

Liberty

January 1991

Vol 4, No 3

\$4.00

The Man From Mars

Who is this guy
challenging Lech
Walesa, anyway?

meltdown

The End of the
Soviet Empire

David Boaz, Ralph Raico, James Robbins, Jane Shaw

Lies, Liberalism and Lip-Reading

by Loren Lomasky and Stephen Cox

Gordon Gekko, Michael Milken and Me

by Douglas Casey

Also: How freedom fared in the November elections;
Jim Robbins on the alarming increase in premarital interdigitation;
Lawrence Person on skatepunks and anarchy for fun;
and other articles and reviews.

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\$20.00 Liberty	50,249	103,828,017	918,832
\$20 St Gaudens	171,189	70,290,333	1,434,450

Liberty

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Liberty (ISSN 0894-1408) is a review of libertarian and classical liberal thought, culture and politics, published bi-monthly by Liberty Publishing, 1532 Sims Way, #1, Port Townsend, WA 98368 (Mailing Address: PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368). Subscriptions are \$19.50 for 6 issues, \$35.00 for 12 issues. Foreign subscriptions are \$24.50 for 6 issues, \$45.00 for 12 issues. Recent single issues are \$4.00 each, plus \$1.00 for postage & handling.

Second-Class Postage Paid at Port Townsend, WA 98368, and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Liberty, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368.

Manuscripts are welcome, but will be returned only if accompanied by SASE. Queries are encouraged. A Writer's Introduction is available; send request and SASE to the address above.

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Letters

A Taxing Idea

Sheldon Richman ("My daughter Jennifer has been seized by the state," November 1990) asks when the government will send him tuition tax credits so that "someone besides the rich can avoid . . . citizenship indoctrination."

I am a little concerned with the popularity of tuition tax credits among libertarians. Aren't tuition tax credits really redistributed tax monies collected from all property owners, not only those who have children? At this time this money goes to support the public schools. With tuition tax credits, some of the same money, collected the same way, would go to individual families to be used for educational alternatives. Why should property owners who do not have children be forced to support Mr. Richman's choice of private education any more than they are currently coerced into supporting the public schools?

Instead of spending so much of his time trying to undo what other educators feel needs to be done to Jennifer, why not take that time and energy to create a home learning environment where Jennifer can explore and grow in the same effective way she no doubt did prior to her entrance into the Virginia educational monopoly? Homeschooling has become available and legal in virtually all the states precisely because so many ordinary people have refused to allow the seizure of their children by the state, and have given up belief in the inevitability of mass education.

Dave Meilstrup,
Santa Fe, N.M.

Medical Scoop

Kudos for scooping other opinion journals with Dr Ron Paul's analysis of the non-abortion uses of the so-called "abortion pill" (September 1990). *The New Republic's* look at the same issue in its cover story on Nov 26, was three months' later than yours and not half as good.

Ronald Armstrong
New York, N.Y.

El Supremo

I enjoyed the interview with Ed Crane (November 1990).

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There is a world of good reading in *Liberty* . . . and there has been ever since *Liberty* began publishing! Whether you want to catch up on what you missed, stimulate your mind, or complete your collection, now is a good time to buy. Enjoy!

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Letters (continued from page 4)

Whether Libertarians like the man or not, Ed probably has done more to further their cause than any other individual in recent years. Also, the Cato Institute probably ranks as the most effective of all libertarian organizations.

K. C. Blair
Santa Fe, N.M.

Rock Solid Rights Need No Excavation

From the interview with Ed Crane: Bradford: "What rights do people bring into society?"

Crane: "Rights to life, liberty, and property."

Bradford: "Where do these rights come from?"

Crane: "Oh, come on, Bill"

That's it!!! Rights to life, liberty, and property form the central axiom of political philosophy. All attempts to derive these rights from some underlying principles, such as natural rights, utilitarianism, or extrapolations, interpolations, or deviations on those themes, are elephant shit.

Life, liberty, and property (rightfully obtained—not stolen) are the bedrock of libertarianism. If you dig deeper all you will find is magma.

Millard H. Perstein
Sedona, Ariz.

Moral Corruption, Anyone?

In "Why is Anyone Virtuous?" (November 1990), David Friedman explains why he believes most people are motivated to be virtuous and act honestly. I believe he fails to credit the basic reason why any person, motivated by rational self-interest, has no incentive to act other than with the highest integrity.

To make my case I must give credit to Ayn Rand for identifying altruism as the moral corruption that it is.

To a rational mind, a material asset has no value unless it has been earned, that is, unless the asset has been acquired in exchange for the fruits of his labor. To a rational mind, to quote the senior Friedman, "There Ain't No Such Thing as a Free Lunch" and something acquired for nothing has no real value. Happiness proceeds from achieving one's values and, if productive achievement is man's noblest activity, then the earnings of one's efforts represent the highest value one can achieve.

The motivation to theft or fraud logi-

cally proceeds from the altruist philosophy. The basic motivation of altruism is to be the beneficiary of the sacrificial offerings altruism preaches. Greed is the aspiration to the unearned. An altruist equates worth with value and he mistakenly believes that to acquire a material asset for free, that is, without having earned same, will bring him happiness and wonders why it never does.

When a young child is first told that he must never steal, the inevitable message is conveyed that to acquire that which one has not earned is a desirable objective and this, of course, is precisely the wrong message. A rational upbringing would teach a child that, for something to be of value, it must be earned.

All forms of mysticism have an altruist base and, as religion in one form or another is still pervasive, the desire of something for nothing is common among most believers. It is this wrong motivation that drives people to steal, commit fraud or even participate in gambling. To the rational mind, gambling represents making an investment where you know beforehand absolutely that the odds are against you, so on that ground alone one is disinclined to gamble. But a rational person also doesn't gamble because of his lack of interest in the remote possibility that he might suddenly acquire a windfall without having earned it. News stories are legion with the grief and disasters that have befallen winners of lotteries. This should come as no surprise because the one ingredient that could insure happiness is lacking.

The rational person, motivated by self interest, has no incentive to seek the unearned and hence cannot be tempted to a non-virtuous act. On the contrary, as his concept of value is inseparable from the need to earn his reward, he lacks all aspiration for the unearned. In dealing with his fellow man he is a trader, seeking values in voluntary exchange to mutual profit, neither seeking or offering the unearned. Therefore, the basic motivation of the rational mind to be virtuous is the recognition that this is the only path to happiness.

William Vandersteel
Alpine, N.J.

The Philosophical Mosaic

I read with very great pleasure and interest John Hospers's account of his encounters with Ayn Rand ("Conversations With Ayn Rand," July and Sep-

tember, 1990). I wish he would write a book about her so people could get a glimpse of her as seen through his eyes. This might show her in a more balanced and human light—emphasizing her life's major preoccupation—than did either of the Brandens' books.

I also wish is that Hospers had reported that there are *many* academic philosophers not influenced by Rand who nevertheless share her vision of philosophy. Indeed, many of the classical philosophers, such as Plato, Aristotle, Descartes, *et al* (even Kant) held out hope for a constructive philosophical undertaking, even as they carried out a great deal of critical analysis. Even Bertrand Russell approached philosophy with an eye to finding answers to fundamental questions and even believed that propositions of the sort Hospers treats as "heuristic maxims" may in some sense be statements that could be true about the world (in general or about its basic constituents).

If Hospers thinks that "philosophical formulas . . . merely give us 'philosophy on the cheap,'" then by his account there are many very prominent figures in the history of philosophy who tried to get by with cheap philosophy—Hegel, Kant, Marx, to name just three who tried to come up with generalizations or basic truths about reality as a whole or as such.

Isn't there room for grand theorizing, something attempted in a sketchy way by Rand, and also for meticulous, detailed scrutiny? I advocate pluralism about styles of philosophizing—some suit some folks, others other folks, but most of them can be done well or badly. When done well, they have their value. And *à propos* Hospers's championing of critical philosophizing—does not criticism presuppose some valid criteria for assessing theories, hypotheses, concepts, distinctions, etc.? Why should we not attempt to identify those criteria? And might not there be some very fundamental criteria with some kind of base in "the nature of reality" itself? And perhaps we can come to learn even that.

I hope that the sadness I detected in Hospers's concluding paragraph is not a primary state of mind for him vis-a-vis his experiences with Rand. My much less prominent but somewhat similarly disappointing personal relationship with her is clearly overshadowed by the good fortune of having encountered her.

Tibor Machan
Auburn, Ala.

Reflections

I wanna hold your hand — Feel like a little innocent hand-holding? Then stay clear of Cincinnati. Commodore C. Canyon and John K. Harden were busted by alert officer Marty Polk, who saw them holding hands in a parked car in Eden Park, in flagrant violation of a 1974 Ohio law prohibiting "disorderly conduct for creating a physically offensive situation."

Little matter that there was not one case of the law being enforced since it was enacted in 1974, or that sitting quietly in a parked car is hardly a "physically offensive situation"; Officer Polk saw his duty. Could this be a case of deliberate harassment of homosexuals in the wake of the Mapplethorpe flap? No way, according to Polk—he said the situation would have been as offensive had it involved a man and a woman. Well, I guess Officer Polk had never been to Eden Park before, where this sort of outlandish hand-coupling has been going on for years, between members of the same or different sexes, married or unmarried, and even interracially.

I myself have engaged not only in premarital interdigitation but even osculation with a woman in Eden Park, in the presence of police officers, without once being cited for such a socially disruptive display. When the Cincinnati Symphony Orchestra holds evening concerts in the Park, people spread out blankets on the grassy hillsides and sit with arms and legs entwined, and some even snuggle. Simply outrageous. But it took two men sitting in a car holding hands while one consoled the other over the death of a relative to finally get the law enforcement authorities moving. And we are to believe that this was not a case of selective prosecution and legal harassment? It's a good thing Judge Joseph Luebbers threw out the charges, otherwise the Cincinnati Police would have to arrest practically the entire city just to prove they aren't hypocrites. —JSR

For Jesses' sake — Why is it that opposition to affirmative action injects racism into an election campaign, but support for it does not? —SLR

Demokratization — According to a recent *Wall St. Journal* article the only police item now in abundant supply in the Soviet Union is the PR-73 rubber truncheon. This useful gadget goes by the ever-so-ironic name of "demokratizator." You can't say those Ivans don't have a sense of humor.

Since imposition of an income tax is high on the list of nearly every Western expert offering advice on "modernizing" the Soviet economy, an income tax will likely be among the first "reforms" implemented for the benefit of the New Soviet Man, er. . . Taxpayer. The KGB is ready to function as the IRS. Few real changes will be needed, aside perhaps from fresh supplies of "demokratizators."

I wonder what snappy term the Soviets will come up for

income tax forms, previously unneeded in the workers' paradise. In keeping with local custom. I suggest the "kollektivizor." —MH

Entrepreneurship as crime — Repercussions of events in the Middle East have given us new insights into our rulers' delusions of competence. Senator Lieberman of Connecticut provided one example on the TV show *Crossfire* of October 23, 1990. He complained that emotions, hunches, and worries had been driving the price of oil. Maybe the envisioned shortages would not occur after all. It was too soon for prices to respond. The market just was not working right, and he had introduced a bill to impose criminal penalties.

Lieberman evidently did not understand that all economizing and all entrepreneurial activity necessarily look to the future.

Libertarians should cite examples like this one in response to calls for "industrial policy" (or whatever its latest fad name may be). Besides the dubious economics of such policies, we should emphasize how they blend politics with business. Do we really want to give more power to people whose grasp of economics is as pathetic as Senator Lieberman's? —LBY

Have it Fidel's way! — Another indication of the revolution sweeping the socialist world is the opening of "McCastro's," the unofficial name for the new Cuban state-owned fast-food burger joint. The Havana restaurant is very popular, but those who want to "hold the pickle, hold the lettuce" had better remember just where they are. McCastro's isn't Burger King, and special orders are illegal. —JSR

A game to end all games — During the same week in which Mikhail Gorbachev was awarded the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize, two candidates leapt to the head of the queue for next year's award. Under the orchestration of coaches Lou Holtz and Dennis Erickson, football teams from the universities of Notre Dame and Miami succeeded in making their way through the tunnel leading to the field and then conducting practice without a single punch being thrown. Those unaware of the history of the teams' encounters may find this unremarkable, so I note for their benefit that the event is roughly comparable to Yitzhak Shamir and Yasser Arafat getting together for a cordial game of bridge. The coaches deserve congratulations; it is up to the wise men of Oslo to determine if they merit more.

Football is a game of physical conflict in which for each winner there is a loser, so it is no surprise that contests frequently take on the character of mini-wars. Genuine animus against the players on the other team seems to be conducive to peak performance on the field. However, it is not only within the confines of athletic stadiums that loathing trans-

lates into maximum exertion; the same phenomenon apparently characterizes the pursuit of social policy. For example, an administration convinced that controlled substances are detrimental to the health and productivity of American citizens finds educational messages a woefully inadequate means for communicating that concern. Nothing less than declaration of a "War on Drugs" will do. Appropriations adequate to equip a medium-sized army are solicited from a thoroughly complaisant Congress in order to bring "Public Enemy #1" to heel, imprisonments beating the number recorded by the South African regime during the darkest days of *Apartheid* duly follow, and supposedly friendly foreign governments are destabilized so as better to pursue the enemy. Taking a cue from Mao's Cultural Revolution, children are publicly praised for turning in traitorous parents. When these efforts are observed to yield minimal results, commanding general Bush, ably seconded by cheerleader Bill Bennett, whips up the troops to further exertions by calls for secret strikes against users and public executions of dealers.

There is, of course, nothing new in this rendition of policy-as-war. While fighting a hot war in Vietnam, Lyndon Johnson declared a cold War Against Poverty at home. Each disastrously misfired. Who can forget the egregious Jimmy Carter's characterization of his administration's energy policy as the "moral equivalent of war"? (To give George Bush the credit that he is due, his pursuit of oil supplies features a considerably more realistic similitude of war.) And if I may be permitted the insertion of an autobiographical note, I began my graduate studies in philosophy as the recipient of a National Defense Education Act fellowship, content in the knowledge that I was ensuring the security of my country by pondering Leibnizian monads and the existence of other minds.

There may be a good sociobiological explanation of why ordinary policy pursuits so routinely escalate into pseudo-declarations of war. Perhaps we are genetically programmed to apply ourselves maximally only when primal aggressive urges are tapped. Even if that is so, I note that an instinct which may have well-served our Neanderthal ancestors has proved itself to be of dubious efficacy in dealing with contemporary conundrums. Too often when we tap the arsenal of rhetorical armaments we end up shooting ourselves in the foot. What we need, I suggest, is a war on wars on whatever.

Oh yes: Notre Dame won a 29-20 victory over a Miami team which, deprived of its customary pregame brawl, seemed remarkably listless. —LEL

Just say, "Dough" — Cant, like clothing, has its fads and fashions, and the most *au courant* these days is the line that goes, in its most placard-ready form, "Say no to government-approved art."

Well, yes, I say, and nod approvingly and thoughtlessly, as I suppose I am meant to. Of course those using this slogan intend it as rhetorical heavy artillery in the war to save the National Endowment for the Arts from content restrictions in its federal funding of artists and art institutions. So what they really want is not an end to government-approved art; rather, they desire an expansion of it, to reach as far as the eye can see and the hand can grasp. They want *more* government-approved art, and more thoughtlessly government-approved art.

This is all quite obvious, and it has inspired me toward some fanciful thinking about an America where the only art form with skilled practitioners remaining is that of filling out grant applications to the federal government. We could have neo-classical grant applications (an attractively-proportioned, powerfully built young man carved from pure marble, exuding confidence and ability, draped with a sandwich-board sign reading "Give me money"), and Dada grant applications ("Give me money. Watch your overcoat.")—the possibilities are endless. It's a disturbing and absurd world, and it's just the sort of world that public supporters of the NEA deserve to live in. —BD

The Victory of Central Planning Over the Chaos of the Market, Chapter 11.—

Leningrad city officials, in an effort to ward off starvation as the Soviet food distribution system continues to crumble, implemented food rationing for the first time since the German encirclement during World War II. Other cities are expected to follow suit. But Leningraders are lucky. Imagine what it would be like if, in addition to all their other troubles, they had to put up with exploitation by the marketplace. At least under socialism food is cheap—at least it would be cheap, if there were any. —WPM

Jennifer, the sequel — And now, another episode of *The Indoctrination of Jennifer: A Saga of Government Schools*. When we last left Jennifer, 7 years old, she was being forced to recite the pledge of allegiance by rote and was being warned that selling drugs was grounds for expulsion. She entered first grade able to read and to do simple addition, but many of her classmates were just beginning to read and apparently unable to count to ten. So naturally Jennifer was held down to the lowest level. What's worse, the teacher was using the look-say method of reading. At a parents' night early in the school year, she explained that she reads a simple story to the kids over and over until they memorize it. Then she has them recite the story from memory while sliding their fingers under the words on the page. "That's reading," she told parents. "That's bullshit," I thought as I sat listening to this. She then explained that she encouraged them to write about the stories read to them. Some kids, she explained, are only able to draw the characters. "That's writing, too," she said. "Let me outta here," I murmured to myself. After that we learned that this "teacher" planned to teach the kids addition—ready for this?—using calculators. That's the math equivalent of look-say. We insisted that Jennifer be moved up to second grade.

Things of course haven't improved. The cultural side of this education is actually worse than the academic side. Jennifer recently told us that she was required to wear an American flag pin everyday so that she would think about our troops in Saudi Arabia. Luckily it broke and they haven't given her another. We complained to the principal, who assured us it was supposed to be voluntary. (I can just imagine the file the principal has on us.) We opted her out of a "values" program that is little more than pro-state propaganda against drugs, alcohol, tobacco and caffeine! (The principal thought we must have made a mistake.) The schools are now the vanguard of a goddam temperance movement. Just the other day Jennifer displayed some other knowledge she was imparted:

mean people are cutting down the rain forests, killing animals and making the planet hotter. Somehow the schools left out a few details. I can't take it anymore. We're probably going to begin homeschooling real soon.

—SLR

"Just checking, Ma'am"— My home town of Gainesville, Fla., has recently received some unusual national media attention for a nightmarish reason: Two months ago, within a three day period, some person or persons brutally murdered and mutilated five Gainesville college students, four females and one male.

This sort of occurrence, of course, creates public panic and disturbance. Never have I been in the center of so many confused, scared and angry people, and never have I witnessed at such close range and high speed the sociology of rumors. And never have I witnessed so much frightening credulity displayed on the part of normally intelligent, thoughtful people. People were ready to believe anything they heard, apparently using adrenalin as their only epistemological standard. If a rumor made them more frightened than before, they believed it. Body counts ballooned upwards in the public imagination; reports of unlikely and gruesome mutilation methods abounded. The stonewalling of police investigators fueled the fires of rumor.

Understandably, people begin to feel somewhat grateful for the presence of police in these circumstances. Government's primal hold on the public imagination—as the preserver of civic order and safety—is in the forefront, and people forget what a shoddy job it generally does at maintaining that civic order.

Indeed, no one has yet been arrested or charged with the crime, though an unfortunate student who happened to be arrested in the wake of the crimes for assaulting his grandmother and who had a history of mental illness has been fingered in the public imagination and in newspaper headlines as a "prime suspect." Still, no more murders have occurred, or at least been discovered; so perhaps the large increase in police patrols around town has done part of the job that they are supposed to be there for.

But, as in all government activities, they can't resist doing just a little bit more. Though all reports of the forensics of the murder scenes indicate that there are no fingerprints or other obvious features to link suspects with the crime, police patrols around Gainesville have taken to performing random stops and fingerprintings of bikers and pedestrians. Florida Highway Patrol spokesman Ernie Leggett admits that there isn't any particular reason they are doing this, any suspicion they are trying to allay: "It's a cursory check," he is quoted as saying in the Gainesville *Sun*, "We're stopping people in the area if there are any questions why they're there. . . . This is not being done in an accusatory way." Apparently he intended this remark to ameliorate people's anger, and stave off attention from the American Civil Liberties Union.

I could understand if they were checking people who they had reason to believe were suspects; but they are merely using a panic situation to excuse random, causeless searches and fingerprintings, the sort of thing our Bill of Rights was meant to

prevent. But, as always, the State feels that any crisis situation, real or imagined, excuses the use of any means possible or conceivable to meet its goals, whatever they may be, and never mind what the Constitution might have to say about it.

And crises are everywhere, as any newspaper reader is aware. Childcare crises, Mid-East crises, S&L crises—and the police-like minds of our "leaders" will forever be ready to excuse any action made in the wake of these crises with the casual assurance of police spokesman Ernie Leggett. We, whether citizens of Gainesville or just the United States, should not be calmed by this nonsense. We should be appalled.


—BD

Another one bites the dust— The direct monetary cost to the American people of the Iraqi border build-up will be reduced the first year, perhaps by half, because of contributions from Japan, Germany, Saudi Arabia, the exiled Kuwaiti regime and the United Arab Emirates. But this money will come at the expense of constitutional integrity. The administration wants the Pentagon to be able to collect and spend any money raised from foreign sources without the approval of Congress. Legislation to that effect has been introduced. Thus, the people's theoretical representatives, to whom the Constitution gives control of the purse strings, would lose nearly all authority over the administration's military adventure. This would complete the reprehensible process begun by Harry Truman in 1950: now a President will be able not only to get us into a war without Congress's passing a declaration, he will be able to fight the war without Congress's appropriating the money. In the process of creating a new world order,

approval of Congress. Legislation to that effect has been introduced. Thus, the people's theoretical representatives, to whom the Constitution gives control of the purse strings, would lose nearly all authority over the administration's military adventure. This would complete the reprehensible process begun by Harry Truman in 1950: now a President will be able not only to get us into a war without Congress's passing a declaration, he will be able to fight the war without Congress's appropriating the money. In the process of creating a new world order,

George Bush is destroying the separation of powers, such as it is, at home.

—SLR



Your people, sir, are a great beast— Feeling sorry for an entire police force is rare enough, in my case at least, to warrant a brief explanation.

The police force for whose members I now feel constrained to shed a figurative tear or two, is that of the District of Columbia.

First of all, its members are on the front line of William Bennett's maniacal, wrong-headed, losing, costly, destructive war on drugs. They must watch virtually helplessly as the capital's murder rate ascends to new international records. Warring over turf in the government mandated monopoly on drugs—making criminals the exclusive purveyors—is the admitted cause.

And most lately, they must put up with injuries and hate-filled demands for probes and punishments because they dared protect the civil rights of a group of unlovely people, the Ku Klux Klan.

The Klan was awarded a license to parade prominently through downtown Washington (a license that survived substantial court squabbling). The Peoples' coalitions, unions, and federations against this or that went into maximum outrage that someone of whom they did not approve had been

awarded the right to do exactly what The Peoples' coalitions, unions, and federations had long demanded for themselves: the right publicly to demonstrate no matter how unpopular the cause of the demonstration might be.

Now that the marching shoe is on the other foot, The People are howling in rabid fury.

Just as bad is the grotesque reasoning used to justify the attacks against the police who were protecting the Klan marchers:

It's all the Klan's fault.

If the Klan hadn't been so bold as to want to strut its obnoxious stuff in public then The People wouldn't have had to attack the police to exercise their special privilege of beating on people (lower case) and restricting freedom of expression and assembly.

After all the years of agony in establishing the right to protest in public (government) space, The People have taken a big, violent step toward trashing the entire concept because of their most egregious insistence upon a double standard. Protest, it now seems, has to be approved by The People. The People's Republic of China would understand. —KH

Cant and recant — "It turns out, of course, that Mises was right." No, that is not Murray Rothbard. It is socialist Robert Heilbroner in the Sept. 10 issue of *The New Yorker*. In his article "After Communism," Heilbroner honors Mises as he contemplates the collapse of the Soviet Union and speculates about what is to follow. He doesn't get Mises' argument against communism quite right: "no Central Planning Board could ever gather the enormous amount of information needed to create a workable economic system" is how he paraphrases it. What Mises said was that without a real price system rational calculation is impossible. Heilbroner's paraphrase is actually one of Hayek's weaker formulations. But Heilbroner does seem to understand that the problem is related to prices. He shows this when he writes that the Soviet economy was inefficient "when projects had to be joined into a complex whole—a process that required knowing how much things should cost. Then, as Mises foresaw, setting prices became a hopeless problem, because the economy never stood still long enough for anyone to decide anything correctly." This is pretty close for someone like Heilbroner, and he does add, "There is no doubt that the market is an astonishing solution to the problem of creating a workable economic system."

But all this does not mean that he now favors capitalism. For him, capitalism still has booms and busts, mass unemployment, and — of course — Environmental Degradation. Heilbroner still has much to learn and should keep on reading Mises. In Eastern Europe, he writes, the ideal economic system "will possess the vitality of capitalism without a class of powerful capitalists, a substantial amount of government guidance without a corps of bureaucrats. It may have a stock market but not a casino." —SLR

Where is the Soviet Rifle Association?

— Soviet officials have recently been complaining of the vast number of illegal guns that are in the hands of the supposedly disarmed populace. These weapons, most of which are appar-

ently handguns, are showing up not only in the possession of criminals, but at off-the-record gun shows and among nationalist paramilitary units. The central government has been offering to buy black market guns on a no-name basis, and in July declared a period of amnesty for those who turned in their weapons at the police stations (20,000 handguns and three tons of military explosives were surrendered). According to informal Soviet sources, buying a machine gun is easy in the larger cities.

Now, a question for anti-Second Amendment activists in the United States. If the USSR has been unable, in a culture with no strong tradition of individual ownership of individual weapons, to keep its people from being, in the words of an editorial in *Komsomolskaya Pravda*, "armed to the teeth," do you really believe that Americans will be willing to surrender their guns. Or, are you willing to propose an even more repressive legal system than that of the Soviet Union in order to accomplish your goal? —WPM

Wrestling with Israel — No one can fully understand what is going on in the Middle East, especially the animosity toward the United States, without grasping the significance of American support for the creation and continuation of the state of Israel. Americans typically don't want to hear about this; they've been cynically taught that it is anti-Semitism.

But to the Arabs, who have several times been cheated out of self-determination, Israel is merely a new form of western colonialism. While the promoters of the state in the early days assured the Arabs that their rights would be respected, they told other audiences, as Chaim Weizmann put it, that they wanted Palestine to be as Jewish as England is English and America is American. The UN arrogantly divided Palestine, giving 57 percent to the Jews there, though they were less than a third of the population and had bought less than 7 percent of the land. Under this gerrymandering, the Jewish part had an Arab population of just under 50 percent. Without their consent, these Arabs had imposed on them what they reasonably regarded as a foreign western-backed government, an occupying power. Since then, the Israelis have used every pretext to expand their territory, killing and uprooting innocent people in the process. But only Palestinians trying to take back something that was stolen from them are called terrorists. The Palestinians who remained are second class citizens, which is to be expected; after all, it is a Jewish state, that is, it is for the benefit of Jews, not Arabs. Until we understand this situation and stop supporting Israel, Americans will remain the targets of Arab hostility and violence. —SLR

Comparative Integrity — In 1989, Milli Vanilli, a pair of corn-rowed pretty boys, were awarded a Grammy by the National Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences for "best new artist." But the group's status as "best" was quickly challenged: while offstage at a New Jersey concert, the alleged singers' alleged voices sounded over the speakers, inspiring New Jersey Assemblymen Neil Cohen and Joseph Mecca to propose labeling legislation for "live" concerts that feature vocals lip-synched to tapes.

Then, in mid-November, Frank Farian, the producer of

the Vanilli boys' 7 million-selling *Girl You Know It's True* LP revealed in a press conference not only that the duo lip-synched to tapes at their live shows, but that the tapes weren't even of their own voices. They weren't singers at all. When they let their success go to their heads—they declared after winning their Grammy that they were more important than Bob Dylan—and demanded to actually sing on the planned follow-up, Farian took action. He would make a new record with the people who actually sang on the first one, and Rob Pilatus and Fab Morvan, the frontmen, were out of luck and a job.

Walter Duranty, the Moscow correspondent for the *New York Times* during the thirties, wasn't a pretty boy, and doubtless sported a more conservative haircut than Rob and Fab. But he too was a complete fraud. While fully aware of the facts about the Ukrainian famine created by the policies of Joseph Stalin, he chose not to report them because of his professional dependence on the good will of Uncle Joe. As the *Times's* man in Moscow, he had prestige and an "in" with the world's most powerful dictator; why risk that for the sake of something as silly as reporting the facts accurately and fully?

I'm sure Rob and Fab thought along the same lines. They were beloved of pre- and immediately post-pubescent young ladies the world over, they had accolades heaped upon them, and they were getting rich. Why rock the boat for the sake of the truth?

Duranty also was honored for his perfidy. He was awarded the Pulitzer Prize in 1932 for his coverage of the Soviet Union.

Here, unfortunately, is where the eerie similarities in the lives of Rob, Fab and Walter diverge. Mere days after Farian's revelation of the actual professional accomplishments of Milli Vanilli, the Nation Academy of Recording Arts and Sciences, in a show of integrity, withdrew the Grammy. This was the first time in history that an "artist" had ever been stripped of the award.

Years after the revelations of Duranty's lies—by scholars such as Robert Conquest, the personal witness of Ukrainian refugees, and now even revisionist revelations from the Soviet government itself—the Pulitzer committee has still not seen fit to revoke Duranty's prize.

The episode illustrates what I have long suspected: that the pop music industry has a stronger sense of honor and integrity than the journalism industry. It is a fact that consumers of the products of either industry should keep in mind. —BD

"We are not a crook" — When it first became known that five U.S. Senators who had accepted gigantic "campaign contributions" from savings-and-loan cacique Charles Keating had intervened with Federal regulators investigating the fraud that Keating had perpetrated, thus delaying the end of Keating's operations and costing taxpayers billions more, the Keating Five responded that that they were just providing "constituent services." The suggestion that they were helping Keating in the same way that they help a widow whose social security check was lost in the mail amused the more cynical ("the same sort of services they would provide to anyone who funnels hundreds of thousands of dollars their way"), but virtually no one took it seriously.

So the Senate Ethics Committee hired itself a special prosecutor to investigate. Not surprisingly, he found a trail of corruption repulsive even by the lax moral standards of Washington, D.C. Three days before Thanksgiving, Keating's Senators responded. The "constituent service" argument was gone, and in its place was a new argument: Senators would never take any action to harm their own reputations.

"The notion that I would risk my reputation and the reputation of this body, which I love, by raising money in any improper way," said Sen. Cranston, "is simply preposterous."

The crooked Senators seek to deflect the charge from themselves to the Senate itself. The idea is to make the members of the investigating committee, also members of the Senate, into allies by equating attacks on crooks in the Senate with attacks on the Senate. This defense is bogus, of course. Keating's Senators are not accused of the picturesque charge of being members of the U.S. Senate—they are accused of interfering with an enforcement action against a criminal because the criminal had given them money.

The second argument is sillier still. "The notion that I would risk my reputation is preposterous." By this theory, no person of good reputation would ever commit a crime. When a prominent member of the community is accused of murdering his wife, does anyone buy the theory that it is impossible for him to be guilty because he would not risk his reputation? The simple fact is that crooks most often engage in their criminal acts because *they don't think they will get caught*. This is as true for big-time criminals with good reputations as it is true for petty criminals with bad reputations. And it is true, I believe, for U.S. Senators who engage in criminal acts as well.

Neither of these arguments are original. Richard ("I am not a crook!") Nixon used exactly the same arguments in defending his role in the coverup of the Watergate burglaries. His accusers were attacking the institution of the presidency, he said, and besides, why would he risk his reputation by committing a petty crime? These arguments didn't save Nixon: his reputation went down the toilet, he resigned one step ahead of impeachment, and was saved from time in the big house by a pardon from his successor, a man he had appointed to office.

Ordinarily one would not expect Keating's Five to have any better luck with this argument than did Nixon. But there was one major difference between the situation of Keating's Five and Nixon's: Nixon was a Republican President who was investigated, accused and judged by Democrats in Congress; Keating's Five are bipartisan members of the Senate being investigated, accused and judged by other bipartisan members of the Senate. It will be interesting to see whether the same justice that applied to Nixon will apply to Keating's Five. —RWB

King in context — Reports that Martin Luther King Jr., as a graduate student, may have plagiarized his academic work are disappointing, but not crushing. (I say "may have" because despite a lack of footnotes, he reportedly always listed his sources in his bibliographies.) But let's assume the worst: what does that mean? It should not detract from King's many virtues. He was one of the first prominent opponents of the Vietnam War. He won his fame through an eminently li-

bertarian act: he inspired and organized a boycott of the municipal bus system in Montgomery, Alabama, because a city ordinance compelled blacks to sit in the backs of buses. His opponents were those who had long used state power to violate blacks' right of free trade and association. This was a time of laws, for example, against interracial marriage; a time when police connived at lynchings and the bombings of churches and homes. As Clint Bolick wrote in *Changing Course*, "King was an intellectual heir to Locke and Jefferson, Garrison and Douglass, Washington and DuBois. As did all his predecessors, King consistently drew upon the Declaration of Independence as the highest expression of his civil rights vision." As King put it, "there are certain rights that are neither confirmed nor derived from the state." When some blacks preached racial hatred and violence, King preached racial peace and nonviolence. "Black Power," he said, was "racism in reverse." However fuzzy his notions of freedom and nonviolence, he summed up the essence of individualism when he said that people "will be judged not by the color of their skin but by the content of their character." The civil rights movement has certainly got off this track. But we shouldn't let that overshadow King's achievements. As Bolick suggests, we should use the best in King to make civil rights an individualist concept again.

—SLR

Bushwhacked on Downing Street — The excuse for the repudiation of Margaret Thatcher by her Conservative colleagues was her reluctance to surrender as much sovereignty to a united Europe as other countries were surrendering.

Mrs Thatcher had reservations from the start about the political and economic union of Europe, and for good reason. Having made miraculous progress in reversing Britain's headlong plunge into socialism, she feared that joining with socialist countries in a political union might undo the good she had done.

Of course, the European question was only the excuse for her ouster. Her rejection by her own party was made possible by a decision she had made that had proved unpopular to many British subjects: the replacement of property tax as the basis for funding local government with a "poll tax." The poll tax was a courageous attempt to advance her pro-capitalist agenda in the face of stubborn opposition from some town councils, which were controlled by the Labour Party.

The problem was that as Mrs Thatcher and her party had rolled back the power and size of government at the national level, many cities with Labour governments had stepped in and taken over the same idiotic government programs she had abolished nationally. Local government programs were financed by property taxes, and property ownership in British cities is far from universal. So the burden of expensive programs rested on a minority, often a tiny one. Needless to say, this made the programs palatable to most voters, who enjoyed their largesse without having to pay for them.

Mrs Thatcher's solution to the problem was to put a flat tax on all residents of a town. Now if a city government wanted to have an expensive new program, all of its residents would have to pay for it. To keep their taxes down, she believed, most people would withdraw support for the profligate spending of the local councils.

Needless to say, the new tax was not popular, especially in towns with Labour governments. It provided the radical left an opportunity to organize fairly extensive protests, which dominated British news for some time. Mrs Thatcher's popularity plunged.

Mrs Thatcher anticipated that there would be a negative reaction. But she knew that she didn't have to face re-election until 1992. This, she hoped, would be long enough for the benefits of her plan—the reduction of wasteful spending by local governments—to become manifest to voters.

Mrs Thatcher will not have the opportunity to see whether she was right. Weak-kneed Conservatives found encouragement in the public's initial negative reaction to the poll tax measure and found the nerve they needed to bushwhack Mrs

Mrs Thatcher is not the kind of conservative we are accustomed to in the United States. Unlike Mrs Thatcher, American conservatives are always ready to compromise and even abandon their principles in the face of the slightest opposition.

