it, as an abandonment of the teachings of Karl Marx," the magazine states in its Oct. 2 issue. "To be sure, the emigrants are hoping for a better life than they found under the East German regime. But the country to which they are traveling . . . is not Thatcher's Britain or *apres-Reagan* America." No, says *The Nation*, they are going to the welfare state in West Germany, with its panoply of social programs, job protection, and worker participation in management. "True, it is a capitalist society, but one in which there are agreed-upon limits to the sovereignty of the market . . . By leaving East Germany the new emigrants have chosen capitalism with a human face. Its humanization was and is the work of the party Marx founded. And so the newcomers have gone from Stalin back to Marx."

I would have thought that the East Germans chose West Germany not because it is a welfare state, but because they speak the language, are automatically citizens, and in many cases have relatives there. But *The Nation* perhaps sees a truer reality. One thing it sees that is not there, however, is the work of the "party Marx founded." The West German social programs are actually the work of Ludwig Erhard and the Christian Democratic Union's postwar government. And let us not forget the German welfare state was pioneered by that non-Marxist Bismarck in the last century. Details, details.

—Sheldon L. Richmann

the power of communism. Socialism may be able to grab men's minds—human beings seem almost infinitely able to believe in crazy ideas—but it cannot organize a social system in a way that brings prosperity. For libertarians, socialism was never the wave of the future; it was always a wave of the past, a wave that held a powerful grip on men's minds, but was always doomed to fail when put into practice.

Twenty years ago, as a college student, I argued with conservatives that a defeat of the U.S. in Vietnam wouldn't be much of a loss. The war was between two dictatorships, equally unable and unwilling to institute free markets. Vietnam would remain a poor country whichever side won, and its people would be unhappy and rife for further change. If the socialist totalitarians defeated the anti-socialist totalitarians, all it would mean is that the Soviets would have a problem that would require either substantial cash subsidy (as in Cuba) or massive military repression, rather than the U.S. having the same problem.

My argument, of course, went nowhere. Didn't I realize that Vietnam was a domino, that if the Reds captured it, next they would grab the rest of Indochina, then Thailand, then Indonesia . . . and the next thing we knew they would be in California. This childish faith in the power and efficacy of communism seems pretty silly today, but in the 1950s and 1960s it fueled conservative ideology and U.S. foreign policy.

Now there are some conservatives who argue that the collapse of Communism has been the result of the Reagan "get-tough" policy. But this is surely nothing more than a coincidence. It was not the military strength of the U.S. that destroyed the Berlin Wall or brought about elections in the Soviet Union. It was the inability of communist govern-

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ments to deliver the goods to its people. World War II battleships or Polaris submarines. The Russian people didn't demand democracy because of Reagan's financial aid to the Unita army in Angola or to the Contras in Nicaragua.<sup>3</sup>

How will the crisis into which the death of socialism has plunged conservatism be resolved? Will the great compromise engineered by Buckley come to an end? With no further need to fight communism around the world, will conservatives join libertarians in fighting the growth of the state at home? Will conservatism return to its quasi-libertarian, pre-Cold War roots?

Or will it cast aside its libertarianism entirely, now that it can no longer be placated with lip service, and make its reactionary, statist "social agenda" its central theme?

My suspicion is that conservatism will follow the latter course. It was this course, after all, that brought conservatism such political power as it enjoys. But only time will tell, and in the meantime, I applaud those libertarians who again approach American conservatives.

### Observation 5: The death of socialism is not a victory for libertarian ideas.

The proposition that state control of every element of economic life is morally good or economically productive is pernicious. Belief in that proposition has been at the root of much of the pain, suffering and death that men have inflicted on one another for the past century. Its passage into the intellectual cemetery is a profoundly progressive development.

The death of socialism is cause for celebration by lovers of liberty, as it is for all human beings. But it is not a victory for libertarians *qua* libertarians. The end advocated by libertarians goes far beyond the elimination of the total state: it is the radical reduction of state power, or even its total abolition. The fact that governments that once advocated the total state have changed their tune, while a wonderful development, is not a victory for the proposition that the role of the state should be minimized.

### Observation 6: Libertarians now face their greatest challenge.

Consider the following propositions about the optimal role for the state in human life.

1. The role of the state in people's lives should be radically reduced or even eliminated; only when individual control of social life is maximized will a good, just and prosperous society emerge.
2. The role of the state in people's lives should be increased substantially; only when state control of social life is maximized will a good, just and prosperous

**Gorby: closet Objectivist?** — It is amusing to see the right-wingers who are nostalgic for the Cold War grudgingly concede that something significant is going on in the Eastern bloc, but at the same time try to salvage a part of the good old days by insisting that Mikhail Gorbachev can't possibly have honorable intentions. Even some libertarians and Objectivists are prone to this. But consider this: imagine that Gorbachev, just before becoming boss of the Soviet Union, had read Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged* or Henry Hazlitt's *Time Will Run Back* and had become thoroughly convinced that individual liberty and the free market were right. Might it not be reasonable for him to have pursued the same policies as he has for the last several years? Sure, he could have defected to the United States and renounced his homeland, but that would have had little effect on the Soviet system or his people. Instead, he might have decided to continue his rise to power and liberalize from within. He, of course, has done some bad things, such as ordering the suppression of ethnic demonstrations. But one could argue that he had no real choice given the constraints imposed on him by the communist system. Failure to do something might have gotten him ousted and blown his program to free the Soviet Union. I'm not saying this gets him off the hook morally—only that he reasonably could have seen those actions as his best choices under the circumstances.

Of course, Gorbachev is probably not a libertarian. The point is that none of us knows what his intentions are. We would need much more information to make an intelligent guess. But more importantly, his intentions are not relevant. The law of unintended consequences is what matters. The toothpaste is out of the tube, and good intentions or not, it won't be easily put back in.

An Objectivist in the Kremlin? There's one running the Federal Reserve, isn't there?

— Sheldon L. Richman

society emerge.

The first of these is a reasonable summary of the libertarian (or classical liberal) position; the second is a reasonable summary of the socialist position. It is plain that the agreement with one proposition implies disagreement with the other and the truth of either implies the falsity of the other. But this is no place to enforce the Law of the Excluded Middle.<sup>4</sup>

These are not the only two propositions about the optimal role of the state. There is another proposition, one that is more widely accepted than either the libertarian or socialist proposition:

**RIP: The New Soviet Man** — It is hard to refrain from commenting on the ongoing breakup of the Communist Empire. For now I will limit myself to two observations. The first is that, on one of the very central issues of the movement that he represented and molded, Josef Stalin was right. Specifically, he was correct in his belief that, within the context of a Marxist-Leninist (or more accurately, Leninist-Stalinist) regime the only long-term workable model is the Stalinist one—i.e., the total absence of intra-party democracy, the extirpation of all competing institutions down to the most trivial level, and rule by endless terror. The history of the Communist world since Lenin's death has shown that this model (of which classical Maoism is a slight modification) is stable and other versions of the Leninist dream are not. Within the context we are using, that is to say, Bukharin, Tomsky, Radek and, more recently, Abenganjan, Yeltsin and Gorbachev himself have been wrong, and the Father of Peoples was correct. (Of course, it is also true that for some of the current Soviet leaders the Marxist-Leninist framework may no longer be the guiding principle in any sense whatsoever, although I regard this as uncertain at the present time.)

My other observation concerns a tenet that was at one time held not only by party members and fellow travellers but even by quite a few anti-communists. For a long time many observers believed that, for good or evil, the Soviet regime had succeeded in annihilating the primordial patterns of human existence and producing a new type of being, a sort of *Homo sovieticus*, the perfect totalitarian being. In the 30s and 40s, especially, this was an article of faith among the more silly-brained breed of Sovietophiles. (It was not so common among the more cynical, G.B. Shaw types.) This period saw a parade of now-forgotten volumes explaining that greed, envy, selfishness, careerism, and old linguistic, religious and national identities and loyalties had vanished in the Socialist Sixth of the World. A few decades later we were told that individualism had ceased to exist in China and that its countless citizens yearned with a single will to be faceless cogs in the Maoist anthill.

Well, wrong on all counts. When the screws were loosened, it turned out that the New Soviet Man does not exist, that people still think of themselves as Latvians and Lithuanians and Ukrainians and Moldavians and Great Russians and Armenians. They are Orthodox Russians and Catholics and Baptists and Jews and non-believers. They are westernizers and (in much greater numbers) romantic Russian nationalists. Unfortunately, many of them are anti-Semites. The point is, they are the same variety of people they were before the imposition of Communist despotism. At the same time, we have been given ample evidence of the deep and abiding love that the populaces of the satellite nations have for their Soviet masters and for the Marxist system. And, in the other red giant, we see that, lo and behold, Chinese are people too, with a wide range of opinions, with hopes and plans and individual desires, and furthermore that many of these desires are rooted in western liberal concepts. So much for the billion happy blue ants with which the media constantly regaled us during the Nixon-Mao era.

There are two historical lessons in all of this:

1. If you're serious about tyranny, you must rule as a tyrant.
2. Once repression slackens, the natural order of human activity—in both its benign and malevolent manifestations—speedily reasserts itself.

—William P. Moulton

3. The state should have a powerful role in people's lives, but its power should not be absolute—indeed, the optimal role of the state may vary considerably from one situation to another; only when the power of the state is set at an optimal level and carefully managed will a good, just and prosperous society emerge.

This third proposition is a reasonable summary of the political views of most Americans, and (I believe) most educated people around the world. It's easy to understand its widespread popularity: it is "middle-of-the-road," non-extreme, non-radical and non-threatening; it reflects (more-or-less) the status quo, and it seems to be working adequately.

And it is this proposition, this "Middle Way," that libertarians find most vexing. The actual policy issues that libertarians face take the form of: Should government power be increased to deal with this-or-that problem? The libertarian answers no, it should not, because the growth of the state is a bad thing.

The libertarian is nearly always opposed by advocates of the Middle Way, not advocates of total state control.

Consider the last time you witnessed (or participated) in a discussion by a libertarian and a non-libertarian on just about any public issue. Chances are the discussion took the following form.

Professor Libertarian: We should solve problem X by restricting or eliminating government interference with the free exchange between individuals.

Joe Citizen: Well, I don't like giving the government more power very well, but if we don't, then how are we going to solve problem X?

Prof: Whenever you increase government power, you decrease the net utility, thereby reducing the total. (Or: Increasing government power violates people's rights, and this is always wrong.)

Joe: But what about problem X?

Seldom indeed does the dialogue between a libertarian and non-libertarian take this form:

Professor Libertarian: We should solve problem X by restricting or eliminating government interference with the free exchange between individuals.

Joe Citizen: No, no, no! We should solve it by increasing government control as much as possible.

Prof: Whenever you increase government power, you decrease the net utility, thereby reducing the total. (Or: Increasing government power violates people's rights, and this is always wrong.)

Joe Citizen: You've got it completely wrong, Professor. Whenever you in-

crease government power, you increase people's control of their own lives, which makes everyone but the rich capitalists happy!

Those who advocate the Middle Way are impressed by neither the theories of the libertarian nor the theories of the socialist.

Both socialism and liberty seem extreme and far too abstract. The marketplace is productive, all right, but it does a poor job of taking care of the poor, or the elderly, or the environment. An absolute free market would be a very bad place in which to live. Massive state control may help provide a safety net for the poor, medical care for the elderly, and the kind of environment that we like, but it isn't very productive. The socialist state would be as bad a system as the free market. What we need, then, is to optimize life by allowing the market to function, but tempering it with government control. We will have constantly to adjust this system as circumstances change.

For example, as long as our country is the lowest cost producer of most agricultural and industrial products (as was the U.S. during the post-war era) then free trade is the optimal system, and countries that do not favor it better watch out! Maybe we won't protect them with our military! Maybe we will pass laws punishing them!

But if other countries are able to produce industrial or agricultural goods more efficiently than the U.S. . . . well, that's not fair, they will put Americans out of work, ruin our balance of payments . . . maybe we should charge them large sums of money to allow them to sell their goods in our country, or "convince" them to limit their sales in the U.S. "voluntarily."

Just as advocates of the Middle Way are unimpressed with libertarian thinking, so libertarians are unimpressed with Middle Way thinking. Just as the advocate of the Middle Way dismisses libertarianism as too abstract, so libertarians often dismiss the Middle Way as too concrete-bound. This view may be philosophically satisfying, but its relevance in a world characterized by mixed economies and populated chiefly by advocates of the Middle Way is difficult to fathom.

Many libertarians argue that the Middle Way is no way at all because a social system organized according to it is inherently unstable and unviable. The debate over social organization is a debate between socialism and liberty; there is no third position.

These arguments usually grow from the observation that when state power is increased to solve one or another social problem, the result is usually an actual exacerbation of the problem and perhaps other problems as well, which generally results in further calls for the increase of state power by its advocates, or that when a crisis is responded to by the increase of state power, the power of the state is seldom reduced to pre-crisis levels after the crisis has passed, but instead falls to a new level, from which it expands at the time of the following crisis. Another argument, promulgated mostly by Objectivists, holds that the philosophical inconsistency of the Middle-Way causes it to break down.

These views offer intelligent ways of understanding recent history, but it is difficult to see them as genuinely universal. In fact, the decline of state power in the communist world in recent years, or in the Republic of Texas during the second administration of Sam Houston—he cut spending by nearly

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90%—demonstrates the possibility that state power can decline.

Furthermore, the impact of an increasingly powerful state is mitigated in a mixed economy. As markets and technological expertise expand, people channel their energies into areas in which the power of the

state is limited, often rapidly developing "new" industries that the state hasn't yet jumped on. We have seen this in the U.S. during the past three decades: heavy industry (e.g. steel-making), which is highly regulated has shrunk, while new industries (e.g. computer technology and software), which are almost unregulated, have grown tremendously. Indeed, so far as the U.S. economy as a whole is concerned, the decline in steel production has been dwarfed by the growth in computers. Indeed, it may be appropriate to term such heavily regulated industries as steel-making "politically obsolete."

Soviet propaganda films from the 1930s featured heavy industry, with its huge grey buildings filled with gigantic grey machines operated by sweaty grey men. It is not coincidental that heavy industry was the centerpiece of socialist planning during its heyday: here, at least for a while, by concentrating national efforts, the planned economies could compete, more or less, with their heavily regulated "capitalist" counterparts. The Soviets remained reasonably competitive with the West in these areas; however, both soon were upstaged by heavy industry from a quarter they least expected: the unregulated, free-market Pacific Rim.

At any rate, it is clear that the burden of proof is on those who assert that the Middle Way is fatally unstable; our common experience indicates that it is sufficiently stable to enable human life to go on, and indeed to prosper, albeit to a lesser degree than a more libertarian society would permit. Libertarians commonly agree that civilized society has never taken the form of total liberty, and that total state control is actually impossible. If these propositions are correct, it seems pretty obvious that society has *always* been organized according to the Middle Way.

The equilibrium between state power and individual freedom that exists in society changes constantly. But to suggest that this constantly changing equilibrium results in an inherently unstable and therefore unviable society makes no more sense than to argue that the constantly changing equilibria of prices mean that a free market is inherently unstable and therefore unviable.

For libertarians, individual rights are the absolutes that provide structure to society in which prices and economic conditions are in disequilibrium; for advocates of the Middle Way, individual rights fluctuate, providing a changing structure to society so that prices and economic conditions are more or less in equilibrium. When Herbert Spencer, the most systematic thinker among 19th-century advocates of the liberal social order, wrote about the ideal libertarian polity he titled his work *Social Statics*, and for good reason. Libertarians, who like to talk about market processes, should recognize the extent to which they oppose the *political* process. The case for libertarianism will remain unconvincing as long as it remains unclear why libertarians believe that *everything but politics* should be in flux.

One can no longer make the case for a free society simply by demonstrating that a totalitarian one doesn't work or is un-

pleasant to live under. Socialist theory has long ago been refuted by liberal thinkers, and now is rejected even by the socialists themselves. For libertarians to concentrate their intellectual energy on criticizing socialism in this age is nearly as silly as it would be for Christian evangelists today to aim their attacks at Gnosticism.

With socialism out of the picture, libertarians must develop arguments that a free society is superior to the Middle Way. This will not be an easy task: for most people the crack-up of socialism seems like evidence that the Middle Way is correct. The crack-up of socialism demonstrated that extreme positions are best avoided and that social systems based on the application of universal laws don't work.

The primary challenge for libertarians of the next generation is to demonstrate that a free society is preferable to a society with the market inhibited and controlled by state intervention. This is a far more difficult job than proving that socialism doesn't work.<sup>5</sup>

### Observation 7: Socialism is dead as an ideology, but socialist states may persist.

As countries run by socialists grew poorer and meaner, socialism has lost its intellectual and religious vigor, its moral high ground. With few exceptions—mostly in the political leadership of dreadfully poor African nations and in academic chairs of Western universities—no one believes the religion of socialism any longer.

But socialist political institutions remain, and lip service is paid. Anyone who thinks this necessarily means that communism is on its last legs should look at the history of Rome. The ideology of the Roman Empire was a religious view that the Roman people were uniquely blessed by their gods with a morally superior way of life, centered on dignity, simplicity and productive work, and had a divine mission to carry their way of life to the rest of the world.

**No time for pessimism** — I think Bradford is too pessimistic about libertarian chances in the dialogue or struggles of the future.

While it is true that most people tend to stay in the confused Middle, one extreme pole—socialism—has now been thoroughly discredited, whereas freedom has not. One powerful argument we can use is that Middle Way policies are *socialistic* and incorporate aspects of policies that everyone dreads. This means that, in contrast to the socialists in the late 19th century, *we* now have the permanent moral high ground. We can now say, when an advocate of the Middle Way says that libertarianism won't work, "Give us a country, or a region, and *let's find out.*" The fact that Communists are constantly calling for freedom, private ownership, currency convertibility (even a gold standard), private property rights, etc. has to have an *enormous* effect on the Middle, and to shift the Middle way toward our position.

It should be noted that the Misesian position on the Middle Way is far more sophisticated than the common libertarian position Bradford outlines. It is *not* simply that government intervention creates new problems in a failed attempt to solve one, and thereby leads cumulatively to socialism. It is rather that these new problems confront everyone with this choice: *either* escalate the interventions (finally going on to socialism) *or* go back, repeal the interventions and move "back" to freedom. Whereas the West has generally taken the first set of choices, the Communist countries (beginning with Yugoslavia in the 1950s and 1960s) take the *other* path. When things get screwed up, they ask: where can we roll back the state in order to solve these problems? The point is not that socialism the inevitable result of intervention; it is that intervention is not a viable system because it sets these other choices into motion.

— Murray N. Rothbard

This ideology was already in decline by the birth of the Empire, and was clearly dead by the end of the first century. Yet the Empire was vigorous well into the fourth century, and continued to exist on a reduced scale until the Eastern Empire was overrun by the Turks in 1453.

But only one Roman state has come along in the past two millennia, and whether the socialist states will show similar longevity remains to be seen. The long life of the Roman state was the result of a great many factors, but the most important were the practical success of its political institutions and the primitive level of its competition.

Socialist states, in contrast, are burdened with eminently impractical institutions, and their competing states are far more advanced in the provision of wealth and order.

True, socialist states control tremendously powerful military forces, massive police forces, tax collectors, regulators, educators . . . These states are owned and operated by powerful elites that live very well, despite the poverty of their subjects. Members of these elites (a large class, not limited to changing politburos) stand to lose power, status, and a high standard of living if their states wither away. They can be expected to try to maintain their privileges.

Already the leaders of the socialist states have shown a little stomach to defend their institutions and leaders. They have been inclined to try to survive at any price: equally willing to abandon leaders, institutions and fundamental ideas. Without their ideology or willingness to use raw state terror on a wide scale, the institutions of socialism will give way to those of the Middle Way: free elections and at least some free markets. A few hard-line states (e.g. North Korea, Romania) may persist by virtue of state terror, but these states will be increasingly poor and isolated.

With the old wine back in the old bottles, we can expect less danger than we have grown accustomed to, but there will still be a lot of spillage: lives will still be broken, and the entrenched bureaucracies of the socialist states may continue to pose a military threat to the security of free people. □

### Notes

1. Throughout this essay, I use the term "socialism" in its original, somewhat technical sense: the theory that society is best organized when a single authority controls capital goods, as opposed to individual ownership of such goods. In a socialist society there would be at most two markets: a monopsonistic market for labor and a monopolistic market for consumer goods. In recent years, especially in colloquial discussions, "socialism" has come to be used to refer to other views.

"Socialist" is also sometimes used to mean "tending to increase collective control of the economy." This usage is a bit misleading, since it connotes that to advocate any increase in collective control is to advocate absolute collective control. A better term to use in such situations is "socialistic."

These days, "socialism" is sometimes used to refer to the theory that a combination of collective ownership and individual ownership is opti-

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WHAT IT MEANS

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# Once for All?

by Stephen Cox

Once to every man and nation  
Comes the moment to decide  
In the strife of truth with falsehood  
For the good or evil side.

*In "The End Of History?" Francis Fukuyama argues that historic change is the result of ideological struggle, and that the resolution of East-West differences will result in the end of history.*

*His controversial thesis has touched off considerable controversy: responses by Allan Bloom, Timothy Fuller, Gertrude Himmelfarb, Irving Kristol, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, David Satter, Leon Wieseltier, and others. (The National Interest, Summer and Fall, 1989.)*

According to Fukuyama's thesis, the nations have had the moment promised them in the old Protestant hymn, and they have chosen truth—truth being defined as "Western liberalism," the ideology of economic and political rights that is embodied in more-or-less capitalist, more-or-less democratic states like West Germany, the United States, and Japan.

The nations' choice has put an end to history—history being defined as the struggle of conflicting ideologies, which is the only kind of history that really matters to Fukuyama. Because "systematic alternatives to Western liberalism" have now suffered "total exhaustion," no source of deep ideological conflict remains, and we may expect no further profound changes of human values to threaten or inspire us. The world deprived of profound conflicts will be the kingdom of the saved: comfortable but dull. In the ample sun of this new age, art and philosophy, which have traditionally been the code and expression of ideological conflicts, will shrink into mere semblances of themselves, healthy but juiceless raisins and prunes: "In the post-historical period there will be neither [new] art nor [new] philosophy, just the perpetual caretaking of the museum of human history."

The post-historical world resembles the world of Calvin and Hobbes, as depicted in the Sunday comics now lying on my desk. In the first few panels of today's strip, Calvin tells Hobbes that "History is a force . . . everything and everyone serves history's single purpose." "And what is that purpose?" Hobbes inquires. "Why, to produce me, of course!" Calvin answers. "I'm the end result of history." Hobbes then wants to know, now that history has reached its culmination in his self-satisfied friend, "what are you going to do?" The answer comes in the last panel, in which Calvin and Hobbes are sitting in their easy chair, laughing their heads off at a televised cartoon about Bugs Bunny.

Well, I doubt the part of Fukuyama's thesis that implies that art and philosophy are about to become the preserve of couch potatoes like Calvin, but I'd like to believe some of the rest.

In principle, the victory of Fukuyama's "liberalism" is the victory of my "liberalism," too—my idea of the ism of liberty. I'm not unduly worried about Fukuyama's failure to distinguish among all the varieties of liberalism. I'm quite willing to accept the idea that there are "liberal" premises I share with George Bush and Helmut Kohl, especially when the alternative is the illiberal premises of people like Fidel Castro and Erich Honecker. I think I have more in common, ideologically, with such hum-

ble essayists as F. A. Hayek and Mario Vargas Llosa than I do with such world-historical figures as Bush or Kohl, but I'm quite willing to defend the principles of individual political and economic freedom that the contemporary Western big-government leadership claims to be defending, especially if an inspection of those principles reveals that they ought to be much more consistently applied and defended than "liberal" big government intends to do.

And who would deny that all the once-vigorous ideological competitors of liberalism seem to be dying? East-of-the-Elbe Marxists are trying to figure out how to hold onto their dachas after the next election happens; West-of-the-Elbe Marxists are trying to figure out how to advance to Full Professor without admitting that History has betrayed them. (Their latest strategy is to "formulate" an *ahistorical Marxism*.) I am still attracted by John Lukacs' theory that fascism didn't perish in World War II but merely migrated to the national-socialist countries of the Third World. But current privatization and liberalization campaigns in many of those countries leave me less secure in my opinions. And I must admit the cogency of Fukuyama's central claim that in the long run, it's ideology that matters. The ideology of national socialism is now so discredited that it may not be able to wage serious trench-warfare against a liberalism that demonstrably works.

When Fukuyama argues that in the long run, it's ideology that matters, he is arguing as an Hegelian; but on this ground, individualist liberals and Hegelians will have no trouble embracing one another. It is (among other reasons) because individualists view the contents of the human mind as ultimately determinative of its contexts that they have perennially struggled against all Marxist and fascist claims for the dependence of human values on social conditions. Individualists have tended, like Hegelians, to see history as a drama of ideas, ideas that promote or inhibit various forms of social and economic behavior; indeed, individualists, like Hegelians, have

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*The theory is that world deprived of profound conflicts will be the kingdom of the saved: comfortable but dull. In the ample sun of this new age, art and philosophy, which have traditionally been the code and expression of ideological conflicts, will shrink into mere semblances of themselves, healthy but juiceless raisins and prunes.*

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sometimes harbored far too abstract visions of history as a drama of ideas.

And yet, simply because many of Fukuyama's arguments seem so gratifying and even so cousinly to the libertarian mind, one cannot help feeling that one needs a good slap in the face to keep from getting drunk on them. If Fukuyama were coming up with anything but good news for liberty, I would have started this article by vigorously lecturing him about his many and grievous intellectual offenses, all of them typical of modern Hegelian meditations on history. But it's not too late for the lecture. I, and several of the people who comment on Fukuyama in *The National Interest's* book-length considerations of his thesis, accuse him of the following thought-crimes:

1. He does not sufficiently distinguish distant and secure long runs from current, very wiggly, short runs. Here the name

Tian An Men Square comes ominously to mind.

2. He relies far too faithfully on the dialectical means of thinking that got poor Marx into so much trouble—and he relies on it without once trying to justify or answer objections to its use as a logic. When Fukuyama describes history as progressing through the dynamic action of grand binary "contradictions," and progressing by means of this action alone, he uses very different tools of thought from those employed by classical-liberal pluralism and empiricism, which do not assume, *a priori*, that history *must* assume this shape or that, or that we will be able to know its shape (if any) before we see many kinds of specific evidence for it. In fact,

3. He tries, as political scientist Timothy Fuller points out, to unite the "radical voluntarism" of the liberal vision with the "determinism" of historical dialectic. To do this,

4. He generalizes unmercifully about historical movements, virtually excluding the possibility that little accidents like Hitler's charisma might leave any mark on history's well-wrought urn.

Some of the published responses to Fukuyama are almost too dumb for words. For example, one critic insists that Fukuyama is wrong in claiming that nations no longer consider it legitimate to appropriate one another's territory, and the reason Fukuyama is wrong is that the Japanese have been buying land and industry in Australia and the U.S.: "Is this *some* 'kind of territorial aggrandizement,' or is it not? . . . If it is not, then neither was the Japanese presence in Manchuria in 1925." What can one say to nonsense like this?

But many of the responses are thought-provoking. Among the most interesting is one by David Satter, former Moscow correspondent for the *Financial Times* of London. Satter is skeptical about the victory of liberalism in Eastern Europe so long as the "liberal" reforms in those parts proceed from the notion that a well-running social and economic system is the highest good rather than from the "sense of transcendent values" on which Satter believes that liberalism ultimately relies. Libertarian subjectivists and relativists take heed: if a "supramundane" sense of values is not provided as a check on the state, the state may define *itself* as a "supramundane point of reference." Satter and a number of other critics of Fukuyama warn that his comfy post-modern world may be destroyed by a continuing "spiritual crisis," the crisis arising from people's difficulty in finding and living by transcendent values. In such a world, so it is claimed, there is always a market for "destructive political ideas" that can seem to impart value to lives that appear to have no ultimate meaning, whatever political freedom or economic success the people living them may have attained.

Fukuyama will answer his critics in the next issue of *The National Interest*. In the meantime, the energy and clarity of his argument, as well as its timeliness in relation to the revolutionary resurgence, in Eastern Europe and elsewhere, of all kinds of liberal ideas, have made it the hottest thing on 1989's intellectual stove, the thesis that every thinker must at least pretend to have read. When all objections have been duly recorded, Fukuyama's description of the current scene—illiberal systems in crisis, liberalism sitting pretty as an historically validated ideology—is curiously close to the truth, despite the description's murky origins in dialectic.

Columbus, you know, was quite wrong and self-deluded about the *reasons* for which he expected to discover bountiful lands in the distant west. □

Bradford *continued from page 20*

mal (the system that Mises calls *zwangwirtschaft* and is most often today called a "mixed economy"). I prefer to stick to the original meaning of the term for several reasons: it is the original meaning; there are many other terms in common use for the theory advocating the mixed economy, but socialism remains the only term in common use for total centralized ownership.

2. We who grew up in the 1950s and 60s and defended free markets and the liberal social order were often confronted by our elders with an argument that we could not answer: *You didn't live through the Depression*. Our response that the Depression was caused by credit manipulation by the Federal Reserve Bank, and exacerbated by a plethora of interventionist responses to it by both Hoover and Roosevelt fell on deaf ears: *we didn't live through the Depression*, so how could we know anything about it?

One of the compensations for reaching middle age is that proponents of this type of thinking are dying of old age, and their silly syllogism is going to the grave with them. I guess maybe there is a lesson here: that arguments consisting solely of vague impressions from shared experiences are not very convincing to those who do not share the experience. What a pleasure it is that today John Kenneth Galbraith is perceived as an irrelevant old windbag, to the extent he is paid attention to at all!

3. Russia's defeat in Afghanistan may have played a small role in the collapse of Soviet communism, and Reagan's bellicose efforts may have played a minor role in the Soviet loss—the deployment of American Stinger missiles by the rebels discouraged Soviet air strikes—but defeat was the inevitable result of its attempt to conquer an extremely hostile country without a total commitment to victory. The Russian people didn't like getting their sons back in zinc-lined coffins any more than the American people did during the Vietnam

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conflict. Just as the Vietnamese made conquest of their nation by the U.S. more expensive in terms of treasure and human beings than the American citizens would pay, the Afghanis were able to make the price of conquest higher than the Russian people would pay.

4. Of course, the Law of the Excluded Middle does apply to each of these propositions, as it does to all propositions. About each proposition, it says the same thing: if the proposition is meaningful (i.e., is indeed a proposition) then it is either true or not true.

5. Of course, the categorizing of both libertarianism and socialism as equally "abstract" and "simplistic" is itself simplistic and misleading, as can be seen by the demonstration of the unworkability of socialism. Socialists have rested their case for the political control of economic life on the argument that the decentralized system of capitalism is *too complicated* and *too chaotic*, and that a simpler, controlled organization works better than many competing ones. But socialism does not work because the world of civilized social life is *necessarily* complicated, much too complicated for political institutions (the means of socialist organization) to direct in any way that can even approach the successes of the industrial West. Libertarians, on the other hand, recognize the complexity of economic life, and rest their case for sticking to a few simple, *general* rules on an *extension* of their case against socialism: not only is the world *too complicated* to be run "simply" by a conscious, master plan, but it is too complicated to *run well* when constantly "fine-tuned" by piecemeal political manipulations. Socialism fails because it says that simplicity is better on nearly *every* level of social life; libertarianism may work because it insists that a complicated system works best if there is one element of simplicity in society that remains constant, thereby providing an element of stability for *all* members of society. □

## WHAT'S SO SPECIAL ABOUT F<sup>3</sup>?\*

1. The defense of free markets, private property, willing exchange, the unlimited accumulation of wealth, free trade, religious liberty, freedom of speech, civil liberties, and all other aspects of individual freedom.
2. The promotion of truth, honor, integrity, principle, voluntary charity, self-reliance, individual responsibility, private education, environmental quality, healthier lives, higher standards of living, and all other attributes of a free society.
3. The *elimination* of government schools, welfare, social security, licensing, public parks, trade restrictions, immigration controls, drug laws, minimum wages, subsidies, loan guarantees, censorship, foreign aid, foreign intervention, conscription, pre-trial presumption of guilt, and all other political infringements of individual freedom.

