

Liberty

"Liberty is the sovereignty of the individual." – Josiah Warren

The Sociology of Libertarians

by John C. Green & James L. Guth

The Rise of the American State

by Murray N. Rothbard

Understanding Anti-Corporatism

by Tibor R. Machan

Living With The State

essays by Nathan Wollstein and Ethan Waters

Fatal Patterns:

The Libertarian Party in Historical Perspective

by William P. Moulton

Also: Reviews by *Michael Townshend, Mike Holmes, Ross Overbeek, Stephen Cox, and Jonathan Saville;*
and fiction by *Franklin Sanders*



Enlarged

Brilliant Uncirculated Silver Dollars

Less Than \$9 Each!

The recent sharp increases in the prices of precious metals have affected silver only slightly. Silver sold for more than \$50 per ounce during the boom of 1980. But silver has lagged behind gold and platinum during the bull market of the past year, which have seen price increases of more than 45%.

Often referred to as "the poor man's gold," silver offers the small investor an opportunity to acquire a precious metals position at price levels as low as in March 1985, when the gold market hit its bottom.

A problem for investors

For small investors, the best way to invest in silver is in the form of silver coins. And for good reason: silver coins are widely recognized, inexpensive, easy to store, and easy to sell.

For many years, U.S. silver dollars have been the favorite choice of many investors. But today, even the most common date dollars command a price far above their melt value. Currently the most common dollars sell for more than six times their melt value!

Given that huge numismatic premium, where can the small investor turn for his silver coin investment?

Low Cost Solution

"Look north. Old Canadian silver dollars, each containing 0.6 oz. of silver are selling for under \$10 each," writes investment advisor Adrian Day in *Investment Monthly*. "The pre-1967 dollars are big, heavy, real silver-- honest-to-goodness money-- whose value is not subject to investor fads and fancies."

It's easy to see the logic in what Mr Day writes. At present the most common U.S. silver dollars are selling for about \$30 each in rolls of 20 coins. And other common dates sell for as much as \$85 each in quantity. Yet at about \$9 per coin, Canadian silver dollars offer greater rarity at a lower price.

The chart below compares current prices of the most common U.S. silver dollars with the Canadian silver dollar:

Item	Date	Mintage	Price
U.S. Silver Dollar, Morgan type	1921	44,690,000	\$35.00
U.S. Silver Dollar, Peace type	1923	51,737,000	29.75
Canadian Silver Dollar	1965	10,786,596	8.90

As you can see, the Canadian silver dollar sells for about 75% less than the U.S. silver dollar-- despite the fact that the Canadian silver dollar has a far lower mintage. You can buy a "mini-roll" of ten Canadian silver dollars for about the same price as

two of the commonest Morgan silver dollars minted!

For the past two months, Liberty Coin Service has been quietly acquiring Canadian silver dollars. Our buyers have bought carefully and quietly, with close attention to quality.

Thanks to our careful buying, we have been able to accumulate a reasonably large quantity at remarkably low prices. LCS' price is less than \$9 per coin even in lots as small as a ten coin "mini-roll." We invite you to compare our prices and quality!

Act Quickly! The silver market has been very active recently. Our offer is limited to our current inventory, and we have no way of knowing what it will cost us to replace the coins we offer here. Orders will be filled on a first-come, first-served basis. Because we offer Canadian silver dollars at such a remarkably low price, there is a good chance our entire inventory will sell out!

To Reserve Your Purchase call us **Toll-Free** at 1-800-321-1542. (Michigan and Alaska residents call 1-517-351-4720.) Or return the coupon below.

Liberty Coin Service has served investors with lowest prices and immediate shipment of precious metals since 1971. You can call LCS toll free at (800) 321-1542 for quotations on any rare coin or precious metal item, or for an introductory packet of information.

Yes! Please send me the Brilliant Uncirculated, Canada Silver Dollars, pre-1967, that I have indicated below. I understand that every coin is backed by LCS' guarantee of grading and authenticity, and that I may return the coins for a full refund within ten days, with no questions asked.

_____ "Mini Roll" of 10 coins @ \$ 89.50 = _____

_____ Rolls of 20 coins @ 178.00 = _____

_____ Bags of 500 coins @ 4425.00 = _____

Postage & handling _____

Total enclosed _____

Name _____

Address _____

City _____ State _____ ZIP _____

Phone _____

Liberty Coin Service ☎ Toll Free 800-321-1542
300 Frandor Ave, Lansing, MI 48912

Liberty

R. W. Bradford
publisher

Murray N. Rothbard
Douglas Casey
Stephen Cox
Ross Overbeek
R. W. Bradford
associate editors

Timothy Virkkala
assistant editor

Kathleen Bradford
copy editor

Rex F. May
cartoonist

Susan Coleman
circulation

Harold Koski
production

Liberty (ISSN 0894-1408)
is a bi-monthly review of lib-
ertarian and classical lib-
eral thought, culture and
politics. Subscriptions are
\$18.00 for one year, \$32.00
for two years. Send subscrip-
tions, address corrections,
and letters-to-the-editors to:

Liberty
PO Box 1167
Port Townsend, WA
98368

Manuscripts are welcome,
but will be returned only if
accompanied by a SASE.
Queries are encouraged.
Address submissions and
queries to the Assistant Edi-
tor, and send to the above
address.

Copyright © 1987,
by Liberty Publishing.
All rights reserved.

Contents

The Sociology of Libertarians

John C. Green & James L. Guth, page 5

Living With The State

Dilemma of the Gladiators

Nathan Wollstein, page 13

The Apostasy of Robert Nozick

Ethan O. Waters, page 14

Fatal Patterns

The Libertarian Party in Historical Perspective

William P. Moulton, page 18

Understanding Anti-Corporatism

Tibor R. Machan, page 21

Going Home

a story by

Franklin Sanders, page 25

Departments

Reviews

Murray N. Rothbard on the rise of the American State, page 31

Michael Townshend on American culture, page 32

Mike Holmes on Australian history, page 35

Ross Overbeek on the puzzles of philosophy, page 37

Booknotes, page 38

Stephen Cox on Film, page 40

Jonathan Saville on Oliver North as Actor, page 42

Letters, page 4

Contributors, page 45

Terra Incognita, pages 45 & 46

Cartoons, pages 17 & 32

Poetry, by Stephen Cox, page 24

Letters

A Dangerous Animal?

William Moulton is your best provocateur. His remarks on conservatism ("Conservatism Redux") is powerful stuff. Even so, one wonders how starry-eyed libertarians would respond if they faced the same pragmatic considerations as the conservative Reaganites. How would Moulton cope with real-world problems like Tip O'Neal House, a shaky Senate, Soviet Imperialism, and the teeter/totter Supreme Court? Would he, in this situation, hang on like the pit-bull he so resembles as a writer? Would his bite be as effective as his bark?

W.D. Conrad
Lansing, Mich.

A Vote Against Politics

Thanks for the Tom Marshall/Rayo coverage. While his specific program would not suit me personally at all, it does illustrate that freedom is something that each individual creates for himself, not the product of some movement or other communitarian endeavor.

Moulton's review of Hawkins' article was an eye-opener for me. I'd had the impression that, as different as libertarians and conservatives are, they at least shared an approval of free market economics. Now that's in question. It would be interesting to see a rebuttal by one whose claims to speaking for conservatism are at least as strong as Hawkins', provided this doesn't lead to an endless analysis of conservatism in the pages of *Liberty*.

It looks like no matter what happens at the convention in Seattle, there will be many disappointed people. The main benefit may turn out to be a whole new population awakened to the fundamental incongruity of libertarianism and politics, especially state politics. Maybe they'll begin to redirect energies now squandered on politics instead to insulating themselves from the depredations of politics. A consonant side effect would be that if enough people

did this, politics (and the state) would dry up and blow away! (What if they held an election and nobody came!)

John E. Kreznar
Los Angeles, Cal.

Constrained Revisions

I completely disagree with Timothy Virkkala in his review, "On the Shoulders of Hayek," that "Sowell is a first-rate thinker." *A Conflict of Visions* displays a mind full of mental blocks, in fact the very sort of mental blocks that earlier led Sowell to ardent Marxism.

The funny thing about reading *A Conflict of Visions* as a libertarian is you find yourself rooting for the unconstrained vision of Man throughout the first half of the book and then rooting for the "constrained" vision in the second half. Sowell concludes, in the middle of the book, that libertarianism is an inconsistent vision. He admits that there is another possibility, but dismisses it as unworthy of consideration.

The problem is that the book itself is inconsistent. In the first half of the book, the object of constraint is the Individual, but only noneconomic, moral issues are discussed. The unconstrained view holds that the Individual should not be constrained by the State to a particular moral code.

Then in the second half of the book Sowell flip-flops and the object of constraint becomes the State. Now that we are dealing with economic issues, the "unconstrained" vision holds that the State should not be constrained in its constraining of individuals!

Sowell reluctantly admits in the middle of the book that if someone were to approach the issue as an "atomistic" individualist and continue to focus on the individual, rather than on the group, when dealing with economic issues, then libertarians could be seen as a consistent unconstrained vision. His attitude is clearly, though, that that would be a ridiculous approach to take.

The fact is, though, that this is the approach libertarians *do* take. Sowell's refusal to examine this approach dem-

onstrates a giant mental block, not first-rate thinking. Sowell could only overcome the economics of Marxism by viewing the market as a collective in itself that individuals must submit to. He is playing psychological gymnastics in an attempt to rationalize what he finds emotionally uncomfortable about the free market.

Sowell sidesteps the real conflict of visions. As a collectivist, when he sees people, he focuses on the group. Individualists, on the other hand, focus on the individuals. To collectivists, individuals only have significance through their relation to "their" group. To individualists, individuals are important in themselves and are in fact *ends* in themselves.

With George Sarton, "I believe one can divide men into two principal categories: those who suffer the tormenting desire for unity and those who do not." My visions of "the good society" is a bunch of free autonomous agents running around doing as they please. This vision terrifies Sowell.

Terry Inman,
Florissant, Mo.

Debunking Anti-Dunking

"Where," Butler Shaffer asks, "are the anguished cries against Baptists holding children under water until they confess 'I believe'?" Well, as one who has unashamedly called himself a Baptist, I can give the obvious reply: there is no outcry against this sort of abominable behavior because it does not exist! Baptism is something that is freely entered into—as freely as anything can be, and Shaffer's little lie is so ludicrously out of order that, well, it deserves nothing more than a laugh and a *nay*.

Of course, I realize that Shaffer was exaggerating, trying to make a point. I'll go with him only half way, though, and am glad that all libertarians are not so anti-religious as he.

John Reilly
Portland, Ore.

→ more letters on page 30

Survey

The Sociology of Libertarians

by John C. Green & James L. Guth

A truism of political socialization research is that party identification is one of the earliest-formed and most resilient attachments developed by American citizens, comparable in durability to religious ones (Niemi and Jennings, 1981). Children learn their partisan ties from their parents and, with surprising regularity, maintain them into their adult life. When a citizen abandons this early identification, it is usually in favor of independent status, rather than a "conversion" to another party. This parental transmission mechanism is obviously a "conservative" one, tending to maintain existing party alignments over long periods of time.

Although socialization research in the past few years has increasingly concerned itself with post-adolescent political learning, it has not yet come to firm conclusions about the mechanisms of adult change. Nor does the focus of this research extend far beyond "conventional" changes, from partisanship to independence or from attachment to one party to identification with the other major party. Little attention has been devoted to a "deviant" form of change—the choice of a third party identification.

The emergence of an important third party obviously can not be explained by the predominant socialization model. Without parental example and family tradition to constantly fill and renew its ranks, a third party must depend on conversion. Given the absence of any sustained third party movement since the advent of modern socialization research, we have very little understanding of this process. Yet, the frequent conjunction of third parties with party realignments in the American past and the emergence of potential third party groups such as the 1980 Anderson campaign,

This paper was presented at the annual meeting of the South Carolina Political Science Association, College of Charleston, April 2, 1983. Copyright © 1983 by the authors.

the Citizens Party, and the Libertarian Party indicates that such a study might have important implications for the problem of party realignment (Mazmanian, 1978).

This paper will focus upon the political socialization of a third party elite: financial contributors to the growing Libertarian Party, in existence only since the early 1970s. The party hopes that its doctrinal combination of *laissez-faire* and devotion to civil liberties and personal freedom will enable it to replace the Republicans as America's "second" party. The Libertarians garnered respectable presidential votes in 1976 and 1980, ran numerous congressional candidates in 1982, and appear to enjoy considerable organizational vigor. Unlike most notable American third parties, the Libertarians are a "grass roots" movement, rather than an ideological or regional faction of a major party led by a renegade partisan leader. This suggests the existence of true party identification among Libertarian activists.

The data from this paper are derived from a random sample of 100 contributors to the Libertarian National Committee, drawn from Federal Election Commission records. (This is a subsample of a larger group of 4000 contributors to party, ideological, and third party PACS presently under study by the authors.) Although the survey is still in progress, to this point 67 Libertarian activists have answered the extensive 350-item questionnaire and reflected upon their political experience in a number of additional

open-ended responses. Given the high educational level of the respondents, their ideological enthusiasm and convert's zeal, the quality of the responses is extremely good. A substantial minority also sent us lengthy additional accounts of their political pilgrimage, often several densely typed pages long.

The present paper is a preliminary analysis of some of the information generated by the survey. Obviously, such a study must be exploratory, but we will consider three possible "explanations" for the deviant party choice by these activists.

The first explanation for the rise of third party identification involves what might be called a "weak socialization" model. Explicitly, we would expect libertarians (or other third party identifiers) to be drawn from among previously "independent" young voters or from among those with only nominal party allegiances. Such recent entrants into the political system should be "available" for third party mobilization. In addition, we would anticipate that most such recruits would have been politically apathetic prior to their conversion.

Another explanation would focus less on psychological identification and more on the social location of third party activists. Adherence to a new party may be a function of the individual's life experience: high levels of geographical or social mobility, distinctive class status, or particular types of educational and work environments. Such an argument is behind

the often made assertion that American party politics (as well as that of other Western nations) is being remolded, or perhaps entirely transformed, by the social developments of "post-industrial" society, especially the emergence of a "New Class" of symbol manipulators. These men and women have a characteristic set of "post-materialist" values which has led to considerable dissatisfaction with the old party alignments and a search for new party alignments and a search for new attachments more in line with "post-bourgeois" values.

A final possibility is that a third party may result from distinctive "period effects." A major issue or combination of issues drives political activists from their old political moorings into the relatively uncharted seas of third party politics. The Libertarians' appearance during the Vietnam War and the Watergate scandal hints that certain activists might be driven to a major change in allegiance as a result of disenchantment with the results of the political process.

Of course, these explanations are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Changes in the party system may result from interaction of all three factors: new, weakly-socialized entrants into the political process often represent newly-created social groups, which in turn are often especially sensitive to certain political issues. Nevertheless, there is no assurance that these developments occur in concert, and, in fact, each hypothesis represents an alternative emphasis in the political socialization and party realignment literature.

The Weak Socialization Model

Most scholars attempting to connect party realignments with socialization research suggest that realignment becomes possible only with the second or third generation after the previous party system change. The apparent periodicity of realignments every forty years or so makes sense if large numbers of weakly-socialized new voters are available to realigning forces at these intervals. Although the parental transmission mechanism does pass on party identification to some extent, it does not imbue second-generation partisans with the same warmth of feeling that characterizes their parents (Cf. Beck, 1974).

We have no direct way of testing

this explanation, but we can determine whether some of the predicted conditions are met by these converts. As Table 1 indicates, most Libertarian activists are quite young, recent entrants into the political system, with well over half being under 39.

Table 1
Age Distribution of
Libertarian Activists

25-29	10%	(7)
30-34	22%	(15)
35-39	21%	(14)
40-44	10%	(7)
45-49	6%	(4)
50-54	10%	(7)
55-59	7%	(5)
60-64	5%	(4)
65+	6%	(4)

Most Libertarian activists, then, are clearly not part of the New Deal and World War II political generation. Also bear in mind that these activists are drawn from FEC contributor lists of those donating more than \$100 to a political committee. Most such contributors are middle-aged or older; thus, the predominance of younger contributors here is significant.

The relative youthfulness of Libertarian activists is consistent with a "weak socialization" model, but is hardly definitive. We can also look more directly at the question of party history. After asking respondents a standard question on party identification, we asked if they would ever have answered the question differently, and if so, how. If the weak socialization model is correct, we should expect large numbers of former independents among these Libertarians. In fact, as Table 2 indicates, only 13% of the activists once considered themselves independents, with a majority having previously identified with one of the two major parties, most with the GOP.

Table 2
Previous Party Identification
Of Libertarian Activists

Republican	48%	(32)
Independent		
(Leaning to Republicans)	3%	(2)
(Leaning to Neither)	9%	(6)
(Leaning to Democrats)	1%	(1)
Democrat	7%	(5)
Other	13%	(9)
No answer	18%	(12)
	99%	(67)

Of course, some of these were no doubt weak partisans, but much evidence from comments suggests that many others had been very strong Republicans. The remaining respondents include a few young voters who were either socialized into Libertarian identification by parental activists or had been previously apathetic. But for many Libertarians, conversion from one strong, serious identification to another is characteristic.

The impression that many Libertarians are true "converts" from another strongly-held identification is solidified by their willingness to identify their former ideological position. Our respondents often explained to us at great length that our liberal-conservative continuum was outdated and should be replaced by a more sophisticated two dimensional scale emphasizing both classic "New Deal" economic issues and newer questions of "personal freedom." (Libertarians, of course, are opposed to state intervention in either area.) Nevertheless, most explained at length their former ideological position.

Table 3
Previous
Ideological Identification

IDEOLOGY	(N)	(%)
Liberal	13	19
Moderate	16	24
Conservative	23	34
No Information	15	22
	67	100

As Table 3 indicates, Libertarians come from a wide range of ideological backgrounds. The largest single group is former conservatives, but substantial groups of former political moderates and liberals also appear.

There are some bits of evidence, however, that do support the weak socialization model. Only 15% of these activists mention parental influence as a major factor in getting them interested in politics; nor are parents and other family members listed as important sources of political information and analysis. Although comprehensive data is not available from other groups in our study, preliminary analysis indicates that family is much more important in both respects among strong Republican and Democratic identifiers. If many of these Libertarians were once strong partisans

Break Free of Bureaucracy

QUANTITY AMERICA'S GREAT



DEPRESSION by Murray N. Rothbard, Ph.D.

Was the Great Depression the product of unchecked market forces? No, says economist Rothbard, who traces the disastrous effects of government policies which led directly to the Depression and, further, served only to prolong this nightmare.


#9004 346 pp., hardcover, \$19.95
#9007 132 min., 2 cass., \$19.95



ECONOMICS IN ONE LESSON by Henry Hazlitt

The best, most concise introduction to economic principles and the fallacies of government restrictions on peaceful, private enterprise.

#4010 218 pages, paperback, \$7.95
#4011 60 minutes, 1 cassette, \$9.95



SOCIALISM by Ludwig von Mises

A devastating refutation of government central planning, including such topics as property, law, equality, science, religion, family, morality, democracy, war, slavery, monopoly, labor, etc.

#4026 572 pp., hardcover, \$14.95
#4036 86 min., 1 cassette, \$11.95



WORKING FREE: Practical Alternatives to the 9 to 5 Job by John Applegath

Here is a unique handbook to earn the living that makes sense for *your* life, on *your* terms. "An alternative to the robot-like punching of the time clock."—STUDS TERKEL

#1204 207 pp., paperback \$6.95



HOW I FOUND FREEDOM IN AN UNFREE WORLD by Harry Browne

Here's how you can find freedom from government meddling and other barriers to a full and happy life.

#3009 407 pages, paperback, \$6.95



MEGATRENDS by John Naisbitt

#4052 304 pp., paperback, \$5.95
#4023 360 min., 6 cassettes, \$54.95




Please rush me your free catalog of books, audio tapes, video tapes, games, and collectibles.

Method of Payment (Add \$2.50 U.S. Mail/\$4.00 UPS shipping):
(Calif. residents please add appropriate sales tax: 6-7½%)

Check Enclosed VISA MasterCard Am. Express
Card No. _____ Exp. Date _____


Signature _____ Zip _____

MAIL TO: LibertyTree Network 6600 Silacci Way, Dept. I5, Gilroy, CA 95020



ORDER TOLL FREE
1-800-345-2888

Credit card orders only. Call anytime
Ask for a LibertyTree operator.



QUANTITY



LIBERTYTREE NECKTIES

Handsome, all silk—a must for any wardrobe and the perfect gift! (Boxed)



The Statue of Liberty

#1041 Navy with Gold \$24.95
#1042 Maroon with Gold \$24.95



The Thomas Jefferson

#2034 Navy with Silver \$24.95
#2035 Maroon with Silver \$24.95



STICK THE IRS

In this exciting board game, players compete to pay the least taxes through the use of CPAs, tax shelters, and other means, while avoiding audits lurking with every roll of the dice.



#9040 boxed \$14.95

QUANTITY



HOW TO SURVIVE AND PROFIT FROM THE COMING CURRENCY RECALL by Jonathan Rice and Frances Ciabattini

This year, the U.S. Treasury has announced its plan to replace our currency with new money that the government can track throughout the economy. This excellent book shows what results this will have and how you should protect your assets *now*.



#9003 258 pp., hardcover, \$18.95



THE STATE AGAINST BLACKS by Walter Williams, Ph.D.

A penetrating indictment of how government prevents the economic and social development of black Americans, while *unrestricted* neighborhood and business enterprises actually create economic well-being.



#1012 183 pages, hardcover, \$9.95
#1013 60 min., Beta or VHS, \$49.95



OUR ENEMY, THE STATE by Albert Jay Nock

This passionate volume depicts government's harmful intrusions against the peaceful and productive harmony of the free society and the rights of individuals.



#3010 112 pages, paperback, \$7.95



THE ROAD TO SERFDOM by F.A. Hayek

In the book which catapulted him to fame, Nobel Laureate Hayek charts how government controls lead inevitably to more and more controls, destroying individual political and economic freedoms. "Here is a great deal of truth."—GEORGE ORWELL



#4028 248 pages, paperback, \$10.95



THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION by Robert Axelrod

Can cooperation emerge in a world of competing egoists with no central authority? "This book, if read, grasped, and applied, could have a profound effect."—WALL STREET JOURNAL



#3011 241 pages paperback, \$8.95

LibertyTree Network

FREE WITH \$25 MIN. ORDER
THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
& U.S. CONSTITUTION
Special Georgetown U.
Bound Edition

of a major party, that identification probably had other sources than inculcation of family tradition. If those theorists who stress the importance of early childhood association are correct, the lack of such early partisan ties here may explain the willingness of these activists to make a momentous political move. As we shall indicate below, for Libertarians party choice is a particularly intellectual one, not based on pre-rational or a-rational factors.

The Postindustrial Society or "New Class" Model

In recent years, political analysts have focused on the rise of new social groups as a possible source of party realignment in Western societies. Many observers have seen "postindustrial" societies giving birth to new classes, whose occupants share social and political values different from those of "old class" members (Inglehart, 1971; Bruce-Briggs, 1979). Although the specification of "New Class" membership varies by author, most agree that these new occupations include "idea workers" of many sorts. Irving Kristol lists scientists, teachers, educational administrators, journalists and other communications specialists, psychologists, social workers, city planners, lawyers and doctors in the public sector, social scientists, scholars in general, government regulatory officials, high-level government bureaucrats, and intellectuals. These groups share high levels of education, often from prestigious institutions. They also tend toward liberal social political values and do not generally claim traditional religious values.

Most accounts of the "New Class" have stressed its affinity for the political left (Inglehart, 1971). Only recently have some observers begun to argue that elements of the New Class might have a tendency toward political conservatism or, perhaps, for a more unorthodox political orientation. Perhaps the Libertarians are one issue of the development of a new sector of the American voting population. If this is so, we should expect these activists to share certain characteristics identified with New Class themes: they should resemble New Class groups in status background, educational achievement, current occupation, "postmaterial" values, and national—

rather than local—orientation. If Libertarian activists represent a vanguard of new political forces, we may be able to gauge the nature of that movement.

One persistent theme in this literature emphasizes that the social and political values of "New Class" groups are shaped by "post-material" orientations. New status groups not only represent the cutting edge of economic developments, but they come from a generation in which mere survival and personal comfort are taken for granted because of postwar prosperity. As we noted earlier, Libertarian activists are part of the post-war generation. And, as Table 4 indicates, Libertarian activists are drawn overwhelmingly from comfortable family backgrounds.

Table 4
Social Class Background
of Libertarian Activists

Father's Occupation:		
Farmer	12%	(8)
Manual laborer	9%	(6)
Skilled trades	7%	(5)
Clerical, Sales	7%	(5)
Professional	28%	(19)
Business	30%	(20)
No Information	6%	(4)
	99%	(67)

Their families' relative affluence, according to Inglehart, means that these activists are free to pursue social and political goals which "no longer have a direct relationship to the imperatives of economic security" (1971, 991).