Thatcher over the European issue.

Both issues that resulted in Mrs Thatcher's sudden expulsion were issues on which she had courageously taken well-reasoned positions—principled positions, pursued with courage, in the face of widespread opposition, positions aimed at weakening the power of the state.

Her repudiation is an occasion for sorrow for libertarians and classical liberals.

This is not to say that Mrs Thatcher is a libertarian. Her record on civil liberties is terrible: she acted to restrict freedom of the press and the rights of the accused, and even shifted the burden of proof to the defendant in certain criminal cases. Her primary motivation is not the enhancement of human liberty. She is a political conservative; that is, she has advocated policies of less government intervention in the economy and more government intervention in matters of civil liberties.

But Mrs Thatcher was not the kind of conservative that we are accustomed to in the United States. The difference lay not in stated goals, but in courage to pursue them. Like Mrs Thatcher, American conservatives advocate economic freedom and balanced budgets. Unlike Mrs Thatcher, they seem always ready to compromise these goals and to abandon them in the face of the slightest opposition.

Twenty-five years ago, Reginald "Rab" Butler, then the Chancellor of the Exchequer in the Conservative government of Harold Macmillan, explained that in Britain the word "conservative" didn't refer to the opposition to government control of the economy as it did in the United States. British Conservatives were more flexible; they recognized that a socialized economy was here to stay, unlike American conservatives (then typified by Barry Goldwater) who hoped to roll back the state's power over the economy.

Somehow, in the mid-1970s, at a time when anti-state feeling in Britain seemed at its low point, Mrs Thatcher had managed to convince enough of her fellow Conservatives that

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Report

"A Pole Can Do It"

by R. W. Bradford

Polish-Canadian libertarian Stan Tyminski exploded onto the world's stage by knocking off the Prime Minister of Poland at the polls. While the the establishment media in the U.S. and in Poland curse him as an insidious "outsider," suspiciously "unknown" to them, he is not unknown to *Liberty's* editor.

"Lech Walesa's hopes for a quick decision at Poland's presidential polls have been frustrated," said the NBC television newsman. "The culprit is a darkhorse candidate who has spent the last two decades in Canada and Peru."

"The voters of Poland were clearly confused," added correspondent Tom Pettit. "Lech Walesa, the hero of Solidarity, was denied a clear-cut victory . . . Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki was humiliated, finishing a poor third. Voters rejected him and went for this man: Stan the Man Tyminski. Democracy is complicated, as Poland is learning."

"Tyminski's appeal was illusion," CBS news chimed in, "giving people the hope that they wouldn't have to suffer the pains of economic reforms anymore and that like Tyminski they could become rich."

That's how Stan Tyminski burst upon the consciousness of Americans on the evening of Nov 25: he was a "culprit" who had "humiliated" Lech Walesa, "the hero of Solidarity," and Tadeusz Mazowiecki, "the man who led Poland's first year of freedom," by tricking the voters of Poland, who are only "learning about democracy," with an "illusion."

As I write, Stan Tyminski is in the midst of a brutal campaign to be elected President of Poland. By the time you read these words, he may very well be Poland's first democrati-

cally elected president. He is a libertarian, and has already received more votes than any other libertarian in history. Who is Stan Tyminski? Where did he come from? Why is he running for the presidency of Poland? Why did so many Poles vote for him? And why are the television newsmen so hostile toward him?

Tyminski The Man

Stanislaw Tyminski decided to run for the highest office in Poland only 44 days before election day.

He had left his native Poland in 1969 on a student visa with only \$5 in his pocket. "It was clearly visible that Poland was one big labor camp," he recalled twenty years later, "with borders and barbed wire and dogs. The average salary was \$25 per month at that time. I lost most of my friends because they became Communists. . . . My mother wrote to me and asked me not to come back." After a short stay in Sweden, he moved to Canada and began to build a new life. He found a menial job in a radio store, then moved on to a position with Hewlett-Packard. In 1974,

he went into business for himself, founding a small firm that designed computer systems for factories and power plants. His business prospered. By 1980, he was financially independent and looking to broaden his horizons.

A few year earlier, he had read a magazine article about an orphanage in Peru that seemed to be doing good work, and he had begun making contributions. In 1981, he decided to visit Peru and see first hand how it operated.

He spent some time in Peru. Before long, he founded a firm to haul fuel by barge to Iquitos, Peru's port on the Amazon River, deep in the rain forest. Petro Rápido was profitable until the Peruvian Army confiscated his barge, ostensibly for use in its war on drugs, leaving him with a loss of nearly a million dollars. This trauma prompted him to journey into the rain forest and live with the natives. "Stan got very close to the people and many of their mystic ways," his business partner in Canada told the *New York Times*. "I've been told that Shirley MacLaine

went through a similar experience and wrote about it." Tyminski himself wrote, "In my travels in the jungle, I found myself on the brink of hungry death and I had to learn to eat live ants and worms from palm trees."

Tyminski returned to Iquitos, where he founded a cable-TV company and settled down. He married a young Peruvian woman and began to raise a family. When he could find no good restaurant open on Sunday, he went into the restaurant business. Dissatisfied with the quality of local produce, he founded a farm to provide produce for his restaurant. Eventually, he also began a radio telephone company.

In 1985, he returned to Canada, where he continues to oversee his business interests both there and in Peru, eventually adding a farm and a tropical fish store to his Canadian interests. In 1987, he returned to his native Poland, where he founded a

"Stan is very friendly, solid sort of neighbor, a pleasant guy to talk to. While talking in the back yard one day, he mentioned that he loved gardening and that he had a farm in Peru. He has a farm here also and he used to grow corn and pumpkins and he'd be up there working on weekends and give everybody in the neighborhood corn and pumpkins at Halloween."

small computer company, to be managed by a relative.

Transduction, the firm he had founded in the mid-1970s, continues to prosper. Its clients include Ontario Hydro, the giant electrical utility, and Dofasco, one of Canada's biggest steel companies. In 1986, Transduction won an award for the best Canadian product at the Canadian High Technology Show, for the "Black Beast," an industrial com-

puter terminal.

Despite his prosperity, Tyminski was not one for conspicuous consumption. In 1987, he purchased a modest home for \$250,000 in Toronto. "His kids go to the same school as my kids do, which is just down at the end of the street," his neighbor D'Arcy Dunal says. "Outwardly he obviously was doing quite well in his business, but there was no sign of lots of wealth. He doesn't drive a Mercedes-Benz or something like that. He drives a Chrysler mini-van, and his wife has a Honda."

His neighbors remember him as a pretty ordinary guy: "Stan was very friendly, solid sort of neighbor. And a pleasant guy to talk to . . . While gardening in the back yard he mentioned that he loved gardening and that he had a farm in Peru. He has a farm here and he used to grow corn and pumpkins and he'd be up there working on weekends and give everybody in the neighborhood corn and pumpkins at Halloween and stuff. It was quite a friendly gesture."

By 1990, Stan Tyminski was in a position that most people would envy. He was living a comfortable life with his beautiful wife and three children, made secure by his income from business interests on three continents. But he was not content.

Tyminski the Politician

For one thing, he remained a Polish patriot. He had left Poland because it was socialist, but he continued to hold a strong affection for his native land. For another, he was increasingly unhappy with political trends in his adopted country: Canada seemed to be heading toward socialism.

The event that radicalized him, according to his friend George Dance, was a reassessment of his house in Toronto which resulted in a bill for \$65,000 in taxes. He contested it; ultimately the city sent a bailiff to seize his house. As a businessman, he hadn't cared much for government interference and taxes; as a Pole, he had witnessed the destructiveness of socialism at first hand; and he had read the radical libertarian fiction of Ayn

Rand and the economics of Milton Friedman. He was ready to get involved in politics.

In May 1989, he heard a brief news item on the radio about an anti-tax demonstration. He called the station and found out that the demonstration was organized by the Libertarian

The event that radicalized him was a reassessment of his house in Toronto which resulted in a bill for \$65,000 in taxes. He contested it; ultimately the city sent a bailiff to seize his house.

Party. He contacted that group and at once felt he had found an ideological home.

The Libertarian Party that Tyminski joined was deeply in debt, thanks to extremely optimistic spending on the 1988 election campaign, and many thought it might go under. In May 1990, only 30 people attended its national convention in Toronto. Weighing heavily on the minds of most delegates was the question of whether the party ought to attempt a major campaign in the next federal election. The leading candidate for Party Leader, George Dance, argued that the party lacked sufficient resources; given the failure of the previous campaign and the enormous debt that it had caused, his argument seemed persuasive. But two other Ontario delegates disagreed: Roma Kelembet and Daniel Hunt believed that the only way to progress was to campaign aggressively.

They were plainly in a minority, but they had not come to the convention unarmed. They brought with them proxies from 68 other delegates and their friend, newly recruited member Stan Tyminski.

Proxies had traditionally been allowed at conventions of the LPC, but never before had anyone brought in enough to control the voting. The Chair ruled the proxies ineligible to vote; this ruling was appealed to the

convention. Proxy votes were not allowed on the issue. Eventually, a compromise was reached: the new Party Leader would have to receive a majority of both the delegates present and the proxy votes.

There were four candidates for Leader, but most support centered on George Dance and Tyminski, who favored an aggressive, expensive national campaign. In a recent interview, George Dance recalled the convention :

Stan ended up running against me. He did an enormous campaign and impressed a lot of people. The big difference was strategic. I was saying that we have to build up the grass roots—build up the membership—before we can make a serious election effort. He favored a big campaign centered around the Party Leader. A big media campaign. The big argument against that was that the party can't afford a big campaign like we tried that in 1988 with a big advertising budget, which resulted in a huge deficit. Stan's answer to that was, "Well, what if I made a donation?" That was a clincher. More or less he'd pay for his whole tour, his whole campaign. That's what impressed people.

Stan and I have worked pretty strongly together. I don't have any doubts about his principles. I consider myself an intellectual and I thought he could use a little more intellectualism. But on the other hand, I thought I could use a little more of what he had, which is drive and determination.

Tyminski was elected Leader of the bankrupt party. But he remained almost unknown among its members. A prominent LPC member told me last week, "Tyminski came out of nowhere—I mean, *nobody* knew him. He's as much a mystery man to me as he is to everybody else."

But Tyminski was the sort of person who got things done. Inspired by the thinking of other libertarians and by *The Trouble With Canada*, by William Gairdner, a book that applied libertarian economic thinking to the problems faced by Canada, he decided to write a book about the problems of Poland. He named his book "*Swiete Pay*," or *Sacred Dogs*. In

Poland, he told his Canadian friends, every family has a dog, and no matter how hungry the family gets, the dogs always eat well. Similarly, no matter how poor the people of Poland got, the bureaucrats always lived well at the expense of tax-paying Poles.

In August, he attended the meeting of the International Society for Individual Liberty in San Francisco, where he met many libertarians for the first time. One Canadian libertarian recalls the meeting:

He didn't create an immediate impression. He talked mostly then about the problems he had inherited when he took over the party. He seemed to be down on everybody else who had preceded him, which is usual. As to his actual political beliefs or orientations he really didn't say anything at all. I also heard him give a short presentation at the convention. Again, he spoke mostly about the disarray the Canadian Libertarians were in.

Meanwhile, he had finished his book (which was co-written with Polish reporter Roman Samsel). But he could not find a publisher. Undaunted, he went to Poland and published the book himself, staying

On Oct 12, Tyminski called his friend Roma Kelembet and told her that two different Polish groups—the Green Party and a labor union in Gdansk—had called and asked him to run for President. But he was not comfortable with those groups. Over bowls of soup in a local restaurant, Kelembet suggested, "Why don't you run as an independent?"

on to manage its advertising and promotional campaign. It became a best-seller.

Before long, he was being touted as a possible presidential candidate in Poland. At first, he dismissed the idea. The Autumn 1990 Bulletin of the

Ontario Libertarian Party announced that he would be the keynote speaker at the party's annual meeting on Nov 24. It noted, "He is the author of a best-seller in Poland, *Sacred Dogs*, and is being touted in the media there as a possible presidential candidate. There is, though, one slight problem: he has his sights set on being Prime Minister of Canada, as the Leader of the Libertarian Party of Canada."

His neighbors got their first hint of his political activism in September, when he put up a yard sign for the Libertarian Party's candidates in the election for the Ontario Provincial Parliament. His neighbor D'Arcy Dunal recalls:

He was just putting up a libertarian sign, and I said, "Geez, Stan, you are supporting the Libertarian Party?" That's when he told me that he in fact was the president [sic] of the party. We just had a casual discussion about the Libertarian Party. He said he enjoyed the group and had been to some of their conferences and things like that. We kind of got going and I read one of their flyers and we got discussing it. He mainly liked the party for the ideas that people had. As I understand it it's very much to the right, favoring lack of government control, freedom of the individual, and less taxes, so individuals would be able to be more efficient and the country would be better off.

The Libertarian Party of Ontario had a budget of \$12,000 for the campaign, which didn't include any money for radio advertising. Tyminski strongly believed that radio advertising would help the campaign, so he contributed \$4,000 to pay for it. Libertarians didn't win any seats, but they did amass 25,426 votes in the province, up 88% from their previous attempt in 1987.

Meanwhile, the pressure on Tyminski to run for Poland's presidency increased. On Oct 12, Tyminski called Roma Kelembet and told her that two different Polish groups—the Green Party and a labor union in Gdansk—had called and asked him to run for President. But he was not comfortable with those groups. Over bowls of soup in a local restaurant,

Kelembet suggested, "Why don't you run as an independent?"

The Presidential Campaign

It took only a moment for Tyminski to make up his mind. At 5 a.m. the next morning, he was on a plane to Poland, where he hired a staff and went to work. He had only 11 days to gather the 100,000 signatures needed to be on the ballot. He and his staff got the signatures.

The Poland whose presidency he returned to seek is a nation writhing in pain. The government of Prime Minister Mazowiecki has instituted broad economic reforms, designed to change Poland's economy from state control to free market and to repay its debt to the International Monetary Fund. Prices have been decontrolled and allowed to rise to market levels. Privatization has begun. This has done away with shortages. But at the same time, taxes have been increased. As a result, many people, especially the poor, have been unable to afford the bread that is now readily available in

He campaigned aggressively, financing the campaign from his own savings. "Money isn't everything," he said.

the stores. Under the program, income has been slashed by 40% and 1 million people thrown out of work.

At the same time, there has been a major split within Solidarity, the labor movement that spawned the anti-communist revolution. Lech Walesa, its charismatic leader, turned against Tadeusz Mazowiecki, the man he selected to be Poland's prime minister. Better educated Poles tend to see Walesa as "a kind of Slavic Juan Perón," as Victoria Pope has written in *The New Republic*. "Walesa hates the allusion to the Argentine dictator, but he defends his position with a line that would have made Perón proud. He says he is simply a spokesman for the people: 'I speak

what the masses feel . . . The masses release all their anger through me!" Walesa and his followers, meanwhile, see Mazowiecki and his administration as hopeless intellectuals, "*jajo glowy*" (eggheads).

One point Mazowiecki and Walesa agree on: the program of free-market and high taxes. Both men have also paid homage to Marshal Pilsudski, the Polish revolutionary who led Poland to independence in 1918 and returned as its dictator a decade later. According to the *New York Times*, some of Walesa's campaign posters have been photographed in such a way that they "evoke old pictures of the marshal," and Walesa has statues of Pilsudski prominently displayed in both his home and his office. Mazowiecki aired a television commercial starring the dictator's granddaughter, who is married to a senior official in the Mazowiecki government, saying that it is Mazowiecki "whose personality most closely resembled her grandfather's," and claiming that "Corporal Walesa" was no Marshal Pilsudski.

Despite the fame Tyminski had gained from his book, he was way behind Walesa and Mazowiecki. He campaigned aggressively, financing the campaign from his own savings. "Money isn't everything," he said. He traveled about Poland, everywhere giving the same message: "I am a capitalist. Freedom works. I make a good income, and my employees make a good income. Poland needs capitalism."

The other candidates and the news media ignored him or laughed at him. But on November 11, a poll showed that he had pulled into third place, with 15% of voters supporting him, and the laughter stopped. On November 18, the poll showed that he had moved into second place, favored by 23%. He had passed the Prime Minister in popularity.

The Polish press went crazy. In a burst of wild charges, newspapers accused Tyminski of evading the military draft, of being kept out of the army because he was insane, and of being a terrorist. "But it was unclear whether the attacks on Mr. Tyminski

by established press organizations would not be counterproductive," the *New York Times* reported, "since for many years Poles say they have learned not to trust what they read in the newspapers or see on television."

Everywhere his message was the same. "I am a capitalist. Freedom works. I make a good income, and my employees make a good income. Poland needs capitalism."

This view was echoed by Krzysztof Ostaszewski, a Polish émigré at the University of Louisville, who keeps in close touch with events: "Everybody is united in attacking Tyminski. Just the day before the election, everybody was attacking Tyminski. I have to tell you that this is absolutely amazing, how this sort of curtain is drawn before Tyminski. The Polish media do not want to say anything about him. It's like I am living again in a Communist country because this is the way opposition leaders were treated when Communists ruled. This is the way Walesa was treated in 1984, and this is the way Kuron and Michnik were treated in 1977."


Walesa, who had earlier predicted that he would get 80% of the vote, told a crowd he would move away from Poland if Tyminski was elected. A member of Prime Minister Mazowiecki's cabinet resigned to devote his energy to attacking Tyminski.

On Nov 25, the people of Poland voted for President for the first time in more than six decades. Walesa finished first, with 39% of the vote. Tyminski finished second, the choice of 23% of voters. Prime Minister Mazowiecki finished third with 17% of the vote. Walesa had been forced into a runoff election on Dec 9. And his opponent would be Tyminski, by now dubbed "the man from Mars" by the hostile press.

Tyminski had achieved the impossible. In a matter of only 44 days, he

// The high-beta think tank of the '90s will be the free-market libertarians at the Cato Institute. //

— Lawrence Kudlow, "Money Politics," March 25, 1990



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had moved from Canada to Poland, declared his candidacy for the Presidency, obtained 100,000 petition signatures, and convinced nearly a quarter of Poland's electorate to vote for him, ousting the incumbent prime minister and forcing a runoff election with Lech Walesa, who the day before the election, had announced that he would withdraw from the race if he failed to get a majority.

Walesa reacted like an angry father to his failure to gain a majority. His first reaction was to renew his threat to withdraw from the race, as if

"Everybody is united in attacking Tyminski. Just the day before the election, everybody was attacking him. This is absolutely amazing. The Polish media do not report anything about him. They only attack him. This is the way opposition leaders were treated when Communists ruled. This is the way Walesa was treated in 1984, and this is the way Kuron and Michnik were treated in 1977."

to punish the Polish people for denying him a majority. After sulking for a day, he announced he would remain a candidate, and reiterated his threat to leave Poland if Tyminski is eventually elected. In the wake of his defeat, Prime Minister Mazowiecki resigned his office and endorsed Walesa.

Why have so many Poles supported Tyminski? Certainly, his outspoken pro-capitalist views have been an important element in his appeal, as has his aggressive, American-style campaign. But there are other important factors: Walesa and Mazowiecki discredited themselves with an incredibly dirty campaign; Tyminski's independence from political parties appealed to many Poles who dislike the whole notion of political parties

(their only experience is with the Communist Party); his success as a businessman is very attractive; and the hysterical attacks on him may have backfired.

Hardball Politics

Politics in Poland is a nasty business. The Walesa campaign has repeatedly charged—as if this were a crime—that Mazowiecki is a Jew, despite Mazowiecki's persecution as editor of a Roman Catholic newspaper during the years of Communist rule. So it should not be surprising that the attack on Tyminski has been vicious.

The day after the election, for example, state-run radio invited listeners to call in with any revealing information on Tyminski, about, for example, his involvement "with a drug cartel or the KGB." At a press conference the following day, Tyminski was asked, "Could you please explain accusations that you are an agent of the KGB, that you are sick with epilepsy, that you are involved in the drug trade in South America and that each time you traveled to Poland in the 1980s you traveled through Tripoli, Libya, where you picked up your visa?" These charges are, of course, baseless. The only "evidence" that Tyminski has been involved in drugs, for example, is that he once lived in Peru; the "evidence" of his KGB ties is apparently nothing more than his willingness to increase trade with the Soviet Union.

The Tyminski campaign has made some irresponsible attacks of its own. Tyminski repeatedly used the word "treason" to describe the policies of Mazowiecki, which seems like an overstatement of the situation. And Tyminski's campaign manager for Canada told me that "there's a substantial rumor that Walesa has been a collaborator with the secret police," apparently in hopes that I urge others to believe it.

One criticism against Tyminski seems to have some validity: his program for Poland is vague. Early in his campaign, Tyminski aggressively advocated lower taxes and less bureaucracy, but since his victory over Mazowiecki, this program has taken a

back seat, judging from news reports and his interviews on American and Canadian television. For example, when asked by a Canadian television interviewer on Nov 27 about his "alternative" to the plan now in place, Tyminski answered:

First of all, we have to develop our own strategic plan of development which is compatible with the best traditions of our own nation. We have to look for assets which are competitive on the international market. We have to show the world that, united as a nation, we can grow and prosper, and we have to show the international investment community that we are responsible as a nation, and this way we will attract foreign investment. And the next step will be technology. We have to grow it in our country. And after that, I hope, we will have prosperity.

It may very well be that this vagueness is a conscious strategic decision. According to George Dance, Tyminski spoke at a Libertarian Party open house in Toronto last summer about the surprising victory of

The state-run radio invited listeners to call in with any revealing information on Tyminski, about, for example, his involvement "with a drug cartel or the KGB."

Alberto Fujimori over Mario Vargas Llosa in Peru's presidential election:

He originally supported Vargas Llosa, but got disillusioned. He was impressed by the fact that Fujimori came out of nowhere and won. And he was unimpressed by Vargas because he blew this big lead. Practically and strategically, he was impressed by Fujimori's saying very little, speaking in generalities, merely being a fresh face. I think that's what he's trying to copy in Poland.

The vagueness charge has been trumpeted by his critics in the U.S. news media, but is hardly mentioned in Poland, where the more scurrilous charges predominate. Curiously, his

American critics seldom mention that Walesa is equally vague. (On the Canadian broadcast mentioned above, one of the experts on Poland commented, "The thing about Walesa is that he has made promises in every single direction. This is not new. This is how he's always been. He has a tremendous faith in himself, that he can make all these different promises, and at the precise moment he will know what to do. This ego-mania with him . . . This is almost theology. I think he really believes that he is God's vessel working in Polish history." And on an ABC *Nightline* program that raked Tyminski over the coals for his vagueness (after repeating charges that Tyminski was a drug dealer and a lunatic, and calling him a liar), Chris Wallace acknowledged that Walesa "is doing the same thing." Walesa himself acknowledges his vagueness. "Walesa says one thing in the morning and something else in the afternoon. Do not listen to Walesa's words too closely," Walesa said of himself. (He habitually speaks of himself in the third person.)

Tyminski's Canadian Libertarian friends are frustrated by his vagueness. After an interview on Canadian television, one sent him "a telegram giving him shit . . . he seems to be dancing on coals all the time, and I don't like it." Another told me that he had been trying to get him on the phone to urge him to be more explicit in his policy recommendations.

I am not so sure that Tyminski's refusal to spell out his program is a mistake. Neither candidate has presented a detailed program, and I see little evidence that the Poles want one. On the main issue—the Solidarity program of moving toward free markets in an environment of high taxes and heavy bureaucracy—their views are well known. And as human beings, Tyminski and Walesa present a sharp contrast: Walesa is a politician, who believes he embodies the Polish people, confident that he can perform whatever miracles are needed to see Poland through troubled times ahead;

Tyminski is an energetic and decisive businessman, who has started and successfully managed a number of enterprises, making a small fortune in the process, and who is determined to reduce taxes and eliminate bureaucracy. "A Pole can do it," he tells the voters. A Pole can be a success, make money, even become rich.

The parallels between Tyminski's campaign and Alberto Fujimori's campaign for the presidency of Peru go well beyond campaign strategy: both were political unknowns who caught the news media by surprise, both upset much better known opponents with international reputations, both were perceived by voters as good economic managers in part because of their association with a prosperous foreign country.

By the time you read these words, you will know whether Tyminski,

like Fujimori, confounded the experts and won his election.

As I write, the Polish press and the international media are unanimous in writing off any chance that Tyminski will be elected. But they were also unanimous earlier in insisting that he would be unable to topple Mazowiecki in the first round of voting. At least one observer of Polish politics predicts that Tyminski will win the election. In an interview on Nov 30, Krzysztof Ostaszewski told me, "The momentum is incredible. Walesa's recent official announcements are full of fear. He is afraid of losing this election very much. He speaks in a very negative way. He says we can't do such a crazy thing. I think that Tyminski is going to win. This is going to be one of the most exciting developments of the 20th Century."

Tyminski, Libertarianism and the U.S. Media

Tyminski's involvement in the libertarian movement dates back only 18 months. This inexperience, combined with some of the press reports on his campaign, has led some libertarians and classical liberals to doubt Tyminski's libertarianism. The best evidence on the case can, I think, be found among his colleagues in the Libertarian Party, who seem quite convinced of his libertarianism, although some express doubts that it extends consistently to all matters of civil liberties. His candidacy so far, has done little to publicize libertarian ideas, through no fault of his own.

Between Nov 25 and Nov 28, I made a systematic attempt to monitor all the U.S. television network coverage of the campaign. The LP was mentioned only once, Tyminski himself brought it up in response to one of Chris Wallace's insulting questions about his alleged insanity and drug dealing on ABC's *Nightline*: "Let's talk about something else. I'm the leader of a legally registered opposition party in Canada—the Libertarian Party of Canada, and I'm well known in Canada, as the leader of this small party." Wallace re-

sponded by pointing out that an ABC reporter in Toronto had earlier quoted a Polish-Canadian leader as saying he hadn't heard of Tyminski, and quickly asking Tyminski another have-you-stopped-beating-your-wife question.

The show closed with comments by Jeffrey Sachs, the Harvard economist whose program Tyminski has criticized, who denounced Tyminski in these words: "The man is a chronic liar . . . I was amazed at the number of lies that he told just in the short interview that you had." What lies had Tyminski told: "He never said in Poland that he was a political figure. He made just the opposite point—that he was a businessman. In fact he's hardly a political figure in one sense. He's the head of an extremist right-wing party in Canada—so extreme, so much on the fringe, that it's never won a single seat in the Canadian Parliament." Obviously, Prof. Sachs was more than a little upset at the rejection of his economic program.

Of course, the hysteria of "experts" like Sachs and the American news media will have little impact on the decisions of Poland's voters. □

SOCIAL CONTRACT

between an individual and the United States Government

WHEREAS I wish to reside on the North American continent, and

WHEREAS the United States Government controls the area of the continent on which I wish to reside, and

WHEREAS tacit or implied contracts are vague and therefore unenforceable,

I agree to the following terms:

SECTION 1: I will surrender a percentage of my property to the Government. The actual percentage will be determined by the Government and will be subject to change at any time. The amount to be surrendered may be based on my income, the value of my property, the value of my purchases, or any other criteria the Government chooses. To aid the Government in determining the percentage, I will apply for a Government identification number that I will use in all my major financial transactions.

SECTION 2: Should the Government demand it, I will surrender my liberty for a period of time determined by the government and typically no shorter than two years. During that time, I will serve the Government in any way it chooses, including military service in which I may be called upon to sacrifice my life.

SECTION 3: I will limit my behavior as demanded by the government. I will consume only those drugs permitted by the Government. I will limit my sexual activities to those permitted by the Government. I will forsake religious beliefs that conflict with the Government's determination of propriety. More limits may be imposed at any time.

SECTION 4: In consideration for the above, the Government will permit me to find employment, subject to limits that will be determined by the Government. These limits may restrict my choice of career or the wages I may accept.

SECTION 5: The Government will permit me to reside in the area of North America that it controls. Also, the Government will permit me to speak freely, subject to limits determined by the Government's Congress and Supreme Court.

SECTION 6: The Government will attempt to protect my life and my claim to the property it has allowed me to keep. I agree not to hold the Government liable if it fails to protect me or my property.

SECTION 7: The Government will offer various services to me. The nature and extent of these services will be determined by the Government and are subject to change at any time.

SECTION 8: The Government will determine whether I may vote for certain Government officials. The influence of my vote will vary inversely with the number of voters, and I understand that it typically will be miniscule. I agree not to hold any elected Government officials liable for acting against my best interests or for breaking promises, even if those promises motivated me to vote for them.

SECTION 9: I agree that the Government may hold me fully liable if I fail to abide by the above terms. In that event, the Government may confiscate any property that I have not previously surrendered to it, and may imprison me for a period of time to be determined by the Government. I also agree that the Government may alter the terms of this contract at any time.

signature

date

Report

Election '90: How Freedom Fared

by Chester Alan Arthur

Every two years, America goes through the same ritual. Every two years, statism becomes more deeply entrenched. Then again, maybe not.

The 1990 elections promised to be exciting and important. Early in the campaign, Republicans cautiously predicted smaller losses than usual for mid-term elections, or even gains, but their optimism was shattered by the budget talks, which enabled the Democrats to paint the Republicans as the party of the rich. At the same time, voters were becoming aware of the mega-billion dollar cost of the savings-and-loan crisis and of the role that many incumbents played in the debacle.

When the votes were counted, however, the results looked a lot like the same old stuff: voters re-elected practically all incumbent Congressmen and Senators. Democrats gained seven seats in the House and one in the Senate. These were a bit less than normal for mid-term elections, but within the normal range.

For most election analysts, the 1990 election was significant more for what didn't happen than for what did. "What did yesterday's election prove?" asked the *New York Times*. "Nothing . . . The voters' biennial Day of Decision turned mostly into a day of foregone conclusions." The *Seattle Times* began its election headline story, "Never mind the rascals. Throw the pundits out . . . instead of dumping their incumbents, voters re-elected [two local congressmen] and all their congressional colleagues—most of them by comfortable margins."

Despite the media perception that the 1990 election was a dull affair, there were developments of major importance to all Americans, and espe-

cially to those who seek to advance liberty.

Liberty and the Ballot Box

Political libertarians, especially those who run for office on the Libertarian Party ballot, are generally perceived by voters as radicals whose political programs are outright dangerous to Americans. Curiously, however, when given an opportunity at the ballot box to pass laws or amend their state's constitution, the majority of voters in 1990 seemed to agree with the libertarian position more often than not.

Consider, for example, the state-wide ballot propositions decided upon by California voters. The Libertarian Party of California endorsed specific positions on 28 ballot propositions dealing with a wide variety of regulatory, tax and constitutional issues.

The state's voters agreed with the LP-endorsed position on 22 of the 28 issues, including all seven taxing-spending issues, both regulatory issues, four of six administrative issues, and nine of eleven bond issues. Voters disagreed with the LP position on six issues: small majorities favored bond issues for veterans and schools, voters rejected a measure to require that

changes in the initiative process be approved by the voters, a measure to make tax increases more difficult, and a measure to subject governments to the same regulations on dumping toxic chemicals as private businesses. Voters also supported a measure to allow the state to put prison inmates to work for private firms to pay their upkeep and damage to victims. (Many California libertarians disagreed with their party's stand on this last measure.)

On average, 57.4% of Californians voted for the LP-endorsed position.

To investigate whether this is a national trend, I made a list of 32 ballot measures in states other than California in which I could identify a clear libertarian position. Included in the survey were all the state-wide elections that were reported in the *New York Times* and *USA Today*. Voters agreed with the libertarian position on 23 of 32 issues, including 13 of 17 taxing/spending measures and six of seven environmental/land use measures.

On average, non-Californians cast their votes for the libertarian position 55.6% of the time. Included in this average were some crushing defeats for libertarian positions: only 16% of Florida voters opposed a mandatory three-

day waiting period for handgun purchasers, only 31% of Nebraska voters favored a measure to limit increases in government spending to 2% per year, and only 33% of Oregon voters supported a broad educational choice measure that would have weakened the monopoly of government-owned

Libertarians are generally perceived by voters as radicals whose political programs are outright dangerous to Americans. Curiously, however, when given an opportunity at the ballot box to pass laws or amend their state's constitution, the majority of voters in 1990 seemed to agree with the libertarian position more often than not.

schools. (This last measure was the work of Oregon LP activists and received significant funding from organizations closely associated with Ed Crane.)

Is there a lesson in this for libertarians? I am not sure, but the relatively high level of agreement by voters with libertarian positions on ballot measures compared with their low-level of support for libertarian candidates—particularly Libertarian Party candidates—may suggest that libertarian politicians might get greater electoral success if they concentrate more on actual issues and less on their ideological agenda.

Without a doubt, the biggest trend that was evident in ballot measures this year was that voters do not support environmental issues that cost money or that are likely to burden them with extensive regulations. Voters voted the environmental position on only 2 of 14 issues: 53% of South Dakota voters supported a measure requiring that very large-scale dumps get legislative approval; Arizona voters rejected by 66% an industry-backed plan to ease waste standards. Opposition to environmental measures extended from coast to coast: New York voters rejected a \$2

billion environmental bond measure; Missouri voters rejected a "natural streams" measure that would have banned dams and restricted use of 52 rivers; South Dakota voters rejected a measure that would have required permits for mining operations in the Black Hills; Washington state voters rejected a state-wide land control measure that mandated regulators be environmentally sensitive; Oregon voters rejected an anti-nuclear measure and a measure to ban polystyrene foam and mandate recycling; and California voters rejected not only the well-publicized "Big Green," which would have subjected the citizens of the state to a wide variety of intrusive regulations and arguably done extensive harm to the state's economy, but also the more moderate "Big Brown" measure, a measure to spend \$300 million to plant trees and even a measure to subject government bodies to the same regulations about toxic discharges as private companies.

On average, voters went against environmental positions 58.8% of the time. This hostility to the green agenda contrasts with the widespread public support for most of the goals of the environmental movement (i.e. clean air, clean water, etc). There are two reasons

for this disparity. First, it costs money to clean the environment or to increase publicly owned wilderness or parks. While everyone favors a cleaner, healthier environment and more parks and recreational land in the abstract, not everyone wants to pay for them. Secondly, the public is gradually becoming aware that some so-called environmental problems (e.g. global warming, ozone depletion) are either scientifically dubious or are so poorly understood by science that taking radical action to attack them is simply imprudent.

Curiously, at the same time voters rejected environmental measures, Congress was passing and the President signing a new Clean Air Act. Ironically, the Act promises fewer benefits at higher costs than most of the environmental measures rejected by voters. Apparently, the lobbying and media manipulation game works better on legislators than on voters. "If you want to enact regulations that have high costs and low benefits," Jane Shaw observed in a recent *Wall St Journal*, "you are better off in Washington [than facing the voters]."

Throw the Rascals In!

According to the conventional wisdom, the party that controls the White

The Media "Coverage"

One of the problems in reporting on anti-incumbency behavior by voters is that nearly all election results available come from a single, monopolistic news organization which reports the votes selectively. All television networks and virtually all print news organizations have joined together to form the News Election Service (NES). In an attempt to economize, NES decided to report only votes for major party candidates and those third party or independent candidates who it believes will amass significant vote totals.

But predicting the vote for independent and third party candidates is extremely difficult, or, at the very least, beyond the ability of NES's experts. Consider, for example, the Libertarian Party's candidates for governor in 1990.