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## Report

# The Cheesing of America

by Lawrence M. Ludlow

If the business of government is to protect us from ourselves—especially regarding what we ingest for pleasure—then there is only one proper policy for a “nation of cheesers.”

WASHINGTON, D.C., 1999 — It is difficult to imagine a time when the devastating problem of cheese abuse was not recognized as a serious menace. As recently as ten years ago buying, selling, producing, and consuming cheese were not only legitimate activities—approved of and participated in by mil-

lions of people—but were actually promoted by government at all levels. Legislation to regulate and subsidize all phases of a burgeoning cheese industry was a political football occupying the efforts of lawmakers in Washington and across the nation. Senators, congressmen, and entire government bureaus were engaged in greasing the wheels of a huge and many-faceted industry—a “cheese chain” firmly anchored in family farms deep in the nation’s core, extending to trendy recipes in lifestyle magazines, and finally winding its shackles around the lives of those inhabiting our dismal urban slums.

The substance was literally enshrined in day-to-day social functions of every kind—from wine and cheese parties to baseball games, where cheese covered nacho chips were sold openly in the grandstands. Ubiquity and propinquity: cheese was everywhere; it was as close as your refrigerator. It pervaded the diet of the youngest to the oldest—in cheeseburgers, grilled-cheese sandwiches, fondue, and cheese cakes of every description. It came in a hundred varieties—from smelly-sock Limburger to the garlicky-pungent Gorgonzola, from mild Gouda to the seemingly benign yet no less deadly Baby Swiss.

Although tempting free samples

were lavishly given away to prospective gourmands at country fairs, neighborhood markets, and expensive gourmet shops, a user with a full-blown taste for the product was only too happy to expend large sums for cheese by the ounce, by the pound, or in bulk—the large, twenty-pound hunks of arterial sludge, still called “wheels” by those whose stock and trade is dealing in contraband cuisine. But consumption of this deadly delicacy was not merely the province of the rich or suburban. Those too poor to satisfy their craving were perfectly willing to wait patiently in the now-infamous cheese lines, where tons of tax-subsidized cheese was handed out literally brick by brick. The ramifications of that practice are still being felt today. Noting the high percentage of minorities participating in that ill-conceived poverty program, Rev. Percy Bain of the Heavenly Light Baptist Tabernacle and founder of Operation CHOP (Cheese Hurts Our People) claims that the government cheese giveaway was a racist attempt to destroy the health of program participants—a covert attempt at dietary eugenics.

In short, the life of each and every American was once ensnared, from the

womb to the tomb, in a huge network of saturated fats, cholesterol, and melting goo. Whereas the Corsican soldier, Napoleon Bonaparte, once characterized Britain as a “nation of shopkeepers,” one might say that America was once a “nation of cheesers.” What was the source of this nutritional nightmare? Nothing less sacred than the farms of the American heartland.

Wisconsin. Once called the Dairy Capital of America, this seemingly quiet Midwestern state still retains a dubious status: it is widely known as the nation’s Cholesterol Kingdom. Once a proud industrial and agricultural center and home to five million, Wisconsin has lost nearly a million of its residents in the past ten years, and the majority of those remaining—scattered across the state’s 56,000 square miles—are living in poverty. Experts cite two causes for this decline: the continuing demise of rust-belt industries and the massive government crackdown on the dairy industry beginning in 1992. Even the experience of Hawaii with the federal ban on sugar cane production did not match the scale of economic collapse still visi-

ble in Wisconsin. While Hawaiians had the tourist trade and pineapples to fall back on, Wisconsin residents had only memories and millions of pounds of nonfat milk and cholesterol-free cheese with no buyers.

But it is not poverty alone that shapes the lives of Wisconsin's citizenry. Despite the ban on butterfat, the FBI estimates that 25% of the populace engage in the illegal production, distribution, or sale of whole, uncut milk, butter, and cheese. Annual street value: \$15 billion. The creators of this cash crop can be found among the thousands of Wisconsin farms that survived the nationwide prohibition of whole-milk products and the subsequent dairy-industry collapse.

Even the federal program to reduce forcibly the population of milk cows has failed. In fact, it triggered the birth of a hybrid form of animal-rights activism which, on more than one occasion, has hampered progress in this unending battle. Matching the zeal of FDA officials with a quirkily virulent, bovine fanaticism, the activists—aided by a score of well-orchestrated, televised talk-show appearances—captured the hearts of all who watched their depressing black-and-white video of queued cows awaiting their doom in a barracks-like structure with a thinly curling issue of smoke rising from a single stack against a dismal, overcast sky. Combined with the death-march cadence of the sound track and a final wide-eyed stare from an ill-fated cow—a poignant, living plea, frozen by the camera and dissolving into gray ash—the video proved to be the extermination program's *coup de grâce*.

Among those eking out a living in their Wisconsin fields, the Schneider family (not its real name) is a living testament to the conflict that ensues when law meets head-on with a heritage of pride, fierce independence, and dedication to family tradition. No doubt that sense of pride, however misplaced, lay behind their willingness to tell their story. That they are on the wrong side of the law in no way pierces their shield of equanimity. They have worked the same 220 acres for three generations, threatened and thereby toughened, as are all who work the land, by the never-

distant shadow of crop failure.

Chief among their concerns is the recent, added burden of guarding against unexpected raids by law enforcement agents in search of unregistered dairy cattle and illicit milk products. Twice a year dairy marshals mount what locals (many of German ancestry) call *der Kasekrieg*—a kind of dairy *Blitzkrieg*. Sweeping across the countryside in four-wheel-drive jeeps, accompanied in the skies by helicopter air support, the marshals strike fear into this hearty but nonetheless criminal breed.

Emma and Rolf Schneider have remained in business through all of the changes resulting from the Omnibus Controlled Substances Act of 1992. Mr. Schneider recalls the sequence of events that led to their current situation.

"Well, after that bill—we call it the Ominous Act of '92—they started cutting the legal amount of butterfat in milk products. We had a big decline in our aboveboard business because nobody wanted to buy the nonfat milk and cheese. But what really made it hard on us was when the state Agriculture Board started mixing that Para-Clot stuff in the cattle feed back in '94. It was just plain *murder*. They thought they could make fatty dairy products just too dangerous to eat by poisoning them. When they began phasing it in, they sent out a few state inspectors with government pamphlets explaining how it worked. They said Para-Clot combines with the fat molecules in milk, and the only way to get rid of it is by getting rid of the fat. It stays in the milk until all the fat is removed at the milk-processing plant. So the old-fashioned, real cheese is deadly, and only the skim-milk products would be safe to eat—you know, the USDA's fat-free, super-skim milk and fat-free cheese. Freese, they call it. Tastes like salty paste to me. But it's not even salty really—not since the voluntary restraints on salt in foods kicked in. Now everything tastes like sawdust.

"Well anyway, seems like somebody, somewhere, goofed with that Para-Clot stuff. At first it only made the cows kind of woozy. But after a couple of months, it was a different story—lots of stillborn calves and even worse. My own herd gave me some real monsters. Like everybody else by now, you've probably seen all the articles and TV documentaries about calves born with permanently shut eyelids, no ears, or

fused joints. When that made it into the news, they really had problems around here, everybody blaming us farmers for allowing dangerous milk to go to market. But it just wasn't the way they make it sound, at least not the way the public-TV documentaries and news people tell it. You'd think they were working for the government the way they act like a PR firm and all. They put on a big show to scare people by showing how farmers were selling bad milk even when they knew it was tainted. That may be true about some of us, but not me. I kept a few cows on the side, and they really helped me through the whole thing. I smuggled out safe whole milk and got a pretty penny for it too. And I don't care who calls me a clot-pusher; at least it wasn't poisoned.

"But like I was saying," he went on, squinting slightly and nodding toward the window, "there were some farmers—I'm not naming names—who weren't so particular. They sold whole-milk products from cows that'd been poisoned. They knew nobody would complain. It's not like the times when

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*The life of each and every American was ensnared, from womb to tomb, in a huge network of saturated fats, cholesterol, and melting goo. America was a nation of cheesers.*

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farmers were proud of their work, and you could take someone to court if he sold bad produce. Now you have to make your own justice in secret because you sure can't take it to a judge—at least not unless you're willing to admit you broke the law by buying it in the first place. Heck, if you do go to the cops, they might just string you up for something worse—especially after the First Lady went on TV and called all cheese makers and sellers 'murderers' and said we were responsible for all the truck hijackings and other cheese-related crimes happening across the country. I'll tell you, it's making it hard for us honest cheese-makers to earn a living. There are more and more bad ones every year pushing the good ones out of business. And many've been the times when I've

not picked up a hitchhiker who I'm afraid will club me over the head, hoping to find some hidden packets of real cheese under the seat of my car.

"But no—and I can see that look in your eye, Mr. Reporter—if you ask me, it's not the farmers and the cheese that're causing the real crime and violence. It's the laws. We never had these crimes before, not when it was all open and aboveboard. But nowadays, just saying 'cheese related' gets everybody all excited and self-righteous. I think it's

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*While the crooks get \$100 per pound for good and bad cheese alike, the cheese-abuse clinics and the police forces all get scads of tax dollars to fight the War on Cheese.*

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all a put-on. Maybe I'm no expert on the cop killings and cheese-gang fights in the city, but those laws sure ruined things around here, and it wouldn't surprise me a bit if something similar was happening in the city." The dull thud of his finger hitting the seat cushion punctuated his last sentence.

He shifted in his seat, remained silent a few moments while collecting his thoughts, and then went on with his story:

"Anyway, getting back to the Para-Clot scare, with all the suspicion and fear, lots of people wouldn't touch Wisconsin milk, Newbutter, or Freese for a long time. You couldn't give it away, and I don't know how many good farmers went under. Worse yet, lots of women are still afraid to have kids and are living in fear for the ones they've al-

ready had, not to mention for themselves.

"I was suspicious right from the start though. Whenever I hear about people messing around with any kind of food, whether for people or animals, I can't help but think of all that PCB stuff in Michigan back in the 70s—how they mixed that fire retarder into the cattle feed. I was only a youngster at the time, but I remember all about it—how the cows wouldn't eat it and how they mixed sugar syrup and molasses into the feed to get the animals to swallow it. Well, when the Agriculture Board started talking about Para-Clot, I put two and two together and decided to just feed my own grain and hay to the cows. That went fine until the Dairy Enforcement Administration paid me a visit. Seems my name was turned in because I wasn't buying enough from Wesley's Feed Supply in town. Not that Wesley's a bad guy or a goody-two-shoes; he's probably got to fill out forms from here to Washington and keep records of all his customers—you know, who's buying what and how much. Spend more time filling out forms and questionnaires than you do farming nowadays. I'll bet pharmacists and doctors don't have to watch their medicine cabinets the way we have to watch our cows' udders, if you know what I mean. So I had to buy their specially treated grain, and that was that.

"I had to start feeding my cows the grain from Wesley's, and sure enough, they wouldn't touch it. Sometimes animals know what's good for 'em better than we do. Needless to say, my family never ate cheese or milk from *those* cows. I kept a couple aside and fed them my own grain or just let them wander and glean in the fields. The state agents aren't that good that you can't keep a thing or two out from under their noses. But for the rest of the cows, I did just like everyone else. I followed orders and mixed syrup with the new feed, and the cows ate it. Sure enough, they started acting queer, sometimes just standing there looking straight ahead, but not naturally. They didn't even move sometimes—not their heads or mouths, not even their tails swishing away the flies. And that's really something for a cow.

"Sure enough, the stillborns and freaks came—if the cow could even get pregnant. And I'll tell you something,


the bulls weren't too frisky either. Well you know all the rest—how some DNA kid at the university found out that Para-Clot was splitting all those chromosomes and all. That was about . . . oh, early '96 or so—a little late to do anything about it, even if the government didn't try to hush things up. But by that time the word was out, cover-up or no cover-up. So the state legislature had to give up on Para-Clot. But it sure wasn't easy to convince them. After the complaints, it took another year waiting for some blue-ribbon committee of experts to be gathered and put to work on starting a program to phase out Para-Clot and find a substitute.

"But it wasn't the DNA thing at all that ended the whole business. It was the pressure put on the Agriculture Board by the Anti-Cruelty Society. They made such a stink about all those suffering animals that the state legislature just *had* to do something. Those animal people can really put on the squeeze. All they had to do was put a few ads on TV showing all those poor creatures—especially the one with a wobbly legged calf walking in circles—and boy didn't the politicians just get up and dance to their tune. It reminded me of the commercial they ran last year when they tried to kill *all* the cows to protect us. It wasn't enough that human lives were being put in danger and that we were being ordered around like soldiers, but everybody likes a cuddly puppy or a long-legged baby calf! What I wouldn't do to have a lobby like that animal-rights bunch for just plain leaving people alone.

"So a lot of farmers went out of business. Had to raise state taxes just to feed those people—and that was after raising them just a few years before to finance this whole Cheese War fiasco in the first place! Of course the taxes put even more people out of business. It never ends. So the whole Para-Clot thing really broke the spirit of a lot of folks around here—having to slaughter their herds and start over. But it sure gave a boost to the farmers in other states, what with all our milk off the market."

"I don't know where it'll all go," he said, shaking his head in disgust, "but I'll tell you a couple of things I do know: the only people making off like bandits are the crooked farmers and the govern-

*continued on page 33*



"Why, sure, Coach, I'll be glad to take a drug test—I know a *lot* about drugs!"

## Exploration

# The Greenhouse Effect: Beyond the Popular Vision of Catastrophe

*by Patrick J. Michaels*

The enemies: everything from aerosol sprays to volcanos.

The victim: Mother Earth.

The question: do the fires of ideology produce little more than smoke in our eyes?

A scientist responds.

The "Popular Vision" of the future, according to *Time* magazine's Planet of the Year issue,<sup>1</sup> is genuinely frightening: A global temperature rise of 4°C by 2030–2050, massive deforestation and ecological chaos including famine, related civil strife, and tidal waves crashing through a Manhattan landscaped with palm trees.

Similar scenarios also abound in the writings of politically active environmental scientists, environmental lobbyists, and newswriters.<sup>2–5</sup> Elected officials have compared the situation to that of Fascist Germany: just as certain events, such as Kristallnacht, presaged the holocaust, so we should have been warned by such ominous events as the drought of 1988. Those who fail to recognize the gravity of the situation have been labeled modern-day Neville Chamberlains.<sup>6</sup>

Such rhetoric underscores the deep emotional commitments that now guide this issue. In this light, it would behoove us to examine the scientific inconsistencies and nuances that characterize the Popular Vision, and how these flaws relate to policy. I shall leave to the reader whether these inconsistencies are sufficient to justify interventionist legislation<sup>7</sup> and the implementation of "global warming" concerns into U.S. foreign policy.<sup>8</sup>

The argument is often tendered that virtually all policy is made in the light of some scientific, technical, or logical uncertainty, and therefore we should proceed apace with greenhouse intervention. In some cases such activity is prescient and beneficial (for example, the 1962 Surgeon General's statement on

smoking), while other times it has been disastrous (e.g., the promulgation of Marxism on "scientific" grounds). But it is perfectly true that concrete policy cannot require perfect science, as such a thing will never exist. In the final analysis it is an ethical judgment, rather than a scientific one, that determines whether or not a specific policy is suitably buttressed by technological underpinnings.

In this essay, I will concentrate on some of the scientific uncertainties and inconsistencies that should be factored into policy decisions.

### **Problem 1: Trace Gas Concentrations and Temperature Histories**

Although there are several thermally active trace gases that have increased as a result of anthropogenesis, almost all of the radiative forcing is associated with (in descending order) carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, and the chlorofluorocarbons. The effect of carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) is the most important by a wide measure: the total radiative forcing of the other three gases is approximately equal to 80% of the effect of a change in CO<sub>2</sub> from 279 to 350 parts per million (ppm).<sup>9</sup>

Intensive instrumental records of CO<sub>2</sub> concentration date from the late 1950's at Mauna Loa Observatory, where the 1958 annual average was 315ppm. The concentration is now very close to 352ppm.

"Pre-industrial" (circa 1800) concentrations were initially assumed to be in the range of 295ppm,<sup>10</sup> giving a net increase of 19% over the last 180 years. Initial ice-core studies gave a background value of 270–290, with a most likely value of 279ppm.<sup>11</sup> Another analysis obtained a lower figure of 260ppm.<sup>12</sup> The highly publicized Soviet/French work on the long Vostok Station ice core appears to corroborate the lower values.<sup>13,14</sup> A background of 260ppm implies an anthropogenerated rise of 35%.

Background methane (CH<sub>4</sub>) concentration, again calculated from ice cores, appears to be around 800 parts per billion (ppb),<sup>15</sup> compared to a current value of nearly 1700ppb.<sup>16</sup> Indirect measurements give a concentration of 1140 in 1951.<sup>17</sup> The primary sources of this increase are growth of rice paddy agriculture and bovine flatulence. Neither of these phenomena seems likely to end in the foreseeable future. An in-

creasing fraction now comes from biomass burning.<sup>18</sup>

It is clear that both CO<sub>2</sub> and CH<sub>4</sub> concentrations have risen exponentially in the last 40 years. As of 1982, the climate-forcing effect of current methane concentrations was 38% of that of increased carbon dioxide.<sup>19</sup>

Precise knowledge of the sources and sinks of nitrous oxide is unavailable,

*The observed mean warming is far below calculations based upon the combined effects of all of the anthropogenerated trace gases. More amazingly, inspection of the hemispheric temperature histories reveals that much of this warming was prior to the major increases in the trace gases.*

and background concentration estimates are much less reliable than those for the other trace gases. The historical estimate of 285ppb should be taken with some caution, as should future projections. The current value is 298–308ppb.<sup>20</sup>

Virtually all chlorofluorocarbons (CFC's) are anthropogenerated. Concentrations in 1950 are estimated at .001ppb for CFC-11, and .005 for CFC-12. Current values are .219ppb for CFC-11 and .378 for CFC-12.<sup>21</sup>

The 1987 estimate that the combined current radiative effect of the non-CO<sub>2</sub> trace gases is 80% of that caused by a change in CO<sub>2</sub> concentration from 279 to 350ppm implies the current atmosphere can be viewed as having an *effective* CO<sub>2</sub> concentration of 407ppm (assuming no other increases in thermally active gases), or 146–157% of a background range of 260–279ppm. In other words, because of the combined effects of the various trace gases, *we have already gone half way to an effective doubling of the preindustrial CO<sub>2</sub> concentration.*

*This cannot be reversed in our lifetimes.*

## Global versus Hemispheric Temperature Histories

It is customary to present the time history of global mean temperatures as "at least not contradictory to"<sup>22</sup> climate

model projections. However it is noteworthy that the observed mean warming of 0.5 °C is far below the calculated equilibrium value of 1.7° based upon the combined effects of all of the anthropogenerated trace gases.<sup>9</sup> If a 260 ppm background is used instead, an analogous calculation gives an expected mean global warming of 2.0°C to date. Further, inspection of the hemispheric temperature histories shown in Figure 1 reveals that much of the warming was *prior* to the major increases in the trace gases.

These discrepancies are well known, although their magnitude is seldom emphasized in public discussion. Further differences between predicted and observed values are partially explained as a function of oceanic thermal lag whose estimates vary between ten and fifty years. Nonetheless, the most liberal estimates of this lag still imply an expected warming to date of 1.0–1.2°C, meaning that the globe has warmed up approximately

one-half as much as the lower limit suggested by combinations of climate and ocean models. Why this much warming is "missing" is simply unknown,<sup>24</sup> although I will speculate on the issue in this article.

The five climate models used as a basis for the Popular Wisdom<sup>25</sup> predict an average warming of 4.2°C for doubling of atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>. These in fact represent penultimate generation of climate calculations that have been criticized as having inadequate ocean circulations, unrealistic ocean-atmospheric coupling, and unrealistic parameterization of cloud processes.

Very recent reports detail improved climatic models that partially compensate for some of these inadequacies. As a result of more realistic cloud parameterization, the United Kingdom Meteorological Office model (UKMO) now predicts a net global warming of 2.7°C for a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub>, compared to




Figure 1. TOP: Southern Hemisphere temperature behavior for the last half century resembles what one would expect from a greenhouse alteration, except the magnitude of the rise appears to be low. BOTTOM: Virtually all of the warming in the Northern Hemisphere record took place prior to the major trace gas emissions; there has been no net warming for the last half century.<sup>23</sup>

5.2° in its previous generation.<sup>26</sup> The national Center for Atmospheric Research Community Climate model (CCM), because of a more realistic ocean model, now predicts a net warming of only 1.7°C<sup>27</sup> after running for thirty years following an instantaneous doubling of CO<sub>2</sub>. The comparable previous model predicted a warming of 3.5°. The implied warming for forty years of an increase in the trace gases that mimics what occurred between 1950 and 1980 (as opposed to an instantaneous doubling) is in the range of 1.0°C.

While the improved ocean and cloud parameterizations are not strictly independent, it seems clear that the combination of the two (UKMO and CCM) models will result in a further reduction of the predicted warming. Nonetheless, the *observed* global warming since 1950 of 0.22°C is still much lower than that expected from climate model simulations.

Intrahemispheric comparisons support the contention that thermal lag itself may be overestimated. The southern hemisphere, with the disproportionate share of ocean surface, displays a warming whose functional form (but not magnitude) is what might be expected from a straightforward interpretation of model output. The northern hemisphere shows most of its warming prior to the major input of trace gases, and shows no net change over the last 55 years<sup>23</sup>—when CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations went from approximately 300 to 352ppm and the other thermally active gases were in their steepest growth phases, giving rise to the current effective concentration of 407ppm.

Stratospheric temperatures, which should fall in a trace-gas enriched at-

mosphere, have dropped considerably more in the southern hemisphere than they have elsewhere, with the greatest declines in the polar zone. These may be associated with the south polar springtime ozone minimum. Declines since 1960 in the northern hemisphere are generally not statistically significant.<sup>28</sup>

### Problem 2: The Urban Effect on Temperature Records

It is well known that long term climate records sometimes warm because their surroundings become more urbanized. While much has been written on this problem, it remains elusive.

A sobering example is the recent study comparing NASA climate records over the U.S. to the urbanization-adjusted Historical Climate Network, which found an artificial warming in the NASA record of 0.4° in the twentieth century.<sup>29</sup> It is noteworthy that this is the same NASA record that received so much public attention in Congressional hearings in June, 1988.

There is no *a priori* reason to suspect that the urban bias is appreciably different in other parts of the industrialized world. Therefore, a simple extension to the globe—which is not possible to defend rigorously at this time because the exhaustive research has not been performed—would yield a residual warming of 0.2-0.3°, an amount that is three times less than that predicted by the general circulation models used to generate the Popular Vision.

This disparity remains unresolved, and unpublished accounts now say it is related in part to a programming error when NASA supplied the data to NOAA for analysis.<sup>30</sup> It should be noted parenthetically that statements about "99% confidence" of "cause and effect" between observed temperatures and anthropogenerated greenhouse alterations<sup>31</sup> do




Figure 3. Latitude/Altitude plot of temperature change projected for a doubling (top) and a quadrupling (bottom) of CO<sub>2</sub>. Because of the combined effect of other trace gases, we are now over half-way to a doubling.

not take into consideration human factors that may induce errors in the analysis. Figure 2 details the disparity between the two records.

### Problem 3: High Latitude Temperatures

Figure 3 (above right) details latitude/altitude plots for the Northern Hemisphere from a Geophysical Fluid Dynamics Laboratory 1980 computer simulation of future climate.<sup>32</sup> This particular study remains highly representative of climate model output used to formulate the Popular Vision, even though the level of sophistication has since improved dramatically, and estimates of future warming have been lowered drastically. The prime feature of all of these models is amplified warming at high latitudes and relatively modest warming in tropical regions. Noteworthy is the highly linear behavior in the transition from 2 X CO<sub>2</sub> to 4 X; it has been noted that above some threshold level, this behavior appears to be inherent to all climate models.<sup>32</sup>

As noted above, because of the combined effect of the thermally active trace gases, we have effectively gone beyond half way to a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub>. It is quite apparent from Figure 4 (see next page) that high latitude temperatures have




Figure 2. NASA's record over the coterminous U.S. warms up approximately 0.4° C compared to the urbanization-adjusted Historical Climate Record. The discrepancy may result from a programming error.




Figure 4. Arctic temperature records.

simply not responded in the predicted fashion. In fact, the data indicate a rapid rise in temperature *prior* to the major emissions, followed by an equivalent *decline*.<sup>33</sup> An Alaskan study that used physical measurements that could not suffer from population contamination found no trend in the last forty years.<sup>34</sup>

Figures 5 and 6 (see next page) detail two interesting recent calculations. The first shows expected changes in winter temperature after one of the new generation climate models is allowed to equilibrate for thirty years after a step-change doubling of CO<sub>2</sub>. The predominance of polar warming is quite apparent, although its magnitude is reduced from the previous generation (Figure 4). The second figure shows expected temperature changes after thirty years of a one percent per year increase in CO<sub>2</sub>—something quite analogous to the human alteration of the atmosphere that took place between 1950 and 1980.<sup>27</sup>

In that figure, winter temperatures over much of the northern half of North America warm by 2–4°C, while over much of northern Eurasia they cool by

4–6°C(!). Such anomalies, which comprise the major signal in this overall calculation, have simply not been observed in reality, even though they are projected to appear in this simulation over a decade ago.

#### Problem 4: Day and Night Temperatures

Careful analyses of the U.S. Historical Climate Network data that have been adjusted for urbanization indicates that daily temperature ranges have declined precipitously since the major trace gas emissions. Interestingly, daytime high temperatures have actually declined, while night temperatures are rising relative to day values; see Figure 7 (see page 32). This behavior is consistent both with an increase in the trace gases and with increases in cloudiness that have been documented across the country.<sup>36</sup>

If anthropogenerated warming takes place primarily at night, the Popular Vision is dead wrong. Evaporation rate increases, which are the primary cause of projected increases in drought frequen-

cy, are minimized. The growing season is longer, because that period is primarily determined by night low temperatures. If cloudiness of any type continued to increase, the incidence of skin cancer would decline (after adjusting for age and behavior), and finally, many plants, including several agriculturally important species, would show enhanced growth from the well-known “fertilizer” effect of CO<sub>2</sub>.

Much of this “positive” vision of the future climate has been promulgated by Soviet Academician Mikhail Budyko,<sup>37</sup> whose position in their national science hierarchy is analogous to those of, for example, our Steven Schneider or James Hansen in the American scientific hierarchy. I present it here to emphasize the broad range of future climate expectations, some of which clearly are at variance to the Popular Vision.

#### The Holistic Nature of Global Change and Negative Feedbacks in the Pollution System

One of the arguments often tendered concerning the certainty that disastrous warming either has begun or looms in the immediate future is based upon the concurrence of climate changes and CO<sub>2</sub> in Antarctic ice cores dating back through the last glacial cycle. In fact, the resolution of those data is insufficient to determine whether or not changes in CO<sub>2</sub> presage or follow the climate change. However, even if they “cause” the change, the usefulness of the Pleistocene analogy is severely limited by the cause of the current trace gas excursion: man.

It is clear that human activity, besides altering the concentration of thermally-active trace gases, also produces substances that can serve to counter that effect. These include particulates, which serve to scatter radiation, and sulfur dioxide molecules, which in their oxidized state can serve as cloud condensation nuclei. Anthropogenerated pollutants can therefore serve to “brighten” clouds, reflecting away increasing amounts of solar radiation, and possibly compensating for greenhouse warming. A recent calculation demonstrates that the magnitude of this effect could indeed explain the recalcitrance of the Northern Hemisphere, where most sulfate emissions occur, to warm up in the fashion of the Popular Vision.<sup>38</sup>




Figure 5. Changes in winter temperature for a doubling of CO<sub>2</sub> calculated by one of the most recent generation of climate models.<sup>27</sup>

Satellite data now confirm that ocean-surface stratocumulus—one of the most common clouds on earth, and the variety most likely to be affected by increasing numbers of condensation nuclei—indeed are considerably brighter in the lee of regions of major anthropogenically generated sulfur dioxide (SO<sub>2</sub>) emissions.<sup>39</sup> The brightening persists for thousands of miles downstream from the continental source regions. A control study, over the clean South Pacific, yields no strong trend in cloud brightness.

It is currently unknown whether this change is sufficient to counter the expected greenhouse warming to date, or how long it might take increased trace gas loading to overcome this effect. However, if human activity is indeed brightening clouds for thousands of miles in the lee of continents, there will doubtless be some compensation for altered surface warming in the position of the jet stream.

There are several reports documenting an increase in northwesterly flow over eastern North America during the last three decades.<sup>40</sup> Such a change is consistent with the hypothesis that increased cloud reflectivity would lead to a tendency for a jet stream trough to develop in the lee of the continents. Perhaps this can explain the cooling of the United States daytime temperatures,<sup>41</sup> or the dramatic drop in southeastern mean temperatures over the last 60 years,<sup>41</sup> in the face of the trace gas increase.

Thus we are faced with the possibility that the same emission that causes acid rain may in fact be protecting the

Northern Hemisphere from the disastrous greenhouse warming. Wigley concluded his June, 1989 paper with:

The effects of SO<sub>2</sub> associated with acidic precipitation and urban pollution are clearly detrimental, and measures to reduce emissions are being implemented widely. However, if we were successful in halting or reversing the increase in SO<sub>2</sub> emissions we could, as a by-product, accelerate the rate of greenhouse-gas-induced warming, so reducing one problem at the expense of another.<sup>43</sup>

### The Crisis on the Horizon

The intense politicization of the global change problem almost guarantees that some type of action will be taken, such as the recent proposals by the President to limit drastically sulfur diox-

ide emissions in an attempt to control acid rain. However the interrelatedness of the components of global change dictates that any single remedial activity can have unforeseen or negative consequences that in fact serve to exacerbate the problem.

Regardless of the remedial actions attempted, however, concentrations of the greenhouse gases will continue to increase. This will likely cause a crisis in environmental politics. If none of the responses not take into consideration the holistic nature of the problem (such as the likelihood that drastic reductions in sulfate emissions will stimulate the greenhouse effect) the specter of disastrous climatic change becomes much more imminent.

Will the warming continue to be expressed primarily in night temperatures, as appears to be the case today? How will scientists convince a public that has endured an intense campaign on behalf of the Popular Vision that, if this trend continues, the greenhouse effect might not be so bad? What will become of the credibility of the scientists and politicians who have in all earnestness and out of genuine concern promoted the Popular Vision?

Alternatively, if the Popular Vision indeed begins to be verified, the public will have to choose a mix of two actions: direct and purposeful intervention in the climate system (as proposed by Budyko) and/or attempts at adaptation. According to Academician Budyko:

Another approach to limiting global warming . . . (is) accessible even to modern technology (and) was pro-




Figure 6. Changes in winter temperature that might be expected between 1950 and the late 1970s in one of the new generation of climate models.<sup>27</sup>




Figure 7. This plot details the difference between United States daily high and low temperatures. The narrowing of the range, which results primarily from a rise in nighttime temperatures (daytime values declined from the 30s through the 80s) is unprecedented, and is consistent with a benign (or possibly beneficial) greenhouse effect.

posed long before the onset of wide international studies on anthropogenic climate changes. The main idea of this method is to increase the stratospheric aerosol concentration by burning sulfur delivered by aircraft into the lower stratosphere.

It can be noted that this method will require *incomparably* less expense than those due to damage caused by drastic reductions in carbon fuel consumption aimed at retarding global warming. One other most important advantage of this method is the possibility to considerably change climate to cooling for a short period of time...<sup>37</sup>

It seems highly improbable that a public that accepts abnormally high risk aversion will agree to Budyko's remedy.

## Conclusion

According to the Popular Vision, increasing concentrations of trace gases have brought the world to the brink of an ecological disaster characterized by dramatically rising temperatures, increased evaporation rates, and higher sea levels. This Vision continues to be espoused despite several lines of evidence that indicate such a "carbon dioxide in-warming out" concept is immature at this time, given the complexity of the global change problem. Nonetheless, politicians have compared the severity of the expected paroxysms to those of the Nazi holocaust. Global warming is now a touchstone of U.S. foreign policy.

The Popular Vision developed despite several remarkable inconsistencies. The northern hemisphere, which should be the first to warm according to the theory, is no warmer than it was 55 years

ago. One very careful study shows relative warming at night, which may in fact be beneficial.