At first glance, the current income of these activists might seem to contradict this picture of freedom from material concerns. As Table 5 suggests, Libertarians are generally above the poverty line, but in comparison with most PAC contributors they appear virtually impoverished.

Table 5
Income of Libertarian Activists

Less than \$20,000	6%	(4)
\$20,000 to \$29,999	18%	(12)
\$30,000 to \$39,999	24%	(16)
\$40,000 to \$49,999	9%	(6)
\$50,000 to \$74,999	9%	(6)
\$75,000 to \$99,999	6%	(4)
Over \$100,000	22%	(15)
No information	6%	(4)
	100%	(67)

Still, it should be kept in mind that most of these activists are young, just beginning their careers. Hence, their relatively modest incomes may not influence their perceptions about their personal economic situation. In fact, that seems to be the case. Fully 78% of the respondents said that their personal and financial situation has improved over the past decade; only 6% said that it had declined. Few other groups of respondents demonstrate such an overwhelming positive assessment. They are also overwhelmingly optimistic about prospects for the country.

If these Libertarians come from comfortable backgrounds, do they also represent the "modern middle class" (Inglehart), the "New Class" of knowledge workers? Or are they found in more traditional middle-class occupations? Are they, in other words, part of a new or old social stratum? If we look at their educational backgrounds, we find that they do exhibit very imposing absolute levels of education.

Table 6
Education of Libertarian Activists

	(%)	(N)
Less than 12 years	0	0
High school graduate	3	2
Some college or trade school	13	9
College graduate	36	24
Some Graduate work	48	32
	100	67

Of course, political activists are generally well-educated, but the fact that one-half of these activists have done at least some graduate work is quite impressive. Almost a quarter have Ph.D.s. Quite obviously, these individuals share many of the educational characteristics of the New Class. Indeed, this finding is consistent with those of Lillie and Maddox (1981), whose secondary analysis of CPS election data reveals that those voters sharing "Libertarian" values (in favor of both civil liberties and economic laissez-faire) are drawn disproportionately from among the highly-educated.

One aspect of education that has received less attention is the type of education possessed by New Class members. Following some hints from Ladd & Lipset's (1975) study of the politics of American academics, we hypothesized that not all higher education

would orient New Class members toward the Left or (in the American context) toward the Democratic Party. (Cf. Inglehart, 1971, 1009-1115). If students in particular majors emulate their professors—or at least replicate their political values—the sciences, technology, business, and perhaps other areas might incline some members of the new Class in a conservative or, perhaps, other unconventional direction.

As Table 7 reveals, libertarians are drawn disproportionately from certain types of educational environments.

Table 7
College Majors
of Libertarian Activists

Major	(%)	(N)
Science	20	13
Mathematics	18	12
Humanities	17	11
Engineering, Electronics	15	10
Economics and Business	14	9
Social Sciences	9	6
Education	3	2
"General"	3	2
	100	67

Libertarians are drawn primarily from scientific, mathematical, and technical fields, with a sprinkling of business and economics majors. Humanists and social science majors are fairly rare. (These latter groups, it should be noted, bulk very large among John Anderson's 1980 supporters and among Citizen party activists—often considered harbingers of the political New Class in America.)

The attraction of Libertarianism to graduates in scientific and technical fields is rather intriguing. There are several possible explanations for this relationship. First, the economic "conservatism" of such graduates has often been explained by selective recruitment of scientists, engineers and technical personnel from essentially middle-class homes. Furthermore, both scientific academics and their students are likely to have more contact with the business community, even during training, and thus might be more influenced by business values of entrepreneurial freedom (Cf. Ladd and Lipset, 1975, 55-92). At the same time, the inherently critical scientific worldview might lead to a similar emphasis on personal autonomy and freedom in thinking about social values. Indeed, Libertarian thought is influenced not only by classical liberal

ideas, but by the "scientific" rationalism of Ayn Rand's "Objectivist" philosophy. Although such speculation is really beyond the purview of this paper, we may note that social scientists have just begun to explore the implications of educational background for political ideologies. (See, for a good example, Wuthnow, 1976, 112-123.)

Given their choices of academic majors, the occupations of Libertarian activists should come as no surprise. As Table 8 indicates, Libertarians are located primarily in new scientific and technical jobs, with a considerable number in small business enterprises—most of which are "new technology" firms. Notably absent are the other "half" of the New Class: government workers, media people, academic specialists, and other intellectuals. (These latter types do, however, show up heavily in the Anderson and Citizen Party subsamples.)

Table 8
Occupations
of Libertarian Activists

Occupation	(%)	(N)
Computer-related	18	12
Engineering	10	7
Managerial	10	7
Small Business Owners	9	6
Scientific and Technical	9	6
Medical Professionals	9	6
Law	9	6
Teachers	6	4
Farm Owners	3	2
Factory Workers	3	2
Nonprofit Institutions	3	2
Commercial Pilots	3	2
Sales	1	1
Investor	1	1
Federal Worker	1	1
	100	67

Thus, Libertarians do represent one part of a developing social stratum of "knowledge workers."

The Libertarian activists also exhibit the sort of information search to be expected of New Class members. Not only are reported sources of information dominated heavily by books and periodicals, rather than by the mass media, but Libertarian literature is very prominent. As the general political environment is full of "signals" from a two-party communications process, third-party activists come to rely on a communications network comprised of specialized "Libertarian" sources. Table 9 illustrates this graphically.

Table 9
Sources of Information on Politics
"How important are the following sources of information in helping you make up your mind on political issues?"

Source	% "Very Important"
Books	63
Opinion Magazines	46
Political Newsletters	33
Friends	13
Family	10
Newspapers	7
Work Associates	1
News Magazines	1
Clergymen, TV News, Radio	
News, Trade Associations, Union	0
or Professional Publications	0
No source "Very Important"	18
Missing Case	1

As befits "New Class" intellectuals, Libertarians derive information from Party newsletters, books and journals such as *Inquiry* and *Reason*. Also, some Libertarians report relying at times on the understandings and expertise of friends—but only if they are Libertarians.

Do these activists have an affinity for a new set of "post materialist" values? One frequently noted characteristic of New Class values systems is secularism, evidenced by the lack of traditional religious beliefs and affiliation (Cf. Inglehart, 1971; Kirkpatrick, 1979). We asked our respondents for their religious preference. Table 10 reveals the responses of Libertarians.

Table 10
Religious Identification
of Libertarian Activists

Preference	%
None	58
"New Religions"	13
Unitarian/Reform Jew	12
Mainline Protestant	10
Roman Catholic	4
Conservative Protestant	1

Libertarians are overwhelmingly unconventional in their religious identifications. Although some Libertarian thinkers insist that orthodox Christian belief is compatible with Libertarian Party identification (Rothbard, 1980), the Party has certainly not done well in attracting such supporters, at least at the activist level. Indeed, many Libertarians are not only a-religious, but militantly antireligious, as indicated by extensive write-in comments. At least in this respect, Libertarian values differ from those of the Old (Middle) Class. Indeed, Libertarian values are distinctive. We asked respondents a modified version of a Gallup question about what aspects of life are impor-

tant. The resulting comparisons between Libertarians and the American public as a whole are revealing.

Table 11
Libertarian Values

Value	% Answering "Very Important"		
	Lib (10,9)	Public (10,9)	Public (10,9,8)
Freedom to do what I want	97	73	86
Good physical health	84	81	92
Good family life	82	82	93
Living up to potential	78	71	86
Interesting job	72	68	83
Strict moral code	47	47	63
Working to better America	46	51	71
Personal security	40	--	--
Having enough leisure	19	36	58
Having many friends	18	54	69
Having a high income	18	37	58
Nice car, home, belongings	15	39	58
Following God's will	10	61	73
Social recognition	1	22	37

Note: public attitudes are drawn from the Gallup Poll (Princeton Religion Center, *Religion In America*, 1982, pp. 141-159). The first Public column represents scores of 10 or 9 on Gallup's 10 point scale; the second represents scores of 10, 9, or 8. To us the latter grouping would seem to be more comparable to our "very important" category.

Whether one looks at the first or second column of public responses to these questions, the Libertarians still come out being more concerned with the value of personal freedom and less concerned with material well-being, doing God's will, friendship and social recognition, and working to better America. For the most part, Libertarians prefer an individualistic version of "postmaterial" values.

Two other pieces of evidence support the general picture thus far presented. Libertarian activists are very mobile, in line with the usual picture of the "New Class." Despite their relative youth, they had lived in an average of 3 different states since age 21. This mobility, together with their high level of education suggests that Libertarians are largely "cosmopolitan" rather than "locals," to use Robert Merton's classic distinction. To test this possibility, we looked at Libertarians' responses to a question on local community involvement. Table 12 compares Libertarians with two New Right groups, contributors to the National Conservative Political Action Committee and to Christian Right groups.

Table 12
Community Involvement

	"How active are you in local community affairs?"		
	Very Active	Occasionally	Rarely
Libertarian	6%	39%	55%
NCPAC	21%	41%	37%
Christian Right	46%	36%	18%

Libertarians are much less active in local affairs than adherents of the two New Right groups. Although part of the difference is no doubt due to the youth of the Libertarians, not all of it is. In fact, virtually all are very active in national elections and other forms of political activity.

In reviewing the data on the Libertarians' social characteristics one is impressed with the degree to which they do represent a special set of New Class traits. Whether the growing numbers of other members of this class will join them in a new party to express these status concerns and value orientations is not clear. But it should be noted that the values of these enthusiasts differ only in degree from those of many other American who share their social and demographic characteristics (Cf. Princeton Religion Center, 1982).

The Period Effects or "New Issues" Model

Another explanation for the rise of the Libertarian Party looks to the political agenda of the period in which the new movement appeared. Perhaps disenchantment with particular national policies of one or both major parties, or disillusionment with the course of American politics prompted many individuals to seek a political vehicle in a third party.

The standard CPS political cynicism questions might be useful in tapping generalized discontent. As Table 13 demonstrates, political activists generally have relatively high levels of cynicism (as does the contemporary public), but Libertarians are unequalled in their distrust of the government in Washington.

Table 13

Political Cynicism

"How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right?"

	most of the time	only some of the time	seldom or never
Libertarians	0%	60%	40%
Republicans	39%	61%	0%
Democrats	39%	61%	0%

Note: none of the respondents answered "always."

Fully four in every ten Libertarians wrote in a response that you could seldom or never trust government to do what is right. (None of our first hundred Republicans or Democrats felt impelled to modify our closed-ended question in this way.) Ironically, Liber-

tarians are very trusting of people, with an overwhelming 87% saying that you can trust ordinary people "most of the time," perhaps supporting the contention that Libertarians have an excessively optimistic view of human nature (Rothbard, 1980).

In any case, Libertarians have developed a great distrust of government. As a partial measure of the impact of recent political issues on the activation of these Libertarians, we asked our respondents the source of their initial political involvement. As noted above, most Libertarians became active during their early twenties and seem not to have been motivated by family tradition of involvement. Their age and the timing of this activism suggests that the great issues of the 1960s and 1970s may have had a special effect. Table 14 shows the reasons Libertarians give for becoming interested in politics.

Table 14
Source of Interest in Politics

Source of interest	Mentions	% of Mentions	% of Sample
Economic Situation	31	25	46
War	24	20	30
Civil liberties	14	11	21
Libertarian literature	12	10	18
Family member	10	8	15
Friends	10	8	15
Candidate	9	7	13
Teacher	6	5	9
Domestic political issue	3	2	4
Foreign policy issue	2	2	3
Government program	2	2	3

Both the tabulated responses and many write-in comments demonstrate that the Vietnam War and the economic crises of the past two decades were the prime sources of Libertarian involvement and dissatisfaction with the two major parties, both of which were perceived as too ready to undertake imperialistic foreign adventures and interventionist domestic policies. Furthermore, many Libertarians indicated some personal experience as the basis of their involvement: either a confrontation with the draft or with Federal regulatory agencies. Obviously, issues had the effect of dislodging these activists from not only their political apathy, but from their previous (and in some cases, nominal) partisan identification.

Conclusion

Although this preliminary analysis can not eliminate any of the three possible explanations for the develop-

Are Two Different Visions Tearing Our World Apart?

Thomas Sowell is at it again.

Over the last two decades he has taken on and demolished a mountain of myths in one area after another. Now he's turned in another blockbuster that breaks new ground with an originality of perspective and a boldness of style that will make everyone, left and right alike, sit up and take notice.

It's a book that will be hotly debated, examined, contested and turned inside-out. Because this time Sowell looks at political conflicts as they have raged for generations,

and he has uncovered the remarkable fact that these conflicts have been dominated by two opposing visions that reflect radically different assumptions about the nature of man! On virtually every issue they line up on opposite sides, no matter how unrelated the issues. *The very meaning of such words as "freedom," "equality," "rights" and "power" differs drastically from one vision to the next.*

So different are these two visions that often people from one camp cannot even understand what those from another are talking about. But that hasn't stopped them from threatening to tear apart societies and egging on the world to potential disaster.

Why? Because as Thomas Sowell points out, visions are powerful things. They underlie our ideologies and our political positions, and they may motivate us more than money, power or fame. People will kill for them and die for them. Indeed, *"We will do almost anything for our visions except think about them."*

The purpose of this book is to help us think about them.

- Why do concepts like "freedom," "equality," "rights," and "power" have such different meanings to different people?



- Can these differences ever be resolved?
- Why are failed visions in the natural sciences so much easier to abandon than in the social sciences?
- What makes some people undergo radical conversions?
- How does evidence influence vision?
- Are visions stronger than self-interest?
- How do those with one vision regard those with another?

A Conflict of Visions

Ideological Origins of Political Struggles

THOMAS SOWELL
author of MARXISM

This readable and controversial book is bound to become a classic. Order your copy today!

ORDER TOLL-FREE
1-800-238-2200
ext. 500

Charge your Visa or MasterCard
Continental U.S.
★ 24 hours a day ★
7 days a week

MONEY BACK GUARANTEE
If for any reason you are dissatisfied with any book, just return it within 30 days for a refund.

Please send me _____ copies
of A CONFLICT OF VISIONS

\$13⁹⁵

POSTPAID

Order
#TS4576

TOTAL

Send your order to:

LAISSEZ FAIRE BOOKS

Dept. LIA 632 Broadway,
New York, NY 10012

- Send me your FREE 32-page catalog of books on liberty.
 Check or Money order MasterCard Visa

Card No. _____

Exp. Date _____

Signature _____

Name (Print) _____

Street _____

City _____

State/Zip _____

ment of Libertarian Party identification in these activists, the data does offer intriguing hints. Libertarians are young, relatively recent entrants into the political process. Most seem to have acquired some degree of conventional party identification during their youths—most were not part of the growing wave of independents—but other evidence suggests that their partisanship was not always deep-seated. This, then, indicates some support for the "weak socialization" model.

The evidence points more clearly

to the Libertarian activists as a part of the much-heralded New Class of "knowledge workers," characterized by high levels of specialized education and possessing distinct sets of "postmaterial" social and personal values. Although much more work needs to be done to specify the relationship between these background traits and libertarian ideas, the distinctiveness of these activists suggests that New Class theorists may be on to something, but that New Class values may be creating pressures on the Right side of the party system as well as on the Left.

Finally, the times and issues also seem to have their influence. Libertarians were especially activated by the war, the economic crises of the past fifteen years, and, in some cases, by concerns over civil liberties. Of course, Libertarians react to these issues in ways influenced by their social and intellectual history. For this portion of the New Class, at least, the experiences of the Vietnam War and economic dislocations led to the conclusion that government itself, in all forms, was the chief danger to both free individuals and free society. Why certain individuals were predisposed to accept the Libertarian answer for these questions raised by the sixties and seventies remains to be answered. □

Center for Libertarian Studies

Occasional Papers Series

1. **Methodology of the Austrian School**, Lawrence H. White. An historical study of the development of the subjectivist method of economic analysis. The focal point of Austrian analysis is the purposeful, acting individual, rather than aggregates or other "macro" constructs.
2. **The Production of Security**, Gustave de Molinari (translated by J. Huston McCulloch). A coherent and logically argued proposal for free-market defense services by a leading 19-century French laissez-faire economist.
3. **Toward a Reconstruction of Utility and Welfare Economics**, Murray N. Rothbard. A close critical inspection of the assumptions underlying orthodox welfare economics with a call for a sounder basis upon which to ground policy analysis.
4. **The Political Economy of Liberal Corporatism**, J.R. Stromberg, R.A. Child, Jr., R. Alexander. Historical investigations into the decline of market capitalism and the rise of State capitalism in early 20th-century America.
5. **Theory of Classical Liberal 'Industrielisme'**, Augustin Thierry (translated by Mark Weinburg). Observations on individual liberty by a major historian and social analyst of the French Restoration.
6. **Why the Futile Crusade?**, Leonard P. Liggio. A critique of capitalism's preeminent "contradiction"—its alleged dependence on foreign adventurism and exploitation—from the perspective of the American "Old Right," or classical liberal, position.
7. **The Clash of Group Interests and Other Essays**, Ludwig von Mises. Explains the process by which market arrangements for social and economic coordination have historically been supplanted by State power and an ultimate reversion to new forms of caste society.
8. **The Austrian Theory of the Trade Cycle and Other Essays**, Ludwig von Mises, Gottfried Haberler, Murray N. Rothbard, Friedrich A. Hayek. Theoretical analyses of business fluctuations and the effects of inflation. Highlighted are such Austrian concepts as the role of relative prices, faulty expectations and the misdirection of capital and labor brought on by monetary disturbances.
9. **Medical Malpractice: The Case for Contract**, Richard A. Epstein. Observes that recent trends in malpractice law point toward a reversion to forms of law characteristic of a status society. A case is made for putting the doctor-patient relationship on a sounder, contractual basis.
10. **Frank S. Meyer: The Fusionist as Libertarian**, Murray N. Rothbard. Demonstrates that the late conservative political theorist, F.S. Meyer, was basically a libertarian and that Meyer's Fusionism breaks down under analysis to either libertarianism or traditional conservatism.

All papers are \$4.00 each. The complete set of 10 papers can be purchased for \$35.00.

Non-U.S.: Please add \$.85 postage for each paper ordered; or \$3.50 for the complete set. Please send U.S. Dollars only.

Center for Libertarian Studies

P.O. Box 4091 Burlingame, California 94011 (415) 342-6569

References

- Beck, Paul Allen. 1974. "A Socialization Theory of Partisan Realignment." In *The Politics of Future Citizens*, by Richard G. Niemi and associates. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.
- Bruce-Briggs, B. 1979. *The New Class?* New Brunswick: Transaction Books.
- Inglehart, Ronald. "The Silent Revolution in Europe: The Intergenerational Change in Post-Industrial Society." *American Political Science Review* 65 (December): 991-1017.
- Jennings, M. Kent, and Richard J. Niemi. 1981. *Generations and Politics*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Kirkpatrick, Jeanne. 1979. "Politics and the New Class." pp. 33-48 in the *New Class?* ed. by Bruce-Briggs.
- Ladd, Everett Carl, Jr., and Seymour Lipset. 1975. *The Divided Academy: Professors and Politics*. New York: W.W. Norton.
- Lilie, Stuart A., and William S. Maddox. 1981. "An Alternative Analysis of Mass Belief Systems: Liberal, Conservative, Populist, and Libertarian." *Cato Institute Policy Analysis*, Washington D. C.
- Mazmanian, Daniel A. 1978. "Third Parties in Presidential Elections." Pp. 305-317 in *Parties and Elections in an Anti-Party Age*, ed. by Jeff Fishel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Princeton Religion Research Center. 1982. *Religion in America—1982*. Princeton: PRRC.
- Rothbard, Murray. 1980. "Myth and Truth About Libertarianism." *Modern Age* (Winter): 9-15.
- Wuthnow, Robert. 1976. *The Consciousness Reformation*. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Problems

Living With The State

Two essays on moral difficulties encountered by libertarians living in a statist society.

The Dilemma of the Gladiators

Nathan Wollstein

How should a libertarian live and act in a non-libertarian world? Can he live up to his moral standards and avoid the charge of hypocrisy?

Nearly every libertarian has faced a charge something like this: "You say you're a libertarian, but you use the public libraries, the roads, the utilities, and so forth. Aren't you yourself indirectly benefiting from the coercion of many people?"

These accusations should make every libertarian who takes morality seriously pause and feel at a least little uneasy. How can one answer them?

What about the libertarian attending or teaching at a public school or university? I often see that a libertarian author teaches at some public university and wonder whether he feels any qualms about getting paid out of public funds raised through taxation, an inherently coercive process.

What about the libertarian businessman or employee working for a company that's partially subsidized by the government? Maybe his company has tariffs that stifle its competition. Maybe some zoning laws work in its favor. Maybe the government pays half the wages of its handicapped employees. Maybe there are entry restrictions or required licenses that prohibit others from entering the same field and competing. Should the libertarian businessman feel uncomfortable about any of

this? What's the proper thing for him to do?

These questions are difficult to answer because our world is so full of coercion. Almost every good or service that we come in contact with is tainted by some degree of coercion.

The pen I write with might have been made by a company that's protected by tariffs. The airline I patronize has possible competitors stifled by protective entrance requirements. The car I drive is made by a company that was bailed out by the government. The food I eat is produced with the help of government money.

Such "ill-gotten" goods and services are everywhere. I can easily eschew some of them, but others aren't so easy to avoid. In fact, avoidance can be quite costly.

Suppose I go to college. I don't want my education paid for by other people, and so I don't attend a public university. I look into private universities but find that they're much more expensive. In fact, I can't afford them at all. What am I supposed to do?

If the government hadn't been taxing me, I would have had enough money to pay for the private school. Further, if the government hadn't disrupted the whole economy in the first place, there would presumably be more universities at a lower cost. And so, since the government has taken my money from me and crowded out free market alternatives, if I want to go to

college at all, it will have to be at a public university—a university funded coercively.

Does this mean that I must forego college entirely, if I'm to be a consistent libertarian? If so, this is yet another huge cost that the government is imposing on me.

And surely there are many other cases where avoiding "ill-gotten" benefits will be very, very costly.

But does this even matter? Perhaps one should avoid benefiting from coercion entirely, regardless of the costs. Perhaps morality dictates that one must always avoid benefiting from, or participating in coercion, even indirectly.

Another Approach

Everyone has time, money and effort consumed, disrupted and interfered with by the state. But the same government that destroys our freedom and steals our property also passes out benefits.

We can attend a public university. We can use the fire department, the roads and the post office. We can take out a small business loan. We can ask for public money to be spent for some project in our state, city or community.

All of this can be viewed as merely getting back what the government has previously stolen from us. It steals from us, and so we now get some of the booty back.

But this is an uncomfortable way to look at the situation. It leaves something out: namely, that when we take something from the state, we are indirectly taking it from some other poor guy who's being robbed by the state to

finance our project. The government takes his money to give to us.

I'm reminded here of the metaphor of the two gladiators thrown into the coliseum. Neither of them has chosen to be there; neither wants to hack at the other. But if either doesn't, he may get killed. Each must fight or perish, and so they fight. Are they responsible for their actions?

In a similar way, a libertarian doesn't want to force others to work for him, to live their precious lives for his sake. Yet if he doesn't accept, or even go after, benefits that the government offers, he is doubly used.

First, like the gladiator's, his available alternatives have been restricted by the state's regulations, its tendency to crowd out market activity, by virtually all its redistributive laws. Second, the libertarian can't even freely use the resources he has left. If the gladiator wants to live, he can't just dig down and refuse to fight. But neither can he hack away at his opponent without feeling any moral reservations or regrets. Surely he will feel bad about fighting and trying to kill another innocent man, even if he recognizes that that is his best (or only) option for self-preservation. Similarly, the libertarian can't freely expend his money and efforts in a world tainted by, if not filled with, coercion. He must choose very carefully.

The costs of maintaining a good conscience by avoiding all areas that are tainted by coercion are enormous. If a consistent libertarian is one who never participates in or benefits from coercion, even indirectly, then you'd never see a consistent libertarian. They would all be living as hermits in caves somewhere.

And so when I'm accused of hypocrisy I can only answer that I feel like a gladiator. I'd rather not receive anything that was derived from coercion, but I didn't choose to be here. I'm getting robbed by the government anyway, and if I don't take the benefits the government does sometimes offer, I'll never come close to recouping my losses.

The state already imposes huge costs on me, and trying to live completely non-coercively would increase those costs exponentially. I refuse to bear those costs.

Is this just a rationalization? Am I betraying my values and principles?

And what of the consequences of

this sort of thinking? If I argue this way, aren't I on a slippery slope? Doesn't this sort of logic justify just about any type of coercion? If I operate by this logic, how can I criticize any form of coercive redistribution?

These are challenging and important issues. Libertarians don't often

speak of these problems. I recall only two brief discussions of them: one by Nozick, another by Rand. Maybe there's a good reason for this—they are challenging and important issues, and there seem to be no easy answers. But one thing is certain.

Silence won't make them go away.

Reflections on the Apostasy of Robert Nozick

Ethan O. Waters

In September 1983, Robert Nozick, the prominent libertarian philosopher and author of *Anarchy, State, and Utopia* (Basic Books, 1974), signed a one-year lease on a condominium apartment in Cambridge, Massachusetts, owned by Eric Segal, author of *Love Story*. The mutually agreed upon rent was \$1900 per month. A year later, Segal bumped the rent up to \$2400 per month. Nozick signed on for another year.