The LP fielded gubernatorial candidates in ten states. But the NES decided that the LP was running

serious, credible races in only four states and ignored them in the other six. Here are the LP gubernatorial votes for the four states that NES reported:

California	1.9%
Georgia	2.6%
Oregon	1.3%
Vermont	1.0%
average	1.7%

Compare that to the LP gubernatorial votes for the six states where NES ignored the party's candidates:

Colorado	2.0%
Hawaii	1.1%
Nevada	2.5%
New Hampshire	4.9%
New York	0.7%
Texas	3.3%
average	2.5%

LP gubernatorial candidates got an average vote share 48% larger in states where NES didn't report their vote than in states where NES reported it. It wasn't just LP candidates whose votes went unreported: it also ignored the 9%

House can expect to lose 10 to 20 seats in the House of Representatives in an off-year election, but Republicans were optimistic for their chances as 1990 began. That optimism began to fade when President Bush backed down on his "no new taxes" pledge last spring and began negotiations for deficit reduction with the Democrats that control both houses of congress. The agreement that came out of the budget summit raised taxes and made minor cuts in welfare benefits offered old people under Medicare. The measure was rejected in the House by Democrats anxious to curry support from old people and Republicans not wanting to back down on taxes. In the wrangling that followed, the Democrats discovered a new tactic: blame the deficit on the "millionaires who don't pay their fair share" and insist that any tax increases sock it to the wealthy. With the airwaves inundated by campaign ads portraying Republicans as supporters of the millionaires, Democrats picked up in the polls and expected much bigger gains than usual. (The Democrats never mentioned that the income tax designed to "make the millionaires pay their fair share" kicked in at less than \$50,000.) Somehow, this appeal didn't seem to

translate into many votes. It is not certain whether voters saw through the scam the Democrats were trying to put over on them, or rejected the appeals to the base emotion of envy, or the Republicans convinced most voters that their rhetoric aside, the Democrats favored higher taxes for everybody. But one thing is certain: when the votes were counted, the Democrats gained only a single Senate seat and seven House seats.

At the same time, voters were witnessing the disastrous savings-and-loan scandal. Congressional foolishness on this issue in the past decade will likely end up costing the taxpaying voters something in the neighborhood of \$500 billion. The episode illustrated the inherent corrupting effect of the power possessed by Congress, as five Senators faced charges of intervening with regulators on behalf of an insolvent and arguably fraudulent savings-and-loan association in exchange for "campaign contributions" of hundreds of thousands of dollars. The episode was made more repulsive by the participation in the corrupt activities by John Glenn, the first American to orbit the earth and a national hero, and Alan Cranston,

elected to the Senate originally as a idealistic left-liberal and advocate of the poor and oppressed.

In light of the budget mess and the savings-and-loan scandal, it was not surprising that public opinion polls showed a considerable anti-incumbent feeling. Yet when the dust had settled, nearly all incumbents were re-elected, leading many pundits to conclude that the public's dissatisfaction with "politics as usual" was over.

RIP . . . "Politics as Usual"

It is a serious mistake to interpret the low mortality rate of Congressional incumbents as evidence that voter satisfaction was reasonably stable. Congressional mortality is only one measure of dissatisfaction, and not a particularly good one. The political deck is stacked so strongly in favor of incumbent congresspeople that the removal of an incumbent is almost unknown. Consider some of the advantages that incumbents enjoy:

- 1) The vast power of their office stimulates campaign contributions from special interests, often amounting to hundreds of thousands of dollars per election.
- 2) In most states, congressional districts are gerrymandered to fit the spe-

of Kansas voters who cast their ballots for independent Christina Cline-Campbell, and the 10% of voters in Oklahoma who cast their votes for independent Thomas Ledgerwood.

NES also missed the boat on votes for LP senatorial candidates. It reported the votes of only one LP Senate candidate—in Hawaii: 1.4%.

Compare that to the LP candidates whose votes were not reported:

Delaware	1.0%
Montana	2.5%
New Hampshire	3.7%
New Jersey	0.7%
South Carolina	1.9%
Texas	2.3%
average	2.0%

Again, the unreported candidates got a much larger vote share than the reported candidates.

In some races, the NES's choices resulted in its causing its members to report election results that were simply inaccurate. One such case occurred in Washington's

second congressional district. The Democratic incumbent, Al Swift, was widely regarded as a shoo-in. He averaged 86% of the vote in his most recent two re-elections. The Libertarian Party nominated Bill McCord, who wasn't expected to put up much of a fight. NES made a decision to count and report the votes only of Swift and his Republican opponent.

Because they were completely dependent on NES for election returns, the *New York Times* and *USA Today* knew nothing of McCord's vote, and recorded the final vote as follows:

Al Swift (Dem)	84,282	55%
Doug Smith (Rep)	67,642	45%

It looked like a tighter race than most people expected, but it didn't look like a very close race. But here are actual vote totals including votes for Libertarian candidate Bill McCord:

Al Swift (Dem)	84,282	50.8%
Doug Smith (Rep)	67,642	40.8%
Bill McCord (Lib)	13,831	8.3%

As a result of their dependency on NES, both the *Times* and *USA Today* seriously mis-reported the results of the race. Swift was not elected with the comfortable majority that they reported. He received only a bare majority of the vote. Had the Libertarians and Republicans supported the same candidate, there is a strong possibility that the seemingly invulnerable Swift would have lost.

How many other third party and independent votes were missed by NES? How many other misleading and inaccurate election returns were published by the *New York Times*, *USA Today*, the television networks, and your local newspaper? There is no way to tell. Aside from the re-reporting service for Libertarian Party votes set up by volunteer LP members, there is no way to get the information. —CAA

Note: For more on the NES, see "A Conspiracy of Silence," Margaret Fries, *Liberty*, May 1989.

cific needs of incumbents.

3) Incumbents are allowed to campaign at public expense by sending newsletters and other advertising to constituents free of postage charges.

4) Incumbents have staffs of employees paid at taxpayer expense who work on "constituent relations" and other activities designed to increase voter support for incumbents.

5) Incumbents function as ombudsmen for constituents in matters involving the federal government; as the power of government grows, the political benefits of this function increase.

The Democrats blamed the deficit on the "millionaires who don't pay their fair share" and insisted that any tax increases sock it to the wealthy. Of course, they never mentioned that the income tax increase that was designed to "make the millionaires pay their fair share" kicked in at less than \$50,000.

It is not surprising, given these advantages, that most incumbent congresspeople were indeed re-elected. And so the common observation in election post-mortems that anti-incumbency sentiments had been grossly overrated.

But the fact is, there was a great deal of evidence of changes in voter behavior. Term limitation measures were passed in California, Colorado and Missouri. In addition, there is substantial evidence that re-elected incumbents won by smaller margins. It is also worth noting that the voters of Vermont sent a Socialist to Congress, and voters in both Alaska and Connecticut elected independents to their governorships.

But perhaps the greatest evidence can be found in data that was overlooked by almost all analysts: the increasing vote totals of third party candidates. From coast to coast, third party candidates who had toiled in obscurity amassing miniscule vote totals

suddenly found themselves with the highest vote totals of their political careers.

Across the nation, there were 28 seats in Congress that were contested by candidates of the Libertarian Party and both major parties in both 1988 and 1990. The LP candidates did better in 1990 than in 1988 in 27 of those 28 races. The average LP share of the vote total in these districts in 1988 was 1.6%. In 1990, the LP share averaged 3.2%. Libertarian vote share doubled in only 2 years.

In Washington state, there were two races for the State House of Representatives contested by the same Libertarian Party candidates as in 1988. In the 48th district, Tom Isenberg got 3.6% of the vote in 1988; this year he got 7.6%. In the 27th district, Rich Shepard got 2.7% of the vote in 1988; this year he got 15.8% of the vote, finishing ahead of the Republican in a heavily Democratic district. Was this the result of unusually active campaigns? Isenberg says he didn't campaign at all this year; in 1988 he campaigned actively. Shepard—whose vote share increased almost six-fold—tells the same story. "In 1988, I organized a campaign committee, set up a campaign breakfast, answered the various questionnaires, attended candidate forums, advertised in local newspapers, and door-belled. In 1990, I answered questionnaires and appeared in some local forums—no doorbelling, no advertising, no campaign breakfast, no fundraising. And this time I got five times as many votes."

As the experience of Isenberg and Shepard indicate, the move to the Libertarian Party was not the result of additional campaign efforts. Indeed, their much improved performance occurred despite their running much less active campaigns. Plainly, what happened in 1990 was *not* primarily the result of the activity of LP candidates. It was the product of a change in voter attitudes, a willingness to consider non-mainline alternatives, perhaps even a desire to express opposition to major party politics.

1992: The Year the LP Comes of Age?

The central fact of third party politics is that success or failure is dependent mostly on factors totally outside

the control of candidates and activists. The success of LP candidates in 1990 was substantially the result of public dissatisfaction with current politics. In the wake of the savings-and-loan crisis and the corrupt politics of the budget "solution," voters were willing to look beyond the Republicans and Democrats on their ballots and vote for the Libertarian Party.


Other important exogenous factors that have tremendous influence on the success of LP campaigns are the presence or absence of other candidates who are not representing major parties. Voters looking for a way to express hostility to the mainline candidates will generally favor an "independent" who has substantial electoral experience as a Republican or Democrat over a Libertarian or other minor party candidate. This was the rock that sank the 1980 LP presidential campaign.

In addition, the public perception of the closeness of any race is of vital importance. When voters are convinced that a race will not be close, they are far less susceptible to the "why waste your vote" argument.

Now it is plainly far too early to figure what role these factors will play in 1992. The public's perception of the closeness of the race will not be known until the election is days away. Other major third party or independent candidates may emerge; we won't really know until the middle of 1992.

Likewise, a lot can happen between today and the 1992 election to change voters' satisfaction with the two major parties. But given the political situation and the electorate's mood today, it certainly looks as if there is an outstanding possibility that voters in 1992 will be very open to third party candidates. Both the crises that undermined voter confidence in the two party system—the savings-and-loan mess and the corrupt budget negotiations—are unlikely to abate. Chances are good that the savings-and-loan crisis will heat up considerably; quite possibly a few Senators may be censured or even impeached because of their involvement with savings-and-loan kingpin Charles Keating. Any such punishment will increase the public's feeling of disgust with the major parties. And if none

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
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are punished, voters will likely feel even more fed up with corruption in Congress.

The budget "solution" solved nothing; all it did was anger a lot of voters. The same sort of negotiations—and the same unpopular choices—will take place every year for the foreseeable future. As taxes are raised and spending cut, voters will likely increase their hostility to "politics as usual."

In addition, the chances are good that the U.S. will go to war in the Middle East. The war will cost a great deal, both in terms of money and men. When the fighting is over, a lot of American blood will have been spilt, a lot of American money spent, and (most likely) gasoline will cost even more than it does today. If the bipartisan support for the war continues, both parties will likely be hurt in the 1992 elections. But the bipartisan support for the President's actions is showing signs of breaking down. In the past few weeks, various Congressional Democrats have criticized the administration—some suggesting a less aggressive posture, others a more aggressive posture, others suggesting that a long-term occupation of Saudi Arabia with no war might be the best course of action. Curiously, however, when administration officials have suggested turning the issue over to Congress for a vote (what a quaint constitutional notion!) the Democrats have refused. If this cowardly course is continued by Democrats, voters are likely to say, "A pox on both your houses."

To top it off, the United States appears headed toward a major recession. Increased unemployment, higher inflation, and a general perception that the standard of living is declining will increase voter dissatisfaction—especially if occurring against a backdrop of increasing budget deficits, higher taxes, spending cuts and savings-and-loan losses in the hundreds of billions.

It is too early to know for certain. A lot can happen between now and November 3, 1992. But the prospects of the Libertarian Party doing very well in 1992 are excellent at this point. Of course, whether the LP will find a candidate able to articulate the libertarian vision and to raise funds necessary to take advantage of this situation is another matter. □

The Californians Are Restless

by Gene Berkman

What happens when an irresistible force meets an immovable object? We got a hint on November 6 in California. The not quite irresistible force is the public's disgust with "politics as usual"; the not quite immovable object is the incumbent government and the established parties that support it.

Widespread lack of confidence in government was clearly shown by the voters' rejection of ten proposed bond issues, four initiatives that included bond issues, and three proposed tax increases. California also adopted, if narrowly, the nation's toughest term limits on elected politicians. Libertarian and other alternative candidates received high vote totals in some races, and nine incumbents in partisan offices went down to defeat. Protest votes in a number of races resulted in winners elected with less than 50% of the vote; these included the races for Governor, State Treasurer and Attorney-General, as well as four Congressional and two State Assembly races.

Thumbs Down to Taxes

California voters rejected—largely for fiscally conservative reasons—most of the propositions presented to them. They passed, however, Proposition 140, a radical term limitation initiative that limits the Governor, other state officers, and State Senators to two four-year terms in office, and limits members of the State Assembly to three two-year terms. It also abolishes the state legislature's pension system, and mandates a 20% cut in the cost of operating the legislature. This proposal was put on the ballot by a coalition of conservatives, libertarians and taxpayer groups, and received support from about a dozen Republicans in the state legislature, Senator Pete Wilson (the Republican candidate for govern-

or), and all three alternative parties.

The same coalition of conservatives, libertarians and taxpayer groups qualified an initiative Constitutional Amendment to require a two thirds majority of the voters to approve any new special or earmarked tax, or any increase in rates of such a tax. The campaign in support of this proposal received several million dollars from the beer, wine and liquor industry, which sought to head off proposed increases in alcohol taxes. The Taxpayers' Right to Vote Act (Proposition 136) lost with 48% voting in favor.

Voter disgust with Establishment politicians was reflected in the gubernatorial race. Senator Pete Wilson and the Republican Party spent about twenty million dollars, Diane Feinstein and the Democrats more than fifteen million dollars on the race for Governor. The pre-election polls showed an extremely close race, with a large undecided vote. Despite fears of wasting votes in a tight race, more than 350,000 votes were cast for alternative candidates, including more than 135,000 for Libertarian Dennis Thompson. Senator Wilson was elected Governor with 48.8% of the vote.

Dennis Thompson campaigned more actively than had the last two Libertarian candidates, but his campaign failed to raise significant amounts of money and received only limited publicity in the news media. He came in third, with 1.9% of the vote. The fourth place finish of the American Independent Party was aided by support from anti-abortion groups upset with Senator Wilson's pro-choice stand. The Peace and Freedom Party nominee, Maria Munoz, got 90,000 votes, an increase of more than 75% from her race for the same office on the same ticket in 1986. All told, third parties got 5.0%

of the vote.

Incumbents were re-elected in every race for state-wide office that they contested. But third party candidates did unusually well, garnering between 6% and 10% of the vote for each office. Libertarians led the minor parties in all races except the Treasurer's, for which there was no LP candidate.

Libertarians hoped to get their biggest vote in the race for Controller. Their candidate was Tom Tryon, a member of the Calaveras County Commission, and the LP's highest ranked officeholder. An estimated \$20,000 was spent on television ads on his behalf, in hopes of receiving 2% of the vote, needed to maintain ballot status. Tryon received more than a quarter million votes, 3.7%, about twice as many votes as either of his minor party competitors.

But Tryon did not lead the LP ticket. That distinction went to Ted Brown, its nominee for Insurance Commission, who received nearly 400,000 votes, an astonishing 6.0% of the vote. It is suspected that Brown's outstanding vote total resulted from his last name. Another quarter of a million voters cast their ballots for the Peace and Freedom candidate, bringing the statewide third party vote for this office to 10%.

In the end, the LP's fear of losing ballot status was groundless: all state-wide candidates except gubernatorial candidate Thompson received more than 2% of the vote, and Thompson missed that total by about 7,000 votes out of the 7 million votes cast. In addition, both the American Independent Party and the Peace and Freedom Party also received enough votes to stay on the ballot. The fact that hundreds of thousands of Californians cast votes for underfunded candidates of the three minor parties indicates substantial dissatisfaction with the status quo and the bipartisan leadership that dominates the state and federal governments.

Libertarian Strength in the Countryside

The Libertarian Party of California, with fewer than 2500 sustaining members, provided only minimal campaign support to its statewide slate, concentrating on the Tryon for Controller effort. But a number of county organi-

zations can be credited for efforts for their candidates for Congress and the state legislature, reflected in unprecedented voter support for Libertarian candidates.

The San Diego County LP organization provided the candidate for Governor, three candidates for Congress, one for State Senate, and five for State Assembly. In the 45th Congressional district in San Diego, Libertarian Joe Shea received about 42,000 votes, over 27% in a two-way race against Republican Duncan Hunter. In the 43rd district, GOP Congressman Ron Packard had no Democrat challenger, but was held to 68% by PFP and Libertarian candidates who together pulled 32%. In 1985, Packard had been re-elected with 72% in a two-way race against a Democrat.

In San Diego, Libertarian Scott Olmsted received 35,000 votes for State Senate, more than 15% of votes cast. He came in behind PFP candidate Jane Evans, who polled more than 18%. Together they held Republican Senator William Craven to 66%.

Two incumbent Republicans in the State Assembly from San Diego were defeated. In the 75th Assembly district

(AD), incumbent Sunny Mojonner had legal problems, and lost with less than 41%. In the last two elections she had received about 70% of the vote. This year the Democrat won with 46%, with 11% going to Libertarian John Murphy. The LP benefitted from Republicans unhappy with the incumbent, but unwilling to vote Democrat.

In the 78th AD, pro-choice Republican Jeff Marston, only recently elected in a special election, lost his seat to a Democrat who received less than 46% of the vote. More than 6% of the voters backed Libertarian Ed McWilliams.

In the 76th AD, which San Diego shares with Riverside County, pro-choice Republican Tricia Hunter was re-elected with 58%. Democrat Stephen Thorne advocated legalizing drugs, and won only 28% in this conservative district. Libertarian Bill Holmes polled over 12,000 votes, almost 10%. A PFP candidate came in fourth with 5%. In San Diego's 77th AD, abortion foe Carol Bentley was re-elected with 53%, but pro-choice Republicans helped Libertarian Joel Denis pull almost six thousand votes.

Santa Clara County Libertarians ran candidates in the 12th and 13th

Election Notes for Sports Fans

A few days before the election, CBS Sports announced during a telecast of a football game involving the Phoenix Cardinals that if the voters of Arizona resisted pressure to declare the birthday of Martin Luther King a state holiday, the National Football League would move its scheduled Super Bowl out of Phoenix. Concerned that its threat might be taken as a threat by voters, the NFL denied it shortly after the broadcast. The measure, whose sole practical effect would be an additional paid holiday for state "workers," went down by a 51% majority.

Meanwhile, voters in Santa Clara, California, faced a measure to authorize a 1% tax on their utility bills to build a \$153 million baseball park to attract the nearby San Francisco Giants, who are unhappy with their present ballyard. The usual argument—having a big league team in town would be an economic boon to

local businesses—was trotted out. Perhaps the voters wondered why local businesses wouldn't pay for the ballpark themselves if it would be so profitable for them. At any rate, a slim 51% majority turned back the measure.

But sports fans did prevail in four races. In New Jersey, former All-American, All-NBA basketball player Bill Bradley was re-elected to his Senate seat by a thin margin over token opposition; the closeness of his race was blamed on the tax increases instituted by his party's governor, James Florio, who was elected two years ago on a promise of "no new taxes." In Maryland's 4th Congressional District, NBA player Tom McMillen was easily re-elected, as was Jim Bunning, former baseball great, in Kentucky's 4th District.

And voters in Brooklyn Park, Minnesota, elected as their new mayor professional wrestler Jesse "The Body" Ventura.

—R. W. Bradford

Congressional districts; each polled more than ten thousand votes. Santa Clara Libertarians also backed three candidates for State Assembly who pulled 5% to 6% of the vote.

Several Libertarian candidates for State Assembly in two-way races received more than 20% of the vote. Eric Roberts received almost 28,000 votes in a race with liberal Republican Bev Hansen, for an LP total of 24%. Ronald Tisbert received almost 24,000 votes for 24% against GOP incumbent Phillip Wyman. And Dale Olvera received more than 21% against Democrat Richard Polanco in a Hispanic district in Los Angeles.

In more competitive districts with both major parties offering candidates, LP members received between 5% and 11%, in 18 races for State Assembly. LP members received between 5% and 8% in four races for State Senate and eleven Congressional districts in which they faced both Democrat and Republican opponents. These totals reflect a widespread desire for an alternative to the established parties and incumbent politicians. Libertarian candidates in particular drew strength from their opposition to taxes, gun control and drug laws.

A major part of the increase in support for LP candidates came from Republicans and independent conservatives unhappy with GOP support for tax hikes and new gun laws. This was the first election of the post-Reagan era, and growing conservative distrust of GOP leaders, including President Bush and Governor-elect Wilson, points to a growing base of po-

tential support for Libertarian political efforts.

As Republican and Democrat politicians escalate the bipartisan war on drugs, marijuana smokers and civil libertarians are increasingly supportive of Libertarian candidates. The newsletter of California NORML mentioned the Libertarian Party and its candidates in several 1990 issues. Legalization of marijuana and other drugs was an important issue in most LP campaigns.

Republicans are also divided over the issue of abortion, and as the Libertarian Party develops a higher profile, it may gain increasing support from pro-choice Republicans. The start of such a trend was seen in several races this year.

Out in Left Field

The Peace and Freedom Party ran up big vote totals in several races. In the First Congressional district in northern California, PFP activist Darlene Comingore attacked incumbent Democrat Doug Bosco on environmental issues, and took almost 32,000 votes. The 15% of the vote cast for the PFP threw the election to Republican Frank Riggs, who won with just 43%. In the same area, PFP Assembly hopeful Bruce Anderson received around 16,000 votes, more than 13% in a three-way race.

In Los Angeles, Ivan Kasimoff received almost 15% of the vote in a two-way race against Democrat State Senator Diane Watson. Also in Los Angeles, Michael Long took 15% for the PFP in a two-way race against Assembly Democrat Curtis Tucker. In San Diego County, several PFP candidates received between 5% and 8% in four-way races.

Statewide, LP and PFP candidates faced each other in seventeen four-way contests for Congress and state legislature. LP candidates came in third, ahead of PFP, in ten of those races. PFP came in ahead of the LP in a three-way Congressional race and a three-way contest for State Senate, both against Republican incumbents in San Diego County.

The third and smallest of the three alternative parties is the right-wing American Independent Party, which lacks local organization in much of the state. The AIP ran one candidate for House of Representatives, in Riverside County; Gary Odom came in third, ahead of Libertarian Bonnie Flickinger in a race that saw GOP Congressman Al McCandless reelected with 49% of the vote.

The fact that hundreds of thousands of Californians cast votes for underfunded candidates of three minor parties indicates substantial dissatisfaction with the status quo and the bipartisan leadership that dominates the state and federal governments.


The AIP ran ahead of the LP in a four-way contest for Assembly from San Diego. In Silicon valley, the other AIP candidate for Assembly came in fourth, behind the LP.

The "Libertarian Republicans"

Libertarian Republicans of California (LROC) ran one candidate, and was involved in several other campaigns in 1990.

LROC co-founder Eric Garris, a veteran of numerous LP campaigns, was the Republican candidate against Assembly Democrat Byron Sher in Silicon Valley's 21st district. Garris made legalization of drugs his main campaign issue. His opposition to taxes and gun control brought support from the Santa Clara Republican Assembly, while his pro-choice position on abortion brought him the support of the California Republican League (CRL), California Republicans for Choice, and Congressman Tom Campbell. Garris received 29% in a two-way race; this is four per cent ahead of the GOP candidate in 1986. In 1988, with no Republican in the race, a Libertarian received 13% in the district.

At least six other Republican candidates came out for legalizing drugs during the 1990 campaign. Barbara Ga-



"Good news, Sire—our economic experts say that promising a tax cut will stimulate the economy almost as much as if you really *did* it!"

lewski, with support from CRL and Republicans for Choice, pulled 38% against far left Congressman Ron Delums from Berkeley's 8th district. In 1988, the Republican candidate was able to attract only 29%.

Also in the San Francisco Bay Area, Mark Patrosso received CRL support in his bid for Congress against 10th district incumbent Don Edwards. Patrosso, with backing of Republicans for Choice and Young Republicans, took 37%. LROC backed both Galewski and Patrosso, neither of whom had LP competition.

In Santa Clara County, CRL activist Lori Kennedy, with backing from LROC and Republicans for Choice, pulled 41% in a two-way race for state senate.

In Santa Barbara, GOP activist Carey Rogers received LROC support in her bid to unseat State Senator Gary Hart. Senator Hart is best known for his championing of a massive expansion of the educational bureaucracy. Ms Rogers also received support from CRL and Republicans for Choice. She received 35% with an LP hopeful taking over 4%.

In Los Angeles, two GOP Assembly candidates backed legalization of marijuana. Elizabeth Michael in the 45th district and Geoffrey Church in the 46th district polled very low totals against allies of the Waxman-Berman Democratic machine.

Eric Garris and a half-dozen GOP legalization advocates illustrate the fact that pro-freedom candidates can get the Republican nomination—in safe Democrat districts. Two GOP officeholders—Congressman Tom Campbell of Palo Alto, and State Senator Ed Royce of Orange County, have refrained from supporting new anti-drug measures, but most Republican politicians are enthusiastic champions of the war on drugs.

Facing the Future: 1992 and Beyond

On November 6, 1990, hundreds of thousands of Californians voted for Libertarian candidates. Millions of California voters joined with Libertarians to reject billions of dollars in new debt and tax hikes. Large protest votes resulted in eleven partisan contests won with a minority of the vote.

California may be on the verge of a

multi-party system. Voters who backed Libertarian candidates cannot be counted as automatic votes for the LP ticket in future elections. But they have shown a willingness to vote Libertarian at least sometimes. By their numbers, they have shown that it is worth the effort to seek their votes.

Libertarian candidates will continue to benefit by splits in the Republican Party. Large numbers of conservative and liberal GOP activists are willing to vote for LP candidates in preference to their Republican factional opponents. Fiscal conservatives who want to oppose welfare state Republicans; gun

owners opposed to gun controllers; and pro-choice Republicans unwilling to support abortion foes have shown a willingness to vote Libertarian, and we should more actively invite them to do so in future campaigns.

California has over a million independent and minor party voters. Split ticket voting is endemic throughout the state. Large percentages of the California electorate agree with Libertarian positions on specific issues. Communicating with the voters remains the most substantial and expensive challenge to Libertarian political activists. □

Frontrunner Stumbles

Andre Marrou, frontrunner for the Libertarian Party's presidential nomination, stumbled as he left the gate. In a letter to potential supporters dated and mailed one day after the elections, Marrou announced his candidacy and solicited funds to enable him to qualify for "the federal matching funds to recover income taxes looted from Libertarians."

Unfortunately, the letter contains false information about matching funds. "We only qualify for matching funds for money we raise between today and our September 1991 Nominating Convention," Marrou wrote. Actually, matching funds are awarded only for funds raised between Jan 1, 1991, and the nominating convention. Since the letter was mailed on Nov 7 by first class mail, nearly all the funds it raises will be paid prior to Jan 1, and thereby not qualify for matching funds.

"Every dollar you give now," Marrou advised, "will be matched by another dollar of federal funds . . . If you can give \$1000, please do." Matching funds are limited to \$250 per donor, not \$1,000.

In addition, Marrou claimed that "Every dollar of matching funds will be used for television ads for our Libertarian Presidential Campaign." Under the law, all funds raised now and all matching funds awarded later *must be spent prior to nomination*. This means that any television ads would have to be run before the LP Nominating Convention over Labor Day weekend 1991—some 14 months

prior to the election. Television ads run 14 months or longer before the election would obviously be a waste of money.

In sum, it appears that practically none of the funds raised by the letter will qualify for matching funds, and any matching funds captured will be wasted if spent on television, as promised.

The question of accepting matching funds from tax dollars is controversial among Libertarians. Many believe that it is simply immoral to accept tax money. Others think that as opponents of the redistribution of wealth, the LP appears to be hypocritical if it accepts tax dollars.

Whether one accepts these arguments or not, there are important prudential reasons against accepting matching funds. There are two kinds of matching funds available: general election and primary election. General election funds are available only to candidates who receive 5% or more of the popular vote in the general election. To date the best performance by any LP nominee was that of Ed Clark in 1980: 1.06%. So the chances that a LP nominee would top 5% seem negligible for the foreseeable future.

It would be relatively easy for LP candidates to qualify for primary funding, which is available to candidates seeking nomination. The problem is that all matched funds and matching funds must be spent prior to the nomination. The Libertarian Party holds its nominating convention more than a year before the general election. So far

continued on next page

Chester Alan Arthur, "Frontrunner Stumbles," *continued from previous page*

as the voters are concerned, the presidential campaign doesn't begin until the primary season starts in January of the election year—three months after the LP convention, three months after all matching and matched funds must be spent. So there is no prudent way to spend any tax dollars that an LP candidate might qualify for.

Marrou's credibility was also hurt by his claim elsewhere that his 1988 Vice Presidential campaign "independently raised over \$200,000." According to statements filed with the Federal Election Commission, Marrou raised \$163,655 for his Vice Presidential campaign. In addition, the letter failed to state that contributions are not tax deductible, as federal law requires.

Elsewhere in his letter, Marrou promised that his Project 51-92 fund-raising committee for ballot access "will have North Carolina on the ballot by July 4, 1991." This may have been a political mistake: the mention of Project 51-92 brought to mind unpleasant memories. Project 51-92

claimed former LP National Chairman and 1984 Presidential nominee David Bergland as "Chief Advisor," prompting a quick denial by Bergland. It claimed to be a "Libertarian Party project," which was also contrary to fact. Indeed, William W. Hall, legal counsel for the LP wrote Marrou a stern letter, instructing him to stop claiming official status and to remedy his past misrepresentations: "You should do so in a way which is not deceptive." Hall warned him that he had failed to include the legally mandated warning that contributions are not tax deductible.

In a telephone interview a week after the letter was sent, Marrou responded to charges that the letter contained substantial false information about matching funds by denouncing the individual who had first pointed out the errors: "They originated with Alan Lindsay, well-known Republican, who is doing everything he can to hurt the Libertarian Party. Since I am currently the largest target in the LP, he's doing what he can to hurt me. You're probably acquainted with Alan Lindsay and

his assorted nefarious schemes. In fact, it's so bad that I've heard accusations that he is in the employ of one of the two major parties, or perhaps both." He did acknowledge that there may have been "inadvertant mistakes," but that that the campaign has "been going along all the time with the best advice we can get . . . [The] regulations are voluminous, and trying to understand the regulations, as with most federal documents, is difficult." He then turned the phone over to Michael Emerling, Chief of Staff of the Marrou campaign, acknowledged that the letter did indeed include substantial errors. He said he would offer donors who respond to the letter a refund of their donations.

Others within the LP were not so easily satisfied. One prominent LP leader who had been inclined to support Marrou prior to the episode told me that the letter seemed to indicate that Marrou and his staff was either incompetent or dishonest, "neither of which is exactly confidence-inducing."

—CAA

"Bushwhacked on Downing Street," *continued from page 12*

wimpy acceptance of the statist status quo was not the proper policy, that to regain leadership, they must advocate a change in policy. A few years later, Thatcher's Conservatives came to power in Britain.

American conservatives came to power in Washington at about the same time. The taste of electoral victory and the power it brought turned the backbones of American conservatives to jelly. Their stated goals of cutting taxes, reducing regulation, and selling off government enterprises were always on the bargaining table, and were always traded away to achieve some transitory foreign policy goal.

Mrs Thatcher was different. She was tough, she was smart, she was principled, and she pursued her goals with determination. She read the opinion polls, but she took advantage of the fact that the only polls that mattered were those on election day. Her mistake was to overlook the fact that she also had to watch the polls of her own party's Members of Parliament. She overestimated the strength of their will, their good sense and their commitment to the same sound policies that she advocated.

Britain will be worse for the Conservative MPs' decision to dump her. And so will the world. —RWB

Thanksgiving mourning — On Thanksgiving morning, I got in my car to drive to a friend's place for the holiday dinner. Two nights before, he and I had watched a television clip of one of Margaret Thatcher's speeches. She

was desperately fighting for her political life, but she had retained her pluck, her spunk, her nerve, and a few other things. "Thank God she's still there," Paul said. We wished her well, knowing that her opponent, Michael Heseltine, whose name suggests an unsavory bit player in a Victorian satire, was living up to the suggestion of the name. Heseltine, a political opportunist, was appealing for votes to the "wet," indeed miasmal, longing of the left wing of Thatcher's party for something called a "caring capitalism"—not a capitalism that works, mind you, but a capitalism that "cares."

The car radio brought me the network news: four minutes of meaningless "human interest" stories about the visit of George Bush to U.S. soldiers in the Persian Gulf, followed by a brief reference to the Macy's Parade and an even briefer reference to something that Maggie Thatcher had said about the Gulf. It wasn't until I found Paul's apartment buried in gloom that I realized what the electronic medium, with its normal alertness to history in the making, had not thought important enough to headline. "She's resigned!" Paul said. "Not much to be thankful for now."

We recovered, of course, but more distress was to come. The day after Thatcher perished at the hands of her own Conservative party, the liberal American press had much to say about the "fact" that her day had passed, taking with it her anachronistic "totally free-market approach." Statements this preposterous are simply an insult to one's intelligence;

continued on page 66

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Discussion

The Production of Virtue in a Free Society

by David Friedman

In *Liberty's* last issue I proposed a positive explanation for moral behavior ("Why Is Anyone Virtuous?" November 1990, pp. 48-50)—that is, I explained why many people (for example) will not steal even if nobody is watching. The purpose of this note is to point out a simple and interesting implication of my analysis. Consider any personal characteristic, such as honesty, which benefits those around me at some cost to myself. Such a characteristic makes me more valuable as an associate. If others can observe it—if, as I argued earlier, it is easier to *appear* honest if you *are* honest—then honest people will be more attractive as employees, employers, spouses in any association with someone else who benefits by their honesty. Dishonest people will find that they are able to find jobs only if they are willing to accept lower salaries than honest employees and can hire workers only if they are willing to pay higher salaries than honest employers. In such a situation, an individual motivated entirely by narrow self-interest will find it in his interest to try to train himself in honesty—to synthesize the conscience. The size of this incentive to virtue depends on how large a fraction of our interactions are voluntary.

Consider two societies. In one, most associations are voluntary—we choose our jobs, our employees, our spouses. In the other, most associations are chosen for us. The former might be a competitive, free-market society, the latter a

centrally planned socialist society where workers are allocated to jobs, or a traditional society where most people are born into a particular role and have very limited alternatives.

In the market society, since most who associate with me do so voluntarily and only if they think they benefit from the association, there are sizable costs to being dishonest and sizable benefits to being honest. In the other sort of society, these costs and benefits are much lower. If you are a worker in a centrally planned society, your job is determined and your salary set by someone far away, someone who does not know you and will not have to associate with you. The dishonest employee has the same opportunities as the honest one—and the additional opportunity to steal things when nobody is looking.

The same argument applies to vices. In my previous article I gave the example of someone with an "aggressive personality"—a strategy of beating up people who do not do what he wants. Committing himself to that strategy may be profitable, even though beating up people is costly, because people will back down, giving the bully his way without the cost of a fight.

One disadvantage to being a bully is that in a voluntary society people stay very far out of your way—they avoid the problem by refusing to associate with you. Bullies are not very attractive as employees—or as employ-

ers. So this strategy is likely to have a low payoff in a market. It still has some advantages since not all associations are voluntarily chosen—most of us, for example, have limited control over who our neighbors are. But the payoff will be much lower than in a society in which we are assigned or born into most of our relationships.