The amount of global warming is at least a factor of three less than predicted by the most sophisticated models. If findings about urban contamination of climate records over the U.S. persist worldwide, the amount of warming is even less and may vanish altogether. Polar regions have a temperature history over much the last forty years that is in fact opposite to what is the

Popular Vision.

And there is evidence that other anthropogenerated compounds may in fact be mitigating the expected warming. We have now embarked on a road to eliminate those compensating emissions, even while there is universal agreement that the concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to increase, despite our best efforts.

A crisis in environmental politics lurks on the horizon. If the greenhouse effect proves to be primarily benign, it will be very difficult to convince a public that is now so highly sensitized to accept its malignancy. If in fact the Popular Vision appears likely, it will be equally difficult to convince the public that some type of direct intervention and adaptation—perhaps even the introduction of a compensating pollutant—may be the only viable remedy. □

## Notes

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24. Testimony of Patrick J. Michaels to the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, April 20, 1989.
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Ludlow, "The Cheesing of America," continued from page 26

ment employees. While the crooks get \$100 per pound for good and bad cheese alike, the cheese-abuse clinics and the police forces all get scads of tax dollars to fight their War. And the control-this-and-that bureaucrats do too: they make off real well administering blood tests to cheese abusers and "rehabilitating" them—whatever *that* means. Probably some high-priced cooking classes! And that's not to mention paying for anti-cheese slogans on TV and programs in the schools. Heck, even the judges and lawyers get jobs accusing and defending suspects and building new prisons to house them. Worst of all, the taxpayers have to shell out for this \$10-billion War. I'll tell you, next time I hear someone say we must 'pay any price' for some busy-body program, I'll have a cow!

"They'll never learn their lesson," he added, bitterly pursing his lips and leaning back again, sinking into the couch. "I hear they want to redouble their efforts, call in the armed forces, and even impose the death penalty. Some of these people get a bug up their . . . uh . . . bee in their bonnet, and Hell'll freeze over before they give up."



"It's a jungle out there!"

I asked if he was worried about how his children would be affected by their involvement in such activities. "They know better than to believe everything they hear," he said, "especially when their teachers tell them to turn in their own flesh and blood. Used to be a nice town where kids respected their parents and kept the sixth commandment."

"Fifth, dear," his wife Emma broke in. "Honor thy fa . . ."

"OK, fifth, but you know what I mean."

"Fact is," he continued, pointing his finger directly at me, "I feel more honest selling a ripe wheel of tasty cheddar than I do about lining up for all of those government nonfat milk subsidies. Bah! It's just one thing after another these days. Pretty soon we'll all be in jail."

Almost as if to emphasize his point, the children's expressions took on an air of defiance, and the family seemed to gather into itself—the children, Bobby and Jennifer, moving closer to their parents on the already-crowded piece of furniture.

The interview took us late into the night, and I slept on the Schneider's living-room couch. After sharing their simple breakfast the next morning, Mrs. Schneider followed up by handing me a small package with a snack for my long drive to the airport. They had been remarkably hospitable during my entire visit, even when they sensed my insufficiently hidden contempt for the "family business."

We said our goodbyes, and as I left them—driving down the narrow dirt lane to the county road—I saw them one last time in my rear-

view mirror: the four of them, standing together, reflecting the insularity of their position and the unthinking obedience which characterized their family ties and allowed them to raise themselves above the welfare of those around them.

A few hours later, with a full tank of gas and a freshly brewed cup of coffee cooling on the dashboard, I remembered Mrs. Schneider's package. The orange and apple slices were just fine, but the cheese sandwich was the best I've ever had. □

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## Manifesto

# The Case for Paleo-Libertarianism

by Llewelyn H. Rockwell, Jr.

Thirty years ago, an attempt was made to promote a *fusion* of libertarianism and conservatism. The attempt failed; Llewelyn H. Rockwell, Jr. thinks it is time to try again.

"The conservative crack-up is near," writes Charles Krauthammer. "As Communism unravels, so does . . . the conservative alliance." Indeed, old-fashioned conservatives (paleoconservatives) *are* splitting with statist neoconservatives.

Patrick J. Buchanan argues that America should "come home": we are not "the world's policeman nor its political tutor." Ben Wattenberg, a neocon advocate of what Clare Boothe Luce called globaloney, denounces Buchanan as a "Neanderthal." Joseph Sobran then notes that democracy is not a good in itself, but only in so far as it restricts State power. Jeanne Kirkpatrick—a former Humphrey Democrat like most of the neocons—says none of these intellectual arguments mean anything because the neocons hold State power and don't intend to let go.

Despite Kirkpatrick, these intra-Right arguments are extremely significant, and more than foreign policy is involved. As the U.S.S.R. is revealed as a paper bear, good conservatives are returning to their Old Right roots in other areas as well.

Conservatives are questioning not only foreign intervention, but the entire New Deal-Great Society-Kinder Gentler apparatus. This worries the neocons even more, since—like their Svengali Irving Kristol—they give at most "two cheers for capitalism" but a full three cheers for the "conservative welfare state."

This conservative crack-up presents an historic opportunity for the libertarian movement. The Cold War ruptured the Right; now the healing can begin, for Lord Acton's axiom that "liberty is the highest political end of man" is at the heart not only of libertarianism but of the old conservatism as well. Many issues separate good conservatives from good libertarians, but their number is lessening and none of them is so broad as to prevent intelligent exchange and cooperation.

There have been more than ideological disputes, however; culture has also separated us, and there is no more powerful unifier or divider. So divisive has it been in this case that good libertarians and good conservatives have forgotten how to talk to each other.

For the sake of our common ideals we should restore the old concord. But can we? In my view, not until libertarianism is deloused.

### **The Conservatives Are Right: Freedom Isn't Enough**

Conservatives have always argued that political freedom is a necessary but

not sufficient condition for the good society, and they're right. Neither is it sufficient for the free society. We also need social institutions and standards that encourage public virtue, and protect the individual from the State.

Unfortunately, many libertarians—especially those in the Libertarian Party—see freedom as necessary *and sufficient* for all purposes. Worse, they equate freedom from State oppression with freedom from cultural norms, religion, bourgeois morality, and social authority.

In its 17-year history, the LP may never have gotten 1% in a national election, but it has smeared the most glorious political idea in human history with libertine muck. For the sake of that glorious idea, it's time to get out the scrub brushes.

Most Americans agree that aggression against the innocent and their property is wrong. Although these millions are potential libertarians, they are put off by the Woodstockian flavor of the movement. *Hair* may have left Broadway long ago, but the Age of Aquarius survives in

the LP.

The cultural *anti*-norms that mark the libertarian image are abhorrent; they have nothing to do with libertarianism *per se*; and they are deadly baggage. Unless we dump that baggage, we will miss the greatest opportunity in decades.

Americans reject the national Democratic Party because they see it as disdainful bourgeois values. If they have ever heard of the LP, they rebuff it for similar reasons.

The Libertarian Party is probably irrefutable—and irrelevant even if it weren't. Libertarianism is neither. But unless we cleanse libertarianism of its cultural image, our movement will fail as miserably as the LP has. We will continue to be seen as a sect that "resists authority" and not just statism, that endorses the behaviors it would legalize, and that rejects the standards of Western civilization.

Arguments against the drug war, no matter how intellectually compelling, are undermined when they come from the party of the stoned. When the LP nominates a prostitute for lieutenant governor of California and she becomes a much-admired LP celebrity, how can regular Americans help but think that libertarianism is hostile to social norms, or that legalization of such acts as prostitution means moral approval? There could be no more politically suicidal or morally fallacious connection, but the LP has forged it.

With their counter-cultural beliefs, many libertarians have avoided issues of increasing importance to middle-class Americans, such as civil rights, crime, and environmentalism.

The only way to sever libertarianism's link with libertinism is with a cleansing debate. I want to start that debate, and on the proper grounds. As G.K. Chesterton said, "We agree about the evil; it is about the good that we should tear each others eyes out."

### **A Culturally Effective Libertarianism for America**

If we are to have any chance of victory, we must discard the defective cultural framework of libertarianism. I call my suggested replacement, with its ethically-based cultural principles, "paleolibertarianism": the old libertarianism.

I use the term as conservatives use paleoconservatism: not as a new creed, but as a harking back to their roots which

also distinguishes them from the necons. We have no parallel to the necons, but it is just as urgent for us to distinguish libertarianism from libertinism.

Briefly, paleolibertarianism, with its roots deep in the Old Right, sees:

I. The leviathan State as the institutional source of evil throughout history.

II. The unhampered free market as a moral and practical imperative.

III. Private property as an economic and moral necessity for a free society.

IV. The garrison State as a preeminent threat to liberty and social well being.

V. The welfare State as organized theft that victimizes producers and eventually even its "clients."

VI. Civil liberties based on property rights as essential to a just society.

VII. The egalitarian ethic as morally reprehensible and destructive of private property and social authority.

VIII. Social authority—as embodied in the family, church, community, and other intermediating institutions—as helping protect the individual from the State and as necessary for a free and virtuous society.

IX. Western culture as eminently worthy of preservation and defense.

X. Objective standards of morality, especially as found in the Judeo-Christian tradition, as essential to the free and civilized social order.

### **Is Paleolibertarianism Libertarian?**

The libertarian must agree with the first six points, but most activists would be outraged by the last four. Yet there is nothing unlibertarian in them.

A critic might point out that libertarianism is a political doctrine with nothing to say about these matters. In one sense, the critic would be right. The libertarian catechist need know only one answer to one question: What is the the highest political end of man? The answer: freedom.

But no political philosophy exists in a cultural vacuum, and for most people political identity is only an abstraction from a broader cultural view. The two are separate only at the theoretical level; in practice, they are inextricably linked.

It is thus understandable and desirable that libertarianism have a cultural tone, but not that it be anti-religious, modernist, morally relativist, and egalitarian. This tone rightly repels the

vast majority of Americans and has helped keep libertarianism such a small movement.

### **The Conservative Attack on Libertarianism**

None of the conservative criticisms of the political philosophy of libertarianism is persuasive. The same is not true, unfortunately, of the cultural critiques.

Russell Kirk is the conservative critic libertarians find most offensive. He

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claims that the libertarian, "like Satan, can bear no authority, temporal or spiritual. He desires to be different, in morals as in politics" as a matter of principle. As a result, there "is no great gulf fixed between libertarianism and libertinism."

A conservative critic libertarians find more congenial is Robert Nisbet. But he too worries that "a state of mind is developing among libertarians in which the coercions of family, church, local community, and school will seem almost as inimical to freedom as those of the political government. If so, this will most certainly widen the gulf between libertarians and conservatives."

Kirk and Nisbet are right about all too many individual libertarians, but not about the formal doctrine, as Rothbard, Tibor Machan, and others have shown. Yet this distinction between the doctrine and its practitioners is difficult to make for non-intellectuals.

### **Anti-Christianism vs Freedom**

94% of Americans believe in God, yet a poll by Green and Guth showed that only 27% of LP activist-contributors do. These political scientists comment: "Although some Libertarian thinkers [such

as Murray N. Rothbard] insist that orthodox Christian belief is compatible with [their political ideas], the Party has certainly not done well in attracting such supporters." In fact, "many Libertarians are not only a-religious, but militantly anti-religious, as indicated by extensive write-in comments."

A later *Liberty* poll shows 74% of the respondents denying the existence of God; this is no surprise to the editors, who mention the "common perception that libertarians are almost all atheistic."

I do not, of course, argue that religious faith is necessary to libertarianism. Some of our greatest men have been non-believers. But the vast majority of Americans are religious and too many libertarians are aggressive atheists who seek to portray religion and libertarianism as enemies. That alone, if unchecked, is enough to ensure our continued marginalization.

The family, the free market, the dignity of the individual, private property rights, the very concept of freedom—all are products of our religious culture.

Christianity gave birth to individual-

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*Unfortunately, many libertarians see freedom as necessary and sufficient for all purposes. Worse, they equate freedom from State oppression with freedom from cultural norms, religion, bourgeois morality, and social authority.*

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ism by stressing the significance of the single soul. The church teaches that God would have sent His Son to die on the cross if only one human being had needed this intercession.

With its emphasis on reason, objective moral law, and private property, Christianity made possible the development of capitalism. It taught that all men are equally children of God (although not equal in any other sense), and thus should be equal before the law. It was the transnational church that battled nationalism, militarism, high taxes, and political oppression, and whose theologians proclaimed the right of tyrannicide.

Acton said that "Liberty has not sub-

sisted outside Christianity" and he urged that we "keep liberty as close as possible to morality," since "no country can be free without religion."

While agreeing that it is not "anti-religious," Machan says libertarianism allows no "reliance on faith for purposes of understanding ethics and politics." Paleolibertarians prefer the view of two other non-believers: Rothbard, who says that "everything good in Western civilization, from individual liberty to the arts, is due to Christianity," and F.A. Hayek, who adds that it is to religion that "we owe our morals, and the tradition that has provided not only our civilization but our very lives."

### Authority vs Coercion

"Question Authority!" says a leftist bumper sticker popular in libertarian circles. But libertarians are wrong to blur the distinction between State authority and social authority, for a free society is buttressed by social authority. Every business requires a hierarchy of command and every employer has the right to expect obedience within his proper sphere of authority. It is no different within the family, the church, the classroom, or even the Rotary or the Boy Scouts.

Giving trade unions license to commit violent crimes subverts the authority of the employer. Drug laws, Medicare, Social Security, and the public schools sap the authority of the family. Banishing religion from public debate undermines the authority of the church.

In a recent article, Jerome Tuccillo claims he's fighting for freedom by battling "the orthodoxy of the Roman Catholic Church." But there is nothing libertarian in fighting orthodoxy, Catholic or otherwise, and by deliberately confusing his prejudices with libertarianism, he helps perpetuate the myth that libertarianism is libertine.

Authority will always be necessary in society. Natural authority arises from voluntary social structures; unnatural authority is imposed by the State.

Paleolibertarians agree with Nisbet that "the existence of authority in the social order staves off encroachments of power from the political sphere." Only "the restraining and guiding effects" of "social authority" make possible "so liberal a political government as that which the Founding Fathers designed. Remove the social bonds," says Nisbet and you have "not a free but a chaotic

people, not creative but impotent individuals."

### The Role of the Family

Libertarians tend to ignore the essential task of the family in forming the responsible individual. The traditional family—which grows out of natural law—is the basic unit of a civilized and

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free society. The family promotes values necessary for the preservation of a free society such as parental love, self-discipline, patience, cooperation, respect for elders, and self-sacrifice. Families encourage moral behavior and provide for proper child rearing and thus the continuation of the race.

Chesterton said the family "might loosely be called anarchist" because the origins of its authority are purely voluntary; the State did not invent it and neither can it abolish it.

Yet the State attacks the family through perverse economic incentives. As Charles Murray has pointed out, federal welfare policy has been largely responsible for the 450% increase in illegitimate births in the past 30 years.

"The most vital function" the family performs, Chesterton thought, "is that of education." But beginning with the establishment of the public schools in the 19th century, which sought in Horace Mann's phrase to turn "local citizens into national citizens," the State has attacked the educational function of the family.

Since the role of the State schools is—as one official put it—to "mold these little plastic lumps on the social kneading board"—then a key part of the State agenda must be subverting the family. Libertarians, on the other hand, should cherish and support it. We are not, as so many commentators have claimed, promoters of "atomistic individualism." We should show that by lauding the indispensable roles of the family and

social authority.

## Hatred of Western Culture

"Culture," said Matthew Arnold, "is to know the best that has been said and thought in the world." For our civilization, that means concentrating on the West. But the Left, from Stanford to New York, denounces Western culture as racist, sexist, and elitist—worthy more of extinction than defense.

Those who defend Western culture are called ethnocentric by leftists who equate Dizzy Gillespie with Bach, Alice Walker with Dostoevski, and Georgia O'Keefe with Carravaggio, and who teach our children such bosh. They seek to construct a cultural canon that is sexually and racially "balanced," meaning unbalanced in every other sense. Yet on these cultural matters, too many libertarians agree with the Left.

Libertarians have to catch up with the American people, who are fed up with modernism in arts, literature, and manners that is really an attack on the West. Consider the outcry against the government-subsidized pornography and sacrilege of Robert Mapplethorpe and Andres Serrano. The people knew instinctively that America's tax-funded art establishment is devoted to offending bourgeois sensibilities. Yet the typical libertarian newsletter was far more upset with Jesse Helms's correct position on this outrage than with taxpayer funding for the National Endowment for the Arts, let alone with blasphemy or obscenity.

"Art, like morality, consists in drawing the line somewhere," said Chesterton. Paleolibertarians agree, and make no apology for preferring Western civilization.

Pornographic photography, "free"-thinking, chaotic painting, atonal music, deconstructionist literature, Bauhaus architecture, and modernist films have nothing in common with the libertarian political agenda—no matter how much individual libertarians may revel in them. In addition to their aesthetic and moral disabilities, these "art forms" are political liabilities outside Berkeley and Greenwich Village.

We obey, and ought to obey, traditions of manners and taste. As Rothbard explains: "There are numerous areas of life" where the "pursuit of custom eases the tensions of social life and makes for a more comfortable and harmonious society."

Albert Jay Nock said that in a free so-

ciety, "the court of taste and manners" should be the strongest institution. He called it the only court of "undebatably competent jurisdiction." In this court, many libertarians stand condemned.

## Egalitarianism and Civil Rights

Most Americans despise civil rights and rightly so. At one time, civil rights "meant the rights of the citizen against the State," says Sobran. Now "it means favored treatment for blacks (or some other minority) at the expense of every-one else."

Yet because so many libertarians are themselves egalitarians, they are either blind to this issue or purposely ignore it. Paleolibertarians suffer from no such liability. They reject not only affirmative action, set-asides, and quotas, but the 1964 Civil Rights Act and all subsequent laws that force property owners to act against their will.

State-enforced segregation, which also violated property rights, was wrong, but so is State-enforced integration. State-enforced segregation was not wrong because separateness is wrong, however.

Wishing to associate with members of one's own race, nationality, religion, class, sex, or even political party is a natural and normal human impulse. A voluntary society will therefore have male organizations, Polish neighborhoods, black churches, Jewish country clubs, and white fraternities.

When the State abolishes the right of free association, it creates not social peace but discord. As Frank S. Meyer wrote, "The multifarious adjustments of the relations of human beings—sensitive and delicate, and above all individual in their essence—can never be regulated by governmental power without disaster to a free society."

But the existence of such institutions is a scandal to egalitarians. Congressman Ron Paul, the 1988 LP presidential candidate, was attacked by libertarians for opposing the tax-financed Martin Luther King holiday. King was a socialist who attacked private property and advocated forced integration. How could he be a libertarian hero? Yet he is—for egalitarian reasons.

Too many libertarians also join liberals in using the charge of racism to bash non-conformists. It may be scientifically false to believe, for example, that Asians are more intelligent than whites, but can it really be immoral? From a libertarian perspective, the only immorality would

be to seek State recognition of this belief, whether correct or incorrect.

From a Christian viewpoint, it is certainly wrong to treat someone unjustly or uncharitably as a result of racial beliefs. It is also wrong to treat someone unjustly or uncharitably because he's bald, hairy, skinny, or fat. But can it be immoral to prefer the company of one to the other?

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*The family, the free market, the dignity of the individual, private property rights, the very concept of freedom—all are products of our religious culture. With its emphasis on reason, objective moral law, and private property, Christianity made possible the development of capitalism.*

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Black liberal William Raspberry recently wrote about the newest slogan in Washington, D.C.: "It's a Black Thing. You Wouldn't Understand."

This is "race-conscious in a healthy sort of way," says Raspberry. "But show me a white with 'It's a White Thing . . .' and my attitude changes," says Raspberry. "A Congressional Black Caucus is legitimate" but a "Congressional White Caucus would be unthinkable." "Black Is Beautiful" is permissible but "White Is Beautiful is the slogan of bigots." Oh?

There is nothing wrong with blacks preferring the "black thing." But paleolibertarians would say the same about whites preferring the "white thing" or Asians the "Asian thing." Paleolibertarians hold no utopian vision of social relations; we seek only to stop the State from interfering in voluntary actions.

## Crime and Coercion

Libertarianism is widely seen as anti-force. But force will always be necessary to defend against wrong-doers and to administer justice. Libertarianism opposes aggression against the innocent, not coercion in general.

The State has always been the primary aggressor, but there is also private crime. As the breakdown of social authority invites statism, so does the absence of coercion against real crime. If crime goes underpunished or unpun-

ished, as is typically the case today, immoral behavior is rewarded and encouraged, and therefore increases.

Liberals and some libertarians tell us to be soft on crime because much of it is

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*Libertarians must adopt a new orientation. How nice that it is also the old one. In the new movement, libertarians who personify the present corruption will sink to their natural level, as will the Libertarian Party, which has been their diabolic pulpit.*

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caused by white racism. But if that were the case, given concentration camps, property seizures, and widespread bigotry, we would be threatened by Japanese "wilding."

In fact, crime is a result of moral evil, a conscious decision to attack innocent lives and property for immoral motives. For that reason, even more than for deterrence, crime must be punished swiftly and harshly, although a libertarian criminal justice system would make use of restitution as well.

The present State monopoly over the production of domestic security is a failure. The streets of our big cities have become the realm of barbarians (if that is not a libel against the Visigoths). In New York City, reports of home burglaries are filed and forgotten. In Washington, D.C., violent muggings elicit police and prosecutorial yawns.

Like all bureaucrats, police, prosecutors, and judges have no incentive to respond to consumer demand, in this case would-be consumers of protection against crime or justice against criminals. There is no consumer sovereignty when the State has a monopoly of fighting crime, and when the only crimes it treats seriously are those against itself: counterfeiting, tax evasion, etc.

I know a woman who lived in an Italian working-class enclave surrounded by Cleveland's slums. Crime was unrestrained around this refuge, but within it, streets and homes were safe.

Anyone who crossed into the Italian area and committed a crime was—thanks to private surveillance—almost always

caught. But the perpetrator was seldom turned over to the police, since he would be released in a few hours and free to rampage again. The criminal was punished on the spot, and as a result, there was almost no crime in this neighborhood.

Although hardly an ideal system, it was rough justice and eminently libertarian. Yet many libertarians would oppose such a system—even though it was a response to State failure—because the criminals were black. Paleolibertarians have no such reservation. There should be equal-opportunity punishment.

### The Return of Paganism

Paleolibertarianism is unabashedly pro-Man. It argues—and how can this be controversial?—that only man has rights, and that public policies based on mythical animal or plant rights must have perverse results.

Environmentalists, on the other hand, claim that birds, plants, and even seawater have the right to be protected from energy production and other human activities. From the snail darter to the furbish lousewort to wilderness as a whole—all deserve State protection from the production of goods and services for mankind.

Environmentalists claim that nature was in perfect balance before the modern era, and man's "damaging" economic development must be repaired by returning us to a more primitive level. Leaders of England's Green Party idealize the level of economic development between the fall of the Roman Empire and the coronation of Charlemagne—in other words, the Dark Ages. Friends of the Earth characterize the Industrial Revolution, and its enormous increase in standards of living, as a "vicious worldwide stripmining." Earthfirst! says, "Back to the Pleistocene!"

The de-christianization of public policy has resulted in an environmental movement that is not only anti-capitalist but pro-pagan. Paganism holds that man is only a part of nature—no more important than whales or wolves (and, in practice, much less important). Christianity and Judaism, on the other hand, teach that God created man in His image and gave him dominion over the earth, which was created for man's use and not as a morally valuable entity in its own right. The natural order exists for man and not the reverse, and no other understanding is compatible with a free market and private property, and therefore with libertarianism.

Environmentalists worship at the altar of Mother Nature, sometimes, as in the Gaia Movement, literally. Too many libertarians join them, proving Chesterton's gibe that "people who believe in nothing will believe in anything."

Paleolibertarians are unapologetic about preferring civilization to wilderness. They are likely to agree with Nock that "I can see nature only as an enemy: a highly respected enemy, but an enemy." Politically we need not be shy about being pro-Man. Few Americans are willing to sacrifice their property and prosperity to satisfy pagan delusions.

### The Challenge

If the American people continue to connect libertarianism with repellent cultural norms, we will fail. But if paleolibertarianism can break that connection, then anything is possible.

Even non-paleo libertarians ought to be unhappy that our movement has a single cultural image. They ought to welcome, in conservative middle-class America, libertarians who are cultural and moral traditionalists. But my guess is that they will not, and that we will have a nasty fight on our hands. I, for one, welcome that fight.

Do we want to remain a small and irrelevant social club like the LP? Or do we want to fulfill the promise of liberty and make our movement a mass one again as it was in the 19th-century?

Culturally meaningful libertarianism has arrived during the greatest turmoil on the Right since the 1940s. Libertarians can and must talk again with the resurgent paleoconservatives, now in the process of breaking away from the neocons. We can even form an alliance with them. Together, paleolibertarians and paleoconservatives can rebuild the great anti-welfare state, anti-interventionist coalition that thrived before World War II and survived through the Korean War.

Together, we have a chance to attain victory. But first we must junk the libertarian image as repugnant, self-defeating, and unworthy of liberty.

Instead, we must adopt a new orientation. How nice that it is also the old one. In the new movement, libertarians who personify the present corruption will sink to their natural level, as will the Libertarian Party, which has been their diabolic pulpit.

Some will find this painful; I'm looking forward to it. Let the cleansing process begin—it is long past due. □

## Eschatology

# Kingdom Come The Politics of the Millennium

by Murray N. Rothbard

Christianity has played a central role in Western civilization, and contributed a important influence on the development of classical liberal thought. Not surprisingly, Christian beliefs about the "end times" are very important for us *right now*.

Christian Reconstructionism is one of the fastest growing and most influential currents in American religious and political life. Though the fascinating discussions by Jeffrey Tucker and Gary North (in the July and September issues of *Liberty*) have called libertarian attention to, and helped explain, this movement, to clarify Christian Reconstructionism fully we have to understand the role and problem of millennialism in Christian thought.

The problem centers around the discipline of eschatology, or the Last Days, and on the question: how is the world destined to come to an end? The view that nearly all Christians accept is that at a certain time in the future Jesus will return to earth in a Second Advent, and preside over the Last Judgment, at which all those then alive and all the bodily resurrected dead will be assigned to their final places; and human history, and the world as we know it, will have come to an end.

So far, so good; a troublesome problem, however, comes in various passages in the Bible, in the Book of Daniel, and especially in the final book of Revelation, in which mention is made of a millennium, of a thousand year reign of Christ on earth [KGE]—before the final Day of Judgment. Who is to establish that Kingdom, and what is it supposed to look like?

The orthodox answer to this problem was set forth by the great Saint Augustine, in the early fifth century; this Augustinian line has been accepted by

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all the orthodox and liturgical Christian Churches: the Roman Catholic, the Greek and Russian Orthodox, high-church Lutheran, and Anglican, as well as by the Dutch wing of the Calvinist church (where Calvin himself stood is a matter of dispute). The Augustinian line is that the millennium, or thousand-year reign, is solely a metaphor for the creation of the Christian Church; the millennium is not something to be taken literally, as ever to take place, temporally, on earth. This orthodox position has the great virtue of disposing of the millennium problem. The answer: Forget it. At some unknown time in the future, Jesus will return, and that's that.

But to many centuries of Christian dissidents, this answer has failed to satisfy. It deprives them of hope, of the literal passages in the Bible that seem to promise a thousand years of temporal blessings on earth: the glorious Kingdom. Among the numerous groups of *millennialists*, those who believe that the KGE will and must eventually arrive, there are two very different groups: those who believe that the Kingdom will be established by Jesus himself, who will therefore return to earth *before*

the millennium (*pre-millennialists*, or "pre-mils"); and those that believe that Jesus will return to earth *after* the millennium (the *post-millennialists*, or "post-mils.")

This seemingly abstruse theological difference carries enormously significant social and political implications. For as much as the pre-mil yearns to attain the KGE and install it for a thousand years, he is constrained to *wait*; he must wait for Jesus's return. The post-mil, on the other hand, maintains that *man* must establish the KGE, first, *in order that* Jesus may eventually return. In other words, the post-mil is under theological obligation, as a fulfillment of the divine plan, to establish the KGE as quickly as possible. Hence, the sense of hurry, the sense of rushing toward impending triumph, that generally suffuses the post-mils. For the march of history, the plans of Providence itself, depend upon the post-mil being triumphant as soon as he possibly can.

What, then, is this all-important millennium, in either the pre-mil or post-mil version, supposed to look like? As we might expect, as with many Utopias, the vision is a bit cloudy. Most theorists, beginning with one of the first and most

influential, the early 13th century Calabrian abbot, Joachim of Fiore, have been explicit communists: that is, that work, private property, and the division of labor will disappear in this perfect society. Joachim, who almost converted three popes and therefore almost significantly altered the history of Western civilization, offered a unique solution to the problem of production under communism: it would disappear, because in the KGE aborning (he predicted its advent in fifty years after he wrote), all human flesh would disappear, and man would

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*Throughout history, pre-millennialists pored over the Bible, and over world events, and discovered presumptively infallible signs of the Big One (Armageddon) coming up.*

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be pure spirit. So much for the problem of production or property. These pure disembodied human spirits, then, would chant praises to God in mystical ecstasy for the duration of the millennium. Other millennialists, however, could not take such an easy way out.

While most KGE theorists have been communists, some post-mils, such as early twentieth-century American Calvinist, J. Gresham Machen, have been laissez-faire, free-market stalwarts. But on one point all millennialists are agreed: there can be no sinners worthy of living in the perfect world of the KGE. "Sinners," of course, are broadly defined to encompass a massive chunk of the existing human race: they include adulterers, sodomites, blasphemers, idolaters, prophets of false doctrines, and all the rest. So a crucial question then becomes: how are the sinners to be gotten rid of, so that the KGE can be established?

For the pre-mil, the answer is that, just prior to Jesus's Second Advent that will establish the KGE, God will send us Armageddon, the final War of Good against Evil, in which all the strange creatures that populate the Book of Revelation will figure prominently: the Beast, the Anti-Christ, 666, and all the rest. At the end of Armageddon, the world will have been cleansed of all the sinners, and Christ and His cadre of

saints can go about establishing His Kingdom. From the libertarian point of view, the pre-mil poses little danger, since his role is to await eagerly the alleged Signs of the impending holocaust. For the pre-mil, regardless how eager he may be, is supposed to wait for God to make the crucial moves. Unfortunately, there are many strains in pre-mil thought holding it important, and morally obligatory, for the pre-mil, knowing Armageddon to be at hand, to try to speed up God's timetable by giving it a little healthy push, thereby "doing God's will." In that way, to borrow from another famous (atheist) millennialist, the pre-mil is to act as "the midwife of history." Which is why I, for one, would be a bit fidgety to have a pre-mil with his finger near the nuclear button. (Our beloved ex-president, Ronald Reagan, is an avowed pre-mil, but it is doubtful if he fully understands the implications of his own position.)

In general, if you want an event badly enough, and you think it inevitable, you tend to see it coming just over the horizon. And so pre-mils, through history, have been poring over the Bible, and over world events, and seeing presumptively infallible signs of the Big One (Armageddon) coming up. Any times of war, upheaval, or revolution have engendered large numbers of pre-mil movements. But these precise predictions have always been falsified—the eternal problem of "historical" pre-millennials, those who pick specific historical dates for either Armageddon or the Second Advent. One of the most influential group of historicists was the Millerite movement, followers in America and England of the Yankee preacher William Miller, who forecast Armageddon on a specific day in 1843. Typically, when nothing happens on the predicted date, the guru rethinks the matter and concludes that there was a slight error in his scientific calculations—the date is really a year or so later. This is what happened with Miller. But then, when nothing happens on the second date—in this case 1844—confusion sets in and the movement collapses. In the case of the Millerites, a sub-group arose that claimed that Jesus *really did* arrive, thus vindicating the prediction, but that his Advent was *invisible*; the Advent would be made visible to all at some time in the future. This less than satisfying resolution was

the path taken by the group that later became known as the Seventh Day Adventists.