Less than a month after his renewal, Nozick showed up at the Cambridge Rent Control Board to ask whether the local rent control law applied to his apartment. "We told him it certainly did," said rent control enforcer Buddy Packer. "The final legal maximum rent on that apartment should have been \$1900." Nozick got his rent reduced to \$1900 and a refund of the \$500 he had already "overpaid." That finished the matter, so far as the rent control board was concerned.

But Nozick pursued the matter further. He discovered that condos were brought under control on March 31, 1976, and that the maximum rentals allowed since then were determined by the first rent charged after that date. With further investigation, Nozick learned that later in 1976, Segal had rented the apartment to a house-sitter for \$675 per month.

When Nozick's second lease expired in September 1985, he neither renegotiated nor moved out. (Nozick was within his legal rights: the stringent local law prohibits evictions unless the owner wants to move into his own property, and Segal was living in England.)

In October, Nozick sued Segal in District Court, arguing that Segal had illegally overcharged him during his two years' use of the condo, and demanding a \$25,000 "refund" plus another \$75,000 in damages.

The Rent Control Board hemmed and hawed and in May 1986 decided the maximum legal rent should be \$1303 per month. (The monthly property tax, maintenance, and mortgage costs to Segal were more than \$2000.)

In September 1986, Nozick agreed to vacate the apartment, in exchange for \$31,000 cash from Segal. The amount of back rent that Segal owed Nozick amounted to \$21,000. The extra \$10,000 was intended "to pay off Nozick to get rid of him. Otherwise he might have been there forever", according to Segal's attorney.

All these facts were reported by William Tucker in the December 22, 1986, *New Republic*. Tucker noted that as a libertarian philosopher Nozick had strongly criticized contemporary liberals for being "willing to tolerate every kind of behavior except capitalistic acts between consenting adults."

Nozick the Apostate

The response from libertarians was swift and emphatic. By employing local rent control laws to reduce the cost of his housing, Nozick had "used the state to screw his landlord," the head of a libertarian think tank responded. "It is outrageous."

Jorge Amador wrote in *Individual Liberty* that Nozick has "embarrass(ed) libertarians and endanger(ed) the hard-won progress libertarianism has made as an intellectual movement... I

am hurt. All of us are. Our own integrity is now in question because of somebody else, a famous somebody, who calls himself a libertarian... I had thought that libertarians' commitment to the free market was more than just a rhetorical device or an angle to make a living from..."

Every single libertarian I have heard from on the matter was upset, angry and outraged: the view was that Nozick's use of the rent control laws constituted a crime so great that he must be ostracized from libertarian society.

Clearly, the depth of indignation aroused indicates more than simple disagreement.

The episode brings to the fore an issue that is crucial for libertarians: Just what sort of belief is libertarianism?

Clearly, libertarianism is a belief about the role that the state should play in human life. Some libertarians ("limited government advocates") believe its role should be reduced to a nearly negligible minimum. Other libertarians ("anarchists") believe the state should be eliminated altogether.

But just what sort of belief is this?

Most libertarians would say that libertarianism is a "philosophical" or "scientific" belief; that is, libertarianism is the conclusion of a systematic and rational analysis of the nature of man, of society, of reality— an intellectual discipline of the same kind as Euclidean geometry.

The visceral reaction to Nozick's "crime" offers evidence to the contrary: libertarianism is not a philosophical or scientific belief at all.

Is moral outrage the response of one scientist to another who disagrees with the conclusions of his research? Is passionate condemnation the reaction of one philosopher to another who disputes his conclusions?

To those who claim that libertarianism is a "philosophical" belief, I ask: does philosophical disagreement (as demonstrated by Nozick's action) justify the virtually universal condemnation that Nozick has faced? Is this the philosophical response to Nozick's philosophical disagreement?

To those who argue that libertarianism is a "scientific" or "economic" belief, based on analysis of human society and optimization of human values, I ask: does disagreement over matters of science or economics justify the universal castigation of those who disagree? Is

this the scientific response to a controversial view?

Clearly, the outrage expressed by the libertarian community has more in common with the response of a church toward a member who is discovered to be a practicing Satan worshipper,

The libertarian response to Nozick's action is religious in character. The outrage expressed by the libertarian community is not unlike the response of a church toward a member who is discovered to be a practicing Satan worshipper, pederast or advocate of mass murder.

pederast or advocate of mass murder. By using rent control laws to pay less rent, Nozick has, it seems, forever cut himself off from the body of believers. The libertarian response to Nozick's action is religious in character. There is a word for the crime that libertarians have accused Nozick of committing. That word is apostasy.

The episode illustrates libertarianism's similarity to Marxism in one important respect: despite each belief's insistence that it is "scientific" or "philosophical" in nature, each is actually religious.

For most libertarians, apparently, libertarianism is not a philosophical or scientific belief at all. It is a religious belief, a devoutly held moralistic belief to be employed in the condemnation, persecution and exile of those with whom one disagrees.

A Hypothetical Contract

Let us consider the issue from another angle. Consider a hypothesis about a social situation and the libertarian response to it.

Consider a society identical in every way to current American society, except that 200 years ago, every inhabitant of the continent agreed to vest all ownership of real estate in a corporate body, which would be governed ac-

ording to the same rules that are encoded in U.S. law today. Nominal private ownership was allowed, subject to periodic payment of fees (called "real estate taxes") and various other controls (called "laws and regulations") on the behavior of those who might live on the corporately owned land. The original corporate agreement specified that the taxes, laws and regulations might be changed according to certain specific procedures.

Let us suppose further that the city of Cambridge (a wholly owned subsidiary of the corporation) has established rules by which "reasonable" rents for the use of the nominal property within its boundaries are to be determined, and a means of adjudicating of any disputes between tenant and nominal owner over the "reasonableness" of the rent.

Let us further hypothesize that the contract has been amended in Cambridge to establish bizarrely convoluted rules for determining what constitutes "reasonable" rent and to erect a board of arbitrators to adjudicate disputes between renters and landlords.

Let us suppose further that there lived in this corporate subsidiary (Cambridge) an individual named Robert Nozick, employed as teacher of philosophy by the local university. This fellow rents a condo from a writer of trash novels. He studies the byzantine regulations which define "reasonableness" and concludes that the rent charged by the nominal owner (to which he had agreed) is an absolute violation of the requirement that all rents be "reasonable", and that under the terms of the contract he is entitled to substantial monetary damages provided he can convince the arbitration board of the correctness of his position.

In these circumstances, what libertarian could object to the "screwing of the landlord" by this Nozick? Surely no libertarian whose position is based on the sanctity of private property and voluntary contract could object: in this society, all property is indeed private (although subject to a substantial level of joint ownership) and voluntary contracts are respected (except when they conflict with earlier voluntary contracts.)

It may be pointed out that neither hypothetical Nozick nor hypothetical Segal entered into the original voluntarily. But this is plainly irrelevant. After all, the original contract was signed by

all residents of the continent 200 years ago. From the perspective of the moralistic libertarian and his belief in the sanctity of private property and voluntary contract, hypotheticals Nozick and Segal are not parties to the contract at all, and therefore have no rights under it. The contract was among their predecessors, who owned the land and had the right to enter into whatever voluntary contract about its disposition and use that they pleased. They freely chose to transfer the land to the corporation and to establish rules by which the land could be used in the future. Hypotheticals Nozick and Segal are third parties: unless they inherited their predecessors' rights to amend the contract as per the original contract's terms, they have no more right to make side deals in violation of the contract than two employees of a corporation have to sell corporate property to each other at a discount.

Of course, a contract for joint ownership and administration could specify that such bilateral side deals are permissible. But our hypothetical contract does not.

The hypothetical Nozick must be considered a just man acting on his just prerogatives by the same libertarian moralists outraged by the real Nozick. Hypothetical Nozick is simply a free man acting in his rational self-interest.

The libertarian who bases his belief on a moral imperative prohibiting the initiation of force could not object: the dispute between the philosopher and his landlord is simply a contractual dispute to be resolved by the courts according to the terms of the contract.

Just how is this example different from the actual case that has subjected Nozick to universal approbation?

There is only one difference between the two cases. In our hypothetical case, the cumbersome rental framework with its arbitration process by meddlesome bureaucrats was established by ancient contract; in the actual case, it was established by coercion.

Establishment by contract versus establishment by coercion is a vital distinction, the moralistic libertarian responds. It is the difference between liberty and slavery.

Contract versus coercion—a fundamental distinction. It makes all the difference in the world.

It is not only the distinction between a private arbitration service and the gov-

ernmental judiciary; it is the difference between the U.S. Post Office and a private message delivery service. It is also the difference a government financed school and a private school, the difference between government built streets and private streets... bread made from

The same logic that forces the moralistic libertarian to condemn Nozick for using a government-owned and operated arbitration service forces him to condemn the person who teaches (or studies) in a government school, who walks or drives on a government road, who eats bread made from government-subsidized wheat.

government subsidized wheat and bread from privately grown wheat...

Which brings up several new questions:

If Nozick is to be condemned for using an arbitration service that had its origin in coercion rather than contract, then what of the person who teaches in a school that has its origin in coercion rather than contract? What of the person who uses a message-delivery service whose origin is in coercion rather than contract? The person who eats bread produced coercively rather than contractually?

The same logic that forces the moralistic libertarian to condemn Nozick for using a government-owned and operated arbitration service forces him to condemn the person who teaches (or studies) in a government school, who walks or drives on a government road, who eats bread made from government-subsidized wheat.

Plainly, the moralistic libertarian has a problem. He must support any government that is based on contract, including those that greatly restrict human liberty. Furthermore, his evaluation of any social system must be based on its origin, not on the content of the laws or customs by which its members regulate their affairs.

It is equally possible to hypothesize

a virtually totalitarian state having its origin in contract. Suppose that all the landowners in a given area agree that they will vest ownership of their land in a corporation, and then choose by lot an individual who will have total life and death control over anyone who voluntarily lives on that land... And so the moralistic libertarian can be forced to defend a totalitarian state.

This is all part of the broader problem the moralist libertarian must face: the problem of dealing with coercion in his own life. Under exactly what conditions is it proper to use the services of coercive institutions? Under what conditions can one morally be the beneficiary of coercion?

It can be argued that there is no good reason for people to agree to the contractual relationship that I have hypothesized: after all, who would want an arrangement that subjected its makers to byzantine regulations and capricious adjudication of disputes?

But as an advocate of individual sovereignty, what libertarian can object to the sovereign individual freely entering any contract he wants?

Ah, but this convoluted example is not relevant to the real Nozick, the real city of Cambridge, the real condo and the real Segal. After all, they exist in a world where the crucial hypothesized condition is not met: there was no contract universally agreed to 200 years ago and amended since.

But this objection also fails: the purpose of the example is not to demonstrate that such a contract does exist, only that it can exist in a way consistent with libertarian moralistic principles. If the moralistic libertarian claims his moral system is universal, then it must apply in all situations that are possible, whether or not he has actually had to face those situations.

It can be argued that certain liberties of individuals cannot be given up by contract. Such Lockean arguments typically attempt to demonstrate that some individual prerogatives (e.g. the right to dispose of one's own life) are inherently inalienable. Without considering the merits of such arguments, we should note that they are not relevant to this hypothetical situation, which rests on the idea that it is possible for an individual to give up some of his rights by contract.

Would those who argue that many rights are inalienable object to the spe-

cific conditions of our hypothesis? Would they argue individuals could form a voluntary association in which they vest the control of all real estate and its regulation?

Of course, if it can be ineluctably proven that "no man has the right to initiate the use of physical force against others" and that coercion is universally opprobrious, all that the foregoing analysis implies is:

1) that it is no more wrong to use the state to "screw your landlord" (or otherwise coerce your fellow man) than it is to walk on the public sidewalks;

2) that the actual customs, laws and actions of a social arrangement are of relatively little import in evaluating its morality: what really counts is whether the social arrangement had its origin in voluntary contract of all landowners.

If these propositions seem absurd or amoral, then all I can suggest is that you follow the advice of Ayn Rand: "Check your premises!" Perhaps it's time to think about divorcing the notions of sin, guilt and condemnation from the ethics of libertarianism. Perhaps it's time to consider a libertarianism based not on the morality of non-initiation of force, but based instead on the superiority the way of life free men and a free society over the way of life of slaves and a slave society.

The Moralist Response

The only libertarian moralist to address this problem, to my knowledge, is Rand in her essay, "The Question of Scholarships" (*The Objectivist*, June 1966, pp 11-15.) She argues that one can accept government booty so long as one "regards it as restitution and opposes all forms of welfare statism." She bases her argument on "the right of the victims to the property (or some part of it) which was taken from them by force."

Rand goes on to argue that the recipient of such stolen property "is morally justified *only so long as he regards it as restitution and opposes all forms of welfare statism...* It does not matter, in this context, whether a given individual has or has not paid an amount of taxes equal to the amount" of the booty he receives from the government.

"The issue," Rand concludes, "is primarily *ideological*, not financial. Minimizing the financial injury inflicted on you by the welfare state laws, does not constitute support of welfare statism (since the purpose of such laws is to in-

jure you) and is not morally reprehensible. Initiating, advocating or expanding such laws, is."

Does Rand's solution solve the problem that the moralist libertarian faces in the real world? How does it apply to the actions of Nozick and hypothetical Nozick?

It seems to me that provided Nozick had systematically opposed the ideas and policies of statism, he would be perfectly justified in Rand's scheme to "screw his landlord": what he did plainly falls into the category of using a government service to his benefit while opposing all forms of welfare statism and regarding the arbitration service as restitution. And certainly Rand would support the legitimacy of hypothetical Nozick's actions.

Even so, I think there are problems with Rand's solution to the problem. The spectacle of opponents of statism competing for its booty seems a bit silly. And I am not convinced that it is psychologically possible for an individual to oppose statism fervently while living off its benefits. Over the past twenty years, I have known a lot of libertarians (including some good friends) who have taken jobs or other forms of booty from the state, only to have their commitment to liberty gradually ooze away. Perhaps this is a reflection of the lack of moral fiber of the individuals involved. But I suspect it is rather normal and natural for any person to feel favorably toward the source of his livelihood or prosperity.

To her credit, Rand specifically warned of this problem: "The ultimate danger is psychological: the danger of letting yourself be bribed, the danger of a gradual, imperceptible, subconscious deterioration leading to compromise, evasion, resignation, submission."

The Second Libertarianism

It is worth noting that not all libertarians share the moralistic vision of those who condemn Nozick. There are libertarians (Ludwig von Mises comes to mind) who advocate liberty as the most expeditious and utilitarian arrangement for human interaction. They advocate liberty because they believe the consequences of liberty are preferable to the consequences of illiberty.

Of course, these libertarians do not employ their energy condemning in high dudgeon those who disagree with them or take actions that imply disagreement. They do not sign oaths that they "do not believe in the initiation of force."

Unlike the moralistic libertarian, this other sort of libertarian is not forced by the logic of his position to sanctify the actions of the hypothetical Nozick while condemning the actions of the real Nozick. Nor is he required to judge a coercive state on its origin.

This other sort of libertarian has the same thing to say to both Nozicks and their neighbors.

To both Nozicks, he says: "You have acted against your own avowed principles, against those principles by which, you argue, people should regulate their relations with their fellow men. Perhaps you should rethink your position..."

To both Nozicks' neighbors, he says: "The rules by which you regulate relationships between individuals in your community do not achieve their stated ends; in fact, they make it harder for all people to succeed in achieving their goals. Perhaps you should change those rules..."

"Have you ever thought of a system of Liberty, in which each man respects the property of others?" □



Baloo

"Get the lead out, you two — I want that bomb on my desk the first thing tomorrow morning!"

Historical Analysis

Fatal Patterns

The Libertarian Party in Perspective

by William P. Moulton

Around 1970, an obscure left-wing publisher in Detroit issued a small book titled *Detroit—I Do Mind Dying*. The author was a member of some long-forgotten Maoist "party." This little tome was ultra-sectarian in tone, and went on at considerable length concerning the issue of whether the working class was truly represented by China (in which the Cultural Revolution of 1966-70 was cooling off) or by Albania (then ruled by hyper-Stalinist Enver Hoxha). Mind you, the author was talking about the working class in *Detroit*, and he maintained that up and down the assembly lines, at GM, Ford, Fisher Body, and all the other plants, workers were arguing over this momentous question.

Now it is easy for us to say, "What a deluded fool. Probably not one worker in a hundred even knew what or where Albania is, and certainly not one in ten thousand had ever heard of Enver Hoxha and his Three Worlds Strategy." The issues raised by the author were of concern only to an absolutely miniscule group of marginal intellectuals. And that outlook is undoubtedly correct.

In a way, the Paul/Means fight (and other controversies within the Libertarian Party) remind me of the Albania/China debate: each side seems to agree on nearly all issues, but the relatively minor differences that divide them are deemed so important by their partisans that the ideological movement they inhabit could be torn apart—which indeed was the fate of Detroit's radical left of the early 1970s.

One context in which the LP can be viewed and judged is within the history of American political parties. It is not the only such viewpoint, and it may not even be the most vital one, but it is important, and it has been generally neglected by libertarian writers.

Part of the reason for this neglect might be a fact which must be stated

at the outset, lest a certain sense of perspective be lost. Among all democratic countries, minor political parties have their most dismal track record in the United States. Now, read that sentence over again, because if you don't grasp it, you won't really understand the remainder of this article. The record of minor parties is worse here than in the other two-party states such as England, Canada, West Germany and Sweden, and worse than in the multi-party republics such as Italy, France and Switzerland. It is not feasible, in this article, to analyze exhaustively the reasons for this state of affairs. Let us simply observe that it certainly bears some relation to the relative calmness of American politics, at least since the War Between the States. (Please note that I use the term *relatively calm*. We have not had, for example, situations in which an important political party threatened, should it win, to dissolve the opposition parties, or to cancel all future elections, or to treat opposition party leaders as criminals. These things have occurred in many other countries.)

Schismatics and Ideologues

Let's look a little more closely at the record of minor political parties in this country. By way of background, it must be said that we have always had, at least to date, a two-party system. There have been times when this situation seemed, and probably was, threatened: the Era of Good Feeling around

1820, the breakup of the Whig Party in 1854, and the meteoric rise of the Progressive Party in 1912. But each time, the system has reasserted itself.

(Of course, every minor party dreams of displacing one of the major parties. A few have dreamed of overthrowing both of them. This is not surprising: no founder or leader of a political party thinks, "I hope we can keep this outfit small and marginal indefinitely.")

There are two major types of third parties: the charismatic/schismatic party and the ideological/institutional party.

The first of these is characterized by a leader already fairly well known to the public and, secondly, by the sudden mass movement of a large bloc of supporters from a major party (sometimes, from both major parties) to the new party. There have been several historical examples of this kind of party in American history. The Free Soil Democratic party of 1848, whose ticket was headed by former president Martin Van Buren and which received 10% of the popular vote, was the first. Next came the American Party, sometimes called the Know-Nothing Party, in 1856, featuring former chief executive Millard Fillmore. This was largely a by-product of the disintegration of the old Whig Party, but it qualified as an independent unit for a brief historical moment. In 1860, as the nation was approaching disintegration because of the presence of Abraham Lincoln on the Republican line, Southern Demo-

crats broke away from the national party and ran the sitting vice-president, John C. Breckinridge, as their candidate. This was a unique case, but the bolting delegates did forsee a permanent Southern Democratic Party, and it should be kept on the list. (The Constitutional Union Party of the same year, which represented a last-ditch attempt by some Border State politicians to hold the Union together, is a less certain case.)

No more parties of this type appeared until 1912, when ex-president Theodore Roosevelt did something that all minor parties lust for: his "Bull Moose" Progressive's finished ahead of one of the major parties (the GOP) and did so in both popular and electoral votes. Robert LaFollette's Progressive Party in 1924, Henry Wallace's party of the same name in 1948 (none of the three had any relation to the others) continue the examples, the list of which is rounded off by Strom Thurmond's 1948 State's Rights Democratic Party (the so-called Dixiecrats) and George Wallace's 1968 American Independent Party, which has been the most successful since 1912.

In addition to the properties inherent in the definition, these parties all had a few significant things in common. They were nearly devoid of institutional continuity and depth, being overwhelmingly concentrated around the person of the presidential candidate. In every case (leaving aside LaFollette, who died only months after his campaign) the charismatic leader soon returned to his parent party. Thus Van Buren, Thurmond, and both Wallaces rejoined the Democrats, Roosevelt went back to the GOP, and so on. Finally, in every case, with the defection of the leader the party either collapsed immediately or, at most, lingered on for one more election as a pathetic remnant. The lesson seems to be that this kind of party is not a workable proposition, unless, of course, it were to actually capture the presidency on its first attempt, which has never happened, although Teddy Roosevelt had an outside chance to do in 1912.

There are far more examples of the ideological/institutional variety of third party: the Prohibition Party (the

champion in terms of longevity), the Socialist Labor Party, the Socialist Party (a split-off from the preceding SLP which was much more successful than its parent), the Communist party, the Socialist Workers Party and the innumerable smaller Trotskyist groups, the confusing array of American/American Independent/Constitution Parties of the last twenty years and (of course) the Libertarian Party. There were and are many more.

These parties are characterized by

For many minor-party activists, politics is an arena of acute struggle. For some, it is the most important thing in life. As a result, the frustrations felt by failure or at least mediocre performance in the public sphere stimulate a turning inward of political passions.

the importance they attach to their ideas and platforms. They don't rely on a charismatic or "name" leader to achieve publicity and other goals. Indeed, they almost never have such a leader. When one does come along, as in the case of Eugene Debs' long association with the Socialist Party, he may help the party's fortunes, but his leadership does not generally become "personalized."

These parties tend to organize for the long haul. Their organizational machinery may be miniscule and woefully underfinanced, but there is some appreciation of its necessary function. There is an emphasis on party, rather than personal, loyalty. There are often long-term accoutrements of party life such as cells or sections, internal bulletins, and a formal, rather than merely associational, conception of membership. As a rule, such parties do not take a "quick victory or nothing" approach, if only because it would be so ridiculously unrealistic.

We have already seen that the end of a charismatic/schismatic party occurs with, or shortly after, its abandonment by its presidential candidate. What is the fate of the ideological/institutional parties? Many of them, of course, sustain themselves as organizations for years, even decades. They struggle along at a low level of activity, scarcely known to the general public. Many of these are themselves the products of the normal process of dis-

integration of this type of party, which is to say, of the Ideological Split.

A few small parties have formally dissolved, with the members being told to return to one or both of the major parties. Sometimes several small groups have merged, as in 1958 when several miniscule racist parties joined to form the (slightly less miniscule) National States Rights Party. The most common fate, however, is for factional in-fighting to reach such a level of intensity that the party cannot hold together.

There are all sorts of ways a party can split, and we need not concern ourselves with every variety. The Socialist Party may briefly serve as a case in point. By 1912, at the height of its influence, it could no longer con-

tain within its ranks those who favored "direct action"—i.e., sabotage, direct expropriation, and even assassination. These people left and formed tiny organizations. In 1919, the SP could no longer suppress the divergent attitudes toward the Bolsheviks in Russia. Two warring communist factions split away to form the Communist Party and the Communist Labor Party. After 1923, many members in the northern plains areas left to form Farmer-Labor Parties, of which the one in Minnesota was most successful. Finally, in the 1970's, the tiny remnant of the party split still further into three formal parties, and in the rump SP headquartered in Milwaukee a Debs Caucus emerged, charging the leadership with going soft on true socialist principle.

Things of this sort happen because the people in such groups take ideas and values seriously. (It is not surprising that ideological parties attract people motivated by a concern with ideas and values. It would be difficult to imagine someone joining, for example, the Socialist Labor Party in order to achieve societal power.) For many minor-party activists, politics is an arena of acute struggle. For some, it is the most important thing in life. As a result, the frustrations felt by failure or at least mediocre performance in the public sphere stimulate a turning inward of political passions. In extreme cases, it may lead to the delusion that this failure is caused by imperfections within the party: to unworthy mem-

bers, for example, or to having the incorrect "line" on some issue. This is especially endemic in the Marxist parties.

Members react to these institutional stresses in various ways. There seems to be almost an "iron rule of factions" which dictates that certain tactical groups will occur in every ideological organization. I would describe these factions in the following manner:

First, there are the *liquidationists*, who believe, for whatever reason, that the party should dissolve and continue to pursue its goals by other means. Some may take this position because they believe that continued independent operation is dangerous and counter-productive (this was a major issue in the communist groups of the 1920s). In other cases, party activists may come to believe that the original rationale for the party no longer holds, that there is now some viable alternative within one of the major parties. (Thus many, in fact, most, Socialist voters gradually defected to FDR and the Democrats after 1933.) Then again, people sometimes come to the conclusion that the third-party alternative is simply not viable, that it isolates the members' views from the public and wastes too much time, energy and money on such tasks as ballot drives and attainment of name-recognition. There is currently such a faction in the Libertarian Party.