The implication of this argument is that a market society will have nicer people than either a traditional or a centrally planned society. Virtues will have a higher payoff, so more people will choose to become virtuous. Vices will have a lower payoff, so fewer will choose to become vicious. The result is precisely the opposite of the claim—that such a society breeds blind, narrow selfishness—often made by opponents of capitalism.

One important change in American society over the past fifty years has been the increasing frequency of laws—mostly designed to reduce racial discrimination—that require individuals, if challenged, to justify decisions

A market society will have nicer people than either a traditional or a centrally planned society. Virtues will have a higher payoff, so more people will choose to become virtuous. Vices will have a lower payoff, so fewer will choose to become vicious.

such as hiring one job applicant instead of another, or renting an apartment to one of several potential tenants. Such laws may make racial discrimination more difficult, but they also make it harder to discriminate among individuals on reasonable but highly subjective grounds. An answer such as "I hired Smith because he seemed like a much nicer man than Jones," is not likely to convince a court or a fair employment practices commission. So one result of such laws is to lower the payoff of the strategy called virtue, and thus reduce the number of people who choose to follow that strategy. □

Journal Entry

From Russia, With Surprise

by David Boaz

Some intellectuals and politicians of the Soviet Union have awoken to the fact that only radical free-market solutions can save their country from chaos. But will liberalism sell in Petropavlovsk?

Gavriil Popov, the stooped, mustachioed economist turned mayor of Moscow, shuffles up to the podium. He tells the Soviet and Western participants in the Cato Institute's conference, "Transition to Freedom: The New Soviet Challenge," that prime Minister Nicolai Ryzhkov has betrayed the radicals by going back on his promise to submit to parliament a plan for rapid transition to the free market. Thus, Popov says, the radicals will take to the streets on Sunday to demand far-reaching privatization and the resignation of the Ryzhkov government. The next night, at an open forum attended by about 800 Muscovites, Popov delivers the most libertarian speech I've ever heard from a politician; he discusses the individualism and free markets of the 19th century, the unfortunate turn to Marxism and Keynesianism in the 20th century, and the bright prospect of a return to liberalism and capitalism by the beginning of the 21st.

What a delight to be in a country where "radical," "liberal," and "left" all carry the traditional meaning of support for democracy, free markets, and civil liberties. "Conservatives" defend the *ancien régime* of statism and privilege, as they did when the word was coined, and liberals call for progress toward private property and limited, decentralized government. Cato chairman William Niskanen reads in *The Economist* that the most popular words in the Soviet Union are, in ascending order, "radical, liber-

al, expert, economist." He's in heaven.

Outside the conference hall, it is easy to see why there is so much agitation for markets. Communism seems to do two things well: preserve old buildings—no creative destruction here—and build really big new buildings, row after row, block after block of ugly apartment buildings unsurprisingly reminiscent of American public housing. Our conference hotel, owned by the prestigious Academy of Sciences of the USSR, reminds us of a dormitory at a mediocre college after, say, 30 years of hard use. (Even that is too flattering; there are, for instance, no showers, and dishcloths suffice for towels.) We are stunned to learn that it was built a year and a half ago. The windows don't quite close (who would have anticipated mosquitos in Moscow in September?) the floors have buckled, the bricks on the front gate are held together with wire. Mysteriously, the elevator offers buttons for floors 1 through 10, though the building is only three stories high. In one elevator, the buttons have been installed wrong and the proper numbers are penciled in.

Earlier on this trip, I had discovered the same huge, ugly buildings in East Berlin. All my life I have anticipated the fear and titillation I would get from crossing to the other side of the legendary Berlin Wall. But now, as Sidney Blumenthal reported in a recent *New Republic*, the Wall is mostly gone, and traffic moves freely between East and West Berlin. Now East Berlin is just sad, ugly, and boring. Maybe the ex-Communist countries should keep small areas of traditional police-state communism around behind a wall, to attract tourists—the way the British keep the monarchy around.

Comfort and convenience are not hallmarks of communism. All the stories you've heard about communist toilet paper are true. Fortunately, we've all brought our own, along with bottled water. We leave the water in our rooms for toothbrushing and so on, and we get desperately thirsty through long, salty meals with nothing but Russian champagne and warm Pepsi to drink. As for meals, we're covered. Mayor Popov has generously arranged sufficient stocks

for us, which are brought to the hotel by armed guard. Twice a day, every day, in the hotel or at restaurants, we have the same meal. Variety is one of the spices of life missing in the Soviet Union. Meals on our own are much more difficult. One day several of us decide to spend the afternoon in downtown Moscow, eat dinner, and visit Red Square at night. Don't be ridiculous, our Russian host tells us, you can't expect to just walk into a restaurant and be served; there are

Gavriil Popov, the stooped, mustachioed economist turned mayor of Moscow, shuffles up to the podium and delivers the most libertarian speech I've ever heard from a politician.

restaurants, but you have to make reservations well in advance. We begin to wonder just who planned this system.

And speaking of planning: In all of Moscow there is one really beautiful building, the colorful onion-domed St. Basil's Cathedral in Red Square. When you buy the official pack of 18 Moscow postcards, there's no picture of St. Basil's.

It's not easy to say what the dollar-ruble exchange rate is. In the hard-currency stores, prices are marked in "rubles," which turn out to be worth \$1.60 each. But at a bank you get 6 rubles (which cannot be used in the hard-currency stores) for a dollar, and the rate is anywhere from 10 to 20 for a dollar on the black market. But I never change any money on the black market because there is almost nothing I want in Moscow or Leningrad that can't be obtained for dollars. In Moscow, we have to go to the Arbat shopping street to find people selling the famous Russian matryushka dolls, black lacquer boxes, chess sets, and thousands of pins commemorating the triumphs of the Communist Party and the Soviet state. Walk down the street speaking English, and you will be offered other items, notably Gorby dolls—a set of matryushka dolls featuring a large doll painted to look like

Gorbachev, with smaller dolls depicting Brezhnev, Krushchev, Stalin, and Lenin inside. Sometimes the inside dolls are displayed, but never the Gorbachev doll—presumably because of the law making it a crime to insult the president. Most purchases are made in dollars, but the sellers always look both ways for policemen and sometimes tell us to hand the money to their associates a block away. Things are more open in Leningrad—as soon as we step off a tour bus, we are besieged with opportunities to buy military uniforms, fur hats, and caviar, and no one seems concerned about taking dollars. Gorby dolls are displayed openly.

So far there seems to have been lots of *glasnost* but very little *perestroika*. The people at our conference talk freely about radical political and economic changes, the newspapers publish Solzhenitsyn and other former dissidents, our Leningrad tour guides boast of the support for changing the city's name back to St. Petersburg. During our three days in Leningrad, the words "Marxism-Leninism" come down from a prominent building formerly adorned with the slogan "Long Live Marxism-Leninism." But there are long lines for cigarettes and gasoline—not to mention Baskin-Robbins and McDonald's—and shortages of bread are reported. With no private property, no one has an incentive to produce more, to invest, to offer better service, or even to wash anything. The beautiful old buildings of Leningrad could keep a sand-blasting company busy for decades.

The participants in our conference are mostly liberal intellectuals; they include journalists, scholars, activists, and elected officials. They're much more pro-capitalist than intellectuals and politicians in the West, but many are very pessimistic about the prospects for privatization. Three of them, one a member of the Moscow City Council, corner me at a reception. (And I do mean corner; they stand much closer than Americans like, and I keep backing up until I'm flat against the wall, unable to move my feet.) We know that Russia needs private property and free markets, they say, so tell us how to get there. I offer a plan for

privatization, then another and another, and they tell me that "the people" will reject each of them. The people are afraid of inequality, resentful that some of their neighbors may become wealthy. Finally, I tell them that there is no magic path to capitalism and prosperity, that if the Soviet people are genuinely opposed to private property, then Russia will remain poor and backward and will fade into the sidelines of history. They continue to press me for some sort of answer that will allow them to bring about a modern capitalist system, and I retreat, feeling guilty and depressed at having no answer for them.

When one of our party complains about something at the hotel, the desk clerk responds, "It's not my fault; it's the housekeeper's fault." Fred Smith, president of Washington's Competitive Enterprise Institute, launches into an explanation of hotel management: "The customer doesn't care whose fault it is. When you're sitting at this desk, you are the hotel. He just wants you to fix his problem." The desk clerk has never heard of such a notion.

Travelling from Moscow to Leningrad, we take the overnight train, which turns out to be similar to Japan's love hotels. Young couples, married or not, forced to share a three-room flat with parents and siblings, spend the night on the way back, visit Leningrad for a day, then spend another night of conjugal bliss on the train. Over a bottle of champagne, three of us make bets on the Soviet Union's future. I say that bad as things in Moscow look, we Westerners are exaggerating the notion of crisis and collapse and that the system is going to muddle along at subsistence level with no real reform for the foreseeable future. A Wall Street whiz kid predicts bloodshed. But a libertarian economist, not given to optimism about what governments will do, is the only one of us who has attended the conference's final session on the 500 day plan drawn up by Stanislav Shatalin. It's a very radical plan, he says, it's already been passed by the Russian parliament (though not the Soviet Union's parliament), and Russia will be as capitalist as Western Europe in five years. □

Liberation from the Parasite State

by Ralph Raico

Suppose you had the opportunity to address a group of Russian social scientists and politicians: What would you say? Fortunately for us—and for the Russians—Ralph Raico recently had just that opportunity.

There is no need to emphasize for this audience the world-historical significance of the changes that are taking place today in east-central Europe and, especially, in the Soviet Union. This great transformation has led many people to reconsider the merits of an ideology once thought to be obsolete—liberalism.

Today I wish to deal with liberalism as it has been understood historically, and to consider its connection with a certain strand of Marxist thought—a strand that may well be much more important now than other elements of Marxism that have been emphasized in the past.

Liberalism has, of course, many meanings. Without arguing the point here, I wish to maintain that the most authentic form of liberalism has been concerned above all with two things: first, the expansion of the free functioning of civil society, and, second, and increasingly, the restriction of the activity of the State. In other words, by *liberalism*, I will mean *laissez-faire*, “Manchester” liberalism, also known as “dogmatic,” “doctrinaire,” and “dog-eat-dog.”

Liberalism arose in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries as Europe and America’s response to monarchical absolutism. Where the monarchs by divine right claimed to

This paper was originally presented at the Cato Institute “Transition to Freedom” Conference in Moscow, September 12, 1990. It will be included in a collection of conference papers to be published next year.

control and direct all of the life of society, liberalism replied that, by and large, it is best to leave civil society to run itself—in religion, in thought and culture, and not least in economic life. The liberal slogan of *laissez-faire, laissez-passer, le monde va de lui-même* (“the world goes by itself”) encapsulated this philosophy.

Sometimes through revolution, more often through piecemeal reform, liberalism accomplished much of its program, building, of course, on the inheritance of free institutions and individualist values of earlier centuries.

Throughout the western world a system developed based on freedom of thought, freedom of labor, clear rights of private property, and free exchange. Nowhere—not even in England or America—was this system consistently realized in every aspect of life. Still, as the great Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises put it, it was enough to change the countenance of the world. For the first time, mankind was able to escape the Malthusian trap. *With the enormous increase in population came a steadily increasing per capita income.* What this

dry little fact meant in the lives of the many, many millions still awaits its poets and novelists. In reality, the only imaginative writer who has done justice to this vast transformation was the great novelist born in Leningrad, Alicia Rosenbaum, who came to America and wrote under the name of Ayn Rand.

But the bureaucratic-military State that had emerged in Europe in the early modern period, though excluded from some areas of social life, remained entrenched. Soon it began once more to expand. By the early nineteenth century, independent thinkers all across the political spectrum, from conservatives to anarchists, were alarmed at the growth of the parasitic State. This was a problem that concerned also Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.

As has been sometimes noted, Marxism contains two rather different views of the State: most conspicuously, it views the State as the instrument of domination by exploiting classes that are defined by their position within the process of social production, e.g., the capitalists. The State is

simply "the executive committee of the ruling class." Sometimes, however, Marx characterized the State itself as the exploiting agent. You will perhaps excuse me for quoting some passages from the works of Marx and Engels which are doubtless quite familiar to you. A brilliant passage occurs when Marx, in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of*

The only imaginative writer who has done justice to the vast transformation of society was the great novelist born in Leningrad, Alicia Rosenbaum.

Louis Bonaparte, comes to consider the State as it developed in France, and he refers to:

This executive power, with its enormous bureaucracy and military organization, with its ingenious state machinery, embracing wide strata, with a host of officials numbering half a million, besides an army of another half million, this appalling parasitic body, which enmeshes the body of French society like a net and chokes all its pores . . . All revolutions perfected this machine instead of smashing it. The parties that contended for domination regarded the possession of this huge state edifice as the principal spoils of the victor.¹

Some twenty years later, Marx speaks of the Paris Commune aiming at restoring "to the social body all the forces hitherto absorbed by the State parasite feeding upon and clogging the free movement of society." In 1891, Friedrich Engels, referring to the United States, wrote:

We find two great gangs of political speculators, who alternately take possession of the state power and exploit it by the most corrupt means for the most corrupt ends—the nation is powerless against these two great cartels of politicians who are ostensibly its servants, but in reality dominate and plunder it.²

I am myself far from being a Marxist, but I must confess that I find more truth in this description of the American political scene by Friedrich Engels than I usually find on the editorial page of the *New York Times*.

Thus, the conception of the "parasite State" is clearly enunciated by the founders of Marxism. Several decades before they wrote, however, an influential group of French liberals had already singled out the parasitic State as the major example in modern society of the plundering and "devouring" spirit. This school of liberalism elaborated a doctrine of the conflict of classes, and in this respect had not only a logical, but also a historical, connection with Marxism—as Marx himself conceded and as was conceded in later years by Engels and the thinkers of the period of the Second International, including Lenin. This earlier liberal school can moreover be taken as virtually the *ideal-type of authentic, radical liberalism*.

Let me cite Adolphe Blanqui, from what is probably the first history of economic thought, published in 1837. Blanqui's words will probably have a familiar ring to them:

In all the revolutions, there have always been but two parties opposing each other; that of the people who wish to live by their own labor, and that of those who would live by the

labor of others. . . .
*Patricians and plebeians, slaves and freemen, guelphs and ghibellines, red roses and white roses, cavaliers and roundheads, liberals and serviles, are only varieties of the same species.*³

The school of authentic, radical liberals of which I spoke, and which influenced Blanqui, centered around a few young liberal intellectuals, Charles Du-

noyer, Charles Comte, and Augustin Thierry. They can be considered the culmination of the tradition of French liberal thought. In turn, they continued to influence liberal thought up to the time of Herbert Spencer and beyond. They called their doctrine *industrialisme*, Industrialism.


The Industrialists agreed with Jean-Baptiste Say, who held that wealth is comprised of what has value, and that value is based on utility. All those members of society who contribute to the creation of values by engaging in voluntary exchange are deemed productive. This class includes not only workers, peasants, and the scientists and artists who produce for the market. It also includes capitalists who advance funds for productive enterprise (but not rentiers off the government debt). Say awards pride of place, however, to the entrepreneur. J. B. Say was perhaps the first to realize the boundless possibilities of a free economy, led by creative entrepreneurs.

But there exist classes of persons who merely consume wealth rather than produce it. These unproductive classes include the army, the government, and the state-supported clergy—what could be called the "reactionary" classes, associated by and large with the Old Regime. However, Say was quite aware that anti-productive and anti-social activity was also possible, indeed, altogether common, when otherwise productive elements employed state power to capture privileges.

The Industrialist doctrine may be summarized in the statement that the history of all hitherto existing society is the history of struggles between the plundering and the producing classes.

The Industrialist writers looked forward to "the extinction of the idle and devouring class" and to the emergence of a social order in which "the fortune of each would be nearly in direct ratio to his merit, that is, to his utility, and almost without exception, none would be destitute except the vicious and useless."

Augustin Thierry—whom Karl Marx later referred to as the "father of class struggle theory in French historical writing"—summarized the Industrialist doctrine of strict *laissez-faire*:



"If you don't like it here, why don't you go back to Atlantis?"

Government should be good for the liberty of the governed, and that is when it governs to the least possible degree. It should be good for the wealth of the nation, and that is when it acts as little as possible upon the labor that produces it and when it consumes as little as possible. It should be good for the public security, and that is when it protects as much as possible, provided that the protection does not cost more than it brings in. . . . It is in losing their powers of action that governments improve. Each time that the governed gain space, there is progress.⁴

The function of government is simply to ensure security from those who would disturb the liberal social order either from within or from without.

However, as increasing numbers of individuals aspire to government jobs, two tendencies emerge: government power expands, and the burden of government expenditures and taxation grows. In order to satisfy the new hordes of office-seekers, the government extends its scope in all directions; it begins to concern itself with the people's education, health, intellectual life, and morals, sees to the adequacy of the food supply, and regulates industry, until "soon there

French liberals singled out the parasitic State as the major example in modern society of the plundering and "devouring" spirit, thus elaborating a doctrine of class conflict. In this respect, liberalism has both a logical and a historical connection with Marxism.

will be no means of escape from its action for any activity, any thought, any portion" of the people's existence. Functionaries have become "a class that is the enemy of the well-being of all the others."

The concept of a conflict of classes linked to the State is one that permeates the history of liberalism, from beginning to end. It was especially conspicuous at the time of the struggle against the old "feudal" powers, but it

is by no means limited to the period of that struggle. The most radical and authentic of the liberals perceived the continuing existence of class exploitation by means of the State in the later nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries as well.

As time went on, one area of State-exploitation captured their attention more than any other: militarism and imperialism. A very long list of examples could be given of the liberals who opposed their governments' overseas wars. The appropriation of the wealth created by the producing classes by the State's military bureaucracy and its capitalist suppliers was the theme of the most "doctrinaire" and consistent liberals for generations. In the same spirit, present day American writer Ernest Fitzgerald has identified the masses exploited by the military branch of the American State:

it is undoubtedly true that subject population exploitation is a major objective of the military spending coalition. The people marked for exploitation, though, are not the masses of peasants in underdeveloped countries. The exploited masses are United States taxpayers, the most productive and easily managed subject population in the history of the world.⁵

What are the implications of this analysis for contemporary problems?

As the French liberals knew, the expansion of government activity keeps pace with the increase in the number of State functionaries, who must somehow justify their incomes and jobs. And today, throughout the world, in every regime, the number of State functionaries continues to grow. According to reports in the West, most of the relatively few Soviet bureaucrats dismissed under *perestroika* have been rehired in new intermediate agencies, production or research associations, and so on, sometimes headed by the former minister himself. It is estimated that the number of Soviet bureaucrats has actually *increased* by 122,000, bringing the total to around 18,000,000.

But the experience of the hydra-headed bureaucracy is by no means limited to the Soviet Union. Administrations elected on platforms demanding the reduction of the legions

of functionaries—whether in Brazil or the United States—seem somehow never to be able to realize their original intentions. It was good of Deputy Prime Minister Leonid I. Abalkin to point out that the United States

There now flourishes, in every advanced country, a class of State-funded social scientists whose profession consists in discovering and defining — out of the infinite mass of human misery — particular "social problems" which will become the material for further State activity.

Department of Agriculture has more employees than the Soviet State Commission on Procurement and Food. The conclusion to be drawn, however, is hardly the one the Deputy Prime Minister seems to favor—that even a market economy requires great armies of bureaucrats.

Most lucrative for the State has been war and preparations for war. In this connection, I must praise the courageous speech of Mr. Georgi Arbatov at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, in which he assailed the "huge and fabulously expensive war machine" in the Soviet Union. This is an example that cries out to be emulated by influential commentators in the West.

With the emergence of the Welfare State, the opportunities for the State "enmeshing society in a net and choking all its pores" become literally endless. There now flourishes, in every advanced country, a class of State-funded social scientists whose profession consists in discovering and defining—out of the infinite mass of human misery—particular "social problems" which will become the material for further State activity.

The monstrous growth of the State apparatus will not be stopped by those who, ignorant of economics and given to literary-moralistic musings, equate the private property, market economy

with totalitarianism. President Vaclav Havel of Czechoslovakia recently warned against "the stupefying dictatorship of consumerism and of pervasive commercialism." This "dictatorship," President Havel feels, will tend to produce alienation, and, in the speech in which he discussed this problem, he appealed to German philosophers to help prevent this plunge into alienation by turning to "the service of renewing global human responsibility, the only possible salvation for the contemporary world."

I doubt that we require the help of German philosophers to remedy the "ills" caused by an over-emphasis on the rights of the individual. In any case, what is this "dictatorship" of consumerism, this "mindless materialism," of which President Havel—and many other literary intellectuals in east-central Europe—speaks? Is it the provision of compact-disc electronic systems to tens and soon hundreds of millions of people, enabling them to listen to near-concert-hall-perfect versions of the music of Tchaikovsky,

Most of the relatively few Soviet bureaucrats dismissed under perestroika have been rehired in new intermediate agencies, sometimes headed by the former minister himself. It is estimated that the number of Soviet bureaucrats has actually increased by 122,000.

Rachmaninov, and Shostakovich? Does it consist in making available, in every Western country, well-produced paperback editions of all the great works of literature and philosophy, and of all the modern works as well—especially those that attack the "materialism" of the capitalist system? In America and other western countries, there are millions of people who have attained the degree of affluence that permits them to interest themselves, in an amateurish way, in original works of art—in drawings, paintings, sculptures, and photographs. Their homes

are filled with such works, by local artists for the most part. Is the affluence that permits this middle-class amateurism another example of "materialism"?

Here a touch of the old Marxist skepticism is in order, I think. For whom does President Havel speak when he derides "consumerism" and "commercialism"? Whose interests are served by eclipsing the market economy and the voluntary choices of consumers?

In the former socialist countries of east-central Europe, as elsewhere, there is, of course, in place a stratum of state-subsidized intellectuals, in the media, the arts, the press, and education. There is, moreover, a continuing process of the reproduction of this class. I suggest that their social position requires an ideology to justify the continuance of State-funds. Perhaps the task of "renewing [sic] human global responsibility"—whatever that may be—will be at the center of it.

The "vulgar Marxism" that in the past dismissed liberal ideology as "nothing but" the rationalization of the interests of the bourgeoisie cannot stand the test of critical examination. Moreover, if that notion were true, then there would be no reason for our Soviet friends to be here today, listening to the speeches of the "bourgeois ideologists" collected at this Cato conference.

I have stressed today a dimension of liberal ideology that clearly has great relevance for every nation in the world. A New Zealand scholar, J. C. Davis, has recently reflected on the rise of the Leviathan State during the past four hundred years, a process spanning the globe:

The comprehensive, collective state with its assumption of obligations in every aspect of human life, from health to employment, education to transport, defense to entertainment and leisure, is a feature of every advanced state, whether of the East or the West, and of the aspirations of most Third World governments. Curiously, both revolutionaries and reactionaries, by their demands that the state more closely control social processes, have furthered the growth of Leviathan.⁶

This description is one with which both the great French liberals I have discussed and Karl Marx could have agreed. The question remains, what realistic alternative exists to State-parasitism? The answer provided by a

I am far from being a Marxist, but I must confess that I find more truth in Friedrich Engels' description of the American political scene than I usually find on the editorial page of the New York Times.

contemporary French author, Raymond Ruyer, represents my own point of view, and, I think, that of authentic liberalism:

One must fully recognize a great truth, which rings as a scandalous paradox and a challenge to the beliefs and quasi-religious faith of the intelligentsia, both in the West and the East, namely, that the only choice is between a bureaucratized political State, seeking power and glory in every domain, including those of art and science; and an "anarchical" regime of self-direction in every economic domain first of all, but also in culture. But the heart of the paradox is that it is only the liberal economic order that can promote "the withering away of the State" and of politics—or at least their limitation—it is not centralizing socialism.⁷ □

Notes

1. Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Selected Works in Three Volumes* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), vol. 1, p. 477.
2. *Ibid.*, vol. 2, p. 188.
3. Jérôme-Adolphe Blanqui, *Histoire de l'Économie Politique en Europe depuis les anciens jusqu'à nos jours* (Paris: Guillaumin, 1837), p. x. (Italics in original.)
4. *Censeur Européen*, 7: 206 and 205.
5. A. Ernest Fitzgerald, *The High Priests of Waste* (New York: Norton, 1972), p. xii.
6. J. C. Davis, *Utopia and the Ideal Society: A Study of English Utopian Writing 1516-1700* (Cambridge, Eng.: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 8-9.
7. Raymond Ruyer, *Éloge de la Société de consommation* (Paris: Calmann-Lévy, 1969), pp. 266-267.

Profile

A Hero of Our Time

James S. Robbins

Maybe Gorbachev merely stumbled into the role of great reformer. But then, his whole life has been a string of lucky breaks.

Nobody was surprised when the 1990 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to Mikhail Gorbachev. Gorbachev received the prize for doing in only a few months what Western diplomats and negotiators had tried and failed to do for forty years, namely allowing the East European peoples a measure of self-determination, and agreeing to withdraw Soviet forces from the former subject states, and for his reformist efforts inside the Soviet Union, where economic, political and social change has proceeded at a dizzying pace, especially compared to the stagnation in the 1970s and early 1980s.

True, Gorbachev had presided over the ruthless suppression of independence movements in Georgia, Azerbaijan and Armenia, and had applied pressure just short of force in the Baltic States and Moldavia. But peacefulness has never been a prerequisite of winning the Peace Prize: Henry Kissinger received the Prize in the wake of the Cambodian bombings, which were far more violent in terms of scope and casualties than Gorbachev's ventures into riot-control.*

A year into the new decade, Mikhail Gorbachev stands at the brink of an era that he created himself, most-

ly by accident. The Gorbachev era has been characterized by the dismantling, or perhaps the implosion, of the traditional system of Communist Party rule and its replacement with a political apparatus depending less on the direction of the Party and more on the hitherto emasculated and subservient state machinery. This transition from Party oligarchy to State "democracy" has been hailed as revolutionary, and it has produced some pretty considerable third-party benefits—most notably relaxed East-West tensions and the separation of Central Europe from the Soviet Empire. On the other hand, the rapid changes of the Gorbachev years have also led to internal instabilities and economic dislocations, lowering already abysmal Soviet standards of living to levels unplumbed since the days of Stalin.

Gorbachev's empire appears to be coming apart at the seams. Many of its problems are of his own making. The economic and political stagnation of the "Old Thinking" could, some people might argue, have been dealt with in a variety of fashions short of the radical overhaul the Soviet system has undergone, and in fact Gorbachev did

pursue these avenues early in his career as leader. Many others, including most classical liberals and libertarians, would argue that the real problem has been that he has not gone far enough, fast enough.

When Gorbachev took his first steps towards reform, the question arose as to his sincerity. Was he another of the CPSU (Communist Party of the Soviet Union) General Secretaries who would preach a vaguely reformist line but continue the standard Communist practices? Or was he in fact a liberal idealist who would send the ailing Soviet state into a golden era of individual liberty and international peace? These two poles are so far apart that Gorbachev could not help but fall somewhere in the middle, I suppose, but in this case I believe that this is exactly where he belongs. He is neither an idealist of the socialist stripe nor a closet libertarian. He is a pragmatic politician, wise in the arcane science of rising through the labyrinthine Communist Party system, and in the art of political manipulation, but a babe in the woods when it comes to understanding economics or the advantages of freedom. The story

* Ironically, the Soviets also agreed unilaterally to lower troop levels more than was specified in the CFE treaty, after two decades of negotiation, rendering the agreement meaningless by the time it was signed.

of his rise to power may help explain how a man so ill-informed of the consequences of his actions could wind up leading the most important period of reform since the forced industrialization of the 1930s.

Gorbachev's story begins humbly enough. He was born March 2, 1931, in the North Caucasian village of Privol'noye, which means "free" or "spacious" (referring to the landscape) but has also been translated as "liberty." His parents were peasants and he

Mikhail Gorbachev stands at the brink of an era that he created himself — mostly by accident.

lived a peasant life, operating farm machinery and staying close to the soil—a romantic background in the Old System, if you didn't starve. In 1950, he went to the Moscow State University Law School, sponsored by the regional party of the city of Stavropol, the nearest large city to Gorbachev's hometown. His peasant status may have helped him in getting to Moscow; under the Stalinist system, people of modest backgrounds were sometimes the beneficiaries of a sort of primitive affirmative action program designed to give the impression of an equal-opportunity classless society. But the law school was not as prestigious as a similar school might be in the West, since lawyers in the time of Stalin were less advocates than part of the state mechanism for control. Prosecutors were feared, and defenders were non-entities. Both were regarded with even greater suspicion and contempt than lawyers in the West. None of this had any effect upon Gorbachev's career, however, since he was less interested in legal studies than in political work. He is said to have had a propensity for making speeches instead of studying, which had the predictable effect on his grades. It did not slow his political progress, however. None of Gorbachev's early speeches appear to have been recorded, so one can only speculate as to their content. It is a pretty safe bet, however, that he was a little

softer on Stalin, who was still running the country in those days, than are his present pronouncements.

Gorbachev became a member of the Communist Party in 1951, graduated by the skin of his teeth in 1955, and returned to Stavropol. The future president's departure from Moscow was not entirely voluntary. He tried to get appointed to a post with the Moscow Komsomol (Communist Youth) apparatus, which would have placed him at the center of power and on the fast track within the Party. But, according to Fridrikh Neznanskii, a former classmate of Gorbachev's, he was edged out of the race by another classmate who restructured "the votes the night before the selection was made." The outmaneuvered Gorbachev was forced to return to the provinces for the next twenty-three years.*

Back in the countryside, Gorbachev continued to work on his career in the Komsomol. In 1962 he became a party organizer of collective and state farms, and took a correspondence course with the Stavropol Agricultural Institute, from which he received a degree in Agronomy in 1967. In 1968 he became second secretary of the Stavropol *kraikom*, and was given charge of agriculture. Gorbachev tried some innovations in this position, such as limited private cultivation, but he appears to have not had much success, judging from the subsequent harvest years, which were poor. At this point Gorbachev, who was approaching 40, was lagging a bit behind his peers, and appeared to be set for a life as a mid-level bureaucrat.

In 1971 Gorbachev's luck changed spectacularly. He was made a member of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Admittedly, this is not as important as it sounds; the Central Committee contains hundreds of members, and has always been a rubber stamp for the decisions of the Politburo. Still, this promotion did signal that Gorbachev had found a mentor. It was usual in the Brezhnev era for individuals to rise

through the Party ranks because of their connections rather than their abilities, and at this point in his life, Gorbachev was not into being an exception to the rules.

In the early '70s Leonid Brezhnev was approaching the height of his powers and was actively promoting supporters to solidify his control, but surprisingly, Gorbachev's promotion came because he was part of a competing group. His patron was Fedor Kulakov, a Politburo member and a rival to Brezhnev. There was even some speculation that at some point Kulakov might succeed Brezhnev as Party leader. But he died unexpectedly and mysteriously in July 1978, leaving a political void. Gorbachev, of unproven competence and at age 48 just a baby by Kremlin standards, was never a contender for Kulakov's role within the power structure, but he was a small enough fry to be a perfect compromise choice for entry into the Politburo. Accordingly, he was appointed to that august body as a candidate (i.e. apprentice) member on November 17, 1979.

At long last Gorbachev was a genuinely powerful person. As the new minister for agriculture, he took control just in time to suffer the effects of the poor harvest of 1979 and, shortly thereafter, the American grain embargo imposed in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. This placed pressure on the Soviet Union (and Gorbachev) to raise output in 1980, both for purposes of prestige and to offset U.S. sanctions. Resources were directed away from other aspects of the economy and towards agriculture, but to no avail—1980 saw the usual disastrous harvest. But Gorbachev did not suffer the ignominy of so many previous heads of agriculture. Brezhnev thought himself an agricultural genius, and Gorbachev took care not to contradict the aging General Secretary, whose micromanagement left him with little to do. He made sure to agree with Brezhnev that the basis of Soviet agriculture was sound, and only "better administration" was needed. Interestingly enough, Brezhnev, and therefore Gorbachev, favored increasing the size of the "private plots," the 1.4% of peasant land which produces 61% of the

* Reportedly, the man who was appointed to the Komsomol post instead of Gorbachev was arrested on unspecified charges on the day that Gorbachev took power. If nothing else, Gorbachev has a long memory.

potatoes, 54% of the fruit and 34% of the eggs in the Soviet Union. (It has even been suggested that in January, 1981 Gorbachev planned, with Brezhnev's approval, to do away with many land use restrictions—excepting state ownership—but that this plan was scuttled when Ronald Reagan ended the grain embargo on April 1!) Whatever the case, Soviet agriculture continued to decline, and after the failure of a vaunted food program in 1982, Gorbachev had reason to expect the worst. Three years of such failure set him up as a scapegoat for the failings inherent in the system and in Brezhnev's detailed control of the agricultural sector, and the death of party ideologist and old Kulakov ally Mikhail Suslov the previous January had left him without a patron. It seemed clear that he would meet his (political) end at the November 16 plenary meeting of the CC.

But fate intervened. Three days after Brezhnev attempted to dispel rumors about his ill health by standing

It was usual in the Brezhnev era for individuals to rise through the Party ranks because of their connections rather than their abilities. Gorbachev's rise is a striking example of this.

atop the Lenin Mausoleum in bitter cold during the November 7 parade celebrating the 60th anniversary of the creation of the USSR, he died of a heart attack. Yuri Andropov was chosen General Secretary over Brezhnev crony Konstantine Chernenko. He immediately implemented an "anti-corruption campaign," the greatest purge of Party personnel since the time of Stalin. Gorbachev's adherence to the minority Kulakov-Suslov faction now became his chief asset. He was clearly no Brezhnevite; his adherence to the Brezhnev line on agriculture had obviously been a prudent career move and nothing more. This was sufficient to make him a member of the Andropov "reformist" camp. When Andropov's

health began to wane in the spring of 1983, Gorbachev was in a position to move up in the world. A good harvest in 1983 (mostly the result of favorable weather) helped his prospects. When Andropov died in February, 1984, Gorbachev appeared to be one of the front runners to succeed him. This was quite a turnaround for a man who had faced expulsion from the Politburo only a little over a year earlier, and who had exercised very little real power before that.

Much of Andropov's authority had been based on fear; as KGB chief, he had spent a decade and a half collecting potentially damaging information on his opponents, suitable to pressure them to support him or to subvert them if they were persistent in their opposition. With Andropov dead this fear abated, and the Brezhnevites found new life. Chernenko emerged a narrow winner. Gorbachev may have acquiesced to this choice, assuming correctly that Chernenko, old and failing, would be swiftly done in by the job, leaving the path to power open and himself in the driver's seat.

The "anti-reform" group around Chernenko tried to reverse the process of the previous 15 months, but they underestimated the extent of Andropov's changes. "Reformist" Party members did not control the Politburo, but they did control much of the bureaucracy and the major media outlets and were able to launch a debate in the press over the shape of necessary reforms, so the anti-reform movement was stalled. Probably its biggest handicap was Chernenko's cautious approach. Chernenko had an old man's terror of change and was unable to stop the reformists from placing their own personnel in key positions, although his faction was able to slow the rate at which these appointments were made.