But at last a creative way out was discovered from the irritating falsifica-

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*Many have understandably grown tired of Waiting for the Rapture, and have started looking for a coherent political program and strategy, which pre-millennialism can never be equipped to provide.*


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tions of the historicists' predictions. John Nelson Darby, an English preacher and mystic, invented around this time the concept of dispensationalism, which later spread like wildfire in the United States and was to become known as "fundamentalism" (after the volumes, *The Fundamentals*, published in 1910.) What Darby and the fundamentalists did was to repudiate the basic method of the historicists, which was to time the countdown to Armageddon from clocks of prophecy which they discovered in the Bible. Darby severed the pre-mils from being tied to the number-prophecies based on the Bible. According to Darby, the Biblical clock of prophecy kept ticking *until* the founding of the Christian Church. The founding of the Church stopped that clock, since it constituted a new dispensation in history. The Church, in a famous phrase of Darby's, "is the great parenthesis in history." At some point, however, for which pre-mils look for Signs, the clock of prophecy will start up again, and the countdown to imminent Armageddon will begin. One of the predicted signs was the return of all the Jews to Palestine and their mass conversion to Christianity. With a little stretching, then, the mainstream of pre-mils picked the founding of the State of Israel in 1948 as the beginning of the countdown, with many of them therefore picking forty years after that, or 1988 as Armageddon Year.

As pre-mil thought developed, however, Armageddon—which is now considered to take seven years, and which is known as "the tribulation"—began to pose a big problem. It is true that the Bad Guys, the vast mass of sinners, will

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be satisfactorily disposed of by God's wrath. But how about the Good Guys? After all, they, too, during those wonderful but strenuous years, will be in danger of getting caught in the crossfire, and getting slaughtered along with everyone else. It didn't seem fair.

And so pre-mil theorists, poring over the Bible, came up with a solution: the Good Guys will not have to suffer during Armageddon. Instead, just before Armageddon is to begin, Jesus will

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*Jesus never held nor ran for political office, nor did he ever advocate any legislation—perhaps, after all, an indication that Jesus was more libertarian than the Reconstructionists have believed.*

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return *invisibly* (a variant on the Seventh Day Adventists) and "rapture up" the Good Guys bodily to Heaven. Then, the Good Guys, the saved, will sit at the right hand of God up in Heaven watching (enjoying?) the spectacle of the Bad Guys slaughtering each other down below. Then, *after* the war is over, the dust settled, and perhaps the radiation fallout finished, Jesus will return *visibly* to earth along with his Saints, to rule the earth for a thousand years, and with the sinners eliminated in a most satisfying manner. Thus, the Second Advent is split into two parts: the first invisible one where Jesus raptures up the Good Guys; and the second visible one, where He returns with them to set up the KGE.

I will remember one sermon by my



"A pacifist? Sorry, Armageddon's coming up, and we'll be needing aggressive types."

favorite pre-mil televangelist, the Reverend Jimmy Swaggart (before personal or satanic forces laid him low). The Rapture, which Jimmy asserted was imminent, was the emotional high for the reverend along with his massive congregation. As he described the glories of the Rapture, shouts and sobs of joy shook the celebrants. It didn't seem contradictory to any of the faithful when, a few sober moments later, Jimmy pleaded for contributions to his Bible college. But why worry about schools and colleges when the Rapture was promised for a few weeks or so hence?

Pre-millennialism is basically a passive creed, and yet, since the early 1970s, fundamentalist Christians have engaged more and more fervently in political action. Many have understandably grown tired of Waiting for the Rapture, and have started looking for a coherent political program and strategy, which pre-millennialism can never be equipped to provide. Hence, the golden opportunity for the Christian Reconstructionists.

Enter, then, the post-mils. Post-mils *have* to have some sort of political program, because they believe that man must establish the KGE on his own. Post-mils can be divided into the "immediatists," who want to seize power and establish the KGE immediately, and the gradualists, who are prudently willing to wait a bit. The most notorious immediatists burgeoned at the beginning of the Reformation, in fifteen brief but turbulent years, from 1520 to 1535. In numerous towns in Germany and Holland, different sects of Anabaptists tried to grab power and bring about the KGE. The sinners were to be gotten rid of by immediate slaughter of all heretics, which included all who refused to take orders from the sect's maximum leader. Leaders like Thomas Müntzer and Jan

Bockelson tried to impose theocratic communism, vowing to exterminate unbelievers and act as "God's scythe," until, as some of them phrased it, blood will cover the world to the height of a horse's bridle. Finally, in 1535, the last and most important of the bloody experiments in Anabaptist communism, in the city of Münster, was overthrown, and its adherents massacred in turn.

The Anabaptist failures served to discredit immediatism, and from then on, post-mils turned to more gradual, and therefore somewhat less coercive, measures. The idea was that instead of killing all sinners and heretics immediately, post-mils would take over the reins of government, and, by rather kindlier and gentler means, use the State to shape everyone up, make men moral, and stamp out sin, so as to make them fit to enter the KGE. The mainstream Protestant churches of nineteenth century America, for example, were taken over by a fervent pietist version of post-mil, who emphasized revivalism, bursts of emotion, and rule by the Holy Spirit. These post-mil Protestants became increasingly more progressive and statist, their outlook being best expressed by one of their leaders, Professor Richard T.

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*To say that it is impermissible to talk to or work with anyone who is not a 100 percent libertarian is to follow the disastrous and crackpot path of Orthodox Randianism: That is, to dig oneself a deep sectarian hole and then leap in.*

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Ely, founder of the American Economic Association, Christian Sociologist, and indefatigable activist and organizer, who considered "government as God's major instrument of salvation." The sins that the Protestant pietists were particularly interested in stamping out were: Demon Rum, sabbath-breaking, and that well-known instrument of the Anti-Christ, the Roman Catholic Church.

On the other hand, the seventeenth-century Puritans in America were theonomists, believers in God's law, trying to construct a Christian Commonwealth rather than emotionally harking after the Holy Spirit. The modern Christian Reconstructionists are the Puritans' spiritual descendants. But post-mil theonomists have a problem. For Jesus never held or ran for political office, nor did he ever advocate any legislation—perhaps, after all, an indication that Jesus was more libertarian or less KGE-minded than the Reconstructionists and

*continued on page 45*

## Credo

# Choosing Freedom

## Public Choice and the Libertarian Idea

by Charles K. Rowley and Richard E. Wagner

"For the man devoted to liberty, there is nothing which makes liberty important. And he has no reason for his devotion."—R. Rhees, *Without Answers*

Public choice scholars are a more diverse lot than the recent debate in *Liberty* concerning the usefulness or otherwise of public choice would seem to suggest. We believe that both Jane Shaw and Murray Rothbard commit a serious aggregation fallacy in ascribing to all public choice

scholars the normative values and the particular scientific method associated with James M. Buchanan. We enter this debate as two scholars of public choice anxious to offer our own personal perspectives on the controversy. We do not speak—indeed could not possibly speak—for the diversity of our colleagues in this vibrant and expanding field of scholarship.

We believe it is especially relevant that we should respond to the issues raised in this exchange, since we, more than most of our colleagues, are viewed as true believers in classical liberalism, if not perhaps in the libertarianism of Murray Rothbard. No doubt we both would die in the same ditch as Rothbard fighting against the same enemies of liberty.

Our departure point in this discussion is the concept of liberty itself, since it is doubt concerning the compatibility between liberty and public choice that leads Rothbard to vent his spleen against the public choice approach. For us, freedom is construed as non-interference within a protected sphere of an individual's life, as independence or autonomy; a free man is characterized as one who governs himself and is governed by no one else. In this sense, freedom is a negative and not a positive concept, though, following Isaiah Berlin, we recognize that these concepts are

not mutually exclusive. As a rule, however, the subject matters of negative and positive freedom do not overlap, even though conceivably deprivation of the positive freedom to be one's master may be judged as infringement of a man's negative freedom. Recognizing that the freedom of a vagabond may have little value to that individual is not to deny that his freedom is lost when eventually he is conscripted into some more comfortable economic environment.

In defining freedom in negative terms—as the absence of coercion or the threat of coercion of one individual by another—we do not deny that such freedoms may have to be curtailed, either because their exercise conflicts with that of other, perhaps incommensurably valuable freedoms, or because they compete with other values that largely are distinct from those comprehended in typical judgments about freedom. For we share with Berlin a repudiation of monism in philosophy and a recognition that the conflict of values is an ineradicable feature of human experience.

A liberal society in which moral conflicts are openly revealed is commended to us because in it the competition for "goods," which is an unalterable feature of the human predicament, is

not shirked or evaded, but is actively embraced. In a nutshell, we who embrace freedom will not force others to be free. Yet, for us, freedom is valued as an ultimate end, not as a means to some higher political goal or as a derivative of some other end.

From this deontological perspective we evidence neither a desire nor a necessity to justify our goal of liberty. For us it is an ultimate and a self-evident value. It is not to be justified, as Hume and Mill argued, as a prerequisite for individual rational self-determination. For liberty may be used well or ill without impact upon its value. Nor is it, as Buchanan and most other contractarians argue, the derivative of some more highly valued concept of universal consent to be pursued through such artificial devices as the Rawlsian reflective equilibrium enunciated by hypothetical individuals following a hypothetical constitutional debate behind some hypothetical veil of ignorance. Our devotion to liberty is as unjustifiable as it is unqualified, with debate curtailed only to the important issue of the definition itself. In this position, we sense our oneness with Rothbard. Our values are the same.

Though our values are the same, our visions of desirable institutions

differ. For Rothbard, private markets represent voluntary exchange and gains from trade, and a market economy is the institutional incarnation of the principle of liberty. Government, in contrast, represents coerced exchange, where one party gains at the expense of the other, and is a vehicle of grand larceny and is the very epitome of coercion. With this unequivocal distinction we find ourselves uncomfortable, not least as a consequence of viewing these institutions through the lens of public choice. Our discomfort, however, is not that which would energize Buchanan, whose prin-

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cipal contributions have revolved around the delineation of logical foundations for constitutional democracy vested in universal consent and whose vision of such forms of government is essentially benign. For our vision is one in which real-world parchment is of a different texture from that of any calculus of consent, the derivative at best of a transient super-majority and ultimately dependent for its survival upon the competing guns of minority interests.

For us the principle of liberty leads not to the parchment of even some widely endorsed *limited* transfer state, but rather to the classical liberal doctrine of the *minimal* state, in which government is small and heavily constrained and acts as nightwatchman for an otherwise unconstrained market economy. Note however that this vision does not lead us to endorse the zero state of Rothbard or indeed the totally unconstrained interaction between individuals that then would ensue. For we do not view private markets as benignly as Rothbard, nor do we eye government as an entirely malignant Satan, the very existence of which is the enemy of freedom.

Shaw notes that "[Buchananesque public choice scholars] believe that

government can be fair only if it follows rules that everyone agrees to before the process of governing begins." To which a Rothbardian natural rights scholar might rejoin: "I have not, and would not have, agreed to the government we have, so it must be judged unfair by your own principle of consent." We would agree that we have not chosen our government. But we would also note that none of us has chosen to be governed by the set of rules that would constitute a market economy. Both governments and markets are coercive in that they represent rules or constraints that we must live by and that we have not chosen.

Individuals can never be completely free in the negative sense here defined except when they are isolated from all other individuals in the sense of Robinson Crusoe prior to the arrival of Man Friday. For relationships between individuals are always conditioned by rules, however primitive, which limit certain freedoms even if only to advance others. Such rules are manifest even in the so-called anarchic jungles that precede the emergence of societies, even in the pre-property right environment where there is no "mine and thine." In the absence of rights, however, and of some rule of law, individuals can be coerced mightily, as predators and prey battle over the distribution of unowned spoils.

The rules that lift savages from the jungle into society evidently require a social interaction more formal than that of anarchy. It is this formal interaction that forms the basis of the minimal state. For if rights are to be established and to be protected from the predations of those who view themselves to be inadequately endowed, an enforcement mechanism more extensive than the individual becomes necessary. To fulfill this function, the state as referee arises, not necessarily through violence and conquest but even through some limited calculus of consent. For even private markets depend on rules, not least the law of property and of contract, that typically do not emerge from a spontaneous order of competing private courts but rather are the product of the bureaucratic judgments of a state judiciary. In the absence of such rules, and of the police mechanism to enforce them, Tullock's law that "might is right" would invade the freedoms of private markets just as they invade freedoms in the unfettered market-place of politics.

Rothbard is entirely correct in his bid to disabuse individuals of any notion that man can be made perfectible through some utopia of the socialist state. Yet, if the mean sensual man of Hume pervades political markets, how is it that *homo economicus* casts down his self-seeking garbs in his dealings through private markets? Viewed from this perspective, Rothbard's *For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto* is no less a chimera than is the communist paradise envisaged by Karl Marx in *Capital*, and his attempted bifurcation between political and private markets is blind to the reality that both inevitably are grounded on rules that invade the freedom of the individual.

Public choice emerged as a scientific endeavor to bond into a single study of markets the two subjects of private and of political markets that had been separated unjustifiably with the demise of classical political economy. Indeed, public choice represents a return to the classical tradition, as refracted through the techniques and methods common to twentieth century scholarship. In probing the strengths and weaknesses of government and its coercive appendages, public choice alerts the friends of freedom to the invasive powers both of governments and of private markets and it signals routes and opportunities to rein such powers in.

Viewed from this perspective, the insights that Rothbard ridicules may be

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*In the absence of rights and of the rule of law, individuals can be coerced mightily, as predators and prey battle over the distribution of unowned spoils.*

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more relevant to liberty than he is prepared to admit. If self-seeking voters deem themselves too unimportant individually to turn an election, they well may divert their attention from matters politic to the sports pages of their newspapers. Ideology well may substitute for information in determining the lever that they pull when they do venture to the polls. In such circumstances, the persuasive media powers of the transfer society interests may exercise a pull that is

no friend of liberty, and the political lobbying of such coercive interest groups indeed may exercise more leverage than freedom can sustain. Better that the friends of freedom are alerted through public choice to the threat that such forces pose than that they rely upon idealistic manifestos of the libertarian creed destined to fall upon the stony ground of self interest in the *Realpolitik* of *homo economicus*.

To be sure, some, though certainly not all, public choice scholarship does assert the preponderance of pecuniary interest and dismisses the significance of ideology. We, however, do not wish to side with one or the other, as if ideology and interest were competing and independent forces in human action. For we would note that to a large extent self interest is itself a mental construction, an idea. George Washington allowed himself to be bled to death. We can be quite sure he did not want to die at that time.

Nevertheless, he died, because his idea or belief about his self interest, erroneously, no doubt, saw the removal of bad humors through bleeding as life enhancing.

The Virginia School of Public Choice, most particularly, is not to be viewed as being careless of, let alone hostile to, the preservation or the restoration of individual freedoms. In most essentials, its objectives and its concerns are identical to those of James Madison and Alexander Hamilton, not to mention Samuel Adams and George Mason, along with the other contributors to the federalist debate who agonized in search of a set of rules that would confine the minimal state to the role of a referee that might preside over a system of free enterprise and yet remain the servant of the people. *The Federalist Papers* themselves recognize the omnipresence of self-seeking men and urge the importance of rules and institutions to protect such individuals from their wont to coerce. There is

plausible ground for thinking that public choice scholarship casts the anti-federalists in a more favorable light than is customary. But the federalists and anti-federalists were united in their commitment to liberty and in their view that the preservation of liberty was problematical and not assured, and most certainly required eternal vigilance combined with right understanding. Public choice, we believe, can provide for modern readers a basis for a reaffirmation of that understanding, which would make eternal vigilance a sensible price to pay.

Grounded in methodological individualism, recognizing the unknowability of the future, and committed to liberty, we who will carry the baton of public choice on its second lap pay it homage, not as any substitute for good sense, but just as a tool that may help us in the important task that we are privileged to inherit. □

## Rothbard, "Kingdom Come," continued from page 42

other post-mils have believed.

Therefore in attempting to construct a commonwealth based on God's law the Puritans could only turn to the Old Testament, and to the government of ancient Israel. Hence, the emphasis on stoning to death transgressors, and hence the dispute about whether ancient Israelite law applies nowadays to sabbath-breakers.

Conscientious Christians try to abide by a personal and political ethic. It is difficult to see how a Christian can be a utilitarian, a nihilist, or a might-makes-right advocate. There are, it seems to me, only two possible genuine ethical systems for a Christian. One is the natural law/natural rights position of the (Catholic or Anglican) Scholastics, in which human reason is equipped to discover natural law, and purely theological or divinely revealed ethics is a very small separate though important part of the system. Another is the Calvinist view that man's reason is so corrupted that the *only* viable ethic, indeed the only truth about *anything*, must come from divine revelation as presented in the Bible. With his usual insight, Gary North sees that the two positions are and must be at loggerheads, and hence stakes his entire case on Calvinist presuppositionalism. Unfortunately,

presuppositionalism is not a position likely to gain adherents outside the hard-core Calvinist faithful, and even there I suspect he might have problems. (Is there really only a *Christian* chemistry, a *Christian* mathematics, a *Christian* way to fly a plane?)

Finally, I must confess I find all the talk about "alliances," coalitions, associations, or "willingness to work together on an informal basis" (Tucker), an exercise in hairsplitting. Libertarians live in a world where—alas!—not everyone is a 100 percent libertarian. Many people—undoubtedly *most* people—are blends of X percent libertarian and Y percent non or anti-libertarian. To say that it is impermissible to talk to or work with anyone who is not a 100 percent libertarian is to follow the disastrous and crackpot path of Orthodox Randianism: That is, to dig oneself a deep sectarian hole and to leap in. It seems to me that both the sane and the common-sense thing to do is to work with the X percent libertarian aspect of people, and to ignore, discourage, or work against the other Y percent. Whether you call it alliance, coalition, or whatever makes no difference. Obviously, in different contexts and different times, some issues will be more important than others, and it is up to the individual libertarian, depending

on the context and on his or her personal temperament and interests, to decide which issues and coalitions to stress.

Obviously, it is important for libertarians to discuss what issues are likely to be dominant or most important in any given historical period. Thus, during the Vietnam War, in my view the most important political issues were the war and the draft, and hence my argument that a coalition, alliance, informal association or what have you with the New Left was in order. Now, the draft is down to registration, and it seems clear that the Wheeler-Rohrabacher "freedom fighters" have pretty well disappeared, and that the Cold War itself is in the process of coming to an end. If that is true, then, in the coming period, some sort of association/coalition or whatever with some types of conservatives might be in order. But *only*, of course, as once applied to the Left, with *anti*-Establishment types. There can never be a persuasive argument for coalescing or allying ourselves with the State apparatus.

In any case, one would hope that strategic discussions can be conducted among libertarians with a minimum of anathemas and threats of excommunication, since, as Jeff Tucker well says, in "questions of strategy, final answers are elusive." □

## Defense

# Elitism In Defense of Virtue is No Vice

by Karl Hess

A simple truth that bears repeating: the charge of "elitism" is often little more than an attack on *merit*, and there is nothing meritorious about *that*.

"Elitism" is one of the strongest words people use to discredit activities they dislike. Its undoubted power to provoke antagonism derives from an earlier evoker of hostility, the concept of "meritocracy." In a meritocracy the major rewards of life are awarded to (or greedily gobbled

up by) people who have performed something with merit—made a good deal, written a brilliant piece of music, discovered a new way to explain an aspect of the physical world, or something along these lines.

This arrangement is bad, it is argued, because it leaves high and dry all of the non-meritorious people who, through no fault of their own, do not acquire enough of those things or privileges necessary for a good life. The evolution from meritocracy to welfare state in this country was deemed necessary in the belief that the non-meritorious—previously attended to by charity—should have the requisites of a good life *as a right*.

As meritocracy vanished as a worthy social and political concept, a new assault word was needed; one that could be targeted not only against whole systems, but with surgical precision could be used against even the most minute part of any activity. Elitism is just such a word. In any social, political or cultural activity, any portion that is not demonstrably and *purposefully* egalitarian may be attacked as elitist.

Why being elitist is now or ever was "bad" has not been widely debated. In the heavens of the mid-century, equality and egalitarianism took on a broad and

undifferentiated air of virtue. The civil rights movement seems to be mostly responsible for this development. From its undeniable moral power, the idea of equality became unassailable and then undefinable. To suggest that in some areas of human action equality is not only impossible but also undesirable—in art and science, for instance—is sometimes attacked as racist as well as elitist. It is difficult, apparently, for anti-racists to attack elitism without making it appear that racial minority populations are not themselves capable of achieving the high standards usually associated with an elite.

Although the arguments are usually quite vague, the charge is felt as sharp and stinging largely because, I am convinced, the media generally have accepted without any question the notion that elitism is inherently bad, so bad that everyone is expected to know that it's bad. The old definition of an elite as an especially privileged, probably undeserving group—an aristocracy—is not generally involved or evoked. The new elitism has to do with the supposedly rejected idea of meritocracy.

Ironically, many who launch attacks on elitism are themselves members of

an observable elite of social workers and educationists specially trained to be social propagandists and organizers. Saul Alinsky's justly famed school for New Left organizers nurtured just such an elite corps. Harvard's law school today, at least in its "critical legal studies" enclave, also seeks to create an elite. Nader's Raiders are another obviously elite group that nevertheless can be counted on to use elitism as a pejorative term.

Social-activist elites deny their own elitism on grounds that their special training and obviously superior grasp of things is meant to serve the helpless and the dispossessed. And, to be fair, many of them actually make it their purpose to help people help themselves—actually to create a new elite of self-helping people in settings of squalor. It seems to me that the best intentioned of these activists are missing a useful tool. To achieve by merit, to do good work, to improve one's life, to be an elitist of accomplishment and energy has a worthy sound if disencumbered of the vague and vogueish *charge* of elitism.

The arguments supporting the charges of elitism, as I have observed them, are usually contained in the head-

lines of the stories: with the word elitism being sufficient for the charge *and* for the explanation. In the text of stories there may be casual clauses referring to elitism as being separatist or favoring a bright minority, but little else.

When I worked closely with many on the New Left, the charge was as powerful and as vague as it is today. New Left *elites* were able to carry the charge successfully into the media without being bothered for a discussion of why elitism suddenly had become such a bad idea.

In those days I always argued in favor of elitism, thus reinforcing the idea of many associates on the left that, down deep underneath my army field jacket and jeans, I was a right-wing flake.

It was, of course, always unsatisfying to discuss elitism with Marxist-Leninists. It was their view, as succinctly stated in one seminar I attended, that the wisdom to tell other people how to live their lives was a science in which Marxist-Leninists had become superbly skilled. When I mentioned that that sounded like an elitism of which they obviously should be proud, I was asked to leave, having become an "obstructionist." The leader of that seminar has gone on to be an energetic supporter of perhaps the most elitist group in all the Americas, the Sandinistas. They are elitist, of course, in the old sense of people who are thought of or think of themselves as socially superior and thus entitled to power and privilege. They are not elitist in the modern sense of having achieved elitism through merit.

Elitism has become a totem word. It has great strength and may be defined by the user. My reference to a modern definition of elitism through merit is an example.

Unlike the Biblical doctrines, with which interpretations can at least be argued because of the availability of text, the *charge* of elitism has no standard text, or definition, and has become more of a meaningful sound rather than a meaningful concept. In movies there are certain musical themes that denote moods or dangers as vividly as if they were accompanied by written signs. Elitism as a charge has become like that. You *know* it's bad and nobody need bother to tell you *why* just as they do not need to give you a musicological explanation of Alfred Hitchcock suspense

themes.

One of the most recent targets of the charge of elitism are the high schools of science and technology that lately have become fashionable in many educational jurisdictions. Since they are limited in number and thus not available to everyone who might want to attend, ways of apportioning space in them have become necessary. One way is to accept only students who have evidenced particular aptitudes or accomplishments.

Such procedures are, obviously, meritocratic, thereby elitist.

Even, however, if the schools admit students on a first-come, first-served basis, the *programs* in the schools may be attacked as elitist. They seek to create, it is argued, an elite class of scientists and technologists.

In this view—which goes back as far as the pioneer public schooler, Horace Mann—public (government) education has as its purpose the inculcation of officially determined social values and the fundamentals of citizenship such as loyalty to the national state rather than to localities or devotion to professions or crafts.

Private schools are, of course, considered pure poison by this view. They weaken support for government schools by siphoning off desirable students and thoughtful parents, and because they create students who may actually think of themselves *as* an elite simply because they got a good education.

Perhaps we should wish these charges to *stick*—for a very elitist reason. Even if government schools of science and technology are successfully opposed by anti-elitists, there is no reason to believe that this will stop the proliferation of special schools in the *private* sector. Successful attacks against government schools of excellence simply opens the market for more and more private schools of excellence.

Elite private schools attacked by Luddites might even gain from the attacks; the attacks could focus the attention of parents not on the plight of the government schools but on the potential advantages to their children of the elite schools. Hurrah!

The attacks against elitism in the governmental system of education might also inspire businesses and industries to start nurturing their own engineers, scientists, and technologists in their own schools which, unlike most of

the government schools, presumably would emphasize the processes and practice of thinking rather than genuflections to Federal guidelines.

The need for elites, in the meritocratic and not aristocratic sense, is more clear now than ever.

It is by the business elite, the entrepreneurs, that markets are created which, in turn, create new jobs. It is by the technical elites that new products are made possible. And these products are not confined, as leftists would have you believe, to the tacky-tacky. They include, for example, the materials of medical treatment and the technologies of information.

Non-elite—that is, heavily subsidized, coddled, technically careless—farmers have been going out of business steadily during the past decade. These were defended in a series of Hollywood and TV films, in ways that included an interesting and subtle—and very propagandistic—version of the anti-elitist argument. The ability of the farmers to grow crops effectively and profitably was never the issue. The issue was re-

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*The air will not be cleaned or the water purified by Everyman thinking clean and pure thoughts. Things are far too far gone for that. The job here and now is going to call for some very smart people, an elite.*

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finned down to the fact that they had been farming in one way and on one place for a long time and thus should be able to continue no matter what. The villains, usually, were the bankers—who make money from interest on debts in order to pay interest to depositors. The way that the careless farmers got into debt, foolishly expanding acreage and buying incredibly expensive motorized equipment to harvest dirt-cheap crops, was not the issue. The issue was simply their *desire* to continue to be farmers—no matter the cost to their neighbors.

In the meantime, an elite of farmers has been appearing, many in truck farming areas where careful consideration of the soil, substitution of low-cost organic fertilizers for high-cost chemical ones, and judicious use of efficient, small ma-

chines is paying off handsomely. The farmers who have been going out of business to the accompaniment of so much Hollywood angst have mainly been those who concentrated on the crops, such as corn, for which price supports have been available and which they have been growing by brute force rather than by technologically sophisticated methods.

Good farmers will not have to go out of business, *ever*, so long as any semblance of a market is available for their absolutely indispensable product. Poor, non-elitist farmers *should* go out of business lest millions someday starve because of an agricultural Gresham's Law disaster.

Now that the task of cleaning the environment is taken seriously by so many people—seriously enough to create a *market* for clean air and water—the need for an elite of superb technologists is urgent as is the need for inspired scientists to keep probing the conditions which we now describe rather primitively as pollution. The air will not be cleaned or the water purified by Every-

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*The fittest are not the slyest or the cruelest or even the strongest. In the long run it seems that the fittest are the smartest, the most thoughtful.*

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man thinking clean and pure thoughts. Things are far too far gone for that. Everyman may have an essential role in *keeping* things clean later on, but the job here and now is going to call for some very smart people, an elite.

Such elites, in a meritocratic sense, seem strikingly non-threatening and wholly beneficial to me. What "mad scientist" has ever been mad enough to achieve political power, to become a mad overlord? And who on earth has not benefitted from the work of scientists generally, by the applications of technologists generally, and by the promulgations of technology through commerce of science, technology, and even culture?

Unfortunately, in one area where an elite is crucially necessary it is difficult even to begin the discussion. That area is the neighborhoods of very poor peo-

ple, the neighborhoods of the underclass. These neighborhoods need parents who encourage their children to study hard and work hard despite the current fashion according to which schoolmates psychologically and even physically attack achieving students as being unbearable nerds or even as being class or race traitors, trying to be like "them," the enemy outside the projects.

And there *are* such elite parents in even the poorest, toughest neighborhoods. When discussing them, however, the media alludes correctly to their heroism and energy but rarely makes an invidious comparison with the non-elite parents. To do so would be, of course, *elitist*.

In the cultural area, The National Endowment for the Arts takes a subtly anti-elitist view, particularly pertaining to painting, music, and poetry. The elitist view, stemming from a meritocracy, would be that people who produce something popular and profitable are commendable and have, without force or favor, been able to convince people of the value of their work.

The richest musicians in the history of the world are the Beatles. They are a pinnacle elite all by themselves, just as Mozart and Beethoven were in their own times. They all became elite in the same meritocratic manner. They produced something that people wanted. Even when rich patrons tried to bolster some flaccid competitor, the elite composers won the audiences then and now. (Imagine Pia Zadora having to compete with Ringo Starr's latest tour.)

The National Endowment has a quite different view. It appears committed to supporting the least elite artists in the realm. Let someone appear with a well-written grant to display scribbles or scrabbles that would stand no chance in a free market setting, and the National Endowment rushes to oblige. Let someone discover that a monotone, repeated for minutes on end, is hot, high musical art and the Endowment orgasmically unquivers its golden bolts and lets them fly.

The great anti-elitist attitude of the Endowment over the years has seemed to be that anything that the public likes (say Andrew Wyeth) is essentially unworthy. Their mission is to find stuff that nobody wants and to thrust it forward. If the Endowment didn't support the stuff, who would? If nobody did,

wouldn't that be censorship of a sort? Wouldn't we risk depriving future generations of good stuff if everything had to be seen as having merit *today*. Groan. Little thought seems given to *why* it wouldn't be supported in the first place. The off chance that the work is unworthy and that not even the passage of time could redeem it is, thus, struck from discussion by an essentially elitist decision (in the old, authoritarian, aristocratic sense).

Think of poor old Van Gogh. Lord knows he wasn't supported much by anyone other than his brother. He just painted and painted. Would it have been nice for him to have had an Endowment grant? Who knows? The point is that it wasn't necessary. His great, elitist work got done anyway.

There has been no other time on the planet that more urgently needs elitism in the meritocratic sense.

There is no time that has more needed courage in facing up to charges of meritocracy and elitism. Those who sense grandeur and goodness in merit often have kept their feelings concealed. I am sure that discussions can be stopped cold today when someone asks "are you defending the idea of a meritocracy" and no one has the courage to say "sure!"

It is rather like the discussion stopper "but, surely, you don't mean that you believe in survival of the fittest."

Well, I do.

And whether I did or not, it's the way things are.

The fittest are not the slyest or the cruelest or even the strongest. In the long run it seems that the fittest are the smartest, the most thoughtful. And, among other things they have, as individuals, practised the sort of charity that has helped the less fit to survive. Or, as artists, they have inspired people to *be* fit. Or as scientists and technologists they have made it easier for everyone to survive, to be more fit.

Way back, when the financier Bernard Baruch was famous for holding "court" on a park bench across from the White House, I sat with him and asked for sage advice. He said "young man, you will hear trusts criticized by all of the politicians. Do not listen to the criticism of trusts. Join one."

Same way about elites and elitism. Be part of the former. Be exalted by the latter. □

## The *Liberty* Interview

# Barbara Branden

*"In terms of fundamentals, I am an Objectivist. But there are a great many aspects with which I no longer agree: a lot about Rand's view of sex, and a lot about her view of emotions, a lot of what she had to say about psychology."*

Ayn Rand's philosophy, Objectivism, with its emphasis on reason, self-interest, and laissez-faire capitalism, played a major role in the resurgence of libertarian thinking. Rand expressed her philosophy in four novels, *We The Living* (1936), *The Fountainhead* (1943), *Anthem* (1944), and *Atlas Shrugged* (1957), plus numerous essays.

Barbara Branden published *The Passion of Ayn Rand* in 1986. Branden was uniquely qualified to act as Rand's biographer: she had known Rand intimately from 1950 to 1968, interviewed her at great length in 1960 for an earlier biographical essay on Rand, and had done extensive research into Rand's early years. She had lectured and written about Rand's philosophy, and been the chief executive of the organization that promoted it.

*Passion* was a best-seller, and caused a sensation among libertarians: among the wealth of details about Rand's life, it told the story of Rand's strange sexual relationship with Barbara's husband, Nathaniel Branden.

In 1989, Nathaniel Branden published *Judgment Day*, a memoir of his life, centering on his relationship with Rand, Barbara and his two subsequent wives. Although the critics have not been kind to *Judgment Day*, it has rekindled interest in Rand, Branden and the movement that grew up around them.