Second, there are the *purists*, for whom concern with the correct party "line" on all issues and with the policing of ideological deviation is paramount. In any organization, this is the faction which tends to promote splits,

sometimes as a deliberate policy, sometimes not. The motives of the purists vary. A strong concern with ideas in and of themselves is usually present, but it is often accompanied by a desire for manipulative power, or a love of denunciation as a tactic for ensuring party discipline. Finally, as mentioned above, in many cases there is an absurdly exaggerated conception of the role of policy stands in winning support from the general public. In such cases, we are back to the Albania vs China syndrome.

Finally, there are the *gradualists* or *accommodationists*. They are the backbone and largest component of most minor ideological parties. They are the ones who hold a party together, especially for the long haul. Their ideological commitment sometimes leads them to the liquidationist or purist camp. When the liquidationists or purists get the upper hand, the party splits, as witness the multiple schisms of the Socialist Party cited above.

The Fate of the LP

Now the time has come to relate this historical analysis to the Libertarian Party. I can't pronounce judgment as a founder of the LP, or as a candidate, or as an activist, or even as a person who has always voted the LP ticket since its arrival on the scene. Instead I offer my prognosis as a serious student of the history of American political movements.

What I see is a party which grew very quickly from 1972 until 1980 (much as the Socialist Party did from 1904 until 1912) and then went into steep decline, thanks in large part to the exodus of the accommodationists to

the Reagan camp. The constant statements by party officials that the decline has been arrested may or may not prove to be accurate, but they remain unconvincing at present.

I also see a party with a lot of intellectuals and activists as a proportion of total membership. Anything wrong with that? No, not at all, but such a membership pattern, in conjunction with a decline in political fortunes, can give rise to a volatile situation, specifically to the more unpleasant kinds of factionalism.

Already something is happening that I find ominous. The battle for the LP presidential nomination between Ron Paul and Russell Means, which commenced in February 1987, is galvanizing passions in some very unhealthy ways. Nobody seems to be viewing this contest as an invigorating contest between two libertarians, except for party newsletter writers whose job is to say such things. Rather, the partisans of each candidate are bombarding us with apocalyptic rule-or-ruin rhetoric. Formal factions have been organized with the express purpose of keeping one or another candidates off the ticket (I am not including in this category, of course, the normal committees formed to nominate one's own candidate).

The most famous living libertarian, Murray Rothbard, writes that the choice between Paul and Means is a choice between life and death. Some ex-LP members have publicly stated that they have temporarily rejoined the LP for the sole purpose of preventing Ron Paul from obtaining the nomination. Meanwhile, hardcore pro-abortionists threaten to leave the Party if Paul is nominated. And former radical caucus members Eric Garris and Justin Raimondo, who abandoned the futility of LP for the greener pastures of the Republican Party in 1986, are returning for the express purpose of liquidating the party. And so it goes.

My wish? A reinvigorated and confident LP marching on to success in 1988 of a magnitude that will shame the 1980 Clark totals. My prognosis? Factionalism and exhaustion, with an actual split probably after the 1988 election.

The task at Seattle and in the months ahead?

Prove me to be wrong. □

HEILAND

a novel by Franklin Sanders

Set in 2020 A.D., *Heiland* is the story of a new America being rebuilt on the ruins of the old.

"An intelligent book!"—Writer F. Tupper Saussy, Sewanee, TN.

"There's everything in this book. You don't want to miss it!"—Attorney Larry Becraft, Huntsville, AL.

"A good example of what Anthony Burgess called 'eschatological fiction.' Sort of an Atlas Shrugged for Christian libertarians."—David Sheldon

The price of *Heiland* is \$6.00, plus \$1.00 shipping and handling. Send cash or postal money order to *The Moneychanger, Box 341753, Memphis, Tennessee 38184, Today!*

Essay

Understanding Anti-Corporatism

by Tibor R. Machan

Many Americans, among them vocal and influential ones, abhor corporate commerce. Even some who vehemently defend the free society voice suspicions about corporations. They are concerned that corporations possess unfair legal privileges accorded to them by way of limited liability for any harms they cause in the course of their various operations.

Catastrophes such as those that occurred at the Union-Carbide plant in Bhopal, India, the scandals on Wall Street, the corporate involvement with environmental mismanagement, the limits on the liability of nuclear power plants, and many less notorious matters, would all appear to lend support to the anti-corporation mentality. It does not seem to matter that professionals and institutions in other fields are just as frequently found guilty of various vices and crimes.

The Hollywood writing community banks on widespread suspiciousness toward men and women in business. Ben Stein's penetrating book *The View from Sunset Boulevard* and the PBS documentary, *Hollywood's Heavies*, aired in March, 1987, confirm the point. So does the booklet, *Video Villains* published by the Center for Media and Public Affairs in Washington, D.C. It is not just the Ralph Naders and Tom Haydens who contribute to the climate. Ironically, there is plenty of corporate backing for the corporate bashing of the entertainment industry. And of course the anti-corporation mentality is dominant in academe and throughout the artistic community.

One disturbing thing about this is that in an atmosphere of wholesale condemnation genuine failings of corporate commerce will not be focused upon. When corporations are held in uniform distrust, when the profession of business is virtually synonymous

with thievery—so that a prominent journalist such as Diane Sawyer of *60 Minutes* can refer to the loot taken by gangs of Italian pickpockets as "profit"—then genuine criticism gets devoured by uniform cynicism. And if the charges against corporations in general are as unjust as they are these days, those who manage corporations will stop listening. When the Ralph Nader brigade of corporation hecklers dismisses all business as evil, how can those in the corporate community begin to take him and his ilk seriously?

There could be considerable merit to discussing the way corporations ought to be managed in modern societies—morally, not just from the point of view of efficiency. Virtually all so-called business ethics texts used in the academic community—including business schools—are hostile to business. (For more on this see Tibor R. Machan and Douglas J. Den Uyl, "Recent Work in Business Ethics," *American Philosophical Quarterly*, April 1987.) They encourage moral numbness in students preparing for careers in business. Not that they will decide against a business career—they will carry on but will be unable to cope with the barrage of sophistic "moral" harangue and become pragmatists.

History

What is the background to the hatred of corporations? Why has it developed despite the evident benefit of the institution to almost every faction in

society?

First, there was a time when corporations were creatures of the state. It was during the mercantilist era that governments established some of the great joint stock companies with an eye to improving their nations' economic posture. In those days the legal and moral foundations of free enterprise had not yet been developed. Political individualism, whereby not the state but the citizen is considered sovereign, was just emerging in the intellectual and political arena. Corporate commerce had begun prior to when such individualism, with its doctrine of individual rights, had taken root in Western culture.

What was the purpose of government-created corporate commerce? Strengthening the wealth of nations. When Adam Smith published his *The Wealth of Nations* in 1776—mainly to refute the belief that nations could be made wealthy by means of governmentally managed commerce—the point of corporate commerce was not to benefit individuals but to serve the government. Smith argued the then paradoxical thesis that it is by governments *not* managing commerce that nations become wealthy. *Laissez-faire* would make the best sense for purposes of enhancing the wealth of a community.

The legal status of corporations has never clearly changed. Even as the United States of America was born, corporations were seen to be between the citizenry and the state, somewhere

in limbo.

The U. S. government has always acted somewhat schizophrenically vis-a-vis corporate commerce. On the one hand the government began with the view that individual rights should be protected and beyond that people ought to be left to their own resources. Largely, this individualism governed America for about a hundred years, albeit with major contradictions—e.g., slavery. Yet, oddly, even by 1867, the free trade association of America had complained about excessive government intervention. (For more, see Jonathan R. T. Hughes, *The Governmental Habit*, Basic Books, 1977.)

In addition to gaining unfair governmental support, corporations had achieved limited legal liability by legislation, something they might have but did not attain through contractual negotiations. (For how the provision of limited liability might be secured by contract, see Robert Hessen, *In Defense of the Corporation*, Hoover Press, 1976.) Even today corporations are not fully liable for damages they cause. Strict (or even less than absolutely strict) liability does not apply. This is one of the reasons why some are very critical of nuclear power generating firms. The harm they might cause could exceed by a considerable amount the limits placed on their liability.

In general, corporations had received extensive government protection, which many small businesses, farms, and other interest did not. This in itself is a justly infuriating aspect of corporate commerce, although the reasons behind it are complex, involving historical, political, and legal factors, and not just greed on the part of those involved in corporate commerce.

Corporations and the Public Interest

Nevertheless, corporations are also extremely useful. They are the best means by which large enterprises can be conducted. Individuals must combine in order to fund the risky massive ventures which corporations undertake. Only by getting the government involved in economic life, in a way intolerable to a free society, would these endeavors be manageable without corporations. The cost of a plant such as that which Union Car-

bide built in Bhopal could not be born by individuals. Furthermore, the responsibility for mishaps could not be borne by individuals either, judging by what is now the well publicized figure of the first lawsuit filed against Union Carbide Corp., namely \$15 million. Governments, which enjoy immunity from such suits, would not be very accommodating entrepreneurs, given the objectives and responsibilities of corporate commerce. And when governments do take on such tasks, they often turn their societies into slave labor camps, since if the prospect of prosperity does not motivate people to combine to achieve what are the usual corporate feats, fear is made to do the trick.

The proliferation of corporations is also caused, in part, by the onset of substantial economic equality that follows the abolition of special legal class privileges. Without massive, legally protected private wealth to carry out the gigantic economic projects needed to achieve what an abundant society requires for its well being and enjoyment, wealth needs to be pooled. And corporations are the most efficient way for pooling wealth without letting the state—the agent of legally organized force within a society—have this power as well.

Indeed, it is partly because of corporations' usefulness that the politicians have been eager to support corporations with extra legal privileges. You and I might like to be bailed out of our financial troubles, but Chrysler Corporation could go to Washington and obtain bailout money, even from an administration rhetorically committed to free enterprise. The reason is that a lot depends on corporations, for a lot of people, and politicians are always sensitive to that fact. So how could they refuse, without an explicit legal, constitutional prohibition? And in our constitution there is no such prohibition. Government can't aid religion, but it may help commerce. It may, then, also regulate commerce, while it may not regulate church.

Despite their obvious beneficial impact, corporations are often despised, and the most important reason is that they represent a concern for something that even in our time very few people are comfortable admitting they have a concern for: earthy pleasure and satisfaction. Attorney Melvin Belli, who filed the first major lawsuit

against Union Carbide, stated the point baldly. He said, "The American Businessman is . . . concerned with the profit and that's all. . . . I think we should be more concerned with safety than the dollar."

People may sing the praises of altruism, the joys of spirituality, the nobility of self-sacrifice—but they also want to live well. They want to have a decent, prosperous, enjoyable life. And corporate business is there to do this for them in a very big and efficient way.

But it is one thing for people to seek pleasure and satisfaction; it is another for them to be happy about doing so. Many people tend to be schizophrenic—they want to live well, seek joys and delights, but also claim to honor and respect those who care very little for such trivial things and express disdain for people and institutions who unabashedly pursue the satisfaction of desires—or make a living off such pursuits. Praise Mother Theresa and then go shopping.

Corporations, oddly enough, treat us as adults. We want Michael Jackson gloves, we get them. We want pornographic books, we get them. We want Disney Land and Disney World, and pet rocks and cabbage patch dolls, and Nehru jackets, and Pac-Man software, and we get them all, usually at a reasonable price. We are the boss, the corporation says, and we must decide what we will have. They just try to entice us, but if we change our minds, they will change their product and service lines, unless unions or government stop them.

The Philosophical Source of Anti-Corporatism

But why would all this be resented, even while encouraged at another level? The reason goes back many centuries, to ancient Greece.

From the time of Socrates human beings have been struggling to reconcile what they have believed to be opposite elements of their nature—the spiritual and the material.

This fight is simply a version of what we so often experience when we talk about how our better judgment was defeated by our urges and drives and instincts. When people think we ought to do such and such but end up doing the opposite, they tend to explain it as a battle between mind and

body, spirit and matter, our intellectual and appetitive sides. Indeed, many characterize this conflict as the conflict between good and evil—the body is base, the mind or spirit is noble.

I suggest that the anti-corporate mentality is an outgrowth of the view that what satisfies our bodies, our earthly, base nature, is in cahoots with the devil or our lower instincts, while what guides us toward otherworldliness is indeed spiritual.

Corporations, we should notice, mainly concentrate on serving our earthly needs. And the few which do serve our spiritual ones are rarely under attack—the major orchestras and opera houses, the large private universities, the think tanks, the newspapers, magazines and networks tend to be exempt. But when there is a combination—as with the major movie companies which produce the more popular forms of "art" may be construed as serving sheer, crass pleasure—the fact that the organization makes money by suiting our immediate, earthly needs serves to condemn it for certain.

This all may strike some as odd, and for good reason. The most fervent ideological opposition to corporate commerce, comes, after all, from a fundamentally materialist source: Marxism.

Marxism regards capitalism as the adolescent phase of humanity's development. As with adolescence in general, so with capitalism, what is lamentable is its recklessness, anarchy, irrationality. Marxist would point to the incredible productive energy consumed for such trivial purposes as I have already mentioned—pet rocks, Michael Jackson gloves, horror films, the Gong Show. But for Marxists this reckless production is explainable, just as the wildness of adolescence is. It all has a vital function, namely, to build muscle which the next, more rational phase of the growth process will put to good use.

For the Marxist the future here on earth should usher in the more spiritual life for us all, while for most religious viewpoints that spiritual life awaits us elsewhere. In either case, the life which satisfies our material, physical, earthly or contemporary demands is inferior to one seeking spiritual or intellectual fulfillment.

So what is notorious about corporate commerce is that it unabashedly

regards the satisfaction of our "mundane" desires as perfectly worthwhile. And what is more, corporations, as they now exist, tend to make it possible for everyone just to jump right in there and pursue prosperity without apology.

Whereas in its inception, corporate commerce was under the jurisdiction of the state, in a near-capitalist society it is not. In a near-capitalist or capitalist society corporations are creatures of individuals who wish to prosper.

This makes of the profit motive, or, as some might rather refer to it, of greed or of ambition, a respectable trait. It gives it a legitimate role in human community life. It is, for many (even among those who participate in the institution), a kind of legitimation of sin.

Our Dilemma: Corporations, Moral or Amoral?

So the point can be put simply. Corporations were born of the state and received privileges from it. That is one count against them. They flourish by satisfying people's wants, regardless of the quality of these wants. That is another count against them, at least by some people's measure. They serve people's economic aspirations, their desire to prosper in life. That is yet another lamentable fact.

Corporations would not be despised if people did not have the belief that there is something lowly about attaining worldly satisfaction. If people held their earthly life in high esteem, if they could in good conscience accept their own desires for pleasure, fun, and happiness as these are available here on earth, then perhaps corporations would begin to gain a standing and Ralph Nader, their arch enemy, would not be the saint he is today.

Whenever some institution or practice is regarded with total disdain, yet also felt to be indispensable, it remains outside the scope of morality. This is well illustrated by the underground economy, for example, in drugs. When a business is driven outside the law, it begins to be conducted in a criminal fashion. During prohibition, the business of making wine, beer, and other alcoholic beverages became thoroughly demoralized. Those associated with it were placed outside the law and thus no distinction could be made between those who par-

ticipated in the business and acted decently and those who were crooks. In any underground economy we find this to be the case. Institutional support for doing business decently is lacking and then the entire industry tends to get corrupted.

A somewhat milder version of this phenomenon occurs in connection with corporate business and, indeed, business itself. In the eyes of many who discuss moral issues in our society, business is regarded as wholly base or, at best, tolerable because necessary. Even those in the business world often reinforce this picture when they talk about the need for realism and the lack of room for naive idealism in business. In short, people in business, managers, executives, and employees of corporations often accept the view that they see depicted on television, in the novel, and by the verbalists in our community. They see their profession as amoral, virtually immoral.

When this happens, is it surprising that business would not behave itself very decently? Is it any wonder that every-one is suspicious of corporations? Since they are in fact indispensable yet are held in contempt by those who forge the moral opinions in the land, the very idea that there could be decent corporate conduct, that we should in fact discover standards for corporate behavior, vanishes.

Not long ago I had a conversation with one of our major corporation's anti-trust attorneys. I was shown an internal booklet in which the firm discusses its policy on foreign business conduct. One item in this booklet struck me as tragic yet understandable. It was the declaration that the firm regards any conduct vis-a-vis foreign countries permissible unless legally forbidden. Legality alone, not morality or ethics, is of primary concern. But, of course, the law is itself impure and often the source of moral failure.

Those who wonder why many firms simply do what is legally permissible when it comes to trading with the Soviet Union, Chile, South Africa, or other foreign countries or firms in those countries, should know this. When a society tends to hold an institution as inherently amoral and even immoral, that institution begins to accept that picture and refuses to bother itself about questions which are relevant only for people and institutions which could be decent, which could act ethi-

cally, morally.

It is not my purpose here to develop the case for the proper moral standards of corporate commerce, although I believe that there is such a case. I am simply interested in presenting a picture, one that I think is disturbing and worth thinking about: An institution in our society that seems to be vitally necessary is also widely held in contempt — that's tragic.

There is a particularly notable area where this tragedy appears, namely, in business's role in environmental pollution. Business is supposed to produce for us efficiently, so that what we want we can get at the lowest price. But in doing this business will make use of the public realm. Making use of the public realm requires political permission. How much soot may go into the skies over New York and Los Angeles is something politicians and their bureaucrats decide. Business just does not do this on its own. The government determines or helps determine the limits.

Of course, people don't blame the regulators, they don't sue the government—which, at any rate, enjoys sovereign immunity and cannot be sued even if it contributes to pollution—but turn on the irresponsible, immoral corporations.

It is not as if corporations do everything right but that it is almost impossible—some argue entirely impossible—to determine what is the right thing for them to do. If we want to appreciate the problem, we can begin with these two matters: corporations are held in contempt, yet everyone helps make them rich; they are blamed for ruining the environment, yet everyone wants them to charge lower prices.

Marx railed against capitalism in his early writings, when he still believed in morality, saying that "The right of man to property [the fundamental principles underlying capitalism and corporate commerce] is the right to enjoy his possessions and dispose of the same arbitrarily, without regard for other men, independently from society, the right of selfishness." (Never mind that no capitalist could survive if he or she disposed of property "arbitrarily, without regard for other men, independently from society.") It is true that in a capitalist system one

has the *right* to do this. And, more importantly, in many relationships in such a society one is concerned not primarily with whether others will in fact benefit, even if one has to be concerned with whether others believe that they are being benefited. The claim made by George Gilder that capitalism is ultimately altruistic is obviously strained, even if there lurks something important behind it, namely, that others do benefit first when capitalist make their move to seek profit! But they clearly do not make those moves with the primary aim to benefit others.

So the charge that capitalism and its most visible institutions, corporate commerce, is selfish rings quite true. One of this century's most ardent defenders of capitalism, novelist-philosopher Ayn Rand, proudly defended this system by observing that it accommodates the ethics of rational self-interest. But by this she did not

mean a reckless disregard for others, only a sensible, prudent concern with one's life as a human being, including one's economic welfare; an idea not very different from that of Xenophon's *Oeconomicus*, a Socratic dialogue concerned with the importance of seeking prosperity in the course of household management.

In the end, corporate commerce does rest, ultimately, on the view that human beings are most often doing the right thing when they concern themselves with their own well being, with the welfare of those whom they love (more than with the welfare of strangers), and with their own community before the communities of others. If this be morally offensive, capitalism and corporate commerce must plead guilty. In a moral climate dominated by praise for self-sacrifice (though not necessarily acts of benevolence), it is no wonder that corporations receive a bad press. □

In Memoriam J. P.

Late report: into the tomb of Juan Perón
a gang of robbers found its way, and from that stone
labyrinth of symbols stole: a hat,
a ceremonial sword, a touching letter that
his third wife sent, an Argentinian flag,
and both his mouldering hands. Surrealistic gag!
that merits a surreal response. When hands
escape the grave for life renewed in upper lands,
what will they do? Hop like disconsolate
frogs toward the palace, wait quietly in late
cafés for followers seeking autographs?
Repress impatience, fear young couples' laughs,
start counting up imaginary votes,
and fold discreetly on imaginary throats?
Perhaps write verses, rent a compact car,
or play old sit-coms on the VCR.

—Stephen Cox

Fiction

Going Home

by Franklin Sanders

Heiland first noticed the smell of clean sheets. His back felt gigantic and swollen, but numb. He twisted slightly and felt bandages. Must've taken three acres of gauze, he thought. He turned his head, opened his eyes, his gaze swept the room. One side of the room held a stainless-steel topped counter, above which were more glass-doored cabinets. At the far end of the room were a desk and several chairs. Behind the desk was a woman in white. Two male guards in green lounged in the chairs. Heiland drew his hands up under his shoulders, pushed away from the bed, and with a twisting motion sat up on the edge of the bed. The woman looked up, stood, and walked over to him.

"How're we doing?" Heiland noted precisely and with a touch of resentment that "we" had not both received the stripes. His self-control took over as he lowered the fog over his eyes.

"Rough," was his only reply.

"It'll feel better soon. You're all bandaged up. Keep it clean for the next few days and in a couple of weeks you'll be as good as new." She turned to one of the guards. "J.D., go get this man some breakfast, then take him up to Number Assignment, get him a tattoo, and let him go."

Heiland again lay face down on the sheets. His empty mind drifted between waking and sleep. J.D.'s voice woke him. "Got your breakfast." Heiland sat up as J.D. rolled a table to the side of his bed. Mechanically he ate the contents of the tray. As soon as he had finished, J.D. rose from his vantage point across the room and walked over to the bed. "Ready?" Heiland answered with a grunt and a nod.

Heiland rose shakily and followed J.D. out of the room and down a cement corridor, then into another white room. Heiland looked without interest

at a machine that resembled some sort of small industrial stamping machine. The attendant motioned him to sit down in front of the machine, then sprayed his right hand with a pungent, sticky substance. She lifted Heiland's forearm and inserted his hand into the slot in the front of the machine. After opening Heiland's file, she punched nine settings on the machine, then a red button. Heiland felt a slight sting. The attendant drew his hand out, glanced at the result. Heiland could see only a barely bleeding spot, about one inch square. He held his hand closer to his face and noticed that the square was composed of vertical lines.

"Don't worry," the attendant said. "It's only machine readable. After a week you won't even know it's there."

After a week I'll have it off *or my hand*, Heiland answered silently. The attendant picked up Heiland's file, checked off a box, and handed the file to J.D. Heiland stood and followed J.D. down the hall to the last room. As he entered Heiland noticed windows behind the desks. "One for release," J.D. said to the woman behind the desk, handing over the file folder.

J.D. turned to Heiland. "She'll get your duds and they'll let you go in a little while. Have a seat over there." Heiland sat down in one of the plastic chairs that faced the counter while the woman disappeared into another room. A dull throb from his back had taken over his body. He closed his eyes, yielding to the waiting and the pain.

A brisk "Hey, you!" startled Heiland back to wakefulness. The woman had returned with a brown paper bag and was pushing it across the counter at him. She jerked her head to the door at his right and said, "These are yours. Take 'em in there and change. Bring your grays back out here to me."

Go now before they change their minds, Heiland's wits urged on him. He entered the rest room, changed into his own clothes as quickly as possible, and returned to the waiting area. He shoved the prison uniform back across the desk to the attendant. "Which way's out?"

"Out that door behind you and to the left. It opens right out on the street. You have to sign here for your things and you'll need this sheet to get out." She shoved a piece of paper at Heiland. Heiland picked it up, opened the door behind him, and walked into a small anteroom with two guards. Without speaking one guard held out his hand. Heiland passed the paper over to him. The guard noted down the time and Heiland's name and number in a log and motioned him to a small reader to the left. Heiland stuck his right hand into the reader, a small light flashed green, somewhere in the bowels of the counter a recorder whirred, and the guard motioned Heiland out through the two glass doors. Once through the doors Heiland did not pause to breathe, but set out at an energetic pace down the street. Don't run, he cautioned himself. Just get away.

In the fresh air Heiland's mind began to function again. He ran down the possibilities of his situation. Perhaps Tettamairde had been fooled. Perhaps they had taken him for a "useless eater", an offdoler not worth fooling with. But perhaps also they had identified him and let him go only to tail him. He ran over the possibility that they had inserted a bug under his skin for radio location, then discounted it. It could only have happened while he was unconscious, and besides, he would just have to take the chance that they didn't consider him big enough game for such measures. Anyway, once he got back into the network they could de-bug him.

But the tail was almost a routine certainty, and his misgivings on that score must be settled before he went further. Heiland came to an alleyway that opened through to the next cross street, ran quickly down it, turned back to his left and changed directions. He dodged into a bar, took a seat in the smoky twilight, and ordered a beer. "Where's the john?"

The waitress jerked her head toward the back of the bar. Heiland waited a full ten minutes after she had fetched his beer, then walked to the back. One short hall led to the bathrooms on his right, straight ahead was another piled with boxes. At the end of the hall Heiland could see light under a door. He passed easily out of the back door into the alley, paused long enough to look both ways, then headed back south.

