

Liberty

September 1991

Vol 5, No 1

\$4.00

The *Real*
Clarence
Thomas

AIDS and Marijuana

by Robert O'Boyle

50 Really Stupid Ways to Save the Earth

by Karl Hess

Buckley's Case for Slavery

by William Moulton

Stalking the Giant Testes of Ethiopia

by Robert Miller

Canada Explodes (No One Cares)

by Barry Chamish and Scott J. Reid

Also: "When Bombs are Smarter Than People" *by Bart Kosko;*

Frank Fox witnesses the smashing of Communist monuments;

Steve Cox on hugging President Bush; Plus other Articles and Reviews.

"We are here to let in the light of Liberty upon political superstition." —Benjamin Tucker

Letters

... A Good Man Is Hard to Find

JSR's "Actions vs Words" is probably worse than the feminists he is trying to slander.

Feminists are not really bad. All they want is a good man who can do the dishes.

Norman Gorback
Plantation, Fla.

Self-Incrimination at Stanford

I found Stuart Reges' article "I Am a Casualty of the War on Drugs" (July 1991) most interesting. He stated that "Stanford's previous policy on alcohol and drug use was to respect the privacy of students, faculty, and staff—as long as people behaved responsibly . . ." (p 38) And Reges' account suggests that unofficially that remained Stanford's policy even after the official policy statement was changed in order to continue to receive federal funds. Why didn't that satisfy Reges? Was it responsible behavior on his part to by-pass the Stanford administration and bait government officials directly with harassing letters? Those letters didn't make fools of the government people; what they did was to make plain Stanford's duplicity in accepting the funds without intent to enforce the policy. Refusal of the funds would have been the appropriate action to guarantee academic freedom. As it is, Stanford faculty know for sure what Reges should have been smart enough to figure out for himself—government money is more important to running Stanford University than is free speech.

I hope you will keep us informed on how Reges fares in a job search.

Maribel Montgomery
Albany, Ore.

The Last Leftist

I suspect that Robert Heilbroner is unaware of just how well his talk with Mark Skousen ("Economics After Socialism," July 1991) demonstrates the poverty of the Left. His hatred of the ATT break-up is nothing more than knee-jerk anti-capitalism, and his praise for Keynes reveals an economist concerned not with his science, but with his leftist ideology.

What, after all, were Keynes' "significant contributions"? Heilbroner cites Keynes' belief that "the national econo-

my could be open to manipulation" and his "rather benign view of the future of capitalism." But much more significant were Keynes' contributions to economic theory: his concern with the role of expectations in the market process and his explanations of secondary depressions. Heilbroner's appraisal of Keynes was an appraisal of Keynes as politician and prophet, not as economist. Serious discussion of Keynes' ideas will persist. But considering Heilbroner's judgment, I predict that one of the best things about "economics after socialism" will be the unplanned obsolescence of lightweights such as Heilbroner.

David Sheldon
Gresham, Ore.

Mises-ing the Point

In your July 1991 issue two very good men, Milton Friedman and Robert Heilbroner, take some cheap shots at a very great man, Ludwig von Mises.

Friedman ("Just Say 'No' to Intolerance") tries to characterize the philosophy of Mises as a dogmatic religion. Friedman merely begs the question—is economics an aprioristic or empirical science?—when he says that, because it isn't empirical, Mises' economics isn't a science but a religion. Logic and mathematics aren't empirical either. Are they religions, too?

Heilbroner ("Economics After Socialism") will give only the most grudging credit to Hayek and Mises. Yes, they were right all along, socialism can't work, but they were never really very clear about the reason for it—that you can't run an economy without market signals. Well, if Heilbroner didn't learn this from Hayek and Mises, who did he learn it from? And why doesn't he ever mention the real hero, why just Hayek and Mises if they had nothing to do with his belated enlightenment?

D. G. Lesvic
Pacoima, Calif.

Another Paradox of Tolerance

Apparently Dr Friedman does not recognize the paradoxical character of his critique of Ayn Rand ("Just Say 'No' to Intolerance"): Rand is wrong to think that she can have objective moral knowledge because it shows that she lacks hu-

mility. Yet, it seems, Dr Friedman thinks that humility is an objective value and he is able to make the moral judgment that Rand lacks it!

Also, Karl Popper is by no means the simple empiricist and realist about facts Dr. Friedman seems to think he is. And even when explicated more completely, there are serious doubts about the wisdom of Popper's analysis of disagreement—see, for example, David Stove's *Popper and After: Four Modern Irrationalists* (Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1982).

In most developed sciences it has become evident that facts are not obvious or plain to apprehend. They are theory-laden and often the issue is whether the theory backing up the identification of the facts is a sound one, compared to other live options. This opens the door to seeing moral facts as part of our universe. And when it has become evident that some act or person is morally wrong, it is not always sound policy to tolerate it.

Tibor Machan
Auburn, Ala.

A Does Not Equal A-Priori

I am surprised at Milton Friedman for repeating the old canard that Ayn Rand "derived everything from the basic proposition that A=A" ("Say 'No' to Intolerance," July 1991).

The law of identity, in her view, was an axiom that sets the fundamental purpose of thinking (to identify the nature of what exists) as well as the fundamental constraint (to avoid contradiction). It is the *methodological* foundation of knowledge. But the whole *content* of our knowledge comes from observing the world—with induction, not deduction, as the primary engine of cognition. Ayn Rand was an explicit foe of any rationalist effort to deduce a philosophy from a self-contained set of axioms.

She also held that certainty is possible to man, a thesis with which Friedman is certainly free to take issue. But I cannot help wondering if he really means what he says. He argues that the basic premise of libertarianism is based on the absence of certainty. "I have no right to coerce someone else, because I cannot be sure that I am right and he is wrong." But is Friedman unsure even of this argument, and of its conclusion? What if someone argued that because certainty is impossible, persuasion is pointless and coercion is the only means of dealing with people? And what can we say to someone

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Liberty (ISSN 0894-1408) is a libertarian and classical liberal review of thought, culture and politics, published bi-monthly by Liberty Publishing, 1532 Sims Way, #1, Port Townsend, WA 98368. Second-Class Postage Paid at Port Townsend, WA 98368, and at additional mailing offices. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to Liberty, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368.

Subscriptions are \$19.50 for 6 issues, \$35.00 for 12 issues. Foreign subscriptions are \$24.50 for 6 issues, \$45.00 for 12 issues. Recent single issues are \$4.00 each, plus \$1.00 for postage & handling. Manuscripts are welcome, but will be returned only if accompanied by SASE. Queries are encouraged. A Writer's Introduction is available: send request and SASE. Address all correspondence to: Liberty, PO Box 1167, Port Townsend, WA 98368.

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who actually enjoys using force? What sort of defense do we have for freedom or tolerance if we can't say for sure that coercion is wrong?

Milton Friedman is a great and tireless champion of liberty. At some basic level, surely, he's sure of what he's fighting for.

David Kelley
Verbank, N.Y.

Vouch-Safe, Vouch-Free

It is, of course, a big honor to be mentioned by Professor Friedman in his article "Say 'No' to Intolerance" (July 1991). Dr Friedman has played a very important role in my own intellectual development, and his deep dedication to freedom has, of course, influenced and inspired thousands all over the world. By taking the proponents of vouchers to task, I certainly had no intention of disparaging the work of this great advocate of liberty.

Unfortunately, many people see vouchers as an end rather than as a means to an end. As Dr Friedman points out, the end is education decisions being left to parents and the free-market process. But we at FFF believe that the best and most direct route to this goal is not through vouchers, but through the repeal of compulsory-attendance laws and school taxes, and the selling off of school property—and through the constitutional separation of school and state.

Jacob Hornberger
Denver, Colo.

Stealing Friedman's Plunder

With all of the due respect that Milton Friedman gives for Mises and Rand, we would like to suggest that Friedman, Bradford, et. al. are starting out with assumptions that should be seriously questioned.

An assumption that we start with is this: that stealing is the wrong way of dealing with our fellow man.

Friedman points out that "libertarian philosophy is based on the premise [assumption?] that you should not initiate force, that you may not initiate coercion." How are taxes collected other than using force, coercion? Taxes are theft, if you accept those premises. As Bastiat said in *The Law*, "How is this legal plunder to be identified? Quite simply. See if the law takes from some persons what

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Stimulate

There is a world of good reading in *Liberty* . . . and there has been ever since *Liberty* began publishing! Whether you want to catch up on what you missed, stimulate your mind, or complete your collection, now is a good time to buy. Enjoy!

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Richman, Richard Kostelanetz and others, an interview with Ed Crane, and a symposium on investing. (80 pages)

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• "Something Anarchical in Denmark," by Ben Best
Plus a symposium on the Gulf War; and articles and reviews by John Baden, Richard Kostelanetz, Richard Minter, Richard Stroup and others; and a short story by Lawrence Thompson. (72 pages)

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• "Say 'No' to Intolerance" by Milton Friedman
• "I Am a Casualty of the War on Drugs" by Stuart Reges
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Letters (continued from page 4)

belongs to them, and gives it to other persons to whom it does not belong." What other description of taxation does anyone need?

Even the United States Supreme Court agrees: "To lay with one hand the power of the government on the property of the citizen, and with the other bestow it on favored individuals . . . is nonetheless *robbery* because it is done under the form of law and is called *taxation*" [emphasis added] *Loan Association v. Topeka* (1874).

Does the person who 'fences' stolen goods, condone theft? Does that person assist in the illegal plunder of property? Considering the number of arrests of people who 'fence' stolen goods, some people think so.

Is the person who suggests the use of educational vouchers, in effect, condoning theft? After all, educational vouchers are only made possible by the use of coercion to put the vouchers into effect.

And to have a negative income tax—there must be a positive income tax somewhere. If we agree that taxes are theft, then this can only mean that Friedman condones theft, that he endorses force and coercion. Therefore he can hardly call himself a liberal/libertarian.

Abby Rodgers
Thorndale, Pa.

Spring Cleaning

This may seem utopian, but why should I be tolerant? I am *right*. Mankind is in its present jam because liberalism rules not; patience and prudence have no place in a political purification program. The cause is rife with equivocators nineteenth century conditions would have pruned in adolescence ere they grew to feel their nonsense is true. Where is Gareth Garrett when I need him?

Steve Smith
Dayton, Ohio

Caught in the Cross-Fire?

I have no wish to enter the well-trodden debate over the morality of U.S. involvement in the recent Gulf War, nor the rather sterile debate of whether *Liberty* should indeed cover the debate.

The implications of Virkkala's note in the July magazine ("Wars for liberty"), however, do warrant comment. Virkkala supports Sheldon Richman's comment in a previous article that "a reasonable mo-

ral code would not condemn someone for killing an innocent person . . . to save his own life."

He then takes this further and says it's "okay" to kill innocent bystanders in order to repel an aggressor, concluding with a "moral rule" that foreign intervention is acceptable when "it is in your interest" and when you "believe you can make the situation better."

I would reject this as just and sufficient reason for intervention or for killing. Virkkala's moral rule sounds awfully like "the end justifies the means," which I understood to be the basis for Marxist and most other evil "morality" throughout history, and the antithesis of libertarianism.

Absent from Virkkala's code are several tenets which have formed the basis of Christian teaching about a just war for centuries. War is inherently evil, but can be justified in extreme circumstances.

The cause itself must be just; it must be grave; all reasonable alternatives must have been exhausted; and innocent casualties must to the greatest possible extent be avoided or minimized.

Perhaps these tenets are not the complete answer, but they do add an important moral dimension to what appears to be Virkkala's purely practical rules. I hope I'm never an innocent bystander in the way of Virkkala's interests. I might just get killed.

Adrian Day
Annapolis, Md.

Selective Censure

Recent letters and articles in your publication have correctly voiced libertarian objections to the tax-funded military interventions initiated by the U. S. government in the Persian Gulf area. However, the vehement indignation seems suspiciously selective in singling out this specific activity for censure, while ignoring so many others. It is apparent that many writers were far more upset by the nature of the activity than by the fact that it was subsidized and managed by governments.

It is quite true that the intervention in Iraq was not a legitimate function of the United States government. Libertarians should therefore point out that foreign intervention is not a proper government activity, that coercively collected taxes should never be used for such purposes (and that other nations' use of draftees was triply obscene). However, most of

the actions taken by American soldiers in Iraq were quite correct, appropriate, and not at all contrary to libertarianism.

If General Schwartzkopf had been the operations manager for a private, voluntary, mercenary force that had been employed, say, by victims of Mr Hussein's violent initiation of force, it would be very difficult to raise objections based on libertarian principles. Unfortunately, if such were the case, current U. S. laws would have branded him an "outlaw." Other laws would have prevented his group from obtaining weapons, forbidden its voluntary financing, barred reconnaissance by orbiting satellites, and generally made it impossible for legitimate retaliatory actions to have been carried out by non-government groups. It is these laws that are objectionable to libertarians—not the military actions themselves.

Despite the impressions left by several writers, libertarianism is not pacifism.

Bruce A. Martin
Middle Island, N.Y.

The International Leash-Law

One argument that the various articles on the Gulf War have failed to address is what I call the rabid dog argument.

I'm sure that all libertarians would agree that when a man's dog develops rabies it is the responsibility of the owner to shoot or otherwise dispose of him.

For years our wonderful government supported Saddam Hussein with military and other goodies. When he developed rabies and invaded Kuwait it became our responsibility to shoot him. Let me emphasize this: to shoot him, not the entire damn country. After all he was our dog, bought and paid for.

Of course, the same argument possibly could be applied to George Bush with equal legitimacy.

James Odle
Glendale, Ariz.

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Letters Policy

We invite readers to comment on articles that have appeared in *Liberty*. We reserve the right to edit for length and clarity. All letters are assumed to be intended for publication unless otherwise stated. Succinct, typewritten letters are preferred. Please include your phone number so that we can verify your identity.

Reflections

Dope on the Court — It seems as though every time a Republican president nominates a halfway decent man for the Supreme Court, it turns out the guy smoked dope in college. First Daniel Ginsburg was forced to withdraw his name from consideration and now the media is making a stink about Clarence Thomas' inhaling "a few puffs" of marijuana while in college.

Of course, it is not surprising that Judges Ginsburg and Thomas tried dope while in college. They were both in college in the 1960s, at a time when just about everyone at least tried dope. At my *alma mater*, dope smoking was *de rigueur* even among football players and frat-rats, not to mention Jewish intellectuals and alienated black radicals.

If we are to disqualify from consideration for high office everyone who smoked dope in college, we will be left with an entire generation of leaders who were socially-isolated malcontents or weanies. The prospect of a Supreme Court consisting of such people is terrifying. —EOW

Honor thy father, or go to jail — The Florida Supreme Court has upheld a lower court ruling that a divorced mother must "do everything in her power to create in the minds of [her children] a loving, caring feeling towards the father." Finding that the children's anti-paternal feelings were the result of motherly brainwashing, the Court ruled that the father had a "constitutionally protected inherent right" to a "meaningful relationship with his children." Next on the Court's agenda: to determine whether everybody has the right to have a nice day. —JSR

Oops! — Ten years ago the Environmental Protection Agency considered dioxin the most toxic of all synthetic chemicals. Dr Vernon N. Houk, an official for the Center for Environmental Health, repeatedly recommended that the people of Times Beach, Missouri, a town of 2,242 where dioxin-contaminated oil had been spread on the streets, abandon their homes. In 1982 they did so.

The homes and other property were purchased by the federal government, and eventually a nine-year, \$200 million cleanup of the dioxin-contaminated soil was begun.

Now comes Dr Houk to say that it was all a mistake. If dioxin is a carcinogen at all, it is "a weak one that is associated only with high-dose exposures." Other experts have reached the same conclusions. Studies of the former Times Beach residents have found no evidence of ill effects on their health.

Dr Houk comments: "We should have been more upfront with the Times Beach people and told them, 'We're doing our best with the estimates of the risk, but we may be wrong.' I think we never added, 'But we may be wrong.'"

So thousands of lives have been upset, hundreds of millions of dollars have been wasted, countless people frightened, and an expensive, pointless cleanup initiated—all because the government insisted on protecting people from a substance for which the evidence was insufficient to justify the fear.

However the story ends at Times Beach, we can be sure that the name of that unfortunate little town will live on in the environmentalists' storybook of horrors, along with the lurid tales of Love Canal and Three Mile Island and other sensational myths. The stories that report the corrections never get much press. For the news media, there's more money to be made by scaring people than by reporting the truth.

—RH

Defending the indefensible — In March, a black man in Los Angeles accused police of beating him brutally after stopping his car for speeding. The police offices involved responded that they had used only the force necessary to subdue him. The incident wouldn't have amounted to anything if a man who lived nearby hadn't recorded it on videotape. Two days after the beating, the man took his videotape to a local television station.

That night people saw what had happened. What they saw horrified them. As the black man lay prone on the pavement, surrounded by a dozen police officers, three policemen beat him mercilessly with clubs. In the few seconds recorded on tape, the police clubbed him 56 times. The man made no attempt at resistance.

Virtually the only public voice raised in defense of the beating came from Lew Rockwell, the head of the free-market oriented Ludwig von Mises Institute who aspires to be a nationally known commentator. In a column in the *Los Angeles Times*, a watered-down version of which later appeared in *USA Today*, he justified the beating on grounds that "the issue is safe streets versus urban terror," and went on to blame the person who videotaped the beating, declaring that "Liberals talk about banning guns. As a libertarian, I can't agree. I am, however, beginning to wonder about video-cameras." Along with many other libertarians, I was shocked both at his defense and his claim that his defense was libertarian. In the *May Liberty*, I recapitulated the story of the beating and criticized Rockwell's defense of it, as did Rick Henderson in the *May Reason*.

Rockwell remains convinced that his defense of the beating was a good thing. In the most recent issue of the Ludwig von Mises Institute's *News Notes*, he takes credit for its publication in the *Los Angeles Times*, and in a letter to *Reason* Rockwell defended the beating again, writing this time as President of the Mises Institute. I suppose it's appropriate for

Rockwell to take credit in the name of the Mises Institute, since the Institute syndicated his column on the subject to the *Times*.

Meanwhile, Rockwell's colleague at the Mises Institute, Murray Rothbard, has risen to defend his friend. Rothbard argues that those critical of the police beating had failed to understand the "context" of the beating because "videocameras are dumb, and people who follow them blindly are even dumber." Here's the "context" that, according to Rothbard, was missed by the "dumb" people who were shocked at the sight of a man lying prone and helpless on the concrete as a group of cops smashed him to pieces:

- 1) Rodney King is a bad person.
- 2) Rodney King was "maniacally speeding" and tried to avoid the police, and refused to get out of his car when the police stopped him.
- 3) The police couldn't use a choke hold on him because "the noxious forces of left-liberalism . . . had gotten the choke hold outlawed as being unfair to poor criminals."
- 4) The cops shot him with a taser gun, but that didn't stop him from "dancing around maniacally."
- 5) Some weeks later, when police tried to arrest King for hiring the services of a prostitute, King "tried to run down a police office with his car."

In this "context," Rothbard writes, the cops had no alternative but "beat Rodney King into submission with batons. Except a couple of baton blows couldn't do it. *Why* did the cops keep beating King again and again with their batons? The Rasputin factor; he simply wouldn't go down."

Rothbard has some facts wrong (e.g. the police records indicate King drove as fast as 55 mph, hardly "maniacally speeding"). But even if his argument were factually correct, it isn't very convincing. Does an attempt to elude police for a speeding ticket justify a beating? What if the driver also refuses to get out of his car? What if goddam liberals won't let the cops use a choke hold on the speeder? (As I recall, the "noxious left-liberals" couldn't get the choke hold outlawed until the police had killed more than 25 people in custody by using it.) What if the taser gun doesn't knock the driver senseless? Then are the cops justified in beating him senseless as he lies helpless on the pavement? And what does King's behavior weeks after the incident have to do with it anyway?



"I went to sleep in my car, and they arrested me for impersonating an officer."

One thing is plain: Murray Rothbard remains a master rhetorician. His articles never conclude before he has used every persuasive strategy possible. In this article, he used an *ad hominem* attack on Rodney King, a bad person. But that's not all. He includes *ad publicatorum* attack on the publisher of *Liberty*. It would have been too obvious to respond to what I wrote about Rockwell's column. Instead, Rothbard analyzes my life: "Bradford is just a business man who decided to buy himself a libertarian magazine. Well fine, but so what? What's he ever done apart from that? The fact that he *calls* himself a scholar and philosopher should cut no ice with anyone."

I can remember Rothbard calling me a scholar (after I'd written an article critical of someone he disliked), but I never

Lew Rockwell remains convinced that his defense of the L.A. police brutal beating of a black motorist accused of speeding is a good thing. He bragged about it in the Ludwig von Mises Institute newsletter, attacked Reason magazine for criticizing him, and sicked Murray Rothbard on Liberty for the same offense.

have. But I enjoy the romantic view of myself as a literary J.P. Morgan, buying up journals. But most entertaining is his notion that only philosophers or scholars should be allowed to comment on newspaper columns. That should keep the noise down in political circles.

—RWB

Zero coherence — Clarence Thomas smoked dope. Big surprise. The Bush administration pooh-poohs those who use this against his appointment to the Supreme Court. Just a youthful indiscretion. Anyway, he's renounced his sin.

How does this (eminently sensible) attitude jibe with the drug war strategy of targeting users with draconian property takings and tougher jail sentences? How does it mesh with the anti-drug rhetoric of "just saying 'no,'" or all the hysterical calls for hanging dealers on street corners? Isn't it time for the Bush administration to admit publicly what it has tacitly admitted—that people's private drug use just isn't any big deal, isn't anyone's business, and isn't worth violating civil liberties and wasting the citizenry's tax dollars?

If drug use isn't enough of an issue to disqualify one from a seat on the Supreme Court, how can it disqualify you from your right to life, liberty and property?

—BD

Compulsory volunteerism in the Free State — A proponent of mandatory "voluntary community service" for Maryland high school students stated that the program will teach students, "To be fully human, you must serve." It's a shame the Thirteenth Amendment is keeping all of us from realizing our full human potential.

—JSR

Zappa for President? — Rock-classical composer/guitarist/smartass Frank Zappa—whose name had been bandied about as a potential Libertarian candidate in '88—

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has officially announced his intention to run for president in '92, but as an independent. I've heard that matchmakers within the Libertarian Party are trying to hook up with him, but with the convention only a month and a half away, the arrangement seems unlikely to be consummated. Besides, Zappa is too iconoclastic to want to be saddled with any party identification. He announced his intentions in an interview in the July issue of the rock culture magazine *Spin*. Libertarians of my acquaintance were impressed, particularly by his suggestion to abolish the income tax.

Zappa first came to the (non-rock world) public eye as a star witness against Tipper Gore's record labeling initiative in the mid-'80s. Hey—strong on civil liberties *and* economic freedoms! The very definition of a proper libertarian, right?

Well, I think it more than possible that Zappa is a libertarian by inclination. At least his broaching of the idea of the abolition of the income tax shows he's not just another idiot liberal showbiz loser. Could you imagine Ed Asner saying something like "the only thing the income tax does to everybody who pays it is it pisses you off because you earned that money and now the government is taking it away from you"?

Zappa also seems to understand that there are good *practical* arguments for gutting the income tax: he cheers the enormous economic boom that would result from an income tax abolition.

But on other issues he seems slightly soft in the head. He makes reference to "Reagan's depression during '82-'83,

Pop artists are generally idiot-savants utterly ignorant of politics (and everything else), and political thinking usually casts a pall of hypocritical solemnity over music that is death to the pop aesthetic.

when his economics first took its toll." What could he mean by this? What policy unique to Reagan created this? This sounds like typical thoughtless left-liberal rhetoric about the "decade of greed," usually based on the widespread (and untrue) assumption that Reagan was a vicious slasher of social spending.

Zappa responds to the hopeless mess of the state education system with lame, vague prescriptions to "meet [children] halfway and install equipment into classrooms that are going to be able to deliver data into the language that kids already understand." In rap, I suppose? No, Zappa is merely pulling on the tired old McLuhan "post-literate" string here.

But he still has a positive side. He stands up to sensitivity pressure groups—he resisted a request to apologize for his song "Jewish Princess" by the Anti-Defamation League of the B'nai B'rith. He is also leery of democracy and very sincerely pro-free expression. He refuses to debate other candidates when he runs, just because he thinks they're all hopelessly full of shit. But of course.

Is this whole question anything more than a fanciful exercise in badinage? Would it really make any strategic sense for the Libertarian Party to pursue the candidacy of a long-

hair modern classical/jazz/pop-rock composer? Especially one whose music is as alternately silly, scatological, overly mannered and ill-conceived as Zappa's?

Well, why not? As I see it, what you want to do with a party like the LP—that is, one with no hope of winning a national election—is gain media attention for your organization and ideas, however possible.

Zappa would certainly deliver on press attention. He points this out as one of the pluses of his candidacy. "You know what the other guys are going to say before they say it. And television is an entertainment medium. Now, you don't know what I'm going to say. Now you're in the middle of an election year and it's real dull. Do you think they would send someone over to talk to me every once in a while just to liven things up a bit?"

He has a point. But, of course, he'd just be a laughing-stock—right? Could be. Just consider his hair, his past, hell, even his *views*. But perhaps his persona may help people think about heresies like abolishing the income tax—if only for a minute. And once that thought is in people's heads, who knows?

I am dubious about the combination of pop and politics on aesthetic grounds. Pop artists are generally idiot-savants utterly ignorant of politics (and everything else), and political thinking usually casts a pall of hypocritical solemnity over music—as over an extended family at the funeral of a universally hated patriarch—that is death to the pop aesthetic.

But on political grounds the marriage is fine with me. Anything to get attention, as the fisherman said to the salmon swimming upstream. We libertarian salmon ought to welcome a Zappa candidacy, LP related or not. —BD

RIP Leningrad, 1924–1991 — An old Soviet joke goes: A man at an employment agency was asked several questions. Where was he born? St. Petersburg. Where did he grow up? Petrograd. Where does he live now? Leningrad. Where would he like to live? St. Petersburg. Well, if he's still alive, he will get his chance. In a recent referendum, 54% of the citizens of Leningrad voted to change the name of their city back to St. Petersburg, honoring Tsar Peter the Great, who carved the port city out of a swamp to increase access to and contact with the developed west.

Soviet cities have been changing their names for several years now, casting off Communist-imposed titles in favor of their traditional names. Leningrad, the birthplace of the revolution, was the largest of the renamed cities. But Lenin's experiment, if destroying a country can be called that, has failed miserably. His name and those of his cohorts are being wiped from the maps, just as the names of ancient despots were obliterated from marble columns by their newly freed subjects. The *Bolsheviks* thought they acted for the ages, but history has shown otherwise. —JSR

How to succeed in business — First, form an oil-and-gas exploration company. Call it, say, Apex Energy Co. Get a buddy to join you in contributing capital. The two of you together should invest only \$3,000 while retaining 51 percent control of the venture.

Get the rest of the capital you need—say, \$2.3 million—by

selling stock to and borrowing from venture-capital corporations that operate with federal guarantees. This should not be difficult, so long as the venture-capital firms are controlled by a longtime friend of your father. The Small Business Investment Corporation, an institution created to assist politically well connected guys like you, will dispense the money.

Now, make yourself the president of Apex at a salary of \$160,000 a year plus expenses; give your buddy a salary of \$80,000 a year plus expenses. In a few days the two of you will have recovered in salary more than you invested in the company. Your first business move should be to buy an oil-and-gas lease for \$150,000 from two other companies already owned by you and your buddy.

Fourteen months later, report that Apex has lost \$708,000 and its stock has no value. But don't worry. If the remaining assets of the venture-capital outfits (now being liquidated) that lent you the capital are insufficient to cover the losses, the taxpayers will take care of everything.

Finally, resign from your position as president of Apex and look for another job—a similar one, of course.

Sounds too good to be true?

Not so. Just ask Neil Bush.

—RH

Owl spotted — Footnote to the Northern Spotted Owl controversy: a number of spotted owls have been sighted in second generation forests in eastern Washington. This is big news indeed.

You will recall (from my discussion, "The Owls Are Not What They Seem," July 1991) that by defining the word "species" to include "subspecies" and "distinct populations" of a given species, the Endangered Species Act had enabled the spotted owls that live in the mountains along the northern Pacific coast to be classified as a species, despite the fact that substantial populations live elsewhere and are not threatened. The only way to protect this new "species" is to prohibit timber harvesting, since the spotted owl can survive only in old growth forests.

The discovery of the spotted owl living happily in second growth forests around Wenatchee in eastern Washington strikes two blows at the notion that timber harvests in the coastal mountains should be stopped: (1) it demonstrates that the spotted owl can indeed live in areas that have been harvested; (2) it suggests that the spotted owl was not nearly as "endangered" as had been believed.

Why hadn't the spotted owl been seen in eastern Washington before? Like most predators it is shy around humans and naturally has a low population density. And nobody had looked for them before.

This is another unhappy episode of the government disrupting thousands of people's lives and wasting millions of dollars, because of wrong conclusions arrived at by political-ly motivated scientists.

—RWB

Up from inebriation — In the July issue of *Liberty*, I reported that the ever-vigilant Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms is at work protecting us against winemakers who have the audacity to proclaim on the labels of their products that drinking wine is a cultured, civilized activity. It gives me pleasure now to note that BATF's cuddling embraces are not restricted to hoity-toity sauvignon sippers.

The beer drinkers who made this nation great enjoy its protections too.

BATF has come down hard on G. Heileman Brewing Co.'s attempt to market a new malt liquor called "PowerMaster." (No, that's not a brand of cordless drills.) According to bureau spokesman Tom Hill, the name constitutes an illicit form of advertising. While beers typically have an alcohol content of 3.5 per cent and malt liquors 5.5 per

If consumers were afforded alcohol content information, might they then elect to moderate their inebriation by choosing a less potent brand? Sure—and Dan Quayle might resign the Vice Presidency to study phenomenology at the Sorbonne.

cent, PowerMaster is cranked up to a jolting 5.9. Federal law forbids brewers from mentioning alcohol content either in advertising or on labels. Heileman may have thought it had hit upon a clever way to subvert the law's intent, but it couldn't sneak its subliminal ploy past the watchdogs at BATF. (Well, actually it did sneak it by. BATF first gave Heileman approval to market PowerMaster and then, once thousands of cases were already on their way to the stores, rescinded the agreement. Being a federal bureau means you don't have to live with your mistakes; the other guy does.)

Some naive folk believe that the government's job is to police deceptive advertising. That may be true in Third World backwaters, but not here. Consumers can fend against falsehoods for themselves; Uncle, though, will protect them against incursions of *truths*. Why? Well, if Joe Sixpack knew that he needed only eight bottles of PowerMaster to get sozzled instead of 14 Buds, then he might decide to drink less and enjoy it more. Although that would carry some ecological benefit—fewer aluminum cans tossed onto roadsides, less water consumed by flushing toilets—its liabilities are profound. They include . . . well, I'll let the readers of *Liberty* figure it out for themselves.

Why this prohibition for beer when wine and whiskey labels declare in large type their alcohol content? The answer is obvious. The characters on *thirtysomething* sip wine; real Americans guzzle beer. If they're thrown off their stride, consequences for our nation's well-being could be profound. Suppose that Ford assembly line workers had spent the previous evening downing PowerMasters: would *you* drive the cars they put together the next day? (Please don't write in to tell me about the new Honda in your garage. Neither I nor BATF would be amused.)

If consumers were afforded alcohol content information, might they then elect to moderate their inebriation by choosing a less potent brand? Sure—and Dan Quayle might resign the Vice Presidency to study phenomenology at the Sorbonne. Remember, these are beer drinkers we're talking about. For them, a little knowledge is a dangerous thing and more than a little entirely out of the question. BATF knows its clients. Let them be entertained by commercials replete

with bouncing C-cups and superannuated jocks; just don't tell them what's actually in the brews they hoist.

Heileman may have received its just come-uppance, but BATF's work has beerly commenced. "We've been collecting advertising. If we find any to be similar in nature, using the term 'power' or connoting strength, we will be writing those companies letters telling them to cease and desist that type of advertising," announces Mr. Hill, BATF's spokesman.

Buy that man a Perrier!

—LEL

Unhappy campers — Scouting has been in the news recently for policies that exclude gays from being scoutmasters and atheists from joining at all.

Eight year old atheist Mark Welsh sued the Cub Scouts after they denied him membership. I don't have any problems with atheists or homosexuals—or atheist homosexuals—joining any organization. But is the issue here discrimination or free association? Certainly the Boy Scouts of America are discriminating against atheists who want to be scouts. But does anyone, whatever his religious orientation, have a right to be a scout? Or does the organization have the right to decide for itself what it regards as proper qualifications for membership?

Mark Welsh's attorneys claim that the scouts are a public organization and may not discriminate. According to this reasoning, the scouts are "public" because they "recruit in the public domain." Thus, the argument goes, they must admit members who disagree with their social philosophy.