**Liberty:** It's now been 21 years since you broke with Ayn Rand and 3 years since your book came out. I'd like to explore how your perspective has changed during those years. Has your evaluation of Rand as a literary figure changed since you wrote *Passion*?

**Branden:** Oh, no. I have always thought that she was a truly great writer, a literary genius. I am aware of certain problems in her books. But I don't know a book in which one couldn't say that something is a problem.

**Liberty:** Some critics have argued that Randian heroes became more two-dimensional as her career progressed, that the quality of her characterization actually declined.

**Branden:** I don't think that that's true at all. I agree that John Galt [the hero of *Atlas Shrugged*] is two dimensional. It may have been because of the assignment she set herself. In two ways. First of all he doesn't appear until 2/3 of the book is

over, which is very much a problem. But he's there as a presence earlier, an almost god-like presence, which makes it difficult to make him seem real when he does appear. Also he's presented so much as the perfect man, and always from the outside. We never go into Galt's psyche. These things make him seem less real.

But Rearden, my favorite character, is very real. Francisco is very real. Dagny is very real. They are wonderful characterizations, more complex and more interesting than those in her earlier novels.

**Liberty:** One thing that *Atlas* definitely lacks is the great tragic figure like Andrei Taganov in *We The Living* or Gail Wynand in *The Fountainhead*. The closest we can find in *Atlas Shrugged* is Eddie Willers or Cheryl Taggart.

**Branden:** Cheryl Taggart is a wonderful character.

**Liberty:** Yes she is, but she doesn't have the scope, the grandeur that Wynand or Taganov have . . .

**Branden:** The closest to it is Robert Stadler. A great man . . .

**Liberty:** Yes, but when we first meet him his tragedy has already occurred. We find out about his greatness only through flashbacks.

**Branden:** That's true. But this was a great man who destroyed himself.

**Liberty:** But we don't see his fall in the way that we see the development of Wynand's personal tragedy. Stadler's tragedy has already occurred when we meet him and we learn that he is only the shadow of the great man he once was.

**Branden:** I can't say that Ayn ever said this, but I believe that as time went by she believed less in the great tragic figure as a possibility. She felt that where there is real greatness, greatness of mind, of character, of soul, not just of productive or creative activity, that those people are not destroyed and do not destroy themselves. It was less interesting to her and she was less sympathetic to the concept by the time she got to *Atlas Shrugged*. There is a way in which Rearden for a great deal of the book is very much a tragic figure. His flaws are destroying him, but he triumphs over them.

**Liberty:** I think Rearden was the best developed character and the most sympathetic character . . .

**Branden:** I think so too, although a lot of people prefer

Francisco. But Rearden is my special love. I mean, his dogged courage, his fight against his own mistakes . . . It's wonderful to see.

**Liberty:** What do you think of Dominique Francon in *The Fountainhead*?

**Branden:** I don't think she's well realized, but I always adored her. She's a fascinating character. But with Dominique, unfortunately, Ayn wrote on a level of abstraction that she didn't use with the other characters in the book. Had the other characters been treated that abstractly, Dominique would have made sense. But the others are more realistic and Dominique is more a symbol and it doesn't work. You have less a sense of her as a real person, you understand her less, because she's a

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*As time went by Rand believed less in the great tragic figure. She felt that a person with real greatness — greatness of mind, of character, of soul, not just of productive or creative activity — that those people are not destroyed and do not destroy themselves.*

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symbol. And in the context of people who are more real you don't "get" her. But I found her fascinating.

**Liberty:** Who would you say is the central character in *Atlas Shrugged*?

**Branden:** For me, personally, it's Rearden. No that's not right. It's Dagny really. Despite Ayn's view of sex, why feminists are not rushing to embrace Ayn for the character of Dagny I do not know. If ever there was an ideal feminist, that's Dagny—a woman who ran a railroad, who was sexual, who loved men, who did her own thinking and made her own decisions—she's perfection from a feminist point of view.

**Liberty:** What do you think of Rand's view of sex?

**Branden:** The concept of woman as man-worshipper always made me want to crawl under a rug even though I could find no flaw in it intellectually and had to say I accepted it.

Let me pause here. I just said something interesting.

"I could find no flaw in it and therefore had to accept it." Do you realize that doesn't follow? None of the Collectivist realized it, for all of the Objectivist years. It was a simple logical fallacy that none of us knew we were committing. We all believed—it was not said, but it was implicit—that if Ayn gave us an argument we could not answer, we had to accept her argument. We could not say, or think, "Okay, this seems to make sense, but something's bothering me and I need to think about it more. I don't know what's bothering me. I've got to find out." That was unthinkable.

Ayn had a lot of arguments for her view, but in retrospect they're not very convincing to me. I think the real truth is simpler. I think what Ayn was doing was presenting her own insides. This is a woman who from the time she was a child was stronger and smarter than everybody else. And that was painful to her as it would be painful to anybody. There was such a longing in her to meet somebody stronger and wiser and with more endurance than she had. I think that was really the root of her theory of sex more than anything else. It was her own longing presented as a philosophical concept.

**Liberty:** What do you think of the hypothesis that Rand sought to rationalize beliefs that she already had? I am thinking, for example, of her theory of music, where it's very easy to argue

that she elevated her personal taste to the level of philosophical principle.

**Branden:** One has to be fair here. Ayn always said that she could not prove the validity of her musical taste, and that we do not have the means, the "vocabulary," to understand the line between music and emotions. She was aware of when she had proof and when she didn't. But she had so strong a personal preference in the realm of music and of art generally that she tended to make it binding on the rest of the world—a way of functioning that was deeply a part of her psychology: it was acutely uncomfortable for her to feel something strongly but be unable to defend it philosophically. But she knew it wasn't really proven, and she said so.

**Liberty:** I've heard about her belief that there were good homosexuals and bad homosexuals.

**Branden:** Oh, dear. You know, this was not a belief. Ayn would have been the first to say that she had not given it ten minutes' thought. I think this was simply her background that she had never thought about. And that's terribly unfortunate.

**Liberty:** I understand that because there were some homosexuals whose work she admired she felt it necessary to develop a theory that in them homosexuality was not the unmitigated error that it was in other people.

**Branden:** No, no, no. She thought it was a terrible error in anybody.

**Liberty:** I have heard this in particular about Noel Coward and Terence Rattigan, whose plays she admired.

**Branden:** I think Ayn's view that homosexuality is morally evil—is a moral issue at all—was destructive and unconscionable and wildly unjustified. But even here, we have to grant her the right to be a human being.

I believe her view of homosexuality was one of her rare hangovers from childhood, never questioned as the years went by. What is astonishing about Ayn Rand is the number of things she questioned that all of us are taught as children and it doesn't enter our minds that there are alternatives. I mean, the brightest of us, the smartest of us, the most philosophical of us, still carry around an enormous baggage of what only seems self-evident because we grew up with it. The astonishing thing about Ayn is how much she thought about that the rest of the world takes as self-evident. But she didn't think about everything.

**Liberty:** I have been told that Nathan was especially homophobic.

**Branden:** Yes he was.

**Liberty:** Old friends of his have told me that they cannot believe that the new Nathan overcame the homophobia of the old Nathan.

**Branden:** I have an opinion not for print.

**Liberty:** Okay. . . What did Rand think about animal rights?

**Branden:** Here she was very honest. I remember her a few times saying that she would love it if someone would come along with a proof for animal rights. She wasn't able to prove it. But she would be thrilled if somebody could. It was something she felt quite strongly about. But she herself was not able to find proof.

**Liberty:** Was she a vegetarian?

**Branden:** (incredulous) Ayn? No, no she wasn't. (laughs) She was a chocolate eater more than anything else. I think that was one of the great bonds between us.

**Liberty:** Somebody told me that Rand was an agoraphobic. Is

this true?

**Branden:** No. My goodness, people come up with the strangest things. No, it's not true.

**Liberty:** Have you read *Elegy for a Soprano*? What do you think of it?

**Branden:** I liked it very much. I thought it was a fine book. I admire Kay Nolte Smith's writing immensely.

**Liberty:** It is generally believed that the Vardis Wolf character was modelled on Ayn Rand.

**Branden:** Well I think that's true, but it's very abstract. It could be Ayn. It could be any one of a dozen other people in a very abstract way. Yes. Presumably, her knowledge of Ayn may

*Rand's concept of woman as man-worshipper always made me want to crawl under a rug. What Ayn was doing was presenting her own insides. From the time she was a child, she was stronger and smarter than everybody else. And that was painful to her as it would be painful to anybody. There was such a longing in her to meet somebody stronger and wiser.*

have been the source of it, but it's not Ayn Rand as opposed to Maria Callas or whoever else.

**Liberty:** The theme of the book is that genius doesn't justify cruelty.

**Branden:** I agree with that.

**Liberty:** Was Ayn Rand cruel to the people around her?

**Branden:** Cruel is not the right word. There was nothing mean or vicious about Ayn. There was no pleasure for her in inflicting pain. But yes, she did hurt people terribly because she was proud of the fact that she was a moralist and she did not understand the difference between morality and psychology. She would morally denounce very easily and with no awareness that there can be psychological reasons for what she observed that have nothing to do with morality. Everything to her was a moral issue. It was either morally good or morally bad.

I don't mean to excuse her by saying this. No one has the right to inflict the suffering on others that she inflicted. It was time for her to "check her premises."

**Liberty:** Was this the case from when you first met her or did it develop later?

**Branden:** This was not the case from the start at all. The woman I first met was the kindest, most understanding person in the world. She would have moments when she would flare over nothing. She would have moments when she might be more condemning than she should be, or than I would think she should be. But they were the exception. Mostly she was sensitive, understanding, giving. She was wonderful. But gradually this other aspect took over. It really went into high gear after *Atlas Shrugged*.

I have often thought that nobody who didn't know her during that early period really knew her. Perhaps that's why the people who met her later never seemed to feel the love I felt for her—they didn't have that time of pure gold that I had.

The woman that I met in 1950 and the woman that I said good-bye to in 1968 were not the same person. By 1968, the negative, angry, moralistic aspects of her personality had become totally predominant.

**Liberty:** One of the great mysteries of her life, it seems to me, is

how did she get from A to B? How did she change from being this relatively benign . . .

**Branden:** I don't think that's a mystery. Her life was very difficult. *Atlas Shrugged* was a fatal blow in many respects. To spend thirteen years on that book and then to re-emerge into the world has got to be a stunning kind of negative experience. She had left Galt's Gulch and come out into a rather sleazy world. And the emotional intensity of the years writing *Atlas* had worn her to a nub. She had no energy left, for what faced her, for the opposition, for the fight, for the difficulties. She just had nothing left. She was tired. Tired to the bone. And she had no idea what she wanted to do next. With the creation of John Galt in *Atlas* she had accomplished her life's ambition, which was to present fully her concept of the ideal man. There was nothing left to do. That was terrible for a woman who had worked so hard all her life.

The combination of these things just wiped her out. And brought out all the bitterness . . . which was coming . . . I mean, this was not brand new. But after *Atlas* . . . the bitterness, the sense of alienation, the sense that the world had nothing to offer her, they just snowballed.

**Liberty:** This is the most difficult element of Rand's life for me to understand . . . that after *Atlas Shrugged* was published she was depressed by the reaction of the world to it. It seemed to me that she could hardly have expected the critics to react better than they did. And the public reacted by buying the book.

**Branden:** I remember a couple of months after my book came out. My editor said to me, "Well, are you going through post-partum depression yet?" It's very typical of writers. You are so immersed in a project that excites you, that uses all of you. There's no part of you that isn't used in writing a book. And when you come out of it you wonder, "What am I going to do with me?" A lot of people go through severe depression after. Ayn certainly did.

What threw her was not so much the critics, though they were a little worse than she had expected. It was the absence of any peer—of anyone who she felt had accomplished something important—standing up and acknowledging what she had

*Ayn said several times that she would love it if someone would come along with a proof for animal rights. It was something she felt quite strongly about, but she herself was not able to find proof.*

done. It was predominantly kids who responded. It was people whose lives were really beginning.

She wanted somebody of stature, somebody of achievement, to stand up *publicly* and say this is a great book and this is why it's a great book. There wasn't one such person. Not one. She felt absolutely alone, totally cut off from her generation. It's one's own generation that can be the most nurturing. And she got nothing from them.

**Liberty:** I have a feeling that part of what cut her off from her own generation was the intensity of her relationship with Nathan, and to a lesser extent with you and the other members of the collective, but that prior to the development of this relationship that she had more friends who were more or less her equal. We know from your book about her friends in California. We know that for some time after she came to New York she saw people socially like Frances and Henry Hazlitt

and occasionally Margit and Ludwig von Mises.

**Branden:** Yes, but those relationships were never really close. And they were never philosophical enough to suit her, not in her terms. These were people she liked who in certain ways she admired very much, but they were not fulfilling relationships because they were not philosophical enough. That's all she really cared about.

The Collective occupied a unique place in her life where she could talk about the things she really cared about and know we were fascinated every second. And that was terribly important to her. She never had it before.

**Liberty:** Was Murray Rothbard the first person expelled from Rand's circle?

**Branden:** Oh no! There were people before that.

*There was nothing mean or vicious about Ayn, nothing. But she did hurt people terribly because she was proud of the fact that she was a moralist and she did not understand the difference between morality and psychology.*

**Liberty:** Oh, really? Who were they?

**Branden:** They're not names you would know, but students, young people . . . I mean, Nathan was expelling left and right.

**Liberty:** Yes, he mentions quite a few trials but the only people he mentions who were expelled were Murray Rothbard, John Hospers, and Edith Efron. Is that because the other people weren't known?

**Branden:** They weren't known. But I can't believe that's his reason for not giving specifics. His only description [in *Judgment Day*] of his cruelty to people is the same example I used in *Passion*—the young girl who was involved with Leonard Peikoff. Somewhere he has blocked his own years of savagery out of his mind. There were dozens of such instances of young students who were expelled and were just shattered.

**Liberty:** He mentions to your credit that you didn't show up for your trial with Rand presiding. Elsewhere he notes that Rothbard didn't show up for his trial with Nathan presiding, which he interpreted almost as an admission of guilt by Rothbard. How many of these people actually showed up at their trial?

**Branden:** Oh, they all did.

**Liberty:** Except you and Rothbard?

**Branden:** Yes, but the others had a different relationship with Nathan. There was no question of not showing up. The other people felt, "If Ayn has something to say about me it's terribly important that I know it even if it hurts like hell." So they came.

These kangaroo courts didn't always mean expulsion, but they were held and they were agony, they were awful. And I have discovered somewhat to my surprise that twenty years later, that with some people the scars remain, a lot of the pain remains, the confusion . . . I'm happy to say that my book helped with a lot of that. It was horrible what was done to people. Awful.

The savagery of those years was one of the reasons I wrote *Passion*. It is my *mea culpa* for the fact that I sat passively, hating what was being done to people, and did nothing. And it is my attempt to make those years intelligible, to explain them to

the victims.

**Liberty:** What sort of things?

**Branden:** What was very terrible was that Nathan was everybody's therapist, so his denunciation was much more damaging than Ayn's. Ayn would talk strictly morally and philosophically. Nathan talked psychologically and they had been in session with him and he was supposed to know and he was supposed to be the world's greatest psychologist. So if he denounced them it hit at their self-esteem in a way that nothing else could. And he used that. He was constantly denouncing. It's not clear in his book, but, oh boy, I remember it, loud and clear. Ayn seemed like a pussycat in comparison.

**Liberty:** Most of the people who were closely associated with Rand during the 50s and 60s were like you and Nathan—just developing their own intellectual character. But there were three members who were closely associated with Rand during these years who came to the Collective fully developed intellectually—Edith Efron, John Hospers, and Murray Rothbard. Is it a coincidence that these individuals were all purged?

**Branden:** It was just a coincidence. I mean, ultimately everyone was purged. (laughs)

**Liberty:** Did Nathan's influence alienate Rand from intellectual contacts other than the incestuous contact with the collective, which consisted of her intellectual offspring?

**Branden:** That's hard to answer. I would have to say that he didn't alienate her. It was her own doing, in later years, after *Atlas* came out. I think Nathan would have been interested in meeting other intellectuals and talking to them.

**Liberty:** Would you give the same answer if we were talking about the period from 1953 to 1957, before *Atlas* came out.

**Branden:** Ayn was not that alienated at that time, she was simply very, very busy.

**Liberty:** Was the Collective a nebulous thing, or did people come and go all the time?

**Branden:** Oh, no, the original Collective stayed.

**Liberty:** Who were members of the original Collective?

**Branden:** Let's see. Nathan and me. Joan and Allan Blumenthal. Alan Greenspan. Leonard Peikoff. Mary Ann Rukavina. Elayne and Harry Kalberman. Then later Edith Efron.

**Liberty:** At some point, Erika and Henry Mark Holzer and Kay

*Leonard Peikoff sued me because I used the tapes of my interviews with Ayn. He said they were his property.*

Nolte Smith were in close relationship. Were they members of the Collective?

**Branden:** Yes indeed.

**Liberty:** Was John Hospers ever a member?

**Branden:** No. He was never in full philosophical agreement. He was fascinated by Ayn's politics, but he was interested in other aspects of her too, which I think they talked about more than politics. They disagreed in other areas, specifically, as I recall, in epistemology.

**Liberty:** Was Patricia [Nathaniel Branden's second wife] a member of the collective or was she on the periphery?

**Branden:** She was not a member of the Collective. I guess you'd say she was on the periphery. She was an enchanting young woman, but she was not an intellectual. We saw her occasionally. That was about it.

**Liberty:** What about her husband, Larry Scott?

**Branden:** Larry also was on the periphery. This is not, by the way, a statement of inferior worth. Larry is a fine, decent, intelligent man. It's just that the Collective was a group of friends who had been together for years.

**Liberty:** Part of the reason I asked whether they were in the Collective is that I have heard from you and others that Nathan required everyone in the collective to take therapy from him.

**Branden:** I know there has been a lot of talk about whether or not Nathan did marriage therapy with Patrecia and Larry. He denies it. It probably was not official therapy in the sense that a fee was paid, and it did not last a long time. But I clearly recall—and I was appalled—that he did have long conversations with them to “help” them with their marriage—while he was having an affair with Patrecia.

**Liberty:** Speaking of Patrecia, one persistent rumor has it that her death was suspicious, that she may have committed suicide.

**Branden:** There is no question in my mind that it was an accident. First of all, everything I know about her tells me that suicide would not be possible for her. Secondly, it's almost impossible to drown yourself in a swimming pool if you can swim. You just can't. When people want to die by drowning they swim out to where they can't get back.

**Liberty:** Rand was exempt from psychotherapy from Nathan. And I presume you were . . .

**Branden:** No, no. He was my psychologist all the years we were married.

**Liberty:** Oh my God. What a nightmare!

**Branden:** You cannot imagine what a nightmare.

**Liberty:** What was your role in the organized Objectivist movement?

**Branden:** If one considers that Ayn was God and that Nathan was Jesus Christ, that left me the Virgin Mary. Which Nathan would certainly dispute. But that was sort of how it was. I was number three.

**Liberty:** We know that Rand was the theoretician and the center, but in a very important sense Nathan was the gatekeeper...

**Branden:** That's right . . .

**Liberty:** He controlled access to Rand and he interpreted Rand for the inner circle and the various concentric circles radiating out. I have the impression that you were the business manager, the one who saw to it that the bills were paid . . .

**Branden:** I really ran NBI. In *Judgment Day*, Nathan talks about my passivity about writing in the 60s, but there is a little thing he chose not to mention.

We had a *very* concrete agreement that in those years he was to write his book—what became *The Psychology of Self-Esteem*—and I was to run NBI. When he finished his book he would run NBI and I would write. Well, my turn didn't come. He does not mention that. He simply says that I wasn't writing, that I was passive about writing.

**Liberty:** Does this relate to his apparent hostility about the financial settlement he made with you?

**Branden:** We had a contract that he unilaterally broke. A man is supposed to honor contracts; surely an Objectivist appreciates the sanctity of contracts. But he just said, “No more.” I was stunned.

**Liberty:** You mean he just stopped sending the checks?

**Branden:** That's right.

**Liberty:** Did he give any explanation?

**Branden:** He didn't think it was fair.

**Liberty:** Did you sue him?

**Branden:** Yes I did.

**Liberty:** Did you win?

**Branden:** It didn't get to court. It would have taken four years to get to court and neither of us wanted to do it. My lawyer was asking an impossible sum. His lawyer was offering nothing. I finally said to Nathan this is ridiculous, we'll be spending money on lawyers the rest of our lives and get nowhere they are too far apart. I said, “You and I are both angry about this. Nevertheless I think we should get together and talk, not yell.

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*If one considers that Ayn was God and that Nathan was Jesus Christ, that left me the Virgin Mary. Which Nathan would certainly dispute.*

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Nobody is allowed to yell. We have to talk about this until we settle it. Because if we don't settle it, nobody is going to.” And that is exactly what happened.

**Liberty:** Speaking of lawsuits, I understand that Leonard Peikoff sued you over *Passion*?

**Branden:** He sued me because I used Ayn's tapes which he said were his property. The whole thing was ridiculous. Of course they're not his property. Ayn had said on the tapes a couple of times that there was much too much material here for the little semi-biography I was doing [*Who Is Ayn Rand?*] and that I may one day want to write a full biography and I will have this material. She gave her consent and never retracted it.

Our lawyers settled. I got more than I wanted. For instance, I have the right to do a book, 50% of which is material from the tapes. The biography was maybe 6 or 7% those tapes, so it's ridiculous. I can do anything I want with them. Legally Leonard owns them, but I have the right during my lifetime to do just about anything I want.

**Liberty:** Did Nathan use them?

**Branden:** I don't think so. I think that instead of the tapes he read me. So there is material in *Judgment Day* from the tapes, but it is the material that I used from the tapes.

**Liberty:** Then do you think Nathan used your book as a major source for his?

**Branden:** *Judgment Day* would have been quite different if he hadn't read my book. But I wish he'd used it as a source for discussing Ayn psychologically.

**Liberty:** One of the peculiarities of *Judgment Day*, a book written by a professional psychologist of considerable renown, about Ayn Rand, with whom he was intimate, is that he neglected to explain such psychologically important details from her background as the fact that she was smarter than those around her, or that she was taking amphetamines all the time. Or the fact that she grew up as an overbright, not particularly attractive girl. These seem like important data for a psychologist.

**Branden:** What astonished me about that book is it's absolute lack of psychological insight. . . into Ayn, into me, into his friends. Nathan told me that he didn't want to give me a long, elaborate interview for *The Passion of Ayn Rand* because there was a lot of material that he wanted to keep for his book. I thought, “Oh, great, he's got all sorts of psychological insights

into Ayn." I read the whole book and there was nothing there. Nothing!

**Liberty:** Do you think your book sort of set Nathan up to write his? Do you think that he could have written his book before yours?

**Branden:** He says that he thought of his book two years before I started mine but I never heard him say so at the time. I leave that to you and your readers to decide.

**Liberty:** What do you think of the apparent fact that Objectivism had radically different effects on different people? For some of those who took an interest in it, Objectivism was a source of inspiration that helped them to lead very creative lives, while other peoples' lives seemed to have been embittered and shriveled by their experience with Objectivism.

**Branden:** Well, it's not surprising. The first category is by far the larger because most of the people involved were not

*His account of his first encounters with Ayn is about 25% her compliments of him. I think in the course of the book he repeats every compliment anyone ever paid to him in his life.*

close—physically or psychologically—to Nathan or Ayn. The people who were close were really desperately hurt in so many ways at so many times. There is a bitterness in some of them. In my travels doing publicity, I found there was a lot of pain in people—more than I would have expected—but also less bitterness than I would have expected.

**Liberty:** Do you still have contacts with any members of the Collective?

**Branden:** Oh yes indeed. I am very close to Joan and Allan Blumenthal. I am close to Alan Greenspan. And Edith Efron and I are good friends. I don't see Leonard, obviously, nor Mary Ann. I have seen the Kalbermans a few times; we're not close, but there's no problem there. I see the Holzers; I'm close to them. Kay and Phillip Smith and I are very good friends. Robert and Bea Hessen are good friends. And John Hospers. They're wonderful people. What has happened is that I've resurrected my relationships with those people I really cared about. The ones I didn't care about, no.

**Liberty:** To what extent is Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan still an advocate of Objectivist ideas?

**Branden:** I can't say that I've questioned him about it in detail. I know that Ayn's political-economic theory is very important to him, and that always was crucial because that's his work. Nothing has changed there to the best of my knowledge. And I believe he would be in general agreement, probably the same way I am, with the basic concepts. But I can't say that in recent years I talked to him much about Objectivism *per se*.

**Liberty:** Murray Rothbard insists that Greenspan was always a Keynesian. My own recollection from hearing him lecture in the 60s is that he was an Austrian, or close to one . . .

**Branden:** And that was true when we met. He was never a Keynesian, to the best of my knowledge.

**Liberty:** Greenspan strikes me as the odd-man in the Collective. His relationship to Rand wasn't the most important element in his life . . . his life didn't revolve around his relationship with Rand. My impression is that for most members of the Collective their lives really did.

**Branden:** Alan was running a large business and he had a life of his own. He was fascinated by Ayn; I think he cared about her very much; he wanted to understand her ideas. He was very much part of the Collective. But he had his own life.

**Liberty:** When he became prominent in national affairs . . . Did this cause any friction in his relationship with Rand?

**Branden:** Oh, no. Ayn was delighted. She felt what he was doing was wonderful. There was no friction whatever.

**Liberty:** I heard a story about her having lunch with him in a posh club in New York and getting in a fight with him and accusing him of being a coward . . .

**Branden:** Oh, yes, I know. But that didn't mean anything . . . I mean, that way Ayn . . . that kind of thing didn't last with her. I mean everybody went through that. Four thousand times.

Unfortunately, she was very quick to make such accusations. But fortunately, the heat didn't last very long. It was miserable to endure, but one would find, perhaps the next day, that she was in the process of retracting her accusation.

**Liberty:** What did Ayn Rand think of the people who read her books, who signed up for NBI courses? One has the impression, at least from what Nathan says, that she didn't think very much of them.

**Branden:** When she saw in the beginning that they didn't immediately understand everything that she wanted them to understand, that their lives didn't immediately change, she was very disappointed and felt, "they're nothing." But as time went by, she saw that there were changes, that they were learning and that things were happening. And she was far more pleased with them as time went by and she came to realize that what she had originally expected was not possible, that learning and growing is a much slower process than she had thought. There were many of them that she did not like and many that she did like. She was very pleased with the phenomenon of NBI and essentially pleased with its students.

**Liberty:** NBI must have been immensely profitable.

**Branden:** No, not immensely. It was certainly profitable, but nobody got rich. We were plowing money back constantly.

**Liberty:** I had the impression based on the fees NBI charged and the expenses it had in relation to its tape transcription courses that they must have been substantial profit centers.

**Branden:** Yes and no. We had to put ads in papers all over the country, we had to keep track of our representatives, we had enormous overhead in New York and a big staff and we did our own production.

**Liberty:** Another member of the Collective told me that Nathan's memory is notoriously bad . . .

**Branden:** Yes it is.

**Liberty:** . . . and that, for example, his account about how his affair with Rand started on a trip to Toronto in 1954 for a piano recital by Allan Blumenthal . . .

**Branden:** He's got the wrong episode. The affair started on a trip to Toronto in 1954, but not for Allan's piano recital, which took place years later. A lot of things are very scrambled. Yes.

**Liberty:** Are there other specific examples of his making major factual errors?

**Branden:** I wouldn't say "major factual errors." It's what he leaves out more than anything else that is incredible. Important details are just not there. For instance, he says that he will list all his documents in the Epilogue, but he lists none there.

**Liberty:** Yes, the only source he mentions that I can recall cited

in the entire book other than his memory was Patricia's diaries.

**Branden:** His account of his first encounters with Ayn is about 25% her compliments to him. (laughs) I think in the course of the book he repeats every compliment anyone ever paid to him in his life. He cannot resist it. He's got to keep going into it again and again. Even after it's perfectly established that Ayn thinks he's wonderful he's got to keep repeating it and repeating it and repeating it.

**Liberty:** It's difficult not to notice the contrast between his treatment of you in his book and your treatment of him in your biography of Rand. His cruelty has been noted in virtually every review of the book I have read.

**Branden:** Yes, and it pleases me very much that readers have found his attitude to me so transparent.

*I was never the Whore of Babylon. Nor did I run to Nathan with confessions as he says I did. I am not a pathological confesser and I never have been.*

**Liberty:** Why do you think he took this attitude?

**Branden:** I think the reason is made clear in *Judgment Day*, from his treatment of me, to his treatment of Ayn, his treatment of Joan and Allan, and his treatment of Alan Greenspan, that he is not a man who takes rejection well. Clearly, I rejected him romantically. Clearly, Ayn rejected him in every way possible. He made overtures to Allan and Joan and to Alan Greenspan which were rejected; they did not want to see him or have anything to do with him. Now I suppose the time has come for revenge.

**Liberty:** When did this happen?

**Branden:** Oh, with Joan and Allan it was the late 70s.

**Liberty:** So this would be after they split with Rand?

**Branden:** About that time. With Alan Greenspan I think it was later. But he was roundly rejected. And it's really then that his diatribes went into high gear. Ayn refused to talk to him when he called her, but it started before that. She really rejected him at the end of their relationship. My own rejection was of a different sort, which he goes into endlessly, ridiculously endlessly. I had no idea until I read the book that my sexual rejection of him was still eating at him. My god, it's been almost thirty years! As far as I can tell, that's the basic source of his animus against me. I had no idea that this was the case, but it just shouts from the pages of the book.

There are some other things I want to say about *Judgment Day*. I want to say something about my friends, about Joan and Allan Blumenthal and Alan Greenspan. These three have been my dear friends for many years—Joan since I was 12 years old. They are my dear friends because they are among the most honest, the most intelligent, decent people that I have every been privileged to know. Nathan's diatribes against them demean only himself. I think it's truly disgusting what he does to them. But I think it's refuted by its obvious venom. It won't be taken seriously, it won't be believed, because his own psychology is showing so clearly. He takes great pains to announce that he is a different man today, particularly in his treatment of people, than he was in the 50s and 60s. In fact, nothing has changed; his book makes it clear that he has remained harsh, cold, cruelly and irrationally judgmental—with the added fillip of being out to get whoever may have scorned

him.

About me, the inaccuracies go on forever. You know, some of my friends have been very concerned . . . was I hurt, was I in pain over his account of me? I've got to say my basic reaction was amusement, and remains so. I am very angry at him for his treatment of Ayn and his treatment of my friends. His treatment of me is so ludicrous that I cannot even be angry. And I want to give you some chapter and verse.

Contrary to the impression one might gather from *Judgment Day*, I was never the Whore of Babylon. Yes, I had been involved with young men before Nathan and I married—a few. And I am proud of each one of them.

Nor did I run to Nathan with confessions as he says I did. I am not a pathological confesser and I never have been. Each of the so-called confessions was wrung out of me by the constant demands from the man who was—God help me—my moral mentor, my boyfriend, and then my husband, and worst of all, my therapist. He was the man who was going to help me reach the exalted status where I would be fully in love with him. Confession was supposedly in the interest of my self-esteem to a man who morally flayed me each time I did it. But I was certainly not running to him with confessions.

As for my marital relationship with him, I was precisely as sexually cold with him as he said I was. But it is interesting and typical that much later in the book he mentions that he and I ended up in the same boat, that he with Ayn felt morally and intellectually bound to love a woman he didn't love and that he realized that I had felt the same thing about him. But it's interesting and typical of his never presenting anybody's context except his own . . . except for that one comment, he never indicates any reason other than pure . . . I don't know . . . it sounds like I just wouldn't respond to him sexually. And this is a theme that goes through the entire book. In even the smallest of his failures, he presents a lengthy and presumably understandable and rational context for his own actions. For anyone else, and most especially including Ayn, there's no context whatever. Just none. I mean . . . only he has context. And that was always true of him.

*Ayn was a woman who, whatever her faults, nevertheless was utterly devoted to reason. What mattered most of all to her was to see, to grasp, to understand. For almost 14 years increasingly what Nathan gave her was totally inexplicable.*

There's something sort of funny, I don't think that it will be of interest to anybody. But he talks about the beginning of our affair, and I couldn't stop laughing. It didn't happen where, when, or how he said it did.