When agricultural output fell to its usual deplorable level in 1984, Chernenko was in a position to push for Gorbachev's dismissal. But he made no attempt—not even a half-hearted one—to do so. Chernenko's attempt to groom Viktor Grishin as a successor died with him in February. Gorbachev hastily convened a meeting of the truncated Politburo (several im-

portant Brezhnevites were out of town), and was elected General Secretary. Purists who get alarmed by this sort of thing will be disturbed by the rumor that there was not even a full quorum at this meeting. Even so,

Gorbachev is neither an idealist of the socialist stripe nor a closet libertarian. He is a pragmatic politician, wise in the science of rising through the system and in the art of political manipulation, but a babe in the woods when it comes to understanding economics or the advantages of freedom.

the vote for Gorbachev is said to have been tied. Andrei Gromyko, who once observed that Gorbachev had "a nice smile, but iron teeth," cast the deciding ballot. Gorbachev proved Gromyko to be correct by rewarding him with a pink slip.

Luck, Pluck, and More Luck

Gorbachev came to power through a string of fortunate circumstances. He made connections in his youth, but not really the right ones—had he been more astute he might have linked up with the Brezhnevite faction in the 1960s, or found a way to stay in the capital after graduating from Moscow U. But after rising with Kulakov he was able to shift allegiances skillfully when expedient and to avoid the blame for the failures of Soviet agriculture under his administration. This was quite a political feat, although the timely deaths of Brezhnev, Chernenko, and Kulakov were essential to his success. Ideology was mostly unimportant, and there is nothing in Gorbachev's biography to suggest he had any more liberal leanings than did his predecessors. He came to power with no real plan. This fact explains many of the subsequent events.

Gorbachev's first few years in power were a period of consolidation. He continued Andropov's "anti-corruption campaign" with renewed

vigor, ousting adversaries and bringing friends into leadership positions. When he became more powerful he dropped the "anti-corruption" cover and began outright purges of his enemies, whom he replaced with people whose loyalty was to him and who would co-operate with his reform attempts.

To counter the influence of the Politburo, Gorbachev increased the powers of the Secretariat of the Central Committee. Then, in November 1988, he subverted the Secretariat by shifting many of its powers to six CC Commissions created earlier in the year. When the six Commissions, controlled by powerful and generally more conservative regional Party bosses, became difficult to deal with, Gorbachev got around them by distributing more power to local leaders, in many cases his own appointees, who were more amenable to his reforms. The Central Committee, which has been a focus of opposition, was purged regularly, most dramatically in April,

There is nothing to suggest that Gorbachev had any more liberal leanings than did his predecessors. But he was interested in shaking the dust out of the Soviet state, and the fact that he came to power with no real plan about how to do so explains many of the subsequent events.

1989, when 110 members were released, prompting a comment from *Izvestia's* P. Gutionov that Gorbachev was making the Party "a debating society" instead of society's guiding force.

And that was exactly what Gorbachev was doing. He had declared himself to be a reformer on the way to the top, and now he needed to follow through if he was to retain the support of those people who had taken him seriously. The Party had resisted his reforms, so he sought to implement them through the state organs instead.

This process began at the Nineteenth Party Conference in 1988. Gorbachev enhanced the power of the Supreme Soviet (the parliament) at the expense of the CC, and created the Congress of Peoples' Deputies, an all-purpose reformist body with ill-defined but potentially broad powers. Elections to the Congress became referenda on Communist candidates, many of whom lost and were purged. The influence of the ministerial bureaucracy increased vis-a-vis the CPSU, and Party management of the economy and society diminished.

That is the situation today. The KGB, MVD and Ministry of Defense are watched by the Supreme Soviet, and as the duties of the Politburo have decreased, the Defense Council, a non-party organization, has stepped into the void as a stop-gap, to be replaced eventually by a new Presidential Cabinet. Gorbachev has gradually moved his power base and the governing power of Soviet society from the Party to the state while remaining in charge of both.

The shift from Party to state rule was more the result of expediency than theory. Gorbachev was not implementing a master plan for reform. Had the party gone along, Gorbachev would have used it. When it didn't, he adapted. He pursued reform until he met opposition; when it became too strong, he side-stepped the opposition, giving new power to another body.

But there are limits to the amount of twisting Gorbachev can do before he begins to run into barriers that cannot be circumvented. With the more radical reformers out of the CPSU, the remaining power is in the hands of die-hard socialists. Not surprisingly, opposition to reform within the Party remains strong, and is intensifying. Despite Gorbachev's efforts to reduce the Party's power, he cannot simply declare the Party over, since much of his legitimacy still rides on it.

Gorbachev also faces opposition from outside the Party. His use of the Congress to move reform forward has worked to a certain extent, but the Congress has become increasingly a forum for criticism of Gorbachev. Linked to this is opposition from nationalist groups in the various Union

Republics, where Communists were defeated by significant margins in the Congressional and Republic elections. These groups have pushed for separation from the Soviet Union, taking Gorbachev's own decentralization

The future does not look promising for Gorbachev. But it never really has. Somehow he has managed to confound both his enemies and his friends and to slip by the many adversities he has faced.

scheme to its logical conclusion. Gorbachev has resisted these attempts (most notably in the Baltic States), but it is questionable whether he could react to mass secession by half a dozen Republics. This is vividly illustrated by attempts by President of the Russian Republic Boris Yeltsin to challenge the authority of the central government to any economic management of Russian resources. There have also been demonstrations by Russian nationalist groups favoring secession from the USSR. Such a development would leave Gorbachev a president without a state, and would effectively end his political career.

Economic deprivation has also intensified, and these are points stressed by the opponents of reform in their quest to bring back socialism. Vladimir Yakushev, of the Workers' Opposition, has stated that these problems have arisen precisely because of the attempts to abandon socialism. Radical reformers, such as Nikolai Slyun'kov, counter that it is the slow transition to a market economy that is to blame, and that for reform to succeed the old system must be thrown out quickly and completely. This is probably the case, but such an argument may not seem relevant to people facing increasing shortages of basic necessities. They are more likely to flock to those who distribute immediate relief than those who promise future wealth but only after short-term sacrifice.

Whence came the radical reformers

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Critique

Abortion and Feticide Are Not the Same Thing

by Eric Schendel, M.D.

In the September issue, Dr Ron Paul argued that RU486, the controversial abortifacient, should *not* be banned. He also gave a moving account of why he believes abortion to be wrong. It is to this latter point that Dr Schendel responds.

The “slippery slope” that Ron Paul invokes to justify his opposition to abortion is a straw-man. In order to reach his conclusion that abortion is immoral, he employs two different definitions of abortion and ends up confusing fundamental libertarian principles.

The term “abortion” is commonly applied to both miscarriage and feticide. It properly refers to a miscarriage—that is, the premature expulsion of the fetus, an occurrence that until recently was natural. Its modern usage has expanded to include medical expulsion of the fetus. The word does not mean the fetus has to be dead.

Feticide, on the other hand, does mean killing the fetus.

An abortion is not the same thing as feticide. Technically, whenever a doctor uses pitocin to induce labor so that he does not have to come in at 2 a.m. to deliver the baby, he is performing an abortion, and doing so solely for the convenience of himself or the mother. Therefore it must not be abortion *per se* that Dr Paul opposes. Presumably he opposes abortion because he equates it with feticide, which he regards as a violation of the nonaggression principle.

It is true that libertarians, in common with most of humanity, regard human life as sacred and deserving of the protection of law. It may also be true that there is no rational way of defining the beginning of life other

than at conception. Thus Dr Paul is correct that the nonaggression principle is involved. However, it applies only to feticide, not to abortion.

The reason involves another libertarian principle, one that is a corollary of the nonaggression principle. The corollary is that nobody has the right to force another person to be his slave. This principle is also fundamental: there are no exceptions.

An analogy will illustrate why abortion cannot be an exception. Suppose that a slave in the antebellum South went on strike and demanded his freedom. Suppose further that his master was incorrigibly lazy and refused to work, claiming it was the divine order of things that black people take care of white people like himself. And finally, let this slave-owner be poor, with only one slave and no other property of value. Then, if the slave persisted in his strike and the master in his refusal to soil his hands with honest labor, the master would eventually starve to death.

It is hard to imagine that anyone would support charging the slave

with homicide. We would consider him a freedom fighter, not a murderer.

The implications would be similar even if the master were quadriplegic and physically unable (as opposed to psychologically unwilling) to work and feed himself. We might consider it unfortunate that no one was willing to feed the slave-owner, and if we weren't hypocrites we ourselves might help him. However we still would not consider the slave a murderer for striking for freedom.

The same arguments apply to abortion. A woman who decides to expel the fetus implanted in her by a rapist because she does not wish to be its slave (and, not coincidentally, perhaps risk her career, marital happiness, health or life by carrying it to term) is not committing murder. The fetus has no more right to live off her against her will than the slave-owner did.

Once she expels the fetus, it is no more her concern. If the rapist, Dr Paul or some do-gooder wishes to save it with modern (or future) technology, at his own expense and thereafter adopt it, she couldn't care less.

The infanticide bogeyman that Dr Paul uses in his argument against abortion can be understood in the same context. Linguistically the term, like feticide and homicide, refers to a killing. It conjures up images of doctors or parents murdering little babies.

Yet it is often used to refer to the act of abandoning an infant. In the past, parents placed unwanted children outside to die of starvation and the elements. In a sense they were saying, we don't want this baby, if you want him you can have him. In an age when abortion was not feasible and birth control was ineffective, many societies viewed infant abandonment as a rational method of family planning.

In the context of modern mores and the wealth created by the industrial revolution this seems shocking. Recall, however, that in a society living in poverty and on the edge of famine, one extra mouth to feed (not to mention one extra mouth every nine months) might be truly disastrous for the rest of the family. Dividing a subsistence diet

The reason infant abandonment was acceptable lies in the fundamental distinction between killing someone and letting him die.

barely adequate for four people five ways could result in severe malnutrition and illness. If the breadwinners became incapacitated, then the whole family, including the new infant, might perish. In such a context limiting family size was a moral necessity and often abandonment of the newborn infant was the only practical solution. Today such an unwanted child would be abandoned to an adoption agency.

Similarly, in a larger context, when society as a whole faced famine as the result of drought, war or whatever, it would have seemed reasonable to practice infant abandonment. If someone had to starve because of limited resources, society would suffer least in the long term if it expelled the nonproductive members. Nowadays we would postpone childbearing, but in

the past this was not a realistic option.

Thus historically many societies sanctioned infant abandonment, despite the consequences to the infant. They did this because they recognized that even the child's right to life did not supersede his parents' right not to be enslaved. At least in this context they realized that one person has no moral right to force another to be his slave. And even today we allow parents to abandon their children, although now we insist they abandon them to an adoption agency.

The reason infant abandonment was acceptable lies in the fundamental distinction between killing someone and letting him die. We see this distinction clearly in the case of the slave and his lazy owner. We acknowledge it, reluctantly, in the slave and a paralyzed owner. We are beginning to recognize it in "active" and "passive" euthanasia. However, neither the pro-choice nor the right-to-live partisans acknowledge it in the issue of abortion versus feticide.

What, then, are the moral implications of abortion?

As mentioned before, the fundamental tenet of libertarianism is the non-aggression principle. It states that each individual has the right to demand to be left alone as long as he leaves others alone. This is a so-called negative right. An individual does not have the right to be fed because that would require that someone be forced to create the food and feed him. On the other hand, he does have the right not to be murdered, because that right merely requires that everyone refrain from murdering him.

We generally recognize the priority of negative rights over positive ones when they involve able-bodied adults. We are much more ambivalent when they involve children. Although nowadays parents may abandon their infants to an adoption agency, they may not leave them on a doorstep. This may technically violate the prohibition against slavery, but it would seem a not unreasonable compromise.

Similarly, the fetus does not have any intrinsic right to be fed and nourished, because such a right would make the woman its slave. The woman has the right to refuse to provide such

material support, and her only means of refusing is to expel the fetus. That is the libertarian argument why abortion must be permitted.

However, once she expels it she gives up any claim to it, and thereafter

The fetus does not have any intrinsic right to be fed and nourished, because such a right would make the woman its slave. The woman has the right to refuse to provide such material support, and her only means of refusing is to expel the fetus. That is why abortion must be permitted.

any concerned citizen may adopt it. Today, of course, such adoption is not practical, but in the future it may well be feasible.

This brings up another issue. There will be some women, such as those who have been raped, who not only will not want to carry the fetus, but will not want it to exist. In other words, they will not want a person around carrying their genes, perhaps because they detest the rapist, or because they fear they may develop maternal instincts toward it in the future. These women will want the right not only to have an abortion, but also to commit explicit feticide. Should that be allowed?

This concern now is moot, as it is impossible to abort a pregnancy in the first trimester without killing the fetus. At some point in the future it will have to be addressed. The justification for abortion outlined above does not clarify it. Any right to feticide depends on the definition of when human life begins. In point of fact, the current arguments for and against abortion actually apply to feticide.

A partial solution is to minimize the number of women who demand feticide. This could be done by explicitly granting women the right of total abandonment. That is, if a woman chooses to abandon her offspring, either by aborting it or by giving it up

for adoption, society should recognize no claim against her by the child. For example, it would have no legal standing as an heir. Both to enforce this and to grant the woman the emotional distance she needs to prevent activation of her maternal instincts, she should have the right to remain ignorant of whether the fetus survives, and if it survives it should have no way of tracking her down as long as she does not want to know whether it survived. This could be accomplished by placing all adoptable aborted fetuses in a pool, and keeping no record of their parents.

Although not relevant to abortion, Dr Paul's concerns about infanticide do have merit. The true "slippery slope" is the grey area between passive

infanticide and true or active infanticide. Just as abandoning a baby to an adoption agency is moral, it is also moral for parents, physicians or society to refuse to provide (but not to prohibit others from providing) heroic medical treatment of severely deformed infants, thus allowing them to die. The slippery slope involves withholding lesser forms of medical treatment such as oxygen and feeding tubes, and progresses to ordinary feeding and finally the question of whether euthanasia is moral if it would spare the infant a slow and painful natural death. Any resolution of this very complicated issue involves consideration of when human life begins, at what point does damage to the brain deprive a human body of the essence of

human life—certainly anencephaly should qualify—and implied consent.

In closing, it is worth mentioning that the abortion controversy is an example of the larger conflict between involuntary altruism and rational selfishness. However, unlike most examples of that conflict, it is one where most modern liberals are on our side. Therefore it offers an excellent opportunity to persuade the intellectual establishment of the folly of involuntary altruism and so-called positive rights. Developing a compromise national policy on abortion based on the distinction between true abortion and feticide may go a long way toward solving such problems as welfarism and the increasing trend toward socialized medicine. □

Robbins, "A Hero of Our Time," continued from page 42

to the Gorbachev camp? To answer this, one must return to the philosophy department of Moscow University in the 1950s, where young Raisa Titorenko, Gorbachev's future wife, studied and to which she later returned as a professor of sociology. Here, according to former International Department member Evgenii Novikov, she was very popular among the "leftists" on the faculty. She brought these people to the attention of her husband, and it was they who formed the key group in conceptualizing various aspects of the ever-changing course of *perestroika*.

But there are limits to Gorbachev's


tolerance for these ideas. When they serve his ends, he endorses them; when they don't, he loses interest. *Glasnost*, for example, was originally a method of using public criticism to remove particularly resistant Party leaders. Criticism in a certain area would be opened up, a media campaign would result, the official in charge would be purged, and the campaign would end. *Glasnost* was also used as a means for introducing new ideas for reform, and for criticism of the Old Thinking, a favored theme. But there have always been exceptions to "openness," especially when criticism touches Gorbachev himself. In October 1989, he took to task members of the media and some Peoples' Deputies for their statements.

The magazine *Argumenty i Fakty* (Arguments and Facts) had published a poll showing the most popular of the deputies, most of whom were members of the liberal Interregional group. Andrei Sakharov (who died a short time later) was

ranked first, and radical reformist Yurii Afanas'ev fourth. Gorbachev was nowhere in the poll. He demanded the resignation of editor Vladislav Starkov, requested all letters critical of him received by the magazine, and accused those who received ratings better than his of being "a clique of gangsters striving for power."

Boris Yeltsin's dismissal from the Politburo for criticizing Gorbachev is also instructive in the limits of dissent. For Gorbachev, liberalism is a means, not an end.

The future does not look promising for Gorbachev. But it never really has. Somehow he has managed to confound both his enemies and his friends and to slip by the many adversities he has faced. Perhaps his survival and prosperity is a result of fear among his opponents, fear that "the other side" might take over and a crackdown or chaos result. Maybe it comes from Gorbachev's ability to wend his way through opposition in pursuit of his goal of a revitalized Soviet state. Perhaps both. In any case, his skill as a politician is manifest; and if by some unlikely twist of fate Mikhail Gorbachev manages to build a state which bears more than a superficial resemblance to the Western democracies, it will be an achievement well worth applauding. □



"What's all this stuff I hear about a teacher shortage? — I have plenty!"

Budget-talk

Lies, Liberalism, and Lip-Reading

by Loren E. Lomasky

After a budget "compromise" that seems likely to compromise most of the budgets of America, our editors couldn't resist wondering about the ethics behind it.

They were, after Madonna's, the most memorable lips in America. Millions of voters read and liked what they heard. Buoyed by the slogan "No new taxes!" George Bush was elevated to the White House.

But that was then and this is now. Economic advisors have crunched their numbers and peered at the chicken entrails. They concluded that the deficit, rather than fading into nothingness, is ballooning again to \$200 billion-plus proportions. Something "responsible" had to be done, and Bush is, as he has often informed us, nothing if not a prudent man. The lips, now noticeably drawn and parched, offered a new text: "revenue enhancement." Congress ultimately hummed along, though not before performing their best Abbott and Costello imitation.

Perhaps it would be wrong to make too much of this about-face. After all, the half-life of campaign promises matches that of trans-uranic elements for brevity. That this one persisted for a third of a term places it distinctly above the median. The hot breath of Gramm-Rudman was blowing on the national neck, and the reservoir of accounting chicanery had been sucked dry in previous budget years. Once congressional Democrats showed themselves willing to be implicated in tax increases, the political fallout appeared to be manageable. The next campaign could be waged on the backs of flag burners and a "No new

Willie Horton parole!" pledge.

Still, the episode merits more than a cynical dismissal. For George Bush had gone to extraordinary lengths to paint himself into the corner of irrevocable opposition to tax increases. He deliberately rejected opportunities to add conditions or qualifications to the assurance. "No new taxes," it was, straight and unmixed, and the American public was rather taken by the figure of the erstwhile wimp drawing a line in the sand with his lips. Something very much like a contract was tendered to the voters, and a solid majority signed on the dotted line.

Now its terms have been unilaterally abrogated, and for no extraordinary reasons. War has not broken out, and though Operation Desert Shield is racking up costs in the billions, they are more than balanced by the collapse of the Soviet empire and the consequent "peace dividend" of which Mr Bush is the fortunate beneficiary. The economy is, admittedly, sputtering, but the president's about-face occurred while it was still comfortably to the far side of recession. To be sure, failed S&L's suck up federal dollars at an alarming rate, but that's not exactly a surprise. Political insid-

ers have known for years of the hemorrhage to come, and it was on the inside that Mr Bush had prepped for the preceding eight years. No, the "unforeseen exigencies" plea is unpersuasive.

The above is intended not to score some cheap political point but rather a cheap philosophical point. Since the seventeenth century, the preferred mode of liberal democratic political theory has been that of the "social contract." Philosophers within this tradition stylize relations among ordinary citizens and their rulers as the product of a (hypothetical) contract in which all parties pledge themselves to binding norms governing their civic interchanges. No man is the natural ruler of any other, these philosophers maintain; it is only through rational consent that political duties emerge. Therefore, they urge, a political order is legitimate only if it could have been generated by such reciprocal promises.

Initial agreement, though necessary, is, of course, not sufficient to guarantee legitimacy. It is crucial that individuals be required to live up to the pledges they offer. If some comply with the terms of the compact while others remain at liberty to toss them aside as may seem expedient, the con-

tract is rendered null and void. The term of art employed by these theorists to refer to the abrogation of the political order is "state of nature." In some versions it is identified with the state of war.

Whatever else Mr Bush may be, he is surely no political philosopher. Yet his recent twistings and turnings have, I believe, interesting philosophical implications. Bush was not content in 1988 to package himself before the electorate as a wise and good man of considerable experience. Rather, as much as was in his power he undertook to bind himself to a fixed platform of opposition to tax increases. He would look ridiculous, be self-indicted as a liar, if the notorious lips subsequently wavered. By voluntarily foreclosing his political options, Bush gave every impression of entering into a social contract with the voters. Nonetheless, the deed has been done. Bush proposed, Congress disposed, and the American public will pay.

The casting of ballots has become merely an elaborate way to buy a pig in a poke, and though some pigs are more telegenic than others and squeal more pleasantly, it is an entirely open question just whose bacon will be brought home.

We have been graced with an almost laboratory-pure example of the frailty of the model of politics-as-contract. It was evidently the consensus of the electorate that they wished to be burdened with no additional taxation. A government whose legitimacy is devolved from being "of the people, by the people, and for the people" should, presumably, comply. It does not, and no recourse is at hand. One can be pardoned for wondering what our rituals of periodically trotting off to the polls can signify if they afford no assurance that even the most vociferous declarations of candidates will endure. The casting of ballots becomes merely an elaborate way to buy a pig in a poke, and though

some pigs are more telegenic than others and squeal more pleasantly, it is an entirely open question just whose bacon will be brought home.

What then of the warrant of liberal democracy? Evidently it is more modest than its numerous celebrants profess. The periodic cumulation of votes by no means ensures the sway of anything representing a "general will." The process of translating citizens' preferences into policy determinations is distorted by high and persistent levels of noise. That is one reason why it is fatuous for the pundits to routinely bemoan the degradation of political campaigns into a cascade of sound bites and empty symbolic gestures. Why should voters invest time and energy to ascertain the wrinkles and nuances of platforms if these will routinely dissolve before the ballots grow cold? It is more sensible to regard candidate declarations as one does the alluring voices at the other end of the "Romance Hotline": endlessly titillating but with no consummation in prospect.

Admittedly, citizens in a democracy enjoy the opportunity to "throw the rascals out"—no small benefaction as any observer of last year's events in

Central Europe should understand. The opportunity to jump between frying pans and fires is preferable to being consigned permanently to the flames. Americans do not live in the worst of political worlds, far from it. But neither is it one that can bear the full weight of the regnant democratic ideology.

Citizens in a democracy enjoy the opportunity to "throw the rascals out"—no small benefaction as any observer of last year's events in Central Europe should understand. The opportunity to jump between frying pans and fires is preferable to being consigned permanently to the flames.

We do not, through our political institutions, rule ourselves or anything close. However, when we act in our private capacity as consumers and producers, as friends, lovers, propagandists, competitors, adventurers,

The federal government has been spending money like a drunken sailor, and even the dimwits in Congress are aware that they can't continue to spend \$200 billion more each year than they collect in taxes. So what do they do?

First they cut spending "to the bone." One wonders where in the body politic the fat ends and the bone begins: hidden in the 24-pound document that Congress passed is an appropriation for \$500,000 for a Lawrence Welk Museum in Strasburg, North Dakota. An additional \$5 million was set aside to pay for the construction of new parliament buildings in the Solomon Islands. A special tax concession of nearly \$200 million to encourage the production of ethanol as an alternative fuel will end up benefitting a single company, Archer-Daniel-Midland Co.

Then, they reduced projected spending further by outright fraud. For example, they figured the cost of

financing the multi-billion dollar interest bill of the national debt on the projection that interest rates will fall to 4.2% . . . an interest rate that hasn't prevailed in the lifetime of most Americans.

Then, reluctantly, they decided to raise taxes. Their first thought was to raise "sin" taxes—taxes on gasoline, beer, wine, etc. But this proved unpopular, so they discovered a new target: "millionaires who don't pay their fair share." This theme proves very popular with voters—very few of whom are millionaires.

Along the way, Congress killed the good features of the Reagan tax reforms, namely, cutting rates so people will have an incentive to work harder and doing away with deductions that encourage people to spend more time trying to manipulate their tax situation than they do working.

Their work done, members of Congress went home for some last minute electioneering, proud of a job well done.

—R. W. Bradford

dreamers, and creators we do determine for what ends and with what degree of involvement we shall act. No amount of tinkering with the political mechanism will afford us similar opportunity to exercise an effective voice. That is why, although democratic institutions are important, limiting the scope of the state is even more important. It is not through reliance on the promises of our governors that we best

ensure the possibility of leading satisfying lives but by narrowing the range over which they can, take your pick, do good on our behalf/play us for the sucker. This, more than any specifically democratic credo of "one person, one vote" or "power to the people" is the heart of the doctrine of classical liberalism. No wonder, then, that Mr Bush's lips cringe when required to pronounce the "L-word." □

conducted in a retirement home, a number of old people urged upon Congress its responsibility not to make them pay any of the increased costs of the medical and other services rendered them. One old person (no, if they're *senior citizens*, I want to see them act like it) maintained that if Congress did not help her—help her, that is, with money taken from taxpayers—she might have to ask her children for help, and this would represent an intolerable state of dependency.

Not a word was said, of course, about the nearly intolerable burden of Social Security payments that the government already imposes on everyone and about which one might expect lifelong payers of Social Security to be at least slightly concerned.

Anyhow: this person's new moral assumption is even more interesting than Mikulski's. The assumption is that it is right to coerce assistance from total strangers, but wrong to request assistance from family members; and, further, that one is independent so long as one depends on the taxpayers instead of on one's family.

Very interesting. But the most remarkable thing about the two televised moral lessons was the enraged self-righteousness of the new morality's teachers. The retiree screamed into the microphone, face distorted with rage, demanding her obvious rights as a human being; the congresswoman ranted like an angry parent reminding a fractious child of its obvious responsibilities.

But why the rage, if all is so obvious? Perhaps because it takes a lot of emotion to assert oneself as a moral agent in the service of a morality that is self-evidently absurd.

It grieves me to think of so gruesome a metaphor for a respectable old lady and a hard-working legislator, but the news of October 17 and 18 reminded me of nothing so much as a theft I once witnessed on a New York bus. A gang of young punks suddenly surrounded a well-dressed, older man; one of them screamed, "Hey man, he's got my watch! The */&%!*# stole my watch!", then ripped the watch from its astonished owner. As the gang leaped from the bus, they were all shrieking obscenely about the evils of theft. □

The Evils of Theft

by Stephen Cox

"What's that in your hand, Johnny?" asked Mrs Reynolds, glancing down at the dollar bills that the little boy was counting on his way into the classroom. "Is that something you got during recess?"

"Yes, Mrs Reynolds."

"And how did you get it, Johnny?"

"I took it from LeAnn."

"And why didn't you take it from Tommy or Karen? They're the children you usually take money from."

"I already took all their money. They didn't have any left. But LeAnn still had plenty."

"Oh, I see. But what about Martha? I think she has some money."

"But Mrs Reynolds! Martha's my sister! I'd never take money from my sister!"

"That's right, Johnny. I forgot. You're such a nice little boy—and it's so good for the other children to have you for class president."

She gave the child an affectionate pat on the head. "Now get along in, Johnny. It's time for American history."

This isn't exactly what happens in America's primary schools—at least I hope they haven't degenerated quite that far. But it is what happens in that great big American history lesson, the television news.

On October 18, CBS Evening News displayed Congresswoman Barbara

Mikulski delivering herself of the following remarks, *à propos* the budget crisis: "Let us remember: the middle class in this country has no more to give; the poor have nothing to give; so let's go and get it from those who got it."

Of course, it's Mikulski's grammar—or lack thereof—that makes the big, immediate impression. Then it's her rhetoric: the telling insertion of "in this country," that pointless cliché that emerges, like a tell-tale fragrance, in every remark of every modern-liberal politician. (Why do they say this? Where did it start? Is it an ineradicable residue of the hate-America syndrome that has cost liberals so many elections? Or is it the gesture merely of a feckless geographical pedantry, an insistence that everyone remember the simple truth that *this* is a *country* like every other *country* and that we are actually *in it*?)

Once you get past the words, however, you see the point. Mikulski assumes that Johnny will have sufficient justification for taking LeAnn's money if he can show that the other children have run out of money for him to take. The idea of repressing Johnny's (or the government's) desire for additional funds simply does not arise.

Another example of this new morality appeared on CNN's broadcasts of October 17. In a series of interviews

Sermon

The Hope in the Schools

by Karl Hess

Sometimes the solution to a problem is right under your nose. Sometimes your preconceptions—even (*egad!*) your ideology—prevent you from seeing that solution. For instance . . .

Check this one out for yourself. In the next six stories regarding education, as covered in your local newspaper, see how many consider education to relate to the cultivation of effective manners of thinking.

In my own experience in a very typical American small town with a daily newspaper, the answer is "none."

Where are the comments of the people who do the work in the schools—even in the government schools? What do teachers think about this? No one seems to care. The loudest voices in the education debate seem to be those of the teacher union pros. They want cash.

Check out your local school-board meeting. Let some fired-up young teacher talk about teaching and the meeting immediately shifts subjects. For instance, the subject changes at near light-speed when some teacher shyly suggests that high drop-out rates might have something to do with kids who are simply bored to death and, in point of fact, might learn more reading, writing, and arithmetic at a fast food eatery . . .

The debates and the stories about education do not even jiggle what is one of the most powerful special interest group in our nation: the administrators of the education system itself. And the politicians, well, they pose as the heroes, and usually get away with it.

Just as the nation has an "educa-

tion president," my state of West Virginia has an "education governor." Both of these heroes of education approach the subject in a largely tectonic and vocational manner: pay higher salaries to teachers and administrators (particularly the latter), build more buildings, and buy more audio-visual gadgetry. Of course, these approaches fail miserably to help people become creative, self-managing, and literate enough to re-learn ways of working on a regular basis—which is the thing most needful in this age of megabytes and realigning markets.

In the county where I live, with a population of only about 40,000, the superintendent is paid \$73,000 a year. What do we get for one of the highest salaries in the *entire* county? One of the state's highest drop-out rates and an annual graduation of students most of whom have trouble reading all the way through a newspaper. We also get actually illiterate young adults. And in our nearby college we get freshman classes many of whose members require basic remedial reading assistance to even have a faint chance of reading their class work assignment.

As always, there are distinguished

committees of distinguished citizens that meet regularly to stare dumbfounded at a system that cannot even guarantee that every student in it can read an English sentence. So, naturally, they debate how to raise test scores.

If their arguments carry the day, my county will join those many others in which test scores keep going up while intellectual attainment obviously keeps going down.

And how is this educational Greshamism accomplished?

Many schools simply cheat. Test scores are becoming about as dependable as federal budget predictions. Others teach to the test and we can predict huge hunks of tax money soon being spent on "enrichened" school courses on how to take tests in school and in business and industry.

Companies that maintain personnel departments that take this test baloney seriously deserve the labor unrest, bankruptcy, and even psychopathic sabotage that the glassy-eyed test-taking whizzes, in their bored incompetence, will bring to them.

Now, I understand that the schools in a truly free society would avoid most of these problems because school attendance would be a matter of

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choice, not compulsion and, in order to have any student customers at all, the classrooms would have to offer more than the idiot-level drivel of most school text books.

But the sad fact may be that we don't even have a chance of a free market, laissez faire society so long as the landscape continues to be cluttered with perhaps nice but undeniably dumb or thoughtless people.

Grudgingly, then, I have come to accept the existence of government schools as something that will be with us for some time. It seems to me clearly impossible to even *fantasize* about a truly free society without considerable discussion of the school issue—and a discussion that includes a decent voice for ordinary teachers.

I hear from the teachers whom I respect—the ones who are not simple, sluggard time-servers watching their lives ooze on toward pension time and whose interest in children is mainly in passing them up through the grades, on schedule, with paperwork properly done—that what they want is neither complicated nor costly.

They merely want to be allowed to control their own classrooms, to use their knowledge to adapt to the reality they see before them: a raggle-taggle bunch of kids who learn in a dozen different ways, who can be excited or dulled out in even more ways.

They want administrators to stick to the maintenance work and not make minute educational policy decisions for every classroom teacher. They don't want to spend their time filling out semi-fraudulent forms to prove how well things are going. They know that the proof is in the pupil.

They know that the way you find out if Joanna can read is to ask the kid to read something. If you want to go fully radical, you could even ask what they understood the words to mean.

But there isn't time for all that, some officials say.

Nonsense. Beginning in the earliest grades, time could and should be divided up so that there is *no* time for anything else until the vital functions of reading and writing and basic reasoning have been mastered.

All that most classroom teachers want, whether they work in govern-

ment or non-government schools, is to be free to do their work in that context.

In short, leave them alone. Sure, censure or separate them if they screw up intolerably or make everyone furious; but mainly leave them alone.

If they can teach and if the kids respond, glorify them. If they can't teach, and if the kids *don't* respond, then fire them with no more compunction than you'd sack any other dingdong. Teaching is important work, not to be left to the incompetent. It is not meant to fill file drawers with official statistics. It is meant to fill young human minds with the absolute glory of the human ability to think.

Personally, I am not in a panic about the "education crisis." The few who actually change the world with their dreams and gadgets are certainly present in greater abundance than ever. Not even the ninnies with the cruelest systems of oppression have been able to kill them off. (Good thing for the ninnies! They'd starve without the elite.)

But I am also an unabashed sentimentalist when it comes to my neighbors and their kids. For purely selfish satisfaction, I'd prefer to have them as bright as could be.

And that, to close this sermon, is why I am never again going to dump on teachers as a group just because they teach in government schools. I now know too many who truly, passionately believe in the power of the mind. They believe any child can be helped to develop that power.

They may not be libertarians but they are a significant part of the greatest hope we have for a free society. Sneering at them is as idiotic, in my view, as the thug-ugly stupidity of the Nazi hero who bled to death rather than let a Jew attend his wounds.

Libertarians truly need to think and rethink their relationship and possible influence on the schools (particularly the elementary ones). They know, you know, I know that most of our kids are going to go to government schools. If we start right there, seek out and support the lively teachers who just want to encourage kids to think, we might do a hell of a lot more for liberty than we could in a million fraternal prayer services denouncing the latest libertarian heresy. □

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Exposé

Gordon Gekko, Michael Milken, and Me

by Douglas Casey

Judging by what's been going on in the financial markets recently, there's a lot of confusion on the subject of insider trading. It's getting harder and harder to know what's right and what's wrong. So, to get my philosophical bearings, I naturally turned first to our national repository of wisdom and moral rectitude: the popular media. The media's definitive statement on these matters in recent years—and an accurate reflection of the public's attitude as well—can be found in the 1986 movie *Wall Street*. Let's go to the movies!

Wall Street: The Movie

As you'll recall, the movie chronicles the rise of a young stockbroker named Bud Fox (Charlie Sheen) as he becomes a protege of corporate raider/speculator Gordon Gekko (Michael Douglas), his supposed corruption in the process, and his subsequent "return to grace." On a psychological level it's the story of how a "good guy" (exemplified by Fox's father) and a "bad guy" (Gordon Gekko) vie for moral possession of Bud's soul.

Bud's father—an unintelligent, pigheaded loser of a populist union steward—mentions that the FAA is going to exonerate his employer, Blue Star Airlines, for an accident; he gratuitously allows how he always had believed it was "those greedy cost-cutting" airplane manufacturers who were really to blame. This view provides a good clue to the filmmakers' values. Another is offered when the elder Fox originates: "The only differ-

ence between the Empire State Building and the pyramids is that the Egyptians didn't have unions." Sure. And the only difference between McDonald's and a bread line in the Gulag is the sesame seed buns.

Knowledge of the unannounced FAA decision is valuable to a stock trader, so Bud wangles an appointment with Gekko, using a box of Cuban cigars (which his straight-arrow dad must have liberated with a bribe to a customs inspector) as a door-opener. Bud discloses the Blue Star decision to Gekko, who naturally buys the stock in anticipation, making a bundle. This is presented as an illegal and unethical use of inside information.