But this legal definition of "public" is wrongheaded. It runs roughshod over property rights, invites governmental intrusion into what is properly the private domain. The prior moral distinction between public (government owned) and private (everything else) has been lost. So why can't Mark Welsh (or his father) form his own atheist scout group? Why can't gay outdoorsmen raise their own troops? And by what right do federal judges intrude on the God-fearing, gay-fearing scouts to tell them with whom to camp? —JSR

Exporting misery — There is an old joke to the effect that U.S. problems with international competitiveness could be relieved if only we traded according to our comparative advantage: Japan sends us cars and VCRs, and we send them lawyers.

Unfortunately, a variant of the joke is being adopted as U.S. foreign policy in an apparent attempt to prevent the newly liberated nations of eastern Europe from developing.

The Bush administration is sending six teams of government lawyers to the former Soviet bloc countries to instruct officials there in how to frame and enforce antitrust laws.

For a century, antitrust laws have generated counterproductive distortions in U.S. markets. They have given rise to business uncertainties—at times (e.g., 1897–1911, 1938–1941) extreme and pervasive uncertainties. They have helped to shield uncompetitive firms from the gale of creative destruction. And worst of all, they have placed in the hands of government officials a power that cannot help but be wielded in an arbitrary and capricious manner. The antitrust laws have served as a perennial threat to the economic liberty of consenting adults.

Adam Smith observed that there is a lot of ruin in a nation. Given that the American economy has survived for 101 years with antitrust laws in effect, he was obviously right.

Antitrust laws are, and always have been, a bankrupt policy instrument, as Dominick T. Armentano (*Antitrust and Monopoly*, 1990) and others have shown conclusively. How utterly in character that the federal government should give other governments the rope needed to hogtie their economies. —RH

The body snatchers — Who owns one's corpse? A recent court case has raised this question. A hospital removed the corneas from a man's corpse and donated them, contrary to the instructions the man left while alive. His family is suing for redress, but the courts have thus far taken the position that "no-one owns a corpse." Health care workers may apparently loot bodies for organs when there is sufficient need, with no recompense to the deceased's estate.

Why can't one's body be willed to one's heirs, just like any other property? One's body is as much one's property as one's house or car. In fact, it is more than one's property. It is pre-property, a basic factor in one's existence. Treating a corpse—or any other property—as a free resource results in exploitation, shortages, and the replacement of legal for market mechanisms.

Why should judges decide where body parts go? Why not the market? The most often heard retort is that this would mean "organs for the rich." But this is not likely. By establishing regular payment mechanisms for body parts, the market will expand and prices will seek clearance level. Certainly prices would decline from current levels, thanks to tremendous supply and paltry demand. The technologies associated with organ preservation would progress faster, driven by the lure of profit.

We can only hope that, by recognizing that property rights cover corpses, this line of thought can be buried. —JSR

Billions for bombers, but not one cent for defense —

The Pentagon has revealed that Northrop Corp. has been at work for several years on secret development of a "stealthier" cruise missile, a weapon with more than 100 miles range that can be fired from the ground or the air.

The political strategy seems to be that, given all the hoopla about the "smart" weapons used in the Persian Gulf war, the announcement might give a boost to Northrop's B-2 "Stealth" bomber, whose enormous price tag has become



painfully visible to members of Congress. After all, even the \$15 billion projected to be spent for 8,650 stealth missiles looks like small potatoes when compared to the projected cost of the B-2s, which go for \$860 million each . . . that comes to \$64.5 billion for the 75 units the Pentagon would like to procure.

The B-2, the plane famous for having no known mission, looks as if ultimately it will be a loser in the political wars. Even Congress has some budget restraint. But if no more than the 15 already in production ever emerge, the program will still rank as one of the dumbest in the history of a government department notorious for dumb projects. —RH

A self-defense — When I wrote “No Victory for Liberty” (May 1991) I may have under-argued the “do no harm” principle (I wasn’t writing a book), but that doesn’t invalidate it (as contended by Virkkala, “Wars for liberty,” July 1991). It seems to be good advice not only for states, but also for individuals. It means that if you cannot do good, at least do no harm.

However, there is a big difference between states and individuals. Individuals are generally accountable for their actions, and they pay their own expenses. States are not and do not. The history of diplomacy is a sordid saga of presumption and imposition. If a state presumes to defend a people from foreign aggression and forecloses other effective alternatives, the people, until they change the system, are justified in expecting protection, just as they may call the cops. Thus, my statement that a reasonable moral code would not condemn someone for killing an innocent person when it was the only way to save his own life would also apply to that state when it was actually defending the people living under its jurisdiction.

My point in the article was that when its people’s safety is not at issue, the state should avoid doing harm, whether or not it can do good. Virkkala grows vague and mushy when he wonders why the principle about killing innocents does not apply when other people are being aggressed against. It has nothing to do with being heartless (the heartfelt should be free to help at their own risk.) If we are to limit state power, we of course do not want the the government doing international charity (!) work (like the murder of 100,000 conscripts and some number of civilians?). This is a critical point in the debate over limiting or expanding state power.

I disagree with Virkkala when he writes that distinguishing the state from private persons is utopian, whatever he means by that. If anything is utopian it is Virkkala’s last paragraph. States do not make foreign policy that way and never will. There is a basic conceptual problem that impedes the carrying out of his seemingly simple advice: if we are talking about an individual, I know who the *you* is in “Intervene in those conflicts when it is in your interest to do so and you have good reason to believe you can make the situation better.” But what the heck does it mean if we are talking about the state? —SLR

Have you hugged your President today?

— I grew up in the northern midwest, but during my adolescent years (*not* long ago), my part of the country was still racially segregated in every meaningful sense. That is one

reason why my heart warmed so at the picture on page one of my local paper—President Bush warmly hugging Jack Prater, the young black physicist who was Caltech’s outstanding graduating senior at this year’s commencement.

Go ahead, call me naive. Call me a sucker for symbolism. This is the kind of symbolism that does no harm. The President wasn’t handing out promises; he was congratulating achievement. I know that Americans are scandalous over-huggers, but I would rather see a hugging president than an imperial one. A hug may be smarmy (though this one didn’t look that way), but at least it’s a symbol of equal humanness.

That’s a good side of America. A bad side quickly emerged, when Mr Prater, who seems like a very nice man, commented: “I asked him if I could hug him, and he said I

I know that Americans are scandalous over-huggers, but I would rather see a hugging president than an imperial one.

could. I didn’t want anyone to shoot me.” The “anyone” he had in mind was the gang of armed guards that follows the President around, as numerous and as scary as those hundreds of identical cats that used to infest the Mighty Mouse cartoons. It’s ridiculous.

And of course they don’t “protect” just the president. When Teddy Kennedy (and who the hell is he, anyway?) was running for the presidency a few years back, he visited my university, which is 12 miles from the airport. The interstate highway was emptied for him. Helicopters shadowed his route. Sixty-six motorcycle patrolmen followed his car (I didn’t count the ones that preceded it). Cherubs descended on rose-petal clouds.

No, I’m lying about the cherubs. But everything else is true. Hugs and guns: it seems that we’ve got our symbolism a little mixed up. Maybe it has something to do with the President’s defensive remark at the Caltech ceremonies, where he said, “I am not a government basher.” Too bad. But would you consider scaling it back a bit? —SC

Damned if they do, damned if they don’t

— Over the decades of keeping Ivan at bay, American taxpayers have shelled out trillions of dollars. Now that the Cold War is declared won by the West (never mind that the military-industrial complexes on both sides apparently have not heard the news), one might have expected that the taxpayers would get some relief from foreign-policy burdens. But no.

Gorbachev and his *apparatchiki* have discovered a more effective way to deal with the West. Rather than threatening with tanks and missiles, they now turn to blackmail. They speak darkly of the chaos that will envelope the USSR and hence the whole world if they do not receive massive infusions of Western aid. Just imagine, they urge, what calamities would befall Western Europe if, rather than being invaded by Soviet tanks, it were invaded by Soviet refugees seeking subsistence and employment. Worst of all, if the West does not prop up the Gorbachev regime, it might be overthrown by “hardliners.”

So there's a catch-22 for U.S. taxpayers. If the USSR continues the Cold War, we lose. But if the USSR gives up the Cold War, we still lose. It's enough to make you wonder: if heavy U.S. tax burdens are invariant with respect to Soviet actions, then maybe, just maybe, the root of the problem does not lie in Moscow.

—RH

Queue and eh? on nationalized health care

— In the aftermath of the U.S. triumph in Operation Desert Slaughter, the Democrats are desperate for an issue they can use to assail President Bush in the campaign of 1992. Their old stand-by—that Republicans lack compassion for the poor—isn't playing very well these days. So they have decided to pump up hysteria over the "crisis" in health care.

Now, the crisis consists not in increasing mortality or morbidity rates or in declining standards of care. It consists in the desire of one and all to shift the higher costs of high-tech health care onto somebody else.

The Democrat's scheme, abetted by the news media, seems to be succeeding. According to a recent *Wall Street Journal/NBC News* poll, four out of ten people surveyed think that health is either the first or second most important problem for the federal government to solve. The respondents don't blame the government for creating the mess in the first place—insurance companies, doctors, and hospitals get credit for that. Even among self-described Republicans and conservatives, big pluralities think the government must "do something." Sixty-nine percent of the respondents say that would support a universal, government health-care system like Canada's.

Even though the Bush administration seems opposed to such a drastic expedient, Darman and company are hard at work on an alternative reform that will surely give the federal government a more prominent role in the health-care system than it has now.

In the midst of the political *sturm und drang*, the General Accounting Office released a study claiming—I am not making this up—that a Canadian-style system would be much

more efficient. It would save an estimated \$67 billion per year in insurance and administrative costs, which would be sufficient to cover the full cost of insuring all those now uninsured plus the current out-of-pocket costs of consumers of health care.

Pondering these developments, I recall my own experience with the national health system of Great Britain and what I learned from a Canadian physician I knew in Pennsylvania. In Britain, rationing of care is a stark reality. How will this agree with Americans, who tell the pollsters that they are opposed to rationing and unwilling to limit the types of tests and procedures available under a government plan? My physician acquaintance in Pennsylvania had fled Canada in disgust, after finding the entire system mired in mindless bureaucracy and concluding that the decisions made under the system required him to be a party to unconscionable actions in treating, or failing to treat, his patients.

As usual, when convinced—however spuriously—that a crisis exists, Americans cry out for government to "do something." And regardless of which party holds power, the government responds. But should the country adopt a full-fledged government health system, people will live to regret their credulity and impetuosity. Their bodies as well as their pocketbooks will suffer.

—RH


A few kind words about George Will

One of the most irksome forms of sophistry is the evasive argument. I am sure you are familiar with the maneuver: a disputant aims his fire at irrelevant details of an argument, ignoring his opponent's logic and evidence. I suppose this is done out of a fear that one's actual position will not withstand scrutiny, or will not appeal to a large enough portion of the audience being addressed. At other times such a ploy may be a roundabout attempt to soften an argument or make a viewpoint seem less radical.

For example, both liberals and conservatives frequently condemn political activism on the part of clergymen. The reason usually given is that men of the cloth should stick to their own field and not intrude into secular affairs. This argument is patently insincere. Liberals do not commonly object to ministers, priests and rabbis leading anti-apartheid movements or calling for more public spending. Similarly, few conservatives fly into a tizzy upon hearing of clergy who are active against abortion or pornography. In both cases, people are looking for an argumentative shortcut. It is easier, apparently, to say "He's meddling in worldly affairs when he should be sticking to his pulpit" than to present cogent and reasoned arguments for one's stands.

I am always glad when someone forgoes such evasive methods, adopts the principles of Occam's Shaving Kit, and gets to the point. I must, for example, give credit to columnist George Will for his recent arguments for strong gun control.

Unlike most gun-grabbers, Will does not attempt to skate around the Second Amendment. More importantly, he doesn't adhere to the specious notion, common among anti-gun activists, that the amendment is intended only to protect the right of members of state militias to bear arms while on active service. Will is aware that the term "militia" meant, in ordinary



"They are pretty repulsive, Son, but you must remember that the rabble are an important element of the economy."



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18th-century Anglo-Saxon usage, the whole of the adult citizenry (or at least the male citizenry). He quotes George Mason, an early advocate of adding a bill of rights to the Constitution, as stating "Who are the militia? They consist now of the whole people." Nor does he maintain that the Second Amendment is an outmoded reflection of a vanished eighteenth-century society.

Guest Reflection

The no-tell cartel — What's the difference between a lawyer and a gas-filled blimp? Only the blimp can advertise.

At least that's the situation in Florida. In December 1990, the Florida Supreme Court conceded to the Florida State Bar's request for new, more restrictive rules on lawyer advertising. The new rules effective this year make Florida second only to Iowa in circumscribing a lawyer's freedom to advertise. Ads may now be submitted to the State Bar for review and approval, although its opinion is not binding. Firms responsible for running ads found to violate the new rules may have to forfeit any revenue those ads generate.

The new rules prohibit the use of celebrities or actors. If there is a voice in the ad, it must be either the lawyer's or one of the law firm's full-time employees. And less-than-sombre tactics such as dramatizations or music with lyrics are also banned. There can be no mention of fees, unless certain disclosures are made and there are no promises about quality.

In adopting these new rules, Florida bucks the liberalizing trend most states have followed in the past decade. The Florida State Bar apparently views the relaxation of rules against legal advertising as desecration of the professional image of a lawyer—which everyone knows is exemplary. Unregulated advertising can "adversely affect the public's confidence and trust in our judicial system"—which is also at an all-time high. Further, the State Bar expressed worry that advertising may prejudice juries against certain lawyers and their clients.

The State Bar's opinion itself reflects several prejudices. It says that commercial-type advertising can create unwarranted expectations in lawyers by those untrained in the law, thereby demonstrating an embarrassing lack of confidence in prospective jury members. And though the State Bar's expressed intention is to protect this public, it is likely that just the opposite will be achieved.

The social benefits of advertising freedom are repeatedly demonstrated. Advertising allows the advertiser to communicate what he is offering in the marketplace and this information aids those with money to spend. With a state-mandated closed club (as in the case of state-licensed attorneys) advertising is even more important. Those lawyers who do advertise in "unlawyerly" ways at least succeed in shaking some dust off the club's brocade curtains. Their commercial-type advertisements contain a whisper of the dreaded word: competition.

The lawyers and judges who voted against advertising freedom advertise something rather frightening for the future of everyone's freedom—its decline.

To their credit, some lawyers are suing.

Yes, occasionally, doing what's just and practicing law do coincide.

—Ann Rogers

Will also eschews the oft-quoted claim that the U.S. Supreme Court has ruled that the Second Amendment doesn't protect the rights of individuals. In fact, the high court has ruled on Second Amendment issues only a handful of times, most recently over fifty years ago, and its rulings have involved only peripheral matters (taxes on guns, ownership of firearms by felons, and the status of sawed-off shotguns, for the most part).

Will, in short, does not weasel. He hates what he calls the "carnage that is a consequence of virtually uncontrolled private ownership of guns" and admits that our Bill of Rights protects that ownership. He doesn't shrink from the obvious conclusion. As he states in a recent column, "Gun control advocates . . . should squarely face the need to deconstitutionalize the subject by repealing the embarrassing [second] amendment."

Now, I am not a great admirer of George Will; his smarmy, patronizing, statist brand of conservatism is among the less appetizing aspects of the intellectual American right. Moreover, I think his views on gun control are completely wrongheaded. However, I do give him credit for honesty and probity, and for dealing with the real issue rather than burying it in a sea of evasion. Now, if only those right-wingers who advocate censorship of everything they don't like will come out and call for repeal of the First Amendment, we can clear the air even further.

—WPM

Ron Paul in Jeopardy — The Libertarian Party has achieved the status of trivium. On July 15, the final answer on *Jeopardy*, the syndicated television quiz show, was: "In 1988, Ronald E. Paul, the candidate of this party, received the third most votes for President." All three contestants got the question correct.

—KRB

Rational garbage in Montana — Responding to the recent wave of environmental concern, the small city of Bozeman, Montana, has initiated a plan to save future generations by pricing trash on a per garbage-can basis. Bozeman is not running out of land suitable for landfills (this is Montana, after all), so there's no special need for such a program, but the method selected is basically a good one. Each family has to tag its bags or cans with easily purchased tags that cost 65 cents for 20 gallons or 95 cents for 33 gallons.

With each family now paying for the amount of garbage it disposes (after a flat \$40-a year service fee), each family has an incentive to cut back on its garbage, and is free to use whatever means it wishes. This is not only "politically correct"; it also makes economic sense. It is far better than mandatory recycling and is a great improvement over the previous system, an annual garbage fee based on the number of rooms in each family's house!

Unfortunately, now that this program has been in effect for just over two weeks, there are some casualties, the chief one being the recycling business. The Lions Club has closed down one of its bins for collecting aluminum cans because it is losing money and because people are dumping trash at the collection site. And Carl Weissman & Sons, which used to recycle cardboard, has been so overwhelmed with cardboard that it has stopped the program.

My guess is that eventually Bozeman citizens will come to accept the fact that if they want cardboard and old chairs picked up at their doorstep, they have to pay for it. A few will

go to the trouble of taking cardboard and other recyclables to recyclers who, over time, will be able to handle greater volumes. The policing of "midnight dumping" on the property of others will presumably improve.

I hope that the Bozeman city fathers and mothers don't react by instituting mandatory recycling, which would be costly, unnecessary, and a waste of many people's time. Recycling is not a sacred rite in which people should be forced to participate. But people should be held accountable for the full costs of their waste disposal. As long as they pay those costs, there is no justification for reducing their freedom to consume products and dispose of whatever waste they wish. —JSS

Libertarians' dilemma — The Libertarian Party certainly faces a tough choice at its upcoming convention in Chicago. Only two candidates have announced for its presidential nomination: one a "motivational speaker" who has failed his bar exam sixteen times, the other a former state legislator who can't keep his facts straight when speaking in public. Neither have the status to command media attention or the means of raising the funds necessary to run a serious campaign.

The Democrats face a similar problem: no person of genuinely national status seems interested in their nomination. But there is one massive difference: the Democrat nominee has the worst prospects of any Democratic candidate since the Civil War, while the Libertarian nominee will have his party's best opportunity ever. With Bush running away with the election, the ever potent why-waste-your-vote argument is dead in the water, and with both parties getting together to raise taxes and engage in an insane war against drugs, the LP has its best opportunity in its twenty-year history.

If the party could come up with a candidate with the stature, articulateness and resources of Roger MacBride, Ed Clark, or Ron Paul, it could do what those candidates all hoped to do: make a real impact on the national scene. The nomination of Dick Boddie or Andre Marrou, I am afraid, puts the LP back in its old rut on the road to obscurity.

My own guess is that Boddie will get the nod, thanks to his histrionic abilities as a speaker at LP conventions. I have seen him perform, and while his fundamentalist-preacher style is not my cup of tea, it is pretty plain that he impresses party members. And he may be the better candidate for all I know.

Is there a dark horse in the shadows? Ron Paul, Gene Burns, Ed Clark and Mark Skousen have been mentioned, but so far as I know, none are willing to take the plunge. Of course, strange things have happened at past LP conventions, so you never know. But right now the LP is in the odd position of having all the pieces in place for its best results ever, except that no well-qualified people want to run. —CAA

Honoring our anti-war dead — In the American history textbook impressed upon me in high school, there was a picture of Jeannette Rankin, identified as the only member of Congress to vote against U.S. entry into World War II. The caption also noted that she had voted against U.S. entry into World War I, had been a pioneer advocate of women's rights and was the first woman to serve in the U.S. Congress. But she was not a career office-holder: her two terms in Congress coincided with the U.S. entry into both world wars.

I am sure the authors considered this as a sort of enriching

morsel, intended to stimulate reluctant high school students into an interest in American history. I filed the datum away as a curiosity, the sort of effluvium with which a teenager fills his head.

A year or two later, I saw Jeannette Rankin on *Sixty Minutes*. She was an old lady by then, and had abandoned her native Montana for Georgia. She was feisty as hell, explaining to all the world why she thought the U.S. had no business in Vietnam. She was a tough old lady, who heated her small house with the Sunday edition of the *New York Times*. She became a minor hero to me. Above all, I admired her courage in refusing to allow the Congress to declare war on Japan unanimously.

A few years ago, I heard from a friend that there is in Missoula, Montana, a park honoring Jeannette Rankin, and I

Nearly every city has a park or memorial to its war heroes. What other city has honored an anti-war hero, even as shoddily as Missoula has honored Jeannette Rankin?

decided that one day I would visit it. So, in June, I journeyed to Missoula to visit the park that honors her. . . .

The office of the motel at which I stay is full of antique advertisements and store promotional materials; its proprietor is very proud of his 2 star rating from the auto club. But neither the proprietor nor his wife has heard of Jeannette Rankin Park. However, his wife has an idea. "Why don't you give him one of those books about Missoula?" she says to her husband. He thrusts into my hand a slick, staple-bound book.

In the privacy of my room, I examine the book. It contains lots of ads, a map of the town, and information about local tourist attractions. But not a word about Jeannette Rankin Park.

Missoula is a big city by Montana standards—40,000 people—but it seems small enough that some combination of reconnoitering and querying natives will lead me to the park. After forty minutes of driving around town, asking people I stop on the streets, stopping in small businesses and inquiring, I am no closer to finding it. Jeannette Rankin Park may as well be on the surface of the moon as far as the people I talk to are concerned.

I come across the police station. Here, I figure, is my opportunity. I walk in and ask the dispatcher, a friendly middle-aged woman. "I've lived here all my life," she says, "and I've never heard of it." But she is friendly and helpful the way people in Montana all seem to be, and after several phone calls she tells me, "I think it might be at the south end of the Madison Street Bridge."

I check my map and head to the bridge. Traffic is not heavy—it is 8:00 p.m. by now—but it is obvious the bridge carries a lot of traffic. The four lanes of traffic split into two one way streets at the south edge of the river. Straight ahead, on the point formed by the diverging streets, is a large sign, "Jeannette Rankin Park."

No parking is allowed, so I continue south. A cross street forms the southern boundary of Rankin Park. It allows park-

continued on page 25

Appraisal

The *Real* Judge Thomas

The most interesting aspect of Clarence Thomas is not his color, or his smoking habits, or even his past, but his *philosophy*. Here are two rather different views of his character and judicial philosophy.

Who is Clarence Thomas?

by R. W. Bradford

George Bush's nomination of Clarence Thomas to the Supreme Court caught many people by surprise. All that most people seem to know about Judge Thomas is that he is a black federal judge who criticized affirmative action while heading the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission during the Reagan administration.

Libertarians know a good deal more about Judge Thomas, thanks to Bill Kauffman's perceptive interview published in *Reason* (November 1987) and Judge Thomas' contribution to *Assessing the Reagan Years*, an anthology edited by David Boaz and published by the Cato Institute.

In "Civil Rights as a Principle Versus Civil Rights as an Interest," his contribution to the Boaz anthology, Thomas reveals an appreciation of liberty that one seldom encounters from Reagan appointees or Federal judges:

In 1980, I was confident that great strides could be made on behalf of individual liberty . . . Although we are able to take credit for much good, I believe that the administration's efforts did go awry, in both rhetoric and substance. Perhaps its faults can best be examined if I focus on one particular theme: our failures to enunciate a principled understanding of what we were about and to articulate the meaning of individual rights and how we might best defend them.

Elsewhere in the essay, Thomas

characterizes Barry Goldwater's speech accepting the Republican presidential nomination in 1964 as "perhaps the most powerful contemporary statement defending freedom based on our founding principles." He quotes at length from Goldwater's speech. A sample:

We can see in the sanctity of private property the only durable foundation for constitutional government in a free society. And beyond that we see and cherish diversity of ways, diversity of thoughts, of motives, and of accomplishments. We don't seek to live anyone's life for him. We only seek to secure his rights, guarantee him opportunity to strive with government performing only those needed and constitutionally sanctioned tests which cannot otherwise be performed.

He praises the speech for its "eloquence and good sense," bemoans the fact that Goldwater alienated black Americans by opposing the 1964 Civil Rights Act, and warns, "unless Americans begin to take seriously Goldwater's warning, our troubles may prove overwhelming." When is the last time you heard a federal judge quote the words of *Liberty* editor Karl Hess, who wrote this extraordinary plea for human liberty? When was the last time you heard a federal judge express such love of liberty?

In his interview with Bill Kauffman, Thomas is dubious about the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), the agency that he headed at the time, as well as many other government activities:

In a free society, I don't think there

would be a need for it to exist. Had we lived up to our Constitution, had we lived up to the principles that we espoused, there would certainly be no need. There would have been no need for manumission either. Unfortunately, the reality was that, for political reasons or whatever, there was a need to enforce antidiscrimination laws. Or at least there was a perceived need to do that.

Why do you need a Department of Agriculture? Why do you need a Department of Commerce? You can go down the whole list. You don't need any of them, really.

I think, though, if I had to look at the role of government and what it does in people's lives, I see the EEOC as having much more legitimacy than the others, if properly run. Now, you can run the risk that the authority can be abused. When EEOC or any organization starts *dictating* to people, I think they go far beyond anything that should be tolerated in this society.

Later in the same interview, Thomas says, "I don't think that government has a role in telling people how to live their lives. Maybe a minister does, maybe your belief in God does, maybe there's another set of moral codes, but I don't think government has a role." This prompted Kauffman to ask, "So would you describe yourself as a libertarian?" Thomas answered:

I don't think I can. I certainly have some very strong libertarian leanings, yes. I tend to really be partial to Ayn Rand, and to *The Fountainhead* and *Atlas Shrugged*. But at this point I'm caught in the position where if I were a true libertarian I wouldn't be here in government.

L. Gordon Crovitz of *The Wall St Journal* has reviewed the 19 opinions that Thomas has written since becoming a federal judge 15 months ago. His conclusion: "these rulings . . . are textbook examples of judicial restraint." Thomas is dubious about the notion that judges should make law *ex nihilo*, or discover new rights or obligations hidden in the Constitution. Thomas' idea of judicial restraint is favored by many conservatives, concerned about the activities of the courts during the past 40 years. But it hardly suggests that he buys into the conservative social agenda. I suspect that, given his libertarian inclinations, there's not much chance he will ally himself with social conservatives on the court. Even in 1987, when he was a highly visible member of a very conservative administration, he was reluctant to call himself a conservative. "I'm willing to accept it for the sake of discussion, so I don't have to spend a whole lot of time on definitions, etc," he told Bill Kauffman. "But I'm just Clarence Thomas. I'm an individual."

We should remember that judicial restraint is a two-edged sword. During the early part of this century, it was the left, not the right, that called for judicial restraint. At the time, courts were inclined to outlaw social legislation on the ground that it ran afoul of rights *implicit* in the Constitution. For example, in 1905 the Supreme Court ruled in *Lochner v. New York* that a law limiting the length of the workday in bakeries was unconstitutional on the ground that it violated the "right to contract," a right found nowhere in the Constitution. This is the judicial activism of today's left-liberals (e.g. William Brennan, Thurgood Marshall), who have found different rights (e.g. the right to abortion) hiding in the Constitution. Leftist support for judicial restraint evaporated when the leftist judges with different political agendas replaced the conservatives on the Court.

There is a possibility that Judge Thomas' commitment to individual rights and "natural law" (which he calls "the best defense of liberty and of limited government") might overcome his commitment to judicial restraint, making him a judicial activist like Brennan

or Marshall, but with a very different agenda. To date, Judge Thomas has shown no inclination toward such activism. Indeed, he seems committed to restraint even when it is distinctly politically imprudent to do so: he has dared to suggest that the Supreme Court's landmark *Brown v Board of Education* decision may have been bad law, in that it was not based on sound judicial thinking and the U.S. Constitution, but rather on "psychological evidence" and "compassion." It is safe to say that if

When is the last time you heard a federal judge cite the words of Karl Hess, praise Ayn Rand and quote Malcolm X from memory?

Thomas were not black, Bush's nomination of him would have unleashed a Niagara of vicious criticism.


Thomas' philosophy of law also will likely preclude judicial activism of the sort many libertarians favor (e.g. eliminating practically all government activity by means of extension of the "taking" provision of the 14th Amendment) and result in his coming down against the *Roe v. Wade* decision that found protection of the right to abortion in the 9th Amendment. By the same logic, I doubt that he will find any prohibition of abortion in the Constitution, as many anti-abortionists of the "abortion-is-murder" school do. (To date, the public speculation about his views on abortion has centered on his Roman Catholic upbringing; most observers believe he will be an anti-abortionist. From what I read of his character, I doubt his religion will be a significant factor in his decision. He has shown himself to be quite capable of separating his own personal views from his legal thinking. Also, he has demonstrated

independence from the Roman Catholic Church in two ways: (1) he is divorced and remarried; (2) the church he currently attends is Episcopalian.)

Nevertheless, it remains possible that, once ensconced in a position of power with lifetime tenure, Thomas will emerge as a judicial activist. But I doubt it. Thomas seems too committed to judicial restraint, and his independent mind and powerful intellect suggest that he will be able to keep the law separate from his own personal political philosophy in a way that judicial activists seem unable to do. But if Judge Thomas proves to be a judicial activist of a libertarian sort, he would at least be a breath of fresh air in what is shaping up to be a rather dull and stodgy Court.

In a profile in *The Atlantic Monthly*, Juan Williams called Thomas "a sad, lonely, troubled and deeply pessimistic public servant," which I suppose is the way an establishment liberal might view an independent, proud man who is dubious about the value of government. Thomas' success in the world is a testament to his own perspicacity and hard work. As a child, he was dirt-poor. He learned the pain of racism growing up in the segregated South and being educated in the "integrated" North. He flirted with the Black Panthers and quotes Malcolm X from memory. At EEOC, he had two flags behind his desk: the stars and stripes and the Revolutionary War flag featuring a coiled snake and the warning "Don't Tread on Me."

I don't have any idea whether the Senate will confirm Bush's nomination



"I've been waiting for a case like this my entire life — you really *did* yell 'Fire!' in a crowded theatre?"

of Thomas. But I sure hope it does. My own guess is that if the Senate confirms Judge Thomas, he will surprise a lot of people. He has shown himself to be independent, intelligent, tough, and sensitive to human liberty. That's more than we can say for most of the possible candidates or most of the members of the court. □

Judge Thomas *versus* the Constitutional "Mainstream"

by James Taggart

Judge Clarence Thomas' views on constitutional interpretation are potentially "dangerous," says left-leaning constitutional scholar Laurence Tribe. Thomas' writings are "strange" and "further outside the mainstream of constitutional interpretation than [Robert] Bork," writes Geoffrey Stone, the liberal dean of the relatively conservative University of Chicago Law School. "Most troubling," according to syndicated columnist Clarence Page, is that "Thomas' writings are extensive and replete with appreciation for a legal notion called 'natural rights.'" From the perspective of these modern liberal commentators, the "conservative" views of Judge Thomas must indeed seem dangerous and strange, yet this is deeply ironic because Thomas draws many of his ideas on constitutional interpretation from such venerated Americans as Thomas Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln and Martin Luther King.

What scares modern liberals also worries many conservatives. As Judge Thomas declares:

Natural rights and higher law arguments are the best defense of liberty and of limited government. Moreover, without recourse to higher law, we abandon our best defense of judicial review—a judiciary active in defending the Constitution, but judicious in its restraint and moderation.

But conservatives of the Borkian stripe deem natural rights approaches to the Constitution anathema. They are wary of a roving judiciary, unanchored by the text of the Constitution. They rather like majorities, and they wonder about Judge Thomas' "restraint and moderation." To this conservative charge, Judge Thomas

responds directly, "Rather than being a justification for the worst type of judicial activism, higher law is the only alternative to the willfulness of both run-amok majorities and run-amok judges." While conservatives of both the activist and the judicial restraint schools would like to claim Judge Thomas as one of their own, Judge Thomas will not be had. He believes in judicial restraint and moderation, but his is a hybrid strain derived from a different source.

Judge Thomas' version of judicial restraint hails from higher law principles as embodied in the Declaration of Independence and, by implication, the Constitution, rather than from sheer deference to majority will. He is as concerned with run-amok majorities as he is with run-amok judges; he believes that both violate the principle of self-government ("government by consent of the governed"). "The first principles of equality and liberty should inspire our political and constitutional thinking," he has written. But what do these first principles mean? The Declaration states that "All men are created equal." On the meaning of these famous words, Lincoln opined during his speech on the *Dred Scott* decision:

I think the authors of that notable instrument intended to include all men, but they did not intend to declare all men equal in all respects. They did not mean to say all were equal in color, size, intellect, moral developments, or social capacity. They defined with tolerable distinctness, in what respects they did consider all man created equal—equal in "certain inalienable rights, among which are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

From our equality flows our liberty. Because "no man is good enough to govern another" (Lincoln) or "no man is the natural or God-anointed ruler of another" (Thomas), we can do what we will with ourselves and the fruit of our labors, except to the extent that we have consented to be governed according to the Constitution. By higher law Thomas simply means that the principles of equality and liberty hold true regardless. From these first principles come our natural rights. People deserve to be treated in certain ways simply because they are human beings. These rights are inalienable: "neither conferred by nor derived from the state" (M. L. King).