He talks endlessly about my sadness and my guilt. It was there all right. But what he doesn't say was that he infinitely helped to create it. Even when we first met, before we met Ayn, I had to listen to endless conversations about how could I ever be interested in another man. Who by definition was much less than he.

He didn't learn his genius for inducing guilt from Ayn Rand. He had it when he was 18 years old. Now I don't mean that the blame is his alone.

For it to happen I had to be guilt-prone, which I was. Nathan

was the young man I thought I most admired, and it disturbed me terribly that I wasn't romantically in love with him. I understand it today. I didn't then. I understand that what most draws me to a man—to anyone—is a quality of goodness, of decency, which I did not find in Nathan, whatever his purely intellectual powers. He once told me, during those days, that he felt he was basically amoral. He was correct, and that was, for me, a sexual kiss of death.

When he talks about my love affair towards the end of our marriage, he says quite truthfully that he finally agreed to it. What he neglects to say is that he didn't tell me that he had already begun an affair with Patrecia. I didn't learn that for years. I didn't know that before he said okay to me he had already begun an affair with Patrecia. He allowed me and the

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*I clearly remember him telling people in therapy and out that if a man wasn't half in love with Ayn Rand it was a serious flaw of self-esteem. A woman who wasn't half in love with him also had a serious lack of self-esteem. It was excruciatingly embarrassing.*

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man I loved to feel overwhelmed by his magnanimity and benevolence.

In fact, when I accused him over the years of caring for Patrecia more than he would say to me, he did the worst thing that he or anyone else has ever done to me. Of everything he has done, and there have been a lot of things, I think this is the lowest. What he kept telling me is that if I doubted his honor and truthfulness the cause was my own insecurity and low self-esteem. He was saying this while he was having an affair with her. He is a psychologist whose specialty is self-esteem and he was attempting to use my respect for him as a psychologist to cause me to doubt myself instead of him.

But in a way it shouldn't be too surprising for a man who in 1967 while he was lying about his whole life, he was planning to record Galt's speech and rehearsing his role as John Galt each Saturday with Ayn and Patrecia, sitting among the Collective as audience. If it weren't tragic, it would be farcical.

Now I want to talk for a bit about Ayn Rand because that's the most important focus of Nathan's venom. I found his treatment of her absolutely appalling, and without a moment or shred of psychological insight. He presents her as a woman who for no reason at all frequently goes into tirades against him making his life hell. As usual, he gives no context to her behavior.

Ayn was a woman who, whatever her faults, was utterly devoted to reason. What mattered most of all to her was to see, to grasp, to understand. But for almost 14 years, increasingly, what Nathan gave her was totally inexplicable.

Doesn't he have a glimmer of a notion of what his years of deception did to such a woman? For the first time in her life, she was faced with the rationally unintelligible, with his actions that didn't jibe with his words, with words that contradicted each other or simply made no sense, with a man who constantly said that he loved her passionately and couldn't live without her—and ran from her? This from the man she loved with all her heart.

I saw first hand the excruciating effort of her will to understand what was going on, the endless conversations with

Nathan and with me, the endless papers she wrote to clarify her thinking, the ruthless endurance that's worthy of any of her heroes that wouldn't allow her to shrug her shoulders and walk away, that effort to understand while he was lying and giving her a totally contradictory reality was heart-breaking to see. The explanation that would have made his behavior intelligible to her—that he was a liar and a cheat—never occurred to her.

Yes, I know he had a context. I presented that context in *Passion*. But nevertheless he was a liar and a cheat. And when she did grasp it, it came close to destroying her, perhaps it did destroy her. Where is Nathan's vaunted compassion? Where is his psychological knowledge? This part of his book disgusts me beyond my power to name.

And I've got to say that this kind of blindness is typical. He writes at length about Ayn's cruelty in the question periods after lectures. He doesn't say that often he flayed students alive himself, whether she was there or wasn't. Ask them—any of them. They were terrified of him. He talks at length about her cruelty to her friends and his. He doesn't say that he was the real author of the reign of terror against them. He was their psychologist, and at end, their primary denouncer and nemesis. It was he who organized the kangaroo courts at which a friend would be told by Nathan of the moral and psychological meaning of their actions. Morally it was anathema and psychologically it was probably social metaphysics. He had a lot more power over them than Ayn because he was their psychologist. It was his verdict that specifically hit at their self-esteem, and he used his power like a club.

**Liberty:** It seems to me that he must have used the information he gained as a therapist to the members of the group must have been very useful to him.

**Branden:** You know, there was something he did that I used to scream at him about. He had a knack, and part of it came through therapy, of knowing people's most vulnerable, most painful point. He would often publicly make some crack, sup-

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*Insofar as Objectivism became like a cult, it was Nathan who did that, not Ayn. As he said, he loved it.*

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posedly humorous, that hit right at what hurt most. That used to drive me up the wall. It was so cruel. . . . by the way the young girl whose trial he talks about in his book was also his patient.

**Liberty:** Leonard's girlfriend?

**Branden:** Right. It's incredible. The one example of his cruelty is this single episode. Does he not remember the host of other examples? Does he not know that the pain still remains, the nightmares he created? He doesn't even remember the names of the people whose lives he's ruined.

**Liberty:** One thing that strikes me is that nearly everyone in the Collective has a lot of hostility toward Nathan.

**Branden:** I have to say that until this book I didn't have. I mean, I just didn't feel anything. And I can only say that his treatment of me is irrelevant to what I feel now. It's his treatment of my friends and of Ayn that I just cannot forgive him for.

I guess it was about 1980 when he and I still saw each other occasionally. He was making unpleasant remarks about an old friend and I'd had it. So I sat him down and at considerable

length I told him exactly what he had done specifically to this friend over the years chapter and verse. At the end of it, there were tears in his eyes. He told me that he hadn't remembered, that he felt terrible, and that I was to tell her how deeply he regretted the harm he had caused. The next time I saw him he was talking about her exactly as he used to as though it hadn't happened. It was totally out of his mind. During those years he badly hurt many hundreds of people. I'd like to see some regret. There is no acknowledgement of it.

You know what's particularly horrible to me? He keeps saying that he sees the events of those years as high drama, as theater. To me it's like seeing the Holocaust as high drama. I don't know what dimension he lives in where shattered people are theater and the destruction of a giant such as Ayn is drama. This is just beyond me. You know, there is something I have never told anyone, but I am angry enough to tell it now.

Ayn had originally intended to write an introduction to his *Psychology of Self-Esteem* in which she would be calling it a work of genius and praising it and saying what was wonderful about it. When I first told Nathan that I wanted to tell Ayn the truth, the first thing he said to me . . . no, no, it wasn't at that point, it was earlier, when I kept telling him she has to be told the truth, and that if he doesn't I'm going to. He said, "Just wait until she writes the introduction."

**Liberty:** Another thing that intrigues me . . . it's apparent from *Judgment Day* that your greatest flaw was your inability to love him . . . was this an element of psychotherapy? Was one of the ways you could tell a person was healthy was that if he was a male that he greatly admired Nathan and if a female that she was sexually attracted to him? Was this an essential element of his therapy?

**Branden:** Oh, definitely. I remember him telling people in therapy and out . . . he says that he argued with people about [Rand's] view of sex. Not only did he not argue with her view, but he was more royalist than the king. I clearly remember him telling people in therapy and out that if a man wasn't half in love with Ayn Rand it was a serious flaw of self-esteem. A woman who wasn't half in love with him also had a serious lack of self-esteem. It was excruciatingly embarrassing.

There's just one other point I want to make. Throughout the book, Nathan makes it clear that everything ugly that he did was motivated only by his desire not to give pain. Telling Ayn that he loved her, then not telling her he didn't, lying to me about Patrecia, and lying to Ayn about Patrecia was out of a desire not to give pain. This is preposterous. I've never known anyone more indifferent to causing pain. He has never known when he caused pain and he never cared.

**Liberty:** Was Nathan trying to seek power over the people around him?

**Branden:** He certainly had it, and it doesn't fall into someone's lap.

**Liberty:** Was this an important difference between the power he had over people and the power Rand had? That she never sought power or cherished it the way Nathan did?

**Branden:** She never had power.

**Liberty:** Really? You've described how people had so much respect for her that if she asked them to rethink their position on any subject they would do so . . . Isn't this a very important kind of power?

**Branden:** As I've said, Nathan had the power that only a psychologist had, because he could hit at their self-esteem, he could hit at so many things. People are terribly vulnerable to

their psychologist. Tremendously. Because you open yourself up wide. When he then starts flaying you alive . . . that's the most painful, destructive thing in the world.

Ayn did not have that power. She didn't get inside them. She had the power of reason. That was it. And the power of morality, which can be very dangerous. But this was not a woman who wanted power *per se*. I've never seen a sign of that in her.

**Liberty:** One striking similarity between your book and Nathan's is the view that the Objectivist movement was not a cult. You both mention that it doesn't meet the dictionary definition of a cult.

**Branden:** God knows, there were cult-like aspects and there were people involved who were cultists. But what's very rele-

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*Nathan was everybody's therapist, so his denunciation was much more damaging than Ayn's. Ayn would talk strictly morally and philosophically. Nathan talked psychologically, so when he denounced them it hit at their self-esteem in a way that nothing else could. Ayn seemed like a pussycat in comparison.*

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vant to my not calling it a cult, and I know I'm sort of skating on thin ice . . . the appeal to people, whatever happened to them after, was reason. That was the crucial appeal. If you take any other cult in the world, that's not true. Here the appeal was predominantly reason. They may have lost it somewhere along the way, they may have become fanatics, but the essential appeal of Objectivism was certainly not the appeal of a cult.

**Liberty:** There is the long passage in *Judgment Day* where Nathan lists the unstated beliefs of the Collective that certainly sound cult-like . . .

**Branden:** I think he exaggerates a lot with that list of beliefs.

That's not the way it was experienced, that's not the way it was practiced. I mean there were elements of that, there were people who would fit that description well. But that's not what predominantly was going on, even towards the end.

**Liberty:** Reading *Judgment Day* I got the idea that there was very definitely a cult, but that Rand was peripheral to it. She may have been its beneficiary in a very narrow sense, but the cult was headed by Nathan, who was also its chief beneficiary.

**Branden:** No question. He was the one who made a crusade out of her theory of sex, for example. She didn't. Insofar as Objectivism became like a cult, it was Nathan who did that, not Ayn. Ayn didn't have contacts with these people. Her contacts were essentially with the Collective. But Nathan had contacts with many hundreds of people, with thousands of people. He was definitely the one who was keen for creating the cult aspect. And as he said, he loved it.

**Liberty:** Has your view of Rand as a philosopher changed during the past few years?

**Branden:** Not since publication of *Passion*, but it has changed since 1968. In terms of fundamentals, I am an Objectivist. But there are a great many aspects with which I no longer agree: a lot about her view of sex, a lot about her view of emotions, a lot of what she had to say about psychology. There are many things in which I think she was simply wrong. One of the

*continued on page 76*

## History

# The New Benefactors

## How the Rich Finagled the Middle-Class to Support the Arts

by Richard Kostelanetz

By mid-century, the new aristocracy of capitalist rich had grown tired of patronizing their favored artists with their own money. Then Nelson Rockefeller had an idea: let the taxpayer pay.

The first state arts council in the U.S. was established in New York by Nelson Rockefeller, just after he had been elected governor. Rockefeller extended the efforts of his predecessor, W. Averell Harriman, to establish a state arts agency; and as an enterprising collector of visual art and the son of the founder of the Museum of Modern Art, he wanted to establish in New York (and eventually in the entire U.S.) an institution similar to the British Arts Council.

However, there appeared to be another motive at work—a motive as mixed and cunning as many other Nelson Rockefeller “public interest” designs. Since the operation of museums and symphony orchestras had become progressively more costly in the post-WW II period, arts councils could also serve the function of making the financial drains of culture less dependent upon the patronage of rich people. Initially, this might be regarded as a beneficial development, as wealthy patrons could be capricious; on the other hand, the state’s assumption of expenses previously borne by wealthy trustees would take a load off their pocket-books. (And since trustees of orchestras and museums also tend to be large contributors to political campaigns, some of this money thereby saved could be funneled into more partisan purposes.) If arts councils could be blessed with government money, it was calculated, then the tax-paying middle class would implicitly collaborate with a wealthier class in paying for the museums and symphony orchestras. The rich would

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retain their traditional control. In New York State itself, a precedent for this public support of a private cultural vision had been established in the construction of Lincoln Center, which likewise began as a Rockefeller family project. An accurate term for this diversion is “socializing the costs.”

Governor Rockefeller’s speech to the Business Committee for the Arts in Washington, DC, on 17 May, 1971, reveals his thinking:

But in the United States today the arts are also in trouble. The demand for their works, the size of their audiences, the vigor and imaginations of their practitioners have not been matched by their economic prosperity or, in plain fact, their ability to survive. A discouraging number of arts institutions, including many of high prestige and long standing, are literally on the edge of financial disaster.

The cry for help is familiar, of course, but what should not go unnoticed is the unfamiliar formulation. “The arts” that are “in trouble” are not artists or even particular arts (at times reportedly “dead” from avant-garde revolutions) but “arts institutions” that, in Rockefeller’s scenario, “are literally on the edge

of financial disaster.” This could account for why the New York State Legislature’s budget statute promises “state financial assistance to nonprofit cultural organizations offering services to the general public, including but not limited to orchestras, dance companies, museums and theater groups.” In the same speech, Rockefeller continued:

We here in New York State have more reason than most to know in accurate detail what the present-day predicament of the arts really is. For over a decade now our State Council on the Arts, which I was rash enough—I wish I could say prophetic enough—to propose during my first campaign in 1957, has pioneered in the field of governmental assistance for the arts. Over the past two years, the State Legislature . . . has voted substantial appropriations of Aid to Cultural Organizations, larger last year than the sum provided by the federal government for the entire nation.

Thus does New York State take the lead in showing America how to socialize the costs of putatively troubled arts institutions. Governor Rockefeller continues,

What we now know is that no single source can provide the monetary sup-

port which the arts must have. That support must come from a partnership in which government, business and the traditional private patrons each must play a part.

In these sentiments, Nelson Rockefeller echoed the prescription of his older brother, John D. Rockefeller III, who told the *New York Times* (June 23, 1963)

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*If arts councils could be blessed with government money, it was calculated, then the tax-paying middle class would implicitly collaborate with a wealthier class in paying for the museums and symphony orchestras. The rich would retain their traditional control.*

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that only with government patronage will America be able "to close the final gap between our present resources, comprising actual income and private philanthropy, and the costs of operating our [arts] institutions." Thus the Brothers Rockefeller transformed the New York precedent of costs-socialization into a truth valid for all America, today and tomorrow and for the foreseeable future.

In his speech, Nelson Rockefeller drew upon the conclusions of a book entitled *The Performing Arts: Problems and Prospects* (1965), a high-flown "commission study" that was funded by the Rockefeller Brothers Fund, Inc., and prefaced by John D. Rockefeller III. That book, as well as the publicity it generated, helped pave the way for the Rockefeller scenario of government collaboration in arts funding. The chief of the "Special Studies Project Staff" that undertook this study was Nancy Hanks, whom Richard Nixon later appointed chairman of the National Endowment for the Arts. Among the Rockefeller panelists was August Heckscher, director of the Twentieth Century Fund, which had itself commissioned two Princeton University economists, William J. Baumol and William G. Bowen (the latter to become Princeton's president within the next decade), to produce *The Performing*

*Arts—The Economic Dilemma* (1966), a scholarly book that came to similar conclusions, as well as generated similar publicity, about the need for generous government support for the arts. Of course, all "prestigious" foundations that sponsor investigations expect to generate publicity that will influence policy; but the principal difference between the famous Carnegie Commissions on television, say, and the Rockefeller-sponsored reports on the Arts is that there are no Carnegies around nowadays with a vested interest in public television.

The immediate device ensuring public/private collaboration appears within the NYSCA application itself, which reflects in turn the legislative mandate that grants should "help offset operating deficits." An application customarily demands a list of desired expenditures and possible receipts, which include money both "earned" (sales) and "unearned" (gifts from private patrons and other funding organizations). The idea for the applicant is to make the second sum (earned and unearned income) less than the first (expenses), leaving a deficit. The nonprofit organization then supposedly applies for government aid in remedying this deficit—and no more than that sum. If, for instance, an organization estimates that next year's expenditures will be \$10, while its projected income is only \$5, it can apply for no more than the remaining \$5. If anticipated income is \$6, while the projected expenses are still \$10, then it can apply for no more than \$4. An applicant cannot ask for anything more than its projected deficit. This concept of supplementing private support with public monies is called "dollar-matching"—no more than one government dollar for every dollar of income. Dollar-matching implicitly creates a paying partnership between the organization's customers and patrons on one side and the taxpayers on the other.

Since moneyed people established the museum or the orchestra in the first place, they would continue to run it by dominating the boards of directors, hiring and firing the staff as they wished, and using the intelligence of curators for their private purposes, much as they always had. Only now these benefits could come at a substantial discount from their actual cost. In signing the legislation establishing the NEA, on Sep-

tember 29, 1965, President Johnson called for a National Theater Company, a National Opera company and a National Ballet Company. As Michael M. Mooney shrewdly observed in *The Ministry of Culture* (1980), "Fourteen years later, there were still no national performing companies. What the arts muscle wanted was subsidies for the companies upon whose boards they already sat." It is not by luck alone, we sometimes remember, that the rich remain rich.

In 1967, in one of his few public statements about NYSCA, Governor Rockefeller declared, "The politics of art are hazardous—yet an unalterable axiom will eliminate all dangers: There must be no political inference in the arts by government." When constituents complained about any NYSCA recipient's alleged misuse of state money, they would get a letter putatively signed by the Governor himself, declaring that neither he as Governor nor the taxpayer could have any legitimate influence over the activities of the Council on the Arts and, by extension, of its recipients. How-

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*Just as Nelson Rockefeller's defense of freedom for the individual artist served to rationalize freedom for the arts institutions' insiders, so the small grants that individual artists and small organizations received from the arts agencies unwittingly served to rationalize the larger grants.*

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ever, in reality, the Governor's and the legislature's insistence that funding in no "ways limited the freedom of artistic expression" became a two-edged sword, ensuring that not only individual artists but the boards of NYSCA-funded institutions would remain immune from politicians'—and thus taxpayers'—pressure.

Just as Nelson Rockefeller's defense of freedom for the individual artist served to rationalize freedom for the arts institutions' insiders, so the small grants that individual artists and small organizations received from the arts agencies unwittingly served to rationalize the

larger grants. Thus, while independent artists and literary presses received a few thousand dollars apiece from NYSCA, in 1979-80 the Museum of Modern Art received \$703,250 in various grants, the Metropolitan Museum received \$799,000, and the Metropolitan Opera received \$990,000. Make no mistake about it, the folks in charge of NYSCA have always known what it was that Nelson Rockefeller wanted them to do.

In *Twigs for an Eagle's Nest*, his memoir of his years at the National Endowment for the Arts, Michael Straight

reports that Nancy Hanks, its chairman from 1969 to 1977, "believed that the central purpose of government funding for the arts was to generate more support from private sources." Hanks's thesis stands in opposition to the motives attributed to Rockefeller—that public funding would take a burden off private sources. However, just two pages before this quotation, Straight cites contrary earlier research about this issue: "All precedents argue that as public funding increases in any area, private philanthropy declines." When I queried Straight about this dis-

crepancy, he referred me to the director of research at the NEA, Harold Horowitz, whose reply read, "A general view is that private philanthropy has increased, but not in proportion to the increases of public funding in the past fifteen years or in proportion to the increases in expenditures of arts organizations." But, in truth, how could the former increase with the government picking up so many deficits? Rockefeller was right. Public funding of large arts institutions had taken private philanthropy off its increasingly expensive hook. □

Letters, continued from page 4


Mosaic Justice

David Friedman ("Simple Principles vs the Real World," September 1989) makes the obtuse statement that "a prominent libertarian" determined "many years ago" that a victim of theft was entitled to take back twice as much as was stolen. While I realize that Moses is "a prominent libertarian," I don't know how many other readers caught the reference to Exodus.

The problem with the two-to-one ratio as opposed to, say, a three-to-one ratio, says Friedman, is that it is invented, not derived. Let us therefore derive the optimal penalty ratio:

Let the amount of attempted theft (measured in units of some *numeraire*) be a decreasing function of the penalty ratio; the greater the penalty ratio, the less attempted theft. This relationship is illustrated by the downward sloping line marked DD in the following graph.

The Optimal Penalty Ratio



Let the cost of defense (net of recoveries from apprehended thieves, measured similarly) be an increasing function of the penalty ratio (how this happens I don't know—all I do know is that I need this to be an increasing function). This relationship is illustrated by the upward sloping line marked SS.

Recognize that the total cost of crime to law-abiding citizens is both the losses to theft and the cost of defense. This total cost is represented by the parabolic curve marked TT. Notice that the total cost of theft is a minimum at some unique penalty ratio. The question Friedman asks is: how do we derive this exact number?

Chicago School economists would try to estimate this optimal penalty ratio via the econometric method. They'd probably come up with an answer like "2.704 plus or minus 18." Those of the Austrian school would rely on *a priori* reasoning. They'd probably say something like "exactly 2 and anyone who disagrees is a fool." (Does this imply that Moses belonged to the Austrian school?)

It seems clear that Friedman believes this ratio is greater than one (in order to deter theft) and less than infinity (because he rejects "absolute" property rights) But Friedman fudges as to what if any exact number he believes in. Instead of grappling with the socially-optimal penalty ratio, Friedman shifts into utilitarianism. Basically, Friedman argues that there are times when it is "good" (in a deeply personal, moral sense) to steal.

Is this "good" stealing argument made to deny the obligation to compensate victims? Friedman doesn't directly address this issue. But, how could stealing be "good" if the thief is unwilling to compensate victims? It seems to me that unwillingness to compensate victims belies anti-libertarian and anti-utilitarian discounting of other peoples' utility. (The Biblical answer, as I see it, is to compensate the victim. A person stealing bread to feed his family is required to turn himself in to the victim and work off his debt.)

The rule of victim compensation precludes stealing which does not increase

social utility in the sense of increasing at least someone's utility without decreasing anyone's utility. This rule was codified in the "takings" clause of the 5th Amendment. If the community determined that it had to build a road through someone's property, it could do so provided it justly compensated the property owner for his loss. This way, the gain to the community had to at least equal the loss to the victim.

Without victim compensation, there is no guarantee that stealing will increase social utility. First of all, individual utilities are not additive. The increase in utility of those benefitting from theft cannot even be compared to the decrease in utility of the uncompensated victims of theft. Second of all, it is predictable for thieves to be greedy so that once they are loosened from the rule of victim compensation their stealing will have as its sole objective their own utility and not social utility in any meaningful sense of that concept.

I don't believe libertarianism implies "absolute" property rights either in the sense that theft is always morally wrong or that thieves should be absolutely punished. I believe libertarianism implies "absolute" property rights in the sense that victims of theft are to be compensated (note: victims may be merciful). Furthermore, when codified into a rule such as the "takings" clause of the 5th Amendment, victim compensation makes for an operational equivalence between utilitarianism and libertarianism.

Clifford F. Thies  
Baltimore, Md.

David Friedman responds: This is all very interesting, but the "prominent libertarian" I referred to was Murray Rothbard, not Moses.

## Essay

# Ersatz Entrepreneurship

by Roger Koopman

**LOST:** the American entrepreneur. Slipped away unnoticed. Suffers from chronic memory loss and lack of identity. Last seen wandering down Federal Grant Way, waving an American flag and singing patriotic hymns. He is harmless. If found, please return him to a government assistance office near you.

Over the past fifteen or more years, our nation has witnessed a literal explosion in small business growth and, following the cynicism of the 1960s, a dramatic reemergence of entrepreneurial activity. And yet, at the very point in our history when terms like "free enterprise" and "entrepreneurship" seem to have gained popular, almost patriotic usage, those terms have gradually come to mean something entirely different than they once did. For indeed, this is the age of the red, white and blue block grant and the star-spangled subsidy. It is a hostile environment for the true entrepreneur, whose habitat is freedom and whose diet is self-reliance. He is, perhaps, a dying breed, who is unwilling to live with the "new" ways and is unable to compete against them. In the marketplace, he is pitted against his own tax dollars and against people who build their businesses around one tax support after another. The American entrepreneur may well be on the road to

extinction.

Allow me to introduce you to Wayne Phillips, self-professed "Government Grant Expert." Wayne's story is instructive, for he is truly a creature of our times. Wayne Phillips has amassed a personal fortune by conducting seminars and selling books that teach people how to start businesses with free money from the government—all in the name of our "great free enterprise system." He has his own definition of "free."

Wayne advertises his services on a widely aired television "talk show," professionally staged to look like an off-the-cuff interview. For the ensuing 30 minutes, he tells people what they want to hear—that they can get something for nothing and feel patriotic in the process. First, he speaks of how "excited" he is that there is "an almost unlimited amount of money available" (\$33 billion) in the form of federal grants and awards that "pay you to start your own business." "There's something for everyone out there," says Wayne, without giving the slight-

est thought to where all that money is coming from.

Wayne cautions people to never go the conventional lending route when opening a business, because "the government will just give you the money so you'll never have to go in debt. If the business doesn't go well, you'll never have to worry about bankruptcy. You can start your own business without any risk involved to you. You don't need to have a credit rating or even fill out a financial statement. It's just given to you, and you can get it very easily and very quickly—at no risk," he bubbles. But don't stop there, says Wayne. "Be sure to repeat the grant process over and over again!"

This is Wayne Phillips' idea of entrepreneurship, and it is shared by many. In reality, people who pass on the risk of doing business to the taxpayer are not entrepreneurs at all. They are counterfeits. The whole concept of entrepreneurship is centered around sufficient belief in yourself and your ideas that you are willing to take the calculated risks—to reap the re-

wards or suffer the losses. You cannot be insulated from failure if you are functioning in an entrepreneurial role. The freedom to fail is just as important as the freedom to succeed, for it brings out the best in us, and requires us to make the wisest, most consumer-sensitive decisions about the running of our businesses and the investing of our money.

Thus, in a market-based system, the poorly-conceived business will either be forced to improve its service to the consumer, or it will fail and the entrepren-

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*Allow me to introduce you to Wayne Phillips, self-professed "Government Grant Expert," who has amassed a fortune by selling books that teach people how to start businesses with "free" money from the government—all in the name of our "great free enterprise system."*

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neur will lose his investment. The risk of failure is a natural check on inferior or unneeded businesses starting in the first place, and is even more pronounced when the new or expanding enterprise must seek outside investors or institutional financing. Whoever's money is at risk will exercise a powerful positive influence on the business decisions that are made. But this is not the case when the "investor" is a bureaucrat giving out tax dollars that aren't his own. He has no stake in the company's success and the recipient of his grant has no real stake, either. It would be foolish to infer that this person is an "entrepreneur."

The fact that business grants and subsidies have gained such popular acceptance is an indication of how far removed politics has become from the basic economics of a free society. Invariably, these programs are sold to us on the specious argument that they "create" jobs and expand the economy. Nothing could be further from the truth! Where is the net gain when government taxes the private sector so it can later return the taxes in the form of thinly-veiled welfare for those who are unsuccessful, unproductive, and unwilling to assume their own risks? How are more jobs created when job-producing wealth is stripped from the marketplace and reallocated by government "experts" to people whose primary expertise is the writing of clever grant proposals?

Meanwhile, the chambers of commerce and other business groups who support these programs must think the funding for them just floats down from heaven. Do they ever stop to count the true costs? Of course not, and neither does anyone else. It's the age-old problem with government programs that pass out special favors to special interests. Politically-bestowed "benefits" are always very specific and highly visible, while the damage they inflict on the economy as a whole is more generalized and much harder to see. It takes principle to perceive economic truth, and there seems to be far more demand for handouts than principles nowadays.

If we actually knew the number of federal and state programs that offer tax-supported favors to new or existing businesses it would astound us. Indeed, one need look no further than my own home town of 25,000 to see the evidence of this, where local officials are falling all over themselves in arranging

block grants and assorted other goodies that entice new business into our area. Is that the only way that localities can promote private enterprise and build their economies—through government loans, government grants, government contracts, government job training, government "incubators" and government subsidies?

And then, as if to justify their lack of principle, they must glorify these companies that work the subsidy system, and recognize them as the pinnacles of private enterprise and progressiveness. No one gives a second thought to the guy down the street who quietly goes about his business, earning a living the "old fashioned way"—with his own money and at his own risk. He is the real hero of the business community and the backbone of our private enterprise system, yet how do we honor and recognize him? By passing more laws that will set up yet more subsidized, propped-up businesses to compete with him.

It is time we recognize that all of these programs that are supposed to assist business are profoundly anti-business in their net effect. First, they give politicians more power to manipulate our economy. Second, they foster business dependency on government support and kill our entrepreneurial spirit. Finally, they turn our economic system on its head and penalize the very businesses that, through the free market, would rise to the top—without using one penny of government money.

The American entrepreneur can still be saved from extinction. To do so, business people and the organizations that represent them must start reaffirming their faith in the free enterprise system by standing on their own feet—not on the taxpayers' backs. □

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## Essay

# Regulating What Children Watch

by David Bernstein

To all too many people, "Freedom of the Press" is an archaic notion restricted to archaic media; actually applying the concept to radio or television seems an intolerable breach of the "freedom" to regulate . . .

During the Reagan years, the Federal Communications Commission changed from a typical power-hungry Washington bureaucracy to an aggressive deregulator and promoter of the First Amendment. This progress is threatened, however, by the pro-kiddie corps led by Massachu-

setts housewife and political terror Peggy Charren, who is president of Action for Children's Television (ACT), a powerful advocacy group. Ms. Charren supports vastly increased government "supervision" of children's television. Her Congressional allies see the kids' TV issue as a way of shoehorning government back into the business of regulating what Americans watch.

In the fall of 1988, at ACT's urging, both Houses of Congress passed a bill that would have restricted commercials during children's TV (broadcast channels, not cable) shows to 12 minutes per hour during the week and 10.5 minutes per hour on weekends.

At first blush, the enormous pressure for the passage of this bill seems somewhat odd, as a 1988 National Association of Broadcasters survey found that commercials during children's programming take up only about 8 minutes per hour on weekdays and 9 minutes on weekends, well within the proposed limits.

But ACT had a hidden agenda. Charren is fighting not only against actual commercials during kids' shows, but also against shows based on dolls and other toys, such as GI Joe and the Smurfs. She calls such shows "full-length commercials."

While it is hard to imagine the Reagan FCC construing the word "commercial" so broadly, the bill's proponents obviously hoped that if Reagan would sign it, they could rely on future, less "extreme" Administrations, or the courts, to force the offending shows off the air.

The bill had an even more pernicious clause. It required the FCC to ascertain that broadcasters had "served the educational and informational needs of children in its overall programming" before granting renewal of a station's broadcast license. (Once again, this provision does not apply to cable networks, who are not beholden to the FCC for their existence.)

When licenses come up for renewal, interest groups are permitted to testify on whether they think that the broadcasters are adhering to FCC guidelines in their programming. I imagine the presidents of Morality in Media and Planned Parenthood have somewhat different ideas about what constitutes the "educational and informational needs of children." The result of this clause would be to scare the broadcasters away from doing a show for children on any controversial topic, thus

adding to the blandness of children's TV.

Unfortunately, the television industry was not willing to fight the "Kidvid Bill," despite serious constitutional objections to it. According to Timothy Dyk, a partner at Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering in Washington D.C. who has won many First Amendment battles on behalf of the broadcasting industry, the National Association of Broadcasters' lobbyists consider this particular intrusion on freedom of expression to be "low priority." The Broadcasters hope that their support for Kidvid regulation will help them to win more economically important political victories in the future. Moreover, many broadcasters desire more regulation, believing that such legislation would support their claim that broadcasting is a specialized industry that deserves protection from the fierce competition of cable and VCRs.

Fortunately, there was a hero who came riding into town on a shining white horse to save the day. Who was that masked man? Of all people, it was President Reagan. Though his Administration has been in the forefront of crackdowns on indecency and pornog-

raphy, Reagan pocket vetoed (refused to sign) the bill, stating that its provisions "cannot be reconciled" with the First Amendment's free speech guarantees.