Was it illegal? Who knows? The very concept of inside information is undefined and undefinable. The rationale against insider trading is to create a "level trading field" for all players, so no one knows anything before anyone else and there are no "unfair" advantages. Would it have been illegal if Fox had, instead of telling just one person, taken out an ad in *The Wall Street Journal* to inform the world at large? What about those who didn't

read the paper that day; would they have grounds for a lawsuit claiming they were somehow injured because they didn't get to buy? That's up to the whim of some regulator to decide. Shouldn't it also be "inside information" if the few people who hear an official announcement first get to act on it first? What if Gekko just had a definite hunch about the decision and bought Blue Star based on that alone; how could he prove he didn't have illegal data? The concept of inside information is a witch hunter's dream. It's a natural for envy-driven losers, government lawyers, and the like.

Was Gekko's stock purchase ethical? Absolutely, since the information was honestly gained.

Next, Gekko convinces Bud to tail an Australian speculator around town so that he can figure out what stocks the Australian is planning to buy, and buy them first. Bud asks, "That's inside information, isn't it?" before embarking on field research that results in more successful trades. Is it inside information to follow someone around and conjecture what he's likely to buy based on who he visits? I can't see how it could be construed

this way; again, it's information honestly acquired.

Next Bud gains access to a law office, posing as a cleaning man, and copies some files detailing a takeover. Inside information? I don't know. But it certainly is theft. The movie is unable to draw a distinction between detective work and theft. The fact that a theft—a real, common law crime, the

The elder Fox originates: "The only difference between the Empire State Building and the pyramids is that the Egyptians didn't have unions." Sure. And the only difference between McDonald's and a bread line in the Gulag is the sesame seed buns.

only one mentioned in the whole movie—has been committed is never once even mentioned.

A Hero in the Slime

It's hard to keep your attention on the vapid, dishonest little yuppie played by Charlie Sheen. The real focus is on the dynamic Gordon Gekko. He is not a particularly nice guy; he cheats on his wife, is very materialistic, and he doesn't give suckers an even break. And he probably doesn't care where or how Bud gets his information. But do you care where Standard and Poor's gets its data? No. You only care that it's accurate. Gekko encourages Bud to get information that isn't common knowledge; that's what makes for success in many legitimate endeavors. He never encourages Bud to become a criminal.

In fact, Gekko never does anything unethical throughout the whole movie except lie to the union people when he's about to take over Blue Star at the end. Other than that one instance, one can make a case that Gekko is actually a moral hero. Look at the facts, not the nasty patina with which the film paints him: Gekko rewards Bud for doing what appears to be good work; there is always fair exchange.

Gekko's infamous "greed is good" speech at the annual general meeting

of Teldar Paper could have been written by Ayn Rand. Gekko explains how money is congealed life, representing all the good things one ever hopes to have and provide. Love, life and money are all good. And since they're good, so's the desire—the greed—to have as much of them as possible. The episode also illustrates why takeovers are usually a good thing. Gekko points to Teldar's dozens of vice-presidents being paid six figures to shuffle memos and build little satrapies with money that should be divvied out to the shareholders, and Gekko makes it clear that if he wins they'll be fired. He's absolutely right, and his actions throughout the movie can only serve to better the lot of thousands, maybe millions, of people.

Nonetheless, Bud is rightly soured by Gekko's lie about Blue Star and he decides to turn state's evidence on Gekko after being landed upon by the SEC for some of his dealings. Bud wires himself, presumably to get a reduced sentence, and induces Gekko to say compromising things. It's at this point that the only morally unambiguous and satisfying point in the whole movie is made: Gekko, quite correctly, beats the daylights out of the sleazy little creep.

The hateful movie ends with young Bud having completely caved in to the ethical morass personified by his father. He says, "Maybe I can learn how to create, instead of living off the buying and selling of others." Maybe he's planning to retire to a hippie commune to make candles and baskets. Maybe he'd prefer Cuba, where most forms of buying and selling are illegal.

Try defending Gekko sometime, and watch the reaction you get; it's like trying to defend Hitler. People seem to have a very hard time making a distinction between their emotional reaction to a situation and the actual rights and wrongs involved. It's strange how seldom most people analyze moral issues; for many, an act is wrong just because a preacher or an official says it is. They rarely question whether people in positions of authority might have based their judgments on false premises or have a hidden personal agenda. Something is accepted as being wrong simply because everyone assumes it is, and after a while that unchallenged as-

sumption becomes part of the social contract, from top to bottom. This stuff works in funny ways; now "Gordon Gekko" and everything he's supposed to stand for has become a cultural shorthand for all that's wrong with the U.S. financial system.

Ivan Boesky, the greatest inside dealer of the '80s, is a pariah, but not because he wired himself for many months, compromising his closest friends and associates in exchange for a reduced sentence. Rather he is ostracized because he used "inside information" to trade. Whether it was gained honestly or not (probably not, considering the basic character of the man) was never made clear; but that, apparently, was never even an issue.

This kind of thing has major implications for the markets over the long

Robert Freeman was sentenced to four months and a \$1 million fine for being on the other end of a telephone when someone commented "Your bunny has a good nose" in response to his conjectures as to whether a certain buyout would succeed.

run. In that light, it's worth taking an in-depth look at that great real-life villain of the financial community, Michael Milken.

Michael Milken as a Role Model

I presume you're as sick as I am of hearing the press decry the greed that supposedly characterized the '80s. It's not greed if a politically correct Jane Fonda or Bruce Springsteen makes \$50 million in a year, but it is if a stockbroker makes that much. I'm a freedom fighter, you're a rebel, he's a terrorist.

Milken was the object of an intensive government investigation that took hundreds of thousands of man hours and cost many millions of dollars. It became a political issue with a life of its own. Milken had to be punished for something, somehow. After all, we can't have somebody who made

\$500 million in a year live happily ever after, especially if he earned it honestly.

One of the most disappointing elements in this whole melodrama has been Milken's response to the government's Star Chamber methods. He agreed to a \$200 million fine and a \$400 million "contribution" to a fund for the "victims" of his actions, pleaded guilty to six trivial and technical violations, and apologized for being naughty. He has since been sentenced to a ten-year prison term, which may be reduced if he promises to be a good boy and become a witness for the prosecution in the ongoing pogrom against everybody ever associated with Drexel Burnham. Interestingly, four of the six counts to which he pleaded guilty related to the testimony of Ivan Boesky, who's recognized as a practiced, even enthusiastic, liar. The other two counts related to the testimony of one David Solomon, who was granted immunity for turning on his former associates. Whether these felons told the truth, or lied to please the government and save their hides, may never be determined, because there will never be a trial.

But Drexel Burnham, the firm Milken put on the map, didn't get much of a trial either when it was forced to pay a \$650 million fine; Drexel's now out of business because of a lack of capital.

When Milken was first accused, he responded in part by distributing thousands of copies of *The Incredible Bread Machine*, a highly principled defense of the free market. It looked like Milken might take advantage of his situation to play Howard Roark or John Galt to a world-wide audience, exposing his persecutors as the real criminals in the melodrama.

But Milken backed off. Maybe he did so on counsel from his lawyers. Maybe Milken really became convinced what he had done was wrong. Maybe he thought it was wrong all along, and was just in it for the money. Maybe he's never been anything but a sharp bond salesman who can't see any philosophical points in the matter, and couldn't care less about them if he did. Or, maybe, he just figured that battling the government for the rest of his life, using a public defender after they seized all his assets under RICO, just

wouldn't be worth the trouble. It's hard to say what one "should" do in a situation like his. But he certainly conducted himself far more honorably than Dennis Levine, Ivan Boesky, David Solomon, Boyd Jeffries, or many of the others involved.

Milken's troubles illustrate what can happen when you become too successful, too high profile, and the object of political hysteria in *The Age of Envy*.

In a nutshell, Milken and his colleagues, by financing numerous hostile takeovers to the great profit of all concerned, probably did more in a few years to clean up corporate misdealing than all the scores of regulators in history have done. He achieved this while earning a profit, in sharp contrast to the regulators, whose failures were financed by taxpayers forced to pay their salaries.

Inside Information

"Inside information" shouldn't be an issue as long as the information is honestly acquired. The market is a creature of information, and impeding the free flow of information in any way causes distortions. Regulation of "inside information" therefore opens the door to corruption which would not otherwise exist.


You may recall the recent case of Robert Freeman, which is even more of an abortion than that of Michael Milken. Freeman was sentenced to four months and fined \$1 million for being on the other end of a telephone when someone commented "Your bunny has a good nose" in response to his conjectures as to whether a certain buyout would succeed. Apparently, the hyster-

ia has reached a level where it's dangerous to overhear a rumor, whether you repeat it or not; it's dangerous even to form opinions that can't be grounded in a company's annual report. You can never know whether

It's dangerous to overhear rumors, whether you repeat them or not; it's potentially dangerous to even form opinions that can't be grounded in a company's annual report. You never know whether some witchhunting prosecutor will decide to make a hobby out of you.

some witchhunting prosecutor might decide to make a hobby out of you.

The Milken episode is certainly a scandal, but not remotely the way most people think. There's no indication that Milken did anything that in any way injured anyone—with the possible exception of the incompetent managers he fired in the takeovers he financed. Indeed, many of Milken's supposed victims were signatories on the numerous full page ads that appeared in support of him after the indictment. So obscure were the charges against him that Judge Kimba Wood was reduced to using some pretty bizarre logic in trying to explain her ten-year jail term for Milken: "You committed crimes that are hard to detect, and crimes that are hard to detect warrant greater punishment in order to be effective in de-



"He was such a nice kid until he met those businessmen."

tering others from committing them." (One wonders, on the basis of this criterion, what sentence Judge Wood would pass on a very public crime, such as an assassination on national television.)

Insider trading has never cost a shareholder a penny. Other actions taken by insiders have, however, cost shareholders billions. Regardless of the rhetoric, the name of the game in hostile takeovers and proxy battles is always management versus shareholders, and when incompetent manage-

Try defending Gekko sometime, and watch the reaction you get; it's like trying to defend Hitler.

ment is protected, the shareholders are the losers.

Management Versus Shareholders

Few investors—including me, until more recently than I really care to admit—scrutinize a company's management and directors with sufficient diligence. We naturally assume they're working for the best interests of their employers, the shareholders, if only because that's what they're being paid for. They have a legal duty as fiduciaries to always act in the interests of shareholders and to maximize the value of shares. Good management is ten times more important to a company's success than whatever comes second; clearly, when a company does well it's rarely because of dumb luck.

When the people running a company look at the millions or billions of dollars they control, some of them start asking themselves whether they don't "deserve" a little more of the action. Or maybe a lot more. So salaries start rising, there are lots of expense account dinners, the offices get redecorated, and the company buys everyone a country club membership. If management is bold, and the company big enough, arrangements will be made for the company to buy a jet, an executive retreat, and a fleet of BMWs.

Management starts to forget who it's working for, and if the directors

aren't completely independent there's no one to prod its collective memory. Management may decide it's underappreciated by shareholders, who then assume the status of nuisance, and the game is on in earnest. It's as if your housekeeper were to decide she should sleep in the master bedroom, or maybe evict you from the house entirely.

Believe me, I'm only touching lightly on a few of the very most obvious techniques a self-dealing management can use to loot a company. And since management hires the accountants, retains the legal counsel, and writes the news releases and quarterly reports, it takes some real digging just to begin to find out what's going on, much less prove it and put a stop to it.

The interests of management are very often not only different from those of shareholders, but antithetical to them.

Management Buyouts

In larger companies, the top people are often power-seeking "suits" adept mainly at politicking and infighting. They don't create; they schmooze, cajole, flatter, maneuver, and intrigue. They're immortalized in song and story everywhere from "How to Succeed in Business Without Really Trying" to "What Makes Sammy Run." For every Warren Buffet or Boone Pickens, there are a score of Charles Keatings, anti-heroes in the Randian mold. When characters like these see a big pile of money in a corporate till, they stop seeing the shareholders as employers, and view them as part mark and part adversary.

One of the most egregious examples of this is the management buyout of a corporation. Members of management are the only ones who can be expected to know exactly what assets and prospects a company really has, and what they're really worth. When they attempt to do a leveraged buyout, their conflict of interest is omnipresent, since they're on both sides of the transaction, as the buyers and as the supposed representatives of the seller. They have an obligation to

shareholders to realize top dollar, but they're also trying to buy as cheaply as possible. Oftentimes, they try buying the company by borrowing the money from the company, and to add insult to injury, they're on the company's payroll while they're at it.

So what should we do to stop this sort of thing? Most investors would naively say: "That's why we have regulators. The SEC. The government."

The Regulators

The billions of dollars that regulators cost both investors and taxpayers every year serve no useful purpose that I can determine. Trying to get the regulators to expose fraud in a consistent and logical manner appears to be impossible. If management lined the shareholders up against the wall and machine-gunned them, it might be cause for an inquiry, but only if there was a lot of press coverage.

That's because regulators, like all bureaucrats, respond mainly to political pressure. The aggrieved shareholders don't elect them, and are too disparate a group to force them into action. And even if one or more shareholders wanted to press the issue, they'd have to invest 100% of the time and money, for no more benefit than any other shareholder who chose to remain on the sidelines.

Management, however, is usually very well connected, controls the treasury, and can pressure both lawmakers and regulators.

So if the regulators and lawmakers are no help, where will help come from? This is the role of the "takeover artists," the "predators," or the "corporate raiders." Contemporary rhetoric paints them as the bad guys, but they're the true heroes of the story.



"I'm afraid there'll be a delay, sir—your power lunch exploded."

They're the people Mike Milken financed.

The Raider

Raiders keep managements honest by making buyouts when the stock price falls because of mismanagement. The sanctimonious blather issuing from managements about how they're defending "your" corporation from someone who wants to pay above market prices for it is always self-serving.

Most companies subject to takeovers are vulnerable only because their stock price is low relative to their assets, which occurs when their assets are being misallocated, or when the market has no confidence in management. In fact, a company can usually be taken over only if management doesn't own a meaningful amount of stock. Many

Trying to get the regulators to expose fraud in a consistent and logical manner appears to be impossible. If management lined the shareholders up against the wall and machine-gunned them, it might be cause for an inquiry, but only if there was a lot of press coverage.

managers of big corporations own very little stock in them; arguably, that's because they can see it's a poor long term investment.

The raider's major weapon is the proxy contest, in which a dissident slate of directors endeavors to show other shareholders why they should "throw the bums out." Most proxy documents are written in legalese; reading them is not easy, but it is usually re-

warding. Most shareholders, however, are either too ignorant or too apathetic to go to this trouble.

The much-maligned raiders and hostile takeover artists are almost always the good guys. It's a pity shareholders nearly invariably vote in favor of management; they usually should vote against them when there's an alternative slate.

"Parking" Stock

Parking stock is the practice of buying stock in another's name to conceal who the beneficial owner really is. It's done mainly to avoid alerting management that a stock is under accumulation for a takeover. A reasonable person might ask how that's any different from keeping one's hand hidden in a card game. Certainly it doesn't harm any existing shareholders, since they are under no obligation to sell their stock, which is probably going up anyway because of the added buying pressure. Then why is parking "wrong"? It's wrong because of the Williams Act of 1967, which states that once any group acting in concert accumulates more than 5% of a company's stock, it must halt buying and alert management of its intentions. This gives the officers and directors time to arrange for a "poison pill" to preclude shareholders from getting the higher-than-market price the outsiders would be willing to pay after buying as much stock as possible quietly. The Williams whose name this act bears is, incidentally, the same corrupt senator who later did time for bribery in the Abscam affair.

Parking is another artificial non-crime created by the establishment to safeguard itself.

The Bottom Line

Laws and regulations create distortions, and the opportunity for corrup-

tion. And the laws being passed making hostile takeovers impractical will go a long way towards destroying this country's capital markets. The entire byzantine system of securities regulation has

If the regulators and lawmakers are not only not a help, but actually a detriment to the shareholder, where will help come from? This is the market function of the "takeover artist," the "predator," the "corporate raider." Contemporary rhetoric paints them as the bad guys, but they're the true heroes. They're the people Mike Milken financed.

become nothing more than a method of duplicating, in the private sector, the incumbent-protections system which has made it virtually impossible to oust a member of Congress. There is reason to believe that this will produce the same quality of person in the nation's boardroom that we presently see in public office. I for one do not find this prospect encouraging. The corporate raiders could help the nation to recover from this mess, but only if the markets are allowed to function without interference, and only if they can go about their business with a reasonable expectation that their activities won't make them into outlaws. But with Milken on his way to a decade-long stay in the big house, it is likely that his successors will choose to tread lightly. That's especially ominous at the end of one of the longest booms in history. □

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Essay

Rothbard's Libertarianism

by *Chris M. Sciabarra*

What do socialists, conservatives, Hayekians and Objectivists have in common? Well, one thing they share is their opinion of Murray N. Rothbard's thinking.

Murray Rothbard's libertarianism has inspired critical commentary from many different perspectives. Socialists, conservatives, Hayekians, and Randians have derided the Rothbardian version of libertarianism and its seemingly abstract designs for social change. Each of these critiques

has drawn attention to a problematic distinction within Rothbard's theory, one that defines a universal ethos of non-aggression apart from culture and history, psychology and ethics. By taking into account the similarly constituted criticisms of each of these schools of thought, Rothbardians may be faced with the task of redefining the scope and meaning of their ultimate political goals.

Rothbard's impact upon the modern libertarian intellectual movement has been so profound that it is difficult to assess libertarianism as a political philosophy without taking into account his enormous contributions. One of Rothbard's most decisive contributions to libertarian thought has been his conception of libertarianism as a political project that can incorporate a diversity of voluntarist social institutions. For Rothbard, a voluntarist society sanctions a plethora of alternative lifestyles; communities may be collectivistic or individualistic, religious or secular, segregated or integrated. Robert Nozick, in much the same vein, has called this a "framework for utopia" in which "people are at liberty to join together voluntarily to pursue and attempt to realize their own vision of the good life in the ideal communi-

ty but where no one can impose his own utopian vision upon others."¹

For Murray Rothbard, libertarianism is a political philosophy, not a philosophy of life. It rests on one essential axiom: non-aggression. It views force as legitimate only as a response to initiatory violence. This ethos does not imply any specific "meta-libertarian" philosophical foundation. Walter Block, in true Rothbardian fashion, suggests that libertarianism may be justified by egoism, hedonism, Kantianism, common law, pragmatism, natural rights, utilitarianism, agnosticism, objectivism, and Judeo-Christianity. For Block, as for Rothbard, philosophical diversity is a source of libertarian intellectual vitality.²

But the Rothbardian vision embraces an illusive value-neutrality which, when stretched to its logical limits, may undermine the stability of a libertarian society. For example, Walter Block has argued that libertarianism is compatible with all philosophies of life, including Nazism. For Block, the evil of Nazism is not its "weird and exotic" world-view, but its dependence upon coercion as a social

panacea. Block argues, somewhat facetiously, that in a libertarian society, Jews could be put in Nazi concentration camps, as long as they go voluntarily.³ Though Block has embraced a consistent Rothbardian position, he seems to violate the spirit of the libertarian society. Rothbard's libertarianism uplifts the human imagination because it seeks to transcend coercion as a social relation, not because it implores the victims to walk "voluntarily" into the gas chambers.

And yet, Rothbard's "framework for utopia" abstracts the voluntarist ethic from culture and history, psychology and personal morality. His philosophy upholds freedom while it seems to ignore the wider context within which freedom flourishes and upon which it may genetically depend. Objectivists, socialists, conservatives and Hayekians have each criticized this kind of non-contextual political goal.

Rand versus Rothbard

Ayn Rand's influence on Murray Rothbard has been vastly underestimated. Perhaps because of deep sectarianism in libertarian political

circles, Rothbard has rarely acknowledged Rand as an intellectual forebear. His condemnation of the "Ayn Rand Cult" indicates his great disdain for the Randian movement.⁴ Yet, Rothbard owes a huge philosophical debt to Rand. He is quoted by one of Rand's biographers as saying that he is "in agreement basically with all her philosophy"; the biographer goes on to state that "it was she who convinced him of the theory of natural rights that his books uphold."⁵ However, the broader dimensions of Rand's objectivist philosophy separate it decisively from the Rothbardian schema. Our discussion will illustrate the essence of the Randian critique.

Murray Rothbard argues that "in a free society, no man would be permitted (or none would permit himself) to invade the property of another."⁶ The Randian is obligated to ask, "Why?" Why would a man not permit himself to invade the property of another? The answer for Rand depends upon a huge philosophical (i.e., ethical and psycho-epistemological) edifice whose final prescription is non-aggression. "Non-aggression" is not an axiom in Rand's framework.

By contrast, Rothbard proposes an "axiom" of non-aggression that is allegedly value-neutral. Men may adopt any personal values they so choose, as long as they do not attempt to force their own conception of morality upon the social whole. Rothbard's praxeological methodology suggests, further, that he has endorsed a very narrow conception of "rationality" in human action. Praxeology defines "means" as broadly "rational," without passing judgment on the "rationality" of people's goals. For Rothbard, praxeological insight is wedded to libertarian ethos. Both praxeology and the non-aggression "axiom" sanction the rational character of human action, while abstracting it from the particular value-context within which such action is expressed.

Rothbard does not deny the possibility for a rational morality, but he argues that it is irrelevant to politics and to libertarianism.⁷ "Libertarianism is an intellectual ideology," he emphasizes, and it "will get nowhere until we realize that there is and can be no li-

bertarian' culture."⁸ Rothbard seeks to apply the libertarian ethos to a variety of cultural contexts, and to show that libertarianism is consistent with a diversity of moral positions—egoism, altruism, utilitarianism, amoralism—provided that the people who hold these positions do not use a coercive means of implementing them. But this is a huge proviso. It may be that a libertarian ethos is not sustainable without specific personal and psychological convictions, cultural values or historical circumstances. Indeed, Rothbard's critique of "antimarket ethics" suggests that a libertarian society cannot be sustained if "altruistic humanitarianism" becomes a pretext for authoritarian social relationships.

In his praxeological critique of "antimarket ethics," Rothbard attempts to discredit certain ethical positions that he characterizes as "counterproductive," or based on existential errors and logical inconsistencies. According to Rothbard, any goal impossible of attainment should be abandoned.⁹ "Altruism," a normative concept frequently derided by Ayn Rand, receives a similar treatment in Rothbard's works. When a person acts as his brother's keeper, he is made responsible for his brother's actions in every sphere of human existence. This suggests that the "humanitarian" is given power over his brothers as he compels them to follow a certain course of action. "Altruism" becomes a legitimation for authoritarianism.¹⁰ Such authoritarianism is deeply incompatible with the spirit, if not the letter, of the Libertarian Law Code that Rothbard defends so vigorously.

Thus, Rothbard seems to suggest that certain ethical positions may subvert the libertarian framework which he advocates. This implies that libertarianism itself may require a specific meta-libertarian context, in contradiction to Rothbard's assertion that libertarianism is consistent with a variety of moral and cultural values.

By contrast, Rand argues that the free society will not survive in the absence of important moral, cultural, and psycho-epistemological preconditions. For Rand, any distinction between the personal and the political is self-defeating. The achievement of a truly

free society is the outgrowth of a specific code of moral action, one that does not sever reason from ethics, or freely-chosen ethics from a rational, social existence. Hence, the Randian position opposes all acts of even "non-coercive" irrationality, such as racism or drug-using, even though it recognizes people's rights to engage in them.¹¹

The Randian philosophy suggests that the narrow parameters of libertarianism obscure the broadly operative

Perhaps because of deep sectarianism in libertarian political circles, Rothbard has rarely acknowledged Ayn Rand as an intellectual forebear.

hegemonic principles in social reality. Robert Nisbet suspects that a focus on these principles may lead to a developing opposition within libertarian theory to the "coercions of family, church, local community and school," all of which might be viewed as being "as inimical to freedom as those of the political government."¹² Rand's philosophy attempts to develop this kind of focus.¹³ It implores libertarians to concentrate on those "altruist-collectivist-mysticist" premises that underlie so many aspects of culture—including family and sexual relations, state, religious, and educational institutions, art, literature, and music.

Thus, the Randian critique draws attention to a profound distinction in Rothbard's theory between an abstract notion of liberty and the context within which it is expressed. In this regard, Rand's insights have a strong affinity with socialist, conservative, and Hayekian critiques of libertarianism.

Critics On The Left

The relationship of the Left to Rothbardian theory is ambiguous. Rothbard argues that historically, the Left has advocated statist means for achieving progressive political ends. Despite Rothbard's opposition to socialism, it is clear that he owes a significant intellectual debt to the Left. Rothbard's power as a critical thinker derives from his unique synthesis of

many disparate strands of social thought. His Austrian economics is wedded to New Left historical revisionism. His natural rights philosophy is conjoined with anarchist class analysis. Politically, he has joined with the Left in condemning government encroachment of civil liberties at home and U.S. military interventionism abroad.

It is not surprising, then, that the Left has focused specifically on the contributions of Rothbard in its developing critique of libertarian theory. Stephen L. Newman writes that Rothbard's theoretical schema resembles an inverse Marxism.¹⁴ However, inherent in libertarianism is a call for the abolition of politics as a solution to the crisis of public authority. Rothbard's libertarianism qualifies as a "form of anti-politics" and is "not a response to crisis—but a symptom of it." The anarchist solution, in particular, rips Locke out of his historical context and tries to institute a state of nature which amounts to a political *tabula rasa*. Roth-

need for genuine community.¹⁶

Of course, Rothbard's libertarianism does not aim to abolish "politics." It hopes to reconstruct the social polity by abolishing the state, which Rothbard views as an ideologically legitimated form of institutionalized violence. In its place, Rothbard envisions a society that embraces voluntary cooperation and interaction as its *modus operandi*. Yet, the Left does not merely criticize Rothbard for seeking to abolish politics; Rothbard is criticized because he abstracts a political solution from its broader context.

Predictably, the Left condemns Rothbard for his dependence upon voluntarist, "bourgeois" presuppositions. David Wieck denounces Rothbard's "severely individualistic conception of human being" and believes that "anarcho-capitalism" will lead to a judicial and legal domain dominated by the most wealthy. Mark Paul has called it a "rich man's anarchy."¹⁷ This is essentially the same criticism leveled by Ronald Krieger. Krieger calls Murray Rothbard "the outstanding individualist utopian." He argues that in Rothbard's anarchy, the wealthy will rule like feudal barons, with their private para-military troops, mercenaries and vigilantes.¹⁸

However, the Leftist critique is not based solely on its disdain for capitalist institutions. Hal Draper suggests that "right-wing anarchism" is merely the laissez-faire "illusion" transmuted into a one-sided ideology.¹⁹ Similarly, David Wieck argues that Rothbard:

writes of society as though some part of it (government) can be extracted and replaced by another arrangement while other things go on as before, and he constructs a system of police and judicial power without any consideration of the influence of historical and economic context . . . Rothbard has pulled forth a single thread, the thread of individualism . . . [from which he] manufactures one more bourgeois ideology.²⁰

Thus, Wieck suggests that libertarianism creates a radical distinction between abstract principles of non-aggression and their historical and cultural context. Wieck, writing in the Marxist tradition, understands that capitalism is a social system that depends upon a huge constellation of his-

torical, cultural, economic and ideological forces. Marx may have been critical of bourgeois institutions, but he acknowledged their pervasive and revolutionary quality. The emergent principles of trade had a profound ef-

Rothbard's libertarianism requires a widespread and passionate commitment to non-aggression. To accept the non-aggression "axiom" is to accept a revolutionary change in each aspect of our lives.

fect on all aspects of social interaction—from political economy to sexual relationships. In a provocative convergence with the Randian critique, Marxists sense that Rothbard's "framework for utopia" is a one-dimensional construction abstracted from those historical, cultural and social conditions that give it existential meaning.

Critics On The Right

It is ironic that conservatives have been deeply critical of libertarianism, especially since there has been an attempt to depict libertarians as their "uneasy cousins."²¹ Yet, the profound differences between conservative and libertarian philosophy are not illustrative of a spat between blood relatives. Traditional conservatism grows out of the Burkean response to the French revolution. For Edmund Burke, the excesses of the French revolution constituted a dangerous threat to civilized humanity. The revolutionaries, in their demands for the "rights of man," proposed a rationalist design for a new society that neglected man's religious passions, habits and traditions. Rights are of little consequence, claimed Burke, when severed from the context of political and social continuity, essential prerequisites for the establishment of any social order.²²

The modern conservative reaction against Rothbardian libertarianism mirrors the Burkean critique. Ernest van den Haag, writing for *National Review*, believes that the libertarians are "beguilingly simple" in their prescrip-

Rothbard's power as a critical thinker derives from his unique synthesis of many disparate strands of social thought. His Austrian economics is wedded to New Left historical revisionism. His natural rights philosophy is conjoined with anarchist class analysis.

bardian analysis becomes mere reification as his theories stand outside history. In the process, "libertarianism aims at nothing short of the privatization of social existence," neglecting the notion of politics as collective purpose.¹⁵

This identification of anarchism with "depoliticization" is a hallmark of Marxist critique. The anarchists, according to Karl Marx, planned to transcend "alienated politics" by abolishing politics altogether. The solution, for Marx, was not "further depoliticization, but only repoliticization of the required type," one that concretized the

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tions for social change. They are opposed to tradition, says van den Haag, and are hoping "to invent a social organization based not on history but on their rationalist principles."²³ Libertarians "have a tendency . . . to reduce life to economics, denying that it has any aspects which should not be left to the free market."²⁴ Their social philosophy is a "belated offspring of the eighteenth century Enlightenment, of rationalism in its most virulent form." Indeed, states van den Haag, the liber-

The voluntarist society cannot be actualized by merely ordering people to live and let live. It will take more than a Libertarian Law Code to convince a fanatical Islamic fundamentalist that Salman Rushdie has a right to life.

tarian society is "wholly utopian (the word means 'no-where')." And though "utopia cannot be achieved . . . the destruction of an existing society may be. And it is quite likely to be succeeded by a worse one."²⁵

Van den Haag ridicules Rothbard's positions on externalities, proportional punishment, and the Cold War. But at root, his attack on Rothbardian theory is based on the principle that "we are human qua social," and that our socialization provides us with shared values which are essential to the fabric of the social order. Libertarianism dissents from these values and "from history" itself.

Russell Kirk presents a similar critique of libertarianism. With a decidedly insulting tone, he characterizes libertarianism as "a simplistic ideology" that is radically doctrinaire and contemptuous of tradition and custom.²⁶ Kirk argues that libertarians "seek an abstract Liberty that never has existed in any civilization—nor, for that matter, among any barbarous people, or any savage."²⁷ Libertarianism disregards moral habits, social customs, history, and common sense. By giving primacy to "an absolute and indefinable 'liberty,'" the libertarians have

paved the way for "a Utopia of individualism."²⁸ Kirk accuses libertarians of being "metaphysically mad" because they "mistake our ephemeral existence as individuals for the be-all and end-all."²⁹ Of course, Kirk embraces a few "metaphysical" concepts of his own, when he writes that libertarians have ignored the dictates of Original Sin, Duty, Discipline and Sacrifice. But Kirk's essential argument is Hayekian in its implications. Allying himself with Hayek, he claims that the moral order is an outgrowth of "a long and painful social experience," of custom, habit and tested institutions. Libertarians would dispose of this historical legacy, and rule society "by a single abstract principle."³⁰

Though Hayek's approach goes beyond traditional conservatism, it contributes a significant epistemological dimension to the conservative critique. Hayek denies validity to an abstract, universalized, trans-historical conception of natural rights. No human being is in a position to gain such a transcendental view of the world and to construct principles that could be universally appropriate for all contexts. This is an example of what Hayek calls a "synoptic delusion."³¹ The constructivist thinker attempts to design (or "construct") social institutions as if he were outside the context of history, using the infinite powers of his Reason ("with a capital R," as Hayek would say). "Constructivism" is the "fatal conceit," endangering the future of wealth, morals and peace.³²

The Hayekian attack on constructivist rationalism has been used by libertarians and classical liberals in their critique of socialist planning. Yet, Hayek's insights are equally applicable to the Rothbardian framework that aims for a social order based on the axiom of non-aggression. The Hayekian and conservative critiques suggest that Rothbard has created a radical distinction between the normative principle of non-aggression and the cultural and historical conditions that it ignores. These conditions are essential because they provide the context within which all social rules gain specificity. Disregarding context, Rothbard has embraced an ethos that is

highly abstract and, ultimately, meaningless.

Convergent Criticism

So far, I have examined several major criticisms of Rothbard's libertarianism. Randians, socialists, conservatives, and Hayekians argue that Rothbardian libertarianism abstracts an "axiomatic" principle from its broader context. Randian critics claim that Rothbard's framework is inadequate because it is genetically dependent upon broader notions of personal morality, human psychology and culture. Socialists and conservatives argue that Rothbard has isolated a single principle from social reality upon which he has constructed an abstract, ahistorical "framework for utopia." Finally, the Hayekian critique suggests that this abstraction perpetuates a constructivist strategy for social change.

The convergence of Randian, conservative and socialist critique is not a theoretical coincidence. Each of these critiques views Rothbard's libertarian-

Libertarianism requires a systemic change, a transformation not only of current social structures, but in the ways in which people think and act. The crucial question is how any libertarian values could come to predominate in a culture that is hostile to the voluntarist ethos.

ism as a fractured philosophy. Objectivism, socialism, and conservatism have a wider theoretical scope. By contrast, Rothbard's perspective suggests that a narrow adherence to a singular, abstract ethos of non-aggression will generate a respect for the multifariousness of the human condition. In fact, Rothbard opposes wider, totalistic philosophies because these often depend upon a doctrinaire view of the Good Life. Rothbard has argued that socialists, conservatives and objectivists have each shown a profound intolerance of alternative value frameworks.

Socialists and conservatives, in particular, have always shared a devotion to coercive and statist means for achieving their political ends.³³ And though objectivists renounce statism, their "cult" has thrived on purges, stultifying dogmatism and intellectual conformity.³⁴ Perhaps each of these schools of thought is intrinsically opposed to any framework that eschews a singular philosophy of life.

By narrowing his focus, Rothbard claims to have constructed a framework that does not depend upon the emergence of Libertarian Man. The libertarian ideal derives its strength from human diversity. And yet, it is apparent that Rothbard's society will not tolerate any moral ambiguity in the area of inter-personal human relationships. Libertarianism requires a widespread and passionate commitment to non-aggression as a way of life. But Rothbard has underemphasized those factors that may predispose human beings to accept voluntarism. He creates a Universal Libertarian Law Code without defining a more extensive system of values that may nourish and enrich the singular truth of libertarian politics.

The central problem, however, is not in defining that particular system of values. The most crucial question is how any libertarian or quasi-libertarian values could come to predominate in a culture that is hostile to the voluntarist ethos. This hostility is inevitable in contemporary, "hegemonic" culture. Rothbard argues that society is a complex mixture of market and hegemonic principles. It is the hegemonic principle that breeds coercion, exploitation, and the war of all against all.³⁵ It undermines the realization of the voluntarist ideal by corrupting people on a psychological level.

Rothbard believes that from a "praxeological" standpoint, the market economy is the only stable system. But "psychologically, the issue is in doubt . . . [T]hose who yearn for power over their fellows, or who wish to plunder others, as well as those who fail to comprehend the praxeological stability of the free market, may well push the society back on the hegemonic road."³⁶ By recognizing the

destabilizing "psychological" dynamics of the market economy, Rothbard suggests that the libertarian society needs far more than a Law Code to sustain itself. At the very least, the Law's efficacy will depend upon a deeper understanding of why people yearn for power over their fellows, and how such power-lust can be transcended.