Heiland spent the rest of the day in downtown Nashville, lounging through public places. He admitted no hurry, loafing patiently from place to place, to all outward appearances a man with no purpose and no goal. Toward the end of the day he was fairly certain he was not being followed. As the darkness grew his direction took more purpose. He wandered through the nasty streets, stepping over the drunks, his glance immunizing him from the appeals of streetwalkers and dope dealer alike. At last he turned into N----- Street and ahead of him saw the green and brown oak on the neon sign of the Root & Branch Tavern. He went in, eased through the crowd, and took a

seat at the empty end of the bar, head down. The bartender strolled down to him. "What'll it be?"

Heiland looked up. The bartender's jaw dropped slightly as he recognized Heiland, then he quickly recovered his bored aplomb. Heiland whispered, "God greet you, William."

Heiland had known William Esmond since they had fought together in the Patriot Revolution of 1993. All his

The billboard read:
"From the Beginning to the End."
Below this motto was the corporate name:
United States Abortion & Euthanasia Corporation

later prosperity had failed to add any meat to William's 6 foot three inches. At 45 William's small head and loose-jointed frame still deserved his nickname, "Daddy Long Legs."

"And keep you in his mercy, Heiland," came the low reply. "We thought you were dead."

"Case of mistaken identity," Heiland grinned warmly, "theirs, not mine. How about a drink?" William moved down the bar, patiently drew a beer, walked back to Heiland's spot, placed the mug in front of him. Heiland lifted the glass and drank deeply. William watched closely, hardly concealing his satisfaction at seeing Heiland again, alive.

"D'you move the House?" Heiland asked.

"Had to, Heiland, when they took you. Didn't know what would happen, I mean, even you..." William's voice trailed off in embarrassment at what he had almost said but Heiland had taken no offense. Who did know what he would say in their hands? Heiland's taste of their tender mercies had fixed that question more firmly in his mind. People died. The Free State lived on. Heiland would have been the first to bring charges if they hadn't moved the House.

"Anybody here who can take me to the House? I need to get out of Nashville as soon as I can."

William grimaced. "I'm the only one here tonight, unless somebody else comes in. Have to wait till the bar closes."

"Easy enough," Heiland replied. "I'll take a nap in the booth." Heiland took his beer glass, left the bar and walked to the back of the room to one of the booths against the wall. His mind was still unsettled from the pain and he hadn't eaten. The drink began to throw a pleasant drowsiness over him. He stretched out on his side, and in spite of the country decibels from the juke box, gave in to sleep.

"Heiland!" A large hand gently shook his shoulder. Heiland noticed that the music had stopped. He opened his eyes and looked up at William. "Time to go. It's two o'clock."

Heiland sat up and tried to shake the sleepiness out of his head.

His body was soaked in dull pain from his back; sharp stitches jerked at him every time he moved as the protesting skin pulled away from the bandages. Heiland stood up and followed William down the hall at the back of the room. "Stay here a minute," he threw over his shoulder at Heiland. Through the open door Heiland watched as William manhandled a garbage can to its position in the alley. Once it was in place William stood up, wiped his hands on his apron, drew out a cigarette, lit it, and slowly smoked in the darkness, to all appearances a man enjoying a minute's rest after work. Heiland waited patiently while he checked out the alley. After a few minutes William came back, shutting the door behind him.

"Looks okay. My van's on the other side of the door. Let's go."

Without further comment William walked out and Heiland whisked past him to the right, around the door, and into the van. As he climbed into the seat behind the driver's seat, Heiland watched William lock up. Two quick steps brought him to the van and into the driver's seat. William started the van and rolled down the alley and onto the main street.

"We'll have to take a little detour, Heiland, just to make sure you weren't followed." Heiland relaxed back into the seat, content to empty his mind and watch the light patterns changing on the van floor as William drove through the city. Fifteen minutes of doubling back in the empty streets,

then William parked the van. Neither man spoke as they sat in the darkness a full ten minutes by the clock. No traffic broke the silence. Finally William started the van again and drove with considerably more purpose than before. Heiland silently noted the street signs, tucking them away in his memory. Fifteen more minutes brought them into a middle class residential area. William picked out a driveway, pulled around to the back of the house and into a garage. Heiland waited until he had pulled down the garage door behind the van before he got out.

At the left side of the garage was a door. Heiland followed William as he opened it and walked down a flight of steps into the basement. The steps opened onto what looked like a living room with a door on the far side. Heiland knew the equipment would be behind that door. He also knew that anyone who tried to open it without the key would find a roomful of cinders.

Heiland lowered himself gingerly onto the couch as William took the chair opposite him. William couldn't stifle his curiosity any longer. "What happened, Heiland?"

"They caught me in a street sweep," Heiland answered with disgust. "No cards, no tattoo, no nothing. Pure stupidity."

"How'd you get out?"

"CID agent figured me for a PLD * migrant worker. Out of his concern for my welfare I got off with BM and a tattoo."

"BM?"

"Behavior Modification."

"That's a new one on me."

"Nice words for twenty-five lashes."

William grimaced. "Do you want me to get a doctor now or wait till in the morning?"

Heiland considered a moment, decided the pain of re-dressing overmatched his exhaustion. "No, it'll keep. I need to sleep and get away in the morning. Can you arrange it?"

"Sure. I'll call Josh Lee in the morning. He can take care of the tattoo as well. D'you want me to take a look at your back now?" Heiland shook his head. "MacDonald makes a regular run to Clifton tomorrow about noon. I can catch him before then. Come on, I'll make up the bed and get you some pain-killers. The couch folds out."

* permanent learning disability

Heiland stood up and moved aside as William pulled out the couch. He was almost asleep by the time William returned with three red pain-killers and a glass of water. Heiland propped himself up on his right elbow, tossed back the painkillers and half the glass of water. "Call Sara, would you, William?" By the time William had turned off the light, Heiland was out.

He brought me forth also into a large place; He delivered me, because He delighted in me.

Heiland woke up and looked up into William's eyes. Beside William stood another man Heiland did not know. "Heiland, this is Dr. Lee. Call him Josh." Heiland nodded, the newcomer nodded back.

"Let me have a look at your back, Mr. Heiland." Heiland rolled over obediently, turning crosswise on the bed. Lee pulled up his shirt and Heiland heard William hiss as he tried to pull off the bandages. "William, make up about a gallon of saline so we can soak these bandages off." William left and returned downstairs shortly with a full basin. Heiland hugged the pillow as the doctor gently soaked the bandages.

"What I don't understand, Heiland, is why they let you go," William began.

"Couldn't see through the pattern, William," Heiland muttered through clinched teeth. "CID agent just filled out all the boxes in his mind and I came out a loser. He just figured I was an offdoler, not even worth snuffing out with a trip to a FURT. ** Give him a whipping to teach him a lesson, brand him, and turn him loose."

"What if they did know who you were? What if it was all planned, once they found out who they'd swept up?" William answered.

"That's the hard part, William. We just don't know how much they know about us. But I really don't think they're as smart as we give them credit for. Fact is, I think they're stupid. Yeah, I know, a stupid man can still kill you, but I think for the most part they believe their own propaganda. They really think they control the country. They really believe everyone thinks the way they do. Sure, they've got an intelligence service, but that's mostly limited to the cities. The country is ours already, not just in the Free State, but all over North America."

"Besides," Heiland continued,

** Federal Unemployment & Retraining Camp

"what do the cities have that we want anyway? What do they make that we don't make better already?"

"Okay, Heiland, but what if they *did* know who you were and turned you loose on purpose, bait for bigger fish?"

"That's just the chance I have to take, William, but I think this time they just blew it. Anyway, that's where their centralized mindset cripples them. So what if they get me, or a hundred others like me? We don't have any 'head' to cut off. If they get the 'bigger fish', we'll just choose some more. They'd have to uncover and find and kill every one of us.

"Ouch!" Heiland barked as the doctor pulled away the bandages. William's face darkened as he looked at Heiland's back. He sighed impatiently. "Where are you headed next, Heiland?"

"Home," Heiland responded with relief, "back to the real world. Doesn't look like I'd better chance Nashville again for a while."

William watched in silence as the doctor salved and re-bandaged Heiland's back. Once he had finished, William opened the door at the far side of the room and all three men entered. Heiland barely noticed the layout, he'd seen it a hundred times in a hundred different places: miniature infirmary, small computer, arms rack, radio, two large suitcases for minicopters, washing machine-sized Newman generator. Heiland took a seat at a stainless steel table, his right arm resting next to a small hand scanner. Lee took a few minutes to dig out his instruments then sat down opposite Heiland.

He plugged in a small tool about the size of a fountain pen, but thicker and corded. The business end carried a wicked flat needle. From a vial in his bag he soaked a cotton sponge and wiped it over the new tattoo on Heiland's right hand. He put on what looked like battery powered sun glasses (Heiland grinned at the thought), adjusted a knob on the temple piece, and picked up Heiland's hand. Shortly Heiland could feel the pressure of the work on the back of his hand, but not the sharp pain he had expected. Lee worked quickly and expertly with the humming needle, slicing up and down on Heiland's new tattoo. In five minutes he was finished and the hand hardly looked worse for the wear. Finally he placed Heiland's hand under

the scanner, snapped it on, and grunted with satisfaction when the red light blinked.

"Okay, William, it's all gone, but you'd better get him a plastic one to cover that up." William rummaged through the tiny drawers of a small organizing cabinet and fished out several packaged flesh colored patches, complete with hair. He set them down in a row on Heiland's wrist to match the color. At length satisfied, he opened his choice and carefully applied it to Heiland's hand, tediously smoothing it down to conceal the edges. He made another trip to the cabinet, pulled out several tubes, matched those colors against Heiland's skin, and ap-

plied what looked like flesh-colored glue around the patch. It dried quickly and William sanded down the sides with superfine steel wool. When he was finished Heiland himself couldn't see the edges.

As Josh Lee packed up, William rummaged through several more drawers, pulling out several plastic cards. "The tattoo is coded with a person number that will give you access to a bank account as you need it. Be reasonably cautious. The account is controlled by a worm in the FirstNat computer, so don't charge enough to draw attention, say, less than 200,000 ferns * at any one time." William busied himself at a small heat-embosser as he spoke, incising numbers into the four plastic cards he had chosen. "The number on these will match the FirstNat account, same worm takes care of all four. Here's Mastercard, Visa, Exxon/Gulf, and WordFood. Save 'em after your trip back for your next visit to Nashville. If they're discovered they'll turn up on the your hot list within four hours, so check before you use them again."

William dug into yet another drawer, drew out what looked like a thin blue address book. "Here's your pass." Heiland knew that without that he couldn't get out of the city. "It shows an address in Huntsville, same direction you're headed. Let me take a picture for it and you can study it out for yourself."

* fern: Federal Reserve Note, formerly known as "dollar."

William pulled down a green backdrop against the far wall while Heiland took a stool and sat in front of it patiently while William took the picture. William deftly stuck the adhesive photo down to the front page of the pass, laminated it, and embossed it with an official seal. When he was through, he tossed it to Heiland. Heiland flipped it open and noted his new name was "Smithson", occupation "A/E technolo-

It was a trip through a mortuary: mile after mile of abandoned shops, buildings, and shopping malls, a few boarded up with sheets of plywood, most just leering at him like a corpse's head.

gist". He winced. William's sense of humor sometimes took a bizarre twist.

Just as William finished, an LED on a control panel by the door began to flash red. William snapped on the closed circuit TV and flipped through several views, the last revealing a large man in a baseball cap and overalls standing on a porch: MacDonald. William hit another switch, spoke quietly into a flat speaker: "Robert! Come around to the garage door." MacDonald had already disappeared from the porch as William flicked the view selector to reveal the garage door. About the same time MacDonald's hand touched the knob on the inset door, William hit another switch and the door popped open. Two minutes later MacDonald was clumping down the stairs. From his muddy boots to the "Liva-gro" patch on his cap, every inch of him shouted pig farmer. MacDonald's broad red face split into a wide-eyed grin when he saw Heiland.

"God greet you, Heiland!" he rumbled in a deep country voice. He strode across the room and grabbed Heiland's hand in a fist the size of a basketball.

"And keep you in yet mercy, Robert MacDonald."

MacDonald drew off his cap to reveal white-sidewalls beneath a short pelt of red curls, wiped his brow with the back of his hand. "We thought the CID had you."

Heiland smiled wryly. "I just wasn't a big enough fish for them to fool with, Robert. They threw me back." From

deep within his chest MacDonald's laughter rumbled his disbelief and approval.

Heiland turned to William. "Take care, William." Heiland shook William's right hand, pulled him closer, threw his left arm around his back and hugged him tight. "God keep you." Heiland turned to Dr. Lee, shook hands, and wheeled up the stairs behind MacDonald's denim bulk.

Heiland blinked in the bright May sunlight as he followed MacDonald to a rusted red Chevy pickup parked in the drive.

"Is this thing standard?"

"Standard but retrofitted," MacDonald replied. "I'm in the cities too much to run a Jamison drive naked, so we left in the Detroit engine. Even your idiot CID agent could tell the difference between the standard Detroit motor and a Jamison. You're sitting on the Jamison, Newman generator's under the tool box in back."

Heiland ran over the specs in his mind. Newman generator coupled to the Jamison drive would last as long as the batteries would take the charge or until the bearings wore out. The DC Jamison drive with converter would push MacDonald's old Chevy pickup at about 160 mph. Nothing the government had on the road could outrun them.

"Who built it?"
"Leonhart, in Tarpley."
Heiland whistled appreciatively. His own Leonhart package had run him close to two ounces.

Heiland gazed out the window. They were in the middle of Nashville now, headed south on Eighth. He frowned as they pulled up to a stoplight. Across the street on a baby-blue billboard he saw the US A&E logo: stylized white dove in a circle, crossed stem extending downwards. "From the beginning to the end," the billboard read. Heiland glanced back at the thirteen story building across the crowded parking lot.

"From the beginning to the end." Right, Heiland thought, reading the motto off the billboard, but mostly the end. United States Abortion and Euthanasia Corporation. Yearly turn in the neighborhood of two trillion ferns.

Since 2006 US A&E had held the US monopoly on abortions and euthanasia, with a string of death hostels in every city in the US. Federal WERE-TRAP * to the mother-not-to-be ran 3,000 ferns, about two months earnings for the average secretary.

Heiland saw a lone black in the crowd and realized how few they were now. He remembered the old days, when downtown Nashville had been crowded with them, their laughter filling the air. No more. Even according to official statistics, the US black and hispanic population, formerly about 18% of the national total, had been reduced to around 5%. US A&E was efficient.

The federal government paid US A&E for the job, and US A&E got to keep what they discreetly called the "by-products". No one had a clear idea of what US A&E made on the processing and sale of "by-products", mostly to the cosmetic industry, but one thing was clear: next to the bank and government buildings, the US A&E tower was always the newest, most expensive building in town, from New York to L.A.

Without much interest Heiland read the billboards as they passed down Eighth Avenue. There was a deadening imbecility and sameness about them all. With only 15 major *zaibats* in America, each with its own market share meticulously defined and controlled by the Fair Trade Authority, competitive advertising had been reduced to taste-preference promotion. Heiland could name every corporation effortlessly: GM-Ford, Exxon/Gulf, IBM-Mobil, Sears-AT&T, DuPont, GE-Salomon, CitiCorp-KMart, Chrysler-Safeway, US Steel, Kroger-Phillips, GTE-United Technologies, Travellers-Cigna, Occidental, Bank America-Chemical, and Proctor and Gamble. A small market share was reserved for independents, but their turnover was minor. About half the ads Heiland saw were for government agencies.

In form the Fair Trade Authority was a quasi-governmental agency. In fact, it was the gargantuan tail that wagged the government dog. Led by the Federal Reserve, the FTA made policy. What the FTA proposed, the Congress approved, and the Service enforced.

Heiland poked Robert in the ribs

* Welfare Roll Reduction Transfer Payment

with his finger, then pointed to a billboard. A robust sun-tanned face about 35, benevolent and concerned, stared into the viewer's eyes. There was something strange about that face. Heiland realized at last that he couldn't tell whether it was male or female. The short hair and fine features could belong to either. It was a man just a bit too pretty, or a woman just a bit too mannish. But it was an hypnotic face, a face you could trust. The headline read, "Big Sib is watching, and needs to know!" Beneath that headline in smaller letters ran, "Drop a dime, pick up a grand." At the end of the tag line there was a telephone, and underneath, "Tax and documentation fraud rob YOU!" Inflation had outrun the antiquated idiom: the phone call was 10 ferns now, the reward 25,000.

Heiland squirmed easily in his seat as they reached the outskirts of Nashville. This part of the trip always bothered him. It was a trip through a mortuary: mile after mile of abandoned shops, buildings, and shopping malls, a few boarded up with sheets of plywood, most just leering at him from black, broken windows like gaping caves, acres of empty parking lots where wisps of weeds and young trees pushed up through the cracks, like the leavings of stringy hair on a corpse's head. It was the triumph of death, and Heiland loathed it with a hatred beyond rationality.

All that hate me, love death.

They weren't needed anymore, those shopping centers and suburban stores and offices. The official US population had been reduced from 226 million in 1980 to around 106 million at the 2010 census. The massive immigrations in the wake of the fall of Mexico in 1992 had been more than overbalanced by US A&E's efficiency, homosexuality, a suicide rate of 340 per 100,000, and the final blow, the AIDS plague of the middle '90s. Almost a quarter of the city population had died in those waves of epidemics alone. The death wish cult had done its work well, but with its victory had gone the prosperity of population. By 2020 the trees were safe: it was the humans who were endangered.

Economy was their watchword, Heiland thought. If you want to conquer a people, surely war is a costly and wasteful way to do the job. How much more economical and efficient than raining bombs and fiery nukes it was

merely to convince the victim to kill himself. It's much cleaner and it doesn't disturb the real estate.

But Heiland knew the gap between the official statistics and the real ones. The Freeman counties were avoided by government agents of every stripe, most especially census takers. The boxes on the census forms were filled out by imagination, not count. The only concern on the part of their bosses was that the boxes were all filled.

The Church did not take a census, but Free State Intelligence offered quite a different picture from government statistics. Government numbers showed a population of 1.1 million in the Freeman counties in Tennessee alone, about 45% of the 1980 figures. Freeman Intelligence estimated 3.8 million, a 55% increase, and growing. Average family size was 7.3, and the trend was up. Two more generations and the cities would be hopelessly outnumbered.

The lack of effective administrative officers and the hostility and uncooperativeness of the country population had attenuated central government control over the countryside, finally limiting it to those counties immediately surrounding the cities. Regardless of what the Service and the government may think, beyond the limits of the city there was no federal government: there was only the Tennessee Free State.

At Berry Hill Route 31 widened out into what looked like toll plaza. The road branched into ten strips passing between booths. Armed men in khaki uniforms with the red, white and blue shoulder patches of the National Drug Enforcement Corporation lounged around the booths. Several cars were stopped with open trunks. MacDonald pulled in line behind two cars and waited. Slowly the line advanced.

One uniformed man approached the pickup from each side. On Heiland's side the enforcer carried an assault rifle slung over his shoulder, the other wore a .38 on his hip. In their hands they held what looked like plastic pistols, but on closer inspection proved to be merely hand held scanners. Long extension cords trailed from the butt end of the scanners and disappeared into the booth. The officer on MacDonald's side said, "Papers!", and both MacDonald and Heiland reached their blue passes

through the window. The officers perused the passbooks without comment, then the one on MacDonald's side barked, "Right hands!" Both Heiland and MacDonald reached their right hands out the window. The officer passed the point of the scanner over the backs of their hands, waited while the yellow LED showed that the central computer was processing the reading. On MacDonald's side the yellow LED winked out as a green light came on. Shortly afterward the scanner used on Heiland flashed green as well. Using the scanner as a pointer, the officer waved MacDonald on. He weaved through the cement maze on the other side of the checkpoint plaza. The two foot thick walls four feet high showed inner steel I-beams at the top, festooned with razor tape concertina. Machine gun towers stood on either side of the plaza at both ends. Not a place to forget your papers.

Heiland's dark mood left him as the checkpoint vanished around a curve in the road and MacDonald reached more open countryside. This close to the city there was little foretaste of the prosperity farther back in the countryside. Here were only corporate farms. Still Heiland felt the goodness of God overcoming him as he watched the swiftly passing countryside. The air whipping past his face brought to him all the sweet pungency of late spring, moist and damp and big with all the swelling blessing of the earth.

Heiland tried to sort out the odors: honeysuckle, green hay, willow, oak, a suggestion of sweet gum, or was that cottonwood? Before he spotted the dairy barn he could smell cow manure, he noted with more delight than disgust. That smell was *home*. The countryside rolled away from him on either side: gray wooden barn with collapsing wounds in their foreheads, broken barbed wire fences, and green and tan meadows stretching away to welcoming walls of woods, a witness to what had once been well-tended farmland. The farmer in him protested at the waste. He longed without envy to own those lands, to see them flourish under his own hand.

Low passes in the ridges opened onto new, hidden valleys, green walled about by rounded hills. Occasionally a hill rose improbably straight up from a flat valley floor to end in a high dome: huge, high-walled cauldrons overturned and left to dry by a lost race of giants. At the tops of the hills Heiland could see for miles until the hazy air turned the woods from green to blue green then to a pale gray, the farthest hills like cardboard backdrops. Even their speed and the whipping air could not stop the shrill penetration of a meadowlark's whistling song. Heiland looked up: curly masses of bright white clouds hung in the sky.

O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth! Who hast set thy glory above the heavens. When I consider the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars, which

thou hast ordained, what is man, that thou art mindful of him? And the son of man, that thou visitest him? For thou hast made him a little lower than the angels, and hast crowned him with glory and honor. Thou madest him to have dominion over the works of thy hands; thou has put all things under his feet: all sheep and oxen, yea, and the beasts of the field; the fowl of the air, and the fish of the sea, and whatsoever passeth through the paths of the seas. O Lord our Lord, how excellent is thy name in all the earth!

Mine in Him, Heiland thought. Heiland became a giant, skipping across the land, his hand upstretched to brush the clouds. The land was His, but in him, too, from his father's fathers for three hundred years. If he left it he knew he would cease to be Heiland, cease to be a father and a man, cease to be even a part of the world, would shrivel and become like the dry, rotted husk of a walnut, empty of all the worth and goodness inside him. By God's good grace, no one would ever take this freedom or this land from him. Heiland threw back his head and let loose a steep howl of the purest joy: "Eeeeeeeeeeee-yaaaah!"

MacDonald turned in surprise as Heiland burst into laughter. His mind must have been following Heiland's trail, because he, too, began to laugh and the two of them sped down the road like two adolescent fugitives from Bedlam, laughing and howling until their sides ached.

Heiland was home. □

→ from page 4

Letters to the Editors

Antipathy

I am cancelling my subscription.

All of the articles printed under *Politics* aggregated a repetitiously lengthy diatribe against Ron Paul and Russell Means that serves no real purpose. Those Libertarians who oppose either man as the national candidate have beaten the subject to death; all apparently missing a truism: "there is no person who doesn't rapidly become a non-person by losing an election." In lieu of the candidacy of either Paul or Means, who has stepped up to fight for the non-position of National Libertarian Candidate? Shirt tail candidates? There is apparently no Libertarian who would carry anyone into a congression-

al seat.

The Cox "criticism" of the Randian background in the films that Rand was associated with is not as much elucidative of the stated purpose of the articles as being a means to be unnecessarily critical of her. When the comments on her could be favorable, why the damning with faint praise?

I firmly believe that the Rothbards and the Coxes do a great disservice to libertarians with their needless nit-picking and disruptive criticism of people who have helped or are helping to formulate a common general policy to improve humanity and human relationships.

Robert L. Hyman
Center Barnstead,
New Hampshire

Lüftmenschen über alles!

Murray's analysis of politics and culture, entitled: "Life or Death in Seattle" is so wrongheaded that were it not for his eloquent prose, so full of characteristic Rothbardian flourish and bombast, anyone would see at once the almost self-evident nonsense of his argument. In the first place, the *luftmenschen*, the socially and economically marginal men, have been anything but politically marginal figures in American history. A cursory examination of the Jacksonian revolution in the 1830's and the Populist phenomenon of the 1890's illustrate how poor, illiterate, even ignorant voters can

→ to page 39

Reviews

Crisis and Leviathan, by Robert Higgs,
Oxford University Press, 1987, 350pp., \$24.95

The Rise of Statism

Murray N. Rothbard

Crisis and Leviathan is a blockbuster of a book, one of the most important of the last decade. It is that rare and wondrous combination: scholarly and hard-hitting, lucidly written and libertarian as well. To Professor Higgs, being thorough and erudite does not mean timorously qualifying every statement, or torpidly and "judiciously" picking one's way through the minefields of ideology. Higgs's depth and breadth of learning has only intensified his commitment to truth, liberty and the identification its enemies.

Robert Higgs, a noted economic historian, set about to answer a long-standing and vital question: why has the State grown so ominously in power in the United States during the twentieth century? Why did we begin as a quasi-*laissez-faire* country in the nineteenth century and end up in our current mess? What were the processes of change?