While Judge Thomas' views on con-

stitutional interpretation may be difficult to reconcile with contemporary constitutional practice as exemplified by either left-liberal activism or conservative judicial restraint, it is far from clear that his heterodoxy would be a bad thing. And no matter how "strange" his views may seem to the current orthodoxies, the change that Judge Thomas would bring to the Court would arguably stem from the best within the American political tradition.

Admittedly, constitutional theory is not identical to moral or political philosophy. Nevertheless, legitimate problems remain and must be addressed by a natural rights advocate even in the context of constitutional interpretation.

Any natural rights advocate must confront the issue of giving specific content to our general, inalienable rights. Life, liberty and property sound great in the abstract, but what do they mean in concrete cases? Natural rights theory applied to the Constitution could easily become a double-edged sword. Judge

People have rights; they deserve to be treated in certain ways simply because they are human beings. These rights are inalienable. In Martin Luther King's words, they are "neither conferred by nor derived from the state."


Thomas recognizes this peril when he discusses the Ninth Amendment ("The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people"). He observes:

That [amendment] would seem to be a blank check . . . Let's say the Court did discover a right to welfare. Then one can imagine it requiring Congress to raise taxes to enforce this right . . . maximization of rights is perfectly compatible with total government and regulation. Unbounded by notions of obligation and justice, the desire to protect rights simply plays into the hands of those who advocate a total state.

How does Thomas reconcile his advocacy of natural rights with his lack of enthusiasm for the Ninth Amendment?

//The high-beta think tank of the '90s will be the free-market libertarians at the Cato Institute.//

— Lawrence Kudlow, "Money Politics," March 25, 1990



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The answer appears to involve the issue of defining a specific content for natural rights. His approach involves shifting the burden of proof and the corresponding presumptions in constitutional cases. The point would not be to identify what specific rights we enjoy but rather to recognize that the identification of such specific rights is not necessary because our general, inalienable rights secure for each individual a sphere of personal jurisdiction and control. The burden would be on the government to justify its intrusion into this sphere by pointing to a specific provision in the Constitution. As Judge Thomas comments, "[In] government of limited powers, each use of political power would have to be approved under the Constitution." In this context, Judge Thomas discusses Alexander Hamilton's objection to the Bill of Rights:

[He] maintained that the entire Constitution was itself a bill of rights, which limited government power. To add a series of amendments that would explicitly deny to the national government certain powers over various subjects would imply that those subjects, and perhaps others besides, could be regulated in other, unspecified ways.

It should also be noted that Judge Thomas does not completely scorn the Ninth Amendment:

Once a bill of rights was required for the passage of the Constitution, it would appear that the Ninth and Tenth Amendments meet Hamilton's original objection. If we understand the Ninth Amendment thus, it has a great significance in that it reminds us

that the Constitution is a document of limited government.

Natural rights and the Ninth Amendment serve the same purpose in Judge Thomas' approach to the Constitution. He does not consider either to be a basis for carving specific individual rights out of the edifice of Leviathan. Rather, in his view, natural rights and the Ninth Amendment merely signal that it should be the government which bears the bur-

Natural rights and the Ninth Amendment serve the same purpose in Judge Thomas' approach to the Constitution. He does not consider either to be a basis for carving specific individual rights out of the edifice of Leviathan.

den when it seeks to intrude on our general freedoms.

Any constitutional advocate of limited government like Judge Thomas faces the additional problem of how to define our consent to be governed under the Constitution. A century ago, Lysander Spooner rejected the whole notion of implied consent.* If Spooner is correct, the whole constitutional enterprise is seriously suspect.

Judge Thomas' writings are thin on this point. According to him, "[Government by consent] means by majority rule,

* See *No Treason: The Constitution of No Authority*, 1870.

but not just by any majority rule (emphasis in original)." Offering the words of Thomas Jefferson as an explanation, he quotes, "Though the will of the majority is in all cases to prevail, that will, to be rightful, must be reasonable. Let the minority possess their equal rights which equal law must protect . . . and to violate would be oppression." Jefferson merely says what we already know from his language of inalienable rights, namely, that our consent can only go so far. Ultimately, we want to know how far, but we should not demand more clarity on this from Judge Thomas than we would from anyone else. Though Judge Thomas may be ambiguous on this point, he is not "devilishly ambiguous," as some modern liberal commentators suggest. At least he starts from the rights of individuals, not from the prerogative of the state. (For contemporary "liberals," the problem does not really exist.)

Beyond constitutional interpretation, Judge Thomas' writings resonate with themes familiar to libertarians and classical liberals. While he seems much more persuaded by the moral as opposed to the economic argument for limited government, he is not unaware of the negative consequences of government intervention in the economy. Similarly, as chairman of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, he focused on justice in individual cases rather than broad goals and timetables.

What kind of Supreme Court Justice would this individual make? One can rarely tell ahead of time, but the tea leaves look better than they have in quite awhile. □

Letters, continued from page 6

Blaming the "Victim"

The comments of Robert Higgs on the Gulf War are unworthy of a libertarian publication. Yes, there are good reasons for libertarians to have opposed this war, but it is inexcusable to portray America as morally guilty in the destruction resulting from Iraq's invasion of Kuwait. Iraq committed a clear act of military aggression against Kuwait. America acted to undo it. Whether we should have aided Kuwait is debatable, our morality for having done so is not.

Mr Higgs' views betray someone unable to distinguish between perpetrator

and victim. His displeasure at the fate of "thousands of defenseless Iraqis trapped in an enormous traffic jam on the road from Kuwait City" reads as though they were citizens on a Sunday drive. The pertinent fact is that those "defenseless Iraqis" were armed soldiers, part of a brutal occupying army, and guilty of initiating widespread atrocities. Iraq was given ample opportunity to withdraw from Kuwait—its army and booty intact. That many soldiers died in a war to repel an invasion is unpleasant but hardly unexpected.

Next, in this "Iraq as victim" view of


things, is the fate of the Kurds. When Bush publicly stated his hope for an overthrow of Saddam, everyone understood that he was encouraging a military coup. It was only in hindsight that opponents of the war determined that Bush had promoted the Kurdish uprising and "clearly implied that U.S. forces would assist them." In fact, U.S. objectives were clearly limited to no more than forcing Saddam from Kuwait and ending Iraq's military threat to its neighbors. If "getting" Saddam was "Bush's personal reason for plunging the nation

continued on page 68

Site-seeing

Smashing the Idols of Socialism

by Frank Fox



Warsaw, November 1989. A time of dramatic change and colossal wrecks. . . .

A friend phones to tell me a crowd has gathered at Dzerzhinski Square. I grab my camera and tape recorder and in a few minutes I am there. A crowd of young people has encircled the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinski, the Polish-born founder of Lenin's secret police, *Cheka*. This monument to the man who invented modern state terrorism has been the object of scorn for many years. Students deface the statue at every opportunity, painting the nose and fingers different colors each week. The authorities have had to post a twenty-four hour guard on it.

Some young people are taping hand-painted posters to its base. The signs are painted on architectural drawings; these are students from a nearby art institute. "Keep your hands off Feliks!" one sign says. Another: "Feliks, don't leave us!"

An acrobatic young man climbs to the top of the pedestal, about six feet off the ground, pries off a few of the brass letters, and quickly paints on others. The sign had said, "The Soul of the Polish Revolutionary Movement"; now it says "The Ass of the Polish Revolu-

tionary Movement."

The crowd starts to tear away some of the smaller stones set in place around the entire monument. The militia looks on sheepishly. Some are smiling. As the larger pieces of granite loosen, a chain of volunteers begins to load them on waiting lorries. A young, dark-haired girl places a bunch of flowers at the base of the statue and drapes herself with a black shawl in a mocking show of mourning.

I had read in a Warsaw newspaper that the Mayor was about to make a decision on the removal of the statue of Feliks Dzerzhinski. It explained (though no one believed it) that the removal was made necessary by the construction work on the city's Metro, a project that began in 1939 and remains unfinished.

It is obvious to the authorities that

they cannot move the huge statue away today. A contingent of police surround the statue, and the crowd disperses. The statue will be moved tomorrow.

The next day I arrive early but workers have already begun to remove the statue. A crane is beginning to lift the statue from its pedestal. The huge figure of the terrorist policeman rises above the crowd. It cracks suddenly in several places, scattering the people below. The head falls off, then the torso. The rest of the statue swings wildly above the square. People forget the danger and begin to laugh and to collect pieces of the statue as souvenirs.

Seldom in history have so many bronze, marble, and stone monuments been toppled from their pedestals as in the last two years in the Soviet Union

and its former colonies. The Communist system and its symbols are collapsing—literally and figuratively—before our eyes.

My monument watch began in 1975 in Prague. Friends showed me an empty site where a huge, granite statue of Stalin formerly looked over the Vltava (Moldau) River, competing with the church steeples of that beautiful city. As an apocryphal story had it, someone had tied a knapsack to the statue with an inscription: "Time to go!" During the

Crowds carried a bust of Stalin with a sign around its neck, "Nic Netrwa Vecne" ("Nothing Lasts Forever"); the "Velvet Revolution" was underway.

Prague Spring of 1968, Stalin "went." "Marxism with a Human Face" was crushed when the tanks of the Warsaw Pact countries invaded Czechoslovakia. But no one ever restored the statue. I stood on the spot that Stalin had occupied, its base the size of a football field, while my laughing companions photographed me. It was not until I saw the destruction of the statue of Feliks Dzierzinski in Warsaw fourteen years later that I actually witnessed the demolition of a socialist icon.

Several decades of our troubled century seemed simultaneously present as I travelled through Poland in 1989. I was witnessing the hyperinflation of the 1920s, the growing nationalism (and its junior partner, anti-semitism) of the 1930s, the scars of wartime and the unfinished reconstruction of the 1940s and 1950s, the street theater and student demonstrations of the 1960s and the unmistakable signs of the "me" spirit of the 1980s, all scanned from the vantage points of an emotional rollercoaster, leaving me excited and exhausted.

November 1989 was the month the foundations of the Communist world trembled and some of its most enduring leaders fell. In East Germany, Erich Honecker said that the Berlin Wall would stand for another hundred years. A few days later, the Wall was torn down and Honecker was under arrest.

In Czechoslovakia, police brutally attacked students. A few days later, crowds carried a bust of Stalin with a sign around its neck, "Nic Netrwa Vecne" ("Nothing Lasts Forever") and the "Velvet Revolution" was underway. In a stunning reversal, recently jailed Vaclav Havel became President. Eastern Europe and the Balkans were in ferment.

An anomalous situation developed in Poland, the country whose first independent trade union movement precipitated these changes. General Jaruzelski made peace with opponents while retaining the Presidency and Solidarity was transformed from outlaw to government. I had arrived in Poland as the country prepared to celebrate its traditional Independence Day. The modern Polish state was officially recognized on November 11, 1918—a result of Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points and the work of Josef Pilsudski, the Polish patriot whose anti-Communism made his name anathema to Poland's Communist leaders.

Now, as I walked the streets of Warsaw, his portrait was everywhere. The radio was playing over and over the stirring music of "My Pierwsza Brygada" ("We are the First Brigade"), a march always associated with Pilsudski's legions. But Poland's celebration of its Independence Day, its first in forty-four years, was eclipsed by the momentous events occurring in Berlin, where communism was collapsing even more dramatically. Poles listened to radio and television reports from Berlin, happy that socialism was dying, worried about the unification of Germany.

During this period, Polish newspapers reported increasing attacks on statues of Lenin and Stalin and World War II Russian memorials. At Nowa Huta, the site of a huge steel mill, members of the "Fighting Youth" splashed paint on a huge statue of Lenin and tried to firebomb it. After the militant youths made three attempts to destroy the statue, the authorities decided to dismantle it. The official version was that the statue had been removed for repairs and would, eventually, be placed elsewhere. The Communist Party paper, *Trybuna Ludu* ("The People's Platform"), noted that in the city of Szczecin (pre-war German Stettin) a group calling itself "Fighting Solidarity" had "profaned" a monu-

ment dedicated to the victorious Red Army that had liberated the city in 1945. Another story told of people removing a tablet honoring Lenin and substituting one of Marshal Pilsudski.

In 1990 the contagious statue-bashing reached epidemic proportions. In August, an eighteen-foot bronze statue of Stalin was smashed in the Mongolian capital of Ulan Bator. The destruction of a Lenin statue in the Soviet city of Lvov, a Polish city annexed by the Soviet Union during World War II, continued the demolition of hated images. The monument had been built over a foundation of Jewish and Catholic tombstones. In no time the joyous battering spread to the Republics of Armenia, Moldavia, Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia.

Reaction was not long in coming. Gorbachev's decree of October 13, 1990 called for a halt to the removal of statues of Lenin and suspended decisions of local authorities that allowed it. This stern directive came at a time when a memorial to the Victims of Fascism was damaged in the Ukrainian city of Donetsk.

The decree outlawing the dismantling of Communist statuary didn't stop the use of pneumatic drills, picks, ham-

A young man pries off a few of the brass letters, and quickly paints on others. The sign had said, "The Soul of the Polish Revolutionary Movement"; now it says "The Ass of the Polish Revolutionary Movement."

mers, and bare hands. The iconoclasts added humor to their arsenal. On November 7, the day given to traditional celebrations and parades commemorating the victory of Communism in 1917, Moscovites held aloft such symbols of disdain as a plucked chicken with a funeral wreath draped around its scrawny neck as officials standing atop Lenin's mausoleum could only watch and endure. In Bulgaria, a loyal ally in the good old days, there wasn't even the customary parade. The enormous

red star in Sofia that lit up the sky for miles around had been snatched from its lofty perch by a helicopter in a Felliniesque scene. The ashes of the Bulgarian Communist hero, Georgi Dimitrov, were removed from his mausoleum and furtively interred elsewhere.

As 1990 drew to a close, even Albania—which had suffered in its dialectical straightjacket longest—turned against its socialist heroes. On December 21, 1990, the 111th anniversary of Stalin's birthday, officials decided to remove a large, bronze statue of the tyrant. At midnight a flatbed truck carried away a cloaked figure, its head hanging over the back. As morning came, workmen labored behind a red curtain to chip away at the marble base; when they were finished, only rusty iron rods still protruded from the ground. Radio Tirana announced that

all names and symbols associated with Stalin were being removed. By the end of the month, crews carried away the bust of the former dictator, Enver Hoxha, from the House of Culture. A forty-foot statue of Hoxha was demolished as several hundred demonstrators burned his collected works and pictures.

Destruction of hated symbols is as old as the habit of creating objects of veneration. Iconoclasm, a religious movement that sought the destruction of religious images, has had a long history in the Eastern Roman Empire, an area that strongly influenced early Russian society. The persistence of icon worship, the worship of material symbols of faith while pursuing a spiritual otherworldliness, is a contradiction that touches the deepest human emotions. Yet it is clear that the people living in Eastern Europe draw a distinct line be-

tween their spiritual symbols and the humiliating presence of monuments to misery and misrule.

The rage expressed in the demolition of Communist statues is a measure of the desperation and helplessness felt by a people who were left with no means of exacting justice, unable even to confront their flesh and blood enemies, left instead to gaze mutely on the inanimate and heartless symbols of impersonal rule. The massive Socialist statues reduce history to a fable—except unlike a fable, the story they tell is without remorse, reconciliation, or moral resolution. Perhaps only when the statues of Lenin are broken up, when his mummified remains are disinterred, and the mausoleum from whose lofty perch statue-like figures survey the crowds is finally dismantled, will we see the start of a new Russia. □

Reflections, *continued from page 17*

ing between 5 p.m. and 8 a.m., but it was a one-way street going away from the park. So I circle the block and park in front of the park, thankful that I had arrived after 5 p.m.

Jeannette Rankin Park is a triangle of land, bounded on all sides by one-way streets. There is a sidewalk, with an unexplained 25-foot gap, along the cross street.

The park has seven trees. Its lawn is green and has been mowed within the past week or two, but that's about the best you can say for it. There are two small flowerbeds, with minimal signs of cultivation, and two small picnic tables. Heavy power lines and sodium-vapor lights hiss along the streets.

The memorial to Jeannette Rankin consists of a round pool, approximately 15 feet in diameter. It is made of what appears to be corrugated copper metal bent into a circle, with pebble-imbedded concrete facing out. The sides of the waterless pool stand about knee-high. A sidewalk leads to the pool from the sidestreet, with seven spherical junipers along each side. There is a pedestal with a plaque commemorating Rankin where the walkway meets the pool. It is faced with the same sort of pebble-imbedded concrete as is the pool:

JEANNETTE RANKIN, THE FIRST
WOMAN IN CONGRESS.

JEANNETTE RANKIN, BORN, REARED AND EDUCATED IN MISSOULA, WAS ELECTED TO CONGRESS FROM MONTANA IN 1916 AND 1940.

SHE WAS A PIONEER IN THE CAUSES OF PEACE, WOMEN'S SUFFRAGE, WOMEN'S EQUALITY AND THE RIGHTS OF CHILDREN.

DEDICATED JUNE 11, 1980, ON THE OCCASION OF HER 100TH BIRTHDAY.

The top of the pedestal has been damaged—probably by vandals—and the plaque is now secured by ordinary mor-

tar. Adjacent to the pool is a concrete box containing some kind of filtering or pumping mechanism. The box has been bashed in, revealing its flimsy construction of thin concrete over screen and rebars, faced with pebbles. The pumping mechanism lies broken and useless, its corroded copper pipes attached to nothing.

Two park benches face the pool. There are fourteen evenly spaced evergreens—junipers, I think—surrounding it, and two smaller junipers about it. The walkway to the street is torn up, and barriers of yellow “no admittance” ribbon warn away those who might want to use it.

I have come a great distance to pay my respects to Jeannette Rankin, and as I stand on the triangle of land with cars whizzing by, I wonder: what do I do now? I decide to picnic here as the sun sets in the June Montana sky.

In a half hour I am back with a paper bag containing a half chicken and a mountain of french fries, purchased at the Double Front Chicken Restaurant for \$4.00. I sit at one of the picnic tables and eat my greasy meal. I think about Rankin's life, about her courage, about her feistiness, about her love of peace. Nearly every city has a park or memorial to its war heroes. What other city has honored an anti-war hero, even as shoddily as Missoula has honored Jeannette Rankin?

Among the televised reports of the triumphal return of our heroic conquerors of Iraq, Vietnam war veterans complain that they are not honored in the fashion of veterans of other wars. In the little town where I live, there is a modest memorial to them; in the nation's capital, there is a grandiose memorial to them, erected at a cost of millions of dollars, and visited by millions each year. And two thousand miles away, on a triangle of grass in Missoula, Montana, is a memorial to Jeannette Rankin, erected of cheap materials, vandalized, left in a state of decrepitude, forgotten by all except an occasional eccentric tourist like me. —RWB

Report

Experimenting with Marijuana

by Robert O'Boyle

James O. Mason, chief of the Public Health Service, has signed a new policy directive discouraging the granting of permission to new applicants for marijuana as a medicinal drug. "If it's perceived that the Public Health Service is going around giving marijuana to folks, there would be a perception that this stuff can't be so bad," he said. "It gives a bad signal."

Smoke roiled in the red-plastic bong until I removed my thumb from a hole in its side. I inhaled deeply and leaned back on the couch. It's illegal, expensive and hard to come by. But it worked: A few tokes of marijuana and within 10 minutes my nausea began to recede. A signal for appetite rang aloud in my mind.

In the midst of our nation's drug war, I sat relaxed, hungry and high.

It vanquished nausea and raised appetite like no prescription drug I had tried. Had I discovered a panacea for nausea, an antidote for weight loss and a tranquilizer for fear?

Doctors and researchers have known for years that marijuana—regarded aside from morality and myth—can be effective medicine. And I had read enough literature and gathered enough Personal Tales to figure I should give it a try.

But how could I justify breaking the law? Could I be sure it was safe, especially with my immune system already impaired? It's not an easy topic to broach; the use of marijuana as medicine stands in the crossfire of a worldwide assault on drugs.

The subject wasn't always taboo.

During the late 1970s and early 1980s, the federal government provided marijuana for cancer patients in Washington and across the nation through a research program set up to document the drug's medicinal

benefits.

Today doctors can prescribe the drug Marinol, a type of synthetic marijuana, to combat the nausea and vomiting associated with cancer chemotherapy. But Marinol is not commonly available for people with other serious illnesses who stand to benefit from the drug. And in virtually all cases, marijuana itself is no longer legally available.

For the glaucoma patient, marijuana reduces fluid buildup in the eyes, a condition that can lead to blindness. There are reports the drug eases spasms associated with multiple sclerosis. More widely documented is the drug's effectiveness in reducing the chronic nausea brought on by chemotherapy and radiation treatment for people with cancer.

Could it also help people with AIDS, many of whom live with chronic stomach upset from AZT, currently the only drug treatment approved for the disease?

Roger Roffman, author of a 1982 book on marijuana as medicine, believes marijuana likely does hold potential powers of nausea-reduction for the

AIDS patient:

"It would probably be very helpful, especially where the patient is struggling with nausea and vomiting," said Roffman, an associate professor of social work at the University of Washington.

Results from a recent study at San Francisco General Hospital involving people with AIDS and AIDS-related complex support the assumption: Researchers found the drug Marinol, which contains marijuana's main active ingredient, delta-9-THC, produced weight gain in 10 percent of the patients. Weight loss in another 20 percent of the study's cases slowed with the use of the medication.

The wasting syndrome is one of the devastating aspects of AIDS: The body's immune system, already weakened by the HIV virus, begins to crumble as the patient loses appetite and stops rebuilding reserves.

The effects of both marijuana and Marinol go beyond the reduction of nausea, however. Both drugs enhance

appetite, reduce pain and induce relaxation.

In studies with both drugs, patients report experiencing a "high," a subjective mood change often described as mild euphoria.

But while Marinol is commonly prescribed for cancer patients undergoing chemotherapy, there's little precedent for its use for people with AIDS.

And in the march against drugs, legal access to marijuana has essentially been cut off. The federal government has given a small number of individuals the right to smoke marijuana for health reasons, but its widespread use for cancer patients ground to a halt during the 1980s as the nation began its assault on the recreational use of drugs, and as Marinol became available for medical use.

But while both marijuana and Marinol offer health benefits, some experts believe smoking marijuana is more effective than ingesting the synthetic pill.

Smoking marijuana provides almost immediate relief from nausea, says Roffman, allowing the patient to more easily control the dosage. With Marinol,

absorption of THC in the bloodstream can vary greatly, rendering the drug ineffective one day and over-whelming the next.

Today, several groups, including the Alliance for Cannabis Therapeutics in

It's illegal, expensive and hard to come by. But it worked: a few tokes of marijuana and within 10 minutes my nausea began to recede. A signal for appetite rang aloud in my mind.

Washington, D.C., continue to fight for the right to use marijuana for medical purposes.

Drug laws, meanwhile, have become more restrictive. In Washington state, a 1989 law classifies possession of less than 40 grams (about 1 1/2 ounces) of marijuana as a misdemeanor with penalties of up to \$1,000 in fines and 90 days

in jail.

Reviewing my personal experience and the information I've gathered, I remain uncertain about whether people with AIDS should pursue marijuana as medicine.

The challenge, for doctors and people facing life-threatening illnesses, is to legitimize research on the medical advantages of marijuana. More information is needed on the drug's potential benefits and possible harmful effects, particularly for the AIDS patient.

In the meantime, the medical profession could prescribe broader use of Marinol.

Although little precedent can be found, and the tide of anti-drug sentiment washes against wider use of the drug, there is no law preventing a doctor from prescribing Marinol for people with AIDS. Use of the drug may prove to be an important breakthrough in easing symptoms of AIDS and other long-term and life-threatening illnesses.

With more research, and more compassionate legislation, we may find the same is true for marijuana. □

From Psychedelics To Cyberspace

TIMOTHY LEARY

ROBERT ANTON WILSON

60's psychedelic LSD guru and 90's computer software designer

Author of the *Illuminatus!* trilogy, *Promethous Rising*, and *Cosmic Trigger*

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Exposé

GNP: A Bogus Idea?

by R. W. Bradford

The Gross National Product is cited by economists and news commentators as a means of measuring prosperity, and by government planners as a tool for the economy. But does it make any sense?

I just had the pleasure of watching a delightful documentary entitled "Gross National Product." It was an episode of one of my favorite television programs, "Economics USA," a series produced by Wharton Econometric Forecasting Associates and served up by my local government-owned television station as a "college telecourse."

The concept of GNP, it explained, was developed during the 1930s at the instigation of Sen. Robert LaFollette, who wanted it as a tool for fighting the Great Depression. "The greatest economic crisis in our history is a grave national emergency," Sen. LaFollette pontificated from an old newsreel, "which makes it imperative that we fight the Depression on all fronts. Congress must formulate a sound program to this end." (I wonder: if you were freezing to death, would it be necessary to invent a thermometer to warm yourself up?)

At any rate, Congress charged Simon Kuznets, an economist with the National Bureau of Economic Research, with development of this new measurement. At the time, the program explained, "the lack of information about the economy was, in Kuznets' words, a 'scandal.' The data available were as he put it, 'neither fish, nor flesh, nor even red herring.'"

Kuznets came up with the idea of adding together the sales of all goods and services and calling the total "national income." It is this aggregate that came to be called GNP. In January

1934, Kuznets published his report, showing that national income had fallen by \$40 billion since 1929. The report showed that we were worse off than before, thereby verifying what everyone already knew. Just how Sen. LaFollette and Congress used this to formulate a sound program to fight the Depression on all fronts, the program did not say.

But the program did go on to explain one way in which GNP data were useful: for instituting the central planning needed to win World War II. "Without knowing the size of our real GNP, it would have been virtually impossible to judge how much production was physically possible," Dr Richard Gill explained. "Also, it was a question of how many goods would be left over for civilian consumption. And what taxes the government would have to levy to keep the economy from overheating. So, GNP figures were very useful during the war, as they have in fact been in all of the decades since."

Dr Robert Nathan, who helped administer the economy, explained how GNP helped us defeat the Nazis: "The steel industry, which had great impact,

came around and said, 'You're silly! We were down to 15-20% of our capacity utilization for some years at the depth of the Depression.' And it was a heck of a fight, but I tell you this, I don't think we would ever have won that battle if we hadn't had the GNP weapons to demonstrate what an overall fully employed economy accomplishes."

The narrator went on to explain: "There was another capacity that had to be measured and planned for: civilian needs. Why was it important to know how much could be devoted to the war, without jeopardizing the basic supply of food, clothing, housing and transportation? When FDR led the country into World War II, he depended heavily on the GNP framework to predict the kind of arsenal our democracy could become [sic]. In fact the economy exploded during those four years. Seventeen million new jobs were created, the index of industrial production doubled, and the GNP grew 75 billion dollars." All this was accompanied, in the telecourse, by films of the war, factory scenes, and the like, and interspersed with film clips of Roosevelt and other political leaders.

Now maybe I'm not as smart as the college students who take this course, but I still don't see how GNP helped win the war. Did Dr Nathan really mean that without GNP figures the government would have been unable to coerce or convince steel fabricators to make more steel? I don't remember that in pre-GNP wars manufacturers were immune to government pressure. Did the narrator really mean that without GNP figures we would have spent so much on the war effort that there would have been inadequate food, clothing and housing for civilians? I don't recall people starving naked in the streets in World War I. Did Dr Gill really mean that without GNP taxes would have been so low that the economy would have "overheated"? (Just what does it mean for the economy to "overheat" anyway?) I can't recall our losing any wars because of low taxes. . . .

That is the nearest this "college telecourse" came to explaining how the GNP is used as a tool. It did, however, offer more evidence of its value: Simon Kuznets was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1971 "for giving quantitative precision to economic entities."

The concept of GNP is not perfect, the telecourse went on to say. With the rise of the environmental movement in the 1960s, we learned that GNP doesn't take into account pollution and environmental degradation. The program switched to interviews with politicians about pollution and film of smokestacks.

In the course of a half hour program designed to explain how GNP is useful, the economists at Wharton were able to do no better than offer dubious examples of how it helped us kick Nazi butt and assert over and over again that it is very useful. Okay. Fun is fun, and "college telecourses" broadcast over PBS are always good for a laugh. Nevertheless, the fact remains that when economists or news commentators or just about anybody else talks about how the economy is doing, they almost always talk about the Gross National Product. It is almost impossible to get through the evening news, or to read a serious discussion of the

economy or analysis of recent economic history without hearing or reading about GNP.

One might think that advocates of free markets would avoid using a tool designed for the expansion of government power. But this is not the case. Robert Higgs, for example, in his essay "The Myth of War Prosperity" (March 1991), relied heavily (though not exclusively) on GNP data to support his argument that the Great Depression was actually prolonged by World War II. In a recent interview, Ed Crane, head of the free-market Cato Institute, cited GNP data in his comments on the situation in the Soviet Union.

It is plain that free market thinkers like Higgs and Crane are not using GNP as a tool for government control of the economy. They are using it for the same purpose that Sen. LaFollette legislated its creation: as an indicator of the health of the economy, as a measure of how prosperous people are.

This raises the question: just how well does GNP measure prosperity?

GNP is an aggregate of certain kinds of economic activity: the volume of goods traded for cash to a user (as opposed to a middleman). But all sorts of economic goods are omitted from GNP: those that are produced autistically, those that are "exchanged" within the family but outside the cash nexus, and those that are bartered.

If I wash my car, the only effect on the GNP is the cost of the water and soap that I use. Suppose that I give the neighbor kid \$5 to wash my car. In this case, the GNP is increased by the cost for the water and soap, plus the \$5 I give the neighbor kid. But is the economy really more productive if I give the neighbor kid \$5 than if I wash my own car?

When I get my shirt washed at a laundry for \$1, the GNP is increased by \$1. Suppose I marry my laundress and I no longer pay cash to her for washing my shirt. Is the economy more prosperous in the first case than the second?

I go to my dentist and get a root canal. He charges me \$300, and the GNP is increased by \$300. Then he hires me to paint his house and pays me \$300. Now the GNP is up \$600. Now suppose that instead of paying him cash, I agree to paint his house in

exchange for the root canal. No cash changes hands. The GNP is \$600 less than if we had paid each other cash rather than bartered. Is the economy more prosperous if we pass the \$300 back and forth than if we barter?

This suggests a simple way to increase the GNP. All we need do is get Congress to pass a law mandating that every person in this country wash the nose of exactly one other individual, pay him \$20,000 for doing so, and exempt such nose-washing fees from taxation. The income of each individual in the United States would go up by \$20,000; the GNP would double. But each individual would be left with the

When I get my shirt washed at a laundry for \$1.00, the GNP is increased by \$1.00. Suppose I marry my laundress and I no longer pay cash to her for washing my shirt. Is the economy more prosperous in the first case than the second?

same amount of money as before; each would have done a trivial amount of labor; each would have had a trivial service performed on his behalf. That's all: essentially no effect on the economy or on anyone's well-being.

The GNP is proposed as a measure of our economic prosperity. But would we be any better off in the wake of such a doubling of the GNP?

The problems with GNP have become at least dimly evident even to those enamored with econometric modeling. At the conclusion of the "college telecourse," Dr Richard Gill pretty well conceded that most everything he had said in the program about GNP's value and validity was bogus: "GNP does not measure economic welfare. But it is certainly something worth measuring in its own right." After all this talk about what a useful and powerful measuring tool it is, he admits that it is a measurement only of itself. (Immediately after this rather damaging admission, however, Dr Gill's eyes brighten and he

gushes, "Our hats are off to the scholars who make such measurements possible!")

Shortly after Ed Crane cited various GNP evaluations of the Soviet economy, I put the question directly to him: "How meaningful a concept do you think GNP is?" He replied: "It is a meaningless concept. The GNP number is a non sequitur—it doesn't mean anything" (*Liberty*, November 1990).

So why did Crane cite GNP numbers on the Soviet Union? Why do

The rise of the natural sciences has led to the notion that the methods used in the natural sciences will work in any field of enquiry. For economics to be valid, the theory goes, it too must crunch numbers.

economists still bandy about GNP figures like they mean a great deal?

The answer to this question is two-fold, I think.

First, GNP may not mean anything, but plainly we want it to. Practically everyone who advocates any change in government policy needs a way to verify or disverify the value of the changes he advocates. If you advocate deregulation, you need to prove that deregulation works. By the same token, if you advocate increasing regulation, you want to have a way to prove that increasing regulation works. GNP provides that way: it gives us a number that we can believe, that sums up just how prosperous we are. We can point to it and say, "The GNP is up. Our policies are good."

Indeed, many economists have a tendency to define GNP in such a way that it reflects their own policy preferences. Simon Kuznets, for example, subtracted all sales of illegal goods and services from the GNP, because illegal goods are not really goods at all, but are "bads," and illegal services are really "disservices." This led, presumably, to an increase in GNP in 1934, when the cost of alcoholic beverages was transformed from a debit to an asset with the repeal of Prohibition.

Similarly, Murray Rothbard proposed replacing GNP with Net Private Product, which he defines as aggregate spending minus government spending, on grounds that government spending is a "depredation."