Libertarianism requires a systemic change, a transformation not only of current social structures, but in the ways in which people think and act. Each of us has, to a certain degree, internalized character traits which reinforce and reproduce the political coercions which subjugate us. To accept the non-aggression "axiom" is to accept a revolutionary change in each aspect of our lives. This profoundly human achievement could not be sustained in the absence of broader social, historical, cultural, psychological and ethical foundations.

It is here that a more comprehensive understanding of the hegemonic principle is decisive, because it compels libertarians to focus on the wider context. Ironically, it was the Italian Marxist, Antonio Gramsci, who once argued that true radical change could not emerge unless the voluntarist institutions of civil society were universalized. In essence, Gramsci claimed that the voluntarist sphere had to absorb the political sphere, making the use of coercion superfluous.³⁷ Gramsci's concept of hegemony identified power structures in each of society's institutions, including religion, education, family, law, communication, culture, political parties, and trade unions. For Gramsci, hegemonic power had to be fought in each of its manifestations. The new society is made possible only through the development of a "counter-hegemony . . . within the womb of the old society."³⁸

Gramsci's conception of the insidious nature of the hegemonic principle has important implications for libertarianism. It suggests that the voluntarist society cannot be actualized by merely ordering people to live and let live. It will take more than a Libertarian Law Code to convince a fanatical Islamic fundamentalist that Salman

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
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Rushdie has a right to life. Like Gramsci, libertarians need to think "dialectically"—that is, they must understand that a society is a complex, sophisticated, inter-relationship of human actors, social institutions, structures, and processes. Each society is a self-perpetuating system, in which each of its constituent elements expresses the whole, and reproduces its distortions.

By focusing almost exclusively on an axiomatic deduction of principles, Rothbardians obscure the broader "hegemonic" socio-historical and psycho-cultural context.

The critics challenge Rothbard to embrace a greater appreciation of this context. Rothbard's framework attempts to alter the principles by which human beings interact, without taking

into account the real, concrete conditions that shape human action. If changing the totality of social existence is inconceivable, then changing social existence in disregard of the totality is unimaginable. Rothbard's libertarianism uplifts our sense of human possibility only if it incorporates a more comprehensive understanding of its own preconditions. □

Notes

1. Robert Nozick, *Anarchy, State and Utopia* (New York: Basic Books, 1974), p. 312.
2. Walter Block, *Libertarianism vs. Objectivism: A Response to Peter Schwartz* (New York: Laissez-Faire Books, 1987), audio tape lecture.
3. *Ibid.*
4. Rothbard, *The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult* (Port Townsend, Wash.: Liberty Publishing, 1987).
5. Barbara Branden, *The Passion of Ayn Rand* (Garden City, New York: Doubleday and Company, 1986), p. 413.
6. Rothbard, *The Ethics of Liberty* (Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1982), p. 41.
7. Rothbard, "Viewpoint: is liberty enough?" *Reason* 11, no. 8 (December 1979), p. 58.
8. Rothbard, "Left-opportunism: the case of S.L.S., part one," *Libertarian Vanguard* 2, no. 5 (February-March 1981), p. 11.
9. Rothbard, *Power and Market: Government and the Economy* (Kansas City: Sheed Andrews and McMeel, [1970] 1977), p. 203.
10. Rothbard, *Conceived in Liberty, Volume Two: "Salutary Neglect": The American Colonies in the First Half of the Eighteenth Century* (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House Publishers, 1975), p. 110.
11. Peter Schwartz, *Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty* (New York: The Intellectual Activist), p. 56. Not all libertarians reject this view. Some, like Tibor Machan and John Hospers, embrace the more comprehensive dimensions of Rand's philosophy.
12. Robert Nisbet, "Conservatives and Libertarians: Uneasy Cousins," *Modern Age* 24, no. 1 (Winter 1980), p. 7.
13. For a look at how Ayn Rand's philosophy develops a systemic critique, see my article, "Ayn Rand's Critique of Ideology," *Reason Papers* No. 14 (Spring 1989) 34-47.
14. Peter Schwartz, the objectivist, has commented similarly that libertarian anarchism is "simply a right-wing version of Marx's economic determinism." See Schwartz, pp. 20-21.
15. Stephen L. Newman, *Liberalism at Wits' End: The Libertarian Revolt Against the Modern State* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1984), pp. 49, 163-164.
16. Paul Thomas, *Karl Marx and the Anarchists* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 350.
17. Mark Paul, "Seducing the Left: The Third Party that Wants You," *Mother Jones* 5, no. 4 (May, 1980), p. 48.
18. Ronald A. Krieger, "The Economics of Utopia," *Utopia: The American Experience*, eds. G.B. Moment and Otto F. Kraushaar, (Metuchen, N.J.: Scarecrow Press, 1980), pp. 199-203.
19. Hal Draper, *Karl Marx's Theory of Revolution, Volume 1: State and Bureaucracy* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1977), p. 260.
20. David Wieck, "Anarchist Justice," *Anarchism (Nomos XIX)*, eds. J. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, (New York: New York University Press, 1978), pp. 227-228.
21. Nisbet, *op. cit.*
22. Edmund Burke, *Reflections on the Revolution in France* reprint ed., Thomas H.D. Mahoney, (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, [1790] 1955), p. 29.
23. Ernest van den Haag, "Libertarians and conservatives," *National Review* 8 (June 1979), p. 726.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 726n.
25. *Ibid.*, p. 727.
26. Russell Kirk, "A Dispassionate Assessment of Libertarians," *The Heritage Lectures* 158 (Washington, D.C.: The Heritage Foundation, 1988), p. 2.
27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
28. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 6.
30. *Ibid.*, p. 7-8.
31. Friedrich Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 1: Rules and Order* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1973), p. 14.
32. Hayek, *Law, Legislation and Liberty, Volume 3: The Political Order of a Free People* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981), p. 129.
33. Rothbard, *For a New Liberty: The Libertarian Manifesto*, revised edition (New York: Collier Books, 1978), p. 13. Rothbard's recent overtures to the "paleoconservatives" (see Rothbard, "Libertarians, 'Paleoconservatives,' Explore 'Ideological Alliance,'" *The Pragmatist* [February 1990]: 2-3) do not obscure the fact that he still accepts a radical distinction between libertarian principles and context. This distinction is made explicit even in his recent articles in *Liberty* which have explored the significance of religion (see for example, "Kingdom Come," January 1990 and "The End of the Secular Century," May 1989). In recognizing that it is "no longer . . . possible to ignore the importance of religion in human life and culture," Rothbard implores "secularist libertarians" to give up the battle against mysticism, and to focus exclusively on the cause of liberty. Rothbard's recognition of the world's cultural and religious diversity does not provide him with a holistic strategy for social change; it merely bolsters his conviction that libertarianism must abstain from cultural questions.
34. Rothbard, *The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult*, *op. cit.*
35. Rothbard, *Power and Market*, p. 263.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 264.
37. Norberto Bobbio, "Gramsci and the Conception of Civil Society," in *Gramsci and Marxist Theory*, ed. by Chantal Mouffe (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1979), p. 41.
38. Antonio Gramsci, *Selections from the Prison Notebooks of Antonio Gramsci*, ed. and trans. by Q. Hoare and G.N. Smith, (New York: International Publishers, 1971), p. 432.

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Profile

A Master of Black Dots and Strange Timbres

by Richard Kostelanetz

"The East is East and the West is West." Composer Lou Harrison is both.

"My feeling is that Lou Harrison is one of a handful of the most important living American musicians," the conductor Dennis Russell Davies told me recently, explaining why he premiered Harrison's Fourth (and Last) Symphony with the Brooklyn Philharmonic Orchestra at the Brooklyn Academy of Music in late October. In his home in Aptos, California, Harrison recalls, "The idea for this new work arose in a taxi crossing Miami two years ago. Having just conducted my Third Symphony (1982) which he commissioned, Dennis asked me if I might start thinking of another symphony for him. I didn't know whether I had another symphony in my head." A formal commission from the Brooklyn Academy of Music, on behalf of the Brooklyn Philharmonic, helped overcome his doubts.

Though Harrison's work is not played in New York as often as it should be, he has long been regarded as a major American musical figure, not only as a composer but as a critic and editor. Born May 14, 1917, in Portland, Oregon, the son of a businessman, he went to high school in the Bay Area and then began San Francisco State College. As a child, he had taken both dance lessons and music lessons, and had performed in plays. As a young adult, he studied French horn, clarinet, harpsichord, recorder, and percussion instruments; he studied privately with the composer Henry Cowell (1897-1965). At the same time Harrison befriended John Cage, a Californian only a few years older than

himself; and the two share libertarian anarchist politics to this day.

Having already established himself as an accompanist for modern dancers, Harrison was hired by Mills College before he turned twenty, incidentally dropping out of college. Declared 4-F as a homosexual, he spent 1941-1942 in Los Angeles, working for the choreographer Lester Horton and studying with Arnold Schönberg, the Viennese composer who had emigrated there a few years before.

In 1943, Harrison moved to New York, where he met the composer Virgil Thomson, who introduced him to the idea of writing for a living. Thomson was the music critic for the New York *Herald Tribune*, and preferred on principle to hire composers as reviewers. Not long afterwards, Harrison replaced Paul Bowles, who was then a composer and not yet a novelist. Harrison also contributed reviews, profiles and previews to other magazines. In the judgment of Brooklyn College musicologist Carol Oja, "Lou's criticism of the 1940s, while small in quantity, was large in impact, spearheading the recognition

of Ives, Ruggles, Varése and other then-forgotten modernists of an earlier generation."

Back in 1937, urged by Cowell to write the composer Charles Ives, then better known as a retired insurance salesman, Harrison had received a crate of photostats. He "lived with this material for a decade," as he puts it, preparing definitive scores for publication and performance, premiering certain pieces himself, and even writing missing sections for Ives's approval.

Only once did he actually meet Ives, who was customarily portrayed as too ill to accept visitors. "I went to his brownstone in New York City. Walking up the stairs I encountered Mr. Ives whirling a cane; I had to duck. His voice boomed, 'My old friend, my old friend,' even though I'd never met him before in my life!"

After suffering a nervous breakdown in the late 1940s, Harrison left New York, for which he still has distaste, and moved initially to North Carolina, where he taught at Black Mountain College for a year and then stayed another year on the first of two Guggenheim Fellowships. By 1954, he had moved back to the West Coast,

eventually settling in Aptos, a sunny hamlet just east of Santa Cruz, some ninety minutes south of San Francisco.

For many years he lived by his wits, working at times as a forest fire-fighter and even as a veterinary nurse

"I went to Charles Ives' brownstone in New York City. Walking up the stairs I encountered him whirling a cane; I had to duck. His voice boomed, 'My old friend, my old friend,' even though I'd never met him before in my life!"

in an animal hospital. "It was the only other job in which you could caress the customers all day," he jokes. He earned royalties on certain Charles Ives compositions, but not until the 1960s did these amount to much. (And then, according to stipulations in Ives's will, some were reassigned to the American Academy of Arts and Letters.) Harrison received occasional awards to compose and travel.

His fiftieth year, 1967, was a turning point. He met William Colvig, a man his own age who was then working as an electrician in the San Francisco Opera House; the two have lived together ever since. Harrison also began to teach at the universities, beginning with San Jose State from 1967 to 1980, with occasional forays to the University of Southern California and Cabrillo Community College in his home town. In 1980 he was awarded the Milhaud Chair of Music at Mills College, continuing to teach there until his retirement in 1985.

Though Harrison and Colvig do not share a political philosophy—Colvig is pretty much a socialist, while Harrison is a libertarian (yes, they argue all the time)—they do share a compound at the top of a hill, a few miles up from the Pacific Ocean. Behind its high wooden fence is a sun-drenched ranch house with a high-ceilinged studio (called "The Ives Room") a modest trailer that serves as the composer's workroom, a platform

that doubles as either a performance stage or, when screened, a crash pad, prosperous gardens growing food they eat, and Colvig's shack full of tools and scrap wood.

During the 1989 California earthquake—its epicenter was only two miles away—their home almost *became* scrap wood. On October 17, Harrison was sitting in a favorite living-room chair at 5:07 in the afternoon. "It hit without any warning whatsoever. I've been in a lot of earthquakes," he explains, as a veteran Californian, "and normally there's a rumble or some unsteadiness. Here there was nothing. It hit like a sledgehammer. The whole house exploded. Walls splintered. All the walls were shaking in different directions. The cracking, the crushing, the noise—it was terrible. I tried to get out and thought the door would be stuck, because the whole building was moving. Oh, it was terrible. And Bill wasn't here."

After explaining how he pulled open the door as the wall returned to an appropriate angle, he continues, "We couldn't get back into the house for several days. The kitchen was barricaded. There was glass all over. Besides, the thing was quaking all the time. Not too many months ago, I had a dream in which it happened all over again, and this time the house did disintegrate. Had it gone on for more than 17 seconds, as it did, the whole house would have disintegrated."

An ebullient bearded man, with a healthy resemblance to Orson Welles, Harrison identifies strongly with the West Coast in general and the Bay Area in particular—in spite of the earthquakes. The California license plate on his geriatric Mercedes reads "COMPOSRI," which might be immodest, were it not true. He thinks of West Coast music as profoundly different from East. "We don't feel we must torment ourselves or others, and are not afraid if our music sounds well. We're not afraid of new tunings." He is a successor to two California composers—not only to Cowell, who, as Harrison puts it, "as a twentieth century person didn't want to limit himself to one musical tradition," but also to Harry Partch (1901–1974), a true American eccentric who also explored

alternative scales. This accounts for Harrison's long advocacy of "just intonation," which he equates with "truly tuned."

With typical precision his colleague John Cage says, "Now that he's older, his music is more devoted to what we would call, with all of its meanings, a music of the Pacific." Harrison acknowledges the influence of "Korean classic court music, Chinese late chamber music, Javanese court and folk music of which I know three traditions—Cirebon, Central Javanese and Sundanese . . . not 'Sudanese,' which is African." He houses a rich collection of instruments in the Ives room; and those he has not been able to buy Bill and Lou have made themselves, including the complete set of several dozen percussion instruments comprising the gamelan.

To fulfill the Brooklyn commission, Harrison turned first to "unused parts" of music written for the Erick Hawkins ballet *New Moon* (1989). "They were of a different kind from what the ballet needed, but since they felt wonderfully symphonic, I used them here." They became the new symphony's first movement. Not unlike J. S. Bach, Harrison draws frequently upon earlier

The California license plate on his geriatric Mercedes reads "COMPOSRI," which might be immodest, were it not true.

works. For the second movement, he drew upon an earlier gamelan composition for four Native-American coyote stories, using only three of them for his second movement. "In both these movements, all the compositional procedures are lifted directly from Javanese gamelan. In the first movement, those techniques are used in a chromatic context, and they work. I have long maintained that the procedures of Javanese gamelan are what we used to call universal." That accounts for why all the instruments in the piece will be Western, except for three—a bell tree, a big gong, and a very large woodblockish instrument.

continued on page 66

Warning

The Bonfire of the Subsidies

by Michael S. Christian

The spread of monolithic states, with their ability to crush out individual freedoms on a continental scale, has always filled libertarians with apprehension. The sight of the EC crushing the ability of individual *states* to limit personal freedoms, however, is somewhat more gratifying.

The European Community, a group of sovereign states bound by far-reaching treaties, looms larger as additional states sign on or become included by twists of history. In October, the Community expanded to include the former East Germany. As it articulates its powers, its influence will grow even when the territory it covers does not.

The growth of governmental power can hardly be regarded as beneficent in itself. But from a libertarian perspective, the Community as it is now evolving can be the source of good as well as bad news, because as a federal government it is able not only to interfere with individuals but also to limit the onerous powers of local governments.

The Community is supposed to promote, indeed enforce, free trade among its members, free movement of citizens from one member state to another, and freedom from government-sponsored unfair competition. The advent of the Community is no clear victory for such freedoms, but it gives them a chance.

Europe is going through a process of federation or federalization from which Europeans and the rest of the world will benefit and suffer for decades and maybe centuries to come. The proportion of good news to bad news springing from the application of the powers of EC governmental bodies will determine whether, on balance, the establishment of the EC was a good or a bad idea.

I can already hear frowning liber-

tarians saying that more government is never better government. In general, I agree, but consider the growing EC phenomenon that has been called the "Bonfire of the Subsidies."

This is a campaign by the European Commission to reduce the levels of state subsidies granted in various forms, primarily to local businesses, by EC member governments. Recently, for example, the Commission ordered British Aerospace to repay 44.4 million pounds to the British government in connection with its purchase of Rover. In that case, the Commission was applying EC doctrines designed to reach all kinds of subsidies that affect trade among member states.

For this purpose state financial assistance is broadly defined, so that prior approval may be required for many forms of subsidies, including tax exemptions, export assistance, equity participations, and state guarantees. The "Bonfire of the Subsidies" is certainly good news, a movement in the direction of freedom, not only because subsidies are granted at the expense of taxpayers, but also because they interfere with the businesses that do not benefit from them.

We can get an idea of what to expect from the EC by looking at the remnants of our own federal system. We should not forget that much of the history of federal enforcement of the Constitution has been good news. It has often served to restrain the individual states from interfering with the rights of individuals. For example, states fearing certain forms of speech (such as flag burning) or its effect on citizens (such as the use of racial slurs to provoke violent responses), from time to time attempt to restrict our freedom of expression; the federal courts often step in to stop them.

Good charter documents of course are *designed* to define and limit the powers of groups, institutions, and majorities over individuals, but the Constitution is not the only fountainhead of federal restraints on state action. The expansive nature of federal systems is another. This is what Madison had in mind when he wrote:

A religious sect may degenerate into a political faction in a part of the confederacy; but the variety of sects dispersed over the entire face of it must secure the national councils

against any danger from that source. A rage for paper money, for an abolition of debts, for an equal division of property, or for any other im-proper or wicked project, will be less apt to pervade the whole body of the union, than a particular member of it.

Federation is not always successful, but the tendency is there and is often effective. I am sure that were the state of Michigan independent, its citizens would have one hell of a time trying to import Japanese cars.

On the other hand, federal powers, like all governmental powers, are subject to abuse. Proof of this point is

abundant and facile. How about federal deposit insurance, for example, or taxation for the purpose of making transfer payments? Federal abuse of individuals is also systematic and institutional; federal regulatory agencies have almost always been used to interfere with individual liberties (such as freedom of contract, much assailed by the FTC and other agencies). This has given us plenty of bad news from Washington.

However you feel about our federal government, its effects are likely to be mixed. Like the federal government of the United States, the EC interferes not

only with states but also with individuals. It has, for example, recently proposed a new directive to ban various abusive clauses in supplier-consumer contracts, "abusive" being broadly defined. In other words, the directive would keep individuals from entering into fully enforceable contracts if the EC finds a clause abusive to the willing signatory of his own agreement.

Can more government mean less government interference? Sometimes, when the subjects of a government are *other* governments. So keep watching for good news and bad news from Europe. □

Kostelanetz, "A Master," *continued from page 64*

"Dennis told me he likes to do the fourth movement from the *Elegiac* [2nd] *Symphony*, the big chromatic job from the Ruggles idiom. I used to write a lot of it; and so I thought, well I'll essay another chromatic movement for him of that kind. I didn't manage to make it as dissonant," he laughed, "but it is fully chromatic. It has some Ivesian qualities too, to my surprise. I'm always surprised when Ives comes up, though I suppose I shouldn't be."

"I wanted to write an estampie, or stampede. The form has fascinated me for years. I first encountered it in medieval European music in New York, way back when. [My composer colleague] Alan Hovhaness and I were at-

tracted to the form. It's a form I've adopted, which is in a lot of pieces written since then, but I'd never done a stampede as a finale. This time I did. That sort of worries me. It's a long and big piece that should go like the wind and be very exciting, but I don't know." The Fourth Symphony is, like so much of his recent work, an eclectic brew of influences both Eastern and Western, generally unfamiliar but always stylish.

This new symphony represents Harrison's most substantial work since the destabilizing earthquake. "I call the new piece 'Last Symphony' because I need a break from putting black dots on paper. I've written an awful lot of

music in the past decade. All through my life I've done other things; but I haven't had a chance to do them recently, because I've been so involved in this pseudo-professional world." Among the seventy-three-year-old composer's current plans are collecting his writings into books, completing a sequence of abstract paintings, and traveling through his four favorite states—Utah, Colorado, New Mexico, and Arizona. He wants to purchase a Parascender, a propeller-powered parachute, and even showed me a video demonstrating it. "Should I ever write another symphony, probably for Dennis, I can call it 'Very Last Symphony!'" □

"Thanksgiving Mourning," *continued from page 30*

where can you even start with them? Thatcher did not take a totally free-market approach. From the free-market point of view, she was full of shortcomings. Yet with all her faults, she was never out of date, because she was a living demonstration of a timeless truth: she showed that individuals with brains and moral determination could actually change their world.

When Maggie became Prime Minister in 1979, Britain was wallowing, as it had wallowed for decades, in a hideous mire of paternalism, class hatred and the kind of "moral" thinking that sees in socialism both the punishment and the cure of elitism. Both conservative and socialist "intellectuals" self-confidently preached a gospel of defeat and surrender. Capitalism was regarded on all sides as the embarrassment of the past, collectivism as the necessity of the future. Every dose of collectivism produced an economic seizure that called, inevitably, for stronger doses.

Maggie saw through it all. She knew that capitalism was the solution, not the problem. She announced the fact—and

soon, leaders and future leaders of other countries were following her lead. She acted on the fact—and soon, the British economy responded with concrete evidence that she was right.

Thatcher shook up the universities by inviting them to look around for some private sources of financing. She shook up the church by inviting it to remember some things that the Bible has to say about individual freedom and responsibility. She shook up the diplomats by refusing to negotiate plain principles of right. She made good on promises of privatization by selling national property worth \$57 billion.

You don't have to like everything she did to appreciate who she is. Just consider the contrast with George Bush: while he was sitting in Saudi Arabia, eating boneless turkey and serving up platitudes to soldiers who had been thoughtfully disarmed for the occasion, Maggie was standing in the House of Commons, responding in kind to the attacks of her opponents, and in the midst of the battle she was declaring, with a grin on her "iron" face, "I'm enjoying this." —SC

Reviews

Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth,
by W. W. Bartley III. Open Court, 1990, xx + 315 pp., \$17.95.

Why the Academy Fails

William P. Moulton

William Warren Bartley's *Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth* is an exasperating book but also a rich one. I can think of no other serious book concerning which it would be more difficult to answer the question "What is it about?" It is, for example, about the ways in which knowledge grows, and the ways in which knowledge can be put to practical use. It is also about determinism and free will, and about how loose sexual behavior leads to the spread of AIDS, and about the dispute between Karl Popper and Thomas Kuhn regarding scientific methodology, and about the benefits that the nineteenth century colonial system bestowed on its subject peoples, and about the errors of Marxism, the problems created by academic tenure, the alleged sole responsibility and guilt of Germany for the First World War, the distortion of Popper's views by the late Anglo-Hungarian scholar, Imre Lakatos, the inconsistency of both conservatives and statist liberals in regard to freedom, Madison's concept of countervailing interests, and much more.

It is this breadth, this tendency to go off on tangents that frustrates and rewards the reader. One moment Bartley is highly abstract, the next almost absurdly concrete. And for my taste, there is simply too much Popper. Almost ex-

actly one half of the book's pages, by my count, deal *entirely* with the views and professional career of the great philosopher of science. Indeed, the entire second half of the book could be titled "Selected Observations on the Academic Career of Karl Popper."

But in spite of its attention to Popper, the book is Hayekian to the core. That Bartley should be preoccupied with both Popper and Hayek is no surprise, of course. Before his death in early 1990, he had been designated official biographer to both, constructed several important books from Popper's lecture notes, and edited the first several volumes of Hayek's *Collected Works*. Like Hayek and Popper, Bartley is primarily concerned with knowledge, many forms of which can never be wholly objectified and conceptualized (a distinctly Hayekian notion). Consequently, "economic measurements" can be very misleading (Bartley, using Ricardo's words, says they are "vain and delusive"). Hence the choice of *Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth* as title. While that title may not adequately describe the *content* of this work, it certainly conveys its flavor.

This is not to say that *UKUW* lacks original insight. Bartley offers many new applications (especially in Chapters 1 and 2) and even some new epistemological insights. His explanation of the ways in which truth can be "put to the worse" in a free and open encoun-

ter (contrary to Milton's famous aphorism) contrasts nicely with his subsequent analysis of the manner in which such a besting nevertheless advances the process of the discovery and growth of knowledge. Bartley points out a problem arising from the belief that truth is easily observed and should as easily triumph in any conflict with error: "The assumption that truth is manifest . . . leads to an interventionist or conspiracy theory of ignorance and error: that if what is true is not . . . obvious, then some party must have intervened to prevent its being seen [or must be engaged in a] conspiracy to suppress truth, whereas in fact interesting truths are anything but obvious, while error and ignorance are omnipresent regardless of intentions, and do not have to be 'explained' by conspiracy" (pp. 21-8). The relevance of this observation, not only to conspiracy theories of the Birchite variety, but to a movement centered around a certain late Russian-American novelist, will be obvious to most readers.

Bartley's prologue (what he dubs "a manifesto by way of a prologue") contains the most orderly characterization that I have ever read of freedom and the ways in which it can be lost. He begins by identifying freedom with two fundamental conditions: the liberty to supply (or not to supply) and the liberty to receive (or not to receive). He argues that all freedoms can be reduced to the ability to exercise these activities. He then enumerates the means by which freedom can be infringed. He subdivides these according to whether the basic infringement is upon the giving or upon the receiving of goods, services, and information. His categories are further subdivided according to the supposed motivation of the prohibitions—e.g., whether the alleged purpose is to protect life and safety, to regulate morals, to enforce a monopoly (such as postal delivery), or to protect and exalt the majesty of the state. The

prologue by itself makes this book essential reading for all varieties of classical liberals.

The core of *UKUW*, containing Bartley's main contributions to the methodology of the knowledge industry, is the section entitled "Universities and the Wealth of Nations" (pp. 89-149). In this rich segment Bartley, in effect, asks three questions.

Bartley argues that all freedoms can be reduced to the liberty to supply (or not to supply) and the liberty to receive (or not to receive). He then enumerates the means by which freedom can be infringed. I have never read a more orderly characterization of freedom and the way in which it can be lost.

First, *Is the theory of knowledge a branch of some larger discipline?*

Bartley's answer is that epistemology is a branch of economics: "the central concern of that branch of philosophy known as epistemology . . . should be the growth of knowledge." This formulation is, of course, unadulterated Hayek. The definition is in at least oblique opposition to the main stream of Western philosophy, which regards the central issue of epistemology to be the discovery of the relationship between sensation and understanding (what Aquinas called the "apprehension of order").

Bartley concentrates on the idea that knowledge is a form of wealth, and that therefore "epistemology is the economics of knowledge." The failure to understand this proceeds from the fact that "the theory of knowledge traditionally taught in universities neglects direct investigation of the growth of knowledge." Both philosophers and academic economists are to blame for this state of affairs, and have thus proven to be impotent to prevent the academy's onset of stagnation and sterility, especially in matters of scien-

tific progress.

Bartley could have avoided some potential misunderstanding in these areas if he had made it clearer that what he terms theory of knowledge would be called by most philosophers an aspect of the sociology of knowledge. With this in mind, the argument is fairly persuasive.

The second question proceeds from the first: *Why are the institutions on which society presumably relies for the production and increase of knowledge seemingly inadequate for the task?* This has been answered in various ways by previous authors. Recent examples include Allan Bloom (*The Closing of the American Mind*), Nicholas Wade (*Betrayers of the Truth*), Richard McKenzie (*The Political Economy of the Educational Process*), and Charles Sykes (*ProfScam*). Bartley draws some inspiration from each of these, but arrives at a different, and to my mind, better answer. Bloom and McKenzie find the root of the problem in cultural corruption; Sykes finds the professorial system itself essentially corrupting; Wade finds the academy given over to a hopeless muddle of political tendentiousness and thought-policing. For Bartley, the problem is that the institutional framework is not compatible with the ostensible goal of advancing human knowledge. He concludes that the entire university system is bureaucratic; it is structured to perpetuate itself and to further the careers of its members. The advancement of knowledge, the stated goal of the process, is actually little more than a by-product. For Bartley, the academic caste is locked into "fiefdoms, guilds and mutual-protection rackets."

The third question is, *What is there in the structure and organizational patterns of the knowledge industry that renders the entrenchment of "false philosophies" so easy?* Bartley indicates that the principal "false philosophies" that are firmly ensconced in today's major universities are "Wittgensteinian[ism], logical positivism, phenomenology and hermeneutics . . . behaviorism, pragmatism, determinism, and scientism." These doctrines prosper thanks to the incentive structure of universities: they lack a signalling mechanism for changes in the market of ideas. "For certain kinds

of groups, universities are handy places in which to have a strong redoubt. They are handy for groups that are not competitive, that are peddling ideas for which there is little demand—ideas that do not work, that fail to explain, and whose proponents are . . . tempted to turn them into ideologies."

Being a representative of an ideology (or "school") makes academic life easier, since "internal scrutiny is more or less within the control of the professoriate." In such circumstances, "There is little hope of accelerating the advancement of learning . . . until it is more widely acknowledged . . . that individuals working in educational institutions are as self-interested as businessmen, but that the organizational framework in which they operate . . . tends to work against public benefit . . . because educational and professional institutions work contrary to market principles" (p. 100).

Consider Bartley's treatment of one of these "false philosophies." He argues against some of the central ideas of Thomas Kuhn, one of the pioneers of the sociology of knowledge and the originator of the "paradigm" explanation of scientific progress. Bartley identifies the irrationalist, subjectivist, and relativist implications of Kuhn's theory

For Bartley, knowledge is a form of wealth, and therefore epistemology is a branch of economics.

of paradigms, which holds that the discovery processes operative in science never actually advance toward a knowledge of reality but simply exhaust the conceptual potentials of an endless chain of successive attempts at explanation. Amusingly enough, however, Kuhn's paradigm model does seem to describe how the world of the universities collectively gropes with beliefs about the material world, to the credit of neither the model nor the universities.

Though Kuhn's theory may explain how institutions produce generation after generation of bogus theories, it is Popper who explains how appropriate-

ly managed institutions achieve closer and closer approximations of truth. Bartley develops Popper's notion by showing that scientific and scholarly innovation takes place in the academic sphere only when this sphere interacts with (and faces competition from) people and institutions outside the academy. Bartley champions the independent and non-institutional innovator. He sees the universities as essentially dormant and nonprogressive.

Unfortunately, it is the academics who will most enjoy the Popperian segment of this book. Some of the material is so specialized that it seems plainly aimed at those with a professional interest in the arcana of the field of scientific methodology. Other chapters deal with intra-academic disputes, involving such matters as the alleged misinterpretation of Popper's positions by Imre Lakatos and the question of whether or not Wittgenstein's *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* implicitly refutes Popper's negation of inductive logic.

But there are interesting tidbits of information to be mined here and there from the book's long discussion of Popper. For example, I was surprised to learn that Sir Karl's most famous work, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, was initially rejected by more than twenty publishers, and that it was at length published by the firm of Routledge and Kegan Paul only after personal and private intervention by Hayek.

There are other informational jewels scattered through the book. To cite only one: the use of the term "iron curtain" was used to refer to the division between Communist countries and non-Communist countries in Europe long before Churchill popularized it in his famous speech in Fulton, Missouri, in 1946, and before Nazi Minister of Propaganda Dr Joseph Goebbels's similar use a year earlier: it was used in exactly the same context, in a forgotten book called *Through Bolshevik Russia*, published in 1920. (What does this have to do with the methodology of scientific discovery? Well, nothing, of course. Bartley's book is like that).

I am compelled to add a few trivial caveats. Was John Stuart Mill really an "innovative economist?" (p. 128) Was there no growth in per-capita produc-

tion of wealth prior to the sixteenth century? (p. 92) Surely during the long peaceful summer of the Roman Empire (first and second centuries A.D.) there must have been some growth, and perhaps also during the Hellenistic era, to say nothing of the stable periods of the great eastern empires. "Soviet," when used in the context of "Soviet studies," clearly refers to the name of the country involved rather than to a principle of

social organization and should be capitalized (pp. 102 et subq.)

But these are quibbles. Bartley's answer to the problem of the vitality of bogus theory in the academic environment by itself qualifies *Unfathomed Knowledge, Unmeasured Wealth* as an important book, and it offers the reader far more. With its publication, Bartley can no longer be considered to have been a mere epigone of Popper and of Hayek. □

Meltdown: Inside the Soviet Economy, by Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette. Cato Institute, 1990, 152pp., \$9.95.

The Sick Man of Europe

Jane S. Shaw

If you are excited and curious about the turmoil of the Soviet Union, but haven't followed the events step by step, this could be just the book for you. In just 150 pages, Paul Craig Roberts and Karen LaFollette draw a fascinating portrait of a crumbling Soviet economy—a world of deprivation, corruption, and fraud.

And they do more. Roberts has a rhetorical gift for arraying facts to maximize insight, and for shaping insights into sweeping generalizations. He is best known for his role in the 1970s when, as a *Wall St. Journal* columnist, he created an exciting vision of how tax cuts could unleash economic growth. When Reagan's policies stalled in the early 1980s, he was pilloried for having oversold the program. But that criticism faded as the Reagan years turned into a seven-year-long economic boom.

In a similar way, in *Meltdown*, he and LaFollette bring the facts to life, making the nature of the Soviet economy visible and comprehensible to the nonspecialist. (Actually, Roberts is a Soviet scholar; he wrote a scholarly study, *Alienation and the Soviet Economy*, in 1971.) By highlighting key characteristics of the Soviet system, they lay the

foundation for understanding Gorbachev's strategy for dealing with it. They propose some ideas for how privatization could be achieved and, as a fascinating aside, they offer a persuasive explanation for why American intellectuals have always overestimated the Soviet Union.

The facts they build on come mostly from Soviet press accounts since the advent of *glasnost* and from reports by Western and Soviet observers. You read, for example, about the kind of food that can turn up in Moscow: cans of corned beef corroded with black spots; milk sausage with filler that degenerates into a "slippery piece of soap"; and "sandwich butter" (half real butter and half a whitish material).

You learn that a regional hospital in Mogocha has no plumbing; a new one-story clinic cannot open because radiators for hot-water heating cannot be found anywhere in the province. Botkin Hospital in Moscow (apparently one of the better hospitals, where Westerners are sometimes treated) has three toilets for 76 men, but no toilet seats or toilet paper. According to a *Pravda* report, the men's ward in a rural hospital is a "curtained-off corner with three beds"; equipment is virtually nonexistent.

They report that the official infant

mortality figure in 1988 was 25.4 deaths per 1000 live births (placing the Soviet Union 50th in world ranking). They argue that the actual rate is much higher. They tell how eight newborns died of toxic septic disease in a city hospital in Sovetabad; even after the first baby died, staff members couldn't keep the formula sanitary; then the hospital administration tried to cover up the deaths. According to a Soviet television documentary on ethnic strife in Azerbaijan, 65% of the babies born in the city of Sumgait are blue babies (suffering from lack of oxygen).