The orthodox answer, the answer given by statist apologists, is all too simple: the world grew more complex, the increasing need for statism was perceived by intellectuals, statesmen, and farsighted businessmen; hence government expanded in response to those needs. Of course, no one who is not a naive apologist for the status quo will fall for such pap.

Robert Higgs was a student of the Chicagoite school of "Cliometrics" fathered by Douglass North, of the University of Washington. The Northian approach to economic history is marked by several features: (a) a roughly free market approach, but strongly tempered by the "Whig" notion that whatever existed in the past had to exist; (b) a strict economic determinism that everyone is

only out for his own economic self-interest; and (c) the view that all of economic history can be encompassed by a few mathematical equations. It should be pointed out that (c) is totally fallacious on its own, but only gains seeming plausibility if you hold (b), and then add whopping assumptions about measurement of determined behavior. It is patently impossible, even for Cliometricians, to embody ideology, people's values and ideas into mathematical equations.

We can also see that (a)—the Whig determinism that no status quo can be changed, combined with (b), strict economic determinism, leads to total pessimism about changing any situation, past or present, in behalf of liberty. If ideas or principles are unimportant and can have no influence on history, as the public choice wing of Chicagoites has emphasized, then there is no hope to overcome the more pointed and intense economic interest of groups clamoring for special privileges from the State.

The special delight of *Crisis and Leviathan* is that Higgs has worked himself loose from Northian Cliometrics. Much of the beginning of the book is a knowledgeable and trenchant assault on its assumptions and procedures. The key to historical change, and specifically to the growth of statism, North points out, was a change in ideology, in the ruling set of ideas in society. The crucial watershed was the adoption of statism by the American intellectuals during the Progressive period. As a result, any economic or political crisis could give a major thrust to statism that it could not do before.

One great accomplishment of Professor Higgs is to vindicate the role of ideas in history; more specifically, the

role of ideology in bringing about statism in the twentieth century. He has rescued the discipline of economic history from the Chicago variant of economic determinism.

But this is scarcely all. For in virtually every free-market economist of our time, there is one great big hole, one big gap in his critique of statism: war. War is sacrosanct, considered necessary, inevitable, and good, and so while free-market economists will devote a great deal of energy to the evils of government intervention in oil, or forestry, or the retail trade, there is little or nothing said about the horrors and distortions imposed by the Pentagon and the war-making Leviathan State.

In *Crisis and Leviathan*, Higgs identifies war as the critical key to the growth of statism, making his achievement all the more remarkable. World Wars I and II, coming on top of the adoption of statist ideology, were the critical thrusts for the triumph of statism, in economic and social affairs. Higgs points out that World War I, in contrast to previous American wars, was used to impose a collectivism that became a cherished model for all statists as a permanent feature of American life; and that World War II completed the job.

Usually, free-market economists, ever wary of making value judgments, restrict their critique of conscription to a mere argument that it is an inefficient way of mobilizing manpower: hence their call for a volunteer army as a more efficient means of allocating labor and imposing social costs. Robert Higgs, in contrast, argues that the draft is central to the development of statism in the twentieth century. In an important contribution, Higgs points out that once conscription was adopted, the statists were able to use the draft as a powerful weapon for the control of the economy and society. Essentially, they argued that "if our boys are drafted, then surely property must be controlled and conscripted as well."


Already, alert conservatives have

denounced *Crisis and Leviathan* for its pinpointing of war and militarism as a key to statism. The reviewer for the *American Spectator* denounced Higgs for his "libertarian" leanings. When conservatives are faced with a choice between war and freedom, we all know which they invariably choose.

Not the least of the joys of *Crisis and Leviathan* is the love of liberty and the hatred of its enemies that shines through the scholarly apparatus of the book. In Yeat's famous phrase, "The best lack all conviction, while the worst / Are full of passionate intensity." What a

treasure, then, when an erudite scholar and distinguished economic historian such as Robert Higgs, conveys a passionate intensity in favor of liberty and against the depredations of the State!

We live in an age of outrageous hype, when publishers and book-dealers tout every other book in print as "the greatest of all time." So what are we to do when a book of genuine greatness comes along? I say this about very few books: make this your top priority this year; rush out and read the book. And then proclaim it throughout the land. □



"I think it's part of the New Deal."

The Closing of the American Mind, by Allan Bloom,
Simon & Schuster, 1987, 392 pp., \$22.50

The Wasteland of Traditionalism

Michael Townshend

It is rare when a deliberately controversial book about serious ideas sells well in America, and rarer still when one becomes a "best-seller." *The Closing of the American Mind*, by Allan Bloom, is one such anomaly. Despite its focus on weighty matters—education, moral philosophy, history—it is selling not just well, but phenomenally. As of this writing, it tops all non-fiction best-seller lists in the United States.

Just about everyone seems to have something good to say about this book. From *National Review* to *The New Republic*, from the *New York Times* to *USA Today*, the rave reviews roll on and on. If there has been an unfavorable review

of this book from a major source, I have yet to see it.

That it has achieved this fantastic reception is, I think, truly amazing, considering what it is—an intellectualized right-wing screed. All the stock elements are there: hatred of young people and of sexuality; the scapegoating of changes in taste; hysterical denunciation of rock music; even an attack on computer literacy—"The full cheapness of which is evident only to those who think a bit about what literacy might mean." Bloom is apparently not much keener on science: "Science, in freeing men, destroys the natural conditions that make them human."

The book deals with two issues which strike a deep chord within liter-

ate America: the nature of American culture, and the quality of higher education in this country. Its thesis is pretty well summed up by the front-cover blurb: "How higher education has failed democracy and impoverished the souls of today's students."

Although the issues covered go well beyond the field of education, Bloom returns repeatedly to the concept of the university as the repository of a culture's essential values. He argues that the democratization of education and of American life has lowered standards and stimulated the growth of a pervasive nihilism in our universities. As part of this process, values and truth have been declared to be relative or merely subjective. Tolerance and open-mindedness, in reality, disguised forms of indifference, are now the intellectual norm. The faculties of education are over-specialized and over-compartmentalized; they lack contact with any broader tradition and viewpoint. Today's students are confused and directionless, cut off from the best of the western tradition and from any guiding principles in their lives.

Bloom deals more with broad issues of philosophy and morality, especially in relation to young people, than with formal education. His main problem seems to be that he cannot quite cope with the change in college life brought about by recent demographic and cultural changes. After World War II, there developed a consensus in America which regarded mass higher education as a good thing. This attitude, totally new in history, coincided with the post-war baby boom. As the mid-sixties arrived, there was a huge increase in student population, most notably in junior colleges and in the enormous state universities, of which the University of California complex is an example.

There is little doubt that there are many who "shouldn't be in college"—that is, that lack many of the skills, both intellectual and psychological, which used to be associated with the idea of a successful college life. I remember vividly a scene at Western Michigan University in 1969, in which an elderly and inoffensive right-wing speaker who had been invited to address the student body was continually drowned out by shouted obscenities and mass screaming and cat-calls. I remember, too, the question-and-answer session that followed, in which, without exception, the questions from the floor were mixtures

tional unconsciousness." It is the "junk food of the soul."

Looming over all of this empire of evil, Bloom imagines, stands the horrific figure of Mick Jagger. His view of Jagger as a mythic symbol of evil is so goofy that one hesitates to take him seriously. He believes, for example, that Jagger "plays the same role in their [i.e., the students'] lives that Napoleon played in the lives of Frenchmen throughout the nineteenth century."

What is disturbing is that all this go-shawful foolishness, and much more that I will not detail here, emanates from a man who has been a professor at York, Cornell, the University of Chicago and the University of Paris. Bloom is not unintelligent, but he seems to be suffering from what the Thomists call a "deformation of the imagination." He is simply unable to imagine the value, the legitimacy, or even the authentic identity of any tastes and styles of life which differ from his own.

Uncomfortable with pluralism, it is not surprising to discover that Bloom worries about freedom, about "bourgeois rights." He is not really against them, but he frets that they are "sad to say, enjoyed by people who want to see dirty movies." He takes the common conservative view that freedom is merely a snare to make virtue more difficult. In Bloom's burlesqued version, liberty consists of "merely acting as one pleases," guided by the "merely negative freedom of satisfying brutish impulse."

Like most right-wing writers, he is at his best when describing and denouncing the Left, especially, in Bloom's case, the New Left crazies who were so influential at Cornell in the late 1960s. But this is pretty conventional stuff, covered endlessly by other writers.

There are two political themes, though, which give me pause. Both are important to Bloom, and references to them keep coming back into the text regardless of the subject at hand.

The first of these concerns the gradual decline of the intellectual underpinnings of Marxism within the academic and intellectual worlds of most Western nations during the past thirty years. Bloom attributes this decline exclusively to the process by which Marx's views have come to be accepted, even by his followers, as merely a way of looking at history and politics and society, rather than a science of revolutionary change followed by an end to further historical

development. Bloom refers to this process as the "historicization" of Marxism, and he attributes its origin to Lenin's practice, begun in his writings after the 1905 revolution, of referring to Marxism as an "ideology." According to Bloom, this term carried the implication that Leninists no longer regarded Marxist doctrine as true in a supra-historical sense.

This thesis is very weak. The retreat from rigid Marxian positions, even among hard-core socialists, has been a long and steady process dating back to the nineteenth century. One by one the master's dicta have been weakened or cast aside. Today most people who call themselves Marxists do not believe that armed revolution is inevitable in all societies, or that all capitalist countries will quickly reach an identical stage of economic development, or that the industrial working class is the sole mover of history in its final stages, or that the labor theory of value explains economic phenomena. Bloom's odd insistence that some rather trivial matters of definition and terminology are the root causes of all this is difficult to explain, but it seems to be related in some way to his second major political theme: the Nietzscheanization of the Left.

Bloom's interpretation of Nietzsche and Nietzsche's intellectual influence is, for me, the murkiest aspect of the entire book. Nietzsche is brought into every discussion, every denunciation, every clash of values, yet the author's own view of Nietzsche remains elusive. He says that the German philosopher feared that "an evaporation of the soul's boiling blood [was] taking place," that the "spirit's bow was being unbent and risked being permanently unstrung." Much of Bloom's very extended discussion of Nietzsche is conducted on this kind of metaphorical and recondite level. Even so, his thesis that Nietzsche furnished the political Left with a "passion" that came to fill the void left by the intellectual decay of Marxism is at least an issue of scholarly interest. That alone places his treatment of it on a higher plane than most of the remainder of his book. But, like Lenin-"ideology" question, the Nietzsche question seems to make political history revolve around literary history.

Bloom's views on sex are illiberal indeed. In a lifetime of reading, I don't believe I have ever come across a serious book in which the author's anti-

sexualism was so shrill and relentless.

Most of Bloom's views on the contemporary sexual scene are sinister. Some of his statements on the subject are merely silly and fatuous. He believes that modern Americans, and especially the young, are not capable of true *eros*, or even of romantic love, but merely of the act of copulation.

He doubts, for example, that young people ever say "I love you" anymore, and he believes they cannot possibly understand the theme of *Othello* because they are unable to imagine romantic jealousy. Strangely, he regards, for instance, the neurotic, repressed, guilt-ridden figures of Hester Prynne and Anna Karenina as "ennobling exemplars" of womanhood.

He also argues that sexual repression is the *source* of the West's prodigious productivity and success. This is a fairly common view in some circles, and seems to derive from some half-understood views of Max Weber and some modern historians of Calvinism. I don't know whether Bloom believes that the Roman Empire fell because of sexual "immorality"—the issue is not discussed in the book—but it would not surprise me if he did.

Regarding sexual desire, he remarks "that one does not die from not satisfying this hunger, and that even great seducers' lusts can be calmed by the certainty of the death penalty." What, precisely, is his point? That a person can survive a lack of sexual outlet is undoubtedly true, but hardly constitutes a recommendation. Many persons have lived long lives in abject poverty, but that's not a plug for the virtue of poverty. The second part of the statement is stranger still. There is no follow up, and no explanation. What is Bloom really suggesting? Is he advocating some draconian solution to the "problem" of extra-marital sex? I'm not sure, but the rest of his treatment of the issue does not leave me particularly sanguine.

He endlessly bemoans what he sees as the lack of guilt in modern sex. He longs for the days in which "coupling [was] a very dark and complicated business." What is annoying about all this is what Bloom leaves out. In his extensive discussion of sexual mores, he offers no hint of any awareness of the dark side of traditional Christian views concerning sex. Bloom says nothing about the pathological cult of virginity practiced by the Catholic Church for many centu-

ries. He makes no mention of the terrible effects of sexual repression, the hatred of the body and the simple refusal to communicate the facts of sexuality, which have blighted the lives of millions of people.

The Closing of the American Mind is not well written. Its prose is mushy and squishy. Bloom is the sort of fellow one could imagine taking five minutes giving directions to the men's room. And clarity often suffers. We are told that "God is the highest value, on which the others depend. God is not creative, for God is not. But God as made by man reflects what man is... so man makes God out of nothing." [emphasis in original] Far too much of Bloom's writing comes out looking like this.

But the chief fault of *The Closing of the American Mind* is not its style. It is

that Bloom is simply unable to cope with recent changes in behavior. That perfectly decent and thoughtful people have come to prefer a more relaxed kind of relation between the sexes; that women might have careers and still be loving mothers; that some people simply like rock music, just as others prefer country or jazz or classical—or, as in my case, no music of any kind—all this is lost on Bloom. For him, such changes in values are the result of moral depravity, the decay of civilization, and the rejection of tradition.

There is no hint that Bloom perceives the right to make one's own choices about one's own life as an essential element in the western tradition. Instead he gives us neo-Puritanism cloaked in academic garb.

human suffering involved, especially when legal individual rights were barely recognized for ordinary people. Twenty years prior to Australia's first colony, voting rights in freer America were usually available only to white, property-owning males. This was the most radical libertarian recognition of legal individual rights then extant. Hughes makes abundantly clear that the world of the Australian convict settler was vastly worse than the early American world.

Australian colonization began when the semi-feudal English Tory establishment found its urban areas overrun with gin-soaked ex-farmers. All previous notions of crime and punishment were sorely tested. In the rural village society, most criminals had been known locally and were either exiled or physically punished by local magistrates and courts.

"Victimless criminals" were over-represented in the annals of 18th century English crime. Every person who did not live by strict upper-class standards of morality (in other words, most of the population of England) was subject to harsh punishment for petty crimes, like poaching from government forests—virtually the only means of survival for many—and trespassing against the established standards of propriety.

The Fatal Shore: The Epic of Australia's Founding,
by Robert Hughes, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1987, 688 pp., \$24.95

The Gulag Down Under

Mike Holmes

The very day we landed upon the Fatal
Shore,

The planters stood around us, full twenty
score or more,

They ranked us up like horses to pull the
plough, upon Van Diemen's Land.

—convict ballad, c. 1825-30

Between Olivia Newton-John, Mel Gibson of "Mad Max" fame, and Crocodile Dundee's affable Paul Hogan, there's been something of an Australian chic fad come over America in recent years.

Australians seem friendly, outgoing, sports-loving, and enthusiastic imbibers of their half-gallon cans of Foster's lager. It is a romantic sort of place in the imagination, at the very bottom of the tropical South Seas Pacific. We envision it, like America, being pioneered by yeoman-like citizenry, people who could brave the hazards of the outback and the ubiquitous kangaroos.

We tend also to see Australia as something like an antipodal Canada: a nice, pleasant, somewhat sleepy British

outpost that eventually turned into a real country, although one we needn't take too seriously.

These quaint notions about Australian history are rudely shattered by Robert Hughes' surprising American best seller *The Fatal Shore*. Hughes, an Australian expatriate who lives in London and New York, describes early Australia as the Gulag of the British Empire. Modern Australians take a schizophrenic pride in their roots, and *The Fatal Shore* appears to be a major step forward in Australian historical revisionism.

In the mellow afterglow of our own American heritage, British colonial rule is often whitewashed into a benevolent aristocratic guardianship. But the colonization of the arid Australian continent was for the most part a by-product of the British desire to rid the homeland of surplus disenfranchised peasants, who were made redundant by the much hated enclosure laws and the early dislocations of industrialization. While some libertarians may view this industrialization process as inevitable and desirable, it is hard to overlook the

You lecherous whore-masters who practice
vile arts,

To ruin young virgins and break parents
hearts,

Or from the found husband the wife led
astray—

Let such debauch'd stallions be sent to the
Bay.

There's whores, pimps and bastards, a large
costly crew,

Maintain'd by the seat of a labouring few,
They should have no commission, place, pen-
sion or pay,

Such locusts should all go to Botany Bay.

—convict ballad "Botany Bay"

Although Hughes carefully demolishes the cherished Australian myth that most early convict prisoners were heroic freedom fighters instead of petty criminals, political criminals were also in abundant supply. Aside from the large Irish contingent with their proud tradition of fighting British hegemony, most early Australian convicts were simply poor, unlucky petty criminals, few of whom would see the inside of a jail in today's legal climate.

As displaced peasants moved to the cities, particularly London, the government reacted by imposing capital pun-

ishment for an astonishing variety of crimes. But mass hangings failed to deter what were inevitable sociological and economic "crimes." During the politically tenuous times, when wars with France and the Americas sorely strained the authority of a semi-democratic Parliament, the forces of law and order found there was more political favor to be gained by pardoning capital offenders than by hanging them. As Hughes persuasively argues, too many ordinary people felt the noose slipping around their own necks. Authorities had to find something else.

As the modern notion of prison had not yet developed, and few offenders were worth putting up in dungeons, old ships called "hulks" were enlisted to serve as makeshift prisons. These were anchored in rivers and harbors and crammed to the gunwales with prisoners who were often insolvent debtors or otherwise under financial obligation to win their freedom. People were effectively marooned on these old, rotting ships in extremely unpleasant and unsanitary conditions. But far worse from the government viewpoint was the rising cost of keeping these poor souls alive.

Captain James Cook had previously charted a huge, empty land (not yet known in its geographical entirety) in a remote part of the world. The British had no real interest in the region other than to keep the French and Dutch out. So Whitehall planners hit upon the idea of dumping surplus prisoners into the new Terra Incognita to fend for themselves, thereby securing remote lands from geopolitical enemies and ridding the homeland of undesirables.

One of the most intriguing aspects of *The Fatal Shore* (it constantly leaves you hungry for more digressions on various subjects—the mark of a superior book) is the parallel early Australia presents with modern problems of space colonization and otherworldly science fiction scenarios. Australia was a land barely known. The accounts of early explorers drew little attention from military-minded governments more interested in conventional trade routes and easier places to loot. It may as well have been the moon—at least you could see that from England.

The book quotes many first person accounts by original convicts, their families, and the authorities. Also cited are numerous folksongs and drinking ballads (many still popular in Australian pubs) detailing the terror experienced

by those being shipped off to the other side of the world.

How wretched is an Exile's state of mind
When not one gleam of hope on earth re-
main
Through grief worn down, with servile
chains confined,
And not one friend to soothe his heartfelt
pain.

Too true I know that man was made to mourn,
A heavy portion's fallen to my lot
With anguish full my heart is torn
Far from my friends, by all the world forgot.

—verses by convict James Porter, who escaped Tasmania in 1833 by stealing a brig and sailing to Chile, where he was eventually recaptured and returned.

Voyages around Cape Horn and the Cape of Good Hope took months and ships often failed to arrive in Australia at all. On some voyages over half the transportees perished en route. Those who survived ended up in a land popularly believed to be inhabited by semi-mythological beasts and strange barbarians. And based on the differences between Britain and Australia in flora and fauna, these beliefs weren't so far off the mark.

As Hughes shows, the British "criminal class" problem was solved by dumping people on shore and letting them fend for themselves. Dried kangaroo meat became symbolic of the early privations. The Australian coastline looked deceptively like the cherished English countryside, with rolling green hills dotted with large trees. But the harsh reality was that in most places the soil was poor, it was too hot to farm, there were few edible animals, and water was scarce. Until sheep farming became established, there was no real economic development. Because of the vast distances between Australia and possible trading partners, and the lack of readily exploitable natural resources, foreign trade for many decades was virtually nonexistent.

The native "abbos" marauded isolated farms and often returned escaped convicts for rewards. This laid the groundwork for later Australian racial hatred and outright genocide. In Van Dieman's land (now called Tasmania) the entire aboriginal population was ruthlessly hunted to extinction. The miserable gang of rag-tag military convict overseers Hughes describes became known as the "Rum Corps" and much worse. Survival depended on thriving black markets in rum, women, and anything else that

was scarce.

While not entirely succumbing to the once-popular Marxist "people's history" approach, Hughes devotes considerable attention to the details of everyday life. His discussion ranges from primitive farming methods to the "infamous crimes" of sodomy and promiscuity.

Country yokels were housed with hardened criminals and were held in semi- or total servitude by military wardens or private masters to whom they were "assigned." The Australian continent needed few walls since there was no place to escape except the dusty outback, which was incapable of sustaining life. At first deluded convicts tried to escape inland "to China" as rumor had it, or to imaginary white tribes living hidden in the interior. The hundreds of bleached bones of would-be freedom seekers encountered as settlers slowly pushed in from the coast eventually dissuaded the prisoners from "bolting." Hughes notes fewer than a dozen successful escapes (mostly by piracy) to South America or other Pacific islands during the 80-year history of convict transport.

The savage and inhuman punishments meted out routinely in the notorious hell holes like Norfolk Island and Macquarie Harbor are fully comparable to Solzhenitsyn's depiction of life in the modern day Soviet Gulag. A generous application of the "cat o'nine tails" was the routine, often fatal punishment. If there are any parts of this book that are painful to read, they are the repeated accounts of torture and violence inflicted on the hapless convicts by their keepers.

Hughes describes the Irish transportees as perhaps the most stubborn, rebellious and cohesive segment of convict society, and certainly the most feared. The early classical liberal and proto-libertarian political prisoners, mostly Scottish heirs to the Adam Smith individualist heritage, were more educated and affluent than average and tended to become collaborators with authority, Hughes suggests. (One hopes Australian libertarians will research the point and confirm or deny this offhand observation.) But the liberating winds of the mid-nineteenth century that were generated by classical liberal forces in the British government finally ended this experiment in social exile. Also important was the economic impact of the early Australian gold

rush: having gold nuggets in one's pockets suggests the importance of freedom. The gradual introduction of free settlers, and the gradual freeing of convicts and their children provided political interest in destroying the convict transport system.

Hughes notes that there is a modern Australian tendency to both mock and ignore "duly constituted authority" with Crocodile Dundee cheekiness, coupled with a cap-tugging obsequiousness towards authority best suited to survival in a country run like a vast military prison. Australia's convict legacy

has left a curious psychic imprint. As Hughes points out, this era of Australian history has largely been ignored until recently, since an unofficial bias against the early inhabitants reflected the Victorian "tainted seed" theory that the "criminal classes" were some kind of biological mutation rather than individuals reacting to specific circumstances.

The book gives us much to ponder: questions of crime and punishment, law and order, civilization and colonization. And it puts a human face on the victims of imperialism. □

5000 B. C. and Other Philosophical Fantasies,
by Raymond Smullyan, St. Martin's Press, 1983

The Puzzler's Guide to Philosophy

Ross Overbeek

This book should be read once just to appreciate Smullyan's wit and charm. Then it should be reread to appreciate the subtle insights that are somewhat hidden by a deceptively readable style. I hesitate to even describe the contents of this remarkable volume; I cannot help but feel that many readers might fail to experience enthusiasm at the idea of yet another work on ethics, metaphysics, epistemology, and ontology. Few books on these subjects could honestly be referred to as "readable"; this one is not only readable — it is also humorous.

Smullyan is an anomaly. I first encountered his books during graduate school when I was studying formal logic. He gained a reputation for writing with outstanding clarity. His works on first-order logic and formal systems are still considered classics. However, he also has a playful side. He is a professional magician. Indeed, I remember with deep gratitude the evening that he successfully extricated a number of us from a terrible discussion by hauling out a pack of cards and performing some marvelous tricks. He seems committed to the idea of enjoying life. Complex ideas are meant to be savored, played with, and discussed.

There has been a great deal written on Gödel's theorem, a result that shook

the foundations of mathematics. For years, the very statement of the proof (let alone the technical details) was inaccessible to anyone lacking an extensive training in mathematical logic. A number of tracts have been written to explain the result to those with minimal background. Smullyan offers a two-page description of the essential idea in the form of a relatively straightforward puzzle. Any reader willing to devote up to an hour of honest effort can achieve a reasonably clear insight into the problem. I consider such a pedagogical achievement to be wonderful.

A surprising number of libertarian friends have asked me about the significance (or lack of it) and even the correctness of Gödel's work. There seems to be a strange perception that it somehow violates the epistemological framework required to deal with reality. I now have a suitable response: "Go read Smullyan's discussion in miscellaneous fragment #65 in Chapter 3."

Chapter 10 offers a treatment of the ontological proofs of the existence of God. I have never read such a brilliant, concise statement of the results. I remember reading Anselm and Descartes on this topic. I always felt that there was more more than a little legerdemain in those works, but I have

never seen the essential arguments laid bare the way Smullyan does it. He achieves this feat by posing puzzles, formulating postulates and lemmas that imply different theologically imposing theorems. Nowhere will you find attacks or exhortations; the chapter is just a collection of puzzles, answers and observations that together offer a pleasant and amusing intellectual experience. There is none of the intimidation, pomposity, and reverence normally associated with philosophy; it is just fun. I cannot restrain myself from listing his first development of the ontological argument:

"Axiom 1. The property of existence is a perfection.