Second, the rise of the natural sciences during the past few centuries has led to the notion that the methods used in the natural sciences will work in any field of enquiry, and the notion that any field of endeavor that fails to model itself on the natural sciences is not really valid. The natural sciences are all about measurement, accumulation of data, and interpretation of data. For economics to be valid, the theory goes, it too must crunch numbers.

There is another reason, I think. GNP is not totally bogus. It doesn't measure prosperity, it isn't the magic key that enables the government to control the economy in an optimal fashion, and it isn't a perfect way to measure the effect of policy changes.

But it is a raw indication of economic activity in the monetary sphere. As such, it is a very rough indicator of economic prosperity. The fact that the aggregate cash income rises or falls from one year to the next correlates fairly well with our own observations, just as Sen. LaFollette learned when Simon Kuznets' figures suggested that the Depression the nation suffered from was real. Year-to-year comparisons of GNP figures provide rough estimates of changes in economic prosperity.

But comparisons of GNP from one culture to another or from one generation to another are misleading and just plain silly. When we read that the per capita GNP of Bangladesh is \$130 and that of the United States is \$16,320, that does not mean that the average American is 125 times better off than the average Bangladeshi. If we consumed 1/125th as much food, clothing and shelter as we do now, we would starve and freeze to death. The difference between our GNP and theirs is not accounted for wholly by differences in material well-being: it is mostly attributable to differences in our economies. A greater portion of what a person eats, wears and lives in is produced outside the cash economy in Bangladesh than in our economy.

The same is true of comparisons from one generation to another. Per

capita GNP has increased 20-fold in the U.S. during the past century. But that doesn't mean that we are 20 times better off than our ancestors. Much of the increase is the result of our purchasing goods and services that we formerly produced for our own consumption or produced within our families.

This process continues today. In the past generation, the number of meals eaten in restaurants has increased markedly, as have supermarket sales of semi-prepared and fully-prepared foods. This change has increased the GNP. But the deep-fried "apple pie" we eat at MacDonald's is no substitute for Grandma's apple pie.

It is precisely because changes of this sort take place over periods of years that year to year GNP comparisons have some validity, while decade-to-decade comparisons have hardly any.

The Gross National Product is not a magic bullet that cures economic depressions or a breakthrough concept that enables us to understand how an economy functions. It is simply another economic index, and like most such in-

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dexes, it has extremely limited validity. I suspect it is about as valuable a tool as the Conference Board's Consumer Confidence Index. A rising GNP suggests a prosperous economy, a falling GNP an unprosperous one.

Simon Kuznets criticized economic data before his invention of GNP as "neither fish, nor flesh, nor even red herring." So far as I know, he never explained into which category GNP falls. I think we can answer that question: the GNP is a red herring, a slippery concept that often misleads or confuses. It is plain that such limited validity as it possesses as an economic indicator is inverse to the cultural or temporal distance of the economies compared. □

Adventure

Buying Gasoline in Ethiopia

by Robert Miller

Braving a river rapids is one thing. Braving a Third World dictatorship, alien infections, and killer hippos is something else, as Robert Miller discovered when he led an expedition down the Omo River in Ethiopia.

Buying gasoline is usually a simple task. We might ponder the causes, effects and solutions to the world's energy problems. But on a day to day basis we generally figure that we can buy gasoline pretty much at will.

Not long ago, I was nearly defeated in an attempt to buy 20 gallons of regular in Addis Ababa. I was there to complete the plans for a river trip intended to be an adventure for the participants and a source of profits for the organizers. As a condition for our river trip, one branch of the government wanted us to supply another branch of the government with gasoline that only a third branch of government produced and sold. Fair enough. I put my gasoline-buying algorithm in gear. Step one was finding a gas station. I rose early, ate a breakfast of raw hamburger with chilies and a cup of thick coffee. At the door of the hotel I turned right and headed north up the street. Intuitively, I reckoned I'd encounter a gas station within 20 minutes. I passed government buildings, the Hilton, the Cuban and East German compounds. I took mental notes of the streets (most unnamed; none straight; few in a grid pattern). I wandered into a residential slum area. I got lost. I decided to call a taxi, return to the hotel and start over. Addis Ababa has no public phones; I knew no Amharic except for "good morning." If only I could get directions to a public landmark I could start over.

The Imperial Palace of the deposed

Haile Selassie seemed like a good bet, so I accosted a passerby with "tenayistling" and with my best "I'm lost" body language queried, "Haile Selassie?" The poor woman's face turned white with cornea and teeth. I may as well have asked for Yasser Arafat at a B'nai B'rith conference. News travels fast in the slums of Addis. A policeman soon approached, asked for my papers, and with barely intelligible English escorted me back to my hotel.

This time I turned left and headed South down the street. I encountered a commercial district. Lots of shops, kiosks, schools, safes and bookshops. I couldn't help myself. I had to sample the delights of a "people's" bookstore. Did you know that the collected works of Joseph Stalin take up 20 volumes and that Bulgarian farm collectives publish a monthly journal in English? But I was no closer to finding a gas station although I had acquired an Amharic/English dictionary that I thought might help.

Ethiopia is predominantly Christian, and I began to feel quite nervous as I discovered I was in the midst of the Moslem quarter, outside the gates

of the Addis mosque. No gasoline here—just cold penetrating stares. Being of Cuban extraction, I tried exuding an air of Cubanness to cover my aura of lost gringo tourist. It was a subtle distinction lost on the average Ethiopian, but it made me feel better.

I wandered into the largest open air market on the continent. Flies buzzed a welcome. Perhaps jerry cans were available here. I kept an eye out for a pots, pans and containers vendor. I should have watched my step. Rivulets of sewage flowed over the ground in complex dendritic patterns under and around beggars, drunks and amputees. Distracted, I walked into the breasts of an Aunt Jemima look-alike. Time to retreat, I had the will to continue but my nose's endurance faltered at the raw, over-aged meat stalls.

What had gone wrong? Surely, a determined random walk in one of Africa's largest cities ought to produce a gasoline station. Several warm beers later at the hotel bar I made a tactical re-evaluation. I'd entrust my fate to a taxi. Addis Ababa has no mass transit—no buses, no trains, no rental cars, no rickshaws, few bicycles or mopeds.

No taxis as we know them. But they do have collective taxis, all painted blue and white, most of them Morris Miniminors. If you want a ride, stand on a main street, wave frantically, and one may stop. Tell the driver where you're going and if he's going near there, you've got a ride. If not, repeat the procedure. I tried my hand at it. A tiny Peugeot with six people pulled over. The driver looked at me searchingly. My Amharic failed me. I lost that ride.

I hopped into the next taxi without asking about the destination or negotiating a fare. The driver beamed with pride at his foreign passenger. After several other passengers had been

Wilderness adventures and socialism are incompatible. The wilderness is freedom and self-reliance; socialism is regimented and paternal.

dropped off and new ones picked up I worked my way up to shotgun and made him understand where I wanted to go. He drove right up to a gas station with a long queue of taxis. I beamed with success—prematurely. The station had no containers. None. Of any kind. Anywhere.

◆

I never did want to go to Ethiopia. As a Cuban refugee and certified capitalist, a river trip in communist Ethiopia wasn't my idea of a good time. Wilderness adventures and socialism are incompatible. The wilderness is freedom and self-reliance; Marxism is regimented and paternal. But I like a challenge, and I love adventure. And Roy Smith offered me 40 percent of the take. I couldn't refuse. His job was to sign up ten paying customers; mine, to do everything else. Fair enough.

Roy comes from a venerable British explorer tradition with a target fixation on Africa. Since the reign of Queen Victoria, the African bush has drawn these men like stray dogs to a landfill. Roy had left his mark during the Mau Mau uprising of '52, the Suez crisis of '56 and had various first ascents on

peaks in East Africa. Together we had led mountaineering excursions in Kenya and Tanzania. Now the Omo river beckoned.

The Omo has its source in the mountainous plateau just south of Addis Ababa. Flowing south for 500 miles (and down 9,000 feet) it enters Lake Rudolph on the Kenya border. It never reaches the sea. Only one road crosses the upper gorges. The middle reaches are virtually inaccessible and not fully under the control of the revolutionary government. There are no maps. A California outfitter, Sobek, had pioneered Omo river trips during the reign of Haile Selassie. We contracted to hire their rafts. I was to precede our expedition by a few weeks and organize food, equipment, permits, transportation and logistics. My contact in Addis was the National Tourist Office.

Before leaving Arizona I sought out one of Sobek's boatmen who, luckily, made his home in the nearby town of Jerome. Star—my cynicism blossoms when confronted by individuals who effect a single name—agreed to meet me at a roadside vegetable stand.

"Take plenty of food" he cautioned. Star had a disconcerting way of answering in vague, Sixties freak-speak banalities. Everything was either heavy, far out or cosmic. But he did focus concretely on food.

"We lost all the oranges in the first rapid" he declared. Sobek, catering to a young, health-conscious clientele, tried to provide a diet of fresh produce and meats. To accommodate this culinary philosophy required extraordinary effort. Rafts were stacked with boxes of fruits and vegetables. Giant ice chests were constructed of imported plywood and styrofoam and stocked with ice from the Addis Hilton to keep slabs of meat from putrefying in the humid heat. Midway down the river a planned four-wheel drive resupply of provisions, including more ice and meat, sometimes made contact as scheduled, sometimes not, depending on the vagaries of weather, bureaucracy, rapids, hippos or any number of unpredictable contingencies, but always at great expense and trouble. Star had gone hungry or dined on rotting fare and the experience had never left him. I decided on a regimen of dried and

canned goods with no resupply.

Ethiopia has few parallels. Coffee and honey were first domesticated there. Recent archaeological discoveries confirm it as the cradle of mankind. The Ethiopians have always rallied to repel foreign invaders from the medieval hordes of Islam to the Victorian English. Aside from a short and brutal foray by Mussolini in the 1930s, Ethiopia has never been colonized. But its isolation and sovereignty have nurtured pride and equanimity of character along with a variety of *sui generis* religious beliefs. Besides animistic traditions, it is home to an ancient sect of Judaism born of the very first stages of the Diaspora. Most Ethiopians are members of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, itself a branch of the Coptic Church, one of many pre-reformation Christian traditions that do not recognize the suzerainty of Rome. The Ethiopian Church is an amalgam of Jewish and early Christian practices.

About the time of the Italian invasion, a revivalist sect called Rastafarians made their appearance in Jamaica. These people worshipped Haile Selassie under his pre-coronation name (Ras: prince, Tefari Makonnen) as the son of God, the true Messiah. The cult eschews white dominance, pork and second-hand clothing. They are noted for their dreadlocks, long dishevelled peppercorn curls, and use of cannabis.

Ethiopian cuisine revolves around raw meat, sourdough pancakes made with tef, an indigenous grain, chilies and mead. Pasta dishes, introduced during the Italian occupation, remain popular. Before the Revolution, the imperial family and nobility owned all the land. Peasants belonged to the land. Now everything belonged to the Dergue, or Central Committee, chaired by Mengistu Haile Mariam (Mengistu, might of Mary).

But back to the gasoline. We were due to terminate our trip at the newly established Mui National Park and Game Preserve. The park has no road access, no accommodations, no campsgrounds and no game save for scattered Cape buffalo and a few zebra. The animals are poached by marauding Sudanese and local bandit bands. The park has three rangers, one thatched hut, a wind sock and an ine-

briated observation tower made out of sinuous though stiff vines, the function of which, the ranger assured us, was to "watch for enemies of the people." Several years earlier, the park had been endowed with a massive six-wheel drive Volvo flatbed truck. We were hoping to employ this vehicle to transport us the 30 miles between the Mui/Omo river junction and the wind sock where an Ethiopian Air Lines DC-3 might pick us up. The availability of the Volvo was contingent on our supplying gasoline and a mechanic.

I was able to obtain four heavy-duty plastic jerry cans from a government hardware store after securing the necessary permits (the permit ensured I had a valid need and wasn't just indulging in impulse buying). I went back to the gas station. No sale. Frustrated, I went to the National Tourist Office. They informed me, after the requisite wait and red tape, that I needed a permit and a ration card to buy gasoline. Fine; would they supply me with these? No, they would like to comply with my request, but it was not within their jurisdiction. Where could I get the necessary pa-

Being of Cuban extraction, I tried exuding an air of Cubanness to cover my aura of lost gringo tourist. It was a subtle distinction lost on the average Ethiopian, but it made me feel better.

pers? At the Ministry of Transit. I went to the Ministry of Transit. I waited in socialism's ubiquitous queue. Sorry, the Ministry did not issue gasoline ration cards to foreigners unless they possessed a Certificate of Necessity issued by the Ministry sponsoring their visit. I got angry and ran back to the N.T.O. If they knew I needed a Certificate of Necessity, why did they send me chasing paper all over Addis? They apologized. They issued me a Certificate of Necessity and even called up the Ministry of Transit to obviate my need to stand in line. With my three documents in hand, I decided to call it a day and retired to eat

and drink too much at a Syrian restaurant.

John Harrington's 1596 contribution to civilization is a perfect example of form following function. It is ideally suited for the purgative functions of both sexes, though very young children sometimes fall in. Whether by design or happenstance, the rejected contents of a sick stomach seldom miss the bowl. A sober vomitee can bend over the mug and steady himself on the tank. A drunk can settle down on the floor, relax and hug the commode. But there was no position I could take when amoebic dysentery attacked my gut. Every orifice in my body had to disgorge something, and if one went, they all would go. I needed a bathtub with a four inch drain.

After a night of Ethiopian toilet hugging I showed up at my favorite gas station with my four jerry cans, Certificate of Necessity, Purchase Permit, Gasoline Ration Card and cash. Again, no sale. The permit was dated yesterday and was good only on the day of issue at the gas station specified on the back; this station being for taxis only. Back to the N.T.O. for a translator and the Ministry of Transit for a new permit. Three days after beginning my quest, I stood satisfied but helpless on an Addis curb with 20 gallons of regular.

Conrad had been teaching mathematics at the University of Addis Ababa since before the revolution. He spoke Amharic well, a language related to Hebrew, and coordinated Sobek's Omo trips in Addis. Our contract with Sobek, besides the basic raft rental included our use of Conrad as a liaison and general information factotum. Lacking maps—except a trusty Michelin road map to N.E. Africa—Conrad would supply us with a written description and log of major rapids and tributaries along our 350–450 mile descent. But Conrad was suspicious and guarded his turf like a building inspector scrutinizing an owner-built home. Ethiopia had allowed me in as a tourist leading a group of tourists with dollars to spend. I could not engage in any business other than as a retail consumer. Though I bristled at the restrictions, we fulfilled the letter of the law by contracting with Sobek in the USA and signing on our passengers in

Colorado. Still, the transfer of equipment and consummation of the trip would take place in Ethiopia.

For purposes of dealing with the government, Roy and I saw ourselves as Sobek sub-contractors. Not so Conrad. He would have no part of it. To him we were potential competition, or at worst, unlawful commercial adventurers that might imperil Sobek's de facto monopoly. I begged; I cajoled; I tried to reason, all to no use. My dad used to say that if you ignored a prob-

Winston Churchill, in the midst of the Battle of Britain, sought relaxation in the tedium of bricklaying. I spent the rest of the day sequestered in my hotel room measuring food portions into zip-lock bags. I hope Churchill found bricklaying as relaxing as I found this prosaic activity.

lem long enough it would go away. I decided to follow his advice.

But the gasoline was still a problem. No taxi would convey 20 gallons of gas as this was against the law. I had to hire a lorry. Lorries could be hired between 5 and 7 a.m. at the southern edge of Addis. My hotel was on the northern extremity. I needed a good run, so I rose early and jogged to the industrial area, found a 2-ton Benz flatbed with an eager conductor and was soon on my way. We stored the gas at the N.T.O. since my hotel would have nothing to do with it—against regulations.

Hotels in Ethiopia are either for locals or foreigners. My hotel, the Tourist, was the cheapest of its class. In keeping with the new regime's political proclivities, each floor had one communal toilet and shower facility. My room was 2 by 3 meters and was finished in a bare rose stucco, with a single light bulb dangling from a ten foot ceiling. For atmosphere the management piped in the capital's all-news radio station: items on the latest milk production figures in Romania and the progress of Tanzania's rural self-education brigades. Hot water was sometimes avail-

able between 11 a.m. and 2 p.m., electricity only in the evenings. The clientele was mostly vacationing Djiboutians.

I needed a rest from bureaucrats and rules. At heart I'm an anarchist. It runs in the family. My brother was drafted for the Korean War and discharged for being temperamentally unsuited to taking orders. I have always been self-employed. My home has no electricity or phone. I have my own well. No street address, just a sectional description.

To avoid the bureaucrats for a day I concentrated on provisions. I went shopping. Twelve people for 21-28

In addition to miles of whitewater, the Omo offered movable gauntlets of hippopotamuses. Unlike most animals who scatter when startled, hippos plunge to the center of the stream. Never mind that our rafts were usually there.

days. No ice, no fresh food. All canned and dried. Addis has no Safeway, and the open air market looked like a dangerous way. I made the rounds of the neighborhood grocers. Once they had been thriving, cutthroat concerns run by East Indian or local entrepreneurs. Now they were franchises of the Dergue with identical stock and prices managed by bored and surly attendants. I bought dried lentils, black beans and rice, coffee and English tea, canned Russian mackerel (with scales and bones) and tinned ground pork

parts, Eritrean wine and Italian spaghetti, dabo-kolo (a deep-fried, potato chip-like snack), berbere (a spicy gravy base) and Ethiopian peanut butter; and, of course, Cuban sugar. Winston Churchill, in the midst of the Battle of Britain, sought relaxation in the tedium of bricklaying. I spent the rest of the day sequestered in my hotel room measuring food portions into zip-lock bags. I hope he found bricklaying as relaxing as I found this prosaic activity.

Money is freedom. So Ethiopia has strict currency control laws. Every dollar brought into the country, every dollar exchanged into Birr (\$1 = 2 Birr), every Birr spent must be declared, receipted and tabulated on a currency control ledger. Roy and I are honest men, but we ran afoul of the system. Intimidated by the Uzi-toting red guard at the customs desk, Roy underdeclared his bankroll by 50 percent. Ethiopia has a very simple formula for tourists: you can take out as much foreign currency as you bring in minus \$50 per day, every day, whether you spend it or not. Birr cannot be exported, and they can only be exchanged for foreign currency within these regulations. Roy had got himself into a muddle. But even before he arrived, we had our first financial crisis.

One week before embarkation the N.T.O. raised their fees by 300 percent. Visa, Mastercard and Karl Malden couldn't have helped. I had to call Roy and have him bring more money. At the Ministry of Communications I was able to snare an international phone line after a two-hour wait. Roy answered the phone out of a deep sleep. When it comes to money, Roy is parsimonious to a fault—he's from Lancashire. Instinct took over and all he could say was "NO." So I said I'd

cancel the trip and come home. This woke him up. Would I lend him some money? "No." (He must not be fully awake yet.) So I spelled it out for him: You must raise the fee we are charging each customer by a commensurate amount. Since he and the crew were flying separately, the additional funds would be given us in Addis. This solved the N.T.O. problem but left us holding lots more dollars than we had entered Ethiopia with. It's the only time in my life too much money has posed a problem. Currency violations could be a capital offense.

Travel within Ethiopia is strictly proscribed without permits. My most important chore was to ensure that all the requisite travel permits were issued and in order for every member of our group. For this we paid the N.T.O. over \$1,000. Yet each day, like a baroque courtship ritual, I would have to oil the gears of officialdom. "The permit applications are being processed, Mr Robert" (in Ethiopia the family name comes first). Sobek cancelled many a trip for want of permits.

It was on one of these daily trips that I met our tour guide, Efreem. All tourists must be accompanied by an N.T.O. guide. Efreem was 24 years old and hosted a tape worm. This assignment was punishment for a bookkeeping infraction on a previous excursion with East German big-game hunters. He spoke English well but none of the languages we expected to encounter along the banks of the Omo. For \$2,000 we were getting two parasites in one. Our safari guide could neither swim nor cook nor handle a gun. But he was a natty dresser, with pointed leather shoes, sleeveless cardigan and stylish afro.



The day Roy and the rafters flew in, I cancelled the expedition. The Ministry of Parks and the N.T.O. were feuding. The six-wheel drive Volvo, according to the latest memorandum, would henceforth only be used for game management and not for tourist transportation. With nothing to lose, Roy and I stormed into the minister's office and demanded our money back. We played good cop/bad cop: I ranted and raved; Roy begged and bribed. We were lec-



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tured on business ethics and our organizational acumen was impugned. We threatened bad publicity. Finally the minister at N.T.O. phoned the minister at Parks; we got the Volvo.

The day we left for Gibe bridge over the Omo gorge I celebrated by getting drunk and belligerent on Eritrean wine in defiance of the rules for riding in a bus.

At least six separate rebellions hound the Dergue. In the north, Eritrea, an Italian colony until 1952, is trying to strike out on its own. In the Ogaden, ethnic Somalis want to join Somalia. Somalia periodically lends them a hand. Between Eritrea and Somalia, the Tigre People's Liberation Front and the Oromo Liberation Front hold sway. On the west, Sudan gives sanctuary to Ethiopian rebels and poachers, and Addis Ababa retaliates by supporting Sudanese guerrillas. Nationwide, a nascent anti-Marxist resistance is showing birth pangs. At the Gibe crossing, a detail of Baby Thompsons guarding the WWII truss bridge met our seditious little group of tourists. Efreem rescued our cameras from confiscation. We set to work ferrying our gear down the embankment

The Bodi couldn't tell whether we were male or female. I assume our hair, clothing and white skin confused them. So they felt for our genitals. Their innocent arrogance was so disarming we took no offense.

and kitting up our boats. I personally carried the gasoline.

There are three cardinal rules in the sport of river running: always wear a life jacket; tie everything securely to your craft; and never float what you can't see. John Wesley Powell, on his first descent of the Colorado River, had an oak desk chair strapped to the high deck of a dory as a makeshift crow's nest. Sometimes only stopping and climbing the banks will reveal the severity of a drop. Most rapids are caused by the damming of the current

either from accumulated debris or resistant strata.

In addition to miles of whitewater, the Omo offered movable gauntlets of hippopotamuses. One day we counted 300. Unlike most animals who scatter when startled, hippos plunge to the center of the stream. Never mind that our rafts were usually there. Suckling mothers and bulls in rut know no fear. One surfacing hippo heaved a fully loaded raft five feet in the air knocking Efreem into the drink and precipitating a rush of would-be humanitarians into the water after the non-swimmer. Another overprotective cow charged my raft with a five foot jaw spread. With her canines less than a foot from the air chamber she fainted and dove. We had to change our non-violent tactics. One hundred pounds of shot-put size cobbles and aggressive shouts and postures effectively cleared our way. During the night these overgrown pigs graze on the hillsides. Their trails to and from the river are like eight-foot ball chutes in a giant bowling alley. While the hippos monopolized the sandy, sylvan beaches, we camped on rocky, sloping promontories.

Sex will kill us if it doesn't save us. Living organisms procreate and spread without regard for consequences. In North America we annihilated our aboriginal population and repopulated a continent from scratch. In this part of the world, wall-to-wall people are the rule. Yet for 200 miles down the upper Omo we saw not a soul. As romantic adventurers we revelled in the absolute wilderness; as a skeptic, I wondered: Where are the people?

I have never been able to pronounce tse-tse fly, but I certainly felt its sting. About the size and color of a deer fly, the bite is slightly milder than a hornet's and the itch of the welt is comparable to a black gnat's. The insidious effects are not apparent immediately: sleeping sickness and elephantiasis. No shorts or bare backs on our rafts.

Cooling off with river water was no antidote for the heat and humidity. If the crocs didn't snare you, the schistosomes would. Entering through the pores, the parasite lodges in the nearest available organ, lays its eggs and, years hence, brings about its host's demise. Often there are no initial symptoms.

And crocodiles, unlike alligators which are shy and retiring, stalk human prey. I was beginning to understand why the upper Omo was unpopulated.

Camp routine included all-night watches in two-hour intervals. As we boiled the next day's water supply, we'd watch the parade of curious eyes at the perimeter of light. High, large and far apart eyes precipitated frenzied

"Saalam, doctor, saalam!" yelled the Mursi hunter with a penis that hung to his knees and grapefruit-size testicles. It was the only European word he knew. Both our doctors just shook their heads. We had no way to treat elephantiasis.

spurts of fire feeding. It was a good time to read, write or reflect.

Two weeks down the river a Bodi hunting party waved us over—eight tall, handsome Nilotes armed with WWI Italian carbines and a gourd, no clothes or hair. As we approached shore, Anita, our Swedish doctor, warned us against disembarking barefooted. River blindness, transmitted by a beach-borne parasite that travels up the sole of the foot, was endemic to the area.

The Bodi couldn't tell whether we were male or female. I assume our hair, clothing and white skin confused them. So they felt for our genitals. Their innocent arrogance was so disarming we took no offense. One woman was flattered when she was invited to a tryst in the bushes. Another, a recent divorcee, was disheartened no Bodi hands touched her crotch. But most of the stroking they saved for our rafts, so we obliged them with a ride down to their village. We traded razor blades, fish-hooks and empty tin cans for eggs and jerked hippo meat. They knew money had value, though they could not differentiate between denominations and preferred coin to paper.

Sobek, in the interest of preserving the native cultures, had developed a set of guidelines for trading. Anything the river peoples had was fair game. But in

return, trip participants could only offer items already in use by them: fishing line, salt, razor blades and such. No Sierra Club T-shirts, Swiss Army knives or pressure cookers. I can't patronize another human being; we offered anything we could spare.

Navigation on the river was "by ghesse and by God." Our Michelin road map for N.E. Africa supplied the broad strokes. Sobek had compiled a pilot describing major tributaries and

Cooling off with river water was no antidote for the heat and humidity. If the crocs didn't snare you, the schistosomes would.

landmarks with running time between them at low, medium and high water levels. Interpreting their descriptions and differentiating between rapids and tributaries required lots of Zen guesswork and accurate timing. After calibrating our progress, we settled on eight-hour days full on the oars. One rapid, Gypsy's Bane, consumed half a day of portage and lining.

"Saalam, doctor, saalam!" yelled the Mursi hunter with a penis that hung to his knees and grapefruit-size testicles. It was the only European word he knew. Both our doctors just shook their heads. We had no way to treat elephantiasis. Anita put on her best bedside manner and gave him two aspirin.

We were lucky to have two doctors on board. Anita, our expert on tropical diseases, suffered a miscarriage halfway through the trip. Dr Dean, the GP from Texas, was knocked unconscious while cleaning an electric fish we mistook for a common catfish. It was their surgical skills that really saved us: a maverick snag disembowelled Roy's raft; it needed over 100 stitches to become river worthy again. All for naught. A few days later a hungry croc administered the coup-de-grace to the left front chamber of his Avon Pro so we loaded up everything on my boat for the run out. That crocodile swallowed all our profit.

Mursi country presaged the end of the trip. The river broadened as it en-

tered the edge of the Sahara, and we encountered no more rapids. Along the banks the tropical forest was thick, but inland the country resembled central Arizona. The Mursi differed from the Bodi in the females' use of labrets, some a full 6 inches in diameter. Cattle marked the edge of tse-tse fly territory. Log dugouts with live chickens would periodically glide out to trade.

At first we felt confident we wouldn't miss our take-out—"a small tributary on the right preceded by a right bend just past a left bend marked by a prominent pink cliff with a white streak and a Mursi village on the opposite bank." As we neared the Mui tributary, doubts beset us. For one, Mursi villages are seasonal and their location is changed periodically in search of agriculturally productive land. The "pink cliff" was a band of loosely consolidated conglomerate strata overlaying the entire region and exposed at every bend. The "white streak," that I originally pictured in my mind's eye as a water stain, turned out to be a caleche lens—every cliff had at least one.

Somehow we found the right spot.

Logistics at the Mui Game Reserve went as planned. The six-wheel drive Volvo was operational and met us on schedule. I personally fed it the 20 gallons of gasoline we had nursed down the river. Our DC-3 was only two days late, inducing a massive depression among our crew. We hoisted the wind sock and chased the buffalo off the landing field. It was all we could do.

"It's a staph infection," announced Anita prescribing an antibiotic ointment. I was skeptical. My testicles had never been so swollen, raw and painful. I pictured in my mind the Mursi hunter with elephantiasis. Dr Dean declared it looked like herpes and prescribed fresh air (no ointments). I knew it wasn't herpes. The tropics sure breed some strange critters. Our raft decks sprouted large mushroom colonies out of the layers of the plywood. Afterward Conrad told me a Blister Bug had bitten me. I'd be back to normal in a week.

Back in Addis the real hardships began. My visa had expired while on the river, and Roy and I had to devise a way to smuggle \$4,000 out of the country. The visa extension was easy—Efrem accompanied me to the

Department of Immigration and explained why I had been unable to renew on time.

The \$4,000 took more imagination. Part of it was in Birr. We could legally convert some to dollars at the National Bank, so we did. And we got every member of our group to help out. The rest of the Birr we traded to our crew so they could buy last minute mementos. We then converted the remainder into \$100 bills thereby consolidating the loot. We paced and brainstormed for half a day in the hotel room. I love my life. I categorically refused to smuggle any money out. The consequences were just too dire. But Roy and cash are hard to part, and he had experience smuggling guns in Africa.

I suggested making a neat incision along the edge of one of our sleeping pads, placing the money inside, and gluing it together again. Too much work thought Roy. Instead he removed the arch support from the Nikes he'd worn daily on the river and glued the sole pad over the wad of bills. Then he placed the rancid shoes in a stuff sack with his dirty river clothes and stuffed the lot in his duffel bag. He was lucky he opted not to wear them.

At the airport, I didn't even enter by the same door as Roy. Wherever he went, I went the other way. The first hurdle was baggage check. Two armed guards ransacked our luggage for contraband. Roy was three booths away, nonchalant as he could be. The guards pulled out his dirty clothes bag, opened it, pulled out his shoes, took one cursory glance at them and told him he could repack his belongings. But I still didn't relax.

Just before boarding the plane we had to pass currency control. We lined up. The white telephone booth-size cubicles had a quick-draw curtain for privacy. Each departing passenger was subject to a strip search and a full accounting on his currency control ledger. One well dressed East Indian was escorted at gunpoint out of the booth and back into the airport. He was all eyes, sweat and terror, punctuated by the humiliation of unshod feet. The guard carried his shoes in his hands.

When the plane took off and finally entered Sudanese airspace our relief

continued on page 38

Analysis

Smarter Weapons, Harder Fights

by Bart Kosko

"Military intelligence," the old joke runs, is a contradiction in terms. But "intelligent weapons" are a whole different story.

Smarter weapons will complicate warfare in the future. The chess pieces will have eyes and minds of their own; both sides will put silicon brains in their boxes. Smaller countries with higher machine IQs may balance, or even overpower, larger countries with larger weapon stockpiles and more uniformed brawn.

Today's Patriot missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles have limited machine intelligence: small on-board computers house tightly written computer programs. These software programs carry out sophisticated mathematical instructions to estimate their own and enemy positions, match digital TV scenes to scenes stored in missile memory, and adaptively control and guide the missile to its target.

The machine IQs of weapons will rise dramatically in the next decade as computers and sensors shrink and replace hardwired instructions, more communications go wireless, and the new neural-network and fuzzy-logic species of machine intelligence move from the laboratory and commercial marketplace to Pentagon shopping lists.

Today in Japan, engineers race to endow laptop computers with super-computer abilities by inserting flash memory chips and RZSC (reduced instruction set) processors, devices destined for nose cones and missile tips. The spread-spectrum cellular phone systems, under test in Los Angeles

and San Diego, ensure privacy by preventing "enemy" jamming and interception. Future swarms of cruise missiles and ICBMs will likely use spread spectrum to communicate with one another in flight. The communicating swarms will share incoming sensor data and command instructions, reassign targets, and reallocate surviving missiles—reallocate themselves.

The U.S. government has developed spread-spectrum technology for half a century at taxpayer expense. Until recently, the government has usually demanded that workers in the field hold a security clearance. The first patent for frequency-hopping spread spectrum communications was filed in 1941 by actress Hedy Lamarr, of Samson and Delilah fame. She sought to thwart the Nazi attempt to increase the moron-level machine IQ of torpedoes and teamed up with an acoustics expert to do it. Researchers have since developed spread-spectrum systems for electronic warfare in fighter aircraft.

Yet this technology holds the most

promise for the individual. Spread spectrum represents one of the few computer-age technologies that works at every level to increase privacy and decrease external interference. Rather than compress more information through a tiny frequency window or bandwidth, spread spectrum spreads out signals across large stretches of the frequency range, which extends from zero frequency at the bottom to light frequencies at the top. A spread signal looks like low-intensity white noise across any given band of frequencies. You cannot intercept the signal unless you can "derandomize" the white noise. You cannot jam the signal or interfere with it unless you jam most or all of the frequency range, and that can bankrupt even governments. But you can overlay multiple spread signals to achieve genuine multiplexing and to help alleviate the new crisis in modern communications—limited and overcrowded frequency bandwidth.