In Moscow, workers spend much of a typical day away from work, searching for basic necessities; blue-collar workers can do this because little work is expected of them and for the first two weeks of every month, raw materials are usually lacking anyway. Professionals, who do have to appear at work most of the day, hire shoppers to run around town for them.

In Moscow, you learn, workers spend much of a typical day away from work, searching for basic necessities; blue-collar workers can do this because little work is expected of them and for the first two weeks of every month, raw materials are usually lacking anyway. Professionals, who do have to appear at work most of the day, hire shoppers to run around town for them.

Outside Moscow, the basics are even harder to find. People survive on the produce they can grow in their tiny home plots and intercept food on its way to the cities for sale on the black market. "At isolated rural stops, peasants burst onto trains to buy oranges, apples, and milk from a train staff eager to pocket additional rubles for the service," write Roberts and LaFollette.

But *Meltdown* is more than a collection of such anecdotes. Without dwelling on economic details, Roberts and LaFollette offer several valuable insights

into the Soviet debacle. Among them:

1). The Soviet Union is not, in fact, run by rigid, hierarchical central planning. Rather, the much touted central plan is an aggregation of agreements worked out by factory managers and their supply agents, the central planners. There are so many formal rules and regulations that the factory manager, who chooses which to accept and which to ignore, actually has considerable power.

The game is to wheedle enough supplies to enable the factory to meet or exceed the plan. Each plan target is expressed in "gross output"—goods measured by volume, size, or weight, or number. Quality as viewed by the consumer is not a factor. "If the factory's output is specified by weight, its products will be heavy. If the plan is expressed in volume, the goods produced will be very thin or flimsy," they write. Even Khrushchev complained about chandeliers so heavy they pulled down ceilings; more recently, the authors found seven citations in *Pravda*, over a two-year period, that described collapsing roofs or structural walls. "Production in the Soviet Union frequently amounts to destroying the original value of the inputs," they write.

2). In place of central planning, the Soviet Union is run by regional bosses with enormous power holding sway over a terrorized population. Roberts and LaFollette call these people "a depraved breed of rulers" who run their regions like medieval fiefs and have power akin to the satraps of Persia.

The central government's lack of control over such people explains Gorbachev's move to introduce democracy (as well as *glasnost*). Gorbachev is trying to create a separate base of power from which to reduce the power of the regional bosses. This explains his insistence on heading the Communist Party (the old, corrupt structure) and being President as well, thus heading the nascent demo-

cratic forces.

3). Western intellectuals failed to recognize that the Soviet system was an economic and moral disaster because they were blinded by their own alienation from the West. The authors offer a choice selection of Western apologists for the Soviets. Some are obscure today, like the Dean of Canterbury who stated in 1940 that Stalin would "stand out as a giant among pygmies" because he "trained and guided that great family of peoples that we call the Soviet Union toward the right exercise of power. . . ." Others are more prominent, such as John Kenneth Galbraith, who managed to write in 1984 that "the Russian system succeeds because in contrast to the Western industrial economy it makes full use of its manpower." (This sentence makes you hanker for more, but, unfortunately, it is the only quote from Galbraith in the book.)

Partly, the authors argue, intellectuals simply didn't recognize that the world Lenin created depended on violence. But more fundamentally, the hostility of Western intellectuals to their own society prevented them from looking objectively at other societies. Roberts and LaFollette cite Michael Polanyi's explanation that Western intellectuals have inherited an inconsistent mindset from the Enlightenment—fervently held moral goals, on the one hand, and cynicism about human motives, at least under the reigning capitalistic system, on the other. Intellectuals have always been indignant at the failure of Western society to live up to high moral standards (some people are allowed to be poor and live in crowded tenements, for example) but they disparage any moral achievements (the re-



"We're out of coffee — shall I slap you a few times?"

lief of poverty or the advent of sanitation) because they distrust the motives that bring about such improvements. This double-barreled antagonism has made it difficult for intellectuals to see the good in the West and has stunted criticism of any society that seemed to challenge the West.

"In academic life today, any work that affirms our society smells of patriotism and implies a lack of objectivity, whereas anti-Americanism has positive

connotations," explain Roberts and LaFollette. Other countries and social systems that don't share the faults of the West are spared such criticism—because "to denounce opponents [would imply] affirmation of one's own society. . . ."

Meltdown is neither deep, nor long, nor detailed. But it is devastating as it describes a society on the ropes and illuminating in its interpretation of what went wrong. □

Slam, by Lewis Shiner. Doubleday, 1990, 233 pp., \$18.95.

Anarchy's Lighter Side

Lawrence Person

Ex-Cons. Cats. UFO's. Skatepunks. Computer networks. Anarchy. Any of those subjects by themselves might form the basis of an interesting and off-beat novel. But when someone combines them, as Lewis Shiner has done in *Slam*, you know you're in for a pretty strange trip.

Previously known for his science fiction and fantasy, Shiner has moved steadily away from the confines of genre categories in recent years. *Deserted Cities of the Heart*, his previous novel, deftly trod the line between fantasy and reality by combining magical realism, Pyregionian complexity theory and current political events in Central America into a strange and heady brew that won considerable critical praise both in and outside the SF field. With *Slam*, Shiner has shed genre labels entirely to craft his most successful and interesting novel to date.

Dave, a newly paroled ex-con who just did six months of hard time for tax evasion, seems to have landed the perfect cushy job for his return to the outside world. Like something out of a *National Enquirer* headline, a crazy old woman has died and left a fortune to her 23 cats, including a generous stipend for a live-in caretaker to tend

them at her expensive beach house near Galveston. All Dave has to do is feed the cats, lay back, and take it easy while he finishes up parole.

That is, until he finds out that several people are interested in the house as they start to show up, one by one, on his doorstep. There's Bryant Whitney, who preaches a gospel based on UFOs, a world-trotting "adventuress" named Mary Nixon who keeps claiming to be different relatives of the deceased owner, and a blind and deaf husband-and-wife team of treasure hunters (he's deaf and she's blind). If this were not enough, the tendency of Dave's friend to have beer parties in the house and Dave's own "bad attitude" soon lands him in trouble with Mrs. Cook, his fundamentalist parole officer.

In his spare time, Dave plays with the late owner's computer and starts to read her books, which include such titles as *Guerrilla Capitalism* and *God and the State*. But his lessons in anarchy move from the theoretical to the practical when he finds himself in a relationship with Mickey, a girl half his age who lives with a band of teenage skatepunks in a deserted concrete house on the beach. Though Dave starts to enjoy his new life on the outside, his freedom is jeopardized when Terrell, a murderer, escaped convict and Dave's old cell-

mate, shows up at the house with two garbage bags full of marijuana and a penchant for some highly illegal guerrilla capitalism of his own. With his chances of staying out of jail moving rapidly toward zero, Dave decides that its time for him to disappear from society for good. . . .

Although *Slam* does deal with the effects of practical anarchy at the personal level, it is anything but a rigid polemical rant. Rather, it's a very good (and very funny) novel, and one whose writing shows considerable development over *Deserted Cities of the Heart*. Both the book and the prose are lean and unencumbered, filled with real people speaking real dialogue, and zipping along at an almost dizzying pace.

Indeed, by combining several interesting and diverse people in one novel, Shiner has captured a broad range of emotions and themes that reflect life in the late 1980s, from madcap comedy to serious social introspection. There's one very fun scene of a drug deal gone wrong that reads like Cheech and Chong doing the Marx Brothers; in another scene, a young skatepunk's heroin addiction has gotten so bad that he blows the one chance he had for corporate sponsorship at a big competition. Even when it comes to sex, that most timeless of subjects, *Slam* displays attitudes distinctly fixed in the late '80s, with Dave never having intercourse without first donning a condom.

Although Shiner's lean, streamlined prose is certainly far preferable to the turgid political tracts passing themselves off as fiction these days, things in *Slam* move so fast that you wish Shiner had pulled back just a little and put a tad more meat on the bones of this novel. The world of skatepunks that he shows us is so interesting and different from our own that he could easily have spent more time exploring it. By the same measure, there are many topics in this book (like computer bulletin boards and the underground economy) that Shiner only touches on for the briefest of moments, and many of these could have been explored in more detail without slowing the novel's almost frantic pace.

Still, these are minor flaws. With *Slam*, Shiner has fashioned a detailed, amusing and thought-provoking novel, and has also proved that, in *any* genre, he's an author to watch. □

The Civil War,
by Ken Burns. Public Broadcasting Service, 1989.

Uncivil War

R. W. Bradford

My mother's maternal grandfather was wounded at Shiloh. It took him several years to die. Whether he is included in the total 620,000 Civil War dead that the history books report I do not know.

I was an adolescent during the centennial of the Civil War, and like most red-blooded American boys, I found adventure and glory in the war. Of course, I knew, that a lot of people died. But the war had freed the slaves and preserved the Union. I had a fair idea of what it meant to free the slaves and only a foggy idea of what it meant to preserve the Union.

But as I matured, I came to appreciate the War's costs and consequences. And I began to wonder: Why did my great-grandfather and another 620,000 die? Why did my country suffer this horror? Was it worth it?

According to Ken Burns' 11-hour documentary on the Civil War, shown recently on PBS, the Civil War was a Good Thing despite its horrible costs, because it made the United States into a nation. Before the war, the producer tells us, people said "the United States are . . ." After the war, people said "the United States is . . ." In addition, the carnage was sanctified because it was a crusade against slavery.

I'm sorry, but I don't buy it. First of all, I'm not convinced that forging the United States into a nation was a good thing. It seems evident that what is meant by the phrase is that people began to perceive themselves as being fundamentally citizens of a

particular nation-state and that centralizing power in this state is a good idea. This alone, I believe, would be sufficient to qualify the Civil War as a disaster, even if it had not cost the lives of 620,000 American men and God knows how much treasure.

Though Burns didn't explicitly state that the rise of collectivism was essential to the War and to the War's virtuousness, the message was plain enough: the suspension of *habeas corpus*, restrictions on freedom of speech, creation of the income tax, and imposition of the draft. There were other consequences, not mentioned: government control of banking and creation of the first federal government issued money come immediately to mind.

Nor do I find the idea that the noble goal of ending slavery somehow made noble the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of men. For one thing, it is not clear to me that very many of the participants were fighting against slavery. Few of the Confederate soldiers owned slaves, and many of them viewed the slave-owning class with a mixture of disdain and envy. For another, the Federal government and its soldiers claimed for most of the war to be fighting for "liberty and union, one and inseparable, now and forever," i.e. the idea that once a state joins the United States it cannot leave, and deserves to have its citizens slaughtered, its cities destroyed and its land burned over if it tries.

Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation didn't free all slaves in the United States: those who were owned by people loyal to the Federal government were specifically exempt from emancipation, as were portions of the South already conquered by the Union.

The Emancipation Proclamation didn't end slavery at all; it only punished those who opposed the idea of union at the point of a bayonet by confiscating their slaves. In the re-election campaign of 1864, Lincoln's advisors warned him that freeing the slaves of Confederates wasn't very popular and urged him to emphasize the "union forever" theme instead.

I suspect that slavery would have been ended before long even if the Civil War had never been fought. Everywhere else in the Western world slavery was abolished during the 19th century without lunatic generals muttering "war is hell" and ordering thousands of men to their deaths, without picturesque creeks overflowing with human blood, without thousands of arms, legs and heads blown to pieces, without destroying every farm, home, and commercial structure over thousands of square miles and ravaging tens of thousands of square miles only slightly less brutally, without the suspension of fundamental civil rights, without institutionalizing government controlled money and banking, without increasing taxes to gargantuan levels, and often without leaving the legacy of racism that continues to cripple the South to this day.

The British Empire ended slavery by political reform, compensating slaveowners for their lost "property." The idea that a man can own another human being as property is horrible, and the idea that the slaveowner should be compensated for the loss of his slaves seems outrageous. But the price Britain paid to free her slaves was infinitesimal compared to the price America paid.

Brazil ended slavery by political reform. In Brazil today, I am told, there is far less racial prejudice than in the U.S. Is there a connection between the ebbing of racial prejudice in Brazil and its peaceful abolition of slavery and the persistence of racial hatred in the U.S. and our violent abolition of slavery? I don't know, but I suspect that the Civil War had the effect of strengthening and perpetuating the social attitudes that underlay slavery.

We can't go back to 1861 and see how things would have turned out if

the warmongers had not triumphed, if the Yankee radicals hadn't had their way, if the federal government had recognized southern states' secession, or if cooler heads had prevailed in Congress and the fabric of the Union hadn't been torn by the issue of slavery. We can only speculate.

But we can look at another conflict: the conflict between communism and democratic capitalism that began in the wake of World War II and is ending today. To my way of thinking, communism is as evil as slavery. In fact, communism in practice turned out to be pretty much the same thing as slavery: a social system based on the notion that some individuals ought to be under total legal control of others. It is slavery in a pretty dress, with a new ideological rationale.

Radical anti-communist forces within the United States advocated the same sort of approach toward the communist nations that the radical anti-slavery forces advocated in the decades before the Civil War.

During most of the past half century, radical anti-communist forces within the United States advocated the same sort of approach toward the communist nations that the radical anti-slavery forces advocated in the decades before the Civil War. Communism, they argued, is a vicious and evil social system, degrading its subjects, destructive of the human spirit. It must be fought tooth and nail, even if this means total war.

The radical anti-communists managed to get the U.S. government involved in two "limited wars" against communism. In Korea, we fought to a draw; in Vietnam, we suffered a humiliating defeat. But the radicals never got the U.S. involved in a total war against communism.

What would have happened if the radical anti-communists had won? If we had fought an all-out war against communism? Let us suppose that the

Cuban missile crisis of 1962 had resulted in all-out war between the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Obviously, we would have been worse off if we had lost the war. But what if we had won the war, as we won the Civil War? Would the the destruction of communism have been worth the price we paid?

Once again, we can only speculate. We can't go back and change history to see what would have happened. But given the resources at our command and at the command of the communists, it seems quite plain that the war would have been even more costly, that even more young men would have been slaughtered, even more civilians killed, even more property destroyed, even more of our civil liberties and civil order destroyed. A generation decimated by the war, the productive capacity of our free system dedicated to destroying other human beings and their property, greater growth of the power of the state . . . these would have been some of the costs of destroying communism.

Instead, we went about our lives. Instead of inventing new means of killing, we invented computers, videogames, and compact disc players. Instead of killing each other, we got married and had kids. Instead of drinking radioactive water from canteens in filthy trenches, we drink water bottled halfway around the world and served with a twist of lemon. Instead of going off to war, we went off to Maui or Jamaica or Florida and relaxed on the beach. Instead of being inspired by the bellicosity of our war anthems, we were inspired by rock and roll, and jazz, and the blues, and any other kind of music we liked. Instead of driving new, more efficient tanks to our deaths, we drove new, more efficient cars to our vacation destinations. Instead of our nation and half the world being

devastated, we worry about our landfills overflowing with disposable diapers.

No. We didn't have an all-out war on communism. And that meant that more than a billion people had to live under communism for another few decades, just as not having an all-out war on slavery would probably have meant that four million people would have had to live another few decades under slavery.

As I watched Burns' documentary, I wondered: would we be better off forgetting the Civil War, blotting it from our consciousness? For those who learnt from it, remembering its horror, its cost, and its paltry benefits, reliving the war is a dreadful experience. For those who failed to learn from it, the Civil War remains, in the words of one historian whose talking head appeared in the documentary, "a testament for the liberation of the human spirit for all time." It took less than a half century for Americans to go to war again, to forget the horror that war is and to remember the glory that politicians tell us it is.

Don't get me wrong. I am no pacifist. I have no objection to using violence in defense of my person, my family, my liberty, or my property. My dislike of war is purely *post hoc*, the product of seeing war and examining its consequences. There may be "good" wars. I suspect the American revolution qualifies. But seldom does any war justify its cost in terms of hatred, destruction, and carnage. □



"Thank you, sir, but I had to give up panhandling — I couldn't afford the insurance."

Booknotes

Economic Man — After slogging through the turgid, repetitive prose and sloppy thinking of *The Political Theory of Conservative Economists* by Conrad Waligorski (University Press of Kansas, 1990, 260pp.), I can only conclude that my ignorance of conservative economics is blissful.

Waligorski's goal is to examine the normative political implications of the allegedly value-free economic thought of three thinkers who he insists on conflating as being exemplars of "conservative political economy": James Buchanan, Milton Friedman and Friedrich von Hayek. But his inability to see any differences between these thinkers is only the beginning of the book's conceptual flaws.

His major problem in dealing with the thought of Buchanan, Friedman and Hayek is his admitted inability to deal with them as economists. He has no idea, either theoretically or historically, whether these guys have anything up on Keynes, Thurow or even Galbraith. He treats every discussion of government failure or the damage government interference can do to an economy or even the assertion that inflation is caused by government as unproven, unsupported, apodictic assertions on the part of three cranky guys in love with religious notions about "spontaneous order." In the book's final chapter, he paints "conservative political

economy" as a religious belief.

Throughout his litany of complaints against free-market thinkers (they don't leave room for the expression of the popular will, they pay insufficient obeisance to majoritarian democracy, their concept of freedom is only negative, etc.), he continually ignores the fact that the significant normative difference between economic markets and political markets is the use of force. For someone who insists he is dealing with the normative implications of free-market economics, this is extremely strange, as is his ignorance of the fact that any non-coercive interaction is normatively fine in the eyes of a free-marketer of libertarian leaning.

By harping repetitively that Buchanan, Friedman and Hayek refuse to consider his conceptions of proper equality, democracy, community etc., because these interfere with the operations of the "market." Waligorski makes it appear that the only acts given ethical imprimatur by the likes of Hayek are buying and selling. Waligorski seems incapable of understanding that what gives the market such prominence in the theorizing of his subjects is that it is the arena of non-coercive exchange. And non-coercive exchange can certainly include the free play of affections, community feeling and every other good that Waligorski claims Hayek et al ignore in their single-minded de-

votion to the spontaneous order of the market.

I recommend any utility maximizer out there do the only rational and ethical thing: waste none of your time reading this wrongheaded, tedious tome.

—Brian Doherty

Examined Lives — Richard Yates's remarkable novel, *Revolutionary Road* (Vintage-Random House, 1989, 337pp., \$8.95), was originally published in 1961. It has been admired by authors and critics, but it has dropped almost completely out of public attention, resting someplace in the obscurity to which books eventually go when no teachers require their students to read them.

The books that students are not required to read tend to be those that preach no special doctrine, embody no particular artistic ism, make no attempt to rival the scope of *War and Peace*. But some of these books just happen to be perfectly written, and *Revolutionary Road* is one such book. It is grounds for celebration, therefore, that someone has decided to reprint it, wrap it in a hideous glossy cover, and get it out on the shelves again.

Revolutionary Road is a merciless analysis of the life of a young couple occupying a house in a suburb of New York: two young people who are likable, sympathetic, and, in their way, thoroughly dreadful. Imagining that there is something special about themselves, trying to find it, and pretending that they have found it, Frank and April Wheeler become actors in a tragicomedy of diseased self-consciousness. They are the kind of people who just have to stop on the highway at night, a mile from home, so that they can indulge themselves in one more epic argument.

"Look at you, and tell me how by any stretch"—she tossed her head, and the grin of her teeth glistened white in the moonlight—"by any stretch of the imagination you can call yourself a man!"

He swung out one trembling fist for a backhanded blow to her head and she cowered against the fender in an ugly crumple of fear; then instead of hitting her he danced away in a travesty of boxer's footwork and brought the fist down on the roof of the car with all his strength. He hit the car four times that way: *Bong! Bong! Bong! Bong!*—while

Title of publication: Liberty
Publication Number: 002132
Date of Filing: September 30, 1990
Frequency of Issue: Bi-Monthly
Number of Issues Published Annually: 6
Annual Subscription Price: \$19.50

Complete Mailing Address of Known Office of Publication: Liberty Publishing, 1532 Sims Way, #1, Port Townsend, WA 98368. Complete Mailing Address of the Headquarters or General Business Office of the Publishers: Liberty Publishing, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368. Full Names and Complete Mailing Address of Publisher, Editor, and Managing Editor: R. W. Bradford (publisher & editor), Timothy Virkkala (managing editor), Liberty Publishing, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368. Owner: Liberty Publishing, R. W. Bradford, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368. Known Bondholders, Mortgagees, and Other Security Holders: None
Total Number of Copies Printed—(average issue during preceding twelve months): 5317; (issue nearest filing date): 5300. Sales Through Dealers and Carriers, Street Vendors and Counter Sales—(average): 454; (issue nearest filing date): 600. Mail Subscription—(average): 4138; (issue nearest filing date): 4160. Total Paid Circulation—(average): 4592; (issue nearest filing date): 4760. Free Distribution by Mail, Carrier or Other Means, Samples, Complimentary, and Other Free Copies—(average): 21; (issue nearest filing date): 27. Total Distribution—(average): 4613; (issue nearest filing date): 4787. Copies Not Distributed, Office Use, Left Over, Unaccounted, Spoiled after Printing—(average): 615; (issue nearest filing date): 513. Return from News Agents—(average): 88; (issue nearest filing date): 0. Total—(average): 5317; (issue nearest filing date): 5300.

I certify that the statements made by me above are correct and complete: (signed) R. W. Bradford (publisher)

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she stood and watched. When he was finished, the shrill, liquid chant of the peepers was the only sound for miles.

"God damn you," he said quietly. "God damn you, April."

"All right. Could we please go home now?"

With parched, hard-breathing mouths, with wobbling heads and shaking limbs, they settled themselves in the car like very old and tired people.

After a few of these scenes, the reader begins to feel shaky and old, too, but the shakiness and the oldness are rewarding, because they result from witnessing one of the most intense renderings of individual experience in American fiction.

And despite its focus on the lives of two people, despite its refusal to be *War and Peace*, *Revolutionary Road* manages to provide a full and exact depiction of the world surrounding its central characters. All the vapid conformity of their world, all of its horrifying pretense at cheerfulness, all of its secret pathos and heroism—everything is revealed and precisely named. *Revolutionary Road* is the rare work of fiction that is equally good at capturing the atmosphere of the bedroom and the atmosphere of the business office. It is also the rare work of fiction that holds attention both by its continuous seriousness and by its virtually continuous effects of ironic comedy. Look into it. —Stephen Cox

The Feminine Mystic — Robert Anton Wilson is one of my personal heroes. *Illuminatus!*, the novel he wrote with Robert Shea, was the major force in my own intellectual development, helping me toward an inchoate anti-state philosophy as an early adolescent. Wilson once claimed his goal in writing *Illuminatus!* was to make the state an object of ridicule for all educated men, just as Voltaire had intended *Candide* to render the Church. If all educated men would read it, Wilson's goal might yet be achieved. Contained within the novel's wonderfully picaresque and phantasmagorical plot is a witty and thorough assault on the psychology of dominance in all its manifestations, especially its most grotesquely hypertrophied—government.

Some of Wilson's attitudes have prevented him from achieving widespread respect from libertarians. He once de-

scribed the difference between himself and certain orthodox libertarians as being that he doesn't hate poor people. His compassion for them has allowed him to embrace economic notions—from Henry George, Silvio Gesell, Buckminster Fuller and even Ezra Pound—which fall beyond the pale of *laissez-faire*. His curiosity about subjects such as UFOs and ritual magic have lumped him, in some people's opinions, with the "new age" crystalheads. He doesn't deserve this pigeonholing; his mind is skeptical and scientific enough to question all dogma, whatever the source, whether ostensibly mys-

tic or scientific.

His latest book, *Ishtar Rising* (Las Vegas; Falcon Press/Golden Dawn Publications, 1989, 182 pp., \$12.95) is an exploration of the rise and fall of the "feminine" principle in human cultures; he associates the feminine principle with political and social attitudes conducive to freedom. The book is a rewrite of an earlier work, *The Book of the Breast* (Playboy Press, 1974), and he uses social attitudes toward the breast as a synchronistic touchstone for the level of matriarchal, open, freedom-loving values in a culture.

With his typical eclecticism, he

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brings in Freudianism, troubadour love poetry, Eleanor of Aquitaine, Charles Dickens, and the history of chess in his attempt to show the connection between love for and openness about the female breast and the acceptance of freedom and intellectual openness as social values.

Wilson does not argue for a cause-effect relationship; he merely notes that certain trends seem to dovetail together, for whatever as-yet-unspecified reason. Call it speculative social anthropology, if you will.

The book ranges so far in its 182 pages that you could call it a lot of things. It always remains entertaining and intriguing, like everything Wilson writes. And it always shows a genuine passionate love for freedom from oppression, including the oppression of mindless tradition. This is another thing that makes him unbeloved of the *paleo* wing of the libertarian movement. Wilson is a proud defender of psychic and sexual freedom as much as of freedom from minimum wage laws. And he is skilled enough a writer to make the reader feel in their hearts the fierce indignation of which Jonathan Swift spoke on his tombstone—the indignation that lacerated his heart and spurred him to serve human liberty. Any writer that can communicate this feeling is worthy of respect and attention.

—Brian Doherty

Two Hits — Long after his career as a slugging first-baseman had ended, Cap Anson solicited employment in vaudeville with the catchy slogan, "A

better actor than any ball-player; a better ball-player than any actor." The problem with his claim (aside from twice eliding the word "other") is that the intersection of the universe of actors and the universe of ball players had but one member, which renders his claim trivial.

The same is true for the intersection of competent historians and biographers of baseball players. Until recently, biographies of ball players were left to sportswriters, i.e. to pseudo-journalists interested in a good story but unburdened by interest in truth.

That is why those interested in both history and baseball celebrated the publication of Charles C. Alexander's biographies of two of the game's dominant figures from the first two decades of this century, *Ty Cobb* (New York, Oxford: 1984) and *John McGraw* (New York, Viking: 1988). Both are well-researched biographies that try to sort out the truth from the stories of sportswriters.

Cobb and McGraw flourished in the pre-Ruthian era in baseball. In the 19th century, runs were created as much by baserunning and taking advantage of fielding errors (fielding gloves were a novelty and much less elaborate than today) as by hitting. In 1903, three developments reduced the role of hitting even more: home plate was widened from 12 inches to 17 inches, thereby increasing a pitcher's options; foul balls were counted as strikes unless a batter already had two strikes, and the spitball—a murderously difficult pitch to hit—was invented. For the first two decades of this century, the game was characterized by a paucity of scoring, the contest was as much intellectual as physical, and a premium was placed on single-minded devotion to winning both the intellectual and physical game. That era ended with the invention of the home run in the early 1920s, spurred on by the criminalization of the spitball and the juicing up of the baseball. The game in the "dead ball" era is difficult for most baseball fans to understand, let alone appreciate. Alexander in both cases does a credible job of recalling it.

The traditional baseball biography takes the form of a lengthy concatenation of anecdotes, some true and some

not, with a sprinkling of statistical data mixed in, concluding with a moral for readers. During the 1960s and 1970s a new form emerged: debunking biography, as exemplified by John McCallum's *Ty Cobb* (New York, Praeger: 1975) and Ken Sobol's *Babe Ruth & the American Dream* (New York, Random House, 1974). While these were more credible than the traditional biographies, their lack of scholarly rigor allowed them to perpetuate myth, though less blatantly than traditional biographies.

Alexander has established himself, by default, as the premier biographer of the National Pastime. His emergence coincides with baseball's sabermetric revolution, in which analysts have looked beyond century-old shibboleths and strategies and begun to subject baseball to scientific investigation.

Alexander's prose sometimes betrays his academic background (past books include such page-turners as *Here the Country Lies: Nationalism and the Arts in Twentieth Century America* and *This New Ocean: A History of Project Mercury*.) One is tempted to say that the intersection of fine baseball writers and competent baseball biographers is a null set. But Alexander manages to rise above his academic sensibilities. He closes his biography of McGraw evocatively and perceptively:

Throughout his career, whether as player or manager, he remained willing to do anything—or almost anything—to win a ballgame. That ethic made him a relentless, ruthless, sometimes less-than-honest man, sometimes a very stupid one. Demanding and dictatorial with his players, he could also be cruel and unjust. Off the field he often exhibited those same traits, at the same time that he could show abiding kindness and outrageous generosity. A bon vivant and a genuine international celebrity, he took little care of his health, lived his life generally as he pleased, and probably enjoyed himself most of it. He wasn't of our time—he probably wouldn't have wanted to be. But he's worth remembering.

If one wants to get a feel for what baseball was like in the early years of this century when it was becoming the nation's pastime, there is no better way than to read these two biographies.

—R.W. Bradford

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Terra Incognita

London, England

There is no statute of limitations on treason, as reported by the Grand Rapids (Mich.) *Press*:

George Washington has been found innocent of treason against the British crown in a mock trial that featured real British and American judges and lawyers and actors playing historical figures. The audience of 280, who paid \$34 each to watch the trial, waved tiny colonial American flags as the verdict was announced.

Havana

Proof that the Trabant was only a stage on the way to the perfection of socialist automotive technology, as reported in the Seattle *Post-Intelligencer*:

Horse-drawn carts have not yet appeared on downtown Havana streets, but they may soon: The official Communist Party daily *Granma* announced this month that 300 wagons are being built at the Nuevas Tecnicas El Morro factory in the city's Berroa industrial section. The factory is also producing 300 three-wheel carts that will be drawn by men, to replace gas-consuming vehicles.

Providence, R.I.

Disturbing evidence of either a senatorial coverup or an executive branch conspiracy, as reported in the Boston *Globe*:

Senator Claiborne Pell of Rhode Island has disciplined an aide for using paranormal experiments as a reason for warning the Pentagon that President Bush and other top leaders may be disclosing a secret code word in their speeches. The aide claimed that the word "Simone" can be heard when recorded speeches by President George Bush, Defense Secretary Dick Cheney, and Secretary of State James Baker are played backwards.

Costa Mesa, Calif.

News from the front in the War Against Androgyny, as reported in the Orange County (Calif.) *Register*:

Female bodybuilders Lorie Sencer, 28, and Bridget Morton, 20, were stopped by police officers as they were coming out of the women's restroom during a Billy Idol concert. "I told the cops 'We're women. Look at our breasts,'" Sencer said. Two staff members at the theater were ordered by the officers to examine Morton. "They took her into the first aid tent, and made her drop her pants," Sencer said.

Brockton, Mass.

Disturbing evidence that law enforcement officials lack the opportunity to view public service announcements, from the Detroit *News*:

Authorities in Brockton, Massachusetts dismissed about 380 drug-related cases after former Police Chief Richard Sproules pleaded guilty to stealing about \$170,000 in cocaine from the police department's evidence room. Sproules said he used cocaine every day for five years after trying some of the samples he took to anti-drug lectures.

San Diego

Specimen of the sort of verse that helped attract the votes of more than 85,000 American citizens for the candidacy of Dan Kripke, Democratic nominee for Congress in California's 41st district, from the Hon. Mr. Kripke's official campaign comic book:

Let's keep our waterfalls, mountains, and air
Forever pure, our coastline free from oil.
Let's clean up all the toxic waste. Prepare
A plan for managed growth. Then we can foil
Developers, who want to jam our roads
And overflow our beaches, parks and schools.
We all must vote for stronger building codes.
Our quality of life must set the rules.

Lobetal, Germany

Innovation in retirement benefits for former heads of state, as reported in the Seattle *Times*:

Erich Honecker, the deposed head of the East German Communist government was declared homeless, and given a place to stay in a residential center for the mentally ill operated by Lutheran minister Uwe Holmer and his wife, Sigrid. "He was very friendly," Frau Holmer said, "but for us it was at first difficult."

Oakland, Calif.

The synergistic relationship between democracy and religion in the Golden State, as reported in the Los Angeles *Times*:

Two days before the election, the Rev. Frank Pinkard offered a final exhortation to his flock: "If any of you all vote for Pete Wilson, let that be the last thing in the world you confess to me. I'll forgive you for going to Reno or Tahoe and playing the slot machines with the church money. I may even forgive you for drinking a little Jim Beam now and then. But the one thing I have problems forgiving you for is voting for Pete Wilson."

Chamonix, France

Objective evidence of the incompatibility of naturism and mountaineering, as reported in the Detroit *News*:

A music teacher from Paris froze to death on Mont Blanc while meditating in the nude, police said Wednesday. The body of Ghislaine Sanchez, 37, was found near a glacier at 6000 feet. Doctors said the woman apparently was practicing one of the forms of meditation originating in Japan and Tibet that involves exposure to extreme cold.

Nesquehoning, Penn.

Evidence of the psychological diagnostic skills of law enforcement officials, as reported in the Lehigh (Pa.) *Times News*:

Nesquehoning police have cited Warren Hoffman, 29, of 107 Mill St., for causing a public inconvenience over the weekend. He reportedly was playing loud music, shouting obscenities, and barking at the moon. Police said they believe Hoffman was lonely.

(Readers are encouraged to forward news clippings or other documents for publication in *Terra Incognita*.)



1990 FREEDOM DAILY AND OTHER ARTICLES FROM FFF

1. 1990 ISSUES OF *FREEDOM DAILY*

(Photocopies)

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January: "An Introductory Message" from Jacob G. Hornberger; "An Introductory Message" from Richard M. Ebeling; "Self-Reliance" by Ralph Waldo Emerson; and RME's review of *The New Realities* by Peter F. Drucker.

February: "Fighting Plunder with Plunder in Poland" by JGH; "Free Market Money—Instead of Political Manipulation" by RME; "Visions and Ideals" by James Allen; and RME's review of *Discovery, Capitalism and Distributive Justice* by Israel Kirzner.

March: "Forget the Alamo (and the Flag)!" by JGH; "On the Edge of Hyperinflation in Brazil" by RME; and RME's review of *Free Persons and the Common Good* by Michael Novak.

April: "The U.S. Government—Guilty as Charged" by JGH; "The Economics of the Drug War" by RME; "The Morality of Drug Controls" by Thomas Szasz; "An Open Letter to Bill Bennett" by Milton Friedman.

May: "Dying for Freedom in Panama" by JGH; "Panama and the Canal: Children of American Imperialism and Socialism" by RME; "The Conquest of the United States by Spain" by William Graham Sumner; "Patriotism" by Herbert Spencer.

June: "Democracy vs. Constitutionally Limited Government" by JGH; "Freedom's Greatest Challenge" by RME; "The United States and the Roman Empire" by Lawrence Reed; "We Have Socialism, Q.E.D." by Milton Friedman.

July: "The Forgotten Importance of Civil Liberties" by JGH; "The Heritage of Economic Liberty" by RME; "The Bill of Rights" by Hugo Black; "Give Me Liberty" by Rose Wilder Lane.

August: "The Sanctity of Private Property" by JGH; "Is Liberty Too Extreme?" by RME; "The Income Tax: Root of All Evil" by Frank Chodorov; and RME's review of *Tell the World: What Happened in China and Why* by Liu Binyan.

September: "Letting Go of Socialism" by JGH; "The Impossibility of Socialism" by RME; "Sinking in a Sea of Buts" by Leonard E. Read; and RME's review of *The Awakening of the Soviet Union* by Geoffrey Hosking.

October: "Racism, Control, and Rock and Roll" by JGH; "Racism and the Market Process" by RME; "Discrimination" by F.A. Harper; and RME's review of *Preferential Policies* by Thomas Sowell.

November: "The Vietnam War" by JGH; "Foreign Policy and Foreign Wars" by RME; "Conscription" by Daniel Webster; and RME's review of *Rock Around the Bloc* by Timothy W. Ryback.

December: "Christianity and Freedom" by JGH; "Yes, Virginia, There is No Santa Claus" by RME; "Charity: Biblical and Political" by Russell J. Clinchy; and RME's review of *The Ethics of Redistribution* by Bertrand de Jouvenel.

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