"Axiom 2. (the ontological axiom).. Given any perfection P, if all things having Property P also have the property of existence, then there is at least one entity having the Property P."

From these, he proves:

"Theorem 1. (the ontological theorem). Something exists; that is, there is at least one entity that has the property of existence."

Then, by adding:

"Axiom 3. Given any class C of perfections, the property of having all the perfections in C is again a perfection."

and

"Axiom 4. There is a class of perfections that contains all perfections."

he is able to prove:

"Theorem 2. (the weak Bible theorem). There is, at least, one god— moreover, an existent one."

By then adding:

"Axiom 5. For any god g, the property of being identical to g is a perfection."

he finally shows:

"Theorem 3 (the strong Bible theorem). There is exactly one God."

After proving the existence of God, he proceeds to prove that there is no devil. By carefully varying axioms, he makes it obvious exactly how such arguments are crafted. If you have never seen the relatively opaque attempts at this style of reasoning that were given

by Anselm and Spinoza, then this might just be amusing. If you have, reading such a beautifully wrought chapter cannot help but leave the bittersweet feeling that one gets looking at pyramids. Such effort expended in the construction of such edifices—and to what end? "The first time that I read this book, I treated it as light, amusing reading. The true depth escaped me—probably because of a subconscious belief that wisdom can only be bought with pain (or at least effort). Later, I reread sections to refresh my memory, and started to appreciate the thought that went into the construction of this short volume. The book requires absolutely no background in philosophy, other than a general interest in what life's all about. It offers amusement, pleasure, and (with a little effort) insight.

It's a gem. □

Booknotes

That's Not Funny, That's Graphic

Donald Duck could get by with just being funny. More recent protagonists of graphic fiction (i.e., comic books) are encouraged to become deadly serious or (by a further turn of the screw) to become seriously ironic about seriousness. This can all be done well or badly.

A reprint of Steve Ditko's comics from 1966 to 1973 has been issued: *The Ditko Collection*, vol. 1, ed. by Robin Snyder (Thousand Oaks, CA: Fantagraphics). It's available from Laissez-Faire Books. Ditko's protagonist—no his hero in every possible way—is Mr. A, as in Ayn Rand's "A is A." Mr. A is in constant, violent warfare against moral evil, which Ditko constantly reminds you never, never to get mixed up with moral good. A is A, and A is *not* not-A. This lecture can get on your nerves. In the Mr. A pieces, Ditko is as good a story-teller as the people you meet at family reunions; his drawing is as good as the drawing in "Little Orphan Annie." A quaint collector's item.

Much more fun is Kevin Eastman and Peter Laird's *Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles* (Chicago: First Comics), available from your local comic store. This

1986 collection reprints the first three issues of the Turtles series and includes two previously unpublished stories. The Turtles are, of course, a satire on other action comics (though a very gentle satire). These four turtles, see, get mutated and grow about five feet tall—also tough and talkative. They're discovered by a rat who understands martial arts. He forms them into a gang bound by ties of traditional loyalty to him, and full of the heroic lust of battle. I need say no more than that Splinter, the rat had been reading Janson's art history while he raised the Turtles, and he named them Raphael (Raph), Leonardo (Leo), Michaelangelo (Mike), and Donatello (Don). Raphael is the toughest one of the four.

If you have a reactionary longing to go back to *fun*, you should know that the first few months of Bill Waterson's *Calvin and Hobbes* have now been reprinted in a book from Andrews, McMeel and Parker (Kansas City)—it's sold in all the bookstores, though they have trouble keeping it in stock. Calvin, as you may already know, is an imaginative little boy, and Hobbes is a toy tiger who becomes a real tiger when he and Calvin are alone. They're named after John Calvin and Thomas Hobbes, though there is little similarity, if any, between their belief systems and those of the two philosophers. The jokes come mainly from new ways of looking at things. Calvin (experimenting with a toaster): "Wanna see something weird? Watch. You put bread in this slot and push down this lever...Then in a few minutes, toast pops up!" Hobbes, holding the toaster between his paws and squinting curiously at it: "Wow. Where does the bread go?" Calvin: "Beats me. Isn't that weird?" —Judith Petersen

The Jehovah Contract by Victor Koman \$16.95

You're just an ordinary hitman—except, you have a libertarian streak. You only knock off people who deserve it. A television evangelist announces that he is setting out to do battle with God for control of the world. He wants to get the world *back!*

He hires you to kill God. What? You don't believe in God? That's what Dell said. But the evangelist replies, "You don't have to. Just assassinate

Him." In return you get \$500 a day plus expenses and, appropriately, eternal life. Turn the offer down, and you die in three months. What do you do?

Dell, Koman's hero, sets out to kill a concept. Not expecting people to take him seriously, he soon finds that many people are indeed quite serious about stopping him. He is also surprised to find equally serious allies. One is a gorgeous blond, but only those with pure souls—like our hitman—can see her. The other is a pre-adolescent virgin prostitute. They set out to deprogram the world, but Dell runs into more than he bargained for....

Koman is a libertarian, and his book helps fill a cultural void Rand used to complain about. When "liberals" read Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*, they felt like they were being cussed out on each and every one of its 1,168 pages—and indeed they were. They defended themselves by attacking Rand's heroes and villains as "paper" characters. Rand's and Koman's characters are "paper" in the sense that they are comprehensible. The good guys are well-developed, identifiable characters who make the kind of decisions we would make.

Koman's characters, unlike Rand's, display an ability to take a hard look at themselves, a ploy which probably leaves the uninitiated readers more vulnerable to his ideas. He has overcome many of Rand's excesses and finishes his story in fewer pages than it took Rand to get started. Thus, my biggest disappointment with both *Atlas Shrugged* and the *Jehovah Contract* hits Koman's book some 800 pages sooner. It ends. —Terry Inman

Empire: A Novel by Gore Vidal

Random House, 1987 \$22.50

"Politics in a novel," wrote Stendahl, "is like a gunshot in a crowded theater: something crude from which it is impossible to withhold one's attention." Gore Vidal has made an art out of this sort of crudity, and he stands out as the premier historical novelist of our time.

His "American chronicle" is here continued, this time dealing with the McKinley and Roosevelt administrations, and their making of an Imperial America.

The story centers on Catherine Sanford, the granddaughter of Charles Scherhorn-Schuyler (the protagonist of *Burr and 1876*), and her half-brother

Blaise Sanford, as they battle over an inheritance and enter the world American politics and Yellow Journalism. True to Vidal's method, they are friends of all the most interesting public figures of the time: John Hay, William Randolph Hearst, Henry Adams, Henry James, and the presidents. They are all presented to the readers with the usual Vidal wit and accuracy.

Though Vidal is by no means a libertarian (he would fit somewhere on the extreme "liberal" corner of the Nolan Chart), he does know what politics is all about (power), and has a revisionist's sense of the flow of American history. No other contemporary novelist approaches Vidal's ability to deal with politics and history in such an entertaining way. I strongly recommend this book.

—Timothy Virkkala

Death On Demand

Kim Hill and Owen Dale

Thomas Horton & Daughters, 1985

Even though the wittiest words in this book are probably in Gordon Tullock's back-cover blurb, this is still an amusing mystery novel. "Hill and Dale" (the "Marshall Jevons" who wrote *Mur-*

der at the Margin) have once again delivered a novel where economics is used as the tool to solve a murder. This time there are *two* economist-detectives, one a Keynesian and the other a Monetarist, and their bantering provides most of the book's humor.

The book is written with economics students in mind, and is definitely *not* for those who have no interest in the subject. Those who do find economics fascinating may very well enjoy it as an amusing diversion. Mystery fans might want to check it out for its novelty value. I bought it at a discount, and hesitate to advise anyone to pay the "full" price. Plot *that* on an indifference curve.

—TWW

The Story of A = A

by A. Olivetti

Deuce Science Fiction, 1987

The *Story of A = A* is a speculative autobiographical novel of passionate reason (or rationalistic passion) of much significance to the ultra-right wing of the Glibertarian movement. It tells the story of a naive young girl from the Schwein-Holstein region of the Central Asian Pripet Marshes, who becomes the passionate love-slave of

the obscene triad of Max Stirner, Fred Nietzsche, and Jack London. While in their thrall, young Alicia learns many kinky philosophical twists, and more than a few literary devices which she later puts to use in such masterworks as *The Spurt* and *Hercules Flinched*.

Alicia escapes the domination of the three dirty old men, moves to Hollywood, and becomes wealthy by thinking up reasons for Charlton Heston to have his clothes torn in movies. She also works as an extra in a few television and film productions. In "Arena," she almost mashes Captain Kirk with a rock.

Finally, as we all know, Alicia went on to set up a salon of her own, and with her loyal (loyalty is our honor) followers set up the philosophy of "Obnoxiousism," driving millions into the arms of just about any other philosophy available. I don't want to give away the exciting ending here, but it will suffice it to say that it's based on Alicia's famous maxim, "The essence of femininity is fooling around." Alicia never lets a good story get in the way of an Obnoxiousist sermon. This book is currently not available anywhere, due to the fact that nobody qualifies as moral enough to read it.

—R. Beitmachtfrei

→ from page 30

Letters to the Editors

change the complexion of the political debate—and not in a transitory way but profoundly, for all time.

If the nineteenth century seems too remote, consider Al Smith's campaign for President in 1928. He was able to bring into electoral politics for the first time vast numbers of first and second generation immigrants—*luftmenschen*. Smith lost the election only because he lost the base of his party's strength. Southern voters could not stomach the thought of a Roman Catholic or of an end to Prohibition. But four years later Franklin Roosevelt managed to retain the ethnic vote while adding to it the traditional twin sources of Democratic strength, labor and the South. Thus, a historical coalition was forged whose outlines are still visible today.

If this is not evidence enough of *luftmenschen* significance, consider cultural developments of the last twenty-five years. Ideologically, Americans of 1987 are essentially no different from Americans of 1960. Looking beneath the labels people use to identify

themselves, liberals, conservatives and libertarians can be found in about the same proportions. Yet over the same period there can be seen a veritable revolution in popular attitudes regarding sex, the family, and the role of women, a revolution whose impetus owes as much to those dirty, unshaven and profane New Leftists as to anything else. So, it is folly to think that "savagely cultural hostility of the crazies to bourgeois America" is likely to sink our Libertarian ship. Indeed, the fact that we are at or at least astride the cultural vanguard probably makes the ideology we espouse more palatable to the public than it would otherwise be. (And I speak as a cultural conservative, whose position on abortion is closer to Paul's than it is to Rothbard's) From a marketing standpoint, the Libertarian Party has more to gain by going with the cultural flow than it does by resisting it in an ultimately vain attempt to appear respectable.

But the larger point is that whether one thinks of cultural or ideological

revolutions, one can hardly discount the importance of the *luftmenschen*, let alone believe it to be a hindrance to the revolution we seek. If libertarianism succeeds in changing the American political climate, probably it will be as a result of the coalescence of marginal men.

Bruce Earnheart
Athens, Georgia

The ultimate result of shielding men from the effects of their folly is to fill the world with fools.

—Herbert Spencer

If I want to be free from any other man's dictation, I must understand that I can have no other man under my control.

—William Graham Sumner

Film

Kurtz, Kids and Kael

Stephen Cox

The new film *River's Edge* is not a libertarian movie, and for this reason, libertarians ought to see it.

I don't mean that it's an attack on libertarian principles, either implicitly or explicitly. It's an attack, instead, on an assumption that we often make about libertarian principles—the assumption that the freedom we advocate is the final solution to all moral and social problems.

We don't usually put this assumption in so many words, of course. But we act as if it were true when we fail to consider the fact that there are issues in human life that are not addressed by expanding the area of personal freedom. I'm not suggesting that freedom should not be expanded! I am suggesting that we recognize and try to deal with problems that its expansion does not eliminate.

River's Edge is useful in bringing these problems to mind. But before considering the concrete form the film gives them, let's think about them for a moment in the abstract.

Moralists in the libertarian tradition are almost self-evidently right when they assert that no ethical value comes from acting as one is coerced into acting. And utilitarians in the libertarian tradition have good empirical evidence for asserting that people who have freedom to choose their values will generally choose them wisely. What "wisely" means to most libertarians (this one included) is something like "intelligently, with moderation, with respect for self and others." If this sounds like a fairly traditional concept of virtue, it is. Libertarians and conservatives are often mistaken for each other because their lists of virtues often seem so similar. At any rate, the normal libertarian doctrine about "values" is that a free society allows people to be responsible for their own conduct and thereby encourages them to construct for themselves the kind of a moral order that coercion could never consistently or effectively impose.

But there are costs as well as benefits

in every social system, and free societies are certainly not exempt from this rule. A free society may permit—and quite possibly encourage—some of its citizens to measure their freedom by the extent of their liberation from all constraints, moral as well as social. Of course, the material rewards that a free society offers to even a modest degree of self-respect and moderation will considerably lessen the threat of nihilism. But they will not end it. No social system will end it. We can worry about this or not, as we choose. I choose to worry, and I am pleased when other people do. I take it as a sign that they are concerned with individual problems of meaning and not merely with political problems of social organization.

The classic analysis of the costs of freedom remains Joseph Conrad's novel *Heart of Darkness*. Whatever this novel says about political exploitation, whatever its political satire became when reworked (read "deformed") into the film *Apocalypse Now*, it is preeminently an exploration of the darkness at the heart of individuals, not societies. Suppose that a man were as free of internal values as he was of social constraints—what would he be like? Perhaps he would be like Kurtz, who has the power of a god and also a god's capacity to see through all human codes of value. This is a creature who degenerates into a hollow, faithless shell, a skull contemplating only "The horror! The horror!"

Still, there may be grandeur of a kind in Kurtz's final awareness of his plight; as Conrad's narrator says, Kurtz "had summed up—he had judged. 'The horror!' He was a remarkable man. After all, this was the expression of some sort of belief; it had conviction, it had a vibrating note of revolt in its whisper." But times have changed; nihilism has been thoroughly democratized. No grandeur remains for the characters who reside in the heart of darkness sketched in *River's Edge*.

The story is simple. A high-school student strangles his girl-friend be-

cause "she was talkin' shit." He abandons her naked body on the riverbank where he killed her. He frankly proclaims his guilt to his teenage friends. They come out to inspect the body but do not know what to make of it. One of the kids, acting from a desire to participate in the drama rather than any genuine desire to help the murderer, tries to hide the evidence; when the murderer rewards him with a six-pack, he gripes, "You'd think I'd at least rate a Michelob." The teenagers' hold on values is so weak as to render them nearly incapable of moral thought, much less of moral action. Only a struggling intuition that something is wrong finally prompts one boy to report the incident to the police—and he has a great difficulty deciding if he has done a good thing or a bad thing or any kind of a thing at all.

Well, so what? It's just a movie. I might reply to this objection by noting that the film is based on an incident that took place in California six years ago. But why should I? Will anyone put his hand on his heart and deny that the story has the ring of contemporary reality? The circumstances of the little drama are tritely familiar. The teenagers' families exert no control over them; parents are either absent or involved in their own nihilistic dramas. School exerts no control; the only system of values that enlarges itself there is conveyed in the ranting sermons of a teacher who preaches a revival of '60s rebelliousness as an answer to every problem. The kids carry a testbook called *We the People*, but when a nerdy student speaks in favor of traditional public values, claiming that the murder "points up a fundamental moral breakdown in our society," the teacher is pleased to rebuff his moralistic "self-righteousness." Certainly this is a satire on the contemporary state of public education—and certainly a private educational system would do a better job. But the problem lies deeper than public education.

The recognizable reality presented in *River's Edge* is that of a community environment that has lost virtually all its systems of coercive supervision and has failed to replace them with even the rudiments of a self-controlled individualism. In these conditions, the teenagers evolve a surrogate society that gives them feeble, surrogate identities as the followers of a charismatic boy who is brighter than the rest and even more

"radical" (i.e., confused). Most of the kids are neither overtly violent nor avid for illicit material rewards; this is not the comparatively beneficent world of *Public Enemy* or *Angels with Dirty Faces*. Passions—even the murderer's passions—normally run cold; the kids' usual problem, indeed, is how to excite them. In a world without values, what sources of ego-satisfaction are there? what is there to be passionate about? Some of the film's most chilling scenes involve attempts by the nicer kids in the group to feel something definite about the girl who was killed. She was a "friend," they repeat to themselves, but what exactly does that word mean?

Almost anything, one would think, would be better than this soulless nihilism. If there is a spokesman for values in the film, it is an aging biker (played by Dennis Hopper) who twenty years ago killed for love and who has a sense of guilt about it. This is the film's way of suggesting the existence of a world of significance that its teenage characters have lost, but it is not offered as a solution to their problems. The biker's values are real, but he is as lost in his obsessions (perfectly realized by Hopper) as the other people in the movie are in theirs.

In keeping with its obvious aim of refusing to suggest final solutions to the problems it considers, *River's Edge* is carefully objective in its manner. (This type of objectivity seems to account for its mixed reception by audiences, some of which, apparently, have had trouble distinguishing an objective treatment of nihilism from nihilism itself.) The question of responsibility is brought up in such a way as to fend off simple-minded answers. The most honorable of the teenagers asks two twelve-year-old rowdies, "Why are you such delinquents?", and the answer comes back, "Because of our fucked-up childhood." Well, their home life is morally fucked up, but some of their siblings manage not to be—and the junior delinquents are so particularly mean that the clichéd charge of societal guilt doesn't really stick.

The film ordinarily handles its characters in an objectively distanced way, presenting them with a minimum of moral commentary, either in speeches or in camera movements. The cast does an impressive job of giving them intense portrayals without also giving them a phony James Deanish romance. Crispin Glover, who plays Layne, the group's leader, has the most difficult job in this

respect; his performance is full of black humor and freaky liveliness that he does not quite permit to become endearing. Well worth mentioning, in addition, are the performances of Keanu Reeves as the mixed-up protagonist Matt (who is allowed, at least for the sake of balance, his endearing mo-

River's Edge

Hemdale Film Corporation

Producers: *Sarah Pillsbury*
and *Midge Sanford*

Director: *Tim Hunter*

Screenplay: *Neal Jimenez*

Music: *Juergen Knieper*

Cast: *Crispin Glover, Dennis Hopper, Keanu Reeves, Ione Skye, Joshua Miller, and Daniel Roebuck*

ments) and of Joshua Miller as a diabolical pre-teen. Also worth mentioning is the fact that this movie was made for a bargain-basement \$1.7 million.

In the June 15 *New Yorker*, Pauline Kael published an intemperate but interesting review of *River's Edge*. Kael apparently labors under the delusion that the film insinuates the idea that "kids can only trust other kids," and that it reproves the "materialistic" world of adults. Wrong on both counts. Kael also demonstrates her distance from the current facts of middle- and working-class life by claiming that the parents in the movie are "cartoon figures. Matt's mother isn't worried about his smoking pot; she just wants to be sure that he doesn't swipe any of hers. And she's too involved with her lout of a lover to care about what her kids do. She says feebly, 'Where do my kids go at night?' (That's a thesis question.)"

Indeed it is. The thesis is that a moral anomie, a failure of personal responsibility, exists to a significant degree in middle- and working-class American life. (The upper classes, which are no doubt just as vulnerable to the charge, do not happen to lie within this movie's purview.) Probably Kael has never visited an attractive suburban split-level home in which parents and children spend Sunday morning fighting over their dope sup-

plies, while the voices of real cartoon figures shriek over from the television. Kael concedes enough of the film's realism to refer to its "fuzzy naturalistic approach," which "creates a blur that viewers can project onto." Let me put this in a positive way: the movie doesn't tell us how we must react to its thesis. It leaves for us the interesting task of inspecting our reactions.

Kael's reactions define a pattern typical of too many of those people that the admen and politicians call "opinion leaders." She is skeptical about any show of intuitive moral feeling, the sort of feeling that it is hard for even the most unhealthy society to keep completely out of individual life. When the movie shows one young punk turning from maliciousness out of love for his older brother, Kael sneers at the idea that he can "be saved by love.... If ever there was an unconvincing change of heart..." But Kael is anxious to apologize for the kids' failure to respond to even the murder of their friend: "Jamie's death is sudden and unreal; reactions to it...come slowly." I seriously doubt that Kael would be slow to feel an explicit moral revulsion at the strangling of a friend; I attribute her remark to a modern "liberal" willingness to relieve other people of moral responsibility.

How would—or how ought—libertarians to react to the situation portrayed in this film? We might revive the eighteenth-century metaphysical debate about whether people's moral feelings are innate or ultimately derived from social influences. We might decide that social coercion is after all the only way to instill traditional values, and simply become fundamentalists. We might fall back on libertarian legalism and reassert the view that John Doe's nihilism is no responsibility of mine unless it starts exerting force and fraud; then it may be punished or repelled.

Obviously, I think that none of these reactions would help us to understand the ways in which individuals can work to encourage not just moral autonomy but also moral respect for self and others. Getting to a libertarian society, as well as living in a libertarian society, seems to depend to some extent on the existence of this moral attitude among the greatest possible number of people. We should, therefore, think more seriously than we usually do about the means by which a healthy society could promote it. □

Theater

Acting Colonel

Jonathan Saville

The most striking theatrical event of recent months was Lieutenant Colonel Oliver North's appearance at the Iran-contra hearings. A great deal has been—and will be—written about the political implications of North's testimony before the joint congressional committee. But what I would like to do is to explore these televised sessions from a purely theatrical point of view. What really interests me is what North's performance can tell us about theatre.

If I suggest that Oliver North is a consummate actor, it will inevitably appear that I am satirizing this political figure. The trouble lies in a general misunderstanding of what acting is. To many people, "acting" means "faking": an actor is somebody who pretends, deceives, lies. Since North, by his own admission, was quite successful in deceiving various congressional committees about his activities in the National Security Council, he would seem to be an expert actor in this pejorative sense. But I mean something quite different. The fact is that a real actor does not fake his emotions or his self-identity. He experiences them as real. He lives within the character he is playing, he sees himself as that person, his desires and fears are (while he is on stage) authentically those of the fictional character, and his laughter and his tears rise from the heart.

An actor who imitates the outward signs of emotion rather than undergoing the emotional experiences in his own person is said to be "indicating." This is bad acting, for it does not work; the spectators invariably (if not always consciously) detect the fakery and refuse to respond with authentic feelings of their own. To say that Oliver North is a good actor, indeed a superb actor, is not to say that he deceived his audience with an artful pretense, but—quite the contrary—that his emotions and convic-

tions were intense and true, and that an intuitive theatrical talent enabled him to convey this authentic personal reality to his audience. A liar is one thing, and North has certainly had practice in that unpleasant (by his own assessment) role. But real acting is not lying; it is a special, powerful, and concentrated species of truth telling. It was real acting that we saw and heard when North took the witness stand.

One of the prime abilities of the trained actor is something quite independent of emotionalism and the embodiment of character, but no less important. This is the ability to delineate the shape of thoughts, a complex activity achieved through a subtle and precise deployment of diction, intonation, tone color, vocal dynamics, rhythm, and the accompanying supportive motions of face and body. North showed himself a master of this rhetorical component of acting, and his mastery was all the more impressive in that while he was speaking his lines so lucidly and with such balance of emphasis and nuance, he was at the same time providing his own script and composing it *ex tempore*.

North's rhetorical abilities were notably superior to those of almost all his interlocutors: senators, congressmen, and the lawyers representing the committee. For listeners used to the bumbling illiteracies and infelicities of so many political speakers (George Bush or Alexander Haig, for example), it was wonderful to hear the way North could create and deliver lengthy periodic sentences, filled with qualifying parentheses, with each clause perfectly in place, and with the supplely inflected arguments proceeding with perfect clarity from point to point, each stage appropriately underlined, and the whole characterized by a firm architectonic form impeccably mirroring the movement of thought—and all

this at a deliberate but by no means sluggish pace, without hesitations, without gropings for words, without extraneous vocal noises, and with only a modicum of concurrent revision. To these virtues one must add a liveliness and accuracy of vocabulary, as well as the speaker's command of effective sound patterns, sometimes bold and crude ("lives versus lies"), and sometimes of extended orchestral richness.