A shocked Charren accused Reagan of "ideological child abuse." Showing no great appreciation for the non-economic value of civil liberties such as free speech, she wailed, "What's weird is . . . no major economic forces, such as the networks, were against it. It wasn't going to raise the federal budget deficit or taxes."

Congressman Ed Markey of Massachusetts, chief sponsor of the bill, promised to reintroduce similar legislation in 1989. President Bush, never as ideologi-

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cally committed to free markets as Reagan, might very well sign such legislation into law. The Kidvid issue is very much alive. The question remains, however, whether or not there is anything substantive to it.

Most of the people crying for regulation, of course, completely misunderstand the economic aspects of the question. Market forces operate on children's television just as on everything else. Children are not the slaves to the tube as often depicted: they have options such as playing Nintendo, reading books, playing outside, etc., and will only sit and watch television if it appeals to them. In 1987, a federal appeals court judge called the FCC's assertion that the market is operative in children's television "an incredible bureaucratic invention." Yet, advertising time during children's shows has been limited without government intervention. Children hate commercials as much as adults, and if a network or station put on so many commercials that it became unpleasant to watch TV, children would change the channel or turn it off.

But what about those poorly-made TV shows based on toys that have recently dominated children's television?

Well, the better ones, such as *He-Man*, actually have intelligible plots and are doing fine. The others are rapidly being replaced by shows with more original concepts, such as *Pee Wee's Playhouse*, children's game shows, and Disney's *Ducktales*.

Did government force Kidvid producers to improve their shows? Of course not. Ratings did. Saturday morning cartoon ratings were down 30%, as children "just said no" to awful TV. Then along came the smashing ratings success of *Pee Wee's Playhouse*, and all of a sudden a rash of shows appeared that kids (and even some parents) could enjoy. Indeed, many Saturday morning shows are now written on two levels, one for the kids and one for the parents (tune in to the Alf cartoon, for example). Furthermore, intelligent cartoons such as *Bullwinkle* are being revived.

A large part of the impetus for the improvement in Kidvid has come from cable, which is almost completely unregulated by the FCC (the only major role the FCC has played in cable has been in stifling its expansion on behalf of politically connected special interests). Whole channels such as Nickelodeon and Disney are devoted to child-oriented shows, and other cable networks, such as the Christian Broadcasting Network, offer family fare.

Kidvid advocates agree that many of the kids' shows on cable are of superior quality. They argue however, that regulation is still needed for regular TV in order to help poor children who can't afford cable. As Charren says, "[The market] approach is fine for affluent families with kids lucky enough to have pay cable. But if you want to watch Shelly Duvall's *Faerie Tale Theater* you have to get HBO. Other choices might require movie channels. Even today, it's too soon to let broadcasting off the hook when it comes to serving the child audience. The alternate technologies are not equally available to the poor." Maybe not, but the competition fostered by those technologies is leading to improved quality in all children's TV. And keeping government out of the communications field is the best way to ensure that present technologies will get continually cheaper (they already would be if it weren't for government-granted cable monopolies and FCC restrictions on the use of telephone wires to carry TV signals) and that new technologies such as

satellite TV will evolve more quickly.

The strangest thing about the Kidvid legislation is that in return for sacrificing the First Amendment, the bill regulates only a small part of the relationship between children and television. The fact is that youngsters spend only a fraction of their TV-watching time on the type of shows that the Kidvid bill would have regulated. Besides such shows, they also watch cable kids' shows and adult cable and broadcast TV. In the average city, the poor child that Charren worries about who does not have cable can come home from school and watch children's broadcast TV from 3:00 until 5:00 P.M. when reruns of old sitcoms come on. This was also true in the days before deregulation.

As far as cable shows go, there have been legislative attempts to regulate the content of what comes through the wires (most notably regarding obscenity) but all have been struck down by the courts. Moreover, no one, including Charren, seems eager to regulate adult shows that are on in the early evening, prime viewing hours for children. When

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it comes to children watching adult TV, Charren suddenly calls for "parental responsibility." But why shouldn't that be the answer to the Kidvid problem as well?

Some activists point out that many adults use the television as a babysitter, and do not properly regulate what their children watch. That may be true, but it would apply to racy and violent adult shows to at least as great a degree as cartoons.

Many parents, of course, would like to supervise their children and make sure that kids' viewing habits are directed towards quality, non-violent educational shows, but they work during the day and are therefore unable to watch the shows and judge which ones are

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## Observation

# The Midwest Work Ethic and the Spirit of Libertarianism

by Stephen G. Barone

Simple theories of social change will not work simply because people are not all that simple. For instance: the *mores* that libertarians admire could actually *prevent* the achievement of a libertarian society.

Among us advocates of the free market, it is fashionable—if not altogether empirically justifiable—to believe that the greatest resistance to individualistic ideas exists on the East and West coasts of our country, those two seaside expanses of real estate that seem inundated with every manner and form of political loony and socialist academician.

Goes the conventional wisdom: surely Midwesterners must be more amenable to libertarian solutions for government “problems.” Just consider all those East- and West-coast companies that routinely recruit from the ranks of The Heartland, or even move their entire operations there, just to take advantage of the vestigial individualism and quaint work ethic.

I have certainly subscribed to this notion, a transplanted New Yorker from Queens, living as I have in Wisconsin since 1974, and watching the local citizenry going about their day-to-day occupations. Most of them do so with consummate skill and admirable dispatch, showing up for work on time, keeping appointments, smiling when they make change, and saying please and thank-you.

Of course, this is exactly the sort of behavior we would expect from the private sector, wherein being slovenly and taciturn, uncooperative or nonproductive, can have a deleterious effect upon one’s income or continued employment prospects. But even while hating to admit it, I must report similarly congen-

ial behavior among the government employees.

No, the folks at the post office aren’t quite so deferential as the cashiers at the Walmart. But I’ve had letter-carriers track me down at my office rather than leave parcels unattended at my home. Clerks at the windows have waited past closing for me to get important things into the mail. And my intrastate letters routinely make it from city-to-city and hand-to-hand in 24 hours.

True, Midwestern private schools still tend to be more efficient than public ones, just as anywhere else. But most of the public school teachers with whom I work spend many extra, uncompensated hours in their classrooms, and are righteously indignant when they get compared to the illiterate and overpaid unionists who infest many big-city schools.

All of this is disconcerting for someone like me, who believes that a worker’s efficiency and attitude are both inexorably tied to how dependent he perceives the rewards and consequences of the workplace to be upon his performance therein. Why aren’t the postal

workers rude and indifferent, as in New York? Why aren’t teachers lackadaisical, as in Los Angeles?

I think I might know the answer to these questions. It’s that the Midwest’s relatively intemperate weather makes it an unattractive place for the intellectual *beau monde*, who are more prone to wax romantically about a simple life amongst the wheat fields, rather than actually leave Palo Alto to put down stakes somewhere outside of Topeka.

As a result, their collectivist cavil is less familiar to people residing nearer the center of our continent—as is the “social welfare” legislation it tends to spawn—so that Midwesterners still tend to regard slothful behavior in or about the workplace as *abusing* an overtly fair system, instead of *beating* a covertly unfair one.

Suggest that the mailman be replaced with a private courier, and the average Midwesterner will look at you as if you were nuts. The local post office does a pretty good job as far as he’s concerned, and he’s probably correct. Neither will he like your idea about closing the public schools. Kids in his neighbor-

hood routinely score highly on college entrance tests.

Even Midwestern utility workers—people who are employees of heavily regulated and unionized companies that are typically insulated from the efficiencies of the marketplace—are more responsive to customer's needs. I know this because I used to work as an independent electrician. I usually could get a

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utility truck to a house to connect a new service-drop literally within *minutes* of my service order. Try that in Suffolk County on Long Island, where the reputation for poor service and blackouts is so legendary that Midwesterners now ask New Yorkers whether their houses have electricity, instead of the other way around.

So herein lies the problem: if indignant rage is necessarily a prerequisite to the public's rising up against government bureaucracy, then the

American Midwest is the *last place* it's going to happen. This is because the greater industry of its people—and by inclusion, its public and quasi-public employees—precludes such gross deficiencies of government-supplied or regulated services.

I maintain that it is in the Midwest that we can expect to find the least-hospitable environs for libertarian ideas, not New York or Los Angeles, even though we might want to believe that the values evinced by people residing in Dubuque and Peoria are in better resonance with individualism than with statism.

Consider: I am forever chagrined by the propensity of my neighbors to project their own scruples upon those who would be the beneficiaries of one or another government program. They can't imagine welfare cheaters, because they themselves would never cheat the system. They can't imagine indolent civil employees, because they would never loaf on the job.

This is why the Midwest provides such a fecund environment for Rockefeller Republicanism: the notion that it's okay to advocate all the social engineering and economic tinkering traditionally advocated by the Left, so long as such enactments are conceived on a smaller

scale than generally advocated by Democrats, and someone promises to administer each of them efficiently.

I certainly don't mean to offend anybody with this modest thesis, especially since the political milieu and ethical ambience of the Midwest causes me to prefer it over the place in which I grew up. I like it here. But there's a major implication to these demographic observations for those of us who want to propagate libertarianism in this part of the country.

To wit, merely providing evidence that the private sector meets people's needs more efficiently than does government will do little to cause Midwesterners to better embrace individualistic or free-market ideas. This is because, like it or not, differences in quality between private—versus government—supplied services are not so evident around here.

This means that Midwestern receptivity to libertarianism can best be enhanced by talking to the people about the moral and ethical underpinnings of the philosophy. Doing otherwise—by simply underscoring the inherent efficiencies of the marketplace instead of explaining why one way is *right* and the other way is *wrong* has not worked and will not work. □

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### Bernstein, "Regulating Children's TV," *continued from page 64*

worthwhile. Furthermore, even if these parents were able to judge quality, they are often not home to make sure their children are obeying their guidelines. Therefore, the regulators argue, Big Brother must step in to make sure that only quality shows are on the air for children to watch.

As usual, any possibility of a market solution to this problem is dismissed. Groups such as ACT immediately rush to the government for help. But what if ACT—instead of lobbying the government—would review all shows on at hours when kids typically watch TV, including those not aimed directly at children, for such things as violence, sex, educational content, appropriateness for family viewing, commercial time and type of commercials, etc? They could then sell these reviews to TV Guide and newspaper TV supplements. If there are many parents who would like a quick, easy way to know what shows are good for their children—and I'm sure there are—it would not take

long for these reviews to spread across the country.

Of course, ACT would not have a monopoly on this service. It has its own peculiar political and sociological views on what is good for children, and it could be that in the economic marketplace, ACT would lose out. Strangely enough, for example, ACT (to its credit) has filed a legal brief opposing a recent Congressional action banning indecency 24 hours a day on TV and radio. My guess is that unlike the leaders of ACT, the average American is more concerned with bad language and sex on TV than with how much time is spent advertising Care Bears. With the politicians out of it, parents will decide what criteria they will use to judge what their children should watch—for example, a rating system issued by ACT, a rating system issued by the Moral Majority, a rating system issued by a private team of child psychiatrists, or no rating system at all.

Once parents can quickly decide

what their children should watch, the market can also help them make sure that that is what the children do watch, even when the parents are not home. We have programmable VCRs—why not programmable televisions? A parent who works too late to supervise his child could set the TV to go on at a certain time to a certain channel, and then lock in that setting with a key or other device. If the kid doesn't want to watch the show his parent chose, he will either have to sneak over to a friend's house (always a possibility whatever government and parents do) or find some other activity to engage in.

If activists such as Charren would put one-tenth of the effort they put into lobbying into coming up with creative marketplace solutions like the one outlined above, individual liberty would not have to be sacrificed to social expediency. We could then give our children both the benefits of quality television, and of a First Amendment not watered down on their behalf. □

# Reviews

*Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War*, by Paul Fussell. Oxford University Press, 1989, 297 pp., \$19.95.

## The War That Was Hell

Sheldon L. Richman

Paul Fussell has hit a raw nerve. He has written a book about the holiest crusade, World War II, but without the mandatory respect. *Wartime* does not argue that the United States (or England) should not have fought World War II. It does not argue that America was no better than Nazi Germany. In fact, *Wartime* makes virtually no argument at all. It primarily describes—or, more precisely, allows others to describe—how the war changed the United States and Great Britain; how it changed the language, the art, the psychology, and the lives of the people who fought it and the people at home.

But that is apparently too much examination for some people. And that is interesting.

The historian Simon Schama, writing in the *New York Times*, seems in a panic when he writes, "[I]t seems more than ever important not to fool around with the kind of moral equivalences explored in such a cavalier way by *Wartime*. All the folly, squalor, self-deception, incompetence and mayhem exhibited in the Allied conduct of the war do not for one minute lessen its moral legitimacy." The *New York Times*, sounding like an irate father asked one too many questions, felt compelled to address the book in an editorial, "The Good War." "Was it a good war?" asks *The Times*. "The question implies that there was a choice. There was none. World War II had to be

fought and had to be won." That's all. No more questions. Now go to your room.

Sherman's phrase "war is hell" is such a cliché that all meaning has drained from it. "Yeh, yeh, war is hell," many people react, without thinking about what that really means. Fussell's book restores the meaning. War is literally hell.

You would expect [Fussell writes] front-line soldiers to be struck and hurt by bullets and shell fragments, but such is the popular insulation from the facts that you would not expect them to be hurt, sometimes killed, by being struck by parts of their friends' bodies violently detached. If you asked a wounded soldier or marine what hit him, you'd hardly be ready for the answer, "My buddy's head" . . .

Consider the word "front" as it is used in wartime. Of course, it is the point at which two opposing armies engage. But it is something more. There is also the home front, and there are two senses to this phrase besides the official one. First, it can refer to the war against enemies at home. What enemies? The dissidents, the nonconformists, the skeptics—anyone who departs from the orthodoxy as propounded by the government propaganda mill. This enemy is not merely—nor usually—a sympathizer with the official foreign adversary. It is anyone who thinks the war ill-conceived, obscene, or not worth the candle. That person is a threat and

must be silenced. And was. (This suppression need not wait until one's country is fighting. A year and a half before the U.S. entered World War II, Congress passed and the president signed a sedition bill. The act, wrote the legal authority Zechariah Chafee "contain[ed] the most drastic restrictions on freedom of speech ever enacted in the United States during peace.")

The other sense of "front" is that of a façade. The public cannot be told the truth about the war. There must be a false front to preserve morale and prevent reconsideration. Americans never want to fight wars anyway and must be lied into them; so it wouldn't take much to cause second thoughts. As the United States was preparing to enter World War II, the public was told that it would be quick and easy, requiring only light weapons and vehicles and men in dashing uniforms. As Fussell points out, dispatches from the other front never mentioned the many tragedies in which planes bombed their own troops, or anti-aircraft gunners hit their own planes, or warships fired on by their own forces. The folks back home could not be told or shown that people get blown apart by bullets, bombs, mines, shrapnel, and the like. The dead are always peacefully intact in the newspaper and magazine photos. This front continues long after the war ends. Here Fussell allows himself a rare commentary: "It [the popular war literature] has thus conveyed to the credulous a satisfying, orderly, and even optimistic and wholesome view of catastrophic occurrences—a fine way to encourage a moralistic, nationalistic, and bellicose politics."

Thus World War II would seem to have been both a crime against those who fought it and a fraud on the people back home. Fussell's book is worthwhile for having pointed this out so vividly.

But is *Wartime* guilty of being, as Schama charges, "ahistorical"? Surely the Allied effort is vindicated by its purpose, the destruction of fascism. (Read history a little closer and you find that

competition for markets and colonies was generally of more concern to the allies than fascism.) As Fussell points out, the GIs by and large had a less metaphysical view of the war's purpose. Even Ernie Pyle, the famous war correspondent, wrote, "When you figure how many boys are going to get killed, what's the use of it anyway?" To judge from what they were writing and saying, they were fighting, first, to avenge

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Pearl Harbor and, second, because the Japanese aren't white; and they were fighting for the privilege of ending the war and getting back home to their girlfriends and hotdogs. The first reason is less than inspirational, especially considering the dubious circumstances leading up to the attack on Pearl Harbor. The second reason lacks a certain logic.

Not that one could blame them for not having loftier motives. After all, their fathers only two decades earlier had been through the monumental disillusionment known as the Great War. That generation of young Americans, full of Wilsonian idealism, shipped out to Europe to fight the war to end war and to make the world safe for democracy. What they unwittingly produced were Bolshevism, fascism, and the seeds of their sons' war. So maybe FDR and Churchill's Atlantic Charter didn't have the moving power it was supposed to.

And maybe it is hard to muster idealism when your fighting ally is Uncle Joe Stalin, who had starved and purged tens of millions in the previous decade and who had attacked Finland, the Baltic countries, and, as Hitler's ally, Poland itself. And if the average GI felt for the Jews, maybe he found it odd to come to the defense of Poland and the Soviet

Union—not renowned for their hospitality to Jews. (At any rate, the war did not save Jews. It doomed them. In 1939 Hitler was still trying to get them to emigrate from Germany and Austria.) "The war seemed so devoid of ideological content," writes Fussell, "that little could be said about its positive purposes that made political or intellectual sense, especially after the Soviet Union joined the great crusade against what until then had been stigmatized as totalitarianism."

Then again maybe some of the cynical GIs got wind of how the British initiated terror bombing of civilians and how the Allies leveled cities having no strategic value. Allied conduct at the war's end also would not have inspired idealism: the barbaric and unnecessary atom-bombing of Japan, the uprooting of millions of Germans from eastern Germany and the Sudetenland, the forced repatriation of Soviet escapees. These are the big atrocities on the Allied side, as if the little atrocity of merely forcing an individual into the hell of combat were not bad enough.

A war that kills more civilians than servicemen (50 million people in all died) is not the stuff of idealism. The *New York Times* valiantly tried to salvage something, writing, "True the Red Army's triumphs gave Stalin a chance to impose Communism in Europe and advance it in Asia. But no nation sustained heavier casualties than the Soviet Union, and without Soviet blood there could have been no victory. The evil of Stalinism was its betrayal of civilized values; Hitlerism denied their existence." There's a distinction that escapes me.

In judging a book like *Wartime* it is easy to fall into a kind of rationalism. The process works this way: Hitler and fascism are evil. Evil has no rights. Thus whatever it takes to defeat them is justified and maybe imperative. Some libertarians are prone to such rationalistic moralizing. The fallacy is in the belief that a moral principle yields the same prescription whether applied to a bully in a school yard or to an abominable totalitarian nation (which may have legitimate grievances and fears). The simplicity of the first situation cannot be assumed in the second. This rationalism leads one to care only about concrete situations and general principles and not at

all about the experience of past similar situations. Note that so much libertarian discussion of foreign policy is based on hypothetical situations unrelated to any historical context. As a student of Objectivism told me during a conversation about World War II, "I don't care about history."

But history is experience, and most of us (including my fellow Objectivists) are empiricists in that we believe that knowledge begins with the evidence of the senses. We need to know more than that Hitler was evil before deciding what exactly to do about it. Of course he did not respect natural rights, but from this we dare not blithely assent to the murder, conscription, and theft that were indispensable to American participation in the war. (I wonder how libertarians think it could have been fought without taxation and the draft.) As the revisionist C. Hartley Grattan wrote of the debate before American entry into the war, those who "emphasize the menace of fascism—which is real— . . . under-emphasize the menace of war, which is equally real."

To illustrate the two approaches to foreign policy—let's call it rationalistic moralism versus moral realism—consider Finland. In 1948 Finland signed a Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union. The rationalistic moralist might have denounced the treaty as a compro-

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mise with evil. But that course could have led to the crushing of Finland and possibly another world war. The course the Finnish people chose has brought forty prosperous years of liberty, capitalism, and peace. Yes, they promised not to aid an attack on the Soviet Union. But which course served the rational self-interest of the Finns (not to mention the rest of us)?

The war and its prelude did great violence to the United States beside the obvious. As Charles Beard pointed out, they radically changed America's limited, constitutional government without a vote by setting precedents for secrecy, gross deception, and the assumption of autocratic power by a president. National security became the gaping loophole through which virtually any violation of rights could scurry. But these debits are rarely entered in the war ledger.

The history of war teaches much if we are willing to learn: that no one can conquer the world; that war serves the policymakers, not the people; that liberty loses; that war is the health of the state. It is those who failed to understand this, not Fussell, who are ahistorical. The classical liberals, such as Richard Cobden, had a more realistic, and moral, attitude about war. Part of it is well captured by Sydney Smith in his letter of 1832 to Lady Grey:

For God's sake, do not drag me into another war! I am worn down, and worn out, with crusading and defending Europe, and protecting mankind: I *must* think a little of myself. I am sorry for the Spaniards—I am sorry for the Greeks—I deplore the fate of the Jews; the people of the Sandwich Islands are groaning under the most detestable tyranny; Bagdad is oppressed; I do not like the present state of the Delta; Thibet is not comfortable. Am I to fight for all these people? The world is bursting with sin and sorrow. Am I to be champion of the Decalogue, and to be eternally raising fleets and armies to make all men good and happy? We have just done saving Europe, and I am afraid the consequence will be, that we shall cut each other's throats. No war, dear Lady Grey!—No eloquence; but apathy, selfishness, common sense, arithmetic! . . . If there is another war, life will not be worth having. . . .

War stripped of its propaganda exposes the essence of the state most starkly. Fussell helps us to see this. And through the mythology of war the state maintains its grip: it must have us believe that without it we'd have long been conquered by the barbarians. If we wish to delegitmate the state, we will find no better strategy than to turn to historical revisionism and the demythologizing of war. □

*In Pursuit of Happiness and Good Government*,  
by Charles Murray. Simon & Schuster, 1988, 341 pp., \$19.95.

## Life, Happiness, and the Pursuit of Policy

David Gordon

How should social policies be evaluated? One obvious procedure measures the results of a policy against the goals that its advocates profess. The details of such demonstrations do not here concern us: what is important in this context is the method used. To reiterate, the critic issues no challenges to a policy's goals: he does not, for instance, question whether the state should try to make workers better off.

Internal criticism of socialist and interventionist proposals has been the characteristic procedure of free market economists. Charles Murray has been a notable contributor to this tradition. In his controversial 1984 work, *Losing Ground*, Murray exposed to withering cross examination the major claims advanced on behalf of the welfare state.

In *Pursuit of Happiness* he follows a different course, at once more fundamental and less clearcut in its results than his internal criticism of the welfare state. Here Murray's key question is: "What constitutes 'success' in social policy?" (p. 23, emphasis removed). He does not take as given the aims of those who defend the welfare state. Quite the contrary, he endeavors to respond to the question he has posed by coming to grips with the deepest problems of ethics. In Murray's opinion, it is self-evident that everyone's highest goal is happiness, since by "definition . . . happiness is the only thing that is self-sufficiently good in itself and does not facilitate or lead to any other better thing" (26). You must adopt happiness as your highest goal because happiness just means your highest goal.

Unfortunately, the point is less evident than Murray believes. Following Aristotle, Murray correctly notes that a

good pursued as a means to an end is valuable not in itself but because of what securing it will help one achieve. If I wish to go on a diet only in order to lose weight, then dieting is for me not a good that is valuable in itself. But what about losing weight? This might be something I value for its own sake or something sought for yet another goal. Murray maintains that there must rationally be a stopping point in the pursuit of things valued as means: something must be valued for its own sake, if the entire process is to have a point.

So far, so good. But Murray comes to grief in concluding that there must be some one thing—happiness—that is the goal of all rational endeavor. It simply does not follow from the fact that means require ends, that there is one end at which all means aim. The fallacy is exactly that involved in concluding from "Everyone has a father" to "Someone is the father of everyone." In brief, Murray has failed to show that everyone has a highest end, as the rest of his argument requires.

Let us put aside this objection and assume that everyone does have a single highest end. It does not follow from this fact that someone has such an end that the goal in question is his own well-being. If happiness is "the self-sufficiently good in itself," then someone who believes that he ought to stamp out all desires for personal enjoyment in order the better to sacrifice himself for the welfare of others has the goal of happiness, exactly the same way as someone with more conventional views. All that Murray's definition of happiness requires is that someone have a highest end. *Whatever* this end consists of is "happiness."

For most of the book, however, Murray adopts a different characterization of happiness: "the working defini-

tion I [Murray] will employ is lasting and justified satisfaction with one's life as a whole" (44, emphasis removed). I have no objection to this definition and am far from denying that most people do want happiness as thus characterized. But even if one accepts Murray's quasi-Aristotelian argument that everyone seeks happiness as an ultimate end, it does not follow that everyone seeks happiness under the new definition.

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*Of course, one must have food and shelter in order to survive, but once a modest threshold is reached, happiness and wealth are less closely correlated than one might at first assume.*

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Murray has not shown that the new definition encapsulates the only rationally justifiable ultimate end.

The situation confronting Murray is not so black as I have so far painted it. If the foray into ethics that forms Part One of the book is placed to one side, Murray might still reasonably maintain that most people do in fact wish to attain rationally justified satisfaction with life. Murray's definition is much more satisfactory when used as a working hypothesis than when elevated to a rational demonstration.

Having established, to his own satisfaction at any rate, the ultimate goal of action, Murray in Part Two discusses the conditions under which this goal may be advanced. Part Three applies the results of this investigation to public policy issues. Highway speed limits and salaries for teachers are in particular discussed in a highly original way. Before we turn to these sections of the book, however, a further problem confronts us.

Murray finds the key to public policy in a famous phrase of the Declaration of Independence, "the pursuit of happiness." He provides valuable historical discussion of the way in which eighteenth-century writers used the term "happiness" and distinguishes with considerable care between the view that securing each person's happiness is the goal of public policy and the position that the state ought to enable each per-

son to *pursue* happiness. The first policy he convincingly rejects as a pipe-dream: it is the second that he adopts as proper.

But, so far as one can discover, he offers not the slightest reason for thinking that the state ought to provide people with the conditions enabling them to pursue happiness. All that the ethical discussion in Part One shows, assuming the complete success of Murray's argument, is that each individual ought to seek his or her own happiness. How does it follow from this that persons have claims against others for what is required to enable them to pursue this goal?

Murray's discussion, it seems to me, is considerably more successful in Part Two. Here the dominant theme is that the conditions enabling people to lead happy lives are most decidedly not to be equated with the unlimited possession of material goods. Of course, one must have food and shelter in order to survive, but once a modest threshold is reached, happiness and wealth are less closely correlated than one might at first assume. Murray supports this part of his argument with both statistical data and "thought experiments," including one in which the reader is asked to imagine himself suddenly transported to a poor Thai village. Murray's own experience as a fieldworker in Southeast Asia brings this section of the book vividly to life.

If happiness does not require much in the way of wealth, what does it depend on? Murray enumerates a number of enabling conditions, including safety and creative work: but probably the one he regards as of primary importance is self-respect.

A person with self-respect regards himself as someone of value: he believes himself entitled to dignified treatment and will not willingly allow others to trample on his moral rights. Following Professor David Sachs of the Johns Hopkins Philosophy Department, Murray usefully distinguishes self-respect from self-esteem. "Self-esteem" means thinking highly of oneself. It depends on the relation between one's expectations and achievements and is by no means always a virtue. Many people have too much self-esteem: probably everyone has encountered someone who "thanks God that he is not as other men are." As Sachs points out, it is by contrast not possible to speak of having too much self-respect.

Murray's discussion of self-respect is

excellent and the importance of his analysis for public policy is at once evident. There is however one point at which Murray's presentation goes wrong. As he sees it, "a measure of the core concept underlying self-respect" is the degree to which someone feels himself responsible for what happens to him (124-125). Murray suggests that the I-E scale, a psychological test that measures this "locus of control," ought to be interpreted as a measure of self-respect. (Incidentally, a strength of the book is Murray's extensive knowledge of experimental psychology.)

But self-respect, as Murray and Sachs have characterized it, has little to do with "locus of control." It concerns one's self-regard as a person of moral stature and does not entail either one's being in control of the principal events of one's life or the belief that one is. Probably it would be difficult to maintain self-respect if one's life were entirely at the mercy of others; but it hardly follows from this that the degree to which one is "in control" measures self-respect.

Turning at last to public policy, the direction of Murray's argument is clear. If enabling everyone to pursue happiness is the proper goal of public policy, and happiness depends less on the possession of wealth than on "intangibles" such as self-respect, then the policies of the welfare state stand condemned.

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*"Self-esteem" depends on the relation between expectations and achievements and is by no means always a virtue. Many people have too much self-esteem.*

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These policies provide money but ignore the factors leading to happiness which Murray has been at such pains to set out. Do not programs that make people entirely dependent on public largesse strike at the heart of self-respect? How can perpetual subsidies for unemployment enable people to obtain the creative work that Murray argues is essential to their happiness? These and other vital questions Murray discusses in thorough fashion.

The last part of the book descends to

the specific. Murray suggests in a very careful discussion of the 55-mph speed limit for automobiles that the subject needs to be analyzed in a different way from the customary. As most policy analysts see matters, to lower the speed limit will save a certain number of lives. Against this fact, people do not want to be inconvenienced by being compelled to travel more slowly than they wish. How can these two considerations be balanced?

This is in Murray's opinion the wrong question to ask. Instead, one ought to ask: what are the benefits and costs to each individual of having a lower speed limit? If one takes Murray's advice and considers the individual rather than total benefits and losses to society as a whole, then the case for the 55-mph speed limit appears to dissolve. According to Murray's figures, an individual can gain only the minutest increase in safety through following a lowered speed limit.

But is each person concerned only with his or her own safety? What if "you want to save the lives of others even if your own is not at risk—the value of the 55-mph limit is *not* just the good it does for you, but also the good it does for others" (193). Murray responds by noting that any individual who wishes the safety benefits of a lower speed limit can secure these for himself by driving more slowly: to impose the lower limits whether or not others wish it is paternalistic. Murray also claims that individuals are not put much at risk, should they choose to decrease their speed, by the fact that others drive faster.

Murray's stimulating argument does not strike me as altogether convincing. If someone wishes to have a 55-mph speed limit so that a certain number of lives may be saved, then his goal is not the paternalistic one of compelling people to choose a lowered risk of death against their wishes. Lowering the speed limit has as its aim the saving of lives: and this no one person is in a position to bring about through reducing his own speed. True enough, if the speed limit is lowered, some people will have to drive more slowly than they wish; but the reason for this is not paternalistic. (Of course, I do not advocate government road regulation; but I recognize that the problem of safety regulation would not be ended automatically if roads were privatized.)

In a provocative chapter on education, Murray opposes higher salaries for teachers. In his view, the best teachers are primarily motivated by devotion to their work. Though well able to compete for high salaries, they willingly forego large incomes in order to secure the non-material satisfactions of teaching. The low salaries offered by most private schools keep out those without the requisite dedication.

A raise in teachers' salaries will upset the careful balance of material and non-material satisfactions worked out through agreements between the teachers and local communities that employ them. Higher salaries will attract those who find the new monetary rewards attractive. Those who sacrifice money in order to dedicate their lives to their students will be pressured out through competition from those motivated by money. These, once more, Murray regards as less competent than those will-

ing to teach at lower salaries.

Murray's picture certainly violates the "conventional wisdom," but it is none the worse for that. The problem lies not in what Murray says but in the attitude he takes toward it. Murray's account of the dedicated private teacher is no doubt correct in some cases, but is it in fact the way things usually happen? To answer this, evidence is required rather than the "Just So" story that Murray has provided. Whether his account of matters is correct, or whether teachers are influenced by money to a greater extent than Murray imagines, is a matter that can be resolved only by empirical investigation. This Murray fails to offer.

Murray's work is worth careful study. He does not respect the usual pieties but thinks things out for himself. Although sometimes wrong, his work is always original and carefully considered. □

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*Ideal*, a play by Ayn Rand,

The Melrose Theatre: Jamie L. Allen & Janne Peters, producers; Michael Paxton, director; Jeff Britting, music; Janne Peters stars as Kay Gonda.

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## *Ayn Rand Is Alive and Well and Living in Los Angeles*

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Charles Ziarko

Well, not exactly: her *ideas* are alive and well on the stage of a chic, cozy 49-seat playhouse in an industrial area of Hollywood, the Melrose Theatre on North Seward Street.