Look for smart weapons that communicate with spread spectrum within the decade. The U.S. Army has already funded a massive effort to de-

velop handheld spread-spectrum radios for infantrymen. Sometime in the next century spread spectrum should help make "wireless" buildings, cars, and individuals.

Fuzzy logic is not a fantasy. It's already in use. In the past year the Japanese have used fuzzy-logic computer systems to run subways intelligently, to focus camcorders and TVs, to schedule traffic and elevators, to control microwave ovens and car transmissions, to guide washing machines and vacuum cleaners and robot arms—even to arrange flowers. In June, Japan's Ministry for International Trade and Industry estimated that fuzzy products and systems in Japan in 1990 generated \$1.5 billion in sales, (70% of this in consumer electronics) and should generate \$2 billion in 1991.

Fuzzy logic will allow inflight experience to modify a missile's decision units, smooth out control and guidance, and doggedly track deceptive targets. In principle a fuzzy-logic warhead or grenade could prevent its own detonation when it detects friendly troops or buildings nearby.

Future arms races will advance to machine-IQ races, from metal and chemical contests to information contests. When machine bulk meets machine brains, bulk loses. That's a lesson Saddam Hussein failed to learn, and

goes a long way toward explaining why his casualties numbered over 100,000 while Allied casualties numbered about 100. Every military leader and planner has seen the video clips of SCUD vs. Patriot missiles and has read the news-

Future arms races will advance to machine-IQ races, from metal and chemical contests to information contests. When machine bulk meets machine brains, bulk loses. Overnight higher machine IQ has become the new ante in arms races around the world.

paper scoreboards. They will accordingly restructure their plans and budgets. Overnight higher machine IQ has become the new ante in arms races around the world.

The good news is governments can increase the machine IQ of weapon systems more cheaply than they can increase weapon stockpiles or increase and train recruits. This will reduce the perceived need for spending on defense. The bad news is governments will do it, thereby increasing their power and ability to do mischief.

Smart weapons will proliferate in arsenals faster than personal computers have appeared in offices. Every military will have them. For smart weapons provide a new shield as well as a new sword. No one wants a neighbor who can shoot down your weapons and still hit you with his. U.S. and European hightech firms will compete with the Japanese electronics giants to supply the software and computer and sensor components, and in small enough pieces that other governments cannot easily monitor or control.

Every country might face in microcosm the instabilities of a futuristic Star Wars (SDI) shield between it and its neighbors. As the shields go up, those without shields may see their last chance to attack with their old arsenals. As machine IQs go up, the possible conflict scenarios will increase astronomically in complexity and in sensitivity. Decision makers will face more and radically different possibilities with no experience of any of them. The lessons of military history may offer no more guidance to future military leaders than an abacus blueprint offers to a computer-chip manufacturer.

Smarter weapons can lead to thicker skins and mutually assured defense. Or they can lead to thinner skins and pinpoint strikes instead of diplomacy. It can go either way. □

Miller, "Buying Gasoline in Ethiopia," *continued from page 36*

was palpable. We yelled and hugged and counted our money.



Most of us developed a variety of strange symptoms about six weeks after our return home. Roy's were the worst: loss of weight and appetite, dizziness, intermittent fevers of a violent nature. His doctor referred him to the Centers for Disease Control in Atlanta, part of the National Institutes of Health. The NIH took a very solicitous attitude toward our group and began running extensive tests immediately.

"Why don't you mail that in Prescott?" asked Fran, the postmistress at Chino Valley.

"Because this is a U.S. Post Office and I'll be sending out one a week for the next six months and Prescott is a far drive away." Fran had never dealt with Overnight Express Mail and the prospect of reading reams of instructions and filling out new forms set her to quivering. She had become postmistress through a complex process of political patronage. Her brother-in-law had been a one-term state legislator and the job had been offered to her husband. The regimentation ill-suited him, but they needed the money so she accepted the post. Fran worked hard and had a good heart but complexity overwhelmed her.

"What's in there that's so important?"

"Fresh biological material that must

arrive in Atlanta within two days." In fact, I was mailing small ice chests with stools on ice and in formaldehyde and blood samples.

Eight of us tested positive for schistosomiasis and two for amoebic dysentery.

A few years later, Roy returned to Ethiopia. He ran the Omo all the way to Lake Rudolph. He received dual grants from National Geographic and the Ethiopian government. For the former he conducted a team of scientists for a variety of environmental studies. For the latter he acted as an agent of the Dergue helping to extend the central government's control over the lower Omo basin.

Mengistu Haile Mariam was deposed in June of this year. □

Report

The Unraveling of Canada

by Scott J. Reid

Eighty percent of Canadians believe their country will split apart. Scott Reid explains why his country is doomed, and wonders: is its death a good thing?

The drab world of Canadian politics has been transformed.

As Americans watch Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union break apart every night on CNN, they are missing an equally dramatic disintegration in their own backyard. Probably because so many Americans find Canada so boring, they are missing its break up. Ironically, the reason that Canada is coming apart at the seams is the same: Canadians now find the notion of Canada to be boring.

Like the break-up of the former socialist nations, this is a recent and largely unexpected phenomena. Five years ago, Canada was enjoying a period of unprecedented unity and prosperity. The economy was in the midst of the longest boom of the postwar era. The political situation had, on the surface, never been more stable. The popular Progressive-Conservative government held a vast majority in the House of Commons and separatist sentiments in Quebec had dimmed.

Today, the situation is radically different. Over half of the population of Quebec now favors independence. A referendum will be held on the issue by the end of next year. Eighty percent of Canadians think the country is likely to split apart.

The party structure has collapsed both at the federal level and within Quebec. New ethnic-based parties have started to take the place of the old-line parties, signalling the death-knell of a system of French-English coalition government that dates back 150 years. This turn probably means that the old-line parties will be unable to patch together a last minute deal to keep Quebec with-

in Canada. The federal Conservatives have become the least popular governing party in Canadian history. Polls indicate that if an election were held today, the Tories would finish *fourth*, behind the Liberals, NDP, the Reform Party, winning only fifteen percent of the popular vote.

A Lack of Accord

The seed of Canada's destruction was its peculiar system of government by ethnic accommodation. Canada's population is approximately 75% English-speaking and 25% French-speaking. Because Quebec is more homogeneous than English Canada and tends toward block voting, putting together a winning electoral coalition has always involved capturing almost all the seats in which French-speakers form the majority of voters, supplanted by a minority of the seats in English Canada. This is sufficient to provide a majority in the House of Commons. This has entailed that successful Canadian political parties must be non-ideological. Instead of a left or right in Canadian politics, there has been a constant battle for the hearts, minds and pocketbooks of French Canadians.

French Canada has been collectively obsessed with the preservation of its

distinctive culture. This is understandable for a community of six million French speakers nestled in a continent of two hundred million English speakers. Since the early years of the Canadian confederation, this has meant that Quebec has been very jealous of its rights, and distrustful of the central government. Lately, however, this concern has tended to manifest itself in the form of demands for special protection for the collective rights of ethnic groups. The resulting policies have often been upsetting to the generally liberal and individualist sentiments of English Canadians.

The best example of this kind of policy is official bilingualism, which was originally designed to provide government services across Canada in both official languages, but which has long since become an elaborate affirmative action program for bilingual people (most of whom are middle-class Quebecers). Many other programs, such as federal transfer payments to the provincial governments, have been redesigned to provide disproportionate benefits to Quebec.

Confederation, as it is now structured, denies French Canadian nationalism its ultimate aspiration— independence for Quebec—offering in

its place a smorgasbord of subsidies and special deals in return for keeping its soul in perpetual hock.

English Canada dreams much more modestly of prosperity and the right of individuals to equal treatment before the law, but such things are impossible when the state is structured around bribing Quebec to remain in Canada. So English Canada has had to satisfy itself with a make-believe "national unity," a sort of booby prize.

At least one French-Canadian observer appreciates the bizarreness of the situation. Christian Dufour has written:

Well, from one ocean to the other, Canada is presenting a bilingual image that is stronger than ever, while in Quebec, for the first time since 1760, the official image is exclusively French. If one sticks to the image, not only is Quebec sovereign, but it has succeeded in partially annexing Canada.¹

In April 1987, Prime Minister Brian Mulroney called the premiers of the nine English provinces to his lakefront summer home to discuss constitutional changes. Once the nine politicians arrived, he locked them in a room and told them they could not leave until they had agreed on a new constitutional order that dealt with a series of demands set forth by Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa.

The premiers emerged early the next morning, clutching the "Meech Lake Accord," a package of constitutional amendments designed to satisfy Quebec. It was exactly the sort of constitutional arrangement you might expect from a bargaining session that more closely resembled an all-night poker game than a constitutional convention. The original text of the Meech Lake Accord was full of the kind of mistakes that get made by hurried, tired people. Had the Accord become the law of the land, Canadians would have awakened the next morning with a constitution as coherent as alphabet soup.

Under the terms of the constitution, the provinces must approve amendments within three years of their proposal. The June 23, 1990, deadline passed with two provinces failing to pass the package of amendments. But it had lived long enough to become a test of the extent to which English

Canada would contort itself to placate Quebec.

The rising popular tide against the Accord in English Canada, the staunch French-Canadian stand that it must be swallowed whole, and the absurd machinations of the politicians caught up in a crisis of their own making was the stuff of high drama, or else low farce. As expected, the death of the Accord caused an uproar. After its demise, the fundamental philosophical disagreements of French and English

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Canada, which always had been fastidiously swept under the carpet, could no longer be ignored.

Prior to the Accord, ethnic demands were accommodated by alternating administrations. The collapse of the Accord destroyed the century-old formula for winning elections by alienating each of the two constituent groups to such an extent that they could no longer bring themselves to support the same party. Most Quebecers seem finally to have decided that they are no longer willing to sacrifice the goal of national independence . . . or at least that in the future the bribes necessary to keep their province in Canada will have to be extraordinarily large. In the rest of Canada, the population has slowly been coming to the conclusion that if Quebec wishes to remain a part of the country it will have to do so without subsidies and on the same terms as the other provinces.²

New Parties for Old

Clearly these are incompatible visions. Each has given rise to a new political party. The past year has seen the rise in English Canada of the previously obscure Reform Party and, in Quebec, of a newly-formed separatist party,

the Bloc Québécois. The leaders of the old-line coalition parties insist that these new parties signal the rise of intolerant "tribal" politics. This is simple nonsense. The Reform Party and the Bloc Québécois are the political vehicles for the fundamental values of the nations that they respectively represent.

The antipathies typical of genuine tribal politics—recently witnessed in places like Azerbaijan and Yugoslavia—are notably absent from either the Reform Party or the Bloc Québécois. Preston Manning, leader of the Reform Party, stresses in virtually every speech that it is Canada's system of government and *not* the existence of the French minority that is the source of the country's woes. Linden Bouchard, the leader of the Bloc Québécois, has stated that the Reform Party is the real voice of English Canada, and has even suggested a tactical alliance between the two parties in Parliament following the next election. (The Reform Party response has been unenthusiastic, since it is Bouchard's intention to make that session of Parliament into Canada's last as a united country).

The credibility of both the Liberal and Conservative Parties rests on the dying French-English coalition. It looks like both parties will be displaced by the new ones.

Still, the spectacular unpopularity of the Conservative government is only partly the result of its outmoded way of thinking. It is also wrapped up in the personal unpopularity of Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, who is the most vilified Prime Minister in Canadian history. In Quebec he is disliked; in the rest of the country he is despised. He is seen as having sold out the national interests for the sake of maintaining his support in Quebec. It is difficult to find an American parallel to Mulroney. Imagine a politician who combines, in the popular estimation, the backbone of Jimmy Carter, the honesty of Richard Nixon, the moral rectitude of Joseph McCarthy and the understated good taste of Lyndon Johnson.

Curiously, Mulroney is the only thing holding the Conservative caucus together. As an English-speaking Quebecer who has thoroughly assimilated the Québécois culture, he is tolerable to the Quebec MPs. The Quebecers also tolerate him because they feel he stands

a better chance of cutting a deal with their provincial government to renegotiate the constitution than anybody else. Mulroney's English-speaking MPs would probably be happy to get rid of him. Unfortunately, doing so would split the party and cause an immediate election, which would almost certainly result in nearly all Conservatives being tossed out of office. So they cling to their prime minister and will probably continue to do so until their hand is forced. If nothing else intervenes, a new election must be held in the autumn of 1993 whether Mulroney wants it or not. But things may come to a head sooner. If as expected the Québécois cast a "oui" vote on their independence referendum, the Quebec Conservatives would almost certainly split from the English-speaking Conservatives, causing an immediate election.

The Liberals have an equally great problem—though it is better hidden. The party is horribly in debt, and is able to produce literature, advertising, etc., only on the good graces of its suppliers of these goods. These suppliers

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will be willing to work on credit (or even for free) only so long as the Liberals have a realistic chance of forming a government in the near future and paying back these debts in the form of political favors. Once it becomes clear that the Liberals do not stand a realistic chance of forming the next government, the services available to them will dry up almost at once and they will find themselves, quite literally, bankrupt. Already some suppliers are beginning to distance themselves from the Liberal

Party and to look for prospects in other parties.

The Party for Secession

The Bloc Québécois is a one-issue party. Modeled on the "Rassemblement jurassien," a Swiss party that spearheaded the secession of a French-speaking region from a German-speaking canton, the party represents Quebec's regional interests and nothing else. Its stated purpose is to help win Quebec's independence and then to disband. In a sense, this makes the Bloc Québécois a perfect reflection of the obsessive core values of Quebec society. Its membership includes socialists and rightwingers, united by a single all-powerful bond: the assertion that Quebec, as a corporate entity, must have absolute control over its own destiny.

The leader of the Bloc Québécois, Lucien Bouchard, was once Prime Minister Mulroney's right-hand man. However, Bouchard's loyalty to his province proved stronger than his ties to the Prime Minister. He broke with his old friend when the Meech Lake Accord failed, declaring that since Quebec had negotiated the Accord on its knees, it would soon find itself reduced to negotiating on its stomach. For thirty years Bouchard had been Brian Mulroney's closest friend. They have not spoken since.

The Bloc Québécois is now a substantial presence in Parliament. A total of seven members sit under its banner, including four former Conservatives and two former Liberals. Only one of the Bloc's MPs was elected under its colors; the rest "crossed the floor" of the House of Commons and have never faced an electoral test of their decision. However, this is not a reflection of a lack of strength or popularity. The most recent polls indicate that if an election were held today the Bloc would get upwards of 40% of the vote in Quebec.

Even more significantly for the Bloc's prospects, the electoral machinery in Quebec is working in its favor. The federal Liberal electoral machine, which delivered almost every seat in the province to Pierre Trudeau in election after election, is in ruins. The Conservatives have never had a machine in Quebec, but depended instead upon the support of the Parti Québécois electoral machine in 1984 and the provincial Liberal electoral machine in 1988.³ All of

this was done informally. This time, the Bloc Québécois has the formal support of the Parti Québécois, and Liberal Premier Robert Bourassa is probably too clever a political actor to be caught lending the support of his party to the unpopular Conservatives in the next election, since this would damage his nationalist credentials and deprive him of the opportunity to become the first prime minister of an independent Quebec.

The result will probably be that the Bloc Québécois will take every single

For the first time in this century, Canadians will have elected legislators who actually represent the views and interests of their constituents. This does not bode well for Canadian unity.

Francophone seat in that province (about 65 of Quebec's 75 seats). The Conservatives have no support among the English-speaking minority and the loss of the French vote will almost certainly result in the loss of all or almost all the seats in the province which is their power base.

The Party for Expulsion

The rise of the Reform Party has been considerably less spectacular than that of the Bloc Québécois, but is no less troubling for the Conservatives.

The party was founded in 1987 by Preston Manning, a Calgary-based management consultant. It has attracted Westerners who feel that their interests are no longer represented by the Conservatives. This alienation is also a reflection of something more profound. The core principle of the accommodation formula of government is that the country consists of two founding nations of equal status and that the collective rights of these two groups are more important than the individual rights of Canadians as citizens. This has never gone over well in the West, where the egalitarian and individualist spirit associated with the America Revolution has had its strongest impact in Canada.

None of the federal political parties

made any attempt to represent the philosophy of individual rights. In the mad rush to build their popularity in Quebec, the Liberals and New Democrats (a socialist party with 43 seats in the 295 seat House of Commons, mostly from the West) threw their support behind the Meech Lake Accord. These two parties had never been strong advocates of

The Reform Party is far more libertarian than any major party in the United States. The Party's policy manual, called "The Blue Book," is consistently free-market on economic matters.

individual rights or economic freedoms to start with, and their enthusiasm for Meech Lake left Canada with three parties advocating a collectivist line and none representing the individualist core values of English Canada.

For their pains the Liberals and the New Democrats got nothing. In the 1988 general election, the Liberals won only 12 seats in Quebec, and the NDP none at all. The Reform Party, meanwhile, quietly gathered support in the West, although it failed to win any seats in the House of Commons. (A Reform MP was elected a year later to fill a vacant seat. Canada's first elected senator is also a Reformer.)

The Reform Party is far more libertarian than any major party in the United States. The Party's policy manual, called "The Blue Book," is consistently free-market on economic matters. It favors privatization of most government corporations, including the Post Office; legal limitations on deficit spending; a flat tax; and an end to the subsidization and cartelization of Canadian agriculture.

The Blue Book favors referenda on sensitive issues—especially on constitutional reforms—as well as the right of recall and public initiative. These institutions, which are taken for granted in the United States, are nearly revolutionary to Canadians. In general, the thrust of the Reform Party's populism is to redesign the federal government on the model of some of the better-run American states.

The Reform Party has risen to third place in the polls, nationwide, and seems likely to shut out the Conservatives (who have been stuck in fourth place for the better part of a year) and the Liberals in the West. The Party is also rising rapidly in the polls in Ontario, which is home to half of all English Canadians.

Inside Quebec

The extent to which coalition politics has disappeared in Canada is revealed by a parallel set of changes taking place in the party structure in Quebec provincial politics.

In Quebec, the non-French (mostly English) minority is proportionally smaller than the French minority in Canada as a whole (17 percent versus 25 percent). This is enough of a difference that, despite the block-voting habits of the English, Quebec politics does not parallel the federal model, which revolves around coalitions that jealously guard their constituents' rights and interests. On the contrary, provincial legislation has increasingly restricted minority rights.

Traditionally the English vote in Quebec went to the provincial Liberal party. Assuming that the English vote would fall to them no matter what they did, Premier Bourassa and the Liberals set about actively courting the nationalist vote following their re-election in 1985. In 1988, they deliberately abandoned the English speaking community by passing a law that severely limited minority language rights

Like the Conservatives in Western Canada, the Quebec Liberals made the incorrect assumption that they would never face a challenge from the advocates of individualism and individual rights. In 1989, two tiny English-rights parties, the Equality party in Montreal and the Unity Party in rural Quebec contested the Liberal Party's dominance in the English speaking community. The Equality party managed to elect four members to the National Assembly. (The two English-rights parties have since united under the Equality Party name.) Two of the districts that elected Equality candidates had voted Liberal ever since their creation; the other two had voted Liberal for fifty years.

The Equality Party has since expanded its agenda. Like the Reform

Party, it represents free enterprise and civil libertarian points of view. It recently won praise when it was the only party in the Quebec legislature with the nerve to do battle with Hydro Québec, the largest public-owned utility in North America, and probably the most arrogant. The Liberals and Parti Québécois have always gone soft on Hydro-Québec because—and this speaks volumes about the philosophical divide between French and English Canada—the utility has portrayed itself as the industrial expression of the Québécois national spirit.

While the Equality and Unity parties ran candidates only at the provincial level, a new one-issue *federal* party representing the English minority has arisen in Quebec. The Option Canada Party was founded a few months ago in the English speaking-rural area of Quebec known as the Eastern Township. It has spread rapidly into the Montreal area that contains the vast majority of Quebec's non-Francophone population. Its single issue? The partition of Quebec so that the English-speaking areas of the province may become Canada's eleventh province. It is too early to tell if this party will have any success in the next federal election. I suspect that if the separation of Quebec is a realistic prospect at that time, the Option Canada Party will take all the English seats in the province.

The collapse of ethnic accommodation politics will be complete. Federally, the only old-line party to survive the collapse will be one that never represented the coalition point of view: the NDP, which has never had a serious base of support in Quebec and has elected only one member of Parliament in that province. If the next election is fought after a positive vote in the upcoming referendum on independence, my guess is that the Reform Party and the New Democrats will split English Canada between them, with the Liberals limping along in third place. The Bloc Québécois will probably dominate Quebec.

This bodes well for the representation that Canadians will receive in the next Parliament. For the first time in this century, Canadians will have elected legislators who actually represent the views and interests of their constituents.

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Testimony

The Suicide of Canadian Culture

by Barry Chamish

Protectionism's effects are suicidal for a nation: it keeps "infant industries" infantile, and makes healthy concerns weak and pathetic. The same is true of protectionism in the arts.

By 1975, three of my novels and a collection of my short stories had already been published in Canada. All had been widely reviewed and two had won prestigious literary awards. I was only 22 years old. And I decided that it was time for me to emigrate from Canada.

I left because of the new government policy ostensibly aimed at furthering the arts in Canada, but actually aimed at repressing free thought. The policy might best be called "Legislating a Canadian Identity."

The mastermind of the policy was Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau, an over-rated intellectual who posed as a liberal but had a lifetime history of socialist activities. His position? That the future of Canada was best assured by creating a unique—read *non-American*—culture.

Trudeau began small, forcing radio stations to fill 30% of the airwaves with the work of Canadian artists in the hope of begetting a local music industry. Since only about 10% of Canadian songs were worthy of an audience, radio station owners sought every loophole in the book to fill their air time with what the legislation demanded. Suddenly, any foreign record with the slightest Canadian tie was counted "Canadian." Songs from the musical "Hair," for instance, were written by two Canadians. So, shortly after the passage of this legislation, whoever recorded a song from the

play—be he from New Jersey or Tahiti—suddenly became Canadian, whether he liked it or not. By exploiting these loopholes, the radio stations complied with the letter of the law, if not the intent.

Trudeau next passed a law forcing television stations to broadcast 60% Canadian content. This did not work at all, but since most Canadian television was government-owned, the policy continued. This proved to be a tremendous stimulation to the cable-television industry, as Canadians sought to avoid the pure bilge forced upon them by the authorities. Thanks to the miserable fare available on local TV, cable television in Canada thrived—a full decade before the cable industry caught on in America.

Though the intent was to produce a profitable local industry, the opposite occurred. No Canadian television series has ever been seen on the screens of any respectable country, and Canadians themselves have abandoned their local stations for American networks. The policy stimulated the Americanization of Canada in another way: the advertising on the

cable networks was almost entirely for American products.

Still the government refused to acknowledge the irrationality of the policy.

The magazine industry became the next target. The government simply forbade all foreign magazines from publishing in Canada. Both *Time* and *Reader's Digest* had profitable Canadian editions; the government ordered both to shut down. The hope was that a Canadian magazine industry would replace the foreigners. To evaluate the policy, simply walk down to your local newsstand to see if you can buy a Canadian magazine.

Onward to books. McClelland and Stewart, the country's largest publisher, was broke. In accordance with the new policy, the government promised to keep McClelland afloat on the proviso that it only publish Canadian content. The result? A peculiar style of literature that dominates Canadian writing to this day. In order to receive subsidies, publishers must cater to the tastes of the Canadian government. Here are some of the preferred characteristics of this new literature:

1. A constant mention of Canadian place-names, no matter how irrelevant to plot.

2. A mixture of English, French and especially "Native" characters.

3. A political point of view that must be Liberal, or left. (This, because a Liberal administration initiated the policy and the bureaucrats watching over the subsidies were Liberal appointees.)

4. Anti-American diatribes — welcome proof of "Canadianess."

5. Images of geese, snow, beavers or anything found in a frigid climate.

One might think that the academics in Canada would have rebelled at such intervention. But not only did Canadian liberal arts departments toe the line, they toed with a vengeance. One after another, unprofitable literary journals became totally dependent upon government grants to survive. And, one after another, professors passed on the goal of finding a "Unique Canadian Identity" to their students, who bought the guff without serious opposition.

The policy spread to art galleries, dance companies, theater troupes. No one in Canada objected. No one except the most talented artists. They left in droves; the most visible refugees were the original editors of *The National Lampoon*.

During the 1970s, hundreds of magazines, books, plays, radio shows and films were all spawned by a few Canadians who had travelled to New York to set up shop. From Broadway's *Lemmings* to television's *Saturday Night Live* to Hollywood's *Animal House*, Canadian born wit changed both

American and world humor. Such creativity may have been born in Canada, but it could not be tolerated there.

When government determines artistic policy, it guarantees that the result

I addressed the podium and innocently asked if petty nationalism didn't create petty literature. The explosion at Mount St. Helens, I suspect, was quieter. I was cursed, insulted and more than a few times accused of outright treason.

will be mediocre. Before the Bolshevik Revolution, Russian literature was arguably the finest in the world. But when the Soviet Union decided to regulate its writers, to censor its artists in the interest of ideology, a vast tradition died. Only a few expatriates have managed to keep the vestiges of a once great culture glowing—and that, only weakly.

Yet Canadians outside the arts have passively watched their finest leave, and allowed pap to rule.

Shortly after my third book was published, I gave a reading from it to a very enthusiastic audience. Afterward, I was greeted by Dorothy Livesay, a renowned poet in Canada. I was very talented, she informed me, but I wrote like an American. At the time, I took the statement as a compliment. She intended it as a warning.

Based on the success of this novel, I was invited to a conference of literary figures, in part organized by Livesay. For two days I listened to speakers planning ways to keep dreaded American books from Canadian bookstores and classrooms, plotting to replace the banned literature with the Canadian brand. Finally, I addressed the podium and innocently asked if petty nationalism didn't create petty literature. The explosion at Mount St. Helens, I suspect, was quieter. I was cursed, insulted and more than a few times accused of outright treason. I knew then that I could never write honestly if I stayed in Canada. Two months later I landed in Israel.

People often ask why I chose to leave a country as rich as Canada to move to such a poor, besieged one. I always answer that Canada is the most boring country in the world (excepting, of course, Finland). When they don't believe me, I ask them to name their favorite Canadian movie. That usually answers the query. When it doesn't, I ask them to name a Canadian invention, or even a product.

Since I've removed myself from the deep repression of Canadian culture I've had perhaps 350 publications, including work in *The Atlantic*, *Newsday* and *Boston Globe*. But I have no doubt I would have quit writing had I stayed in Canada. I would rather surrender my career before allowing bureaucrats to tell me what and how I should write.

And I think the multitudes of ex-Canadian artists who have relocated to Los Angeles, New York, and London since 1975 would agree. □

Reid, "The Unraveling of Canada," continued from page 42

This does not bode well for Canadian unity. Neither side will be willing to make the concessions the other side wants, and there will be no party apparatus such as the Conservatives and Liberals have always had, to force MPs to vote against the interests of their constituents in order to save the country. Given the kind of country that Canada has become, you have to wonder if this is not a good thing.

Canada seems to be doomed to split in two anyway, but the rise of the new

parties guarantees it. If my country has to die of something, an overdose of democracy is probably better than most of the alternatives. □

Notes:

1. Christian Dufour, *A Canadian Challenge / Le Défi Québécois*. Lanzville, British Columbia and Halifax, Oolichan Books, 1990, and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, 99.
2. The Report of the Citizens' Forum on Canada's Future (Ottawa, 1991) indicates that less than thirty percent of non-

Quebecers who attended its group discussions supported "Unity, at any costs." Over half favored the position "All provinces must be equal," which is unacceptable to Quebec. A much smaller percentage—around 5%—favor kicking Quebec out of Canada. See Figure 3, on page 159 of the English-language text of the Report.

3. Party names in Quebec are confusing: the provincial Liberal Party is in no way connected with the Liberal Party of Canada, and the Parti Québécois is a purely provincial party founded separately from the Bloc Québécois.

Disputation

50 Really Stupid Ways to Save the Earth

by Karl Hess

Recently I came across "50 difficult things you can do to save the Earth," a collective effort by members of various U.S. environmental groups at the invitation of *Earth Island Journal*. Here is the list, with my comments following.

1. *Bury your car.*

Now you'd think that such concerned folk would recommend that it be sold for scrap. That way it would be recycled. The steel industry has been recycling metal for decades. Oh, I forgot. Steel mills use electricity. (See point 4)

2. *Become a total vegetarian.*

Many people in Africa depend on insects such as locusts as a major source of protein. Perhaps you could talk them into eating more beans. But then how would you visit them (see point 43) prior to rebuilding the schooner fleet? Oops, schooners require old-growth timber . . . (See point 13)

3. *Grow your own vegetables.*

Sure, I and others have grown vegetables even on urban rooftops, but snow is a problem and the time taken to do it is a luxury not everyone can afford. Later, of course, lots of time will be available because there will hardly be anything else to do except grow them veggies and trudge dozens of miles to help build houses (out of saplings).

4. *Have your power lines disconnected.*

You won't have much time to use any electrical device anyway after hoeing, raking, and trudging your way through this entire agenda.

5. *Don't have children.*

Save the Earth by ending the human race. Neat idea.

6. *Restrict the population of motor vehicles.*

But, but . . . I thought we'd bury 'em all!

7. *Don't build cars.*

Well, that would take care of restricting the motor car population. But does that include buses? (See point 43)

8. *Stop building roads.*

So that no fugitive motor car could escape burial, I suppose.

9. *Replace roads with homes, parks, and gardens.*

How about at least leaving some footpaths so that folks in Maine could trudge to Florida for their natural Vitamin C or folk music festivals?

10. *Halt weapons production and exports.*

Have you tried that one out on the Pathet Lao or the Shining Path?

11. *Stop the sale, distribution, and export of cigarettes.*

Joints too? Horrors.

12. *Send money to Brazil to provide urban jobs for impoverished workers now forced into the rain forests.*

How come they get urban jobs while the rest of us are demolishing roads

and picking berries? And where do we get money when we have to work without electricity, have no cars, and still have to plant and hoe, plant and hoe?

13. *Blockade a lumber truck carrying old-growth trees.*

Okay, but let pass the trucks carrying firewood, fresh pine lumber, plywood, and so forth? Don't forget, firewood can replace electricity and, with enough burning, cause interesting waves of lung disease in those urban areas populated by working Brazilians subsidized by non-working Yankees.

14. *Spend a month tree-sitting.*

Now, let's see, is that sitting *with* a tree, or *in* a tree? And who will bring us our vegetables?

15. *Try to live within the world average income (\$1,250 a year) for one month.*

That would come to \$104.17 per month—a princely sum for those of us who have buried our car, sworn off meat and grown our own veggies.

16. *Cut up your credit cards.*

Well, you can't be wrong *all* the time.

17. *Unplug your television.*

And miss all those Public Television shows?

18. *Undertake a "Conservation Sab-*

bath"—one day a week without consuming electricity or fuel.

Is that before or after we bury all the cars and dig up the roads?

19. *Fast one day each week and send the money saved on food to help feed the hungry.*

Sorry, but since we started growing all our food we'll have to send turnips instead.

20. *Adopt a homeless person.*

And send him or her out to tend the veggies.

21. *Raise the minimum wage to a survival income.*

See point 15.

22. *Enact a maximum wage law.*

No worry, if the rest of the agenda succeeds, there won't be any wages.

23. *Tie politicians' salaries to the average working wage.*

The tie is tight already. Where do you think those political salaries come from, anyway?

24. *Replace majority rule with proportional representation.*

And the proportional reps would what? Require a majority vote on stuff? Pass laws with proportional provisions for various groups? Oy vey.

25. *Replace the electoral college with direct democratic elections.*

Hmmm. Whatever happened to proportional representation? You're taking the biggest majority vote of all.

26. *Abolish the CIA and the National Security Act of 1949.*

Okay. But we might need a little help from anyone not ripping up the roads, etc.

27. *Pass a nature amendment to the U.S. Constitution.*

Now let's see, would that be to limit nature, zone it, make it pay a fair share of taxes, or what?

28. *Oust Presidential advisor John Sununu.*

And replace him with the *Earth Island Journal* collective?

29. *Plant one new tree every day.*

Okay, but remember, Eskimos in Alaska haven't had much luck with trees the past few hundred years.

30. *Go to jail for something you believe in.*

Wherever is the jail going to get its veggies? How will it transport its inmates? Is tax resistance okay as some-

thing to believe in? How about slaughtering people you don't like because you believe them to be inferior? And while everyone's in the clink, who attends to the rest of the agenda?

31. *Don't own pets.*

Let 'em run wild. There's nothing more "natural" than a pack of feral dogs.

32. *Allow all beef-producing domestic cattle to become extinct.*

Would that be extinction by .44 Magnum or lethal injection? Or how about starvation or being eaten by feral dogs?

33. *Redirect the military budget to restoration work; convert weapons factories to peaceful research; retrain soldiers for ecological restoration.*

And, besides, they'll be used to walking on rough terrain such as all those ripped up roads. But that research item sounds suspiciously like letting technology in through the factory door. Do you really want that, in view of your other points?