These articulations of thought were accompanied, as is always the case in good acting (as opposed to mere recitation), with a continual coloration of suitable feeling, the thoughts justifying the emotions, and the emotions dramatizing the thoughts. I have already spoken of the intensity and truth of this current of emotional discourse in North's performance. It is also instructive to point out the techniques through which the feelings were communicated. North has a mobile face, over which waves of emotion pass with tremendous vividness. His voice is expressive, with a characteristic catch in it that is exceptionally eloquent of strong feelings. Every actor, in a particular role, has a fairly limited repertoire of looks and sounds, which, in their repetition and their variation, create a specific, firmly contoured emotional world—and that of course was the case with Colonel North. After a while one became familiar with the facial movements and vocal intonations employed for the series of emotions North used again and again throughout his testimony. There were the signs of alert respect; there was the look of hurt anger and tense self-containment, North's reaction to a line of questioning that he took to be unfairly accusatory; there were the reverential tones and looks of humble adoration when the colonel spoke of superiors and associates he deeply admired, such as William Casey of the CIA, the president, and the members of the "democratic national resistance" in Nicaragua; there was the mask of tragic pain, the tears glistening in the eyes, and the voice quavering with compassion during references to people who had suffered in the causes North believes in, such as the hostages in Lebanon, the tortured CIA agent William Buckley, and American pilots shot down while flying equipment to the contras; there was, with thrilling effect, the occasional smile of self-directed irony, engagingly innocent, and functioning to relax the emotional tension of the other expres-

sive routines.

The fact that there is such a repertoire of expressions, and that they may be enumerated and described, in no way impugns the sincerity of the emotions they convey. Indeed, the limited and repetitive nature of the facial-vocabulary in an actor's performance enhances our conviction of his sincerity, because it helps to build up a picture of a consistently structured character unifying all the various emotions—the specific instance of a particular type, in part defined by the kind of emotion it favors.

The character type, in North's case, is immediately identifiable. Although he is forty-three years old, the type projected by his mannerisms, his emotions, his appearance, and his speech patterns is that of an adolescent—an ardent, idealistic teenager, respectful of his elders and of traditional value systems, energized by the enthusiasms of youth, sturdy, passionate, and naive. North's smile has been aptly described as boyish; his

voice still has the qualities of midadolescence, with the charming scrape of the vocal chords during the transformation from pre-adolescent tenor to manly baritone; and he relentlessly refers to himself, in the typical American infantilizing manner, as "Ollie." It is impossible to overlook the similarity to Jimmy Stewart, whose acting career, even into old age, has been given its special quality by his perpetual adolescent traits.

The characters projected by North and Stewart share another significant trait: these are not only adolescents, but rustic adolescents. They carry with them the atmosphere of the small town (North comes from such a town near Albany, New York), with all the conventional theatrical associations of honesty, decency, simplicity, closeness to fundamental human institutions, and connection with the preindustrial past of the nation. Mrs. North, who sat behind her husband at several sessions, reinforced the effect of this kind of casting, for in her unadorned beauty (so different from the sultry gorgeousness of North's secretary, Fawn Hall), her modesty of demeanor, and her fresh, neat, little-girl dresses, she too seemed like a small-town teen-ager of 1950, or perhaps 1900.

No one, I think, would maintain that any of this was put on: the North's, all the evidence suggests, are exactly what

they appear. But the effectiveness of North's performance, like that of any actor, was based to a large extent on the familiar external signs of the character type, signs that define the character for the audience with irresistible persuasiveness. North has received overwhelming acclaim from his audience (which includes the members of the congressional committee and the millions of television viewers). But with exactly the same dialogue, how much of this theatrical success would have been achieved by (for example) a small, dark, hook-nosed, harsh-voiced, nervous man from Brooklyn, with a bleached-blond, heavily painted wife in a sleek, low-cut gown? What a wretched piece of casting that would have been!

Thought, emotion, and character are the elements the actor, in his role, brings with him to the dramatic situation; but the situation itself necessarily determines how those elements will be

North's theatrical triumph radically altered the dramatic situation. Suddenly, committee members started smiling at him, praising him for his integrity and his courage, declaring him to be a splendid witness...

exposed and deployed. In the Iran-contra hearings, the situation was a simple one, constantly repeated: the juvenile lead, supported by a few faithful helpers (his lawyer, his wife), being attacked by a massive phalanx of "heavies." Prominent among these antagonists, and also well cast for an intense "courtroom" drama, were the awkward, angry, humorless John Nields (chief counsel for the House committee), the smug, sly, sophisticated big-city lawyer that is the character projected by Arthur Liman (chief counsel for the Senate committee), and the stolid, unsmiling, impassive, and coldly unsympathetic chairman, Senator Daniel Inouye. As actors, these gentlemen scarcely belonged on the same stage—or on the same planet—with Oliver North. In comparison with North's mastery of rhetoric and of the magisterially constructed periodic sentence, poor Nields seemed to be pushing his way through the intractable English language like an icebreaker in the Antarctic. If North's face and

voice were exquisitely sensitive instruments to indicate every nuance of emotion, Inouye resembled a stone statue of one of the less animated bodhisattvas.

As for Liman, an immensely successful trial attorney, he showed himself indisputably as an experienced actor, with a large repertoire of histrionic tricks (the gentle smile with the stiletto behind it, the sudden switch to contemptuous severity, the skeptical cocking of the head). But that these were tricks was always perfectly evident, for Liman, as any theatergoer could see, was a *bad* actor. It was clear that he was "indicating" rather than authentically feeling emotion, that the friendliness or the hostility were merely external devices used to make an effect and obtain a reaction. This kind of acting may work in the courtroom, but when confronted with a truly good actor like Oliver North, Mr. Liman was simply wiped away. Theatrical experience has proved

time and again that an actor who fakes emotion can get away with it only so long as he is not on a stage with an actor who is really moved; the truth of good acting immediately exposes the artificiality of insincere acting and undermines even the most polished of tricksters.

The simple dramatic situation of the hearings may be anatomized, like any dramatic situation, into a conflict of wills, desires, "objectives" (to use the Stanislavskian term). Each side had a number of more or less articulate objectives, some explicit, others implied. The chief counsels and many prominent members of the committee (not all members are of one mind, obviously) wanted to find the truth, punish North, embarrass the president, undermine support for the contras, assert the prerogatives of the legislative branch as against the administration, maximize the advantages to the Democratic Party, and obtain beneficial public exposure for themselves. North, in contrast, wanted to defend himself, protect the administration, advance the claims of the executive branch, do what he considers his duty as a marine and as a former member of the president's staff, stir up public and congressional support for the political and military movement in Nicaragua he so ardently abetted when he was in power, garner public

support for himself that might be of use in his defense against the criminal case the special prosecutor is preparing against him, and justify himself in his own regard and in that of people he respects.

Beneath all these strong and sincere motives on both sides, and fueling them, there was a fundamental conflict of objectives, what Stanislavsky would have called a "subtext" to the explicit dialogue—namely, a struggle for power. It was this subtext that provided the dramatic energy of virtually every moment of North's testimony. What we saw, in any of the confrontations between questioner and witness, was two dramatic wills, each attempting to assert its dominance over the other. It soon became evident that the battle would

always be an unequal one, that North, with his power of rhetoric, his sincerity of feeling, and his character, was bound to win. Arthur Liman, with a canny sense of where North's power lay, made some futile attempts to ruin the witness's scenes. He would interrupt, in an impatient, down-to-earth voice, right in the middle of one of North's emotional moments—just about the worst thing one can do to an actor.

With almost any other witness, this nasty but cogent technique would have worked. But Oliver North let it be known immediately that he was one of those rare actors who are absolutely invulnerable to attacks of this sort. At times, he would simply go on speaking, raising his voice so as to be heard over the interruption—a familiar reaction in conversation, when a speaker insists on his dominance by refusing to allow interruptions. At other moments, when even more confident of his supremacy, North would fall silent; he would allow Liman to complete the potentially devastating intervention; and then he would continue from the point where he had stopped, without the slightest loss of his train of thought or of his emotional concentration, and as though there had been no interruption at all. Liman quickly found out that, no matter how hard you try, you cannot upstage Jimmy Stewart.

In his potent demonstration of what magnificent acting can accomplish, perhaps the most extreme episode was that

centering on North's home-security system, which he allowed to be purchased with funds that were not properly his, subsequently faking documents to conceal his delinquency. Decent and thoughtful people may properly differ over the moral and political legitimacy of many of North's other enterprises: the arms-for-hostages deal, the diversion of funds to the Contras, the misleading of Congress in order to protect a "full service covert operation," and so forth. About the financing of the security system, there

Although he is forty-three years old, the type projected by his mannerisms, his emotions, his appearance, and his speech patterns is that of an adolescent—an ardent, idealistic teenager, respectful of his elders and of traditional value systems.

can be no argument. It was wrong, and concealing the deal was even worse; Colonel North himself admitted, indeed proclaimed, the iniquity of these deeds.

Yet what was the dramatic impression left with the audience after the discussion of this subject? We heard North's confession, witnessed his pain in admitting his moral weakness, heard him speak about the threats that had purportedly been made against him and his family by Arab terrorists, listened as he invoked the memory of the eleven-year-old girl killed by terrorists and as he connected that brutal slaying with his fears for the safety of his own daughter of the same age. We saw the tears in his eyes, heard the break in his voice. Who knows what the legal implications of this confession are? But emotionally, the result was that Colonel North emerged with the audience's total sympathy, and the questioner, John Nields, left the impression—theatrically speaking—of being a collaborator with Arab terrorists and himself a murderer of innocent girls. Our reason, of course, told us how preposterous such a judgment was. But theater works on a level much deeper than reason; at that level, the guilty party played the role of the heroic victor, and his accuser, the upholder of legality, was forced to play the role of defeated villain.

Once they had seen this demon-

stration of North's power as an actor, his opponents evidently realized that there was no possible way of defeating him. Whatever the legal content of their accusations, his talent (and their lack of it) guaranteed that theatrically his will, his objective, his interpretation, would inevitably prevail. In a court of law, where a disinterested determination of the facts is meticulously aimed at, North's acting superiority would have been minimized. But these public hearings are, in their very nature, a form of theater; the objectives of most of the participants are principally political, and politics is itself closely allied with the theatrical; so that North's theatrical triumph radically altered the dramatic situation. Suddenly, committee members

who had denounced him even before his appearance, and who had initially reacted to him with overt hostility, started smiling at him, praising him for his integrity and his courage, declaring him a splendid witness, and making an effort to associate themselves publicly with him and with his political attitudes. Recognizing what the roles of the witness and his interrogators had unexpectedly turned out to be, various senators and congressmen even began to denounce Liman and Nields, their own counsels, for being so insensitively hostile toward a man whom the American audience was ecstatically acclaiming as a star.

It was something amazing to watch—not because of any cynical conclusions one might draw about politics in a democracy, but because of the proof these events offered as to the centrality of theater in human consciousness. I doubt very much whether, ten years from now (perhaps one year from now), the Iran-contra hearings will have produced any permanent change in the way the American government is run, or whether they will have exerted any noticeable influence on American foreign policy toward Iran, terrorism, or Nicaragua. But those who watched Oliver North testify will remember how dramatically invigorating it was to see a politically inspired Marine practice the actor's art as brilliantly as the most able of theater professionals. □

Contributors

"R. *Beitmachtfrei*" is the pseudonym Rex F. May used in his jape that appears on page 37. "Baloo" is the *nom de plume* he uses for his cartoons which appear in numerous magazines, including the *Wall Street Journal* and *National Review*. Mr May is the editor of *The Trout in the Milk*.

Stephen Cox, an associate editor of *Liberty*, is Associate Professor of Literature, University of California, San Diego.

John C. Green and *James L. Guth* are the authors of *The Socialization of a Third Party Elite: The Case of the Libertarians* featured in this issue under the title *The Sociology of Libertarians*, and are members of the faculty of Furman University in Greenville South Carolina.

Mike Holmes lives in the western suburbs of Houston, Texas and is a practicing Certified Public Accountant. He is also Editor of the *American Libertarian* newspaper.

Terry Inman is a real estate broker and editor of *Show Me Freedom* and *Youth Connection*.

Tibor R. Machan teaches philosophy at Auburn University, Alabama, and is Senior Editor of *Reason* magazine.

William P. Moulton is a writer living in

Traverse City, Michigan and a collector of Ancient Egyptian artifacts.

Ross Overbeek, an associate editor of *Liberty*, is a research scientist at the Argonne National Laboratory.

Murray N. Rothbard is an associate editor of *The Review of Austrian Economics*. He is S.J. Hall Distinguished Professor of Economics at the University of Nevada, Las Vegas.

Judith Peterson is an artist living in Santa Rosa, California.

Franklin Sanders is an entrepreneur and publisher of *The Moneychanger*, a privately circulated newsletter.

Jonathan Saville is Associate Professor of Drama at the University of California, San Diego.

Michael Townshend is a "small businessman" living in the North-Central United States.

Timothy Virkkala is assistant editor of *Liberty*.

Ethan O. Waters is a writer living in Southern California.

Nathan Wollstein lives in Charlottesville, Virginia.

Terra Incognita

Ferrol, Spain

How public art elevates public consciousness in the land of Cervantes, as reported by the *Associated Press*:

Mayor Jaime Quintanilla Ulla explained why his city had erected a granite sculpture of a human liver. "The liver is the silent and unselfish organ... tortured by cocktails, wine, tranquilizers and other medications. But every day, the poor little liver is at work neutralizing and purifying everything we take in."

Will it one day develop liver spots? Will it need an organ transplant from another statue?

Miami, Florida

Remarks of one critic, about the new video game, *Contra*, now the nation's 7th most popular, as reported by *Knight-Ridder Newspapers*:

"You hear about the contra rebels on the news," said Jim Kusin, 14. "The one thing that confuses me about this game: These dudes doing the fighting, Lance and Bill, they look American. I thought the contras were, like, foreign dudes."

→ to next page

Terra Incognita

Detroit, Mich

How an American entrepreneur helps celebrate the upcoming visit from His Holiness. As reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

"I wouldn't want to be making ashtrays and seeing people putting butts out in the Pope's face," said Robert Lebow of the Fun Co. in Detroit, explaining why his firm is marketing a 30-inch high 'Pope John Paul II' lawn sprinkler. "We cut them out of plywood and paint them ourselves. We're all Popies now."

Tokyo

Evidence that Japanese sexual mores are different from those of America, as reported in the *Wall St Journal*:

What television is in America, manga (or comic books) is in Japan. "In a typical story, a young girl goes to a dance with her boyfriend but then dances with other boys. The boyfriend gets angry and hires RapeMan. After a rape scene that goes on for pages, the distraught girl goes to her boyfriend's house to tell him what has happened: 'It's you I love; I just danced with the other boys to make you jealous,' she tells him. Shocked, he confesses that he hired the rapist. She sheds a tear, and they embrace. 'That shows how much you love me,' she says."

United States of America

Evidence that democracy is able to attract the highest quality men to its highest office, from the television show *Firing Line*:

When asked whose pictures he would hang on his office wall if elected President, Sen Albert Gore mentioned "President James K. Knox." Frontrunner for the nomination, Jesse Jackson, blamed the infamous "Palmer raids" of 1919 on "President Herbert Hoover," who was not elected until 1928.

Boston, Mass.

Extraordinary method of kicking on the re-election campaign, by Mayor Ray Flynn of the Hub City, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

"What in the hell are you doing here?" asked Manuel Rose, as Mayor Flynn crashed through the front door of Rose's home. Flynn, who had announced for reelection earlier that day, was there to rescue Rose, whose house was reported on fire. After the mayor hauled the protesting Rose from his home, Rose told reporters, "Somebody told him I have an artificial leg. So I'm telling him, 'Let me walk. I can walk. Give me a chance.'"

Sarasota, Fla

Further evidence of the ability of a free economy to satisfy the wants of consumers, as reported in the *Wall St Journal*:

Praise Toys has announced the production of Grace, the talking "pro-life doll," that coos "I used to be a little tiny person inside my mommy's tummy" and "God knew me even before I was born."

Washington, D.C.

Evidence of the superiority of mass democracy, in which every citizen, no matter how public spirited, has an equal vote, as reported in the *London Economist*:

Senator Paul Simon... may be getting a bit more than his share of the poll because of a temporary confusion with his namesake,

the singer, Paul Simon.

U. S. Army

The Army runs into a few stumbling blocks in its campaign to improve the diet of America's fighting men:

When Sgt First Class Jerry Rhea, a 16 year veteran cook, was ordered to steam vegetables, he reacted with "stark terror", he told the *Wall St Journal*. "For years, I just put them in a pot with a pound of butter."

United Kingdom

Insight from H.R.H. Princess Diana into the psychological and physiological differences between men and women, as reported in the *Seattle Times*:

"Princess Diana asked us, 'Don't you think women are more efficient at fiddly work than men?'" said a worker at a factory that the Princess had toured. "We all agreed."

Panama

Dramatic evidence of the progress of democracy in Latin America, as reported in the *Wall St Journal*:

Colonel Roberto Diaz Herrera was removed from his position as number 2 man in the Panama military government when his superiors decided they could no longer tolerate his following the mystical teachings of Indian holy man Satya Sai Baba. The Colonel has never met the guru, but learned of his teachings from a singer in Argentina and a mystic in Los Angeles. "I have no doubt that he [the guru], not I, is in command of everything," the Colonel said.

Meanwhile, the Colonel continues to receive direct psychic commands from the guru. The Colonel lives under heavy guard in his powder blue chateau, which features four Grecian columns and two sphinxes. The mansion is surrounded by high white walls, festooned with banners calling for justice and "military dignity," and topped with iron spikes. The Colonel and his retinue get their meals from their neighborhood McDonald's. According to the Colonel, he made the money to pay for the mansion by illegally selling Panamanian visas to Cubans.

Philadelphia, Pa.

Evidence of the sincerity with which public guardians took their oath to support the U.S. Constitution in this year of its bicentennial, as reported in the *London Economist*:

U.S. Park Service officials and local police arrested demonstrators at Independence Hall in Philadelphia on July 4. The demonstrators were trying to distribute copies of the U.S. Constitution and Bill of Rights, decorated with the American flag.

Moscow

Evidence of the success of the Gorbachev plan to reduce hard drink in the Soviet Union"

The sale of vodka declined 12% in 1985 and another 39% last year, according to official statistics. The *London Economist* notes: "Official statistics do not take into account consumption of *samogon*, (usually explosive) home-brewed liquor. Its main constituent is sugar, which may help explain why retail sales of sugar in Russia jumped 10% last year."

"The price of **Liberty** is Eternal Vigilance."

— George Washington, 1787

"Formerly the price of **Liberty** was Eternal Vigilance, but now it can be had for 50¢ per year."

— Benjamin Tucker, 1887

"The price of **Liberty** is now up to \$18 per year thanks to another 100 years of inflation"

— Murray Rothbard, 1987

Liberty is the new magazine that celebrates the diversity of libertarian thought, publishing reviews, essays and articles that analyze and apply the ideas, the ideals and the life libertarianism implies.

Who we are...

The editors of **Liberty** are Murray Rothbard, economist and theoretician; Douglas Casey, bestselling author of financial advisory books; Stephen Cox, associate professor of Literature at the University of California at San Diego; Ross Overbeek, computer scientist at Argonne National Laboratory; and R. W. Bradford, majority owner of Liberty Coin Service and publisher of the economic advisory letter, *Analysis & Outlook*.

We editors reflect the diversity of libertarian experience and approach. We disagree on many is-

ues. But we are united in two convictions:

1) That the role of government in people's lives should be radically reduced or eliminated altogether—thus we are libertarians;

2) That libertarians need a periodical in which to hash out our differences, to share our thinking, and to discuss issues that interest libertarians from an uncompromising, unapologetically libertarian perspective. That is why we publish **Liberty**.

In every issue, **Liberty** presents lively book reviews, challenging and expanding libertarian thinking; movie reviews, keeping you current on today's cinema, as well as uncovering special films of the past; essays analyzing current trends in political and social thought; articles exploring the sort of society that libertarianism entails; discussions of the strategy and tactics of social change; and

much, *much* more.

Double, Money-Back Guarantee

We are confident that **Liberty** is worth its price of \$18 per year—so confident that we have made your subscription to **Liberty** risk-free. You are protected by our double guarantee detailed in the box below.

Act Today!

Liberty offers you the best in libertarian thinking and libertarian writing. So don't hesitate. With our double guarantee, you have nothing to lose. You have the fruits of **Liberty** to gain!

"The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult" by Murray Rothbard

This analysis of the internal dynamics of the Rand cult in New York City in the 1950s is based on Rothbard's first hand observations.

Never before published, and until now circulated only among Rothbard's close friends, his penetrating analysis reveals details of Rand's New York City circle not reported by Barbara Branden in her recent Rand biography.

Free with your subscription!

To encourage you to subscribe immediately, we will send it to you as a bonus with your subscription. You won't want to miss it! And it's yours to keep even if you obtain a full refund under our guarantee.

Money Back Double Guarantee

1. We guarantee a full refund with no questions upon your request after you have received your first issue.

2. At any time during your subscription, we will guarantee a full pro-rated refund for any unmailed issues.

In any event, *The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult* is yours to keep with our commitments.

R. W. Bradford
Publisher

Yes! Please enter my charter subscription to **Liberty**. Also send me a copy of Murray Rothbard's *The Sociology of the Ayn Rand Cult*, which is mine to keep even if I obtain a full refund under your guarantee.

- One Full Year (6 issues) \$18.00
 Two Full years (12 issues) \$32.00

Name _____

Address _____

City, State, Zip _____

- My check is enclosed (payable to **Liberty**)
 Charge my VISA Mastercard account

Account # _____ Expires _____

Signature _____

Send to: Liberty, Dept L, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368

Liberty
PO Box 1167
Port Townsend, WA 98368

U.S. POSTAGE
PAID
Port Townsend, Wash.
Permit No. 167
ZIP Code 98368

Moving?

Please notify us at least 4 weeks in advance. Be sure to include both your old address (as it appears on your mailing label) and your new address, including ZIP code.

Is Your Address Correct?

If not, please send us your address the way it appears here and your correct address.

Dated Periodical—Do Not Delay!

advertisement

Can You Afford to be Without These Insights?

- January 1983: *Analysis & Outlook* is the first investment newsletter to discuss changes in rare coin grading and to analyze the implications for investors.
- June 1983: *Analysis & Outlook* is the first newsletter to report new IRS regulations making it difficult (but not impossible) for you to maintain

your financial privacy, and to discuss how you can protect your privacy despite these regulations.

- March 1985: *Analysis & Outlook* predicts "a major increase in prices for MS-63 gold coins during the next six months." Six months later, the wholesale price of MS-63 gold coins was up an average of 49.3%.

- July 1985: While nearly every hard money newsletter recommends silver in preference to gold, *Analysis & Outlook* concludes a detailed discussion: "Gold will outperform silver by a substantial margin." A year later, gold has increased 20.4%; silver is down 14.9%.
- June 1986: *Analysis & Outlook* concludes an analysis of silver investments by recommending swapping silver dollars for other forms of silver; at the time other advisory letters recommend dollars. Fourteen months later, dollars are down 7.9%. The forms of silver recommended are up an average of 41.7%.

Yes!

Please enter my subscription for *Analysis & Outlook*.

- Enclosed is my check for \$36.00 for a year's subscription.
- Enclosed is my check for \$10.00 for a three month trial subscription.

Name _____
Address _____
City _____
State _____ Zip _____

Send to Subscription Department, *Analysis & Outlook*, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368.

Analysis & Outlook

P. O. Box 1167 Port Townsend, WA 98368 Volume XVII, No. 8 August 6, 1987

How will you remember 1987?

At least so far as your investments are concerned, I believe that you will likely remember it one of two ways. As the year in which you built a solid position in metals that enabled you to make substantial profits in the late 80s and into the 90s, or as the year of missed opportunity.

In my judgment, the remainder of '87 is one of those rare times when the fundamentals of investing in gold, silver and rare coins are all excellent: a time when both metals are underpriced, when we can reasonably expect major price moves for the short, middle and long haul ahead. In terms of fundamentals, the outlook for gold and silver in the last seven years has not been as good as it has been in the last seven years. Just as there was a flow of investor money from tangible investments in general (and gold and silver in particular) to intangible investments (stocks and bonds) during the 1980-86 period, we are now witnessing a flow of money from intangible investments to tangible goods. As the famous *Times* of London headline recently, "Billion Is Back in Focus."

I don't intend to review here all the underlying reasons for this change. I have detailed these reasons in depth in an earlier issue of this letter—but I invite you to look at the evidence that surrounds them.

It is also a time when, thanks to the concerted efforts of several writers, the promoted gold and silver products (especially the American Eagle Silver and gold coins) are available at historically low premiums. Despite the increase in physical silver and gold see everywhere at present, the investor can actually find a wide variety of gold and silver items at prices less than 3.0% over melt value. And for a slightly higher price, he can buy gold and silver coins with considerable numismatic appeal and an established track record of high prices. If it continues to strengthen, make your purchase wisely during the time period you planned on. Otherwise you might miss the market altogether!



stories or that all my the advice will be as profitable as these examples," Bradford says. "But I can guarantee to pull no punches, to tell you the truth as I see it, to interpret events from my own perspective as an active participant in gold, silver and rare coin markets for more than 15 years."

Analysis & Outlook is published each month and mailed via first class mail, so that you receive it when its contents are still news. And your subscription is fully guaranteed: at any time during your subscription, we will refund upon demand your payment for all unmailed issues.

To subscribe to *Analysis & Outlook*, simply fill out and mail the coupon to the left, along with your payment.

R. W. Bradford writes *Analysis & Outlook* to help you with your own analysis of current events and to develop your own outlook for the future.

"I can't guarantee that I will always scoop the competition on major