By the standards of today's intellectually-comatose professional theatre, *Ideal* would seem mired in the conventions of craftsmanship of the earlier age in which it was written, at age 29, by a Russian émigré who was finding her way with the English language just as she was finding her way within the film business. But what ideas they are, and broad as the brush-strokes may be, how refreshing to hear them anew, and to discover just how contemporary many

of them seem! Even Rand's admirers often overlook what a successful, savage social satirist she was, Swifitean in her scorn, but when her most appalling targets jump from the printed page to three-dimensional life, as they do here, it is impossible to ignore just how skillful were her comic gifts, as well as her dramatic ones.

The "world premiere" of the full-length version of the text, which Rand never published, is a long evening—two and three quarters hours from first curtain to stage-spanning curtain call—but a rewarding one, as the audience follows film-star Kay Gonda in her greatest "real-life" role. She is a contemporary Diogenes in search of the one true believer whose protestations of devotion turn out to be honest when

put to the test of real life. After entering and exiting five lives during the course of one very busy night, and finding them all lacking the inner resources that she hoped to discover, she finally finds her "hero," a cheerful martyr whose supreme gesture of devotion proves to be, cruelly, a useless and needless one.

Complementing the script is some remarkable production design. Instead of trying to cram a postage-stamp stage with period furniture or to reduce the text to a series of abstract black backdrops, Grant Alkin places each scene before a life-size black and white "pencil sketch" of what the set might like, an abstract conception ideal-ly suited to the abstract nature of the text. The effect is electrifying.

Unfortunately, the level of imagination and intelligence is not uniformly maintained: the lighting, by Marty Schiff, is poor; the stage is over-lighted to remind us of a McDonald's at high

noon, a *glaring* error, if ever there was one. The direction of Michael Paxton is more than a bit muddled, not in interpretation of character, but in staging, which tends to random roamings about the stage. These "keep the play moving" in a baffling circle.

As for the cast: Janne Peters is a bit angular for a screen sex-goddess, but her intensity is as tight as her accent; she's not to blame for the moments when Kay is reduced to a cipher and her "fans" take center stage. Notable are the supporting performances of Michael Richard Keller (who delivers two hilarious caricatures), Melanie Noble (who splendidly doubles as a Victorian spinster and a blowsy, uninhibited evangelist), and Keith MacKechnie, an inspired choice for martyrdom.

One hopes that this unexpected and worthy production of *Ideal* generates interest in bringing other Ayn Rand stage scripts back to life in the theatre where they belong. □

*Century* (8:30). At 9:00 is *The Road to War*, followed at 10:00 with *The Vietnam War*. Over time series will come and go, but the basic theme of Wednesday's lineup on A & E remains the same. For the true addict, the entire three hours of blood, guts, and martial music is repeated beginning at midnight.

Thursdays on A & E features a prime time lineup of *Victory at Sea* (8:00 P.M. Eastern) followed by *The Eagle and the Bear* (8:30). Also of interest on A & E is *Profiles* (M-F, 6:30 Eastern), *Battleline* (Sunday, 8:30 A.M. Eastern), and *Biography* (Sunday and Tuesday, 8:00 P.M. Eastern).

So you abhor war but have a passion for nature? Well, currently re-running the public television circuit is David Attenborough's series, *The Living Planet*. As always with PBS, check your local guide for time, date, or (God forbid) availability. A & E also does some nature oriented stuff (earlier this fall they did a cut-up version of Attenborough's *Living Planet*). The Discovery Channel is basically renowned as the nature channel, where you can find every cheap, tawdry nature show ever produced.

For true intellectuals, PBS is airing *The Day the Universe Changed* by James Burke. This is an outstanding voyage through human history. Burke is lucid, witty and iconoclastic. *Moyers: The Public Mind*, is a new PBS series; as usual Bill Moyers attacks contemporary Republican strategies and values with left wing muckraking artfully disguised as unbiased journalism. Surely Moyers ranks with Joseph Goebbels in the Propaganda Hall of Fame.

William F. Buckley Jr. has mercifully cut his *Firing Line* program to only half an hour, and at this length it is digestible. It's on PBS, of course.

Viewers oriented to "Horse Race" politics will want to be sure to tune in to *The McLaughlin Group*, carried by many PBS stations. Loud, brash, nerdy John McLaughlin is there, along with "Good Ole Boy" Pat Buchanan, "Babyface" Mort Kondracke, and well, obese Jack Germond. Fred Barnes is a newcomer to the show, the result of a terminal spat between McLaughlin and Robert Novak.

CNN's political talk show *Crossfire* (M-F, 7:30 P.M. Eastern) also has a new member. Michael Kinsley has replaced Tom Braden. *Crossfire* has been running for years, and somewhere in the past you may have tuned out. Braden was

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There is more on the boob tube than dreck for the booboisie.

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## All That's Fit to Watch

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Andrew Roller

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Recently *TV Guide* praised CNN's *Larry King Live* (M-F, 9:00 P.M. Eastern) as an outstanding program for the intelligent viewer "dry gulched" in prime time. In fact, *Larry King Live* is abysmal, full of salacious gossip, flaming feminists, "abused" females of all ages and varieties, and stern law-and-order types eager to pronounce judgment and punishment. So what is the intelligent libertarian, "dry gulched" in prime time, to watch?

The "King of the Night" is not Johnny Carson, but Charlie Rose, host of *CBS News Nightwatch* (M-F, approx. 2:00 A.M.). Rose is handsome, affable, informed, and humorous. He begins each broadcast with an interview covering the headline of the day. From there Rose moves on to authors, sportswriters and

a panoply of other personalities all eager to shoot the bull. Robert Krulwich, of *CBS This Morning*, drops by now and then as well. *Nightwatch* is two hours long, so there is always something on each program to engage your interest. The smart libertarian will have taped *Nightwatch* while he slept, giving him an enjoyable and rewarding after dinner viewing experience without Larry King or Roseanne Barr.

Perhaps, however, you're not into "talking heads." You prefer to see people getting blown up. Yet you're just smart enough that the *A-Team* or its present incarnation doesn't cut it. You need the Arts and Entertainment Network (A & E). A & E airs educational war series throughout the week, but the big night is Wednesday. Currently Wednesday begins with *World War I* (8 P.M. Eastern), followed by *The Twentieth*

undeniably boring. But Kinsley is sharp, aggressive, and very endearing. He and long-time co-host Pat Buchanan make an outstanding couple. When Buchanan is absent he is often replaced by Novak, and then the program is even better.

So who is this twice mentioned Robert Novak, anyway? He is the co-host of CNN's *Evans and Novak* (Saturday, 12:30 P.M. Eastern). It's pretty boring. Novak has a better forum for his antics on *The Capital Gang*.

Yes, friends, *The Capital Gang* is where you can hear Mark Shields scream obscenities (literally) when Robert Novak asks why the Democratic Party permits itself to be held hostage by the gay lobby. Pat Buchanan is here as well (yes, he's on three talk shows per week). So is Al Hunt of *The Wall Street Journal*. This "Gang of Four" (as they call themselves) always has an important guest who also takes part in the "Gang's" weekly exchange of insults and diatribes. "Political Pornography for the Mind" sums up this show best.

*This Week with David Brinkley* (ABC, Sunday morning) is a more staid version of the political talk show format, without being a total bore like PBS's infamous "wake me when it's over" *Washington Week in Review*. David Brinkley and George Will are the main draws. Sam Donaldson is so slow he ought to be bottled and sold as medication for hyperkinetic children. The best part of *David Brinkley* is the discussion between the hosts that occupies the latter part of the program.

Okay, okay, so you just want a nice little show with flowers, turnips, and happy people. "Tend your garden," as Voltaire said. PBS's *Victory Garden* is the answer for you, my friend, especially now that Peter Seabrook is back with a new series of reports from far-flung foreign gardens, displacing "mush mouth" yuppie farmer Roger Swain. Seabrook is a slender, silver-haired chap from the British Isles who always wears a proper suit and tie as he tours a garden, often with his "brelly" in hand to guard against the occasional downpour. *Victory Garden* can be deadly when Seabrook is absent, but the show takes on a whole new air when his delicate inquisitive figure comes bounding into view. Seabrook really hits his stride when he is not burdened with interviewing some proprietor about a garden, but instead gets to explain to you, the viewer, what he is

seeing. *Victory Garden*, with Peter Seabrook, is true cult fare. Of course it's a great show for gardeners too. □

## Booknotes

**Choosing sides on Deicide** — God is making appearances in science fiction with increasing frequency. It used to be that even the most religious authors of fantastic literature put God at arm's length, perhaps out of piety, perhaps out of prudence. (In C.S. Lewis's *Space Trilogy*, for instance, the closest we get to God are the "Oyarse," or planet-ruling angels.) Well, things have changed considerably, at least since Kingsley Amis dropped God into *The Green Man*—to the salvation of the book as well as its hero. God has played memorable roles in numerous recent works, John Varley's *Millennium* being a good example (unfortunatley He did not deign to appear in this summer's film version, which needed a *deus ex machina*—or something, at least—to save it from Kris Kristofferson). Now Nietzsche's madman has forsaken the seminaries for the science-fiction conventions, and the "death of God" is all the rage—science-fiction authors are aligning the Almighty in their cross-hairs.

How do you kill God? Well, if we are to believe several recent books on the subject, the answer is: *with a blunt instrument*. In Victor Koman's *The Jehovah Contract* (reviewed in *Liberty*, Sept. 1987) it was with Wiccan magic and modern mass communications; in Ted Reynolds's *The Tides of God* (New York: Ace Books, 1989, 247 pp., \$3.50) it is with an alien spaceship and future firepower. Of course, the real blunt instruments are the books themselves, books that do not succeed in treating their subjects with, well, due respect. Koman's book was basically a dumb idea; Reynolds's book is hampered by an inadequate novelistic technique, chiefly by organizational problems, but also by a distracting addiction to displays of cleverness and cuteness and a penchant for playing pointless tricks on the reader.

Still, Reynolds's book is the better of

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the two. He at least has a magnificent premise, and attempts to do it justice. The setting is the future, after the aliens have "made contact" with our civilization. They like our music, and trade their technology (but not their science) for our cultural achievements. But their most stupendous gift is a huge starship, for which they demand humans to perform one task: kill "God."

Now, this "God" is not quite the one you will read about in any sacred text. It ("He" doesn't apply) is not omnipresent, but instead makes a circuit through the stars, and by some sort of telepathy influences sentient beings when It moves through their stellar vicinity. This influence is almost wholly perverse: against reason, tolerance, and any sense of proportion. As the humans in the starship (*The Hound of God*) move closer to their target, reason almost totally breaks down: the crew embraces sectarian warfare and sinks into bloody chaos.

This is, of course, a rather simple-minded, village-atheist vision of religion; still, it is impressive. Fiction can survive quite a bit of crudeness, as the success of Dickens can attest. Amazingly—though not quite *believably*—the novel's denouement transcends its rather juvenile viewpoint, and the author strains for something more than the ultimate in Revenge.

The most interesting aspect of the book, however, is Reynolds's view of reason. His imagined future society revels in it, and organizes almost everything by explicit contract: this includes marriage, education, and security. Not surprisingly, halfway through the novel the word "libertarian" is dropped in, although in a rather inauspicious context. I am not quite certain what Reynolds's attitude to libertarianism is—but then, I am not quite certain what his attitudes are on much of *anything*. Reynolds's end-

ing threw me for a loop, and his real opinions on *any* of the book's important subjects remain obscure. It almost makes me wonder what Entity has been patrolling the waters of *his* mind-scape.

—Timothy W. Virkkala

**What is Right?** — The conservative movement, broadly defined, has grown enormously in three decades. It began as a reaction against New Deal statism and imperialism; it now includes New Dealers whose sole interest is an expansionist foreign policy. The movement as it stands today is a hodgepodge of contradictions.

The best and most comprehensive guide to the American Right available today is Gregory Wolfe's *Right Minds: A Sourcebook of American Conservative Thought* (Chicago: Regnery Gateway, 1987, forward by William F. Buckley, 250pp, \$16.95). It is an invaluable reference book for anyone who works in the opinion industry.

The coalitions of the Reagan years have helped to gloss over the differences between, for example, the libertarians, the paleoconservatives, the neoconservatives, the theocrats, the traditionalists, and the Southern agrarians. Wolfe himself is a paleocon of the Buckleyan variety. Here, though, he takes an ecumenical approach without whitewashing the differences.

The largest and most useful of the book's three sections is an annotated bibliography of conservative writings. Wolfe treats each book with fairness and concision. This is his summary of the thesis of *Human Action*: "an economy is not a machine which is controllable and predictable, but the sum total of human choices and valuations." Wolfe can be purely informative: of Frank Meyer's *In Defense of Freedom* he says, "an influential work which called for a 'fusion' be-

tween traditional conservatism and libertarianism; it has been praised and damned, and continues to provoke response." And he can be provocative: on John Courtney Murray's *We Hold These Truths* he says, "Murray's argument, that the American political tradition is consonant with the Catholic understanding of natural law, is of importance for non-Catholics, since it denies the myth of a modernist, Lockean America."

Wolfe discusses books about law, economics, international politics, communism, liberalism, religion, crime, and much more. Around 500 books are annotated here, and he gives lots of attention to the libertarian variant within the conservative tradition.

Wolfe gives short biographies of major thinkers and works, covering every era from the revolutionary war to the present. The lives of Mencken, Nock, Sumner, Burnham, Chodorov, Gilder, Hazlitt, Buckley, Mises, Hayek, Rothbard, Strauss, Meyer, Kirk, Kristol, and others are covered in biographies that average 300 words.

The book includes a section that lists conservative or conservative-like organizations, their histories, functions, and addresses.

Most readers will have complaints about Wolfe's book. Mine is that he left out the libertarians among our founding fathers (e.g. George Mason and Thomas Jefferson). Others will complain that he left out Ayn Rand, or Robert Welch, or that he doesn't give the neoconservatives enough space (that's a strength to me). Yet even the omissions tell us something about how American conservatism sees itself.

—Jeffrey A. Tucker

**More Liberal than Thou** — Though the idea of economic freedom has gained considerable prestige in the last two decades, the connection between economic freedom and personal freedom has yet to gain majority acceptance, even in the circles where market liberties are respected for their practicality. Thus it is the perfect time for a second edition of Samuel Brittan's 1973 work, *Capitalism and the Permissive Society*. The author has retitled the book (*A Restatement of Economic Liberalism*, Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press, 1988, 346 pp.) and updated it with a lengthy postscript on the advances in liberal theory and political practice. Also included are several appendices, the one

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on foreign policy being the most interesting and important.

"Economic liberalism" is Brittan's term for classical, or free-market liberalism, the creed that "emerged from the religious writers of the seventeenth century and the political and economic philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries" (p. 3). The term is not particularly to my liking—I do not like using "economic" as an adjective: it can mean too many things, and often means nothing at all—but it will do. The policy of "permissiveness"—that is, the policy of simply *letting* people *be* in their personal and community life—is ably defended, and expertly tied to market freedoms. Indeed, the whole book is an excellent introduction to modern market liberalism; Brittan grounds his discussion in the present world of the welfare state, using present-day examples, and demolishes not only New Left doctrines (still popular on campuses), but the record of recent conservative governments, as well. Though some American readers might be annoyed with the British orientation of the examples and discussions, I found them not only interesting but important—many libertarians suffer from the delusion that Margaret Thatcher is mostly on the side of the angels; Brittan shows just how far this bright and shining star has fallen.

Brittan is not, however, a libertarian. Though the word "libertarian" crops up occasionally as an adjective, it is only in the postscript that he discusses the Maddox-Lillie diagram of the political spectrum (well-known to libertarians as the "Nolan Chart") with its four-fold categories of Conservative, Populist, Left-Progressive, and Libertarian. But Brittan does not pursue this opportunity to discuss the modern libertarian movement. He prefers his own (British?) term for this movement—the "New Economic Right"—and never once mentions its most prominent institution, the Libertarian Party. This last, I think, is more than a snub; it is a *mischaracterization* of the American freedom movement, motivated I suspect by Brittan's dislike of its more radical tendencies.

His own version of liberalism is Hayekian, and is "compatible with redistribution of the income and wealth and may require government action to ensure that the market transmits people's preferences effectively" (212).

Though he insists on the primacy of freedom, he believes that "there is no need to derive all public policy from any one central goal. There is a plurality of goals which most of us, including liberals, seek to satisfy" (35).

I am afraid that many readers will at this point lose interest in Brittan's book, which would be a pity. His discussions of Nozick, Rawls and Buchanan are interesting, and his defense of a *mere presumptive case* for liberty is fast becoming the dominant version of liberalism. Libertarians must be able to address (and not merely dismiss) such arguments if they wish to be a part of the liberal revival. Reading books like Brittan's will prepare us for this debate—one that has, at the very least, the advantage of

being more interesting, if more difficult, than the debate now ending with the socialists. —TWV

**The Correct Perspective** — No, Tax Reform didn't make the age of Reagan worthwhile, but perhaps the book of editorial cartoons compiled by Fred Barnes about Reagan's tenure is enough to turn bellyaches into gutbusters. *A Cartoon History of the Reagan Years* (Washington DC: Regnery Gateway, 1988, 218 pp., \$9.95) depicts the colorful history of Reagan and the 80s with only caricatures and captions, drawn by some of today's most talented editorial cartoonists: Steve Kelley, Ed Gamble, Mike Peters, and the very libertarian John Trever.

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**Directory of Libertarian Periodicals**, 6th edition, lists 162 titles, all believed to be presently publishing, all with addresses, much other information. Includes alphabetical list of associated persons. \$3 postpaid, \$4 overseas. Jim Stumm, Box 29-LB, Hiler Branch, Buffalo, NY 14223.

**Attention Objectivist Writers:** Publishing house seeks manuscripts for anthology of Objectivist-oriented fiction, short stories, plays, or poetry. Send to Decca Press, 4808 SW 75th Avenue, Miami, Florida 33155-4437.

**Imagine Freedom from Governments and Churches.** stormy MON, editor. 10th Anniversary, Revised Edition: illustrated, controversial. 188 pp. \$10, international \$12 Libertarian Library, Box 24269-H, Denver, CO 80224.

### Literature

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### Periodicals

**Bigger print** now in The (Libertarian) Connection, open-forum magazine since 1968. Subscribers may insert one page/issue free, unedited. Lots of stimulating conversation. Eight issues (one year) \$20. Strauss, Box 3343Z, Fairfax, VA 22038.

**Freethought Today**, newspaper for atheists, agnostics. \$20 annually or send \$2.00 for sample copy. PO Box 750, Madison WI 53701.

**Panarchy:** Government by choice, not chance. People-oriented Government not government-oriented people. Idea whose time has come. Investigate a political system offering both Freedom and security. Ultimate Libertarianism Newsletter. \$8 year or \$3 sample. Checks to LeGrand E. Day, Editor, Panarchy Dialectic, Box 353 Reseda, CA 91333.

Perhaps only in America could a class B actor they call "the Gipper" become Prez and gain the wide-spread popularity that few presidents have enjoyed. And perhaps only a collection of political cartoons can relate the history of such a political system so well.

After reading this collection of cartoons, I am certain that it wasn't the Christian Right or the ultra-conservatives who loved Reagan the most. It was the cartoonists.

—Rodney E. Mood

**The Machinery of Friedman: An Appreciation** — David Friedman's spirited exposition of anarcho-capitalism—*The Machinery of Freedom: A Guide to a Radical Capitalism*—is one of the most enjoyable discussions of libertarian ideas yet written. The second edition (La Salle, IL: Open Court Publishing, 1989, 267 pp., \$32.95 hc, \$14.95 sc) is now out, and should be bought by anyone who likes playing with ideas. Readers of *Liberty*

are familiar with those portions of his book that we have excerpted—the pieces on Viking Iceland and problems for libertarian theory. What they should note is that there is more new material (all expressly written for libertarians) that we did not print—including a brilliant section on his *answers* to the problems he posed—not to mention all the good stuff in the first edition.

I have long been fond of this book. It is the second libertarian book I ever read (the first was Nozick's *Anarchy, State and Utopia*), and I found it a lot more convincing than all the standard (and confusing) stuff about natural rights and morality. Though my main interest is ethics, Friedman cuts the Gordian Knot of Ethics by concentrating on the practical side of politics. He does this with wit and a sense of good fun, as well as with his "machinery" of economic analysis. His writing is clear and forceful, and a better case for "anarchy" (that is, for agencies of defensive and retaliatory force competing in the marketplace) has yet to be made. Though this is in a sense

regrettable (vital ideas are supposed to be continually refined and restated), lack of strong competitors surely does not detract from the book's value.

Friedman does not strive for a serious tone. Though this may be seen as a defect by some, it is really one of his major assets. Most people are turned off by politics and economics unleavened by humor. For these people *Machinery* is ideal; his exposition of libertarian ideas is very easy to take, as well as understand. Though perhaps best-suited for novices, the book is a pleasure to read over and over again. I have been quoting Friedman's elegant little formulations and witticisms for years—without, I admit, always crediting him. Also, I cherish his wonderful bit of doggerel (the poem "Paranoia") for its arch wit. I suppose that, since tastes in humor vary so greatly, I should be a little more circumspect in my praise—but, surely, anyone who could ask whether Bill Buckley is a contagious disease has something going for him! —TWW

## Branden Interview, continued from page 57

crucial ones is how she applied her distinction between errors of knowledge and errors of morality.

**Liberty:** Rand attaches a lot of importance to this distinction.

**Branden:** It is a very important concept, philosophically and psychologically. There are times when you can say an action is so atrocious that there's no accounting for it except by evasion, by the actor's refusal to understand what he is doing. But in most cases we cannot see into somebody else's mind and it's incredibly presumptuous to say we can. It's all we can do in most cases to know about ourselves, to know whether a mistake we made was an honest one, whether we might have known, should have known, or could have known better . . . It's immensely difficult to one's own behavior. And I think very often it's not even necessary to try. We made a mistake, okay, we pick up and try not to do it again.

But there is a presumptuousness, an arrogance in attempting to judge what's going on in somebody else's mind in that subtle a respect. It is very dangerous; it does a lot of damage and simply cannot be justified.

But a terrible, terrible problem came out of the way Ayn herself misapplied this distinction. She was too quick to find errors of morality in other people, and a lot of students of Objectivism picked up from Ayn her way of dealing with it and the number of moral charges against people, the fear on the part of individuals that maybe they were making a moral error, was just insane, insane and terribly tragic.

In fact, anything in her philosophy that impinges on psychology is really a disaster. Even within the philosophical system there are things that don't make sense to me. But none of them are basic. So in that sense I would call myself

an Objectivist but in no other. If today Objectivism means wild fanaticism then I am no part of that.

**Liberty:** That seems to be what it means, with the current people who apparently own the term "Objectivism."

**Branden:** I am not willing to grant them that term.

**Liberty:** What do you think of the current Objectivists?

**Branden:** Oh, dear! Do you mean the people around Leonard [Peikoff]?

**Liberty:** Yes.

**Branden:** I was going to say that the current Objectivists of significance . . . many of them I admire very much and I am delighted to see that they are creating their own lives away from the need for Ayn or Leonard or Nathan or anybody. And many of them are doing just wonderful things and it pleases me very much. They are going their own ways intellectually and that's just a delight to me because that's what should happen.

The people around Leonard—and to my knowledge there are about two and a half of them because everybody decent is long gone—they are true cultists, fanatics. But I don't think they are of the least importance. They are talking to themselves, and themselves get to be smaller and smaller in number all the time. It's just unfortunate that that's the entrance of many people to Objectivism. I wish it weren't.

As far as what Leonard is doing with Ayn's estate, I think it's simply horrendous. He's selling it off bit-by-bit. Her papers should be in a university where they belong, not published in little bits and pieces with some of the philosophical things edited by Leonard which is just insanity. It destroys all the value they might have. His handling of her estate is appalling. □

# Notes on Contributors

*Stephen G. Barone* is a writer who lives in Platteville, Wisconsin.

*David Bernstein* has entered his second year at Yale Law School. He has written articles for *Human Events*, the *Boston Herald*, and other periodicals.

*R. W. Bradford* is editor of *Liberty*.

*Stephen Cox*, a senior editor of *Liberty*, is Associate Professor of Literature, University of California, San Diego.

*David Gordon*, an Adjunct Scholar of the Ludwig von Mises Institute, has written numerous reviews and essays for diverse journals.

*Karl Hess*, a senior editor of *Liberty*, is also the editor of *Libertarian Party News*.

*Richard Kostelanetz* is a writer and artist living in New York City.

*Lawrence Ludlow's* practice of cheese hoarding has emptied his bank account and overburdened the ventilation system in his Jersey City, N.J., apartment building. In disgust, his wife is filing for divorce. She will not be pursuing her community property rights.

*Rex F. May* is a cartoonist ("Baloo") whose work appears in *The Wall Street Journal* and other periodicals.

*Patrick J. Michaels* is Associate Professor Environmental Sciences at the University of Virginia.

*Rodney E. Mood* is flying high (academically) through college life in West Lafayette, Indiana.

*William P. Moulton* deals in antiques and antiquities in northern Michigan.

*Bob Ortin* lives in southern Oregon, where he surveys commercial applicants for insurance companies and bureaucrats for free-thinking non-parasites.

*Sheldon L. Richman* is director of public affairs at the Institute for Humane Studies at George Mason University.

*James S. Robbins* is a doctoral candidate at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University.

*Llewelyn H. Rockwell, Jr.*, a journalist and think-tank director, has been active in the conservative and libertarian movements for more than 30 years.

*Andrew Roller* is a former launch officer for nuclear missiles in the United States Air Force. He currently lives in Sacramento, California, with his finger on very different sorts of buttons.

*Murray N. Rothbard*, a senior editor of *Liberty*, is the author of numerous books and articles. He is S.J. Hall Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of Nevada at Las Vegas.

*Charles K. Rowley, Jr.* is a Professor of Economics at George Mason University.

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*Jane S. Shaw*, formerly Associates Economics Editor at *Business Week*, writes from Bozeman, Montana.

*Jeffrey A. Tucker* is the managing editor of the Ludwig von Mises Institute's *The Free Market*.

*Timothy Virkkala* is assistant editor of *Liberty*.

*Richard E. Wagner* is a Professor of Economics at Florida State University.

*Ethan O. Waters* has few friends in the libertarian movement, and seems not to feel deprived in the least.

*Charles Ziarko* is an assistant director in Hollywood, California.

## In the Next *Liberty* . . .

- **The Case Against Extreme Isolationism** — Stephen Cox argues that knee-jerk isolationism is for jerks.
- **Humanity vs Nature** — John Hospers explores two popular views of how people should treat animals, and shows how one refutes the other (the winner is *not* the "animal rights" position).
- **Pozner the Poseur** — Richard Kostelanetz visits Phil Donahue's favorite communist in his Moscow apartment, autographs a book, and discovers that there is more to the Soviet PR specialist than meets the eye.
- **Libertarian Intellectuals as Government Lackeys** — George H. Smith argues that libertarians who accept employment from the state don't simply harm their own souls: they harm other libertarians as well.

# Terra Incognita

## Rockford, Ill.

Advance in gender studies, by Thomas Fleming, editor of *Chronicles*, the leading paleoconservative journal, in its December 1989 issue:

"History and physiology teach the same cynical lessons: men are built to inflict pain, women to endure it."

## Orlando, Fla.

The irony of investment analysis, explained by R. E. Veitia, president of Strategic Communications, Ltd, in an announcement of a new publication:

"We're a serious company that publishes conservative, rational economic thought, and carefully researched recommendations, [yet] . . . we are bringing out *Psychic Forecaster*—the world's first periodical that offers mainly astrological and psychic *investment advice*."

## Hartford, Conn

Insight into the right to privacy, as reported in the *New York Times*:

"The right to privacy is not what we seek to pierce," said Lester J. Forst, Chief of the Connecticut State Police, "rather it is the right to be secure that we seek to protect." Forst promoted a state law to allow police to tape record conversations in public places like restaurant tables, and installed equipment that routinely recorded all calls by defendants to their attorneys made from State Police offices. Information learned from the clandestine eavesdropping was "absolutely never" used improperly, a State Police spokesman added.

## Jerusalem

Latest advance in the science of marketing, as reported by the *Detroit News*:

The Israeli Manufacturers' Association announced that it had filed a complaint with the police against the Al Ghazel Macaroni Co. of Bethlehem, whose packages of spaghetti are red, white, black and green—the colors of the Palestinian flag.

## Los Angeles

Proof that violent crime is no longer a serious concern, as reported by the *Los Angeles Daily News*:

Vice squad officers who staked out a bowling alley in Granada Hills arrested Sandy Scholnik, Anne Barnette, Esther Martinez, Pamela Waizenegger and Olga Shores on charges of gambling. The suburban housewives were observed making bets totalling \$8 during their weekly bowling match.

## London

Further evidence that the British are more civilized than their American cousins, as reported in *The Wall St Journal*:

Under a recently enacted law, residents of England will have to apply for and receive a license from the government in order to attend soccer matches.

## Fallon, Nev.

Inspiring demonstration of the ability of the armed forces to minimize impact on civilian life, as reported in the *New York Times*:

During a two week period, the Navy located and either detonated or removed 2,000 bombs that its bombers had dropped on public or private land outside its target range, missing their 22,000 acre target.

## Tacoma, Wash.

Another victory in the War on Drugs, as reported by KOMO-TV *News*:

Heavily-armed soldiers backed up by two armored personnel carriers invaded a farm in rural Pierce County which the police suspected was used for producing illegal drugs. The invaders met no resistance, perhaps because the property-owner was already in police custody. A thorough search revealed no drugs or drug paraphernalia, police announced that they had discovered evidence of drugs: two shotguns and three four-wheel drive motor vehicles.

## Sacramento, Calif.

Interesting new pastime from the Golden State, as reported by Gannett News Service:

"Good Steward," a Monopoly-type board game for Christians, is "wholesome" and "teaches good principles," according to its designer, William Parker, a juvenile delinquent counselor for the California Youth Authority.

Each player starts with \$2,700 in paper money, and can buy, sell and develop properties and "withdraw" money from their "heavenly bank account." Players are encouraged to tithe—donate 10% of income to their church—and do missionary work. They receive "blessings" and are challenged by "difficult and trying circumstances."

## New York

Evidence of the trustworthiness of sports journalists, demonstrated by Bob Considine, longtime friend of home run hero Babe Ruth and co-author of Ruth's autobiography, as recalled by Hall of Fame baseball player Henry Greenberg in his autobiography *The Story of My Life*:

"Babe Ruth had cancer of the throat and wouldn't see anybody; he wouldn't even answer the phone. Bob Considine finagled us in to see the Babe by saying I wanted to stop in and shake hands with him. So Babe was nice enough to invite us to his apartment. Babe showed me all his trophies and he couldn't have been nicer. He gave me a picture of himself that has hung in my house ever since. That's the last time I saw Babe, [who] died in August of the following year.

"I've never forgotten that Considine was rummaging around the apartment, swiping snapshots and clippings, and Babe didn't know it . . ."

## Cleveland, Ohio

Advance in the administration of justice, as reported in the *New York Times*:

On trial for stealing a bag of dogfood from a pet store, Carl Stokes explained that he had intended to pay for the dog food, but he could not find a clerk, and had to rush off to an "important meeting." Stokes, a judge and former mayor of Cleveland, was found innocent by the court.

## San Francisco

Latest development in liberation theology, as originated by Lyle Miller, Bishop of the Evangelical Lutheran Church for Northern California and Northern Nevada, and reported by the *Los Angeles Times*:

"I want to protest against the earthquake. When innocent people die, I want to protest. When normal life becomes chaos, I want to protest."

(Readers are encouraged to forward newsclippings or other documents for publication in *Terra Incognita*.)

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- Plus reviews and articles by Murray Rothbard, Ida Walters, Ross Overbeek and others; and a short story by Jo McIntyre. (48 pages)

### October 1987

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  - "The Rise of the Statism," by Murray N. Rothbard
- Plus reviews and articles by Mike Holmes, Tibor Machan, William Moulton and others; and a short story by Franklin Sanders. (48 pages)

### December 1987

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  - "The Most Unforgettable Libertarian I Ever Knew," by Karl Hess
- Plus essays and reviews by Stephen Cox, Walter Block, Mark Skousen and others; and a short story by David Galland. (56 pages)

### March 1988

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### September 1988

- "Scrooge McDuck and His Creator," by Phillip Salin
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