34. *Remove the U.S. Forest Service from under the Agriculture Department; place USFS, the Bureau of Land Management, and the Fish and Wildlife Service under the Environmental Agency.*

Come on, collective, couldn't we just bury them along with the cars?

35. *Consume only products produced within your bioregion.*

Since bioregions are much larger than countries or states, doesn't that raise the ugly question of roads and tracks and stuff?

36. *Don't eat anything that comes in a package.*

Here, clerk, just shovel that granola into my bag (made from the hide of a now extinct beef cow).

37. *Don't buy anything that comes in a box.*

Okay, okay, let's get this package and box thing sorted out once and for all.

38. *Require operators and owners of nuclear power plants to live within one mile of the site.*

Sure, sure, without cars they'd have to. But what are those nuclear plants going to be doing? Remember—we've disconnected the power lines!

39. *Mandate federal recycling and institute a refuse tax on solid waste.*

Groan. Get out the shovel, Jack.

We're going to have to dig up that damn minivan after all.

40. *Pipe polluted water back into the water supplies of the companies that do the polluting.*

We trust that includes all units of government, the acknowledged largest polluters on the continent.

41. *Don't own anything that runs on batteries.*

Sure. What the hell. By the time we get in from the hand planting, hoeing, reaping, and road ripping we're too tired for any of those gadgets anyway.

42. *Hand over all the excess packaging to a store manager on each visit to the grocery store.*

Pardon our continuing confusion, but aren't we supposed to be growing all our own food?

43. *Travel by bus, never by air.*

Okay. So we don't bury the buses but we do bury the planes?

44. *Stop using toilet paper and Kleenex; use washable cloth.*

What's wrong with your fingers, Mac? They're washable.

45. *Extend the life of your wardrobe by learning to make and mend your own clothes.*

Phew. I really thought that loincloths were going to be mandatory on this one.

46. *Give money to every single panhandler you meet.*

Including the ones who make more than you do? And how can we make sure there'll be enough dough left over for those folk in Brazil?

47. *Democratize your workplace; start a union or a collective.*

Like the Teamsters? Or like those wildly successful collective farms in the USSR?

48. *Learn to farm.*

Tell it to all those farmers living off government subsidies.

49. *Liberate a zoo.*

Nothing like a bunch of rattlesnakes, panthers, hippos and elephants romping through the neighborhood.

50. *Ask your boss if you can take the day off to work on healing the planet . . . with pay.*

What boss, what work, what pay? I thought all that stuff was obsolete according to the implications of most points 1 through 49. □

Suggestion

Persuasion *versus* Force

by Mark Skousen

"Free to choose" and "responsible for choosing." These are not mere slogans. They are also the triumph of civilization.

Sometimes a single book or even a short cogent essay changes an individual's entire outlook on life. For Christians, it is the New Testament. For radical socialists, it may be Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels' *The Communist Manifesto*. For libertarians, it may be Ayn Rand's *Atlas Shrugged*. For Austrian economists, it may be Ludwig von Mises' *Human Action*.

Recently I came across a little essay in a book by Alfred North Whitehead, the British philosopher and Harvard professor, that captured my interest. The book is *Adventures of Ideas*, and the essay is "From Force to Persuasion." Actually, what caught my attention was a passage on page 83, only one page in the entire 300 page book:

The creation of the world—said Plato—is the victory of persuasion over force . . . Civilization is the maintenance of social order, by its own inherent persuasiveness as embodying the nobler alternative. The recourse to force, however unavoidable, is a disclosure of the failure of civilization, either in the general society or in a remnant of individuals. . . .

Now the intercourse between individuals and between social groups takes one of these two forms: force or persuasion. Commerce is the great example of intercourse by way of persuasion. War, slavery, and governmental compulsion exemplify the reign of force.

Professor Whitehead's vision of civilized society as the triumph of persuasion over force should always be paramount in the mind of all politically active citizens and government leaders. It should serve as the guideline for the libertarian ideal.

Let me suggest, therefore, a new libertarian creed:

"The triumph of persuasion over force is the sign of a civilized society."

Surely this is a libertarian creed that most citizens, no matter where they fit on the political spectrum, can agree on.

Too Many Laws

Too often lawmakers resort to the force of law rather than the power of persuasion to solve a problem in society. They are too quick to pass another law in an effort to suppress the effects of a deep-rooted problem in American society rather than seeking to recognize and deal with the real cause of the problem, which may require parents, teachers, pastors, and community leaders to persuade people to

change their ways.

Too often politicians think that new programs and new taxes are the only way to pay for citizens' retirement, health care, education or other social needs. "People just aren't willing to pay for these services themselves," they say.

Oliver Wendell Holmes once said, "Taxation is the price we pay for civilization." But isn't the opposite really the case? Taxation is the price we pay for failing to build a civilized society. The higher the tax level, the greater the failure. A centrally planned totalitarian state represents a complete defeat for the civilized world, while a totally voluntary society represents its ultimate success.

Thus, legislators—ostensibly concerned about poverty and low wages—pass a minimum wage law and establish a welfare state as their way to abolish poverty. Yet poverty persists, not for want of money, but for want of skills, capital, education, and the desire to succeed.

The community demands a com-

plete education for all children, so local leaders mandate that all children attend school for at least 10 years. Winter Park High School, which two of my children attend, is completely fenced in. Students need a written excuse to leave school grounds and a written excuse for absences. All the gates except one are closed during school hours, and there is a guard at the only open gate at all times to monitor students coming and going. Florida just passed a law that takes away the driver's license of any student who drops out of high school. Surely that will solve the problem!

Now students who don't want to be in school are disrupting the students who want to learn. The lawmakers forget one thing—schooling is not the same thing as education.

Many high-minded citizens don't like to see racial, religious or sexual discrimination in employment, housing, department stores and restaurants. Instead of persuading people in the schools, the churches and the media that discrimination is unchristian and morally repugnant, lawmakers simply pass civil rights legislation outlawing discrimination. Well, so much for that problem! Does anybody wonder why discrimination is still a serious social disease in our society?

Is competition from the Japanese, the Germans and the Brazilians too stiff for American industry? We can solve that right away, says Congress. No use trying to convince industry to invest in more productive technology, or trying to reduce the tax burden on business. No, we'll just impose import quotas or heavy duties on foreign products. Surely that will make us competitive.

Drugs and Abortion

Is drug abuse a problem in America? Then pass legislation prohibiting the use of certain high-powered drugs. Surely that will solve the drug-abuse problem. Yet it never addresses the real problem, which is why people misuse drugs in the first place, and how can these needs be satisfied in nondestructive ways? By outlawing drugs, we fail to consider the beneficial uses of these drugs in medicine and we fail to consider the underlying cause of increased drug or alcohol misuse among teenagers and adults.

Abortion is a troublesome issue, we all agree on that. Whose rights take precedence, the baby's or the mother's? Apparently millions of pregnant women prefer abortion because it's a quick little clean operation that can eliminate in a day all the outward signs of sexual irresponsibility. Did you let your sexual desires get carried away? Forget to use a birth control device? No problem—you can get an abortion down at the local clinic. You know, right next to the drugstore, where you forgot to buy the condoms.

Political conservatives are shocked and embarrassed by the millions of legal fetal killings that take place every year in America and around the world. How can we sing "God Bless America" with this eyesore plaguing our nation? So, for many conservatives the answer is simple: Ban abortions! That will solve the problem. This quick fix will undoubtedly give the appearance that we have instantly solved our national penchant for genocide.

Yet wouldn't it be better if we tried to answer the all important question, "Why is abortion so prevalent today, and what can we do to prevent the need for abortions? How can we persuade teenagers, for example, that sexual irresponsibility only creates more problems than the temporary pleasure it gives?"

There are those in society who want to ban handguns, rifles and other firearms, or at least have them tightly controlled and registered. Is there is crime problem? Don't worry. We can solve the murder and crime problem in this country, simply by passing a law taking away the weapons of murder. No guns, no killings. Simple. Thus, they look to change outward appearances, but they show little interest in finding ways to discourage a person from becoming criminal or violent in the first place.

I am convinced that the libertarian movement will remain a fringe movement so long as libertarians

think only in terms of freedom and not in terms of responsibility for their free actions. Too many libertarians equate liberty with libertine behavior. That the freedom to have an abortion means that they should have an abortion. That the freedom to take drugs means that they should take drugs. That the freedom to use handguns means they can use them irresponsibly.

More than Just Freedom

It is significant that Professor Whitehead chose the word "persuasion," not simply "freedom," as the ideal characteristic of the civilized world. The word "persuasion" embodies both freedom of choice and responsibility for choice. In order to persuade, you must have a moral philosophy, a system of right and wrong that governs you. You want to persuade people to do the right thing, not because they have to, but because they want to.

In this context, let us answer the all-important question, "Liberty and Morality: Can We Have Both?" The answer is, absolutely, we must have both—or eventually we will have neither. As Sir James Russell Lowell said, "The ultimate result of protecting fools from their folly is to fill the planet full of fools."

Our motto should be, "We teach them correct principles, and they govern themselves."

Freedom without responsibility only leads to the destruction of civilization, as evidenced by Rome and other great civilizations of the past. As Alexis de Tocqueville said, "Despotism may govern without faith, but liberty cannot." In a similar vein, Henry Ward Beecher added, "There is



"Of course I believe in objective truth — at least as far as I'm concerned."

no liberty to men who know not how to govern themselves." And Edmund Burke wrote, "What is liberty without wisdom and without virtue?"

My challenge to all libertarians today is to take the moral high ground. Neither the Republicans nor the Democrats think any more in terms of persuading people; they feel the need to force their nostrums down our throats at the point of a bayonet and

In this context, let us answer the all-important question, "Liberty and Morality: Can We Have Both?" The answer is, absolutely, we must have both—or eventually we will have neither.

the barrel of a gun, in the name of the IRS, the SEC, the FDA, the DEA, or a multitude of other ABCs of government authority.

Our cause is much more compelling when we can say that we support drug legalization, but do not use drugs. That we tolerate legal abortions, but choose not to abort our own future generations. That we support the right to bear arms, but do not misuse handguns. That we favor the right of individuals to meet privately as they please, but do not ourselves discriminate.

In the true spirit of libertarianism, Voltaire once said, "I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it!" If we are to be effective in convincing others of a libertarian world, we must take the moral high ground by saying, "We may disapprove of what you do, but we will defend to the death your right to do it."

In short, my vision of a libertarian society is one in which we discourage evil, but do not prohibit it. We teach our children and our students not to abuse drugs, but after all our persuading, if they still want to use harmful drugs, that is their right—so long as they do not infringe on the rights of others. We may discourage prostitution and pornography by insisting that

it be restricted to certain areas and to certain ages, but if people really want it, no one is going to be jailed or fined. If an adult bookstore opens in your neighborhood, we don't run to the law and pass an ordinance, we picket the store and discourage customers. If we don't like violence and sex on TV, we don't write the Federal Communications Commission, we join boycotts of the advertiser's products. Several years ago the owners of Seven Eleven stores removed Playboy and Penthouse from their stores, not because the law required it, but because a group of concerned citizens persuaded them. Truly, these actions reflect the spirit of libertarianism.

It is the duty of every advocate of human liberty to convince the world that we must solve our problems through persuasion and not force. Whether the issue is domestic policy or foreign policy, we must recognize that passing another law or going to war is not necessarily the answer to our problems. Simply to pass laws prohibiting the outward appearance of problems is to sweep them under the rug. It may hide the dirt, but it doesn't dispose of the dirt properly or permanently. Libertarians should do more than simply oppose federal funding of abortions, they should also favor the "fully informed" consent rules before a woman can get an abortion. Under this approach, abortion may not be prohibited, but it would be discouraged.

Convincing the public of our message, "that persuasion instead of force is the sign of a civilized nation," will be a lot of hard work, but it can be rewarding. The key is to make a convincing case for freedom, to present the facts to the public so that they can see the logic of our arguments, and to develop a dialogue with those who may be opposed to our position. Our emphasis must be on educating the public. For we shall never change our political leaders until we change the people who elect them.

A Vision of a Libertarian Society

Martin Luther King Jr. gave a famous sermon at the Lincoln Memorial in the mid-1960s. He said he had a

dream about the promised land. Well, I too have a vision of an ideal society.

I have a vision of world peace, not because the military or the police have been called in to maintain order, but because we have peace from within and friendship with every nation.

I have a vision of universal prosperity and an end to poverty, not because of foreign aid or government-subsidized welfare, but because each of us have productive, useful employment where every trade is honest and beneficial to both buyer and seller, and where we eagerly help the less fortunate of our own free will.

I have a vision of an inflation-free society, not because of wage and price controls, but because our nation has an honest money system.

I have a vision of a drug-free America, not because drugs are illegal, but because we desire to live long, healthy, self-sustaining lives.

I have a vision of an abortion free society, not because abortion is illegal, but because we firmly believe in the sanctity of life, sexual responsibility, and family values.

I have a vision of a free society, not because a benevolent dictator commands it, but because we love free-

Taxation is the price we pay for failing to build a civilized society. The higher the tax level, the greater the failure.

dom and the responsibility that goes with it.

I end my remarks with these words taken from a Protestant hymn. The author is anonymous, which I think is appropriate, for it expresses the aspiration of every man and every woman in a free society.

Know this, that every soul is free
To choose his life and what he'll be;
For this eternal truth is given
That God will force no man to
heaven.

He'll call, persuade, direct aright,
And bless with wisdom, love, and
light,

In nameless ways be good and kind,
But never force the human mind. □


THIS MODERN WORLD

by TOM TOMORROW

GOOD EVENING-I'M DAN RATHER. LEADING OFF THE NEWS TONIGHT, A MAJOR CONFLAGRATION THAT COULD HAVE DECIMATED NEW YORK CITY WAS NARROWLY AVOIDED THIS AFTERNOON!



"...IT WAS 4:00 P.M. IN THE CBS STUDIOS WHEN A TECHNICIAN LIGHTING A CIGARETTE ACCIDENTALLY DROPPED HIS MATCH!"



"HAD THERE BEEN A LARGE STACK OF OLD NEWSPAPERS NEARBY, OR AN OLD PILE OF GASOLINE-SOAKED RAGS, THERE MIGHT HAVE BEEN A FIRE WHICH COULD HAVE DESTROYED THE STUDIOS--AND, IN A WORST-CASE SCENARIO, POSSIBLY MUCH OF NEW YORK CITY!"



(ARTIST'S RENDITION)

"FORTUNATELY, THERE WAS NO SUCH COMBUSTIBLE MATERIAL NEARBY. THE TECHNICIAN, THINKING QUICKLY, STEPPED ON THE MATCH AND DOUSED THE POTENTIALLY DEADLY FLAME!"



"ONE EXPERT HAD THIS COMMENT..."

I THINK THIS INCIDENT DEMONSTRATES THE NEED FOR STRICTER RULES AND REGULATIONS!



(AN EXPERT)

COMING UP NEXT-- THE PRESIDENT STUMBLED ON THE WHITE HOUSE LAWN TODAY. HAD HE FALLEN AND HIT HIS HEAD ON A ROCK, EXPERTS SAY HE MIGHT HAVE DIED.



FIRST, THESE MESSAGES.

Challenge

Questions on the Phylogeny and Ontogeny of Rights

by James McClarin

Warning: the American Association of Stodgy Philosophers (AASP) has determined that the following essay will cause readers to both think and laugh.

The animal rights and abortion rights battles are merely two tips of a very large iceberg lurking beneath the plane of debate chosen by most rights theorists: It is our lack of sufficiently rigorous criteria for establishing precisely when the condition of “rights” exists, and when it does not.

What follows is a series of situations—most of them hypothetical—in which “common sense” may not be sufficient to determine the presence of rights. I hope to elicit not conviction but caution: it is time to recognize that many important questions remain unanswered, that our philosophical evolution is incomplete.

Early Man

Assuming humans have inalienable rights, at what point in our evolutionary past might these rights have appeared, and did they do so gradually or suddenly? If gradually, we must assume these rights were something less than inalienable at any point before their full emergence. Would that mean there can be conditions under which modern humans are something less than human (idiots, fetuses), and therefore not in possession of inalienable rights?

On the other hand, if inalienable rights appeared suddenly on our phylogenetic tree, what was the agent that caused this sudden condition? Was every member of the gene pool instantaneously transformed, or was it only one specimen, with the condition passed on as birthright to its de-

scendants? Was the sudden possession of rights unrelated to other conditions, such as intellectual capacity, language, and emotional development, and if so, did it mean that every member of the entire evolutionary line—no matter at what level of development—was thenceforth in possession of inalienable rights?

The Super-Ape

Upon isolating several hundred gene factors affecting intelligence in gorillas, scientists in the year 2007 succeed in concentrating all such factors in one gorilla ovum, and are able to induce development of the egg without fertilization, by parthenogenesis. The result is a female ape of super IQ. Though this ape has characteristic difficulty with vocal language, she excels in non-verbal communication, mastering the word processor in several human languages by age three. This whiz ape goes on to publish philosophical treatises in *Liberty*, eventually landing a job as editor of the *Daily Libertarian News*—America’s largest circulation newspaper.

Does this animal possess inali-

enable rights? Upon what basis?

Human Body Parts

In 2008, a crack surgery team succeeds in keeping alive portions of an accident victim’s body: advanced, miniaturized life-support hardware maintains his brain and one leg. However, there is no practical way to rejoin these surviving body parts. The leg is fitted with a walnut-sized electronic brain that enables it to stand, jump and take bus trips downtown where it hops about, drawing incredulous expressions from fellow pedestrians waiting for the light to change at cross-walks.

The leg is clearly human in genetic composition, and it’s alive. Is it a human life, possessing a “right to life”? If someone killed it, should they be prosecuted for murder?

Meanwhile, the surviving brain is encased in a motorized, suitcase-sized mobile life-support unit with assorted sensory apparatus, mechanical arms and electronic speech. The brain is able to communicate, watch movies, go to the bank or the baseball game, or even go deep-sea fishing.

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Does this brain have an inalienable right to life, and on what basis?

Continua

A doctor examines 800 mentally impaired persons ranging from comatose individuals unable to perform any non-autonomic action, to those able to talk and look after themselves to some extent. Do all of them possess rights? Do some possess more than others?

Various brain-damaged individuals in the 21st century are given electronic brain booster components, enabling them to live useful lives. The interfaced electronic components range from 1% to 99% of brain mass. Do all of these people have full human rights? Why or why not?

Scientists in the 21st century finally succeed in crossing humans and chimpanzees, and soon several mixes exist: 1/4 humans, 1/2 humans, 3/4 humans, etc. Where on this continuum do "human rights" begin?

"Ontogeny recapitulates phylogeny," or so we used to be told in biology class. This famous phrase commemorates a curious characteristic of the flesh: namely, that during its growth, the human fetus resembles a progression of fetuses of lower animal forms in the species' evolutionary past. A human fetus resembles that of a fish, an amphibian, a lower mammal and a lower primate on its way to looking human. Do rights follow ontogeny as ontogeny follows phylogeny? That is, does one possess rights only upon reaching a certain stage of development?

If animals share rights with humans, which animals are we talking about? Does a dog share rights with its fleas or heartworms? Does a snake have more rights than an earthworm? Does a nightcrawler have more rights than the single-celled paramecium? And does the ciliated paramecium have more rights than the flagellated euglena? (The euglena contains chloroplasts, and is a member of the plant kingdom despite its animal-like motility.) Using euglena rights as a reference point, what distinguishes higher animals from higher plants where rights are concerned?

A future android robot has the ca-

capacity for abstract thought, humor, creativity and introspective analysis, which it combines to produce several excellent submissions to and serves as chairperson of the politically dominant Libertarian Party for a term before an octogenarian Democrat assassinates him. Should the Democrat be tried for murder? If so, at what

Insectoid space aliens land and inform us that our notion of rights is all wrong. Should we respect their inalienable rights as if they were simply misguided humans?

point in the evolution of artificial intelligence do these rights emerge?

What's the Porpoise?

Grocery store tabloids finally get a chance to report a true story. Insectoid space aliens land after studying our TV transmissions—their translator units sounding like big-time wrestlers and used-car dealers—and inform us that our notion of rights is all wrong. Should we respect their inalienable rights as if they were simply misguided humans? By what criteria would we attempt to establish their possession of "human" rights? Should we test porpoises and fetuses with the same criteria?

Another tabloid story comes true. While negotiating with the San Francisco 49ers, a huge, hairy sasquatch, is poisoned by a jealous free agent. Should the free agent be charged with murder? Why or why not?

The point of all this idle speculation is merely to reveal that our smug assertion of inalienable human rights rests on a wobbly foundation of inadequate definition.

This is a call to all sides in the rights debate to concede the need for a lot more philosophical development before resorting to extreme actions. It is not a call to stop being political or educational—only to pursue such aims with a little more humility and a renewed dedication to truth. ☐

Reviews

Gratitude: Reflections on What We Owe to Our Country,
by William F. Buckley, Jr. Random House, 1990. xxi + 170 pp., \$16.95.

The Gospel of Duty, According to Buckley

William P. Moulton

Gratitude is William Buckley's most controversial offering of the past fifteen years or so. Reviews from all sections of the political spectrum were decidedly mixed—there were grumblings even among the Conservative faithful. The controversy did not center on style, readability or topicality, nor did it have much to do with whether one, in general, liked or disliked the author. Rather, the focus of the ferment was the book's central motif: its advocacy of a system of compulsory (or nearly so—see below) national service for American youth.

This was a bit much for many, maybe most, conservatives and for at least a sizable minority of liberals, although some of the latter made it fairly clear that they would favor a similar proposition if it were to emanate from a source having more progressive motives. This book, shall we say, raised eyebrows.

My primary intention in reviewing this opus is not to promote discussion of, or even to condemn, what Buckley advocates. I am well aware that the number of libertarians and classical liberals who are favorably disposed toward any concept of national service (as the words are used in today's political milieu) is approximately zero. Instead, I bring this book to the attention

of *Liberty's* readers because it touches on some matters that are worth thinking about but, in fact, tend to be neglected by the kind of people who should be examining them.

WFB has long been one of the more libertarian figures among the major avatars of American Conservatism. Certainly his championing of the decriminalization of marijuana and his mostly tolerant attitude on social issues place him at a considerable remove from, let us say, Russell Kirk or Pat Robertson or Ernest van den Haag. Yes, sometimes he disappoints and sometimes he veers off on some tangent of sheer silliness, viz. his one-time obsession with the so-called Shroud of Turin.

In spite of this fairly decent record, Buckley has flirted with the idea of national service for some time. In his 1974 book *Four Reforms* he briefly and vaguely recommended something of the sort, stating that it needed more thought in order to get around the objections that would arise from those concerned about the level of coercion in society. In the intervening years, he has obviously formalized his views on the matter and, in his mind at least, overcome the objections and reservations to which he alluded in his earlier book.

Gratitude is a slim volume in eleven short chapters of which three contain almost all the meat. Chapter Two, "The

Patrimony and Civic Obligation," argues for the fundamental principle involved. "We are accustomed to hearing it said that criminals ought to repay their 'debt' to society. The term of obligation is used too narrowly. Those who do not [commit crimes] also owe a debt to their society, if only because it pauses to distinguish between those who [commit crimes] and those who do not" (p. 11). This is really the core of the argument.

Buckley himself acknowledges that his reasoning is general, rather than deeply rigorous. We live in a great country, and we should feel gratitude, reverence, and love toward it. He does marshal some heavyweight sources, but utilizes them sparingly. He touches upon the Aristotelian and Thomistic roots of natural law, but more as they pertain to the necessity of a social order and a state than as they relate to the notion of civic duty. He cites Alexander Hamilton's observation that in the event of a "general distemper of the people" (what we would today call a massive alienation, disaffection, and apathy) a republic had no prospect of survival, and Pope Leo XIII's 1891 encyclical *Rerum Novarum's* compendium of warnings of the dangers of an unfettered individualistic liberal order. He scatters in a few other arguments from authority or, at any rate, arguments that bolster their case by reference to authority. For some reason, Buckley neglects Cicero, whose careful and eloquent delineation of the Roman concept of *civitas* would provide much more powerful backing for the idea of active patriotism than do the cited sources.

In Chapter Four, "Anticipating the Libertarian Argument," Buckley takes advantage of being able to formulate his opponents' positions in a manner guaranteed to maximize the ease of their refutation. He is aware, at least in general terms, of the strong qualms and frequent outright opposition that

the very idea he is pushing rouses in many people, including many with whom he is in profound agreement on most matters. As he states, "One needs . . . to face up to the charge that we are engaged in a grand manipulation of the human personality by the state" (48). He responds by merely observing that totalitarian attempts to remake human nature (he cites only the example of Maoist China) have failed: "The idea of Mao-ism died, officially, at Tiananmen Square: died figuratively and literally."

Buckley takes advantage of being able to formulate his opponents' positions in a manner guaranteed to maximize the ease of their refutation.

[This], followed so soon by the events in Eastern Europe, was the gratifying answer to George Orwell. If all the instruments of Chinese Communism under Mao were insufficient to change human nature, it is unlikely that . . . the state will ever be equal to the challenge" (48). This analysis is probably accurate, but it doesn't seem to occur to Buckley that there are many crimes and degrees of oppression and horror that state power has unleashed that do not aim at the creation of a new human typus. Robespierre, Stalin, and Mao are a special kind of case. To put it another way, flamboyant tyranny is not the only, or necessarily even the most complete and successful form of statism. (By very rough analogy, isn't Warren Beatty, rather than Ted Bundy, the archetype of successful male sexuality?)

Buckley is prescient enough to realize that some opposition to his program, even among those he respects, will not be won over. He quotes former Reagan advisor Martin Anderson as claiming that in programs for national service, ". . . one finds the sharp fangs of coercion and compulsion, the faint whiff of envy and hatred of the young and the ideological yearning for demands for a totalitarian society" (49). Buckley also notes that Milton Friedman (whom he describes as "my hero")

has likened national service to the principles of the Hitler Youth (which WFB erroneously calls the Hitler Youth Corps).

Buckley's replies to classical liberal arguments are rather thin. Most are dismissed by mere specifications of the type, "No, this won't happen because the program will be designed so it doesn't happen. Next question." This is a favorite, and probably necessary, rhetorical technique used by authors of utopian and dystopian novels, but it is not very convincing outside of fiction.

Finally, in Chapter Nine, Buckley gets to the meat of his proposal. Who would participate? Ideally, everyone, beginning at age eighteen. For how long? Very complicated—no straight answer. For convenience, let's say that most would serve for one to two years, but some would stretch it out over a longer period. (Some, also, would begin later.) What would they do? Oh, all sorts of things. Work at hospitals, nursing homes, hospices and psychiatric centers. Help with alcoholism and drug treatment programs. Provide home health care. Participate in Big Brother/Big Sister programs. Do maintenance work at just about any public site. Join the Guardian Angels. Count snail darters. Many other things. What are the inducements? At this point the whole project becomes somewhat labyrinthine. To his credit, Buckley backs away from overt compulsion in the form of military-style conscription. His arguments against coercion are more pragmatic than principled, it is true, but he is, I think, sincerely trying to remain within the parameters of a basically pro-freedom outlook. "The argument that it is [wrong] for the state, should its citizens determine upon its advisability, to draft the entire eighteen-year old population for the purpose of finally qualifying it for fully active . . . citizenship is difficult to make. . . . However, prudential arguments against conscripted national service are entirely convincing" (113).

So what would Buckley do? His system would use a carrot-and-stick approach. The federal government would provide some cash payments, and extensive tax credits, to be applied against the liabilities incurred following one's national service periods. The

government would deny "some or all" public subsidies to those who refuse to participate. These would, or could, include direct payments (Social Security, student loans, farm subsidies) indirect revenue-enhancers (depreciations, deductions, and rebates in tax policy; deposit guarantees; special mortgage interest rates for veterans), and, more darkly, such accoutrements to civilized life as driver's licenses, and admission to certain public places of service, relaxation and entertainment. I said Buckley tried to be non-coercive. I didn't say he tried nearly hard enough.

Being a libertarian sometimes places me in a quandary. I don't approve of most "benefits" on the above list. Yet one has to make distinctions. To say one doesn't think driver's licenses should be required to let you drive is not the same as saying you shouldn't be given a driver's license. The latter means, in every practical sense, you shouldn't be allowed to drive. Similarly, I oppose public subsidies. I do not, however, think I am obliged to say "I would be indifferent to a federal policy of giving farm subsidies only to decent married farm couples of European stock who attend church regularly, since the people denied subsidies have no right to such bounty in the first place." I'm not saying that I would

Some libertarians veer off toward a sterile anti-American position, forgetting that it is almost impossible for a movement that hates its own society and nation to build anything approaching a mass base.

campaign for a restoration of the complete subsidy program, any more than I presently go about campaigning for churches to be taxed. I'm simply saying that rejection of the root assumption behind some so-called benefit does not automatically mandate a moral blindness about possible abuse in its actual implementation.

Buckley is aware of the fact that the program he advocates would result in

a two-tier system of citizenship. The closest parallel that occurs to me is the distinction between citizens and *humili-ores* during the Roman Empire. Buckley sees this in rather abstract and elevated terms. The dark side of such a system seems not to occur to him. He writes avidly of "encouraging civic distinctions" and draws a comparison with the distinction between veterans and non-vets when it comes to VA benefits. All this is unconvincing. Buckley should be perfectly capable of visualizing the ugly and socially disintegrative effects of a society permanently divided into "good citizens" and "unpatriotic shirkers."

There's not much more to say about this book *per se*. Buckley presents as strong and reasonable a case as can be made for a program of national service. It falls short in every respect—economic, cultural and moral. It is riddled with evasions and false assumptions, not the least of which is the idea that there are vast areas of human needs that cannot be provided for by the marketplace. His list of these market failures seems almost Galbraithian in scope. Even apart from considerations of liberty, autonomy and self-direction, Buckley simply does not make a case that the service he envisions is in any sense necessary for the fulfillment of "social needs," or that it would improve the tone of civil society in any significant way.

This book does touch upon, without really discussing, some issues that both conservatives and libertarians ought to think about. Many strong, free-market, limited-government conservatives seem to have a schizoid attitude toward our particular nation-state. They despise government, especially the federal government, as it functions as a day-to-day instrument of confiscation and oppression. But they love "America" and despise its critics. Such an outlook might be summed up as "God damn those SOB feds, but if you trash Uncle Sam it'll be over my dead body!" Of course, there is a valid distinction between the government and the nation. Even so, there is a constant tension evident in most conservative pronouncements on these matters, just as would be evident within someone who professes to hate the Pope

and his bishops and priests but love the Catholic Church. Whether conservatives can resolve this tension I do not know, but they ought to give the matter some thought.

As for libertarians, it has long been my belief that for the most part they neglect political theory. Except for sincere and consistent anarchists, libertarians do not have a coherent intellectual relationship with the civic order under which they live. I do not refer here to

Gratitude is worth reading, if only to see the way in which an intelligent right-winger with a sincere but flawed devotion to freedom grapples with some important issues that are of interest to libertarians. Besides, it's short.

grumbling about the depredations of the State, or even to that certain feeling of alienation that nearly all ideologues experience in a culture such as ours. What I am getting at is the fact that libertarians don't seem to know what to make of the United States of America. Again, anarchists don't really have a problem, other than with the caution that prudence dictates. If one really, in one's heart of hearts, regards all governmental authority (or all authority, period) as illegitimate, then loyalty, "gratitude," identification with national leaders, and a sense of common citizenship present no problems.

But for the large number of libertarians who advocate limited or minimal government, there is a tension similar to what conservatives feel. This tension is even more intense for libertarians, because they embrace liberty as a central political virtue. This tension manifests itself in various ways. Some of us revere the republic's radical Whig, quasi-libertarian roots, but can't forget this is the same country whose government so casually sideswipes so many lives in so many ways. We tend to glorify the American people for their historic devotion to freedom, but we can't ignore the high degree of public sup-

port for many (probably all) of the massive invasions of privacy and liberty that the state inflicts on its citizens. We—at least, quite a few of us—want to exalt America and put forth a claim to be the most consistent upholders of its heritage. But too much sticks in our throats. Some libertarians, unable to resolve this dualism, veer off toward sterile anti-American or "fuck the state" fences, forgetting that it is almost impossible for a movement that hates its own society and nation to build anything approaching a mass base. Others submerge all distinctions under an anti-statist rubric, making the U.S. and Britain become the moral equivalent of Stalin's USSR and Hitler's Germany, and one's local police identical to the KGB or Gestapo. (Objectivist Peter Schwartz alludes to this phenomenon with some acuity in his generally dreadful booklet "Libertarianism: The Perversion of Liberty.")

Whether these tensions felt, consciously or otherwise, by libertarians and the better sort of conservatives can be resolved is, of course, a difficult question. For me, William F. Buckley's struggle with them was the most interesting aspect of *Gratitude*. Probably most libertarians would, in the normal course of things, be inclined to pass over this book, turned off either by its subject matter or its author. It is worth reading, however, to see the way in which an intelligent right-winger with a sincere but flawed devotion to freedom grapples with some important issues that are of interest to libertarians. Besides, it's short. No pictures, though. □

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Respect for Nature: A Theory of Environmental Ethics
by Paul W. Taylor. Princeton University Press, 1986, 398pp., \$37.50.

Respecting the Unrespectable

John Hospers

The environmental movement and the animal rights movement have both achieved prominence in the last decade or so. In the popular mind they are often confused with each other, perhaps because they share a common element, the value of non-human living things. Yet they are quite different; indeed, each conflicts with the other at some points.

The pollution of the earth's air and water, the deterioration of the soil and the destruction of forests and wetlands, the need to preserve endangered species, the problems associated with the disposal of garbage and toxic wastes—all these are typical environmental issues. They focus on the general state of the biosphere rather than on any individual life. Animal rights advocates, on the other hand, emphasize the sanctity of all life, the wrongness of injuring and killing animals (regardless of species), and the immorality of using animals for our ends.

Paul Taylor's book is unique in its combination of both emphases. Taylor is an environmentalist, yet he is also convinced of the wrongness of taking animal lives. Unlike Tom Regan, who wrote *The Case for Animal Rights*¹—a book that Taylor's somewhat resembles—Taylor does not defend a theory of animal rights: that is, he does not hold that individual animals have any *claims* against us, but only that we have certain *obligations* toward animals. Though in practice their views often seem similar, their basic approaches are strikingly different. For Regan, the creatures who possess rights, and to whom human beings have duties, are *sentient beings*, capable of sensation and feeling. It is because animals can experience pain and suffering, as people do,

that we should treat them with the same consideration and respect. It is wrong to inflict pain, suffering, and death on animals capable of experiencing these things. Such states are intrinsically evil, and it is wrong knowingly to cause them when there is any alternative. This is an eminently plausible position, anticipated 200 years ago by Jeremy Bentham, who said we have duties to animals, not because of their intelligence or rationality or any other feature than their *capacity to suffer*.

Taylor, however, does not take this position. His case begins with the concept of a creature's good.

The Fundamentals of Respect

Most animals have *interests*. They care what happens to them, they have desires that they seek to realize. Creatures of countless species have interests. But Taylor does not limit the scope of human duties to creatures with interests, wide though that scope is. He extends it to all entities that can be said to have a *good of their own*—a much broader concept, which includes many species that have no interests at all. Plants do not have interests, yet they can be harmed or benefited. Things happen to them and can be done to them that promote or inhibit their lives. Something may contribute to the good of an individual organism without contributing to the good of the entire species—such as fertilizing a particular plant. And something may contribute to the good of the entire species even if it harms or kills the individual member—the individual deer may be eaten by predators, but the loss of weaker or sickly members contributes to the good of the species and indeed of the whole ecosystem (p. 70).

That a being has a good of its own (that it can be harmed, for example) is a fact about it. It is an *is*-statement, as we

say in philosophy. That a being should be treated in a certain way is an *ought*-statement. Statements about *inherent worth*, which is Taylor's basic conceptual tool, are ought-statements. Taylor says that to have respect for nature is to regard the plants and animals of the earth's ecosystems as possessing inherent worth; but what exactly does this mean?

If we use other persons merely as means to our ends (slavery is an obvious example), we are using them as instruments: they have instrumental worth to us but not inherent worth. We treat them as having inherent worth when we treat them as *ends-in-themselves*—for example, when we do something that contributes to their good even if it does not contribute to ours. Taylor's thesis here is very Kantian, except that Kant applied it only to human beings. Taylor takes this Kantian principle of treating all human beings as ends-in-themselves and applies it to all living things. When we are concerned with their good and not merely with what advantage we can obtain from them, we are treating them with

The lioness doesn't pause to consider whether the antelope has harmed her. Why should people be different? Why should the person choose not to harm rather than to harm?

respect. "The entity in question must not only be thought of as having a good of its own; it must also be regarded as having inherent worth. When so regarded, the entity is considered to be *worthy of respect* on the part of all moral agents" (72).

Worth is different from merit. Someone who is a good carpenter has more merit as a carpenter than someone who is incompetent. The merits of individuals are unequal: that is, individuals vary in the degree to which they fulfill standards of merit for a given enterprise. Merit involves much individual variation; worth does not. "If we regard persons as possessing inher-

ent worth as persons, then they all possess the same worth, since it is their simple personhood itself which is the ground of their worth" (77).

Now, if one stipulates that the phrase "inherent worth" is going to be used in such a way that only one thing—being a person—is to count toward a person having it, then, since everyone is (equally) a person, everyone has equal inherent worth. Q.E.D. But this is a mere linguistic victory. If you use the terms that way, the conclusion follows. Similarly, if the *only* thing that gives *non-human* species inherent worth is (as Taylor says) that they are living organisms that can be harmed or benefited, then *of course* it follows that all living things have the same inherent worth. (And if we use the word "triangle" to mean grass, and all grass is green, then all triangles are green.)

The phrase "inherent worth" is not much used in popular parlance. But "worth" by itself is, and as we ordinarily use it, people have very different worths. We consider an honest, reliable person to have greater worth than someone who regularly lies and cheats. They might both be said to have the same "initial worth" in the sense of being equally worthy of consideration (or of a fair chance), just as everyone is said to be equal before the law (deserving of equal consideration). In any case, many people will object strongly to Taylor's allegation that all living things have equal inherent worth. Human beings, they say, have greater worth; humans have rationality, freedom of choice, a sense of right and wrong—and no other animal has these things. Therefore, they say, human beings have greater worth.

Taylor opposes any suggestion that human beings have greater *inherent* worth. We have capacities that other animals lack, he says, but they also have capacities that we lack. If we say that human beings have rationality, and therein lies their greater worth, it can be replied that antelopes and jack-rabbits are swifter, and are superior in that respect. "Why should these capacities be taken as signs of our superiority to them? From what point of view are they judged to be signs of superiority, and on what ground? After all, many non-human species have capacities that

humans lack. There is the flight of birds, the speed of a cheetah, the power of photosynthesis in the leaves of plants, the craftsmanship of spiders spinning their webs. . . ." (129) The speed of locomotion promotes the cheetah's life just as reason promotes (or *can* promote) human life.

Human survival, Taylor reminds us, is totally dependent on the health of the earth's biosphere, but the well-being of the biosphere in no way depends on human life. The environment got along quite well for millions of years before people came into existence (114). And the loss of human beings from this planet would not be a loss to any wild species; in fact they would be better off because their air and water would not be polluted and their habitats destroyed.

One more concept: something has *intrinsic value* for us when we find it enjoyable or pleasant or worth-while for its own sake. The experience of enjoying music is intrinsically worth-while even though it may lead to nothing in the future—that is, it may have no instrumental value. Even the experience of getting high from a dangerous drug is intrinsically worth-while, although it is instrumentally bad—it may lead to a lifelong addiction in which all other values are crowded out. The experience of pleasure is intrinsically good, and of pain intrinsically bad, though some pleasure is instrumentally bad (leads to misery and distress) and some pain is instrumentally good (for example, when it leads to the correction of a diseased condition).

Most writers on ethics and animals, myself included,² have made extensive use of the concept of intrinsic value, because only sentient beings are capable of experiencing pleasure or satisfaction (positive intrinsic value) and pain and distress (negative intrinsic value), and the capacity for such experience seems to define our duties to animals. Taylor, however, does not take this line; intrinsic value plays no great role in his book. For Taylor our duties to animals are based on their having a good of their own, which has different content from one species to another.

"Respect for nature" is what Taylor calls an *ultimate moral attitude*. Taylor takes this attitude to have several components:

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1) A disposition to make certain judgments, specifically "to regard all wild living things in the earth's natural ecosystems as possessing inherent worth" (the valuational dimension);

2) The disposition to aim at certain ends and pursue certain purposes, specifically to avoid harming or interfering with the natural status of wild living things (the conative dimension);

3) The disposition to follow rules of behavior that are conducive to that end (the practical dimension);

Suppose that your dog is being slowly bled to death by woodticks, in places where the dog cannot reach. Are you morally required to be impartial as between predator and prey, letting the dog bleed because you shouldn't intervene in nature's workings?

4) The disposition to have certain feelings with respect to nature, e.g. to feel pleased about the maintenance and prospering of wild communities of life (the affective dimension). People show respect for nature when they act "out of consideration and concern for the good of wild living things" (84).

Respect is not the same thing as love. "Respect is not a matter of simple personal affection the way love of nature is" (90). In respect for nature one is concerned about nature's well-being. One may have a special fondness for a particular species, and this is a part of one's love of nature in general. But respect is not based on any such emotional appeal. That an animal or plant is attractive to us is irrelevant to our adopting an attitude of respect toward it. We may not even like the creatures in question; they may be uninteresting or repulsive to us. But their unattractiveness to us should in no way affect our impartial concern for their well-being.

Most people, most of the time, do not have this disinterested concern for living things. People tend to care most about the animals they can use in some way—eating them, using their skins as

clothing, using them in medical experiments, and making human labor easier. And among animals that serve no particular material function we tend to favor animals we like: some people like dogs better than cats, others cats better than dogs, but not many like rats.

One wonders whether Taylor believes there is anything wrong with this: we can't really help liking X better than Y; it is not clear why we should not act on this preference—as we all do in choosing a marriage partner.

The Rule of Non-Maleficence

Among the major implications of Taylor's view for our day-to-day actions is the rule of *non-maleficence*. "The most fundamental wrong in the ethics of respect for nature is to harm something that does not harm us" (172).

A falcon kills a hawk. This doesn't violate the rule, says Taylor, because the falcon is not a moral agent, and is incapable of wrongdoing, even though it does harm the hawk. Only human beings are moral agents and thus capable of wrongdoing. But if a falcon has been taken from the wild by a falconer, who trains it to hunt and kill other birds, this is a violation of the rule, because it is a bit of human conduct that is aimed at "controlling and manipulating an organism for the enjoyment of a sport that involves harm to other wild organisms. A wrong is being done but not by the falcon, even though it is the falcon which does the actual killing and even though the birds it kills are its natural prey. The wrong that is done to those birds is a wrong done by the falconer" (173).

One may wonder why we should have such a rule: after all, other animals constantly harm creatures that have not harmed them. The lioness doesn't pause to consider whether the antelope has harmed her. Why should people be different? Perhaps the lioness, like other animals, just does what she has been genetically programmed to do, whereas a person has freedom of choice and can choose to harm or not to harm. But why should the person choose not to harm rather than to harm? The usual answer seems to be "Because for a human being to inflict unnecessary suffering or pain is wrong." But this is not Taylor's reply. He would say, rather, that harming other organisms is at odds with respect for nature. Yet when

it comes down to individual cases, it is far from clear which particular actions exhibit respect for nature and which do not. When, for example, are we harming other creatures? If capturing and training falcons is wrong, as Taylor says, what about taming horses and riding them, or harnessing them to the wagon or the plough? We are certainly interfering with their lives, and making them do things that (at least at the time) they don't want to do. Sometimes they do have a better life afterward, but are we harming them when we do these things?

Killing animals in experimental laboratories, for however worth-while a purpose, would seem to be prohibited by Taylor's rule—the rats and guinea pigs have not harmed us. The animals killed in hunting them for sport have not harmed us either. Neither for that matter have the animals we kill for food or hides. If you take the rule to mean exactly what it says, we cannot use animal skins for protection against freezing, unless you happen to find an animal that is already dead and then skin it. The animals we kill for food haven't harmed us either, and this includes fish as well as livestock. Taylor apparently commits us to vegetarianism.

The practical implications are enormous. It may be possible to live as a vegetarian in 1990 (at least in the United States), but it was not possible, in most parts of the world, in 1790. And our ancestors who lived in the Ice Age could not have survived, and thus made our own existence possible, by living on plants.

As if anticipating these obvious difficulties, Taylor has provided an escape-hatch. "It may be the case," he says, "that in circumstances where the only means for obtaining food or clothing essential to human survival is by hunting, trapping, or fishing, these actions are morally permissible" (183). The reason he gives is that "the duty to provide for human survival"—though he has not till now mentioned this as a duty—outweighs the duties of non-maleficence and non-interference. Once the rule has been diluted, the waters are confusingly muddled, and one wonders what other exceptions may be looming on the horizon. (If trapping animals is permissible,

that's already a big exception.)

Indeed, some are: in a later passage (293) he considers "the hunting of whales and seals in the Arctic, or the killing and eating of wild goats and sheep by those living at high altitudes in mountainous regions. In these cases it is impossible to raise enough domesticated animals to supply food for a culture's populace, and geographical conditions preclude dependence on plant life as a source of nutrition." The reason given here is that "if humans refrain from eating animals in those circumstances they would in effect be sacrificing their lives for the sake of animals, and no requirement to do that is imposed by respect for nature." Well and good—but "something's got to go," it would seem—if killing animals is permissible in these circumstances, we must amend the rule that we shouldn't harm those creatures that don't harm us. And it surely waters down his commitment to vegetarianism, though I am not quite sure by how much.

There is yet another qualification to the rule. It is permissible, says Taylor (294), to kill wild animals for food "where environmental conditions make it impossible to use domesticated animals or to grow edible plants." In this as in numerous other passages one gets the impression, though it is not said straight out, that killing domesticated animals is all right (perhaps because

Taylor opposes any suggestion that human beings have greater inherent worth. We have capacities that other animals lack, he says, but they also have capacities that we lack.

they are not "natural species"—or because they have been raised for that purpose?). This would really put an enormous dent in Taylor's vegetarianism, making his position not very different from that of the normal American consumer of beef, lamb, and pork. If indeed it is all right to kill

sheep and cows for food, then the whole thrust of Taylor's argument is quite opposed to that of Peter Singer's defense of vegetarianism because of the cruelty involved in raising and killing livestock, particularly on today's factory farms.³ Taylor, by contrast, seems to have no compunctions about this at all.

If we ignore these exceptions and take Taylor at his original word, then we get a suicidal result: if we can't kill animals and can't use plants as food, what is left? Life can live only on other life—that's the way the system works. We inevitably kill millions of micro-organisms every time we take a step onto the grass. Anyway, Taylor says it is "less wrong" (295) to kill plants than to kill animals—though I am far from sure what "less wrong" means: if an act is wrong at all, it would seem, it can't be right. Or is this a way of introducing still more qualifications to the non-maleficence rule?

The argument for vegetarianism that Taylor emphasizes is a pragmatic one that is not a consequence of his rule. It takes five times more acreage to produce a pound of protein from cattle than from vegetables. "We can drastically reduce the amount of cultivated land needed for human food production by changing from a meat-eating culture to a vegetarian culture . . . Vegetarians use much less of the surface of the Earth to sustain themselves than do meat-eaters. And the less humans use for themselves the more there is for other species" (296). But this "empirical argument" won't work. If we were all vegetarians we *could* get along on much less acreage. But in a short time the ever-increasing human population would expand onto that spare acreage (would we really give it over to the birds and the buffalo?); the saving would soon be more than offset by the increased population requiring that protein. There would be less acreage required per person, but there would be more people.⁴

A Lack of Reciprocity

Suppose a creature *does* harm us; now killing it is all right, just as it is all right to kill a human interloper in self-defense. But does this mean "if they *have* harmed us"? Once a lion or bear has harmed us it's probably too late for

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
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retaliatory measures; to save ourselves we have to strike first. Or perhaps he means "if they *may* harm us, but haven't done so yet"? But they always *may*, I suppose: one dog in ten thousand may bite you, so should you take retaliatory measures against any dog you see? Or perhaps it means "if they

Taylor seems to assume that the system of nature is perfect as it is—nature with its merciless machinery for keeping the fittest alive and throwing the rest aside, nature with its vast profusion of creatures suffering from pain or starvation or being torn to pieces by predators or strangled by snakes.

probably will harm us." This is more plausible, but quite indeterminate. Perhaps you may shoot a lion if he is taking an unfriendly interest in you, but not when it is lying placidly on the ground. At what point one's life is threatened is not always clear.

It would seem, according to Taylor, that if you walk in an area where there are grizzly bears and one of them attacks you, you can kill it in self-defense. But then again, what are you doing invading its terrain? Isn't the bear simply protecting its own turf, as you would yours? Aren't *you* the interloper?

And if you can defend *yourself* against dangerous wild creatures, what about defending others? Can you kill a dangerous creature if it is a threat to *anyone*? A cobra is a threat to virtually anyone in its proximity, so perhaps you should kill it before someone in your family or the village suffers a horrible death?

And where does this end? Dangerous animals threaten not only humans but other animals. Why protect only oneself, after all, or even just one's own species? Here Taylor puts us in a box. And if we extend our considerations to threats of starvation because of the scarcity of essential resources, things become even weirder. Don't we end up having permission to kill any creature

we wish, because *every* creature is a serious threat to *some* other creature?

The Rule of Non-Intervention

Taylor's second rule is even more extensive: not only should we not harm what hasn't harmed us, we should leave nature quite alone; we should not intervene in its processes or in any wild creature's life or activity. We should "let wild creatures live out their lives in freedom" (174). We may not take them from the wild, or put them in zoos, or adopt them as pets—not even by taking them out of danger, not even restoring them to health if they have become ill in the wild (174). We break this rule, says Taylor, even when we take trees or flowers and transplant them in landscaped grounds, or exhibit them where more people can see them. We must "refrain from capturing them and removing them from their natural habitats, no matter how well we might then treat them" (174). It would be wrong to take a parrot from the jungle (even from an area overpopulated by parrots) and give it a secure life in your house, or even in a zoo.

In general, I agree, non-interference with nature is usually good advice. For one thing, humans have done much damage to nature, polluting the air and rivers and oceans, destroying rainforests and creating future deserts, and eradicating numerous plant and animal species. Moreover, even when we intervene with good intentions we often make things worse. "Don't feed the monkeys!" (or other animals in the wild) is advice one constantly hears on safari: they get used to being fed, then become vicious when they are not; worse yet, they can become unable to survive in the wild. When we don't know exactly what we are doing we usually produce a long string of unintended and unforeseen bad consequences. But Taylor's command "*never* interfere" is worrisome.

The only intervention that Taylor approves is intervention that is *restitution* for damages people have already done. "Some interference with or manipulation of the natural world by humans is compatible with respect for nature . . . [e.g.] when a polluted river, lake, or marshland is cleaned up. Another example would be the effort to reintroduce a species, such as the peregrine

falcon, which had been extirpated from one of the original habitats. . . . In all circumstances of this sort, however, the final end of the human practices involved must be to promote or protect the good of the creatures themselves" (94).

Let's say I see, on the beach, a water-bird whose foot is caught under a rock. In this case the injury is not the result of anything that humans have done—so this is not a case of restitution. Should I let the bird suffer a slow death under the rock? Surely almost anyone would think of my rescuing the bird as a commendable action: I am not only easing its pain, I am enabling the creature to be healed, to fly again, and to realize its own good—to fly freely in accordance with its nature. Why should I not help nature along a bit? Why is it incumbent on me *never* to change nature except to rectify bad situations that humans have brought about?

But Taylor is tough on this point: the duty of non-intervention "holds even if such intervention is motivated by a desire to help a species-population survive or a desire to correct natural imbalances in a biotic community" (176). If a species is endangered by past human interventions such as DDT, we should help it survive to be as it was prior to human intervention, but if it would have become extinct without human intervention, we should allow the extinction to occur even if we could have prevented it.

When rabbits were introduced to Australia, they bred so fast that they almost took over the continent; to prevent ecological catastrophe they were killed by the millions. Doubtless Taylor would approve: it was people who introduced these mammals into a continent that lacked them, and the slaughter of rabbits could be regarded as restitution to all the native creatures that were killed. (More precisely, it was restitution to other members of the species; to those killed no restitution can be made.) This example illustrates dramatically the difference between Taylor's view and the animal rights view. For animal rights advocates the rabbits were as much subjects-of-a-life as any other creature, and they should not be made to die: to kill them was to put an undeserved end to their existence. True, the rabbits ate the crops and whatever

else they came across, but these actions were not wrong on the part of the rabbits because rabbits are not moral agents and can do no right or wrong.

Laissez-faire?

How far then should the rule be carried, "Leave nature alone"? Should we not try to prevent natural catastrophes, such as fires that if they spread will kill thousands of birds and trees? Perhaps we shouldn't—we are learning more about what benefits periodic fires confer on the soil in forest country. But is that *always* the case? Must the non-intervention rule be inflexible, with no exceptions? Couldn't there be some fires that it *would* be best to stop? How does one know this, prior to a description of the individual case?

Should we never construct bridges and dams, never try to redirect the course of a river? Such activities can greatly affect wildlife. Sometimes building a dam might facilitate a revival in a flagging bird or insect population, or enable a species to flourish which would otherwise become extinct because of drought, or threat of starvation (no fish to eat), or being overrun by local predators. Surely there could be conditions in which we could rescue

course, as when park rangers let thousands of elk starve to death every winter in Yellowstone Park. But when a species such as the grizzly is endangered, we intervene to save it.

Attitudes Towards Nature

Following Peter Singer, Taylor entreats us to avoid not only racism (giving unfair advantage to members of one race over another) and sexism (giving unfair advantage to one sex over another), but also *species-ism*. By this Taylor means that we should not play favorites among creatures or species, since they all have the same inherent worth. But this is surely contrary to our usual attitudes and practice: we tend to see animals as friendly or hostile, valuable to us or useless, beautiful or repulsive. We see a snake kill a bird, and consider the snake an evil aggressor and the bird an innocent victim. We empathize with the antelope being eaten by a lion, though the lion is only doing what nature equipped it to do—what as a carnivore it *must* do to stay alive. We should not even take sides, says Taylor, against the bacteria and in favor of the larger organisms whom the bacteria can kill. We should remain neutral as between predator and prey, parasite and host, disease-causing and diseased. (Even when *we* are being killed by germs?)

Though our attitudes toward animals depends upon our interests, Taylor says that we *ought* not allow this partiality towards certain kinds of creatures keep us from giving them all equal respect. Presumably giving them all equal respect has *some* consequences for action—but precisely what? Suppose that your dog is being slowly bled to death by woodticks, in places where the dog cannot reach. Are you morally required to be impartial as between predator and prey, letting the dog bleed because you shouldn't intervene in nature's workings? We need not consider the woodticks as evil—they are surviving in the only way they can. Nevertheless may I not be justified in removing the ticks from the dog—not necessarily because it is my dog (thus eliminating one kind of partiality)—I might do it for a passing stray—but because the dog is in dire distress and I can alleviate his pain? Doesn't that count at all? Or is every humanitarian

impulse to be stifled in the interests of "respect for nature"? By alleviating the dog's distress may I not be causing the universe to contain just one bit of extra intrinsic good, particularly if ticks in being killed feel no pain but the dog before being relieved of the ticks feels very great pain?

In view of the current overpopulation of cats, and the fact that many of them die of starvation in our cities,

It may be possible to live as a vegetarian in 1990, but it was not possible in 1790. And our ancestors who lived in the Ice Age could not have survived, and thus made our own existence possible, by living on plants.

many of us think (and veterinarians almost unanimously) it would be a good idea to have female kittens spayed. When I have this done, I am not taking away from the cat a satisfying life, but I am preventing an increase in the number of cats. Surely this is a good thing to do? But it is a clear and unmistakable intervention in the course of nature. (So is putting painlessly out of the way animals born lame or blind or diseased.)

Yet Taylor seems adamant on this: we must keep hands off. Why? Because "by doing so our conduct manifests a profound regard for the integrity of the system of nature. Even when a whole ecosystem has been seriously disturbed by a natural disaster (earthquake, volcanic eruption, flood, drought, etc.) we are duty-bound not to intervene to try to repair the damage" (176). Taylor seems to have an unwritten assumption here, that *the system of nature is perfect as it is*—nature with its merciless machinery for keeping the fittest alive and throwing the rest aside, nature with its vast profusion of creatures suffering from pain or starvation or being torn to pieces by predators or strangled by snakes. Why is that system so perfect that we may not alter it—not its laws (we can't do that), but certain particular circumstances in which the laws operate?

Why should purposeful action on our part necessarily be worse than the impersonal operation of nature's laws and processes? Nature is, it seems, totally indifferent to the suffering of its creatures.

a species of great beauty or other value (value to us, presumably) from extinction? And in that case why should we *not* do it? Just out of reverence for Taylor's non-intervention rule? And would this not be (as some philosophers have said of rule-utilitarianism) mere rule-worship?

We must weigh one value against others. Sometimes we'll decide that intervention is on the whole better in a given case. To make non-intervention an exceptionless rule is too stringent. Sometimes we let nature take its

Admittedly many of our most humane efforts will be counter-productive. If predators are removed from a region to protect the deer, the deer population explodes and then, lacking natural enemies, they multiply until the grasses and shrubs are eaten down to the ground and the land can no longer support the kind of vegetation on which the deer have previously survived. (That has happened in the American Southwest.) It seems that prey-species can't long endure without predators to kill the weaker members of the species. But I count this as a tragic aspect of nature's workings, not something I revere as a part of my "respect for nature." Nature awes me (and this may be the underlying spring of the respect), but it also appalls me.

Why should purposeful action on our part necessarily be worse than the impersonal operation of nature's laws and processes? Nature is, it seems, totally indifferent to the suffering of its creatures. The way to make a species prosper, as nature is now, is for the fittest to survive at the expense of the less fit, sentencing them to the extreme penalty, death, for what is not their fault. But it doesn't follow that we should never intervene on behalf of nature's creatures, even though such attempts are often futile, any more than that a person should never rebel against a tyranny.

"Nature, red in tooth and claw," wrote Tennyson, "with ravine, shrieks against man's creed." And shouldn't we shriek against nature's ways? Can't more good sometimes be accomplished by *not* doing things nature's way? Perhaps respect for nature is not a proper attitude. Is a nature that operates as it does *worthy* of our respect? □

Notes

1. Tom Regan, *The Case for Animal Rights*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983.
2. See my article "Liberty and Ecology," *Liberty*, September 1988, and the follow-up article, "Humanity vs. Nature," *Liberty*, March 1990.
3. Peter Singer, *Animal Liberation*. Prentice-Hall, 1975.
4. For more on this, see an excellent recent book on ecology, *In Defense of the Land Ethic*, by J. Baird Callicott (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), and Holmes Rolston II, *Philosophy Gone Wild* (Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986).

Thirty years ago, the publication of a new dictionary was a scandal.

The War of the Words

Sheldon L. Richman

This year is the thirtieth anniversary of the great dictionary brouhaha. I was only twelve years old in 1961, and having grown up believing that nothing is less controversial than the dictionary, I was shocked to learn years later that it could create the kind of storm you would only expect in response to an archbishop's being caught handing over state secrets to a Russian agent in a bordello run by satanists. But that is the response that greeted Merriam-Webster when it brought out its *Webster's Third New International Dictionary*.

What could have caused such an outcry? Many journalist-reviewers and some of our most respected newspapers and magazines denounced the Third as a permissive affront to every standard of decency. The critics charged that by adopting the modernist notion that use determines propriety, Merriam-Webster had abdicated its solemn responsibility to guide those who consulted its dictionary. The abdication took the form of labeling too few words "nonstandard," "substandard," and "slang," and of eliminating the label "colloquial."

How deeply the dictionary offended can be seen in the intensity of the criticism. Merriam-Webster was damned for joining the "say-it-as-you-go school," which imperiled our ability to communicate. Wilson Follett's review in *The Atlantic* was titled "Sabotage in Springfield." (Springfield, Massachusetts, is home to Merriam-Webster.) Follett called the Third "a fighting document . . . out to destroy every obstinate vestige of linguistic punctilio, . . . every criterion for distinguishing between better usages and worse Why have a dictionary if anything goes?" In *The New Yorker*, Dwight Mac-

donald wrote that Webster's lexicographers "have untuned the string, made a sop of the solid structure of English, and encouraged the language to eat up himself."

Jacques Barzun, writing in *The American Scholar*, called the Third "undoubtedly the longest political pamphlet ever put together by a party. Its 2662 large pages embody—and often preach by suggestion—a dogma that far transcends the limits of lexicography." The *New York Times* referred to the dictionary as "Webster's Third (or Bolshevik) International." The journal of the American Bar Association editorialized darkly that "a serious blow has recently befallen the cause of good English." Imagine that coming from lawyers!

Perhaps the deepest insult was the declaration by the *Times*, *The Washington Post*, and *Life* that they would continue using Webster's Second. This reaction undoubtedly inspired the American Heritage Publishing Company to announce that it would buy Merriam-Webster, junk the Third, bring back the Second, and press ahead on a Fourth. American Heritage failed to acquire the company (Encyclopedia Britannica got it; there is still no Fourth in the works), so it published its own dictionary, one dedicated to preserving the purity of American English with the help of a panel of distinguished writers and speakers—who agreed on little except that the Third was a travesty.

The reviewers criticized some forty items out of 450,000 words. Most commonly mentioned were *ain't*, *finalize*, *irregardless*, *due to*, *disinterested* (as a synonym for *uninterested*), *like* (as a conjunction), *transpire* (for *happen*), *different than*, and *infer* (as a synonym for *imply*). Other detested words or usages were *alright*, *bimonthly* (to mean twice a month), *contact* (as a verb), *enormity* (as

a synonym for *enormousness*), *implement* (as a verb), *none* (with a plural verb), *shambles*, *unique* (with a qualifier), *deprecate* (as a synonym for *depreciate*), and *fortuitous* (to mean lucky).

Philip Gove, editor at Merriam-Webster, defended his dictionary in the *Times* and elsewhere. He justified the dropping of *colloquial* on grounds that it "has been almost universally misunderstood and misused by being read as an arrow calling attention to words to be avoided. It became clear that the sharp distinction between formal and informal was never as clear as sometimes drawn in the Second Edition and certainly not among professional writers." On another occasion he wrote that "there are many different degrees of standard usage which cannot be distinguished by status labels."

Other defenders argued that the role of a dictionary is to report on the current state of the language, not on the prejudices of the lexicographer. They said that the Third gave more guidance than the critics intimated, with notes such as "used by speakers and writers

scribing what *Life*, the *Washington Post*, and the *New York Times* are doing." He ended his review by saying that "anyone who solemnly announces in the year 1962 that he will be guided in matters of English usage by a dictionary published in 1934 is talking ignorant and pretentious nonsense."

A lesser dictionary publisher could not have excited this controversy. Merriam-Webster is the legal descendant of Noah Webster, who published his first *American Dictionary of the English Language* in 1828. After Webster died in 1843, George and Charles Merriam bought the right to use his name. (It is now in the public domain.) In 1909 G. & C. Merriam Co. published its first *Webster's New International Dictionary*, with over 400,000 entries. The second edition followed in 1934. This dictionary became the bible of the American language, the Supreme Authority (Merriam-Webster's slogan) in matters of definition, usage, and pronunciation. From the courtroom to the sitting room, looking it up in Webster became the unappealable method of resolving semantic disputes.

Equally important in laying the groundwork for the battle was the increasing prominence of the science of linguistics. Linguists study how people use the language; they do not judge that use. As the linguist Charles C. Fries put it: "There can . . . never be in grammar an error that is both very bad and very common." This was a break from the traditional view, best expressed by the post-Civil War commentator Richard Grant White (whom Harvey A. Daniels calls the Edwin Newman of his day): "There is a misuse of words which can be justified by no authority, however great, by no usage, however general." This clash of standards, perhaps cultures, between the descriptivists and prescriptivists often touched political and philosophical issues, such as egalitarianism, relativism, and skepticism. In particular, the prescriptivists implied that the disbelief in external linguistic standards (beyond the requirements of clarity) necessarily entails a disbelief in objective moral standards.

The descriptivists openly threatened the established order in 1952 when the Commission on the English Curriculum of the National Council of Teachers of

English published *The English Language Arts*. The document, a product of modern structural linguistics, touted five principles as the foundation of the teaching of English: 1. language changes constantly; 2. change is normal; 3. spoken language is the language; 4. correctness rests upon usage; and 5. all usage is relative. It rejected the terms "good English" and "bad English," except in a relative sense, defining good English as "that form of speech which is appropriate to the purpose of the speaker, true to the language as it is,

The vitality of English lies in the freedom it encourages. The freedom of English is inconceivable in such a language as French, where everything is condemned that does not conform to a definite set of rules laid down by grammarians.

The New York Times called it "Webster's Third (or Bolshevik) International." The journal of the American Bar Association editorialized darkly that "a serious blow has recently befallen the cause of good English." Imagine that coming from lawyers!

on all educational levels though disapproved by some grammarians." Bergen Evans, a rare "liberal" language commentator, pointed out that the issue of the *New York Times* containing its critical editorial had 153 words and constructions not recognized by Webster's Second and nineteen condemned outright. "In short, all these publications are written in the language that the Third International describes, even the very editorials which scorn it. And this is no coincidence, because the Third International isn't setting up any new standards at all; it is simply de-

and comfortable to speaker and listener. It is the product of custom, neither cramped by rule nor freed from all constraint; it is never fixed, but changes with the organic life of the language." Bad English, it continued, "is that use of language which is unclear, ineffective, and inappropriate to the linguistic occasion, no matter how traditional, 'correct' or elegant the words or phrases employed." Since it had been issued by English teachers, the document constituted for some a danger to the children of the United States. The prescriptivists were ready for a fight.

Gove was a perfect adversary. He subscribed to the linguists' five principles and insisted that a dictionary "should have no traffic with . . . artificial notions of correctness or superiority. It must be descriptive and not prescriptive." But had Gove's dictionary broken radically with past lexicography? It seems not, although Merriam-Webster's press release indicated it had. Most lexicographers had been descriptivists. Although Samuel Johnson had aspired at first to preserve the purity of English with his dictionary, by the time he wrote the preface, he had changed

his mind: "[I] now begin to fear that I have indulged expectation which neither reason nor experience can justify. . . . the lexicographer [may] be derided, who . . . shall imagine that his dictionary can embalm his language. . . ."

Likewise, the *Encyclopedia Britannica*'s ninth edition (1875–1889) noted that the lexicographer's intention should be "not to reform the language, but to present it with all its caprices, anomalies, irregularities, beauties, defects—in a word, as the nation has made it." Dr. Isaac K. Funk, in the preface to the 1913 Standard Dictionary of the English Language, added his eminent voice to this view: "The chief function of a dictionary is to record usage." And Clarence L. Barnhart's general introduction to the highly regarded 1957 Random House American College Dictionary said this: "This dictionary records the usage of the speakers and writers of our language; no dictionary founded on the methods of modern scholarship can prescribe as to usage; it can only inform on the basis of the facts of usage." The dictionary included an article on usage by Charles C. Fries, who had been damned for inspiring *The English Language Arts*. The article equated the belief in "correct" and "incorrect" usage with the belief in the flatness of the earth.

Finally, an endorsement of descriptivism is to be found in the venerated Webster's Second itself. The Introduction noted that unlike in the past, "it has become necessary for a general dictionary to record and interpret the vocabularies of geographical and occupational dialects, and of the livelier levels of the speech of the educated."

The Third and its derivative college dictionaries have survived the onslaught and are widely used today. The *Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary* was on the New York Times best-seller list close to two hundred weeks. But their reputations were sullied and the effects linger. Recently, Donald McCloskey, in *The Writing of Economics* (1987), wrote, "Being up to date is unimportant in a dictionary. . . . The big Merriam-Webster *Third Webster's International* is not good, because it does not tell you what usage good writers prefer. Its college offsprings . . . therefore are suspect."

It may be only a coincidence, but just as the anniversary of the great dictionary brouhaha was approaching Merriam-Webster published its first *Webster's Dictionary of English Usage*. Professor John Algeo once said that "anyone who compares usage books will recognize that they propagate by inbreeding." The authors of these books, having the same notion of stan-

"The English language would not have been what it is if the English had not been for centuries great respecters of the liberties of each individual and if everybody had not been free to strike out new paths for himself."

dard English, tend to offer the same kind of advice, though they disagree on many concrete issues. Professor Algeo will now have to amend his statement. Webster's usage dictionary is unlike any other; it is an extraordinary work of revisionist history that should be considered the standard source for many years to come. It is the place to learn how disputed words and expressions have been used since their introduction into English and how a writer's prose is likely to be received if he uses one of them today. The book is delightfully written, laced with humor and a bite directed at the popular usage authorities, who, while always sure of their opinions, are often ignorant of the history of the language.

As you skip through the 2,300-plus entries covering the bloodiest usage disputes, you become aware that many of the rules that Fowler, Follett, Strunk and White, Bernstein, the Morrisises, and others have enounced for years with such certitude are actually *ipse dixit*s that defy usage history. For example, the usage books carp about the lost distinction between *disinterested* and *uninterested*. Theodore Bernstein, in *The Careful Writer*, says, "If one is *disinterested* in a situation he is neutral and has no selfish interest in its outcome. For some reason, however,

many writers seem uninterested in using it correctly."

But the usage dictionary, taking more than two pages, shows that the story is not so tidy. It notes that the earliest meaning of *disinterested*, before 1612, was the simple negative of *interested*. The ethical sense was apparently first used in 1659. "Curiously," it goes on, "the earliest uses of *uninterested* are for ethical senses (both 17th century); the modern use is not attested until 1771." So in the beginning the meanings of the two words were reversed from what the usage authorities say they should be. Samuel Johnson's and Noah Webster's dictionaries listed both meanings for *disinterested*. But contrary to the commentators, the usage dictionary concludes that the distinction between the words has not been lost and that the ethical sense of *disinterested* "is used more than twice as often (in published writing) as the other sense."

A similar revision is found in the entry on *aggravate*. The "worsen" and "annoy" senses came along fourteen years apart in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. Neither was the original definition, which was "to make heavier." The commentators say the "newer" *annoy* sense is not used by "careful writers." This is a charge of sloppiness against Haliburton, Austen, Dickens, Melville, Shaw, Lewis Carroll, Trevelyan, Dreiser, Cheever, Styron, Sandburg, William L. Shirer, and William F. Buckley.

The story is much the same for many commonly condemned usages, including *lay* for *lie* and *infer* for *imply* (Thomas More coined the two senses of *infer* in 1528 and 1533). With the help of 20,000 illustrative quotations, the usage dictionary gives the history of each word's use, a history of the criticism, an analysis and examples of contemporary use, and sometimes a recommendation. It does not advise readers to adopt a usage merely because of its honorable pedigree. The entry defending "the reason is because" (found in the writing of William Morris and E. B. White) ends with this: "If it is not your natural idiom, there is no reason for you to cultivate it. But if it is your natural idiom and you choose to continue with it, you will surely be in some very distin-

guished company."

But *Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* is more than a guide to usage. It is almost a brief in defense of Webster's Third. Its editor, E. Ward Gilman, says he did not have the Third in mind when he and his colleagues were preparing the book, but Frederick Mish, Merriam-Webster's general editor, says the controversy has had a lasting effect on the company. Mish, who was not with Merriam-Webster when the Third was released, says the staff was "dumbfounded" at the response. "I always thought that if maybe we had done a little more in the Third [to explain the history of usage]," Mish said, "the response might have been different."

It is instructive to see how *Webster's Dictionary of English Usage* treats the words for which the Third was most commonly attacked. In each case, the usage dictionary's entry indirectly makes a reasonable case for the Third. Take *finalize*, which drew so much fire. The Third's offense was in declining to label it and thus treating it as standard. It gave examples of the word's use by Dwight Eisenhower, S. J. Perelman, *Newsweek*, and Robertson Davies. But many usage commentators do not like the word. The *American Heritage Dictionary's* usage note says that "careful writers" avoid it and that 90 percent of its expert panel termed it "unacceptable," apparently because it is thought to be bureaucratese. According to Webster's usage dictionary, *finalize* was in standard business use in Australia and New Zealand in the 1920s before it came to the United States in 1927. Inexplicably, the critics failed to notice that Webster's Second had listed the word as standard.

All usage books condemn *irregard-*

less. From the fuss, you would think that the Third urges people to use it. In fact, it labels the word *nonstandard*. But that is what drew the flak. The Third puts that label on words "that can hardly stand without some status label but are too widely current in reputable context to be labeled *substandard*." The usage dictionary says that the word began in dialectical speech early in the century and that it became so widely used in nonstandard speech that Ring Lardner had a character say it in a 1921 story. The word continues to be commonly used, "although its bad reputation has not improved with the years. It does occur in the casual speech and writing of educated people, and it even finds its way into edited prose on rare occasion," for instance in the *New York Times*. Despite this, the usage dictionary ends with this recommendation: "But *irregardless* is still a long way from winning general acceptance as a standard English word. Use *regardless* instead."

How about *due to*? The Third came in for criticism because it did not stigmatize the phrase when used as a compound preposition, as in "The game was called due to rain." According to the language commentators, *due to* may only be used as an adjective: "The effect is due to the cause." Again, the critics of the Third failed to consult their beloved Second. Although in early editions it called the prepositional use erroneous, in the late 1940s it said the phrase was "in common and reputable use," though it acknowledged the objections. The new usage dictionary states that "in our judgment, *due to* is as impeccable grammatically as *owing to*, which is frequently recommended as a substitute for it. There has never been a grammatical ground for objection. . . . The

preposition is used by reputable writers and is even officially part of the Queen's English—the OED [Oxford English Dictionary] Supplement gives a quotation from Queen Elizabeth II."


Of all the blasphemies committed by Webster's Third, the most often men-

tioned, and misrepresented, was this concerning *ain't*: "used orally in most parts of the U.S. by many cultivated speakers, esp. in the phrase *ain't I*." This was prefaced by the cautionary remark, "though disapproved by many and more common in less educated speech," but the critics could not abide the absence of a stigmatizing label. Webster seemed to be saying that *ain't*,

Modern English is nothing if not resilient, as evidenced precisely by the chronic distress about its health, distress that began 300 years after its birth.

meaning "am not," "is not," and "are not," was standard. (The use of *ain't* to mean "have not" and "has not" was labeled *substandard*.)

Over four pages, the usage dictionary charts the obscure history of this most despised and persistent English word. The entry states that the Third's judgment was "based on the information then available," adding that the editors were influenced by the results obtained by linguistic geographers regarding the tag question *ain't I*? (This use has been defended by Fowler, *The American Mercury*, and William Safire, among others.) But, the entry concedes, "There may be legitimate reasons for a certain skepticism about the use of *ain't I*. One is that much of the Linguistic Atlas material was gathered about a half century ago; it is hard to know if the information is still valid." Nevertheless, Merriam-Webster says it has a "fair amount of indirect evidence from letters and such showing that *ain't* occurs frequently in inverted expressions, such as questions." It gives examples from Henry Adams, Alfred Lord Tennyson, Ellen Terry, and Flannery O'Connor (the last from a letter: "My cousin thought this a remarkable coincidence, illustrating how remarkable coincidences can be. Now ain't it?"). The entry insists that *ain't* "is in widespread use but usually in particular circumscribed ways that tend to remove the stigma from its use."



"If the businessman's lunch isn't substantial enough, sir, may I recommend the bloated plutocrat's lunch?"

This may not convince everyone that the Third was correct, but the fact that *ain't* has been an issue for so long may be evidence in the dictionary's favor. Would the authorities make such a big deal if only the uneducated, who don't read usage guides, were using the word?

A clear pattern emerges from *Webster's Dictionary of English Usage*. Many of the condemned usages had been common in the best writing centuries before they were branded ungrammatical by some seventeenth- or eighteenth-century self-appointed authority, usually someone who thought English was vulgar compared to Latin. Many other usages are products of intelligible linguistic processes that have given us uncontroversial words and senses before. Lasting change, it turns out, is rarely the result of illiteracy or ignorance.

Judging by the usage dictionary, no one at Merriam-Webster believes that "anything goes." (Alexander Haig's unique use of *caveat* as a verb did not win it a place in the usage dictionary.)

The lexicographers believe, rather, that how people, including the most respected writers, have actually used the language over long periods is more important than opinions about usage. The tacit message is that, fundamentally, people don't follow linguistic rules; instead, rules are the codified reflections of how people have spoken and written. But they are subject to change, as they were in the past, and the dictionary ought to tell us how they have changed. The Third was often criticized for using too many examples from contemporary speakers and writers. This was probably overstated by the critics, but why shouldn't the examples in today's dictionary focus on contemporary usage? Dr. Johnson's did.

At the level of good manners, Webster's usage dictionary is an implicit plea that the epithets "illiteracy" and "barbarism" not be shot off so easily. No one has to like any particular usage. Simple abstention or the setting of a better example, however, would be preferable to hectoring. Even if one

sees the resistance by guardian-commentators as necessary to the "invisible hand" process, or spontaneous order, that guides change in the language, there is surely no reason for them to be ill-mannered. We are all important to the process.

There is much evidence that descriptivism is more widely accepted now than thirty years ago. The usage dictionary has not been reviewed nearly as much as the Third was; so far, it has been well received, even by the popular language commentators William Safire and James J. Kilpatrick. It has excited no controversy to speak of.

Does this mean the descriptivists have won the day? They have some important facts in their favor. It is hard to take seriously the warnings that the language has deteriorated or is doing so. There is a big difference between losing a distinction and losing a particular expression of a distinction. Even if *disinterested* were lost, the referent is not. What is wrong with *detached*, *objective*, *impartial*? Modern English is nothing if not resilient, as evidenced precisely by the chronic distress about its health, distress that began 300 years after its birth. As Allen Walker Read puts it, "The give-and-take of communication, along with the necessity of being understood, establishes the boundaries that keep American English viable and healthy." "Anything goes" is a straw man.

The vitality of English, as Mencken, Read, and others have acknowledged, lies in the freedom it encourages. The great grammarian Otto Jespersen wrote that the freedom of English is "inconceivable in such a language as French, where everything is condemned that does not conform to a definite set of rules laid down by grammarians. The French language," Jespersen continued, "is like the stiff French garden of Louis XIV, while the English is like an English park, which is laid out seemingly without any definite plan, and in which you are allowed to walk everywhere according to your own fancy without having to fear a stern keeper enforcing rigorous regulations. The English language would not have been what it is if the English had not been for centuries great respecters of the liberties of each individual and if everybody had not been free to strike out new paths for himself." □

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A noted critic examines the economics of art and literature — and criticism.

Art and Literature: Retail and Wholesale

Richard Kostelanetz

Neither art nor literature has value at birth; each assumes value only when sold. There, however, the similarity usually ends. For these two art forms are sold in different ways. Literature is a wholesale biz and visual art, retail—this is the principal merchandising difference between the two. Books are sold in quantities of thousands, paintings in quantities of one.

What is the significance of this? It means, first of all, that when it is said a novelist "sells well," his publisher is selling not thousands of copies but *tens* or *hundreds* of thousands of copies. When a painter "sells," so to speak, the number of items changing owners can be less than a hundred. In literature, it is possible to speak of popular, if not mass, responses to a new work; in visual art, one cannot. Finally, a book is sold for only several times production costs, as are men's shirts and other wholesaled items; a painting is sold for many times the cost of its materials, adding even the expense of labor.

An art dealer is a retailer, a professional who knows most of his customers. A book publisher doesn't know the end customer at all; he sells the titles on his new list only to bookstore managers, who in turn retail the literature. Such a market difference engenders different selling techniques on the part of dealers. When a painter brings slides of his work to an art dealer, the dealer should be thinking: "Can I sell this work to my regular customers—to Jill and Joe, Sally and Bob?" A book publisher, confronted with a similar opportunity for taking on a new work, has no knowledge of his ultimate customers. Thus, his question will be framed differently: "Does the proposed manuscript resemble anything that I have recently wholesaled successfully? Does it resemble anything a com-

petitor has wholesaled successfully?" In making publishing decisions, a book seller is forced to base them not upon his sense of customers' tastes but upon projections of sales estimates, which are usually based upon the actual sales of prior books similar in kind.

This difference between wholesale and retail also accounts for the different function of such devices as reviews and advertisements. Reviews are necessary in wholesaling, because press attention brings the new work to the attention of a larger audience of possible buyers. In Broadway theater, most notoriously, favorable reviews in the daily press are necessary for survival, because nothing else can reach thousands of potential ticket-buyers during the initial weeks of a theatrical run. In visual art, reviews appear in both newspapers and the trade press—the art magazines. As the latter customarily appear after a show has closed, they have little impact upon sales. (Their real function, it is joked, is certifying that an exhibition actually happened.)

Collectors of visual art don't follow newspaper reviews, which they know to be irrelevant. Such newspaper reviews are followed instead by (1) browsers, who tour the galleries on weekends; and (2) curators who must justify their enthusiasms to someone else, and who thus need a favorable review to substantiate their purchase to, say, a board of directors. An example would be a director of a university museum. Every time I see a Philip Pearlstein painting in a university museum, as I often do, I imagine that Hilton Kramer, who was Pearlstein's dogged supporter during Kramer's tenure at the *New York Times*, helped sell it to them.

Because visual art is retailing, most new art is sold in these three ways, in descending order of importance: (1) from dealer to collector, which is to say that a previously satisfied customer is sold

something new; (2) from collector to collector, which is to say that one collector recommends an artist to another collector, as they might exchange hot stock tips, or the second collector admires an artist's work in the first collector's house; (3) from artist to collector, which is to say that a collector asks an artist already in his collection whom else he should consider purchasing. Obviously, serious collectors are more likely to trust an artist than any reviewer, which is another way of explaining why in visual arts, unlike theater, a burgeoning reputation can survive negative reviews. A successful art dealer needs not good reviews but a good track record to succeed, just as a stockbroker must; and one element those two retailers have in common is that both persuade people to part with rather large amounts of money.

Visual art editions represent a promoter's attempt to wholesale what had previously been retail; and even though he is dealing in visual art, a print promoter is essentially a wholesaler, selling not to individual collectors but to local dealers, especially outside his immediate turf. The print promoter, in contrast

A successful art dealer needs not good reviews but a good track record to succeed, just as a stockbroker must, and for the same reason: both persuade people to part with rather large amounts of money.

to the book publisher, produces editions in smaller numbers and claims that his product will increase in value, which is to say that even in his wholesaling the art dealer is performing a most extraordinary magic (of selling something for many times its production costs), a legerdemain that I find insufficiently appreciated in the art world. Contrast him or her to the retailer who says, "Look, this cost me six; I'll sell it to you for eight," and you will realize how rare in even decadent capitalism is the art dealer's talent.

Trade publications have different functions in literature and the visual arts. The reason why most art gallery advertisements in magazines resemble

the tombstones of stockbrokers is that such advertisements don't sell art, but are instead intended to establish credibility with artist, customers and colleagues. One art dealer told me that an ad with a full color reproduction of an artist's work is actually aimed not at regular customers but at other dealers, ideally in other cities, who might think the work reproduced suiting the tastes of their own regular customers. Art magazines influence not art sales but art discussion, which is to say table chatter, whether over coffee or drinks in artists' studios, or over the lunchrooms in art schools, where art magazines are read with far greater seriousness than literary magazines in the writing schools. Therefore, what is really reviewed in art magazines, especially in longer articles, is not art per se but terminologies of understanding.

Don't underestimate the power of newspaper publicity in merchandising new titles. The hoopla surrounding the discovery of Andrew Wyeth's "Helga" paintings indicated that what was really for sale was not paintings for only a few million dollars, but art books for many millions more. Don't underestimate either the power of book reviewing in mass merchandising of culture. It is commonly said that any new book reviewed on the front page of the *New York Times Book Review* will, regardless of whether the review is favorable or not, sell ten thousand more copies. (This was told to me by a former editor of the *Review* in the course of dismissing the art world as strictly business, but I had to remind that if the new book retailed for \$20.00 then

two hundred grand changed hands. Few gallery shows are so successful.)

In a book of mine published over a decade ago, *The End of Intelligent Writing*, I showed how the *New York Review of Books*, co-founded and co-owned by a Random House vice-president, has consistently favored Random House produce, first in reviewing them, second in using Random House writers as reviewers, third in prepublishing excerpts from books on the Random House list; and one reason why Random House has been more successful at merchandising certain kinds of political criticism and literature has been the collaboration of the *New York Review*. Not even the most ambitious art gallery, not even the most rapacious art collector, ever tried to do something similar in visual art, because it would, in truth, be unnecessary. For all of Hilton Kramer's blathering to the contrary, art magazines are less vulnerable to corruption than book reviews.

Nonetheless, precisely because visual art is retailing, its corruptions necessarily involve far fewer people. The principal accrediting agency in establishing reputation is the public museum which doesn't sell art as much as raise the prices for art that had previously been sold. (There is no comparable institution in literature.) That is why collectors like to sit on the boards of such museums, like to court staff curators, not only for advice on their own purchasing, but also to advocate shows that would draw upon their own collections, etc. The principal problem of the visual arts world, as I see it, is that the number of galleries that actually sell

work, rather than show it, are too few, the number that can influence museums is too few. That accounts for the current phenomena, familiar to all, of insufficient disparity in institutional taste. It seems to be nothing short of scandalous that, in exhibiting contemporary art, the most prominent museums in New York City have essentially the same enthusiasms, confirm the same myths, etc.

Not even the most ambitious art gallery ever tried to do something similar in visual art to what The New York Review of Books does in literature, because it would, in truth, be unnecessary. Art magazines are less vulnerable to corruption than book reviews.

There isn't really a free market that allows the establishment of great reputations apart from those institutions, even though we know that in visual art, more than any other art, the top reputations of a certain time are likely to be forgotten at a later time. Don't forget that MoMA's favorite artist in the 1950s was Ben Shahn. In part because the art world is smaller than the literary world (and just as there are fewer art magazines than literary magazines, so there are fewer art critics than literary critics), reevaluations of, say, painting's past take place with far greater rapidity. □

Letters, continued from page 22

into war," Bush clearly had the means to do so. His actions, in this regard, speak louder than the psycho-babble put forth to the contrary.

Lastly, incredibly, Higgs characterizes Iraq under Saddam as a country "surrounded by hostile nations, each with its own intrigues projecting into Iraq." Let me get this straight, Iraq was threatened by its neighbors?(!) Think about that bizarre statement for a moment. Kuwait and Saudi Arabia contributed billions to Iraq and are military pigmies; Iran, militarily exhausted, feared Iraq (just who did start that war?); and Syria, an enemy yes, but hardly a match for the larger and better equipped Iraqi forces. Higgs takes the prize for making the most out-

landish anti-war statement.

Oppose the war, fine, but let us not be duped by anti-war claptrap that makes no distinction between aggressor and victim, and buys into every leftwing conspiracy theory.

Lyndon Cramer
Ashland, Ore.

Egregious Aggression

I'm not going to renew my subscription and I thought you might like to know why.

Robert Higgs' and Sheldon Richman's articles (May 1991) were so demagogic in character that it makes me doubt whether the magazine can be counted on to conduct dispassionate *reasoned* analyses of the issues.

I couldn't believe I was reading *Liberty* and not the Jesse Jackson newsletter when Higgs went on about the lower classes being duped into supporting the war despite the fact that they "stood to suffer the greatest losses." This has been true of every war since the beginning of time and results simply from the fact that there are usually at least a thousand times more lower and middle-class people than there are rich people.

I am speaking as one who opposed our entry into the war, for basically isolationist reasons.

I will miss *Liberty* very much, but I just *have* to take a stand versus this anti-war know-nothingism.

Emmett McArcliffe
St. Louis, Mo.

Notes on Contributors

Chester Alan Arthur is *Liberty's* political correspondent.

"Baloo" is the *nom de plume* of Rex F. May, a cartoonist whose works frequently appear in *The Wall Street Journal* and other publications.

Kathleen Bradford is the resident voice of sanity at *Liberty*.

R. W. Bradford is editor of *Liberty*.

Barry Chamish's forthcoming book, *The Fall of Israel*, a study of official Israeli corruption, will be released this November.

Stephen Cox is Associate Professor of Literature at the University of California, San Diego.

Brian Doherty is a journalist living in Washington, DC.

Frank Fox, a historian living in Pennsylvania, just returned from his most recent trip to eastern Europe.

Karl Hess, the author of many books, including *Community Technology* and *Capitalism for Kids*, is currently working on his autobiography.

Robert Higgs, the author of *Crisis and Leviathan*, is also editor of the recent *Arms, Politics and the Economy: Historical and Contemporary Perspectives*.

John Hospers is the author of numerous philosophical writings, including *An Introduction to Philosophical Analysis* and *Libertarianism: A Philosophy for Tomorrow*.

Bart Kosko has just published with Prentice Hall a textbook on machine intelligence, *Neural Networks and Fuzzy Systems*, and edited its companion volume, *Neural Networks for Signal Processing*.

Richard Kostelanetz is an independent artist, writer, critic, composer and what-have-you.

Loren E. Lomasky is Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University, and author of *Persons, Rights, and the Moral Community*, as well as numerous reviews and essays.

Jim McClarin spent nine years searching for Bigfoot in the Pacific Northwest, and refused military induction on the grounds that killing other humans was not what Christ had in mind.

Robert H. Miller is a climber, kayaker, capitalist and Cuban refugee who dabbles in construction and writing.

William P. Moulton is the pseudonym for a person bearing the same name.

Robert O'Boyle is a free-lance writer living in Seattle, who writes a regular column, "Living with AIDS," for the *Seattle Times*.

Scott J. Reid, a writer living in Ottawa, Ontario, is currently writing a book about the end of the Canadian idea.

Sheldon L. Richman is Senior Editor of the Cato Institute.

James S. Robbins is a writer and historian living in Massachusetts.

Ann M. Rogers is an attorney and writer living in Florida. Her writings have appeared in *The Freeman*, *Affaire de Coeur*, *Jest* and many other periodicals.

Jane Shaw is a writer and former Economics Editor of *Business Week* now living in Bozeman, Montana.

Mark Skousen is an investment advisor and economist living in Florida. His most recent books include *The Structure of Production* and *Economics on Trial*.

James Taggart doesn't own a railroad, or have a sister named Dagny. He is an attorney practicing in Seattle.

Tom Tomorrow is a cartoonist living in San Francisco.

Ethan Waters is a writer who joyously resides in Southern California.

In the next *Liberty*

Letter to a Political Mentor — During the 1960s, David Horowitz was a leading figure of the "New Left." He isn't anymore. In this letter to Ralph Miliband, his former mentor, he explains why, providing important insights into the greatest development of the past half century.

Third City Report — A crack team of *Liberty's* editors and correspondents report from the Libertarian Party national convention in Chicago—from the convention floor, the "caucuses," the huckster room, the streets, and the barrooms, with the sort of no-holds-barred coverage available nowhere else.

Terra Incognita

Indianapolis

Interesting civil service reform in the Hoosier State, as reported by United Press International:

Genell Jones, a supervisor for the Indiana Department of Transportation, required two employees who had used foul language in her presence to wash out their mouths with soap.

Soviet Union

How Soviet democracy under Gorbachev imitates American democracy under Reagan, as reported in the *Baltimore Sun*:

President Mikhail Gorbachev has ordered a crackdown on smut and pornography to "safeguard public morals," and appointed a blue-ribbon commission to investigate how other countries suppress pornography.

"A couple of days ago, I saw on television a certain professor citing Chinese art to illustrate interesting sexual positions," Gorbachev said. "This came as a great shock to the public. People are asking, 'Does the government have any power at all?'"

Albany, N.Y.

Report on the war against alcoholism in the Empire State, as reported in the *Middletown (N.Y.) Times-Herald-Record*:

Sen. Thomas Libous has introduced a measure to ban sales to minors of non-alcoholic imitation beer. "We spend millions of dollars annually educating young people about the negative consequences that result from alcohol abuse," he explained, "yet we allow access to a beverage that is brewed, packaged and marketed as a beer substitute. As a society, we are sending conflicting signals."

Chicago

Cultural note from the Heartland, as reported in the *Detroit News*:

Sherman Arnold of Taylor, Michigan, will be inducted into the Elvis Impersonators Hall of Fame in Chicago on June 7. Taylor, who has impersonated Elvis Presley since 1956, will join other Elvis impersonators in the Hall of Fame, which is sponsored by the Elvis Presley Impersonators International Association. Requirements for admission include 20 or more years of experience, "occasional charity work," and "good taste."

Kissimmee, Fla.

A new twist in penology, as reported by the Associated Press:

Durward Faulk, convicted last year of the attempted murder of his wife, has petitioned the court to reduce his sentence to a form of house arrest. He threw his wife Charlotte out of their boat, knowing that she could not swim, and circled around waiting for her to drown. After neighbors rescued her, she filed for divorce and helped convict him of the attempted murder charge.

He was joined in his petition by his wife, with whom he had reconciled. "It is an unusual situation," Faulk said. "I realize that."

Orlando, Fla.

East meets West in the Middle of Florida, as reported in the *Detroit Free Press*:

The Maharishi Mahesh Yogi, the man who brought "transcendental meditation" to the U.S. has announced that he will build a \$1 billion theme park called "Veda Land" next to Disney World. Veda Land will be designed by Doug Henning, the magician, and will include "a building that levitates over a pool of water and a chariot ride into the molecular structure of a rose petal." The Yogi also announced plans to sell "yogi soap" and a bottled water called "Himalayan Bliss."

Sofia, Bulgaria

Half-measures in the transformation of Bulgarian society, as reported in the *Los Angeles Times*:

Workers moved in and carried away to an unknown destination the upper half of the 50-foot statue of Lenin mounted opposite the former Communist Party headquarters, leaving just the legs.

Singapore

Advance in the legal status of non-human primates, as reported by the *Chicago Tribune*:

Under a 1983 ruling, monkeys in this island nation must have identification cards, complete with photograph and handprint.

New York

Observation on the ethos of the decade just past, as reported by the *New York Times*:

James Dierdon, director of the film *A Kiss Before Dying*, explained why the protagonist of the film (played by Matt Dillon) murders young heiresses: "In a way, his motives are good. He wants to better himself. It's just that he takes the yuppie ethic of the 80s to an obsessive level."

Seoul

The unique contribution science has for our understanding of social problems, as reported in *Time*:

Explaining the recent rash of suicides to an interviewer, Han Wan Sang, a Professor of Sociology at Seoul National University, said that "Self-immolation is an extreme form of the ignition effect."

Washington-on-the-Brazos, Texas

A bold move to increase the historical sense of Lone Star State citizens, as reported in the *Detroit News*:

The exhibit "Chew, Chew, Chew and Spit, Spit, Spit: Tobacco in the Texas Republic" opened at the Star of the Republic Museum. "Even Sam Houston spit on somebody's porch," said curator Sherry Humphreys. "These are just things that people don't normally think about."

Michigan

Advancement in the rationality of the legal order, as reported in the *New York Times*:

In an attempt to "clarify the rules so the public knows exactly what's legal," Michigan's Department of Natural Resources has announced regulations for the picking up of road kill within the Great Lake State:

1. Endangered species, all migratory birds, and most non-game birds can be picked up only by a "scientific or educational institution with a state and federal permit."
2. Game birds and mammals can be picked up during the hunting season by any individual in possession of a valid hunting license. They will be counted toward the licensee's hunting limit.
3. Certain game mammals can be picked up out of season by any individual "after a conservation or local police officer issues a permit."
4. Animals not covered by the regulations can be picked up without specific permits.

A person who violates the law, for example, by removing a dead robin on the side of the road, can be fined \$500, jailed for up to 90 days, and be required to reimburse the State for up to \$1,500. Removing a dead sparrow, on the other hand, is legal.

(Readers are invited to forward newspaper clippings or other items for publication in *Terra Incognita*.)

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by Patrick A. Heller

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
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Panels

Liberty in the Post-Socialist World, with **Sheldon Richman, David Friedman, Robert Higgs, Stephen Cox** and **R.W. Bradford**. (Video: V101; Audio: A101)

Spending the Peace Dividend, with **Robert Higgs, Sheldon Richman, James Robbins** and **Richard Stroup**. (Video: V102; Audio: A102)

Beyond MADness: foreign policy without the "Evil Empire" with **Stephen Cox, Robert Higgs, Sheldon Richman** and **James Robbins**. (Video: V103; Audio: A103)

The Revolution in Eastern Europe, with **Ron Lipp** and **James Robbins**. (Video: V104; Audio: A104)

Right and Wrong in an Unfree World, with **R.W. Bradford, David Friedman, John Hospers, Loren Lomasky** and **Sheldon Richman**. (Video: V105; Audio: A105)

Heroes of Liberty: Chodorov, Paterson, Mencken, Conan the Barbarian, Tannehill, Cage, others, with **R.W. Bradford, Doug Casey, Richard Kostelanetz, Sheldon Richman** and **Stephen Cox**. (Video: V106; Audio: A106)

Liberty and the Environment, with **Jane Shaw, Richard Stroup, John Hospers, R.W. Bradford** and **David Friedman**. (Video: V107; Audio: A107)

Do Rights Make Sense? with **David Friedman, Timothy Virkkala, John Hospers, R.W. Bradford, David Ramsay Steele**, and **Loren Lomasky**. (Video: V108; Audio: A108)

Seminars

The Economic Case For and Against Anarchy, by **David Friedman** with comments by **Richard Kostelanetz**. (Video: V109; Audio: A109)

Did the Libertarian Movement Really Start in Murray Rothbard's Living Room? by **R.W. Bradford**, with comments by **Stephen Cox**. (Video: V110; Audio: A110)

The Politics of the Avant Garde, by **Richard Kostelanetz**, with comments by **Stephen Cox**. (Video: V111; Audio: A111)

Does Economics Make Sense? by **David Friedman** with comments by **Robert Higgs**. (Video: V112; Audio: A112)

Children's Rights by **Loren Lomasky** with comments by **Timothy Virkkala**. (Video: V113; Audio: A113)

The Poverty of Libertarian Fiction by **Stephen Cox** with comments by **Douglas Casey**. (Video: V114; Audio: A114)

Game Theory, Evolution, and Freedom, by **Ross Overbeek** with comments by **David Ramsay Steele**. (Video: V115; Audio: A115)

War and Prosperity: Did World War II Cure the Great Depression? by **Robert Higgs**. (Video: V116; Audio: A116)

Agent or Victim: Reconsidering the Insanity Plea by **John Hospers**. (Video: V117; Audio: A117)

Workshop

How to Write Op-Ed Pieces and Get Them Published, by **Jane S. Shaw**. (Video: V118; Audio: A118)